[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 7527-7528]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               ADMINISTRATION'S AMTRAK REFORM LEGISLATION

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR

                              of minnesota

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 20, 2005

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I join Chairman Young in introducing, by 
request, the Administration's Amtrak ``reform'' legislation. It is a 
common practice for the Chairman and Ranking Member of a Committee to 
jointly introduce an Administration's bill, regardless of which 
political party controls the White House or Congress or the specifics 
of proposed legislation, and I do this as a courtesy to the 
Administration. However, introducing a bill ``by request'' should not 
be interpreted to imply endorsement. In fact, in this instance, I am 
strongly opposed to the Administration's legislative proposal for 
Amtrak and the direction this Administration has chosen for intercity 
passenger rail service in our Nation.
  The Administration's proposal is nothing new. It is the same flawed 
bill that the Administration sent to Congress in 2003. The bill 
establishes two private for-profit corporations to separately manage 
and maintain infrastructure and operations, eliminates our Nation's 
intercity passenger rail network and shifts the cost burden of 
continuing rail service to the States, separates the Northeast Corridor 
from the rest of the rail network, divides Amtrak into three separate 
entities, and eliminates Federal operating support for all intercity 
passenger trains over a four-year period. As a practical matter, within 
three years, all long-distance train service is likely to be 
eliminated. Soon thereafter, the United States entire intercity 
passenger system could consist of skeletal service along the East and 
West coasts.
  The Administration's trust in the magic of privatization and 
decentralization to solve Amtrak's problems is astonishing. It shows 
this Administration's ignorance of the disastrous consequences of 
privatization and under-investment in rail. Great Britain's experience 
with privatization is a perfect example. In 1994, government-owned 
British Rail was dissolved and the British government separated 
intercity passenger rail infrastructure from operations. A private 
corporation called Railtrack took over ownership of all track, 
signaling, and stations. Passenger train operators competed with each 
other to provide service. Unfortunately, the new approach assumed that 
private sector innovation and discipline would drive down the railway's 
public funding requirement and drive up quality of service, overcoming 
recent trends of falling demand. It didn't work, and it led to tragic 
consequences.
  The safety of operations and the quality of service declined 
steadily. More than 30 people were killed in an accident at Ladbroke 
Grove in 1999 and four more were killed in an accident at Hatfield in 
2000. In 2001, another fatal accident occurred at Potters, just north 
of London. These accidents were directly traceable to privatization and 
Britain's long history of under-investment in rail.
  Today, the British government is reeling from the legacy left behind 
by privatization. The government has almost doubled funding for rail, 
and has taken steps to improve performance and tackle the backlog of 
maintenance and renewal needs that exploded under privatization. 
British government officials have described their rail privatization as 
``an absolute disaster''.
  Despite the British experience, the Bush Administration's blind faith 
in the ideology of privatization leads it down the same wrong path. Let 
us not repeat Britain's mistake. The solution to Amtrak's problems is 
not privatization. Amtrak's problems have one root cause: money. Lack 
of adequate investment and the annual threat of elimination have 
conditioned Amtrak to focus on survival.
  Amtrak's opponents are quick to point fingers at Amtrak management, 
and claim that private corporations could dramatically improve 
intercity passenger rail service. The truth is that a succession of 
hardworking and dedicated management teams at Amtrak could not do the 
impossible--that is, operate our Nation's intercity rail passenger 
service without a substantial level of investment from the Federal 
Government. Railroads throughout the

[[Page 7528]]

world receive some government support to supplement the revenues paid 
by passengers. But the Administration continues to insist on the 
impossible.
  Yet despite Amtrak's starvation budget, Amtrak has had its successes. 
Under David Gunn's leadership, Amtrak has improved operations and 
increased ridership to more than 25 million passengers in 2004: an 
increase of one million passengers from 2003 and an Amtrak record. In 
Southern California, Amtrak's Pacific Surfliner has had a 26.3 percent 
increase in ridership in the past year. In Southern California, 
Amtrak's Pacific Surfliner has had a 26.3 percent increase in ridership 
in the past year. Similarly, several Midwest trains, the Pere Marquette 
(up 22.1 percent), the State House (up 13 percent) and the Illini (up 
11.4 percent), experienced the next largest increases in passengers. In 
the East, regional trains carried more passengers than any other Amtrak 
service in the country, increasing from 5,760,499 last year to 
5,974,806--an increase of 3.7 percent.
  Amtrak has also made significant progress in rebuilding 
infrastructure and rolling stock after years of deferred maintenance. 
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 256,000 concrete ties were laid; 2,755 
bridge ties were replaced; 266 miles of continuous welded rail were 
installed; 34 miles of signal cable were replaced; and 19 stations and 
37 substations were improved.
  Amtrak's mechanical department plowed full steam ahead. In 2004, it 
remanufactured 180 passenger cars, rebuilt 51 wrecked cars and 
locomotives, and made seven Superliner baggage modifications in 
passenger cars.
  Amtrak sold excess equipment, eliminated unprofitable services, 
lowered fares on long-distance routes to increase ridership, and, in 
partnership with the State of California, opened a $71 million 
maintenance facility.
  In short, Amtrak is making great progress. All of this progress will 
halt under the Administration's radical Amtrak reform plan.
  Therefore, while I join in introducing this bill as a traditional 
courtesy to the Administration, I want to be clear that I do not 
support its initiatives. Together with Chairman Young, Subcommittee 
Chairman LaTourette, Subcommittee Ranking Member Brown, and the other 
Members of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, I 
strongly support both H.R. 1630, the Amtrak Reauthorization Act of 
2005, and H.R. 1631, the Rail Infrastructure Development and Expansion 
Act for the 21st Century (RIDE 21). In the 108th Congress, the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure reported similar bills 
with near unanimous bipartisan support. I am very hopeful that the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will again soon consider 
this bipartisan legislation and begin to provide the necessary 
investment for our Nation's intercity passenger rail system--that is 
the ``reform'' that Amtrak so direly needs.

                          ____________________