[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 152 (2006), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 13033-13034]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            THE CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 2006

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENNIE G. THOMPSON

                             of mississippi

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 28, 2006

  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, a terrorist attack takes 
three components: a weapon, a target, and a terrorist. Usually these 
three items are separate, as we saw in the 9/11 attack, the terrorist 
bombings in London, Madrid, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, and countless 
other places around the world faced

[[Page 13034]]

with terrorist attacks. In special cases, however, the weapon and the 
target are combined. Such is the case with a facility that produces or 
maintains large amounts of toxic or otherwise dangerous chemicals. If 
such chemicals can be released and cause harm, the target itself 
becomes a weapon.
  While the protection of all national critical infrastructure is 
important, chemical plants represent a special subset of those assets 
which should be given the highest priority in protecting. As a country, 
we recognized such a danger when it came to nuclear power plants. The 
Department of Energy made the connection and put in place rigorous 
security measures. The same has not been true for chemical plants, even 
though they are much more vulnerable, and can have much higher 
consequences if successfully attacked.
  Recently, however, this problem has been given the attention it 
deserves. Successful improvements in securing chemical facilities will 
take the cooperation of the administration, the Congress, and the 
facility owner-operators. We find ourselves in a unique situation where 
all three of these parties are in agreement that there is a security 
gap that needs to be closed, and that it will require regulation to do 
it.
  Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, one of 
its missions has been the protection of critical infrastructure. Some 
85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the country is privately 
owned. Neither the private sector nor the government was eager to 
promulgate security regulations. The hope was that in a post-9/11 
world, private industry would voluntarily make necessary security 
improvements, aided by guidance from the Department in the form of 
recommendations and publication of ``best practices.''
  This worked to some degree. Many members of the chemical industry 
stepped up their security practices voluntarily. However, many did not, 
and the economic disadvantage suffered by those who made investments in 
security practices prompted them to ask Congress and the Administration 
for some regulatory mechanism that would level the economic playing 
field by requiring all members of the chemical sector to ensure that 
their facilities are secure.
  The Department of Homeland Security also noticed that there was a big 
disparity in the level of participation and cooperation to increase 
security across the chemical sector. Both Secretary Michael Chertoff 
and former Secretary Tom Ridge recognized this problem. In October 
2002, then-DHS Secretary Ridge and then-EPA administrator Christie 
Whitman declared in a joint statement: ``Voluntary efforts alone are 
not sufficient to provide the level of assurance Americans deserve.''
  Two and a half years later, during his appearance before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security in April 2005, Secretary Chertoff 
stated, ``In the area of chemical plants, the President has indicated 
that if we could not get what we need in terms of security using these 
various kinds of market-based incentives and best practices, that we 
would look to the possibility of some kind of regulation.'' He 
reiterated this stance in March during a forum on chemical plant 
security that ``free riders,'' meaning smaller plants that have not 
implemented voluntary security standards, need to be brought under a 
regulatory scheme to ensure security.
  Finally, Congress, in both houses and in both parties, is ready to 
act. Recently, bipartisan legislation introduced by Senators Collins 
and Lieberman has been marked up in the Senate. Mr. Lungren, myself and 
(whoever else) will soon mark up a bill which is quite similar and I am 
proud to be a part of this effort.
  The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 will make our 
country more secure by giving the authority to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to regulate security practices at chemical plants. 
However, the bill does not take a heavy-handed, overly proscriptive 
approach. The bill directs the Secretary to place the country's 
chemical plants into tiers based on risk, and to set security 
performance standards which increase in rigor for higher risk tiers. By 
setting performance standards rather than proscribing specific actions, 
the scheme would seek to form a partnership between the Department of 
Homeland Security and the chemical plants to come up with their own 
creative ideas to reach the desired level of security.
  The tiered structure will also provide incentives to chemical 
manufacturers to make their plants inherently safer and therefore lower 
their risk tier. By lowering the inherent risk of the plant, they would 
not be required to have as high a level of security if the plant moves 
from high risk to low risk. Obviously, a plant that makes extremely 
toxic chemicals needs tighter security than one that makes less 
dangerous ones. I believe that acquiring the use of inherently safer 
technology where feasible would be more effective, but I am hopeful 
that the incentive approach will be successful. We also ensure that 
chemical plant workers will be our partners in securing their 
facilities, by directing the Secretary to set up a method that will 
allow workers to report security gaps that they find to the Department, 
and ensuring that such workers are not retaliated against.
  The time for action is now. We have an opportunity to ensure this 
vital industry, and the population that lives around these facilities, 
are safe and secure. We must seize the opportunity to work together to 
secure our infrastructure, our economy and the lives of our citizens.

                          ____________________