[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27228-27232]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    JACK MURTHA, AN AMERICAN PATRIOT

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, yesterday, as all of us know, Jack Murtha, 
one of the most respected Congressmen on military affairs, one of the 
most respected Congressmen on national security issues, a former marine 
drill sergeant and a decorated Vietnam veteran, spoke out on our policy 
in Iraq. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Congressman Murtha is not 
the point. He did not come to this moment lightly. Any one of us who 
knows Congressman Murtha or anybody who has worked with him over these 
years, Republican or Democrat, respects this man, respects his personal 
commitment to our country, respects his understanding of these issues, 
and understands he did not come to that moment lightly.
  He spoke his mind and he spoke his heart out of love for his country 
and out of absolute and total unconditional support for the troops, of 
which he was once one.
  I do not intend to stand for, nor should any of us in the Congress 
stand for, another Swiftboat attack on the character of Jack Murtha. It 
frankly disgusts me that a bunch of guys who never chose to put on the 
uniform of their country now choose in the most personal way, in the 
most venomous, to question the character of a man who did wear the 
uniform of his country and who bled doing it. It is wrong. He served 
heroically in uniform. He served heroically for our country.
  Have we lost all civility and all common sense in this institution 
and in this city? No matter what J.D. Hayworth says, there is no 
sterner stuff than the backbone and courage that defines Jack Murtha's 
character and his conscience.
  Dennis Hastert, the Speaker of the House, who never chose to put on 
the uniform of his country and serve, called Jack Murtha a coward and 
accused him of wanting to cut and run. On its face, looking at the 
record, looking at his life, Jack Murtha has never cut and run from 
anything. Jack Murtha was not a coward when he put himself in harm's 
way for his country in Vietnam and he earned two Purple Hearts. He was 
a patriot then and he is a patriot today. He deserves his views to be 
respected, not vilified.
  Jack Murtha did not cut and run when his courage earned him a Bronze 
Star, and his voice ought to be heard today, not silenced by those who 
would actually choose to cut and run from the truth.
  Just a day after Vice President Dick Cheney, who himself had five 
deferments from service to his country because, as he said, he had 
other priorities than serving his country, just 1 day after he accused 
Democrats of being unpatriotic, the White House accused Jack Murtha of 
surrendering.
  Jack Murtha served 37 years in the U.S. Marine Corps. Jack Murtha 
does not know how to surrender, not to enemy combatants and not to 
politicians in Washington who say speaking one's conscience is 
unpatriotic.
  The other day we celebrated what would have been the 80th birthday of 
Robert Kennedy. When Robert Kennedy opposed the war in Vietnam, despite 
the fact that his brother and the administration he was in had been 
involved in articulating that policy, he talked about how there was 
blame enough to go around. He also said the sharpest criticism often 
goes hand in hand with the deepest idealism and love of country.
  Chuck Hagel showed that he has not forgotten that when he said: The 
Bush administration must understand that each American has a right to 
question our policies in Iraq and should not be demonized for 
disagreeing with them.
  Too many people seem to have forgotten that long ago and too many of 
our friends on the other side of the aisle somehow think that asking 
tough questions is pessimism. It is not pessimism. It is patriotism. It 
is how one lives in a democracy. We are busy trying to take to Iraq and 
take to Afghanistan and take to the world the democracy we love and we 
are somehow unwilling to fully practice it at home.
  We have seen the politics of fear and smear too many times. Whenever 
challenged, there are some Republican leaders who engage in the 
politics of personal destruction rather than debate the issues. It does 
not matter who one is. When they did it to John McCain, we saw that it 
does not matter what political party one is in. When they did it to Max 
Cleland, we saw that it does not matter if one's service put them in a 
wheelchair. And when they did it to Jack Murtha yesterday, perhaps the 
most respected voice on military matters in all of the Congress, we saw 
that some in this administration and their supporters will go to any 
lengths to crush any dissent.
  Once again, some are engaged in the lowest form of smear-and-fear 
politics because I guess they are afraid of actually debating a senior 
Congressman who has advised Presidents of both parties on how to best 
defend our country. They are afraid to debate the substance with a 
veteran who lives and breathes the concerns of our troops, not the 
empty slogans that sent our troops to war without adequate body armor, 
without adequate planning, without adequate strategy.
  Maybe they are terrified of actually leveling with the American 
people about the way that they did, in fact, mislead the country into 
war or of admitting that they have no clear plan to finish the job and 
get our troops home.
  Whether one agrees with Jack Murtha's policy statement yesterday is 
irrelevant. The truth is there is a better course for our troops and a 
better course for America in Iraq. The Senate itself went on record 
this week as saying exactly that. Every Senator in this body voted one 
way or the other to express their feelings about Iraq.
  I intend to keep fighting, along with a lot of other people, to make 
certain we take that better course for the good of our country.
  American families who have lost or who fear the loss of their loved 
ones plain deserve to know the truth about what we have asked them to 
do, what we are doing to complete the mission, and what we are doing to 
prevent our forces from being trapped in an endless quagmire. Our 
military families understand--I mean, all one has to do is visit with 
them when they come here and they talk about their sons, their 
husbands, and their fathers who are over there. They are concerned and 
want an open debate about what will best support the troops and how to 
get them home the fastest with the job done the most effectively.
  The only way to get it done right in Iraq, the only way to get our 
sons and daughters home, is for all of us to weigh in on this issue. We 
also need to be mindful that as the White House yet again engages in a 
character assassination to stop Americans from listening to the words 
of a military expert and understanding the consequences, we need to 
understand the consequences of the road we have already traveled 
because when one looks at the road we have already traveled, it makes 
it even more imperative that we have this debate and engage in this 
dialogue.
  It is a stunning and tragic journey that on many different occasions 
even defies fundamental common sense and leaves a trail of broken 
promises. From the very start, when we were talking about what it might 
cost or not cost, when an administration official suggested it would 
cost $200 billion, he was fired, not listened to. When people wondered 
how we would pay for the war and we were told the oil will pay for it, 
while others were saying the oil infrastructure was not sufficient to 
pay for it, they were not listened to. When the administration could 
have listened to General Shinseki and actually put in enough troops to 
maintain order, they chose not to. When they could have learned from 
George Herbert Walker Bush and built a genuine global coalition so we 
had the world with us, not most of the world questioning us or against 
us, they chose not to. When they could have implemented a detailed 
State Department plan for reconstructing post-Saddam Iraq, they chose 
not to. When they could have protected American forces and prevented 
our kids from getting blown up by ammunition that was in the dumps of 
Saddam Hussein and in the various locations our military were aware of, 
they chose not to. Instead of guarding

[[Page 27229]]

those ammunition dumps and armories, they chose not to. When they could 
have imposed immediate order and structure in Baghdad after the fall of 
Saddam, Secretary Rumsfeld shrugged his shoulders and said, Baghdad was 
safer than Washington, DC, and they chose not to take action.
  When the administration could have kept an Iraqi army selectively 
intact, they chose not to. When they could have kept an entire civil 
structure functioning in order to deliver basic services to Iraqi 
citizens, they chose not to. When they could have accepted the offers 
of the nations and individual countries to provide on-the-ground 
peacekeepers, reconstruction assistance, they chose not to. When they 
should have leveled with the American people that the insurgency had in 
fact grown, they chose not to. Vice President Cheney even absurdly 
claimed that the insurgency was in its last throes.
  All of these mistakes tell us something. They scream out for a 
debate. They scream out for a dialogue. They scream out for a policy 
that gets it right.
  We are in trouble today precisely because of a policy of cut and run 
where the administration made the wrong choice to cut and run from 
established procedures of gathering intelligence and of how it is 
evaluated and shared with the Congress; to cut and run from the best 
military advice; to cut and run from sensible wartime planning; to cut 
and run from their responsibility to properly arm and protect our 
troops; to cut and run from history's clear lessons about the Middle 
East and about Iraq itself; to cut and run from common sense. That is 
the debate some people appear to want to avoid in this country.
  Instead of letting his cronies verbally blast away, the President 
ought to finally find the will to debate the real issue instead of 
destroying anyone who speaks truth to power as they see it.
  It is time for Americans to stand up and fight back against this kind 
of politics and make it clear that it is unacceptable to do this to any 
leader of any party anywhere in our country at any time. We can 
disagree, but we do not have to engage in this kind of personal attack 
and personal destruction.
  I hope my colleagues will come to the floor and engage in this 
debate. Our country will be stronger for it. That is what we ought to 
do instead of attacking the character of a man such as Jack Murtha. 
Believe me, that is a fight nobody is going to win in our America.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I ask unanimous consent to consume such time as I may take.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am going to speak in a moment about the 
PATRIOT Act, but before I do, I want to respond to a couple of comments 
that were made by the Senator from Massachusetts.
  I served with Congressman Murtha when I was in the House of 
Representatives, and there is no greater patriot in the United States 
than Congressman Murtha. In that, the Senator from Massachusetts and I 
agree. I disagree with Congressman Murtha's opinions, but that is a 
matter of debate and that is one of the reasons we have the kind of 
open society that we do.
  I do not think anyone is trying to crush debate or dissent or prevent 
questions from being asked. But it is a fact that when the President of 
the United States is accused of deliberate manipulation of intelligence 
to bring us into war--some have even said lied in order to bring us 
into war--that deserves response. That is part of a healthy debate.
  When the President spoke in response, I think he was entitled to be 
listened to and not ridiculed and not condemned for criticizing those 
who disagreed with him. Neither side need back away from making their 
arguments and arguing that the other side is wrong. But of course no 
one should be questioning anyone else's patriotism. It is assumed 
anyone who serves this Government, and certainly anyone who has put on 
the uniform of this Government, is a patriot. In the case of 
Congressman Murtha, I would be the first to assert that fact.
  I think there are two critical facts with respect to this dispute. 
The first set of facts is that our intelligence, and that of virtually 
every other nation in the world, believed that Saddam Hussein was a 
threat to the world and had weapons of mass destruction and in some 
cases was developing capability for additional weapons of mass 
destruction, such as nuclear weapons. Some of that intelligence turned 
out not to be correct. But it does not mean that the people who debated 
the issues were liars or deliberately misrepresenting the facts. I 
daresay, if you took comments I made on the floor of the Senate and 
comments the Senator from Massachusetts made on the floor of the 
Senate, they would align pretty closely. They were pretty similar 
because they were based on the same intelligence. The same thing was 
said by other Democrats and Republicans, by people in the 
administration, by people in the former administration. I do not think 
it is appropriate to assign deliberate motives to mislead to any of 
those people.
  I myself believe that the information was not correct with respect to 
the weapons of mass destruction but that the people who were giving it 
to us honestly believed it was correct. So I don't even think the 
people in the CIA were deliberately misleading anyone, though they 
turned out to be wrong. Can't we agree that people make mistakes, 
especially with respect to that murky area of intelligence where 
nothing is ever black and white, where everyone is always gathering 
bits and pieces of information and trying to construct a jigsaw puzzle 
out of it when a lot of pieces are missing and where the enemy is 
deliberately trying to deceive you? It is very difficult business. 
While I am somewhat critical, as a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, of the people who were engaged in the activity at the time, 
I don't question their motives either.
  The other fact that I think is true is that it would be wrong for us 
to leave Iraq now. This is where I would disagree with Congressman 
Murtha. I believe the consequences of leaving or setting up a timetable 
to leave soon, before the job is done, would not only be absolutely 
devastating for the people in Iraq who have been trying to set up their 
own government but would also set us back in the war against these 
terrorists, these evildoers, these radical Islamists who are watching 
very carefully what we do in Iraq. When you remember what Saddam 
Hussein said about the weak horse and the strong horse, you know how 
important it is for the United States to maintain a firm, strong 
position with respect to completing the job in Iraq.
  To the extent that there is a suggestion that we will back out if 
they keep enough pressure on us, it does play into their hands because 
they simply play the waiting game in order to wait us out until they 
can move in and do more evil deeds. That is where I think the debate 
comes down. It is a legitimate debate to have, but I think the 
President is on the right side of that debate. We have to finish the 
job before we withdraw.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I respect the comments of the Senator and I 
appreciate the way he has approached it and I am grateful to him and 
thank him, as I am sure others do, for his comments about Congressman 
Murtha. I know he would agree with me that those who suggested what he 
is saying is cowardly or suggested that is surrender, that those are 
words probably inappropriate in this debate. I think the Senator would 
agree with me that those characterizations have no place here. And he 
is right about the question of how everybody approached the 
intelligence. We all did have a unified belief about the existence of 
weapons--most of us.
  But I disagree with the Senator. I would ask him if he does not agree 
that there are legitimate areas of inquiry, which the Intelligence 
Committee is

[[Page 27230]]

now pursuing, with respect to what happened to certain intelligence 
that came to the Congress? For instance--about five areas. One was the 
speech that was made by the President, where he referenced nuclear 
materials coming from Africa which, in fact, the CIA on three different 
occasions, both verbally and in writing, informed the White House: 
Don't use this. But nevertheless it was used.
  Whether that was intentional or inadvertent, all we know is that 
winds up being misleading because the CIA disagreed with the evidence.
  Likewise, telling America they could deliver biological, chemical 
weapons within the period of 45 minutes, which was disagreed with in 
the intelligence community, was not signed off within the intelligence 
community.
  Likewise, suggesting Iraq had trained al-Qaida in the creation of 
bombs, bomb making, and poison creation--not agreed by the intelligence 
community; in fact, erroneous.
  Likewise, as the Vice President said on several occasions, that there 
was a meeting between Iraq and al-Qaida operatives, a meeting that the 
intelligence community did not substantiate, which we now know did not 
take place.
  Those are, on their face, misleading representations made to us, 
which Members of the Congress operated on. I would assume the Senator 
would agree the mere fact that there were no weapons of mass 
destruction means we were all misled. Whether it was intentional is the 
operative question.
  I can't tell you whether it was intentional. But I certainly know 
that when you ignore the CIA's warnings, don't use this intelligence, 
and nevertheless it winds up in the State of the Union message, there 
is a disconnect that raises the most serious questions, that leaves a 
lot of us wondering.
  I ask the Senator, does he not agree that those instances where the 
intelligence community is in disagreement and they don't tell us they 
are in disagreement and we don't get the same intelligence, provides 
some serious questions?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I was very happy to have the Senator from 
Massachusetts take a long time to make a lot of points, asking an 
important question. Therefore, I am happy to engage in what amounts to 
a debate on the issue. I would be delighted to comment on the specifics 
that he points out.
  I served on the Intelligence Committee for 8 years during this period 
of time and have a fair degree of information about it. I need to 
reflect a little bit carefully about what one can now say because, 
after a while, you realize, when you are on the committee, it is better 
not to say a lot because it might be one of the things you should not 
be talking about. But I think I should speak to each of these items.
  The last one first. No, I don't agree that being in error is the same 
as misleading. I don't think that the people in the intelligence 
agencies were misleading us. They were, in some instances, in error. 
Frequently, they expressed their views with caveats and degrees of 
certainty that, frankly, are not reflected in the public debate.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KYL. Let me make my point here. They have a very careful way of 
expressing their views. In the public debate, I have noted the 
political people are not nearly as nuanced and careful in expressing 
these views as the member of the intelligence community is.
  Second, with respect to that, ordinarily the way that views were 
expressed to us, and specifically in this case, they represented the 
majority opinion or the consensus within the intelligence community. 
Where there were significant questions or differences of opinion within 
the intelligence community, those were noted and sometimes with respect 
to some issues, there were divisions. Without getting into a lot of 
detail, there has been a lot of talk about another issue that the 
Senator did not raise, the so-called aluminum tubes. Without getting 
into a big debate about it, you had the majority of the intelligence 
community believing that those were for one purpose related to 
production of nuclear materials. And you had a couple of other agencies 
that had expertise in the area saying they didn't think so.
  I am not sure that anyone has ever concluded which were actually 
correct, or not, but a lot of information has been thrown out that 
clearly the majority opinion was wrong. I don't know that one can say 
that.
  So I think we have to be careful. There are frequently, in 
intelligence estimates, little caveats: We are not sure how good this 
particular source is; we are not sure about this particular element.
  But usually a consensus is reached. That consensus is what was 
briefed to us and that is what we were relying on. With respect to the 
four specific points--with respect to the issue of yellow cake coming 
from Niger, it was a fact that the intelligence the United States had 
was not nearly as conclusive as the intelligence from Great Britain, 
and therefore the President was advised--not the President himself 
directly but his speechwriters were advised--not to suggest that our 
intelligence confirmed the attempts of Iraq to acquire this nuclear 
material from Niger but rather to refer to a different intelligence 
service which, in fact, had concluded that the attempt had been made. 
That was the British service and that was the reference in the speech. 
The British service still stands by its position.
  With respect to the bioweapons, there was very good evidence to 
suggest, prior to the war, that Saddam Hussein not only had a viable 
bioterrorism program but that he had even mobilized--in one respect, 
mobilized that program.
  I am not certain we can say, from the Senate floor, how we have 
finally evaluated the intelligence with respect to that. I think it 
would be probably difficult for any Senator to discuss the issue in 
great length. I would be willing to acknowledge that, certainly, 
questions have been raised about whether it turns out that there were 
mobile units devoted to creation of bioweapons.
  Third, with respect to the intelligence that Iraq agents had actually 
instructed terrorists in bomb making and poison making, that 
information was very clear. It was issued by CIA Director George Tenet. 
It was public information, so that can be discussed on the floor of the 
Senate, and I am aware of nothing that draws any question about that 
particular evidence. I do not recall whether it specifically related to 
al-Qaida or terrorists or al-Qaida-connected terrorists. I probably 
should not speak to that issue because I am not certain how much is 
classified. But it is absolutely certain in public testimony, and in a 
letter George Tenet specifically sent to the Congress he discussed the 
issue of Iraq training terrorist bomb makers in the art of chemical 
weapon-making.
  Finally, in regard to this alleged meeting that never actually 
occurred, if it is the meeting in Czechoslovakia that the Senator was 
referring to, that is a matter of dispute. I don't think it has ever 
been resolved one way or the other.
  The point of all of this is it is one thing to say the intelligence 
was inconclusive and in some cases that there were disputes in the 
intelligence community and in some cases it was not accurate. It is 
quite another to allege that the people who used the intelligence were 
misleading other people.
  Certainly, I was not deliberately misleading anyone, and I am certain 
the Senator from Massachusetts was not deliberately misleading anyone 
when we said roughly the same thing based upon the same intelligence 
that suggested that Saddam Hussein was a threat and had weapons of mass 
destruction.
  The final point on this, and then I do want to turn to the PATRIOT 
Act, there is a bit of a double standard in that critics of the 
administration are now saying: You can't just look to the consensus 
opinion, you need to look at some of those within the intelligence 
community who were dissenting about certain aspects of intelligence, 
the so-called nuggets. If you look deeply into this report, you will 
find there was some element of it that did not quite jibe with the rest 
of the consensus or

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there was some entity in our Government that didn't totally agree with 
the consensus opinion. As I said, you are going to see that through any 
national intelligence estimate or any other description of intelligence 
analysis.
  We encourage that. One of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, and 
the other commissions that have looked into this, is that there is not 
enough devil's advocacy going on. There is too much ``group think'' 
within the intelligence community. So it is a good thing to have that 
intelligence questioned.
  I remember there was actually criticism of Vice President Cheney 
because he went down to the CIA headquarters and had the temerity to 
ask these agents: Are you sure about this? Are you sure about this 
intelligence?
  They said: What's he doing that for?
  He is a so-called consumer of the intelligence. He has every right to 
say: Are you absolutely sure of this?
  People within the administration should be questioning as well. That 
is why I think it is so unfortunate that there is, literally, a cabal 
to attack the Defense Department for questioning some of the 
intelligence community's estimates--not all of which turned out to be 
right, as we know. But there is an investigation that has been actually 
formally requested. In order to get it resolved, the Defense Department 
has agreed to conduct an inspector general's investigation into one of 
the offices of the Department of Defense, into the question of whether 
it should have questioned the intelligence of the CIA and taken its 
analysis and its questions to other people within the Defense 
Department or the national security apparatus of the administration.
  Why not? The whole point of these commission recommendations is 
people ought to be asking questions. The CIA is not a monastery of 
monks who get manipulated intelligence that nobody else ever looks at. 
The whole point of gathering intelligence is so our policymakers can 
use it and make decisions based upon it. When the policymakers have 
questions about it, they have every right to ask those questions. And 
when there is some evidence that suggests the intelligence is not 
exactly accurate, they have a duty to raise that kind of issue.
  There is a bit of a double standard going on that when one wants to 
criticize the administration and wants to play devil's advocate, there 
was a little bit of evidence over here that contradicted the consensus 
in the community, and we should have paid more attention to that. Maybe 
so. You can't turn around and criticize those, in this case, in the 
Department of Defense who saw the same infirmities, and who had 
questions about the CIA intelligence and now are being criticized 
because they had the temerity to raise those questions. You can't have 
it both ways.
  In reality, intelligence is an imperfect proposition at best, and we 
ought to be playing devil's advocate and be asking tough questions 
about it. But I daresay, unless you get very good evidence that someone 
was deliberately lying or misleading, you shouldn't throw those kinds 
of words around.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. KYL. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I hope every Senator was listening to Senator Kyl's 
explanation of the important issues that have been raised. I hope the 
American people are listening. He served on the Intelligence Committee. 
He has been through these debates from the very beginning. He is a man 
of integrity, and he will be responsible in summarizing the matters 
that came before us.
  He indicated that we hear allegations that things were black and 
white, when those of us who heard the briefings didn't hear them that 
way. They weren't black and white. The aluminum tubes--I ask the 
Senator from Arizona, regardless of the detail of it, whether he heard 
from those who debriefed us and got various opinions about that issue, 
and we were not misled. We were told there were various ways to 
interpret that evidence, were we not?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say that is exactly right. In fact, the 
National Intelligence Estimate itself specifically characterized the 
dissenting as well as the majority views with respect to what those 
tubes were for. The majority view was that they were for centrifuge, 
for weapons material production. The minority view was they might be 
for artillery shells, or some other kind of projectile. There were two 
agencies within our government that held that latter view. The majority 
of the intelligence community held the former view.
  But, yes, I remember as a member of the committee being briefed on 
that and hearing testimony on it numerous times.
  Mr. SESSIONS. That was before 78 Members of this body--a majority of 
the Democratic Members along with a majority and maybe all of the 
Republicans--voted to authorize hostilities in Iraq.
  Mr. KYL. That is true.
  Mr. SESSIONS. We knew these subtleties and disagreements, and we were 
given the best estimate that the intelligence agency was given.
  Let me ask the Senator this: The CIA is the Central Intelligence 
Agency. The Senator talked about the contradiction between saying at 
one point you should follow one or the other, or the minority opinion. 
Is one of the responsibilities of the CIA to review all intelligence 
and help advise the President, as that central agency, what he should 
take as reliable?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the Senator from Alabama is absolutely 
correct. There is an important factor the American people need to 
understand. There is not just one intelligence agency, the CIA; there 
are lots of different elements of our Government gathering information, 
a lot of it secret information. They meet as a group to try to put this 
together and to reach a consensus. But when the estimates are briefed 
to us and to the President, they try to arrive at a consensus. 
Frequently, that consensus is less certain because there are some 
dissenting views that characterize the consensus. Doubts are expressed 
in certain technical ways.
  It is one thing for the community to say it is the community's 
judgment; of course, that is stepping down from saying we know it as a 
fact. A judgment is not fact, it is an opinion. Then there are further 
gradations down. We are exposed to those same--these are all footnoted. 
We all know who believed what. But at the end of the day, in order for 
us to get good advice, they try to put it together in a form that 
reaches a conclusion. Sometimes because there are differences within 
the intelligence community, those conclusions are not as certain or as 
certainly expressed as they are on other occasions because of that 
uncertainty.
  Mr. SESSIONS. That is beautifully expressed. I think that is so 
important for us to know.
  I want to drive home one point. The Senator from Massachusetts and 
other Senators have been complaining about these matters. I remember 
the briefings we attended. Every Senator was invited. Every Senator had 
the right to ask questions. People stayed late, if they chose to, and 
asked additional questions. They were given these nuanced opinions. It 
was only after all that, was it not, that this Senate, after full 
debate, voted to authorize military actions in Iraq.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the Senator from Alabama is correct. I would 
say that we should not make too much of these nuance opinions and 
disagreements. In one sense, they are important; but in another sense, 
you have to balance that against the fact that there was a mountain of 
evidence in different areas that all add up to the same proposition. 
And add to that--some of that turned out not to be correct--but add to 
that the element of judgment.
  This can't be overemphasized. Intelligence analysts apply judgments 
and common sense to the evidence that they have. Because the evidence 
is rarely black and white, you very rarely get the bad guy to say, I 
will tell you everything I know, and it is everything you need to know 
about this. So you have to exercise judgment.
  After the first gulf war, we later learned that Saddam Hussein was 
about 6 months away from having a nuclear weapon program. That is fact 
No. 1.

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  Fact No. 2: Throughout the ensuing decade, he hid his programs. He 
tried to deceive the inspectors. He refused to comply with U.N. 
resolutions to release information. One could, therefore, surmise--or 
at least it would not be a bad presumption to engage in--that if he had 
it at one point, or almost had it, we had evidence he was trying to get 
it. Again, he was hiding the ball at every opportunity. The 
intelligence analysts have to say, Which way am I going to presume 
this, that he does or that he doesn't? They concluded that there is 
every indication that we had better assume that he does.
  The policymakers have to take that a step further. We say they are 
not absolutely certain; they are pretty sure, but they are not 
absolutely certain which way we should flop on this. Should we flop to 
the direction of inaction? Let's wait until we have absolute proof 
before we do anything, or go the other way? This is pretty dangerous 
business. If, in fact, he has, we had better act now before it is too 
late.
  We think we will take the action that is based upon the proposition 
that he will have it. That is a judgment that we engaged in.
  As my colleague, the Senator from Arizona, so eloquently has pointed 
out, the choice was when, not if, we would face Saddam Hussein. The 
question was, would we do it on his terms or on ours? We chose to do it 
on ours. The result is Saddam Hussein today stands trial for mass 
murder. The Iraqi people have an opportunity for freedom, and we have 
an opportunity to transform that region of the world into one that 
supports peace and opposes evildoers and terrorists as opposed to one 
which was a hot bed when Saddam Hussein was in charge.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, again, I thank the Senator for his 
thoughtful and thorough analysis of how we came to know what we knew 
and how we came to make the decisions about matters that came before 
us. We think there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass 
destruction against his own people. We know that. That is indisputable. 
Where it went subsequently I don't know, and people are shocked that we 
have not found them. We know that the French intelligence agency--the 
French Government opposed our entry into the war--believed he had 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Those matters were very important. And what I am so glad about is 
people have heard what Senator Kyl said and discussed, which is 
relevant to this Senate. We knew these things, fellow Senators. We 
discussed these things. Grown people make decisions based on the best 
evidence they have.
  We had many hearings, top secret briefings, and every Senator could 
go. We heard the argument. We heard the evidence. We cross-examined, 
and we heard the uncertainties and certain levels expressed by the 
authorities that came before us. Then we came into this body and we 
voted to send our soldiers to execute our policy in harm's way. And we 
owe those soldiers our support. We don't need to be undermining the 
President, or even ourselves and our system, as in this circumstance 
making the policy. We voted by a 78-to-22 vote to make it more 
difficult to achieve and to place our soldiers at greater risk.
  I thank the Senator for his wonderful comments.

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