[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 21]
[Senate]
[Pages 27972-27973]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 COMMENDING THE INDIANA WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM

 Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to commend the 
certification of the Indiana Civil Support Team and the support it will 
provide the people of Indiana in the event of an attack utilizing a 
weapon of mass destruction. During this holiday season, many prefer not 
to think of the horrors associated with nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, but the 22 members of the 53rd WMD-CST don't have 
that luxury. It is their job to help protect Hoosiers should a WMD 
attack occur in Indiana.
  On November 28, 2005, the Pentagon announced that the Indiana Civil 
Support Team was fully ready to assist civil authorities in responding 
to a domestic weapon of mass destruction incident. Stationed in 
Indianapolis, the team possesses the requisite skills, training and 
equipment to make a difference in assisting first responders and local 
officials in the critical moments immediately following a nuclear, 
radiological, chemical or biological event. The CST is able to deploy 
rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the nature of the 
attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the 
identification and arrival of follow-on State and Federal military 
response assets.
  In March 2004, I was pleased to join with Governor Kernan and Senator 
Bayh to announce the creation of the WMD-CST in Indiana. The team is 
made up of highly skilled, full-time members of the Indiana National 
Guard and Reserve who have completed 20 months of intense training. The 
team is equipped with sophisticated detection, analytical, monitoring, 
communications and protective equipment and is under the command and 
control of Governor Mitch Daniels. This signifies another important 
step to ensuring that our country, the State of Indiana, and our local 
communities are prepared should we face terrorists armed with a 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapon.
  Last week's announcement occurred with little fanfare and negligible 
public interest. This is unfortunate because the threat posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the No. 1 national 
security threat facing our country.
  Chemical weapons were introduced on the battlefields of World War I. 
Nuclear weapons ended World War II. Biological weapons were components 
of Cold War arsenals. The 20th century witnessed the brutal use of 
these powerful weapons by superpowers and nation-states. Technological 
advancements and the proliferation of weapons, materials and know-how 
have made weapons of mass destruction accessible to a growing number of 
national and non-state entities.
  Despite the threat of nuclear annihilation throughout the standoff 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was unfathomable 
that a religious sect could acquire the means to attack a major 
metropolitan subway system with biological weapons. Yet the Aum 
Shinrikyo dispersed anthrax in a Tokyo train station in March 1995. Who 
would have expected rebels from a remote region of the Caucasus to 
threaten the detonation of a radiological weapon in a Moscow park? 
Chechens did that in November 1995. Even more difficult to believe 
would have been the notion that the leader of a deadly terrorist 
organization would announce that it was the organization's mission to 
acquire a weapon of mass destruction and use it against the United 
States. Osama bin Laden did that in December 1998.
  The use of a weapon of mass destruction in the United States could 
cripple our economy, lead to the fall of our Government, and threaten 
large segments of our population with disease and death. During the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union had the resources and incentives to 
carefully guard and maintain these weapons and the scientific knowledge 
that produced them. But the political collapse of the Moscow government 
was accompanied by a broader economic collapse throughout the vast 
nation. Not only did Russia and the other successor states have few 
resources for maintaining the Soviet-era arsenal, they could not even 
afford to adequately pay members of the military and scientific 
community who had responsibility for safeguarding the weapons and 
related technology. The United States faced the grim possibility that 
weapons previously held in impenetrable Soviet facilities and 
technology previously restricted to the minds and computers of elite 
Soviet scientists could be stolen or sold to the highest bidder.
  As a country, we must acknowledge that the weapons that haunted the 
Cold War are now available to irrational and undeterrable foes. While 
the threat of nuclear attack from the Soviet Union was awesome, it was 
certain, in that we knew who and where our enemy was and had the 
ability to hold them at equal peril. The post-Cold War security 
environment is anything but certain. Battles are no longer determined 
by armored divisions taking and holding large swaths of territory, nor 
is strategic competition marked by the building of the biggest bomb or 
the longest range missiles. A small group of fanatics with the right 
contacts and resources can obtain and utilize a weapon of mass 
destruction that could destroy or make unlivable large portions of 
Washington, DC, New York, or Chicago. Similarly, toxins introduced into 
our food supply and distribution systems could spread disease and 
panic.
  There is no silver bullet to these threats. U.S. security will be 
secured by small numbers of American Government officials and 
contractors working with former enemies to eliminate the weapons that 
could threaten the future of our country. It will also depend on 
American allies working closely and effectively in detecting and 
interdicting these weapons and local police officers, medical 
personnel, and guardsmen preparing to respond to a WMD event.
  Since the end of the Cold War, I have worked with colleagues here in 
Congress and the executive branch to defend the American people from 
these threats. I have often described the best strategy to deal with 
the WMD threat as ``defense in depth,'' layers of defensive efforts 
designed to stop a nuclear, chemical and biological weapon from 
reaching our shores.
  The first line of defense is prevention and entails activities at the 
source to stop weapons, materials and know-how from leaving their 
current locations. The second is detection and interdiction and 
involves efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and 
materials at foreign and domestic borders. The third line of defense is 
crisis and consequence management and requires domestic preparedness 
should such threats turn into hostile acts. Individually, each of these 
lines of defense is insufficient; together, they help to form the 
policy fabric of an integrated defense-in-depth.
  In 1991, I joined with Senator Sam Nunn and co-authored the Nunn-
Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The program's goal is to 
address

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the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons at their 
source. Over the program's first decade and a half it has focused on 
the threats emanating from the former Soviet Union. When the USSR 
crumbled, it had the largest nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals 
in the world. The next day, four new independent countries emerged from 
the ashes with nuclear weapons. The totalitarian command and control 
system that secured the chemical and biological weapons arsenals and 
infrastructure disappeared. Divisions of ballistic missiles, wings of 
long-range bombers, and fleets of strategic missile submarines were 
left with a bankrupt, dysfunctional master and numerous individuals and 
organizations seeking to steal them.
  The Nunn-Lugar Program has made excellent progress in eliminating 
these threats. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third, 
fourth and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today all three 
are nuclear weapons free. More than 6,760 nuclear warheads, each 
capable of destroying an American city, have been deactivated. Nearly 
2,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles fired from land-based silos, 
missile submarines, and bombers have been eliminated. Two-thirds of the 
Soviet Union's strategic bomber force and over half of its strategic 
submarine force have been destroyed.
  The Soviet Union also left behind enormous quantities of chemical and 
biological weapons materials. Russia declared a chemical weapons 
stockpile of 40,000 metric tons stored under questionable. A public 
accounting of the Soviet biological weapons programs has never been 
made, but it is believed to be the largest and most advanced in the 
world. Tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians had 
assisted in the development of the Soviet Union's weapons of mass 
destruction. With the economies of Russia and other republics in bad 
shape, many of these experts faced unemployment, and concerns existed 
that they might have an incentive to sell their skills to other 
countries and terrorist organizations. In each of these cases, Nunn-
Lugar has responded with innovative dismantlement strategy for the 
chemical weapons stocks, elimination of biological weapons production 
capacity and security upgrades for pathogen collections, and partnering 
with the private sector to find long-term, peaceful employment for 
former weapons experts.
  Nunn-Lugar has also taken on formerly top-secret missions to remove 
dangerous weapons and materials before they could fall into the wrong 
hands. In November 1994, the United States launched Project Sapphire to 
remove 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and 
ship it to Oak Ridge, TN. More recently, Operation Auburn Endeavor was 
carried out in Georgia to remove HEU and transport it to Scotland. In 
Moldova, the United States removed fourteen MIG-29s capable of 
launching nuclear weapons because of efforts by a number of rogue 
states to acquire them.
  Despite the progress we made in the former Soviet Union, the skills 
and capabilities of the Nunn-Lugar Program were confined to that 
geographical region. In 2004, Congress changed that by approving the 
Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act which authorized the use of up to $50 million 
in Nunn-Lugar funds for activities outside the former Soviet Union. 
This authority will be used for the first time in Albania to destroy 
nearly 16 tons of chemical weapons and consideration is being given for 
the program to work in Libya and countries in Southeast Asia.
  Earlier this year, I joined with Senator Barack Obama to introduce 
legislation focused on improving the capabilities of other nations to 
detect and interdict weapons and materials of mass destruction and 
bolstering, expanding, and improving the second line of defense. The 
United States military and intelligence services cannot be everywhere. 
We need the cooperation and vigilance of like-minded nations if we are 
to successfully detect and interdict WMD threats before they can be 
used against their targets. The United States has constructed the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, which enlisted the participation of 
other nations in the interdiction of WMD, but it lacks a coordinated 
effort to improve the capabilities of our foreign partners so that they 
can play a larger and more effective role.
  The Lugar-Obama bill earmarks 25 percent of the Nonproliferation, 
Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account to address the 
shortcomings in the State Department's response. If currently law, this 
would have amounted to $110 million this year. Our bill goes one step 
further by calling on the State Department to also commit 25 percent of 
annual foreign military financing amounts to nations for the purchase 
of equipment to improve their ability to detect and interdict WMD. This 
would represent a potent but flexible tool that could help build a 
network of WMD detection and interdiction capabilities world wide and 
contribute to U.S. national security.
  Senator Obama and I recently wrote in the Washington Post that the 
United States cannot stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction alone. We need the vigilance of like-minded nations, but 
many of our potential partners lack the capability to detect hidden 
weapons and interdict shipments. We believe our legislation will 
address this gap.
  If weapons or materials of mass destruction elude U.S. programmatic 
efforts at the source, at international borders, and our own borders, 
the next line of defense must take the form of help to local ``first 
responders''--the firemen, police, emergency management teams, and 
medical personnel who will be on the front lines.
  In 1996, I joined my colleagues Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici in 
offering the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici ``Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction'' legislation. For the first time, it directed the 
professionals from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency to join into a partnership with local 
emergency professionals in cities across the country, including 
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne.
  The Pentagon developed plans to supply training and equipment to 120 
cities across the country. In February 1998, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 
Domestic Preparedness Program visited Indianapolis and Marion County. 
Six hundred fifty first responders received training to respond to 
nuclear, chemical and biological incidents. In the years that followed, 
thousands of additional professionals received instruction through the 
program's train-the-trainer program. In 2000, Fort Wayne and Allen 
County received similar training under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program.
  The training proved its worth when Indianapolis was confronted with 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Planned Parenthood clinics 
in Indianapolis and New Albany and at St. Matthews Catholic Church and 
elsewhere received anthrax threats. We were relieved that the threats 
were determined to be false but proud to see the professional manner in 
which the city's first responders reacted to the threat and treated the 
potential victims.
  Over the last 15 years, I have worked closely with both Bush 
administrations and President Clinton to safeguard the American people 
from the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. We still 
have much work to do, but the certification of the Indiana WMD-CST 
makes the people of Indiana safer. I am thankful that in the event of a 
WMD incident, the people of Indiana will not be alone. Local first 
responders and the WMD-CST will be there to provide assistance and 
expertise.

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