[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 8538-8539]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 INTRODUCTION OF AIR CARGO SECURITY ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                          Tuesday, May 3, 2005

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, more than three and a half years after the 
September 11th attacks, gaping loopholes in our country's homeland 
security continue to put Americans at risk of another devastating 
attack. The Department of Homeland Security's former Inspector General 
Clark Kent Ervin testified recently before the Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight. Mr. Ervin told 
the Subcommittee that: ``Even in the area where the most time, 
attention, and resources have been invested--aviation security--serious 
vulnerabilities remain.''
  One of our most dangerous vulnerabilities is the failure to screen 
100 percent of the cargo that is carried on passenger planes and all-
cargo aircraft. Every time we fly, we wait in security lines, empty our 
pockets, remove our shoes, walk through metal detectors, and have our 
baggage inspected. We do not complain much--after all, we are told that 
this is required to keep our planes secure--and we accept that. But 
what many people do not realize is that every time commercial cargo is 
loaded onto the very same passenger planes or placed on aircraft that 
transport only cargo, almost none of it is ever inspected at all.
  The security risk created by unscreened cargo is not just 
theoretical: Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland by a bomb contained in unscreened baggage, and Air India 
flight 182 was downed in 1985 off the coast of Ireland by a bomb placed 
in unscreened luggage.
  Uninspected freight on all-cargo carriers also poses a serious 
danger. Last summer, the 9/11 Commission reported that Al Qaeda 
operative Zacharias Moussaoui's terrorist plans included ``buying four 
tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes.'' 
Ammonium nitrate is the same chemical compound that Timothy McVeigh 
used to kill 168 innocent men, women and children at the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 10 years ago. Less than two 
years ago, a young man shipped himself undetected aboard a cargo plane 
from New York to Texas. We were lucky he was just a lonely twenty-
something, not a terrorist.
  It is long past the time when we should have adopted a policy that 
subjects cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft to the same level of 
screening that is performed daily on passengers' checked and carry-on 
luggage.
  Today, Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) and I are introducing 
the Air Cargo Security Act to require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to establish and begin implementing a system to inspect all 
the cargo transported on passenger planes and all-cargo carriers, so 
that this cargo is subject to the same level of scrutiny as passengers' 
luggage. Our legislation also. includes additional measures to close 
the cargo loophole, such as: a mandate that the Secretary of Homeland 
Secretary establish systems to inspect cargo using equipment, 
technology and personnel that meet, at a minimum, the same standards 
established to inspect passenger baggage; a requirement that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and evaluate the research and 
development of effective cargo screening technologies; establishment of 
a system of regular inspection of shipping facilities for shipments of 
cargo to ensure that appropriate security controls and systems are 
observed, both at facilities inside the U.S. and abroad; a directive 
that the Secretary of Homeland Security report to Congress on the 
number of cargo shipping facilities that have been inspected, the 
number of facilities that have failed to comply with security controls, 
and the number of agreements concluded with foreign aviation 
authorities to ensure that regular inspections are conducted for cargo 
transported to the United States; and creation of a training and 
evaluation program for cargo handlers to improve the security ensure 
that cargo is safeguarded from security breaches.
  The House has voted overwhelmingly--by votes of 278 to 146 and 347 to 
47--to require 100 percent screening of cargo carried on passenger 
planes. The airline industry and the Bush Administration strenuously 
objected to the 100 percent screening mandate, and the Senate 
ultimately dropped it from the final

[[Page 8539]]

version of the Department's FY04 appropriations bill. Last year, the 
House narrowly defeated our 100 percent screening amendment after 
strong opposition from the airline industry.
  The experts who are our aviation system's ``eyes and ears''--namely, 
the pilots and flight attendants who work aboard aircraft everyday--
have endorsed the Air Cargo Security Act. The Coalition of Airline 
Pilots Associations (CAPA), which represents 22,000 pilots at American 
Airlines, Southwest, AirTran and other airlines, and the Association of 
Flight Attendants, with its 46,000 members, have endorsed this 
important legislation. Since introducing similar legislation last year, 
I have addressed the concerns of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 
by including all-cargo carriers under the 100 percent cargo screening 
mandate and providing for federal appropriations to implement this 
mandate. When I offered the Air Cargo Security Act as an amendment 
during the committee mark-up of the Homeland Security Department's FY06 
authorization bill, ALPA supported my amendment.
  While last year's appropriations bill for the Department and the 9/11 
reform implementation act included funding for cargo screening R&D, 
additional cargo inspectors, and related provisions, these measures do 
not go far enough.
  TSA currently handles the screening of cargo carried on passenger 
planes by using a process it calls the ``Known Shipper Program.'' The 
Known Shipper Program requires only paperwork to be filed, but no 
screening to be done. Mail and packages weighing less than 16 ounces 
are not even subject to the paperwork check--they are loaded straight 
onto the plane without even a perfunctory paper check! When it comes to 
freight on all-cargo carriers, inspection is the exception, not the 
rule--only a tiny portion is physically inspected before loading 
onboard. TSA now requires air carriers to conduct random inspections of 
cargo that are randomly verified by TSA--but this still results in 
almost none of the cargo on passenger planes being physically inspected 
for explosives or other dangerous materials. TSA is unable to inform us 
of how many cargo inspections are performed by the air carriers because 
the air carriers do not have to report to TSA the number of cargo 
inspections they conduct.
  Some have argued that the technology to screen 100 percent of cargo 
is not available. But there are numerous companies that are currently 
selling technology that is being used to screen cargo, including 
American Science and Engineering; L3 Security and Detection Systems; 
and Raytheon CargoScreen. Some have argued that 100 percent screening 
is not technically feasible. But countries including Israel, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands routinely screen cargo. Moreover, Logan 
Airport in Massachusetts, which has been conducting a cargo screening 
pilot program, reported in February that ``100 percent of all air cargo 
on all types of aircraft is technically possible.'' According to 
Massport, which is responsible for the operation of Logan Airport, a 
federal mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo and a funding mechanism 
to distribute cost among the major players involved are required. The 
Air Cargo Security Act provides this mandate and authorizes the 
appropriations needed to accomplish it.
  Some have argued that the Known Shipper Program is enough to assure 
the security of cargo. The Known Shipper Program is dangerously flawed 
and easily exploited. TSA has admitted that it has not audited most of 
the so-called known shippers in its database, and packages weighing 
less than 16 ounces are not even subject to the Known Shipper Program, 
even though the bomb that brought down Pan-Am Flight 103 contained less 
than 16 ounces of explosive!
  I urge my colleagues to support the Air Cargo Security Act and close 
a dangerous loophole that puts our Nation at risk.

                          ____________________