[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11108-11110]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               AMERICA'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

  Mr. OBAMA. Mr. President, we have been spending a considerable amount 
of time in this body debating the so-called nuclear option. Today I 
want to spend a little bit of time talking about an issue that poses a 
more significant threat to our Republic.
  Throughout the last half of the 20th century, one nation more than 
any other on the face of the Earth, defined and shaped the threats 
posed to the United States. This nation, of course, was the Soviet 
Union and its successor state, Russia.
  While many have turned their attention to China or other parts of the 
world, I believe the most important threat to the security of the 
United States continues to lie within the borders of the former Soviet 
Union in the form of stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and materials.
  We are in a race against time to prevent these weapons from getting 
in the hands of international terrorist organizations or rogue states. 
The path to this potential disaster is easier than anyone could 
imagine. There are a number of potential sources of fissile material in 
the former Soviet Union in sites that are poorly secured. The material 
is compact, easy to hide, and hard to track. Weapons designs can be 
easily found on the Internet.
  Today, some weapons experts believe that terrorist organizations will 
have enough fissile material to build a nuclear bomb in the next 10 
years--that is right, 10 years.
  I rise today to instill a sense of urgency in the Senate. I rise 
today to ask

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how are we going to deal with this threat tomorrow, a year from now, a 
decade from now?
  The President has just completed an international trip that included 
a visit to Russia. I commend him for taking this trip and making our 
relationship with Russia a priority.
  During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union produced 
nearly 2,000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in 
weapons that could destroy the world several times over. To give an 
idea of just how much this is, it takes only 5 to 10 kilograms of 
plutonium to build a nuclear weapon that could kill the entire 
population of St. Louis. For decades, strategic deterrence, our 
alliances, and the balance of power with the Soviet Union ensured the 
relative safety of these weapons and materials.
  With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
all this has changed. Key institutions within the Soviet national 
security apparatus have crumbled, exposing dangerous gaps in the 
security of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and fissile material.
  Regional powers felt fewer constraints to develop nuclear weapons. 
Rogue states accelerated weapons programs.
  And while this was happening, international terrorist organizations 
who are aggressively seeking nuclear weapons gained strength and 
momentum.
  Now, thanks to the leadership of former Senator Nunn and Senator 
Lugar in creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program at the 
Department of Defense, there is no question that we have made some 
great progress in securing these weapons.
  These same two leaders continue to work tirelessly on this issue to 
this day--Senator Nunn, through the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and 
Senator Lugar, through his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  The situation in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union is 
drastically different than it was in 1991 or even 1996 or 2001. But, 
the threat is still extremely dangerous and extremely real.
  In March of this year, a senior Russian commander concluded that 39 
of 46 key Russian weapons facilities had serious security shortcomings. 
Many Russian nuclear research sites frequently have doors propped open, 
security sensors turned off, and guards patrolling without ammunition 
in their weapons.
  Meanwhile, the security situation outside of Russia continues to be 
of grave concern. Fanatical terrorist organizations who want these 
weapons continue to search every corner of the Earth resorting to 
virtually any means necessary. The nuclear programs of nations such as 
Iran and North Korea threaten to destabilize key regions of the world. 
We are still learning about the tremendous damage caused by A.Q. Khan, 
the rogue Pakistani weapons scientist.
  Looking back over the past decade and a half, it is clear that we 
could and should have done more.
  So as the President returns from his trip to Russia, we should be 
thinking--on a bipartisan basis--about the critical issues that can 
guide us in the future to ensure that there are no more missed 
opportunities.
  The first question we should be thinking about is what is the future 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program? What is our plan? I 
believe the administration must spend more time working with Congress 
to chart out a roadmap and a strategic vision of the program.
  There are two things the President can do to move on this issue. 
First, in the National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction of 2002, the administration said the National Security 
Council would prepare a 5-year governmentwide strategy by March of 
2003. To my knowledge, this has not been completed. In addition, 
Congress required the administration to submit an interagency 
coordination plan on how to more effectively deal with nonproliferation 
issues. This plan is due at the end of this month.
  Completing these plans will help the United States better address 
critical day-to-day issues such as liability, resource allocation, and 
timetables. Having a better strategic vision will also help us work 
more efficiently and effectively with other international donors who 
have become increasingly involved and are making significant 
contributions to these efforts. This is very important, as the 
contribution of other donors can help us make up valuable lost time.
  Mr. President, my second question concerns the U.S.-Russian 
relationship. Where is this relationship heading? Will Russia be an 
adversary, a partner, or something in between?
  We do not ask these questions simply because we are interested in 
being nice and want only to get along with the Russians. We have to ask 
these questions because they directly impact our progress towards 
securing and destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials.
  In the last few years, we have seen some disturbing trends in Russia: 
the rapid deterioration of democracy and the rule of law, bizarre and 
troubling statements from President Putin about the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the abuses that have taken place in Chechnya, and Russian 
meddling in the former Soviet Union--from the Baltics to the Ukraine to 
Georgia.
  The Russians must understand that their actions on some of these 
issues are entirely unacceptable.
  At the same time, I believe we have to do a better job of working 
with the Russians to make sure they are moving in the right direction. 
This starts by being thoughtful and consistent about what we say and 
what we do. Tone matters.
  Some of the statements by our own officials have been confusing, 
contradictory, and problematic. At times I have been left scratching my 
head about what exactly our policy is and how administration statements 
square with this policy.
  Another issue is the level of sustained engagement with Russia. I am 
glad the President and Secretary of State have made several trips to 
Russia, but as these trips are only a few days every year or so this is 
only one aspect of the relationship.
  An additional component, which has suffered in recent years, is our 
foreign assistance programs to Russia and the rest of the former Soviet 
Union. These programs are absolutely essential in maintaining our 
engagement with Russia. These programs are not giveaways. They are 
programs that advance U.S. interests by strengthening Russian democracy 
and civil society, enhancing economic development and dealing with 
international health issues--in addition to curbing the 
nonproliferation threat.
  At a time when these programs are desperately needed, their budgets 
have been cut dramatically. At a time when we should be doing more to 
engage and shape the future of Russia, we seem to be doing the exact 
opposite.
  The nonproliferation threat does not exist in a vacuum. The issue I 
just mentioned, along with other important issues such as our own 
strategic nuclear arsenal, must be considered as we move forward.
  Finally, Mr. President, I would like my colleagues to consider how 
our relationship with Russia, and our efforts to secure and destroy 
weapons and materials inside the former Soviet Union, fits in with our 
broader nonproliferation goals.
  Russia is a major player in the two biggest proliferation challenges 
we currently face--Iran and North Korea. Russia's dangerous involvement 
with Iran's nuclear program has been well documented, and there is no 
question their actions will be pivotal if the President is to 
successfully resolve this deteriorating situation.
  The Russians are also an important voice in trying to make progress 
on the deteriorating situation in North Korea. The Russian city of 
Vladivostok is home to 590,000 people and is very close to the North 
Korean border, putting the Russians smack in the middle of the crisis 
that we need to resolve.
  In addition to all this, Russia holds a seat on the Security Council 
of the United Nations, which could consider Iranian and North Korean 
issues in the very near future.
  Developing bilateral and multilateral strategies that deal with 
Russia's role

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in these growing crises will be extremely important, both in terms of 
resolving these crises, advancing our non-proliferation goals within 
the former Soviet Union, and our long-term relationship with Russia.
  I realize that, at this time, none of us have all the answers to 
these extraordinarily difficult questions. But if we hope to 
successfully fight terror and avoid disaster before it arrives at our 
shores, we have to start finding these answers. We have a lot of work 
to do.
  I believe it is worth putting in place a process, one that involves 
senior administration officials, a bipartisan group of Members of 
Congress, as well as retired senior military officers and diplomats, in 
an effort to dramatically improve progress on these issues.
  I am interested in hearing from the President about his trip. I am 
also interested in hearing if he believes that an idea similar to the 
one I put forward is worth considering.
  Delay is not an option. We need to start making more progress on this 
issue today. I urge my colleagues to act.
  Despite all the distractions we have had with the so-called nuclear 
option and judicial nominations, this is literally a matter of life and 
death. I hope we start paying more attention to it in this Senate 
Chamber and in the debates that are going to be coming in the coming 
months.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

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