[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 22]
[Senate]
[Pages 30784-30785]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, just 1 month ago, this Congress approved 
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, of 2006. President Bush signed the bill into law on 
November 14. The act contains strong language concerning the political 
and military situation in Indonesia.
  Congress requested from the administration evidence of genuine 
progress in military reform, the protection of human rights, and 
accountability for crimes against humanity. It asked for such evidence 
before the administration made available to Indonesia any funds 
appropriated under the Foreign Appropriations Act for the Foreign 
Military Financing Program and before it issued any licenses for the 
export of lethal defense articles for the Indonesian Armed Forces.
  Congress also gave the administration the authority to waive these 
conditions when it is in the interests of national security to do so, 
as it usually does when placing these kinds of conditions on this or 
any administration.
  To measure the desired improvements in military reform, we asked the 
State Department to certify that, No. 1, the Indonesian Government is 
prosecuting and punishing, in a manner proportional to the crime, 
members of the Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have 
committed gross violations of human rights; No. 2, at the direction of 
the President of Indonesia, the Armed Forces are cooperating with 
civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to resolve 
cases of gross violations of human rights in East Timor and elsewhere; 
and No. 3, at the direction of the President of Indonesia, the 
Government of Indonesia is implementing reforms to improve civilian 
control of the military.
  Congress does not make these requests lightly, and we based our 
decision on four decades of Indonesian history and U.S.-Indonesian 
relations. The Indonesian Armed Forces have frequently acted to 
forestall progress and the growth of democracy in Indonesia. Over the 
last decade, taking note of this, Congress has placed certain 
restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia, and--over that same 
span of time--we have seen certain positive changes in TNI behavior.
  This progress is occurring--of course--in a larger context. Indonesia 
is making commendable progress in building one of the world's largest 
democracies, with democratic elections most recently in 2004.
  Congress did not include the conditions on aid for Indonesia's 
military contained in the Foreign Operations Act to hinder the 
development of Indonesian democracy or punish the Indonesian people, 
but to assist them as they build a better future for their country.
  The Indonesian Armed Forces have rightly been criticized in the past, 
but I also want to emphasize the changes we have seen, the positive 
steps Indonesia's military authorities have taken. Those steps are 
important and praiseworthy.
  The Armed Forces have revised their old ``Dual Function'' doctrine, 
an artifact of the Sukarno and Suharto years, under which the Armed 
Forces claimed both a military and a socio-political role in the life 
of the Indonesian state.
  Under Suharto, military officers also served as parliamentarians, 
provincial governors, mayors, civil servants, and teachers. The Armed 
Forces also controlled the police. They effectively controlled giant 
industrial and commercial concerns such as the state oil company.
  That has stopped. The TNI has stepped back from politics, and given 
up its reserved seats in the Indonesian Parliament.
  Indonesia's military officers have shown repeatedly in recent years 
that they accept their place in the new Indonesia, and during their 
country's last two national elections, they have behaved in an 
exemplary fashion.
  When Indonesia suffered the terrible blows inflicted upon it by last 
December's tsunami, the Indonesian military acted with bravery and 
great humanity to bring assistance to the victims of that most terrible 
natural disaster.
  We recognize what they have done and we admire their commitment to 
the new and more democratic system their country is building.
  Sadly, while the Indonesian Armed Forces have done a great deal, they 
have not done enough. Too many reasons for serious concern remain.
  Six years after the TNI's involvement in East Timor's referendum on 
independence left 1,400 people dead, the Indonesian authorities have 
not brought one Indonesian officer to justice for abuses committed in 
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[[Page 30785]]

Timorese capital of Dili and elsewhere in that island nation. Indeed, 
some officers suspected of serious abuses have received not punishment 
or censure, but promotions to higher grades of their services.
  There are numerous cases of human rights activists being harassed and 
even murdered, and we still have not seen justice for these victims.
  Last year, when Indonesia's Parliament was considering a South 
African-style truth and reconciliation commission to discuss past 
atrocities, military officials objected--strongly and publicly--to the 
inclusion of ``truth'' in the commission's title, warning any ensuing 
investigation into past human rights crimes would not help the aim of 
building national unity.
  During that debate, a retired Indonesian major general serving in 
Parliament, a man named Djasri Marin, said a remarkable thing. 
According to Australia's The Age newspaper, he said, ``If we reveal 
everything, it will be far from the idea of reconciliation, because 
there will be trials.'' He added, ``If we want to disclose everything 
for the sake of mere truth, it will prevent us from real reconciliation 
. . . Let's bury the past and step towards the future.''
  It will be difficult to move into a common future in a unified 
fashion if the Indonesian military cannot own up to its past and take 
responsibility for its actions. That is one reason why we need to 
continue promoting positive change within the Indonesian Army. We need 
to continue pressing for evidence of genuine military reform, human 
rights protections, and accountability for crimes against humanity, 
just as Congress has requested.
  In plain and simple language, Congress made its intent clear, asking 
the administration for evidence of genuine improvement in these three 
areas. It seems unlikely that either the President or the Secretary of 
State could have misunderstood or misconstrued this congressional 
expression of intent. Still, only a week after President Bush signed 
the Foreign Operations bill into law, the State Department hastily 
waived these conditions on military assistance, squandering an 
opportunity to encourage the TNI and Indonesian authorities to engage 
in meaningful reforms.
  The waiver authority, granted to the administration by Congress, 
comes with implicit expectations by Congress that the administration 
will use it wisely and well. During the few days that passed between 
the time the President affixed his signature to the Foreign 
Appropriations Act and the moment Under Secretary of State Nicholas 
Burns affixed his signature to the waiver, the President has little 
time to act on congressional concerns.
  We certainly saw no major advances in the three areas marked out by 
Congress. The TNI took no new steps to assure the appropriate 
prosecution and punishment of TNI members credibly alleged to have 
committed gross violations of human rights. The TNI took no new steps 
to show it is cooperating with civilian judicial authorities and with 
international efforts to resolve cases of gross violations of human 
rights in East Timor and elsewhere. The Indonesian authorities took no 
new steps to improve civilian control of the military. How could they? 
A week is hardly any time.
  The great irony of all this is that the amount of assistance affected 
would have been small; small, but of great symbolic importance. I 
regret to say that the administration's decision to waive these 
conditions on national security grounds is also of great symbolic 
importance. Congress was promoting accountability and the rule of law 
in a democratic system. The Department of State has said the 
administration remains committed to accountability, but its actions 
suggest otherwise.
  To waive these conditions in such a preemptory fashion raises serious 
questions about the relationship this administration has decided to 
have with Congress. In truth, it makes a mockery of the waiver process. 
Can we trust the administration to implement conditions like this in 
good faith? They waived the conditions--on supposed national security 
grounds--a week after the President signed the bill into law. It 
probably takes a week just to move a paper like that through the State 
Department bureaucracy.
  In truth, it demeans the process, making a national security waiver a 
waive-it-when-you-feel-like-it waiver, rather than a last resort when 
other priorities intrude.
  And so, I ask the administration, how shall we do business with one 
another in the future? Does the administration want us to eliminate 
such waiver authorities, so that its officers are required to give our 
concerns a fair hearing?
  The administration needs to do more to make sure that U.S. policy and 
U.S. assistance to Indonesia promote TNI accountability and discourage 
the impunity the TNI still enjoys. I respectfully disagree with MG 
Djasri Marin. Nobody can step towards the future by burying the past.
  We are intensely interested in Indonesia's future and the success of 
its democracy. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country, 
with an Islamic population larger than that of any other country on the 
planet. It unwillingly hosts a number of radical terrorist groups that 
have killed hundreds of Indonesian citizens and hundreds of foreign 
visitors to Indonesia's shores. It sits astride vital trade routes 
linking the Middle East to the Pacific.
  We want Indonesia to succeed, and we will continue to support the 
Indonesia Government and the Indonesian people. But uncritical 
assistance to the TNI will only hinder Indonesia's democratic 
transition and undermine our interests in that country.
  We know Indonesia faces a serious terrorist threat and that the 
Indonesian authorities must act to protect their nation's citizens from 
that threat. We have urged closer U.S. cooperation with Indonesian 
police authorities to face down terrorism, and we support efforts to 
fund, train, and equip the Indonesian police's anti-terrorism units. We 
applaud the Indonesian Government's determination to vet all members of 
such units to make sure they have not been involved in human rights 
violations.
  We do not dispute that the TNI could play an important and 
appropriate role in Indonesia's own fight against terrorism, but we 
cannot ignore the institution's history of human rights abuses. We 
should not lend American support to an unreformed TNI, a TNI that no 
Indonesian democratic institution can hold accountable for human rights 
abuses. Congress clearly expressed its intent in this regard.
  We will find ourselves on shaky ground--and place our 
counterterrorism strategy in the region at risk--if we do not press for 
reforms in an Army that considers itself above the law.
  I strongly urge the State Department to reconsider its decision to 
waive in such a preemptory fashion the restrictions placed upon 
military assistance to Indonesia by this Congress. The administration 
needs to provide Congress with a better sense of the benchmarks it is 
using to encourage TNI reform and measure TNI progress. And it needs to 
use its waiver authority more judiciously if it expects Congress to 
continue granting such authority.

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