[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13058-13065]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




           UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST--527 REFORM ACT OF 2006

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, at the conclusion of my remarks, I will 
ask unanimous consent to move to consideration of S. 2511, legislation 
that requires that the law be enforced. That is, that the so-called 
527s be made illegal and banned as they properly should be. I will be 
making that unanimous consent request after the conclusion of my 
remarks. I have been told the Democrat side will be objecting to moving 
to the legislation. I regret that very much.
  The legislation is pretty straightforward. It requires any 
organization--including the so-called 527s--that falls under campaign 
finance contribution limits, as is any objective observer's reading of 
the law, to follow the law.
  I regret we will be unable to move this important piece of 
legislation. It is simple and straightforward and designed to overcome 
the Federal Election Commissions's inexcusable failure to interpret 
properly the original Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974.
  I point out to my colleagues that these 527s are a violation of the 
original Federal Election Campaign Act, now BCRA, known by some as 
McCain-Feingold. The Federal Election Commission, as in many cases, 
inexcusably

[[Page 13059]]

fails to properly interpret the original Federal Election Campaign Act 
which would halt the illegal practice that has sprung up whereby 527 
groups are now spending soft money on ads and other activities to 
influence Federal elections.
  I understand fully the politics surrounding this issue, which 
unfortunately is going to cause some of my colleagues to oppose any 
reform. But the time has come to address this issue. We should put 
political prerogatives aside and do what is best for the American 
electorate. We need to have this debate. I am committed to working with 
my colleagues to resolve our differences. Let's bring this bill up, 
have a debate, and consider amendments.
  As my colleagues know, a number of 527 groups raised and spent a 
substantial amount of soft money in a blatant effort to influence the 
outcome of the 2004 election. These activities are illegal under 
existing laws, and yet, the FEC has failed to do its job and has 
refused to do anything to stop these illegal activities. Therefore, it 
is now up to Congress to pursue all possible steps to uphold FECA and 
overturn the FEC's misinterpretation of the campaign finance laws, 
which is improperly allowing 527 groups, whose purpose is to influence 
Federal elections, to spend soft money on these efforts.
  In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court noted wisely that money, like 
water, will look for ways to leak back into the system. With the 
enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, BCRA, the 
national parties were taken out of the soft money business. It did not 
take long before efforts were underway by some to bring soft money back 
into Federal elections through the vehicle of groups that operate as 
``political organizations'' under section 527 of the IRS Code, or so-
called ``527s.''
  The soft money game is the same with these groups; they are raising 
multi-million-dollar donations from wealthy individuals, as well as 
large contributions from corporate and union contributions, and 
spending that soft money on broadcast communications that promote or 
attack Federal candidates, and voter mobilization efforts intended to 
influence Federal elections. We saw, firsthand, how a number of 527 
groups raised and spent huge amounts of soft money in order to 
influence the outcome of the last Presidential election. These 
activities were prohibited under longstanding campaign finance law but, 
again, the FEC failed to properly enforce the law. As a result, 
federally oriented 527s spent over $400 million on the 2004 elections.
  It turns out that almost half of the financing for 527 groups in the 
2004 elections came from a relatively small number of very wealthy 
individuals who made huge soft money contributions. According to 
campaign finance scholar Tony Corrado, 25 wealthy individuals accounted 
for $126 million raised by 527 groups active in the 2004 Federal 
elections. This included 10 donors who gave at least $4 million each to 
527s involved in the 2004 elections and two donors who each contributed 
over $20 million. If that doesn't make a mockery of both campaign 
finance laws, nothing does. Two donors, $20 million each. Over $20 
million each poured into the 2004 Presidential campaign.
  Opponents of campaign finance reform like to point out that the 
activities of these 527s serve as proof that BCRA failed in its stated 
purpose to eliminate the corrupting influence of soft money in our 
political campaigns. Let me be perfectly clear: The 527 issue has 
nothing to do with BCRA. It has everything to do with a 1974 law and 
the failure of the Federal Election Commission to do its job and 
properly regulate the activities of these groups. The new campaign 
finance law, BCRA, has successfully accomplished its goals.
  Last year, David Broder wrote in the Washington Post:

       As one who has been skeptical of the claimed virtues of the 
     McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, I am happy to concede 
     that it has, in fact, passed its first test in the 2004 
     campaign with flying colors.

  It is important to point out that this was accomplished despite all 
of the predictions at the time about how the national political parties 
would be financially undermined without soft money. That was the major 
source of opposition. This would destroy the national political 
parties. The national political parties raised more hard money in the 
2004 election cycle than they raised in hard and soft money combined 
during the Presidential election cycle in 2000. In fact, Republican and 
Democratic national parties raised a record $1.2 billion for the 2004 
elections. What is really good about that is the majority of that came 
from small donors, not large, huge, soft money contributions. They 
increased that donor base. Again, the Democratic National Committee has 
more than 2.5 million new donors; the Republican National Committee, 
more than 1 million new donors; Republican senatorial and congressional 
campaign committees, 700,000 new donors; Democratic congressional 
campaign committee, 230,000 new donors. That was the intent of the law. 
That is what happened.
  According to Tony Corrado, the DNC has more than 2.5 million new 
donors, as I pointed out; the RNC more than a million new donors.
  What is the problem? The problem is, the Federal Election Commission, 
even though directed by the Supreme Court, will still not enforce 
existing law.
  The fact that the overwhelming majority of Federal 527s were created 
after the enactment of BCRA is no coincidence. Of the 68 Democrat-
leaning 527 committees involved in the 2004 cycle, 54 of them were 
organized after BCRA. Of the 26 Republican-leaning 527 groups in the 
2004, 13 were organized after the enactment of legislation which banned 
the use of soft money in Federal elections.
  These groups were set up with every intention of circumventing the 
law. They could not circumvent the law if the Federal Election 
Commission would enforce the law. That is why we have to go to court 
again and again.
  For the record, in order to enforce, to write regulations to enforce 
the BCRA, 13 of the 15 original regulations were thrown out by a 
Federal court judge--a remarkable performance on their part, 
remarkable.
  S. 2511, the bill I would like to see brought before this Senate, 
voted on and passed, requires that 527s register as political 
committees and comply with Federal campaign finance laws, including 
Federal limits on the contributions they receive unless the money they 
raise is spent exclusively in connection with non-Federal candidate 
elections, State or local ballot initiatives, or the nomination or 
confirmation of individuals to nonelected offices. And it upholds the 
hard-fought victory of BCRA.
  The legislation also sets new rules for Federal political committees 
that spend funds on voter mobilization efforts affecting both Federal 
and local races and, therefore, use both the Federal and non-Federal 
account under FEC regulations. The new rules would prevent unlimited 
soft money from being channeled into Federal elections through abuse of 
the Commission's allocation rules.
  Under the legislation, at least half of the funds spent on voter 
mobilization activities by Federal political committees would have to 
be hard money from their Federal account. More importantly, the funds 
raised for their non-Federal account would come only from individuals 
and would be limited to no more than $25,000 per year per donor. 
Corporations and labor unions could not contribute to these non-Federal 
accounts.
  To put it in simple terms, a George Soros could give $25,000 per year 
to a single political action committee as opposed to the $22 million he 
spent to finance these activities.
  Let me be perfectly clear on one point. This proposal would not shut 
down 527s. It would simply require them to abide by the same Federal 
campaign finance rules that every other Federal political committee 
must abide by in spending money to influence Federal elections, nor is 
this bill intended to affect 501(c)(3) or (4) tax-exempt organizations.
  Under the Internal Revenue Code, a 527 group is a ``political 
organization,''

[[Page 13060]]

which is a group whose primary purpose is to influence candidate 
elections or the appointment of individuals to public office. In other 
words, the 527 groups by definition are in the business of influencing 
campaigns and have voluntarily sought the tax advantages conferred on 
such political groups. These groups cannot be allowed to shirk their 
responsibilities to comply with Federal campaign finance laws when they 
are spending money to influence Federal elections.
  The use of soft money by 527 groups to pay for ads attacking and 
promoting the 2004 Presidential candidates was not legal. This is not a 
matter of the new campaign finance law, BCRA; it is a requirement of 
longstanding Federal campaign finance laws that go back to 1974. That 
law, as construed by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, requires 
any group that has a ``major purpose'' to influence Federal elections, 
and spends $1,000 or more to do so, to register with the Federal 
Election Commission as a ``political committee'' and be subject to the 
contribution limits, source prohibitions, and reporting requirements 
that apply to all political committees.
  Section 527 groups need to play by the rules that candidates, 
political parties, and all other political committees are bound by--the 
rules that Congress has enacted to protect the integrity of our 
political process. They need to raise and spend money that complies 
with Federal contribution limits and source prohibitions to pay for ads 
that promote or attack Federal candidates or otherwise have the purpose 
to influence Federal elections. They need to spend Federal funds for 
voter mobilization activities that are conducted on a partisan basis 
and will influence Federal elections--just like every other political 
committee.
  Some have raised questions about whether it is constitutional to 
limit contributions to political committees that operate supposedly 
independent of parties and candidates.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, Madam 
President, a detailed analysis of these constitutional questions 
prepared by Professor Daniel Ortiz, the John Allan Love Professor of 
Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. The memo thoroughly 
explains the constitutional basis for the legislation we have 
introduced.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            University of Virginia


                                                School of Law,

                                Charlotteville, VA, March 7, 2005.
     Memorandum
     Re: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions from 
         Individuals to 527 Organizations That Make Only 
         Independent Expenditures

       This memo addresses whether S. 271's limit on contributions 
     from individuals to Sec. 527 organizations that make only 
     independent expenditures (``527 IECs'') is constitutional. 
     McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), makes clear that it is. 
     In that case, the Supreme Court not only explicitly made this 
     point, id. at 152-53 n. 48, and upheld bans on soft money 
     that were inconsistent with any other result, but also 
     reaffirmed the first principles of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
     1 (1976)(per curiam), which compel it.
       Any doubt that Congress can limit contributions to 527 IECs 
     stems largely from a single source: dicta in the Supreme 
     Court's fractured decision in California Medical Ass'n v. 
     FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (CalMed). In CalMed, the Supreme 
     Court upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA's) 
     $5,000 limit on individual contributions to multicandidate 
     political action committees. At one point, however, the 
     plurality appeared to avoid considering ``the hypothetical 
     application'' of FECA to political committees that make only 
     independent expenditures. Id. at 197 n. 17 (opinion of 
     Marshall, J.). And in a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun, 
     whose fifth vote was necessary for the decision, appeared to 
     suggest that FECA's $5,000 limit could not apply to such 
     committees. He wrote:
       ``[a] different result would follow if [the $5,000 limit] 
     were applied to contributions to a political committee 
     established for the purpose of making independent 
     expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates. . . . 
     [Political action committees like the California Medical 
     Association are] essentially conduits for contributions to 
     candidates, and as such they pose a perceived threat of 
     actual or potential corruption. In contrast, contributions to 
     a committee that makes only independent expenditures pose no 
     such threat.''
       Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring 
     in judgment). Since independent expenditures could pose no 
     threat of actual or potential corruption, Justice Blackmun 
     thought contributions used for that purpose could not corrupt 
     either. The corruptive potential of contributions, he 
     suggested, depended solely on the ultimate use to which an 
     organization would put them. Dissenting on jurisdictional 
     grounds, none of the remaining justices reached the merits. 
     Id. at 204-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
       CalMed necessarily decided more, however, than the 
     plurality and Justice Blackmun suggested. Justice Blackmun's 
     own vote (as well as the plurality's) undercut his dictum. 
     The political committee in CalMed argued not just that the 
     $5,000 contribution limit was generally unconstitutional but 
     that it was unconstitutional in a particular way. Even if 
     Congress could limit contributions that the committee would 
     ultimately use for candidate contributions, it argued, 
     Congress could not limit those ultimately used for 
     administrative expenses and possibly for independent 
     expenditures. Brief of Appellants at 34-35, California 
     Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (``Like other 
     political committees, CALPAC may make independent 
     expenditures as well as direct contributions to candidates. 
     To the extent it makes independent expenditures CALPAC 
     engages in first amendment activity that cannot be limited 
     given the result in Buckley.'') Indeed, on the court below, 
     several judges would have invalidated the $5,000 limit 
     precisely because of its effect on political committees' 
     independent expenditures. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 
     641 F.2d 619, 647 (1980) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (``A 
     limitation on donations to committees restricts not only 
     funds available for contributions by the committees to 
     candidates, but also the funds available for independent 
     expenditures through the committee framework. It is by 
     repeatedly forgetting this incontestable fact that the 
     majority erroneous likens the . . . donation restriction to 
     the contribution limitations upheld in Buckley.'').
       These other uses, however, did not trouble the Court in 
     CalMed. It upheld the $5,000 limit without regard to how the 
     political committee would ultimately use a contribution--a 
     position flatly inconsistent with Justice Blackmun's stated 
     misgivings. If Justice Blackmun's view--that a contribution's 
     ultimate use determined whether Congress could limit it--had 
     controlled, the Court would necessarily have struck down the 
     $5,000 limit at least in part. That limit would clearly have 
     been overbroad insofar as it applied to contributions to 
     political committees that would not be used in ways that 
     counted as contributions to candidates. Congress could have 
     addressed any fear of corruption from candidate contributions 
     in a much more limited and focused way--by limiting only 
     those contributions that political committees would use to 
     contribute directly to candidates. That the Court (with 
     Justice Blackmun's vote) did not strike down the limit on 
     this ground necessarily undercuts Blackmun's own stated 
     position. Despite his misgivings, he himself actually voted 
     to support a broad limit which covered contributions that 
     could be used for purposes of making independent 
     expenditures.
       In McConnell, the Supreme Court made clear that this 
     reading--that CalMed necessarily upheld limits on 
     contributions to independent expenditure committees--is 
     correct. In rejecting Justice Kennedy's ``crabbed view of 
     corruption,'' 540 U.S. at 152, which held that only concern 
     for traditional quid pro quo corruption could support 
     campaign finance regulation, McConnell pointed to CalMed as 
     precedent for recognizing ``more subtle but equally 
     dispiriting forms of corruption,'' id. at 153. The Supreme 
     Court made clear first that CalMed upheld limits on exactly 
     those contributions that Justice Blackmun had questioned:
       ``[In CalMed), we upheld FECA's $5,000 limit on 
     contributions to multicandidate political committees. It is 
     no answer to say that such limits were justified as a means 
     of preventing individuals from using parties and political 
     committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA's $1,000 limit 
     on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA's 
     definition of contribution, the $5,000 . . . limi[t] 
     restricted not only the source and amount of funds available 
     to parties and political committees to make candidate 
     contributions, but also the source and amount of funds 
     available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other 
     noncoordinated expenditures.''
       Id. at 152 n. 48 (emphasis added). As the last sentence 
     states unmistakably, CalMed held that Congress could limit 
     contributions to entities that would use them solely for 
     independent expenditures. McConnell then made clear why: 
     CalMed necessarily found that such contributions pose a 
     danger of actual or apparent corruption. As the very next 
     sentence in McConnell explains, CalMed could not have upheld 
     FECA's broad limit on contributions to party and 
     multicandidate committees without necessarily deciding this 
     point. With respect to party committees, the type of 
     committee at issue in this portion of McConnell itself, the 
     next sentence argues:
       ``If indeed the First Amendment prohibited Congress from 
     regulating contributions to

[[Page 13061]]

     fund [express advocacy and numerous other noncoordinated 
     expenditures], the otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of 
     parties as pass-throughs (e.g., a strict limit on donations 
     that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would 
     have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad 
     legislation.''
       Id. at 152-53 n. 48. In other words, if contributions 
     ultimately used to make independent expenditures had no 
     corruptive potential, the overall limit on contributions to 
     multicandidate committees would have been unsustainable. 
     Congress could have justified the limit only insofar as it 
     remedied so-called ``pass-through'' corruption and much more 
     narrowly tailored remedies, like ``a strict limit on 
     donations that could be used to fund candidate 
     contributions,'' could have addressed that. Thus, the overall 
     limit on contributions to multicandidate committees would 
     have been unconstitutionally overbroad if Justice Blackmun's 
     view had been correct. CalMed, then, despite its ambivalent 
     dicta, stands for two propositions: (i) that contributions 
     can corrupt independently of their ultimate use and (ii) that 
     Congress can limit contributions to political committees that 
     the recipients would use to make independent expenditures. 
     Any other reading of CalMed supplants its holding with dicta 
     that no one on the CalMed court itself followed.
       McConnell's own treatment of FECA's soft money provisions 
     reinforces both these CalMed holdings. If contributions that 
     were eventually used as independent expenditures on federal 
     elections posed no corruptive potential--if they were always 
     and necessarily sacrosanct--then the Court would have had to 
     strike down many of the soft money provisions it upheld in 
     McConnell, particularly Sec. 323(a), the ``core'' soft money 
     provision. Id. at 142. This provision provides that 
     ``national committee[s] of a political party . . . may not 
     solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, 
     donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, 
     or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, 
     prohibitions, and reporting requirements of th[e] Act.'' 2 
     U.S.C. Sec. 441i(a)(1)(Supp. 2003). It makes all funds that 
     the national party committees solicit, receive, spend, or 
     direct--regardless of how the committees intend to use them--
     subject to FECA's amount, source, and disclosure 
     requirements. Contributions that would be spent in 
     coordination with candidates, contributions that would be 
     spent independently on candidates' behalf, and contributions 
     that would be spent on advertisements that do not even 
     mention the party or its candidates are all subject to FECA's 
     requirements.
       In themselves, however, these different party activities 
     pose very different threats of corruption. Coordinated 
     expenditures create a significant danger of corruption, FEC 
     v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
     457-60 (2001)(Colorado II), independent expenditures create 
     less danger, id. at 441; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
     Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996) (Colorado I) (opinion 
     of Breyer, J.), and speech on pure issues that does not refer 
     to any candidates still less. Yet, those different threats of 
     corruption made no difference to the Court. No matter how a 
     national party committee would put a soft money contribution 
     to use, Congress could ban it. The contribution's ultimate 
     use did not determine its corruptive potential. Rather, the 
     corruptive potential stemmed from the party's ability to give 
     donors access to and influence over its candidates. 540 U.S. 
     at 147-50, 153-54 (influence), 150-54 (access). In upholding 
     FECA's central soft money provision, then, McConnell 
     necessarily found that even though independent party 
     expenditures on behalf of candidates could not directly 
     corrupt, see Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), contributions 
     to party political committees for this purpose could. The 
     corruptive potential of the one was a sufficient but not 
     necessary condition for that of the other.
       The same analysis applies to McConnell's treatment of 
     FECA's ban on the use of soft money contributions by state 
     and local party committees for federal election activities. 
     Section 323(b) restricts the use of nonfederal funds by state 
     and local party committees to help finance ``Federal election 
     activity.'' 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). As the 
     Court noted in McConnell,
       ``[t]he term `Federal election activity' encompasses four 
     distinct categories of electioneering: (1) voter registration 
     activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled 
     Federal election; (2) voter Identification, get-out-the-vote 
     (GOTV), and generic campaign activity that is `conducted in 
     connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal 
     office appears on the ballot'; (3) any `public communication' 
     that `refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
     office' and `promotes,' `supports,' `attacks,' or `opposes' a 
     candidate for that office; and (4) the services provided by a 
     state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his 
     or her time to `activities in connection with a Federal 
     election.' Sec. Sec. 431(20)(A)(i)-(iv).''
       540 U.S. at 162. Significantly, none of these four 
     categories necessarily involves contributions to candidates 
     and categories 1, 2, and 3 necessarily do not unless there is 
     coordination. Thus, if Congress could restrict the use of 
     only those contributions to state and local party committees 
     that the committees in turn contribute to candidates, 
     Sec. 323(b), just like Sec. 323(a), would have necessarily 
     been overbroad and unconstitutional. McConnell held, however, 
     that Congress could restrict the use of all nonfederal 
     contributions by state party committees ``for the purpose of 
     influencing federal elections.'' Id. at 167. The reason was 
     clear. Although these activities might not pose a threat of 
     state and local parties themselves corrupting federal 
     candidates, they would allow the contributors to corrupt 
     through these committees. As the Court explained it,
       ``Congress . . . made a prediction. Having been taught the 
     hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of 
     campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money 
     donors would react to Sec. 323(a)[, the national party 
     committee ban,] by scrambling to find another way to purchase 
     influence. It was neither novel nor implausible for Congress 
     to conclude that political parties would react to Sec. 323(a) 
     by directing soft-money contributions to the state 
     committees, and that federal candidates would be just as 
     indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who 
     had formerly contributed to the national parties. . . . 
     Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to 
     state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly 
     qualifies as an important governmental interest.''
       Id. at 165 (internal citations and quotation marks 
     omitted). Section 323(b) is premised on the simple ``judgment 
     that if a large donation is capable of putting a federal 
     candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat 
     or corruption or the appearance of corruption.'' Id. at 167. 
     McConnell identified, moreover, precisely which contributions 
     ``pose the greatest risk of this kind of corruption: those 
     contributions . . . that can be used to benefit federal 
     candidates directly.'' Id. (emphasis added).
       Contributions to 527 IECs pose exactly this same ``greatest 
     risk'' of corruption. Since these organizations must 
     necessarily have the ``major purpose'' of nominating or 
     electing candidates for federal office, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
     U.S. at 79, contributions to them, even more than those 
     covered by Sec. 323(b), will likely be used ``to benefit 
     federal candidates directly.'' It does not matter how the 
     political committee actually uses them. Contributions used 
     for direct candidate contributions, coordinated expenditures, 
     and independent expenditures all represent ``contributions . 
     . . that can be used to benefit federal candidates 
     directly.''
       This is not to say, of course, that all funds ``used to 
     benefit federal candidates directly'' necessarily pose this 
     risk. As McConnell makes clear, ``Congress could not regulate 
     financial contributions to political talk show hosts or 
     newspaper editors on the sole basis that their activities 
     conferred a benefit on the candidate.'' 540 U.S. at 156-57 n. 
     51 (first emphasis added). Something more is needed. In the 
     case of political parties, the added risk comes from their 
     ``close relationship . . . [to] federal officeholders and 
     candidates.'' Id. Parties, the Court thought, were ``entities 
     uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption.'' 
     Id.
       527 IECs pose two special dangers long recognized by the 
     Court that make them more like parties than like ``political 
     talk show hosts or newspaper editors.'' First, just as in the 
     case of Sec. 323(b), it is safe to ``ma[k]e a prediction . . 
     . [that] soft-money donors w[ill] react to Sec. 323(a) [and 
     Sec. 323(b)] by scrambling to find another way to purchase 
     influence.'' Id. at 165. If the law does not cover 527 IECs, 
     they will become the primary means for donors to circumvent 
     FECA's new soft money provisions. Donors seeking to influence 
     federal officeholders--donors who previously would have 
     contributed large amounts of soft money to party committees 
     for use in independent campaign advertising and other federal 
     election activities--will contribute instead to independent 
     expenditure committees for exactly the same uses. Such 
     circumvention, all members of the Court agree, ``is a valid 
     theory of corruption.'' Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456.
       It is, moreover, an extremely powerful theory of 
     corruption. In McConnell, the Court employed it to uphold 
     Sec. 323(f), which bars state and local candidates and 
     officeholders from spending soft money to fund communications 
     promoting, supporting, attacking, or opposing a clearly 
     identified candidate for federal office, see 2 U.S.C. 441i(f) 
     (Supp. 2003). In particular, the Court invoked the theory to 
     dispel the argument that soft-money contributions to state 
     and local candidates for such communications could not 
     corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates. At first 
     glance, this argument appears a strong one. Without evidence 
     that contributors to state and local candidates were gaining 
     influence and access to federal candidates and 
     officeholders--of which there was none--how could such 
     contributions corrupt? The Court saw an easy answer, however, 
     in ``[t]he proliferation of sham issue ads.'' 540 U.S. at 
     185. As the Court described things:
       ``The . . . argument[s] that soft-money contributions to 
     state and local candidates for [the covered] communications 
     do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidate[s] 
     ignores both the record in this litigation and Congress' 
     strong interest in

[[Page 13062]]

     preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution 
     limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the 
     soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possible 
     way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They have 
     labored to bring them under the FEC's allocation regime; they 
     have raised and transferred soft money from national to state 
     party committees to take advantage of favorable allocation 
     ratios; and they have transferred and solicited funds to tax-
     exempt organizations for production of such ads. We will not 
     upset Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that, with 
     these other avenues no longer available, state and local 
     candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits 
     for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising. We 
     therefore uphold Sec. 323(f) against plaintiffs' First 
     Amendment challenge.''
       Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the 
     record developed in McConnell showed that sham issue ads had 
     become such a powerful tool of corruption that contributions 
     for this purpose to any entity were necessarily corruptive--
     even without formal evidence that the contributor expected 
     influence over or access to federal officeholders in return 
     for the contributions. Nothing in the Court's reasoning 
     mentioned, let alone rested on, any special connection 
     between state and local candidates and their federal 
     counterparts. Indeed, the contribution's corruptive potential 
     stemmed entirely from its purpose: to fund sham issue ads 
     that would benefit federal candidates. This is, of course, 
     one of the primary purposes for which 527 IECs put their 
     contributions to work.
       The circumvention rationale applies with special force to 
     independent expenditure committees that accept money from the 
     general treasuries of corporations and unions. Independent 
     expenditures from these sources have such great corruptive 
     potential that the First Amendment allows them to be banned 
     completely. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 
     U.S. 652 (1990); but see FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For 
     Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (defining narrow category of 
     ideological corporation not constitutionally subject to 
     expenditure ban). Thus, corporate and union contributions to 
     527 IECs would represent direct circumvention of the 
     corporate and union expenditure bans and so could c1early be 
     banned in turn. The ``independence'' of an independent 
     expenditure committee has no power to launder away the 
     contribution's original source.
       Second, 527 IECs share with parties--and not with talk show 
     hosts and editors--a central characteristic that increases 
     the corruptive potential of contributions made to them. As 
     the Supreme Court has explained, political ``parties' 
     capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity 
     that apparently opens them to exploitation as channels for 
     circumventing . . . spending limits binding on other 
     political players. And some of these players could marshal 
     the same power and sophistication for the same electoral 
     objectives as political parties themselves.'' Colorado II, 
     533 U.S. at 455. 527 IECs, like parties and unlike talk show 
     hosts and wealthy individuals, have this same ``capacity to 
     concentrate power to elect.'' As the Court recognized in 
     Colorado II, by pooling individual resources and monitoring, 
     rewarding, and punishing more effectively than can any 
     individual the behavior of federal candidates and 
     officeholders, 527 IECs can ``marshal the same power and 
     sophistication for the same electoral objectives as the 
     political parties themselves.'' This ability heightens the 
     risk of corruption inherent in their power to serve as 
     conduits.
       To ignore the relevance of this ``capacity to concentrate 
     power to elect'' would take exactly the ``crabbed view of 
     corruption'' that McConnell rejected. It held instead that 
     factors like a contribution's ``size, the recipient's 
     relationship to the candidate or officeholder [it would 
     support], [the contribution's] potential impact on a 
     candidate's election, its value to the candidate, [and the 
     donor's] unabashed and explicit intent to purchase 
     influence,'' 540 U.S. at 152, are all relevant to determining 
     a contribution's corruptive potential. Indeed, according to 
     these McConnell factors, contributions to 527 IECs would 
     easily qualify as corruptive. Some contributions are so large 
     that they would certainly be remembered vividly by candidates 
     and cast doubt in the public's eye that the contributor 
     enjoyed no special influence over or access to them. The sham 
     issue ads and other activities that these contributions 
     generate, moreover, can have a great impact on a candidate's 
     election--witness the Swift Boat ads in the last presidential 
     campaign--and thus are of inestimable value to candidates. 
     Nothing suggests, in fact, that 527 IEC spending is much less 
     effective than spending by the candidates and parties 
     themselves. It is simply naive to believe that 527 IEC 
     spending cannot create influence over and access to federal 
     candidates. As George Soros admitted in talking to a 
     reporter, this is the point: ``I've been trying to exert some 
     influence over our policies and I hope I'll get a better 
     hearing under Kerry.'' BCRA and the 527 Groups at 8.
       McConnell supports the constitutionality of applying 
     reasonable amount, source, and disclosure requirements to 527 
     IECs in another important way. It strongly reaffirms the 
     basic principles the Supreme Court laid down in Buckley v. 
     Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and later cases, which permit 
     appropriate regulation to prevent corruption and the 
     appearance of corruption. In these cases, the Supreme Court 
     has consistently held that ``contribution limits, unlike 
     limits on expenditures, entail only a marginal restriction 
     upon the contributor's ability to engage in free 
     communication. . . . Because the communicative value of large 
     contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate 
     the speech of their recipients, we have said that 
     contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech 
     only if they are so low as to prevent candidates and 
     political committees from amassing the resources necessary 
     for effective advocacy.''
       McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134-35 (internal quotation marks and 
     citations omitted). And, although the Court has found that 
     ``contribution limits may bear more heavily on . . . 
     associational right[s]'' than on free speech rights, id. at 
     135, here too it has found their impact limited. Since 
     ``[t]he overall effect of dollar limits on contributions is 
     merely to require candidates and political committees to 
     raise funds from a greater number of persons. . . . [A] 
     contribution limit involving even significant interference 
     with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it 
     satisfies the lesser demand of being closely drawn to match a 
     sufficiently important interest.''
       Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks and citations 
     omitted).
       Subjecting 527 IECs to the reasonable contribution limit 
     that applies to other political committees satisfies both 
     these tests. First, it does not in any way affect 527 IECs' 
     ability to make independent expenditures. They can spend all 
     their available funds making such expenditures and can make 
     them however they like. All such regulation does ``is simply 
     limit the source and individual amount of donations.'' [Id. 
     at 139. That this requires 527 IECs to seek contributions 
     from a wider range of people causes no constitutional 
     difficulty. See id. at 140 Second, such contribution limits 
     in no way ``preven[t] . . . committees from amassing the 
     resources necessary for effective advocacy.'' [Id. at 135. 
     Again, all they do is change the committees' fund-raising 
     strategy so that they aim for a broader group. Third, 
     bringing 527 IECs under reasonable regulation would 
     ``satisfy[y] the lesser demand of being closely drawn to 
     match a sufficiently important interest.'' [Id. at 136 
     (internal quotation marks omitted). It would both prevent 
     donors from circumventing Sec. 323 (a) and (b)'s ban on soft 
     money contributions to political party committees--money 
     which the parties used, in part, to fund the same activities 
     527 IECs would engage in--and avoid making federal 
     officeholders subject to improper influence by those who 
     contributed the money that 527 IECs used to aid the 
     officeholders' elections. Both of these governmental 
     interests, the Supreme Court has held, are sufficiently 
     important to justify reasonable amount, source, and 
     disclosure requirements, id. at 144-45, which is what S. 271 
     would place on 57 IECs.
                                                  Daniel R. Ortiz,
                                 John Allan Love Professor of Law.

  Mr. McCAIN. As the memo points out, the Supreme Court in the 
McConnell case spoke directly to this issue and said that such limits 
are constitutional. The Court specifically noted that in an earlier 
case, California Medical Association v. FEC, it had upheld the $5,000 
limit on contributions to political committees even as to a committee's 
spending for ``noncoordinated expenditures.'' The constitutional 
rationale in the California Medical Association v. FEC, as in the case 
of the soft money ban upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell, is 
equally applicable to S. 2511. It is designed to prevent the evasion 
and circumvention of Federal contribution limits and prohibitions.
  It is unfortunate we even need to be talking about this situation 
today. This legislation would not be necessary if it were not for the 
abject failure of the FEC to enforce existing law. As I noted earlier, 
some 527s raised and spent soft money to run ads attacking both 
President Bush and Senator Kerry. The use of soft money to finance 
these activities is clearly illegal under current statute, and the fact 
that they were allowed to continue unchecked is unconscionable.
  The blame for this lack of enforcement does not lie with the 
Congress, nor with the administration. The blame for this continuing 
illegal activity lies squarely with the FEC. This agency has a duty to 
issue regulations to properly implement and enforce the Nation's 
campaign finance laws; and the FEC has failed, and it has failed 
miserably, to carry out that responsibility.
  Let's consider two recent court rulings. First, in its decision 
upholding

[[Page 13063]]

the constitutionality of BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated that the FEC had ``subverted''--``subverted''--the law, 
issued regulations that ``permitted more than Congress had ever 
intended,'' and ``invited widespread circumvention''--those are not my 
words; those are the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in a majority 
decision--of FECA's limits on contributions.
  Additionally, when Judge Kollar-Kotelly threw out 15 of the FEC's 
regulations implementing BCRA, among the reasons for her actions were 
that one provision ``severely undermines FECA'' and would ``foster 
corruption,'' another ``runs completely afoul'' of current law, another 
would ``render the statute largely meaningless,'' and, finally, that 
another had ``no rational basis.''
  No wonder a Los Angeles Times editorial stated that:

       [H]er decision would make a fitting obituary for an agency 
     that deserves to die.

  We cannot allow the destructive FEC to continue to undermine the 
Nation's campaign finance laws.
  An article published just yesterday in the Hill points out that the 
FEC ``is being accused of attempting to intimidate soft-money donors to 
527s by targeting the donors for questioning.''
  The article also makes note of ``the FEC decision last month not to 
implement new regulations for 527s this election cycle. That was widely 
interpreted as a green light for 527s to act without restriction.'' 
What is going on here? The job of the FEC is to write regulations to 
properly implement campaign finance laws--not to bully and intimidate 
those who choose to donate to groups the FEC refuses to regulate.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the article form the 
Hill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                     [From the Hill, June 28, 2006]

        Intimidation Seen as Commission Eyes 527s' Solicitations

                         (By Alexander Bolton)

       The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is being accused of 
     attempting to intimidate soft-money donors to 527s by 
     targeting the donors for questioning.
       The agency, which is tasked with policing national and 
     congressional political campaigns, is targeting some of the 
     wealthiest Republican and Democratic donors.
       Typically such people have escaped tough scrutiny unless 
     suspected of deliberately evading contribution limits through 
     the use of straw donors or other tactics. But recently the 
     FEC appears to have aimed at donors even though it is the 
     527s that are suspected of evading campaign-finance law.
       One prominent GOP strategist has charged that the new 
     tactic is intended to scare big donors away from giving to 
     527s, which Congress and the White House have struggled to 
     curb.
       This is happening despite the FEC decision last month not 
     to implement new regulations for 527s this election cycle. 
     That was widely interpreted as a green light for 527s to act 
     without restriction, as groups such as America Coming 
     Together and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth did during the 
     2004 election. This was expected to mean such groups would 
     spend even more money this year and in 2008.
       But the FEC has not left the same rules in place that 
     allowed 527s to spend $400 million in the 2004 cycle. Late 
     that year, it subtly modified its rules, which would 
     apparently bolster investigations of 527s in response to a 
     series of complaints filed against the groups in 2004.
       The new regulation, which took effect in January 2005, 
     stated that 527s would be subject to regulation if, when 
     seeking money, they ``indicated'' to donors that the money 
     would be spent to support or oppose a federal candidate.
       Election-agency commissioners such as Ellen Weintraub and 
     Hans A. von Spakovsky declined to discuss the investigations. 
     But strategists close to the 527s say donors are being 
     targeted.
       ``I know for a fact that the FEC has subpoenaed donors who 
     may have contributed to 527s in past election cycles and 
     believe that technique is more rooted in preventing future 
     donation to other 527s than anything else,'' said Chris 
     LaCivita, a former senior adviser to Swift Boat Veterans for 
     Truth and former head of Progress for America, both right-
     wing groups.
       Another strategist connected with a prominent conservative 
     527 group, the Club for Growth, confirmed that the FEC is 
     targeting donors.
       ``I've heard that lots of other groups have gotten 
     subpoenas and requests for depositions of donors,'' said 
     David Keating, the executive director of the Club for Growth, 
     which is tied up in litigation with the FEC. Keating said he 
     was not talking about donors to his group.
       ``If you look in the 2004 cycle, complaints were filed 
     against virtually every group out there,'' Keating said. 
     ``None of these matters under review have been dismissed.''
       In 2004, a coalition of pro-campaign-finance-regulation 
     groups including Democracy 21, the Center for Responsive 
     Politics and the Campaign Legal Center filed at least five 
     complaints against the major 527s: America Coming Together, 
     the Media Fund, the Leadership Forum, Progress for America 
     Voter Fund, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and Texans for 
     Truth.
       Fred Wertheimer, president of Democracy 21, said that he 
     believes all of his group's complaints are pending but that 
     he had no further knowledge of the probes.
       Because the complaints, which are 2 years old, have not 
     been dismissed, it is assumed that the FEC has given its 
     lawyers the go-ahead to investigate them.
       One Democratic lawyer said the FEC general counsel's office 
     is asking donors to recall the specifics of their 
     conversations and other interactions with 527s to determine 
     whether those groups indicated that donations would be used 
     to support or oppose federal candidates such as President 
     Bush and Sen. John Kerry (Mass.), the Democrats' presidential 
     nominee.
       ``They're asking a lot of questions of donors about what 
     they were told when they were asked to contribute,'' the 
     lawyer said. ``Who knows what the six-member commission will 
     do with whatever is presented them? There's little doubt that 
     the general counsel's office feels responsibility to show 
     evidence of a violation and this is the route to get there.''
       Once the general counsel presents his case to the 
     commission, its members must vote on whether there is 
     probable cause to believe the law was broken. It is not known 
     if the commissioners specifically approved subjecting donors 
     to subpoenas and depositions.
       ``Their attorneys have been let loose to look into whether 
     . . . the entities violated the law,'' the Democratic lawyer 
     said. ``They're out there trying to gather the evidence. You 
     don't have the FEC as a six-person office approving these 
     inquiries.''
       Former FEC Chairman Scott Thomas, who retired last year, 
     declined to comment on an ongoing investigation but said 
     scrutinizing donors would fit the legal approach that the FEC 
     has adopted in regulating 527s. Citing the newly enacted 
     Section 100.57, Thomas said commissioners agreed in 2004 that 
     527s could be policed most effectively case by case by 
     looking at how they solicited donors.
       Thomas said solicitation is a key element in the FEC's 
     litigation against the Club for Growth. He said FEC 
     investigators are likely to look at ``whether there was some 
     indication given to donors in the solicitation process that 
     the funds would be used to support or oppose federal 
     candidates. The focus is what was said when the money was 
     coming in.''
       Thomas said past enforcement actions focused on what groups 
     communicated to voters to determine whether they should have 
     political-committee status, a designation that would subject 
     them to contribution limits. Thomas said that approach 
     created gridlock.
       Thomas said the regulation change in January 2005 could be 
     used to prosecute groups for activity in 2004. He said it 
     would not apply retroactively in the technical sense but 
     could be held up as a point of consensus among the FEC 
     commissioners about how the laws on the books before 2004 
     should be interpreted.
       ``It's going to be arguing that the same analytical concept 
     can be applied for figuring out what happened in '04 cycle,'' 
     Thomas said in response to claims that the general counsel is 
     focusing on conversations with donors. ``That's probably why 
     the FEC was digging for this information, because four 
     commissioners agreed that concept was the best way to analyze 
     these political-committee cases.''

  Mr. McCAIN. The track record of the FEC and its continued 
stonewalling proves that the Commission is incapable of upholding its 
responsibilities. The time has come to put an end to its destructive 
tactics. The FEC has had ample and well-documented opportunities to 
address the issue of the 527s' illegal activities, and each time it has 
taken a pass, choosing instead to delay, postpone, and refuse to act.
  BCRA has demonstrated that, on a bipartisan basis, we care about 
making sure that political power in this country does not lie solely in 
the wealth of big corporations, labor unions, and the wealthiest of the 
wealthy. We need to uphold and build upon past reforms and not endorse 
the pursuit of ways to get around or unravel them.
  I again point out with this chart that the predictions, when we 
passed BCRA, were that it would be the end of national parties; that it 
would prohibit people from any way to be able to contribute to 
political campaigns, and the

[[Page 13064]]

parties would suffer mightily. Well, here is the amount of money. Here 
is the amount of new donors that both parties got. I have to say, in 
fairness, the Internet had a lot to do with the encouragement of, and 
ability of, millions of new donors to engage in contributions.
  But let me also point out, for those who were worried about the 
destruction of the political parties and some kind of diminution of 
their capabilities, the Democratic Party raised $580 million as opposed 
to $212 million. This is hard money alone, with the elimination of soft 
money. And Republicans raised $632 million. So millions of new donors 
took part in the political process. The parties were strengthened.
  No longer is it legal for a powerful Member of Congress to call up a 
labor union leader, a trial lawyer, or a corporation head and say: I 
need a soft money donation in six figures. And, by the way, your 
legislation is up before my committee. That is no longer legal and has 
stopped.
  Do we have problems still with too much money washing around 
Washington in the form of campaign contributions? Yes. And do we have 
additional measures that need to be taken? Yes. But the first thing 
that needs to be done is to make the 527s fall in line with the same 
restrictions placed on any other organization that engages in 
activities to attempt to influence the outcome of an election.
  I want to emphasize, we are not trying to ban them. We are trying to 
make them subject to campaign finance contribution limits, which are 
clearly, clearly called for in the 1974 law.
  Again, the performance of the Federal Election Commission is really a 
great national disgrace. And how they can continue to fail to write 
regulation to enforce existing law that the Congress has passed since 
2002 and enforce laws that were passed in 1974 is absolutely beyond 
comprehension.
  Mr. President, I note the presence of my friend, the Senator from 
Nevada, on the floor of the Senate at this time, so I will proceed with 
the unanimous consent request at this time.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time to be 
determined by the majority leader, after consultation with the 
Democratic leader, the Committee on Rules and Administration be 
discharged from further consideration of S. 2511, and the Senate 
proceed to its immediate consideration; I further ask that there be 4 
hours of debate equally divided with no amendments in order; provided 
further that following the use or yielding back of time, the bill be 
read a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage, with no 
intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, first of all, I want the Record spread with 
the fact of the work Senator McCain did with my friend, and his friend, 
Senator Feingold, in the now famous legislation, McCain-Feingold.
  In my 1998 race that I was involved in with the Presiding Officer of 
the Senate, I spent $10 million, in the small State of Nevada. My 
friend, the junior Senator from Nevada, spent the same amount of money. 
It was equal spending. But the vast majority of that money we spent in 
Nevada in that hotly contested race was corporate money.
  McCain-Feingold solved that problem. When I ran in 2004, as I have 
told other people, it was as if I had just climbed out of a shower and 
was clean and fresh. I did not have to accept corporate money, which I 
believe did not corrupt me, but it was corrupting when you could get 
these large sums of money, legally, and run them through the State 
parties and then run these negative ads that we all did around the 
country.
  So I think McCain-Feingold personally was a tremendous blow for 
freedom and civility in this country. And I will always be grateful to 
Senators McCain and Feingold for that work.
  I have listened to--I was not able to listen to all of my friend's 
remarks, but most of them I listened to in my office and here. And I 
say that I believe we have to have a full review of all campaign 
finance laws. Mr. President, 527s is only part of what I think we need 
to take a look at. There are foundations that need to be looked at. 
Some of the things going on with political action committees we need to 
take a look at. There are a lot of things we need to take a look at. I 
think at the appropriate time that should be done.
  Now, I say to my friend who makes this unanimous-consent request, we 
have a bill pending in the Rules Committee requiring 527s to register 
as political action committees.
  Now, we have a letter dated June 9 to Senator Frist, the majority 
leader, from one, two, three, four, five, six, seven Republican 
Senators who say, among other things: We oppose taking any action on 
this bill, S. 2511. And they state specifically that they do not like 
it. So I am not sure it could be cleared on your side. It cannot be 
cleared on our side.
  I would, on that basis, object and look forward to working with my 
friend to see if we can do a better job in looking at all the campaign 
finance problems that we have all at one time, not just 527s. So I 
object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter to 
the majority leader dated June 9 of this year be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                     Washington, DC, June 9, 2006.
     Hon. Bill Frist,
     Majority Leader, The Capitol,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Majority Leader Frist. As Republicans, we strongly 
     believe in freedom, including freedom of expression and 
     association. We campaigned for office on the principles of a 
     limited and constitutional government. As elected officials 
     we took an oath of office to ``support this Constitution.''
       The First Amendment's dictates are a model of clarity: 
     ``Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
     speech.'' Yet the House of Representatives approved a bill 
     (H.R. 513) that proposes new restrictions on speech about 
     politicians and policies to be enforced under the threat of 
     criminal penalties. The House then added the provisions of 
     H.R. 513 to the Senate's lobbying reform bil1.
       One of the four pillars of a free and just society is 
     freedom of speech. As George Washington once said, ``If the 
     freedom of speech is taken away then dumb and silent we may 
     be led, like sheep to the slaughter.''
       The targets of the bill's speech restrictions are nonprofit 
     advocacy groups organized under section 527 of the tax laws. 
     The groups pose no threat of corruption as they are required 
     to disclose all donors, barred from urging voters to support 
     or oppose a candidate, and prohibited from coordinating with 
     political parties or elected officials. Rather than restrict 
     others, we should expand people's freedom of association and 
     speech to political organizations and committees.
       While many rightly criticized the McCain-Feingold bill for 
     banning TV and radio ads within 60 days of an election, what 
     justification is there to prohibiting any communication 
     costing over $1,000 that mentions a congressman's name in any 
     medium, 365 days a year, if done through one of these 
     independent citizens' groups?
       Some say this bill is needed to stop the wealthy from 
     funding propaganda, but the bill appropriately places no 
     limits on the wealthy to fund speech on their own. Instead, 
     it foolishly restricts the ability of hundreds of thousands 
     of citizens to join together to speak out about the nation's 
     future.
       Republicans do not need, and should not attempt, to muzzle 
     their opponents. The increase in free speech over the last 
     two decades made possible by the growth of talk radio, cable 
     TV and the Internet has benefited our Party, which allowed us 
     to promote individual freedom and opportunity that has led to 
     unprecedented prosperity for our nation.
       We strongly oppose adding the anti-free speech provisions 
     of H.R. 513 to the lobbying reform bill, or any other bill.
       If such provisions are added to legislation scheduled for a 
     Senate vote, we would give serious consideration to 
     supporting extended debate on the bill. It is important that 
     the American public have the opportunity to learn that their 
     freedoms are at stake and have the sufficient time to express 
     their opinions prior to a vote of the Senate.
           Sincerely,
     George Allen,
     Jim DeMint,
     Norm Coleman,
     David Vitter,
     Michael B. Enzi,

[[Page 13065]]

     John E. Sununu,
     Sam Brownback.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I, obviously, am not surprised at the 
objection of my friend from Nevada. We need to address this issue. As I 
mentioned, I do not think we would have to if it were not for the 
Federal Election Commission's failure to carry out their 
responsibilities.
  I have observed the role of money in politics for a long time. And 
unless these 527s are brought under control, we are going to see ever-
enlarging activities and more and more money being spent through this 
loophole that has been carved out, unfortunately, and allowed, as I 
mentioned, two individuals to contribute as much as $22 million each in 
the 2004 campaign.
  I worry very much about one individual donor contributing millions of 
dollars that would come into a House or a Senate race in the last 
couple or 3 weeks of a campaign. Obviously, that would be a credible 
distortion of the process and undue influence. By the way, 99 out of 
100 of these 527s come from outside the State or district in which the 
money is spent. So I hope we can move forward on this legislation. I 
think it is compelling that we do so
  I hope that we can sit down with others and get this legislation 
debated. As to the unanimous consent request I propounded, I would be 
glad to have amendments to it, other debate, depending on the will of 
Senators. We need to take up this issue and bring it under the control 
for which it cries out. I regret we were not able to do so at this 
time.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

                          ____________________