[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10891-10893]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 36--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS 
 CONCERNING ACTIONS TO SUPPORT THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ON 
           THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Durbin, 
Mr. Corzine, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Levin) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                            S. Con. Res. 36

       Whereas the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
     and entered into force March 5, 1970 (in this resolution 
     referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''), 
     codifies one of the most important international security 
     arrangements in the history of arms control, the arrangement 
     by which states without nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire 
     them, states with nuclear weapons commit to eventually 
     eliminate them, and nonnuclear states are allowed to use for 
     peaceful purposes nuclear technology under strict and 
     verifiable control;
       Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the 
     most widely supported multilateral agreements, with 188 
     countries adhering to the Treaty;
       Whereas the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has encouraged 
     many countries to officially abandon nuclear weapons or 
     nuclear weapons programs, including Argentina, Belarus, 
     Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, 
     Ukraine, and Taiwan;
       Whereas, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 
     the states-parties agreed

[[Page 10892]]

     to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely, 
     to reaffirm the principles and objectives of the Treaty, to 
     strengthen the Treaty review process, and to implement 
     further specific and practical steps on non-proliferation and 
     disarmament;
       Whereas, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the states-
     parties agreed to further practical steps on non-
     proliferation and disarmament;
       Whereas President George W. Bush stated on March 7, 2005, 
     that ``the NPT represents a key legal barrier to nuclear 
     weapons proliferation and makes a critical contribution to 
     international security,'' and that ``the United States is 
     firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT'';
       Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 
     responsible for monitoring compliance with safeguard 
     agreements pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     and reporting safeguard violations to the United Nations 
     Security Council;
       Whereas Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin stated 
     on February 24, 2005, that ``[w]e bear a special 
     responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and 
     fissile material in order to ensure that there is no 
     possibility such weapons or materials would fall into 
     terrorist hands'';
       Whereas Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment and 
     materials for peaceful nuclear endeavors and allows states to 
     acquire sensitive technologies to produce nuclear fuel for 
     energy purposes but also recognizes that such fuel could be 
     used to secretly produce fissile material for nuclear weapons 
     programs or quickly produce such material if the state were 
     to decide to withdraw from the Treaty;
       Whereas the Government of North Korea ejected international 
     inspectors from that country in 2002, announced its 
     withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, 
     has recently declared its possession of nuclear weapons, and 
     is in possession of facilities capable of producing 
     additional nuclear weapons-usable material;
       Whereas the Government of Iran has pursued an undeclared 
     program to develop a uranium enrichment capacity, repeatedly 
     failed to fully comply with and provide full information to 
     the IAEA regarding its nuclear activities, and stated that it 
     will not permanently abandon its uranium enrichment program 
     which it has temporarily suspended through an agreement with 
     the European Union;
       Whereas the network of arms traffickers associated with 
     A.Q. Khan has facilitated black-market nuclear transfers 
     involving several countries, including Iran, Libya, and North 
     Korea, and represents a new and dangerous form of 
     proliferation;
       Whereas governments should cooperate to control exports of 
     and interdict illegal transfers of sensitive nuclear and 
     missile-related technologies to prevent their proliferation;
       Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level 
     Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concluded that 
     ``[a]lmost 60 States currently operate or are constructing 
     nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess 
     the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would 
     enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at 
     relatively short notice if the legal and normative 
     constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply,'' and 
     warned that ``[w]e are approaching a point at which the 
     erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
     irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation'';
       Whereas stronger international support and cooperation to 
     achieve universal compliance with tighter nuclear non-
     proliferation rules and standards constitute essential 
     elements of nuclear non-proliferation efforts;
       Whereas sustained leadership by the United States 
     Government is essential to help implement existing legal and 
     political commitments established by the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty and to realize a more robust and 
     effective global nuclear non-proliferation system; and
       Whereas the governments of the United States and other 
     countries should pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach 
     to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation system, 
     beginning with the Seventh NPT Review Conference of 2005: 
     Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring),

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This resolution may be cited as the ``Reinforce the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-
                   PROLIFERATION TREATY.

       Congress--
       (1) reaffirms its support for the objectives of the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty and expresses its support for all 
     appropriate measures to strengthen the Treaty and to attain 
     its objectives; and
       (2) calls on all parties participating in the Seventh 
     Nuclear NPT Review Conference--
       (A) to insist on strict compliance with the non-
     proliferation obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty and to undertake effective enforcement measures 
     against states that are in violation of their Article I or 
     Article II obligations under the Treaty;
       (B) to agree to establish more effective controls on 
     sensitive technologies that can be used to produce materials 
     for nuclear weapons;
       (C) to expand the ability of the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compliance with non-
     proliferation rules and standards to which all states should 
     adhere through existing authority and the additional 
     protocols signed by the states party to the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty;
       (D) to demonstrate the international community's unified 
     opposition to a nuclear weapons program in Iran by--
       (i) supporting the efforts of the United States and the 
     European Union to prevent the Government of Iran from 
     acquiring a nuclear weapons capability; and
       (ii) using all appropriate diplomatic and other means at 
     their disposal to convince the Government of Iran to abandon 
     its uranium enrichment program;
       (E) to strongly support the ongoing United States 
     diplomatic efforts in the context of the six-party talks that 
     seek the verifiable and incontrovertible dismantlement of 
     North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and to use all 
     appropriate diplomatic and other means to achieve this 
     result;
       (F) to pursue diplomacy designed to address the underlying 
     regional security problems in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and 
     the Middle East, which would facilitate non-proliferation and 
     disarmament efforts in those regions;
       (G) to accelerate programs to safeguard and eliminate 
     nuclear weapons-usable material to the highest standards to 
     prevent access by terrorists and governments;
       (H) to halt the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian 
     reactors;
       (I) to strengthen national and international export 
     controls and relevant security measures as required by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;
       (J) to agree that no state may withdraw from the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty and escape responsibility for prior 
     violations of the Treaty or retain access to controlled 
     materials and equipment acquired for ``peaceful'' purposes;
       (K) to accelerate implementation of disarmament obligations 
     and commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     for the purpose of reducing the world's stockpiles of nuclear 
     weapons and weapons-grade fissile material; and
       (L) to strengthen and expand support for the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today along with Senator Hagel, 
Senator Lautenberg, Senator Durbin, Senator Corzine, and Senator 
Feingold to submit a resolution calling on the parties participating at 
the Seventh Review Conference in New York City to reaffirm their 
support for and take additional measures to strengthen the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty.
  Our resolution calls on parties to the conference to, among other 
things: insist on strict compliance with the nonproliferation 
obligations of the Treaty and to undertake effective enforcement 
measures against states that are in violation of their Article I or 
Article II obligations; agree to establish more effective controls on 
sensitive technologies that can be used to produce materials for 
nuclear weapons; support the efforts of the United States and the 
European Union (EU) to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability; support the Six-Party talks that seek the verifiable 
disarmament of North Korea's nuclear weapons program; accelerate 
programs to safeguard and eliminate nuclear-weapons usable material to 
the highest standards to prevent access by terrorists or other states; 
agree that no state may withdraw from the Treaty and escape 
responsibility for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to 
controlled materials and equipment acquired for ``peaceful'' purposes, 
and; accelerate implementation of the NPT-related disarmament 
obligations and commitments that would, in particular, reduce the 
world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material.
  More than 180 states have gathered in New York to review progress on 
implementing their respective obligations as signatories of the Treaty 
and discuss additional steps each party can take to fulfill all of the 
NPT objectives.
  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has played a critical role in 
protecting U.S. national security interests and promoting peace and 
stability in the international community by bringing nuclear armed and 
non-nuclear armed states together to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.
  Each party has clear and specific obligations. States with nuclear 
weapons

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pledge to eventually eliminate them while states without nuclear 
weapons pledge not to acquire them.
  The track record of the Treaty speaks for itself. This framework has 
successfully convinced countries such as Ukraine, Kazahkstan, Belarus, 
Libya and South Africa to forgo possession of nuclear weapons. At the 
dawn of the nuclear age, who would have thought this would be possible?
  Simply put, the fewer number of states with nuclear weapons, the less 
likely such weapons will be used or fall into the wrong hands. The 
Treaty has saved lives and prevented unthinkable catastrophe.
  The success of the Treaty is a testament to United States leadership 
and our commitment to multilateral diplomacy and cooperation. The gains 
in the area of nuclear nonproliferation over the past thirty plus years 
would not have been possible if we had chosen to shut ourselves out of 
the international community or take on the great challenges of the 
world on our own.
  And, I might point out, as a signatory to the Treaty, we have 
increased the security of Americans and our national security interests 
at a far less cost than any military intervention. Successful arms 
control treaties give us more bang for our buck.
  Now is a critical opportunity to examine the successes of the past 
and the steps all parties can take to strengthen the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty in the future.
  Indeed, the world has changed dramatically since the last Review 
Conference in 1995 and the challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime have become more acute. In the past few years we have witnessed: 
the September 11th attacks and the intent of terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda to acquire and use nuclear weapons; the discovery of the AQ 
Khan nuclear black market; North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and announcement that it possessed nuclear 
weapons; the exposure of Iran's violations of its obligations as a 
signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the possibility 
that states may use the ``Article 4 loophole'' and develop a nuclear 
fuel cycle capability; the existence of global stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons usable materials.
  Combined with an uncertainty on the part of non-nuclear weapon states 
about the intent of nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament 
obligations, these challenges threaten the continuation of a successful 
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
  As the United Nation's report ``A More Secure World'' states: ``We 
are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation 
regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of 
proliferation.''
  North Korea has already withdrawn from the Treaty and escaped 
penalty. Iran may be next. How many others will follow if we stand 
still and do nothing to strengthen the NPT?
  It would be an understatement to say that the collapse of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime will have a devastating effect on the security 
and stability of the entire world.
  That is why the Review Conference is so important and why we must not 
let divisions between nuclear armed and non-nuclear armed states 
prevent the conclusion of a successful conference. We must come 
together to breathe new life into the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
and seriously consider the steps outlined above that will strengthen 
the treaty and make the world safer from the threat of nuclear terror.
  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

                          ____________________