[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 20]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 27526-27527]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, November 18, 2005

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, ten years ago this month a 
genocidal conflict was brought to an end in the Balkans. By initialing 
a ``General Framework for Peace'' at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
near Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina emerged from almost four years of that conflict wondering 
whether it could survive as an independent unitary state and recover 
from the utter destruction not only of its towns and cities but of its 
own, multi-ethnic society.
  Time dulls our recollection of what the carnage in Bosnia was really 
about, so I believe

[[Page 27527]]

it important to recall the nature of this, the most horrific phase of 
Yugoslavia's violent and bloody demise. Active on the Helsinki 
Commission which I co-chair today, I took part in many sobering 
hearings which documented the atrocities and discussed policy 
responses.
  The Bosnian conflict was, in large part, characterized not by 
opposing military forces but by groups of thugs, armed and orchestrated 
by the Milosevic regime in Serbia, wreaking havoc on innocent 
civilians. Tens of thousands were raped or tortured in detention 
centers and camps established across the country. While figures may 
vary substantially, the death toll is commonly estimated at about 
200,000, while two million people--half the country's population--were 
displaced. We can well remember the photos of emaciated detainees at 
Omarska, the live coverage of the shelling and siege of Sarajevo, and 
the recently released video footage of the execution of captured young 
men near Srebrenica.
  While the decreasing advantages enjoyed by the Serb militants by late 
1995 made a settlement possible, the Dayton Agreement did, in fact, 
help to bring this nightmare to an end. At the same time, we cannot 
ignore the fact that its compromises reflect a failure by the 
international community, including the United States, to intervene much 
earlier in the conflict in response to clear violations of 
international principles and what many, including myself, consider a 
genocide.
  The international community repeatedly failed to take decisive 
action, including the credible threat of the use of force, to compel 
the brazen Serb militants to stop their aggression. Instead, time was 
spent deploying peacekeeping forces under United Nations auspices when 
there was no peace to keep. UNPROFOR's presence thwarted more effective 
responses, such as lifting the arms embargo which denied the sovereign 
country of Bosnia and Herzegovina its right, as a member of the United 
Nations, to defend itself. As town after town, including some declared 
to be ``safe-havens'' by the United Nations, fell to the forces of 
ethnic cleansing, the international community acquiesced to a reality, 
codified by Dayton, of a country divided into two political entities 
characterized by an ethnic bias unworthy of 21st century democracy. One 
entity is a Bosnian Federation forged by the United States in 194 
between Bosnia's Muslims or Bosniaks, and Croats. The other entity, 
Republika Srpska, is dominated by Serbs and represents what the 
militants among them started the conflict to create.
  The compromises accepted at Dayton, influenced by years of 
international inaction, also have made subsequent implementation 
difficult, and extremely expensive in terms of personnel, equipment and 
funds. Many persons indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide evaded justice for years, some to wreak havoc later in 
Kosovo and elsewhere, and some like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, 
remain at large. With the economy destroyed and both organized crime 
and official corruption rampant, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
became passive and dependent on the international community for their 
very survival.
  Perhaps the greatest flaw in the Dayton Agreement was its heavy 
reliance on Slobodan Milosevic himself to follow its terms, which he 
did only under considerable pressure. Betting on the man most 
responsible for igniting the conflict meant undercutting the 
development of democratic forces in Serbia which are necessary for the 
long-term stability of southeastern Europe. Many of us worked hard to 
correct this flaw in the immediate post-Dayton years, and continue to 
encourage democratic forces in Serbia to reckon fully with the 
Milosevic legacy.
  Fortunately, along with the eventual ouster of Slobodan Milosevic in 
Serbia, we have seen more vigorous and positive action to move ahead in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the past five years. More of the 
displaced have returned to their original homes than was thought 
possible when Dayton was negotiated. It hasn't been easy for many who 
return as members of a minority population, but determination has 
helped them to prevail. More and more individuals indicted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including 
Milosevic, have been transferred to The Hague, and, at a recent 
Helsinki Commission briefing, we learned that Bosnia's own War Crimes 
Chamber has been established and is ready to conduct sensitive trials 
in accordance with the rule of law. Srebrenica is being acknowledged as 
the crime that it was. Defense and police reform are underway, helping 
to pave the way for Bosnia's further Euro-Atlantic and European 
integration. The region around Brcko, so brutally contested during the 
conflict that not even Dayton could determine its status, now provides 
a model of multiethnic cooperation and economic recovery for the rest 
of the country. There are now discussions of constitutional reforms 
which, if adopted, will hopefully make the country of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina a sum of its citizens and not a balance of its ethnicities.
  If the Dayton Agreement succeeded in anything, Mr. Speaker, it was 
because its detailed provisions and improved implementation have 
provided the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina with both the parameters 
of a state and enough time to bring their country back from the abyss. 
I have increasing confidence that they will succeed in moving from what 
was admittedly a ``General Framework for Peace'' to a solid basis for 
unity, freedom, prosperity and integration.
  In the meantime, the international community has much it still needs 
to learn and develop. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave new 
purpose to NATO and enabled it to begin operating out of area. Fifty 
years after the Holocaust, those who commit war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide no longer operate with complete impunity. Still, 
the international community--whether the United States and its allies, 
regional bodies or the United Nations--remains slow in responding to 
human suffering, or in recognizing the implications massive human 
rights violations can have on international security. It too readily 
accepts the reality of innocent people being attacked, brutalized and 
killed. Look at the response during the assault on Srebrenica and then 
at the response to Darfur today; the similarities are strong.
  I therefore hope, Mr. Speaker, that Dayton's tenth anniversary is 
commemorated in a way that includes not only encouragement for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to move beyond the agreement's limiting provisions, but 
encouragement for all policymakers to learn from the lessons of 
inaction in the face of evil.

                          ____________________