[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 25851-25863]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006--Continued


                Amendment No. 2524 to Amendment No. 2515

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Graham], for himself, 
     Mr. Levin, and Mr. Kyl, proposes an amendment numbered 2524 
     to amendment No. 2515.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page 25852]]

  The amendment is as follows:

                  (Purpose: To improve the amendment)

       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the 
     following:

     SEC. __. REVIEW OF STATUS OF DETAINEES.

       (a) Submittal of Procedures for Status Review of Detainees 
     at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the congressional defense committees, and to 
     the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House 
     of Representatives, a report setting forth the procedures of 
     the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and the noticed 
     Administrative Review Boards in operation at Guantanamo Bay, 
     Cuba, for determining the status of the detainees held at 
     Guantanamo Bay.
       (b) Procedures.--The procedures submitted to Congress 
     pursuant to subsection (a) shall, with respect to proceedings 
     beginning after the date of the submittal of such procedures 
     under that subsection, ensure that--
       (1) in making a determination of status of any detainee 
     under such procedures, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or 
     Administrative Review Board may not consider statements 
     derived from persons that, as determined by such Tribunal or 
     Board, by the preponderance of the evidence, were obtained 
     with undue coercion; and
       (2) the Designated Civilian Official shall be an officer of 
     the United States Government whose appointment to office was 
     made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
     the Senate.
       (c) Report on Modification of Procedures.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to the committees of Congress referred 
     to in subsection (a) a report on any modification of the 
     procedures submitted under subsection (a) not later than 60 
     days before the date on which such modification goes into 
     effect.
       (d) Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants.--
       (1) In general.--Section 2241 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction 
     to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas 
     corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien outside the United 
     States (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(38) of the 
     Immigration and Naturalization Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(38)) who 
     is detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, 
     Cuba.''.
       (2) Review of decisions of combatant status review 
     tribunals of propriety of detention.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (B), (C), and 
     (D), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
     Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
     determine the validity of any decision of a Designated 
     Civilian Official described in subsection (b)(2) that an 
     alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant.
       (B) Limitation on claims.--The jurisdiction of the United 
     States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
     under this paragraph shall be limited to claims brought by or 
     on behalf of an alien--
       (i) who is, at the time a request for review by such court 
     is filed, detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo 
     Bay, Cuba; and
       (ii) for whom a Combatant Status Review Tribunal has been 
     conducted, pursuant to applicable procedures specified by the 
     Secretary of Defense.
       (C) Scope of review.--The jurisdiction of the United States 
     Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on any 
     claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph shall be 
     limited to the consideration of--
       (i) whether the status determination of the Combatant 
     Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien applied the 
     correct standards and was consistent with the procedures 
     specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status 
     Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the 
     conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of 
     the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor 
     the Government's evidence); and
       (ii) whether subjecting an alien enemy combatant to such 
     standards and procedures is consistent with the Constitution 
     and laws of the United States.
       (D) Termination on release from custody.--The jurisdiction 
     of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
     Columbia Circuit with respect to the claims of an alien under 
     this paragraph shall cease upon the release of such alien 
     from the custody of the Department of Defense.
       (3) Review of final decisions of military commissions.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (C) and (D), the 
     United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
     Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
     validity of any final decision rendered pursuant to Military 
     Commission Order No. 1, dated August 31, 2005 (or any 
     successor military order).
       (B) Grant of review.--Review under this paragraph--
       (i) with respect to a capital case or a case in which the 
     alien was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years or 
     more, shall be as of right; or
       (ii) with respect to any other case, shall be at the 
     discretion of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
     District of Columbia Circuit.
       (C) Limitation on appeals.--The jurisdiction of the United 
     States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
     under this paragraph shall be limited to an appeal brought by 
     or on behalf of an alien--
       (i) who was, at the time of the proceedings pursuant to the 
     military order referred to in subparagraph (A), detained by 
     the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and
       (ii) for whom a final decision has been rendered pursuant 
     to such military order.
       (D) Scope of review.--The jurisdiction of the United States 
     Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on an 
     appeal of a final decision with respect to an alien under 
     this paragraph shall be limited to the consideration of--
       (i) whether the final decision applied the correct 
     standards and was consistent with the procedures specified in 
     the military order referred to in subparagraph (A); and
       (ii) whether subjecting an alien enemy combatant to such 
     order is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
     United States.
       (e) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this 
     section shall take effect on the day after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (2) Review of combatant status tribunal and military 
     commission decisions.--Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection 
     (d) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review is 
     governed by one of such paragraphs and that is pending on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, at this time I would like to, in 
conjunction with my colleague Senator Levin, lay down this amendment, 
give a brief explanation of what it is designed to do, and I think we 
will vote on it tomorrow after we vote on Senator Bingaman's amendment.
  No. 1, Senator Levin and his staff have been working on this, along 
with Senator Kyl and other Senators, for the last couple of days. I do 
not know how to say it other than it has been a lot of fun. It has been 
tough at times, but I think we have come out with a product that the 
Senate can be proud of, and hopefully the country can be proud of when 
it comes to how to treat detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
  Here is what we are trying to do. With my amendment, which we voted 
on last week, the concern I had was we were about to criminalize the 
war because of the Rasul case. Section 2241 of the habeas statute had 
been interpreted not to prohibit foreign alien enemy terror suspects 
from seeking habeas petitions in Federal court about their confinement 
and detainment as enemy combatants. The Rasul case was the result of 
the Supreme Court rejecting the Government's argument that Guantanamo 
Bay was outside the jurisdiction of the Federal court. They ruled that 
Guantanamo Bay was constructively within the jurisdiction of the 
Federal court, and in that opinion basically challenged the Congress.
  Now that we have decided that, since there are no due process rights 
in place at the time, we are going to provide habeas petitions to these 
detainees until Congress comes in and says otherwise.
  My amendment was, Congress being on record that the 2241 habeas 
statute has been used to provide habeas corpus rights by Congress to 
American citizens, that we do not intend for an enemy combatant or 
foreign national--someone captured in conflict against the United 
States--to have habeas rights before our Federal courts to complain 
about their confinement and their detention. In other words, we are not 
going to allow enemy prisoners of war the right to go into civilian 
court and start challenging their detention. The military commissions 
are operating at Guantanamo Bay with a different purpose. They are 
going to try people who are charged with violations of the law. Right 
now there are about 10 or 15 cases. There are almost 500 people who are 
being detained as enemy combatants. Last week, when Senator Levin was 
arguing with me about my amendment, I think he made some very good 
points. By working with him and others, Senator Kyl and others, we have 
addressed some of the weaknesses in my original amendment. Senator 
Bingaman will have another amendment, and I think we deal with some of 
his concerns, too. I do see this as a win-win.

[[Page 25853]]

  What we are trying to do, instead of changing what has been the rule 
of law for 200 years in terms of enemy prisoner rights, is create a 
process that not only mirrors the Geneva Convention but goes well 
beyond the Geneva Convention.
  An enemy combatant is a legal term of art. It applies to those people 
involved in hostilities against the United States but are not part of a 
Geneva Convention-recognized Army. The Geneva Convention uses the term 
``irregular combatant.'' We have case law in the United States talking 
about enemy combatant. It deals with German saboteurs; those people who 
commit hostilities are engaged in acts of war but shed the cloak of 
being part of a uniformed force. So the term ``enemy combatant'' has 
been well recognized in our law.
  What we do with an enemy combatant, once a person has been determined 
to be an enemy combatant, we can detain them similar to a prisoner of 
war. The Geneva Convention says if there is a question about whether a 
person's status is rightfully conferred whether you are a prisoner of 
war, enemy combatant, irregular combatant, or a civilian who has done 
nothing wrong, the Geneva Convention requires the host country to have 
a competent tribunal set up to determine status.
  Since August of 2004, at Guantanamo, the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal system has been in place. In my opinion, it is Geneva 
Convention article 5 tribunals on steroids. It gives a right to 
confront. It gives adversarial process to the suspected enemy 
combatant. It also allows a yearly review of an enemy combatant status. 
What they are looking at, at Guantanamo Bay, is whether a person was 
engaged in hostile acts against the United States in a regular fashion, 
whether the person has intelligence value to the United States or poses 
a threat. If one or two of those three conditions are met, they can be 
detained at Guantanamo Bay, and every year there is a reevaluation.
  We have had some people caught up in the net, and we found later 
probably did not have all three requirements and they have been let go. 
We have also had about a dozen people caught up in the net in the war 
on terror who we thought were no longer a threat to the United States. 
We released them and a dozen at least have gone back to fighting. Some 
have been killed. Some have been captured yet again.
  The process we use is important, but no process is perfect. We are 
trying to come up with a process the country can be proud of that 
applies the law of armed conflict standard and does not turn the war on 
terror into a crime. Right now every person sent to Guantanamo Bay will 
be offered a Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing, which is well 
beyond what the Geneva Convention requires, to determine their status.
  In addition to the yearly review, working with Senator Levin, Senator 
Kyl, and others, we have come up with a right of every enemy combatant 
to go to Federal court. Instead of having unlimited habeas corpus 
opportunities under the Constitution, we give every enemy combatant, 
all 500, a chance to go to Federal court, the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. On top of everything else we are doing, 
they can challenge their status determination in a Federal court. The 
Federal court will look at the process involved in their individual 
case to see if it complied with the CSRT standards in terms of 
procedure and the standards that were to be used to determine whether a 
person was properly detained--the evidentiary standards, all other 
standards.
  This will allow a Federal court oversight of any combatant status. It 
will be a one-time deal. It will not be an opportunity for the enemy 
prisoner to sue us about everything they can think of.
  Now, that to me is unprecedented. That is well beyond what the Geneva 
Convention requires or envisions but is something we ought to do and we 
can be proud of because it is a Federal court oversight of a military 
action in a way that doesn't erode the military's ability to conduct a 
war. We can go to other people in the world and say, Our courts are now 
involved in looking at what we do. We can also say that Congress is 
finally involved because in addition to the rights I have described, 
under our amendment, the person who determines whether an enemy 
combatant is retained or released will be confirmed by the Senate. That 
will give the Senate a connection to what is going on in Guantanamo 
Bay.
  If you change the CSRT regulations in any way, you have to send those 
changes to the Congress. That way we are involved. And we have a 
statement in our bill to make sure you do not use statements that were 
a result of undue coercion to determine if you are an enemy combatant.
  So now we have Congress involved in an oversight function. We have 
the courts involved in oversight function. We have a due process right 
well beyond the Geneva Convention requirements. That is something we 
should be proud of.
  Military commissions. There are 10 or 20 people potentially facing a 
military commission trial for what are violations of law of armed law 
conflict. The flaw in my amendment is it did not have a right of appeal 
from a military commission verdict to a Federal court. In World War II, 
the enemy saboteurs I described before were all tried by military 
commissions that President Roosevelt created by Executive order. Four 
of the six were sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reviewed the 
military commission process in the Quirin case and found that military 
commissions were lawful if the person being tried was truly an enemy 
combatant. So there is a historical precedent in our country for the 
Federal courts, the Supreme Court, to look at military commission 
trials to make sure they are lawfully constituted.
  What we have done, working with Senators Levin, Kyl, and others, we 
have created that same type appeal process for all military commission 
decisions. Under the amendment that we have come up with, any case 
resulting in a capital punishment finding--any person who is given the 
death penalty by the military commission--has an automatic direct right 
of appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and the court will determine if they were tried in a court up to the 
military commission standards and procedures and whether the military 
commission was constitutional.
  Anyone who receives a sentence of 10 years or more will also have an 
automatic right to appeal the same court. If you receive a sentence 
less than 10 years, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia will determine whether they want to hear your case based on a 
petition for certiorari or something akin to it.
  That, in essence, is what we are trying to do. In both instances, the 
CSRT procedures and the military commission procedures will be reviewed 
by Federal courts and the court will have the ability to determine 
whether they are constitutional and will have an ability in an 
individual case to determine whether the enemy combatant or the person 
tried under the military commission procedures will be reviewed by 
Federal courts to decide whether they are constitutional according to 
the rules and procedures that have been set up.
  I defer to my friend and colleague, Senator Levin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from South Carolina for working on this 
matter as hard as he has. The Senator from Arizona has also worked 
hard. Many Members on this side have worked on this issue as well as 
the Republican side. There is a lot of thought that has been given to 
this matter.
  The amendment approved last Thursday had some real problems with it, 
in my judgment, and I voted against it, as did 41 Senators. The 
amendment which was approved last Thursday, which is the one now 
awaiting this amendment, would have provided for review only for status 
determinations and not of convictions by military commissions.
  As my friend from South Carolina pointed out, that is an omission 
which he and others acknowledge. It is a real indication of his 
commitment to try to figure out what the right course of action is, 
that he does acknowledge that

[[Page 25854]]

omission. One of the reasons I voted against the amendment last 
Thursday is that it did not provide for that direct judicial review of 
convictions by military commissions. That is the major change in the 
amendment before the Senate, the so-called Graham-Levin-Kyl amendment 
which is before the Senate.
  There are a number of other changes as well, but of all the changes, 
what this amendment does is add to the Graham amendment, which was 
agreed to last Thursday, adds a direct appeal for convictions by 
military commissions--not just for status determinations--and that 
direct appeal would, of course, go to a Federal court.
  The amendment which we are going to consider tomorrow morning, after 
we consider the Bingaman amendment, will also provide for review of 
whether the standards and procedures which are referred to in the 
amendment are consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. Those are important words because all Members believe we must 
operate according to our Constitution. Our laws and the review which is 
provided for now, if we agree to this amendment to the adopted Graham 
amendment, would explicitly make it clear that the review of a court 
would look at whether standards and procedures that have been agreed to 
are consistent with our Constitution and our laws.
  The other problem which I focused on last Thursday with the first 
Graham amendment was that it would have stripped all the courts, 
including the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over pending cases. What 
we have done in this amendment, we have said that the standards in the 
amendment will be applied in pending cases, but the amendment will not 
strip the courts of jurisdiction over those cases. For instance, the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction in Hamdan is not affected.
  However, what our amendment does, as soon as it is enacted and the 
enactment is effective, it provides that the standards we set forth in 
our amendment will be the substantive standards which we would expect 
would be applied in all cases, including cases which are pending as of 
the effective date of this amendment.
  We will first vote on the Bingaman amendment tomorrow. I will vote 
for that amendment. It does preserve some habeas corpus review of 
constitutional issues relative to the detention of enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay. It avoids habeas corpus review of less consequential 
issues, while enumerating the important issues which it would provide 
or permit habeas review of.
  However, I cosponsored the Graham amendment with Senator Graham 
because I believe it is a significant improvement over the provision 
which the Senate approved last Thursday, specifically for the two main 
reasons I identified. The direct review will provide for convictions by 
the military commissions, and because it would not strip courts of 
jurisdiction over these matters where they have taken jurisdiction, it 
does, again, apply the substantive law and assume that the courts would 
apply the substantive law if this amendment is agreed to. However, it 
does not strip the courts of jurisdiction.
  My friend from South Carolina has pointed out what the scope of the 
review would be if this amendment was agreed to. I will read something 
which he made reference to that is important it be very clear as to 
what this grant of review is on page 6, paragraph B:

       (i) with respect to a capital case in which the alien was 
     sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more, 
     shall be as of right; or
       (ii) with respect to any other case, shall be at the 
     discretion of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
     District of Columbia Circuit.

  The scope of review is set forth. It gets the Congress back into the 
business of laying out the ground rules for these reviews, which has 
been the main goal of the Senator from South Carolina. It is a goal 
which I hope all share. We may disagree as to what the ground rules 
are, but I hope all Members share in that goal that Congress become 
reinvolved in setting the ground rules for both the commissions and for 
the tribunals which make the status determinations.
  Again, it has been a very constructive effort on the part of Senator 
Graham, myself, Senator Kyl, and others who cosponsored and will vote 
for this. It makes a significant improvement over what the Senate did 
last Thursday. Again, I as one Senator will first support the Bingaman 
amendment, but if it is not agreed to, I will strongly urge our 
colleagues to vote for the Graham-Kyl amendment.
  I support my friend from South Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thune). The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, my hope is, as Senator Levin indicated, we 
are all doing this because we believe Congress has a role in this war. 
The executive branch has the job to lay the battle plans in place and 
to go after the enemy and be the Commander in Chief. But the Congress 
regulates captives of land and sea. The Congress is involved in issues 
about the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of enemy combatants 
and those who are trying to do harm to the country.
  My goal over the last week was to do two things: get the Congress 
involved and for us to start thinking, what do we want, as a nation, to 
happen in this war now and down the road? What do we want to happen to 
the Sheik Mohammeds and people such as he? Do we want them to be common 
criminals? No. We want them to be people considered under the law of 
armed conflict.
  My amendment last week was a direct result of what I think was a 
growing problem for our country. Section 2241 habeas rights were being 
exercised by noncitizen, foreign terrorist suspects to the point they 
were flooding our courts. They were bringing lawsuits.
  I will give you an example. One Canadian detainee, who threw a 
grenade that killed an Army medic in a firefight and who comes from a 
family with longstanding al-Qaida ties, moved for a preliminary 
injunction forbidding the interrogation of him or engaging in ``cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading'' treatment of him.
  In other words, he wanted the judge to come in and stop his 
interrogation before it started and to sit there basically and 
supervise it.
  Another al-Qaida detainee complained about basic security procedures, 
the speed of mail delivery and medical treatment. He was seeking an 
order that he be transferred to the ``least onerous conditions'' at 
Gitmo and asking the court to order that Gitmo allow him to keep any 
books and reading materials sent to him and to ``report to the Court'' 
on ``his opportunities for exercise, communication, recreation, 
worship, etc.''
  As I said last week, we never allowed enemy prisoners to go into 
civilian courts and ask judges to come over and take over the military 
prison in a time of war.
  The Nazis did not get that right in World War II. We had plenty of 
Nazi prisoners housed in military prisons all over the United States. 
They were not able to go to Federal court and complain about the books 
and the DVDs--they didn't have DVDs then--whatever they were asking 
for.
  There is an ``emergency'' motion seeking a court order requiring 
Gitmo to set aside its normal security policies and show detainees DVDs 
that are purported to be family videos.
  There is another lawsuit wanting the lawyer to have Internet access 
at Guantanamo Bay. That is what I objected to. This is not the law of 
armed conflict being applied. This is giving an enemy prisoner a right 
that no enemy prisoner has ever enjoyed before in the law of armed 
conflict. It was creating litigation against our troops.
  There was one medical malpractice claim. There are over 40 cases 
suing for monetary damages. Can you imagine, after 9/11, if the Senate 
were asked the question, Do you want an al-Qaida suspect who is 
captured to be able to go into Federal court, in unlimited fashion, and 
bring lawsuits against our own troops for their behavior? The answer is 
no.
  But Senator Levin was right. The military commission, part of it is 
written in a way without a direct appeal to

[[Page 25855]]

Federal courts. There is historical precedent for doing it in-house, 
but there is a Supreme Court review precedent. So I am willing to take 
that part of the amendment that was not really the focus of the lawsuit 
abuse and come up with a compromise the country should be proud of.
  Now, as to Senator Bingaman's attempt to strike my language, I will 
vote against Senator Bingaman's amendment, and I will urge all those 
who voted for me last time to stand with me. Senator Bingaman is trying 
to create a right to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals for all enemy 
combatants to bring habeas petitions similar to an American citizen, 
not what we have done in our amendment but a true habeas petition under 
section 2241.
  The question is, Does the Congress want al-Qaida members to have 
habeas rights similar to American citizens? I say no. Senator Bingaman 
allows that right to still exist. He addressed some of the concerns I 
raised. He says the habeas petition cannot consider claims based on 
living conditions. Because I have described how outrageous these claims 
are--about the exercise regime, the reading materials--most Americans 
would be highly offended to know that terrorists are suing us in our 
own courts about what they read.
  He has two exceptions, however. They can still bring habeas lawsuits 
similar to an American citizen, ``whether such status determination was 
supported by sufficient evidence and reached in accordance with due 
process of law, provided that statements obtained through undue 
coercion, torture, or cruel or inhuman treatment may not be used as a 
basis for the determination; and (C) the lawfulness of the detention of 
such alien.''
  The reason I am going to vote no on the Bingaman amendment is that 
these exceptions--the lawfulness of the detention of such alien--would 
allow a court, if they chose, to look at every condition of the enemy 
prisoner's life and do, again, what we are trying to prevent, that you 
could go into Federal court and start asking for a Federal judge to 
intervene in your interrogation before it even starts. My belief is the 
military is the best group to run the war, not Federal judges.
  So I am going to oppose Senator Bingaman's amendment because it 
preserves habeas rights for noncitizen, foreign terrorists to come into 
Federal court at the District Court of Appeals, DC Court of Appeals, to 
put a wide variety of issues on the table. I do not think that is good 
for us. I do not think it is good for the war.
  Now, I will vote with Senator Levin on our comprehensive package when 
it comes to how we are going to conduct the war on terror.
  I will end with this thought. For the first time I know of, since 
September 11, 2001, we have sat down as a Congress and an 
administration to start thinking this thing through. We have come up 
with, I believe, a darn good package.
  I say to Senator Levin, I have enjoyed working with him on this. I 
have been a military lawyer for over 20 years. There are a lot of 
things that go on in the Senate I do not know as well as I should. But 
I feel very comfortable that the war on terror is truly a war, that 9/
11 was an act of war, it was not a crime, and if we will apply the law 
of armed conflict, we can be proud as a nation.
  I say to the Senator, your amendment and my amendment together have 
gotten us back to where we should have been years ago, applying the law 
of armed conflict to these terror suspects in a way that goes beyond 
the Geneva Conventions because we are a nation that wants to do it 
right and then some. But we are also preserving our own ability to 
defend ourselves.
  So to the world, if you are wondering what is going on in America 
now, if anybody goes to Guantanamo Bay, the Congress will be told about 
what goes on, and we will have a say about what goes on. If anybody at 
Guantanamo Bay is determined to be an enemy combatant, not only will 
Congress be involved in how they are kept and how long they are kept, 
our Federal courts will review the actions of our military to see if 
they comply with the Constitution of our Nation. And that is a huge 
change.
  I say to the Senator, I congratulate you for working with me--working 
together--to come up with a review process, where the world can know 
for sure that what we are doing meets our own constitutional standards. 
Enemy combatants are going to get a chance to go to Federal court. The 
Federal court is going to look at the big picture and see whether what 
we have done is constitutional, and when it comes to that individual's 
case, to look at whether the procedures and standards that were 
involved were properly applied. The world should respect us for that. I 
am proud to have been part of that process.
  To those who go to court and have their liberty interests dealt with, 
those who are going to be tried for law of armed conflict violations, 
we can tell the world that those people who will be tried at Guantanamo 
Bay will not be tried in secret. They will be tried in public to the 
extent that we can.
  There is an op-ed piece today in the Washington Post by a defense 
counsel--and God bless him; I have been a defense counsel, and I want 
every right I can get as a defense counsel--saying that the trials at 
Guantanamo Bay are a lot different than the ones at Nuremberg. He is 
right in this regard. Nuremberg was trying people after the war was 
over. We will be trying people at Guantanamo Bay while the war is going 
on.
  What we want to do is make sure the public knows as much as possible 
about the process, that the defendants understand the evidence against 
them, that they have the right to challenge the evidence, call 
witnesses, and testify. And they are presumed innocent. It is a very 
good infrastructure. But there may be some evidence down there about a 
particular defendant that has to be classified because to divulge that 
evidence would tip our enemy off as to what we are doing and how we are 
doing it.
  We are still at war. It is important we understand we are still at 
war. But we can tell the world that for every person who goes through a 
military commission trial, we will be as open as we possibly can be 
without compromising our own security.
  When that verdict is rendered, the Federal courts of the United 
States of America will look at the military action to see if it 
comports with the Constitution of our Nation, the preeminent legal 
document in the world, and will also review the individual's case. I am 
proud of that. It is going further than we probably absolutely have to, 
but it is doing the American thing. It is putting American values on 
display.
  Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, tomorrow is a historic day in the 
war on terror. You have a chance to put some legal infrastructure in 
place that will be a model for the world, that will help us win this 
war on our terms. I am proud to have been part of it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to commend the Senator from South 
Carolina and my colleague from Michigan whom I have worked with these 
many years.
  If the Senator from South Carolina will retake his seat for a minute 
while the chairman speaks, I wish to say I thank my distinguished 
colleague because I look upon the work by Members of the Senate toward 
a resolution of these very difficult issues regarding prisoners taken 
in this series of conflicts, seeing what we have witnessed in 
terrorism, where there are no clear precedents, in many ways, in 
history for this nonstate-sponsored aggression.
  As we witnessed in the tragedy in Jordan, it is not restricted to 
Iraq and Afghanistan. As General Abizaid has briefed the Senate and, 
indeed, briefed the American public on television, this is a worldwide 
movement that goes all the way from Spain to Indonesia. And you do not 
know where they will hit next or whom they will hit or by what means 
they will hit.
  But I do believe as to the work initiated by our distinguished 
colleague from Arizona, Mr. McCain, which you and I worked with him on, 
this matter, which you and Senator Levin have worked on, and to a 
limited extent--I

[[Page 25856]]

am supporting you--I have had a voice, this is--and I say this with 
great respect to the President and the administration--a coequal branch 
of Government, the Senate. The Congress has a very clear mandate in the 
Constitution that we shall take care of the men and women of the Armed 
Forces. And this is part of that.
  So I say to my good friends who have worked on this, well done. You 
are profiles in courage.


                     Amendments Nos. 2518 and 2519

  Now, Mr. President, as announced earlier, we will continue the 
remarks regarding the two amendments, one by my distinguished colleague 
from Michigan with his distinguished leader, the Senator from Nevada, 
and one by myself together with Senator Frist.
  Now, I wish to make an opening comment, and then I would like to 
yield the floor for such time as my distinguished colleague may speak, 
and then I will make some closing comments.
  But it is important in our bill, and particularly on the last day, to 
address the situation in Iraq. But, indeed, it is broader than Iraq. It 
is, as I said a moment ago, the militant Jihadists attacking from Spain 
to Indonesia, wherever they want to bring freedom and current 
government to a standstill.
  So we could have devised on this an entire amendment out of whole 
cloth, but it seemed to me--and I am going to take responsibility--it 
seemed to me that we could show the maximum bipartisanship if we took 
the amendment, as drawn by my distinguished colleague from Michigan, 
Senator Reid, and others, and made a minimal number of changes.
  That is exactly the posture of these proper amendments. That, to me, 
indicates how much we really agree upon, page after page, paragraph 
after paragraph. It is carefully drawn so, first, the Senate expresses 
the sense of the Senate, not binding on the executive branch, it is the 
sense of the Senate. Then the second portion is a reporting 
requirement. But those reporting requirements are looking forward. We 
are not going back to debate history. History will debate that fully. 
We are going forward because the next 120 days, with Iraq in particular 
in mind, with the election in December, the formation of a new 
government, this next 120 days we must maintain stability, a clarity of 
understanding among the American people and the Iraqi people, and we 
cannot adopt any language, be it sense of the Senate or reporting 
language, that in any way raises speculation. Everything we say about 
the implementation of our Armed Forces should be with complete clarity.
  The amendment by my good friend from Michigan left only the option, 
in the reporting to the President, of putting out unclassified 
information. That, to the maximum, the executive branch will do. But 
there are certain aspects--and every Member should be cognizant of 
this--of this very complicated war on terrorism that have to be given 
to the Congress in a classified version.
  So that is the sum and substance of our amendment. Take away any 
indication of timetable, give the President the option to do 
unclassified and classified and have a forward-looking approach as we 
go into these next 120 critical days. This document can be referred to, 
hopefully, as a bipartisan instrument.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my dear friend from Virginia for 
his positive comments. As always, he seeks to build bridges and to 
overcome differences and to reach across the aisle. It is typical of 
him, and it has been that way since the first day I met him many years 
ago.
  The Levin-Reid amendment--there are two amendments pending--is an 
effort to, indeed, try to improve the situation in Iraq, to try to 
change the course for the better. There is no date for withdrawal in 
our amendment. It is not saying that we will withdraw troops at any 
particular specific date. We have done that because we think it would 
be a mistake to set a specific date, at least most of us do. On the 
other hand, we believe it is essential that we change course in a 
number of directions in order to improve the chances of Iraq becoming a 
success.
  America is going to be less secure if Iraq is a failed state. 
Everybody agrees on that. The question is, How can we improve the 
chances of Iraq not becoming a failed state? What could we do here, 
carrying out our responsibility, what contribution can we make here to 
success in Iraq? Things are not working very well in Iraq in many ways. 
I know there are people who will point to progress in Iraq and, 
obviously, there are things to which one could point. But on the other 
hand, there are things that are not working well, and this amendment 
intends to address those in a constructive and positive way.
  Staying the course is not a strategy; that is a slogan. How do we 
improve the chances for success? How do we modify our course so that we 
can achieve or help the Iraqis achieve--more accurately--a nation? And 
how can we also look forward to the day when our troops come out sooner 
rather than later?
  This amendment looks at the year 2006 as a transition year, with 
Iraqi forces taking over security functions to a far greater extent. 
For that to happen, this amendment points out that a number of things 
need to happen. First, we have to advise the Iraqis that we are not 
there for an indefinite period of time, that they must take the steps 
necessary to achieve a broad-based political settlement which is so 
essential to defeating the insurgency. Our military advisers are 
unanimous on this point. There is no purely military solution unless 
the Iraqis come together politically. Unless they unify politically, 
they will not be able to defeat the insurgents. It is a point which 
must be made to the Iraqis. They cannot simply continue to squabble 
over the content of a constitution. They have to come together or else 
they are not going to succeed, and we are not going to succeed in 
helping them to achieve the security they want.
  We need to advise the Iraqis we are not there indefinitely. They have 
to take the steps necessary to achieve a broad-based political 
settlement which is critically important to defeating the insurgency. 
We need a plan for success. We don't have a plan for success. I will 
speak more about that in a moment.
  I want to go through the amendment. I want to point out where there 
is apparently agreement and where there is disagreement and what the 
significance is of both. The sense of the Senate starts by saying 
something that I think every Member of this body would agree with:

     . . . members of the United States Armed Forces who are 
     serving or have served in Iraq and their families deserve the 
     utmost respect and the heartfelt gratitude of the American 
     people for their unwavering devotion to duty, service to the 
     Nation, and selfless sacrifice under the most difficult 
     circumstances.

  We start with that. Our troops and their families deserve the very 
best in equipment, training, and support, but also in our thinking. 
That doesn't mean there is going to be unanimity around. People who 
disagree on what the next step should be should not be pilloried in any 
way or criticized as being less American than those who support the 
administration's policy lock, stock, and barrel. There is a place for 
constructive criticism, for different points of view in a democracy. 
That is what our troops have always fought for. That is what men and 
women have died for, so that we would have an opportunity to have the 
kind of debate on policy which is going on now.
  First, our heartfelt gratitude to our troops. Second, the sense of 
the Senate recognizes that the Iraqi people have made enormous 
sacrifices and that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to live in 
peace and security. There is no disagreement on that. The alternative 
amendment that we will be voting on does not differ with that.
  The next paragraph there is no difference on either. Both amendments 
have the same language. There is no change in our version from the 
Frist-Warner version. That is:

     . . . calendar 2006 should be a period of significant 
     transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security 
     forces taking the lead for the security of a free and 
     sovereign Iraq,

[[Page 25857]]

     thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment 
     of United States forces from Iraq.
  That is in paragraph 3 of the sense of the Senate. There is no change 
in that language to the Frist-Warner language. That is paragraph 
(b)(3). Creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of U.S. 
forces from Iraq surely ought to be a goal.

       (4) United States military forces should not stay in Iraq 
     indefinitely and the Iraqi people should be so advised.

  That is an important statement to the Iraqi people, and it is an 
important statement to our people. We should not be staying in Iraq 
indefinitely. That is the wrong message to send for a number of reasons 
to the Iraqi people.
  What the Warner version does is, it strikes the word ``indefinitely'' 
and says:

       United States military forces should not stay in Iraq any 
     longer than required and the people of Iraq should be so 
     advised.

  The problem with that is, they could be required forever. That is 
open-ended. It is unlimited. It is the wrong message. That is a 
difference, and it is the first difference.
  The next paragraph, there is no difference on:

     . . . the Administration should tell the leaders of all 
     groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make 
     the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based 
     political settlement that is essential for defeating the 
     insurgency . . . within the schedule that they have set for 
     themselves.

  By the way, the schedule that they have set for themselves is to 
appoint a commission when the new assembly takes office in January, to 
appoint a constitutional commission to review the constitution and make 
recommendations for changes within 4 months. That is their schedule. 
They ought to keep that.
  Next--there is no disagreement on this language--

     . . . the Administration needs to explain to Congress and the 
     American people its strategy for successful completion of the 
     mission in Iraq.

  No difference on that language.
  Now to paragraph C on the reports.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, to help those following, you have now 
concluded that section entitled ``Sense of the Senate.'' Both 
amendments have it phrased such, not binding on the administration.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. As you carefully pointed out, but I would like to repeat, 
the entire section that you have referred to we have accepted--I 
accepted and recommended to my colleague--except for that one change of 
striking ``indefinitely'' and using ``any longer than required.'' And 
when I regain the floor, I will explain why I felt that modest one-word 
change was important. Other than that, we have accepted in its entirety 
that section entitled ``Sense of the Senate'' except for a one-word 
change.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct.
  On the report section, there is a change from 30 days to 90 days, 
which I will not spend time on. I think it is a fairly technical 
change, that there is not a particular difference or problem.
  After that first report, whether it is 30 days or 90 days--30 days in 
our version, 90 days in Senator Warner's version--every 3 months 
thereafter, until all U.S. combat brigades have been redeployed from 
Iraq, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report on 
U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq. In our version we say:

       Each report shall include the following:

  What the Warner version adds is ``to the extent practicable, 
unclassified information.'' And by the way, it is clear that there is 
classified information that cannot be in a report, and we don't suggest 
to the contrary. We just want an unclassified report to the extent you 
can have an unclassified report on each of the following items:

     . . . The current military mission and the diplomatic, 
     political, economic, and military measures, if any, that are 
     being or have been undertaken to successfully complete that 
     mission.

  So far, no difference on that one.

       Efforts to convince Iraq's main communities to make the 
     compromises necessary for a broad-based and sustainable 
     political settlement.

  That is what I referred to before. It is so critically important that 
we must convince the communities in Iraq that they must make the 
compromises necessary for a broad-based, politically acceptable 
settlement. No difference on that language; no proposed change in that.
  Next, in our amendment, we need to engage

     the international community and the region in the effort to 
     stabilize Iraq and to forge a broad-based and sustainable 
     political settlement.

  No difference on that.
  We need a report to us every 30 days on what is being done to 
strengthen the capacity of Iraq's Government ministries; to accelerate 
the delivery of basic services; to secure the delivery of pledged 
economic assistance from the international community, and additional 
pledges of assistance; to train Iraqi security forces and transfer 
security responsibilities to those forces and the Government of Iraq.
  No difference on that in terms of what must be in this report.
  Next, we need in this report to know

     whether the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary to 
     achieve the broad-based and sustainable political 
     settlement--

  We need to keep the pressure on the Iraqis. We need the 
administration to tell us the Iraqis have made the compromises 
necessary. Without that kind of keeping the Iraqis' feet to the fire, 
it is less likely the Iraqis are going to make the kind of broad-based 
compromises that are necessary--the compromises that are necessary to 
achieve that broad-based political settlement that is essential, in our 
words, to defeat the insurgency in Iraq.
  And now we get down to the heart of the matter where there seems to 
be a difference, and I want to spend another couple minutes on this. 
This report, according to our amendment--not disagreed to with the 
Warner amendment--must include specific conditions that were included 
in an April 2005 campaign action plan and any subsequent update to that 
campaign plan that must be met in order to provide for the transition 
of security responsibility to the Iraqi security forces.
  There seems to be no objection to that. There is no change in that. 
So we want that document, that report from the administration to set 
forth any specific conditions that were in the April 2005 campaign 
action plan and any updates to that campaign plan that need to be met 
in order to provide for transition of security responsibility.
  There is an acknowledgement by no change in our language that there 
is a report containing conditions, that there is a need for updates to 
that campaign plan that need to be met in order to provide for the 
transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi forces.
  Now we then have language which on this whole next page is not 
objected to, which is accepted, which is that to the extent these 
conditions are not covered, as I have just outlined, the following 
needs to be addressed. We lay out here one, two, three, four 
conditions: number of battalions of Iraqi Armed Forces that have to 
operate independently or take the lead in counterinsurgency operations; 
number of Iraqi police units that have to operate independently or take 
the lead in maintaining law and order in fighting the insurgency, the 
number of regular police that must be trained and equipped to maintain 
law and order; the ability of Iraq's ministries and provincial and 
local governments to independently sustain, direct, and coordinate 
Iraq's security forces.
  Now, so far there is apparently no problem. We have laid out all of 
those conditions that need to be set forth in the report that has to 
come every 30 days after that first report.
  Then in subsection (6) we have a requirement in the report that is 
also not objected to, which is a schedule for meeting such conditions. 
There is no objection to that in the Warner amendment. There is no 
language change in his version.
  So we require a schedule for meeting those conditions which I have 
outlined and an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have 
been met, information regarding variables that could alter that 
schedule, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that schedule.

[[Page 25858]]

  So far, so good. No change in the language.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, for those 
following, we covered first the sense of the Senate. The Senator has 
now covered very carefully all the other provisions. It seems to me 
that there has been no disagreement whatsoever between the two sides. 
You pointed out, yes, I asked for 90 days; you have 30. But I don't 
think that was particularly troublesome. And I pointed out that one 
little change in language, ``to the extent practicable,'' so that the 
President could include classified. So in essence there is absolutely 
no difference between the two amendments up to the point you are now 
addressing, which is the last paragraph; is that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. Not quite, because there was that one change which the 
Senator from Virginia made in the sense-of-the-Senate language.
  Mr. WARNER. No, I pointed that out.
  Mr. LEVIN. I know you said there has been no change other than this. 
I said there was a prior one which we agreed was a change.
  Mr. WARNER. I was referring to now the statutory report language. 
There is no difference until you get to the last paragraph.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would agree. Now to the last paragraph, which for 
reasons beyond me has been stricken.
  We referred to the campaign plan--without objection. There was a 
campaign plan we referred to which said, what are the conditions in 
that plan that must be met in order to provide for the transition of 
security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces? There is the 
campaign plan. There are the conditions which have been laid out, which 
of those conditions must be met in order to achieve the goal which we 
have agreed on in this document--transition of security responsibility 
to security forces.
  Then we have agreed that the report has to contain a schedule for 
meeting those conditions. What are the conditions? What is the schedule 
for meeting them? Three times we refer to that schedule in that same 
paragraph. No objection so far.
  But now we say that campaign plan should also contain estimated dates 
for the phased redeployment of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq 
as each condition is met. The conditions are already laid out. What is 
the campaign plan with estimated dates for the phased redeployment as 
those conditions are met?
  Then we explicitly acknowledge that, with the understanding that 
unexpected contingencies may arise.
  We have already made reference to the phased redeployment. That is 
the first time we have made a reference to phased redeployment.
  In the sense of the Senate, paragraph (b)(3), we have said:

       Calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant 
     transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security 
     forces taking the lead for the security of a free and 
     sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the 
     phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.

  So in subparagraph (7), the last paragraph, which makes reference to 
the campaign plan--we have already described what that is, with no 
objection to it--are the estimated dates for the phased redeployment of 
the United States Armed Forces from Iraq--we have already made 
reference to the goal of phased redeployment of United States Armed 
Forces--as each condition is met. We already have agreement on 
everything up to now, talking about all those conditions and the need 
that they be met, with the understanding that unexpected contingencies 
may arise, which I can't imagine anybody would object to because there 
are unexpected contingencies that always arise. We have acknowledged 
this.
  But why it is there is objection to acknowledging what is obvious, 
that a campaign plan needs to have dates, estimated dates for the 
phased redeployment we have already agreed is desirable, as conditions 
allow and as each condition is met? Why that would be objectionable is 
frankly a mystery to me unless there is a reluctance to do what we do 
in an earlier paragraph, which is to say, folks, we can't stay there 
forever, we have a plan for success, where there is a takeover of the 
major security operations by the Iraqis so we can in a phased way 
redeploy our forces. Eliminating that part of the plan, it seems to me, 
is eliminating what is essential, what clearly follows from everything 
that precedes it, which has been agreed to, and I think it would send 
exactly the wrong message, to agree to all of the pieces that come up 
to that conclusion, including the conditions which need to be met, the 
desirability of phased redeployment, the fact that there is a campaign 
plan, the fact that that campaign plan has conditions in it that need 
to be met in order to provide for the transition of security 
responsibility.
  It is all there. It is all there in the pieces leading right up to 
paragraph (7). Suddenly in the Warner version, paragraph (7) is 
stricken.
  Again, I close with this emphasis. We have not said in this document 
that there should be a date for withdrawal. We said there should be a 
plan. What are the conditions for phased redeployment? What would it 
take for this to happen? What number of battalions need to be brought 
up to capability on the part of the Iraqis in order for there to be a 
number of our forces that are reduced and under what conditions? What 
are those circumstances and conditions which will allow us to reduce 
our forces?
  For the administration to resist stating to the American people what 
are the conditions that need to exist for us to reduce our forces in 
Iraq it seems to me is wrong. It means there is no plan, there is no 
strategy that they are willing to lay out for the American people and 
for the Iraqi people as well so that there is no misunderstanding as to 
where this responsibility must fall ultimately, which is on the people 
of Iraq to come together politically and to take over their own 
military security.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, again I commend my colleague. I think I 
have fairly clearly stated, and I believe there has been concurrence, 
the document prepared by the Senator and others is virtually accepted 
in our amendment. The changes that I put out, the one simple change in 
the sense of the Senate, you understood that. Then we get to the 
conditions, which is changing 120 days instead of 30. So I say to my 
colleague--and I think the Senator has been very fair and objective 
about it--the amendments are parallel in every respect except the last 
paragraph.
  I say to my good friend, I say to all Senators, the next 120 days are 
critical. If this is to become law, the President would have to start 
every 90 days addressing the estimated dates for the phased 
redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq. No mention about 
the other coalition forces.
  I say that few words can be interpreted by all as being the 
timetable, and we do not in this 120 days, in my judgment, want to have 
any hint whatsoever of a timetable. It is so critical, with all the 
progress thus far by the Iraqi people--elections and a series of 
transitional governments, then acceptance of the constitution by 
referendum, then the election of a new legislative body, and then they 
have to stand up and begin to strengthen the ministries and take hold 
in such a way that it is clear to the Iraqi people and the world that 
that government is in control. To put any language such as this in 
there, to suggest any timetable by which we begin to withdraw forces, 
would undermine entirely and make highly risky the next 120 days.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a correction? I inadvertently 
said the report would be every 30 days after the first report. I 
misspoke. It would be every 90 days, as the Senator from Virginia 
correctly has stated. It would be every 90 days after the first report.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this is one of those quiet moments in 
the Senate with very few people in the Chamber when, in my opinion, 
something very important is happening. It is happening in good measure 
because of the two good men, my colleagues

[[Page 25859]]

from Virginia and Michigan, who lead the Armed Services Committee, of 
which I am privileged to be a member. They are two gentlemen, two 
patriots, two people who have known each other for a long time, who 
work closely together, respect each other, even seem to like each other 
and, most important of all, trust each other.
  Those qualities of personal trust and personal relationship have been 
too absent from our Nation's consideration of the ongoing war in Iraq 
among our political leadership. We have, I am convinced, suffered from 
it.
  It is no surprise to my colleagues that I strongly supported the war 
in Iraq. I was privileged to be the Democratic cosponsor, with the 
Senator from Virginia, of the authorizing resolution which received 
overwhelming bipartisan support.
  As I look back on it and as I follow the debates about prewar 
intelligence, I have no regrets about having sponsored and supported 
that resolution because of all the other reasons we had in our national 
security interest to remove Saddam Hussein from power, a brutal, 
murdering dictator, an aggressive invader of his neighbors, a supporter 
of terrorism, a hater of the United States of America. He was for us a 
ticking timebomb that if we did not remove him I am convinced would 
have blown up, metaphorically speaking, in America's face. I am 
grateful to the American military for the extraordinary bravery and 
brilliance of their campaign to remove Saddam Hussein.
  I know we are safer as a nation, and to say the obvious that the 
Iraqi people are freer as a people, and the Middle East has a chance 
for a new day and stability with Saddam Hussein gone. We will come to 
another day to debate the past of prewar intelligence. But let me say 
briefly the questions raised in our time are important. The 
international intelligence community believed Saddam Hussein had 
weapons of mass destruction. Probably most significant, and I guess 
historically puzzling, is that Saddam Hussein acted in a way to send a 
message that he had a program of weapons of mass destruction. He would 
not, in response to one of the 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions 
that he violated, declare he had eliminated the inventory of weapons of 
mass destruction that he reported to the U.N. after the end of the gulf 
war in 1991.
  I do not want to go off on that issue. I want to say that the debate 
about the war has become much too partisan in our time. And something 
is happening here tonight that I believe, I hope, I pray we will look 
back and say was a turning point and opened the road to Republican and 
Democratic cooperation, White House and congressional cooperation, to 
complete the mission. As Senator Levin said, no matter what anyone 
thinks about why we got into the war and whether we should have been in 
there, it is hard to find anybody around the Senate--I have not heard 
anybody--who does not want us to successfully complete our mission 
there. I feel that deeply. If we withdraw prematurely from Iraq, there 
will be civil war, and there is a great probability that others in the 
neighborhood will come in. The Iranians will be tempted to come in on 
the side of the Shia Muslims in the south. The Turks will be tempted to 
come in against the Kurds in the north. The other Sunni nations, such 
as the Saudis and the Jordanians, will be sorely tempted, if not to 
come in at least to aggressively support the Sunni Muslim population. 
There will be instability in the Middle East, and the hope of creating 
a different model for a better life in the Middle East in this historic 
center of the Arab world, Iraq, will be gone.
  If we successfully complete our mission, we will have left a country 
that is self-governing with an open economy, with an opportunity for 
the people of Iraq to do what they clearly want to do, which is to live 
a better life, to get a job, to have their kids get a decent education, 
to live a better life.
  There seems to be broad consensus on that, and yet the partisanship 
that characterizes our time here gets in the way of realizing those 
broadly expressed and shared goals.
  Politics must end at the water's edge. That is what Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg of Michigan said, articulating the important ideal that we 
seem to have lost too often in our time.
  I found a fuller statement of Senator Vandenberg's position, the 
ideal. I found it to be in some ways more complicated and in other ways 
much more compelling. I want to read from it. Senator Vandenberg said:

       To me ``bipartisan foreign policy'' means a mutual effort, 
     under our indispensable two-Party system, to unite our 
     official voice at the water's edge so that America speaks 
     with maximum authority against those who would divide and 
     conquer us and the free world.

  If that doesn't speak to us today--the threat of Islamist terrorism, 
the desire they have to divide us and, in that sense, to conquer us in 
the free world. Senator Vandenberg continued in his definition of what 
he meant by bipartisanship in foreign policy:

       It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate 
     in determining our position. On the contrary, frank 
     cooperation and free debate are indispensable to ultimate 
     unity--

  Of which I speak.

       In a word, it simply seeks national security ahead of 
     partisan advantage.

  I felt again in recent days and recent months how far we have strayed 
down the partisan path from Vandenberg's ideals. The most recent 
disconcerting evidence of this was the lead story from the Washington 
Post--it was in papers all over the country--last Saturday, November 
12. I read from that story:

       President Bush and leading congressional Democrats lobbed 
     angry charges at each other Friday in an increasingly 
     personal battle over the origins of the Iraq war. Although 
     the two sides have long skirmished over the war, the sharp 
     tenor Friday resembled an election year campaign more than a 
     policy disagreement.

  That from Saturday's Washington Post. Campaign rhetoric over policy 
debate, and what about? About how we got into the war 2\1/2\ years ago, 
not about how we together can successfully complete our mission in 
Iraq.
  The questions raised about prewar intelligence are not irrelevant, 
they are not unimportant, but they are nowhere near as important and 
relevant as how we successfully complete our mission in Iraq and 
protect the 150,000 men and women in uniform who are fighting for us 
there.
  I go back to Vandenberg's phrase; the question is how Democrats and 
Republicans can ``unite our . . . voice at the water's edge . . . 
against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world'' in 
Iraq, I add, and beyond.
  The danger is that by spending so much attention on the past here, we 
contribute to a drop in public support among the American people for 
the war, and that is consequential. Terrorists know they cannot defeat 
us in Iraq, but they also know they can defeat us in America by 
breaking the will and steadfast support of the American people for this 
cause.
  There is a wonderful phrase from the Bible that I have quoted before:

       If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow 
     into battle?

  In our time, I am afraid that the trumpet has been replaced by public 
opinion polls, and if the public opinion polls are uncertain, if 
support for the war seems to be dropping, who will follow into battle 
and when will our brave and brilliant men and women in uniform in Iraq 
begin to wonder whether they have the support of the American people? 
When will that begin to affect their morale?
  I worry the partisanship of our time has begun to get in the way of 
the successful completion of our mission in Iraq. I urge my colleagues 
at every moment, when we do anything regarding this war, that we 
consider the ideal and we are confident within ourselves. Not that we 
are stifling free debate. Free debate, as Vandenberg said, is the 
necessary precondition to the unity we need to maximize our authority 
against those who would divide and conquer us. But the point is to make 
sure we feel in ourselves that the aim of our actions and our words is 
national security, not partisan advantage.
  Now we come to today. After reading that paper on Saturday, I took 
the original draft amendment submitted by

[[Page 25860]]

Senator Warner and Senator Frist--it actually wasn't offered, but it 
was around--and Senator Levin and Senator Reid. I took the amendments 
back to Connecticut, and last night I looked them over. Neither one 
expressed fully what I hoped it would, but as I stepped back, I said 
that these two amendments--one Republican, one Democrat, unfortunate in 
a way breaking by parties--these amendments are not that far apart.
  I like the way in which the Warner amendment recited again the 
findings that led us to war against Saddam Hussein and, quite 
explicitly, cited the progress that has been made. I do think Senator 
Levin's amendment doesn't quite do this part enough, about the 
progress, particularly among the political leaders of Iraq. They have 
done something remarkable in a country that lived for 30 years under a 
dictator who suppressed all political activity, encouraged the 
increasing division and bitterness among the Shia's, the Sunnis, the 
Kurds. These people, with our help and encouragement, have begun to 
negotiate like real political leaders in a democracy. It is not always 
pretty. What we do here is not always most attractive. That is 
democracy. Most important of all, 8 million Iraqis came out in the face 
of terrorist threats in January to vote on that interim legislation. 
Almost 10 million came out to vote on a constitution, which is a pretty 
good document, a historically good document in the context of the Arab 
world.
  What happened when the Sunnis felt they were not getting enough of 
what they wanted in a referendum? They didn't go to the street, most of 
them, with arms to start a civil war; they registered to vote. That is 
a miraculous achievement and a change in attitude and action. They came 
out to vote in great numbers, and they will come out, I predict, again 
in December in the elections and elect enough Sunnis to have an effect 
on the Constitution next year.
  So I wish that some of that had been stated in Senator Levin's 
amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would.
  Mr. LEVIN. My amendment is exactly the same as Senator Warner's 
amendment in that regard. Senator Warner has adopted my amendment with 
two minor changes. He has not made any change in terms of the progress 
that has been made or the reference to the great work of our troops. I 
thought I heard the Senator from Connecticut--and I have no dearer 
friend in the Senate--suggest that he had wished that my amendment 
would be more fulsome relative to progress. I just wanted to assure the 
Senator that there is no change in that language in the version which 
was subsequently filed by the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from Michigan. What I said, and I 
know the Senator from Michigan was involved in a conversation, I was 
actually going back and quoting the draft of the Warner amendment that 
was circulating at the end of last week which had statements about why 
we went to war and marked the progress that had been made politically 
and economically since then. But the Warner amendment did not raise 
questions about what our plan is now and how to successfully complete 
the mission. It did not raise the questions Senator Levin's amendment 
rightly raises for progress reports from the administration about how 
we are doing and in that sense did not create an opportunity for a 
dialogue that can get us beyond the partisan gridlock in our 
discussions about the war. I wrote a statement last night expressing my 
frustration on that.
  I had other concerns about Senator Levin's amendment, including 
particularly the last paragraph which I believe creates a timetable for 
withdrawal, and I think that is a mistake, particularly in the next 3 
to 6 months as the Iraqis stand up a new government. It may not be the 
intention of the sponsors, but it does send a message that I fear will 
discourage our troops because it seems to be heading for the door. It 
will encourage the terrorists, and it will confuse the Iraqi people and 
affect their judgments as they go forward.
  Incidentally, I do thank the Senator from Michigan because I know he 
and others in the Democratic caucus worked very hard to make this 
amendment an inclusive amendment. I had the opportunity to make a few 
suggestions, some of which were accepted, some of which were not. Then 
I arrive back in Washington today and I find that the Senator from 
Virginia has decided not to put in that amendment, has seen some real 
strengths in the amendment of the Senator from Michigan, has cut out a 
few points as enumerated, that I personally--and Senator Warner and I 
had no conversation about this--thought weakened or at least I found 
objectionable. I think it is better to strike the word 
``indefinitely,'' that our troops will not stay there indefinitely. Of 
course they will not stay there indefinitely but to make the telling 
point that we will stay there as long as conditions require and no 
longer. I fear that if a timetable is put in at the end, ask for a 
series of dates of phased deployment, even though they are based on 
those conditions that were cited, it looks like a withdrawal plan and 
does not send a sound of strength, the sound of a certain trumpet.
  The point that I wish to make is that Senator Warner has now taken 
most of Senator Levin's amendment. The Republican leader, if I could 
talk in partisan terms, has said to the Democratic leader: We accept 
most of his amendment with these few changes. I think this is a turning 
point. It is a significant development in terms of the Senate's 
consideration of the war in Iraq and hopefully in terms of the 
administration's consideration as well.
  The distrust, the lack of dialogue between the executive branch and 
Democrats in Congress is so deep and complicated now that I cannot even 
begin to describe how we got to this point. I know it is a bad place to 
be, particularly when we are at war.
  I remember the words of the Secretary of War during the Second World 
War, Henry L. Stimson--this was actually after the war. He said: 
Sometimes the best way to make a person--and he really meant a nation--
trustworthy is to trust them. That has been lacking in the relations 
between the executive branch and the Democrats in Congress.
  I believe Senator Warner, the Republican chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, in accepting almost all of the Democratic 
amendment, has in some sense expanded the trust he feels for the 
ranking Democrat on the committee and created a process where the 
administration does have to report to us every 90 days, and if the 
administration--let me put it another way, respectfully. I hope the 
White House, the Pentagon, sees this also as a moment of opportunity to 
engage with the Congress so that we will achieve, after free debate--
and that is exactly what we have heard on the floor tonight--the result 
Senator Vandenberg spoke to, which is that we will, under our 
indispensable two-party system, unite our official voice at the water's 
edge so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who 
would divide and conquer us in the free world.
  It is a different kind of enemy, but the extremist Islamist 
terrorists who face us, as Senator Warner said, from Spain to 
Indonesia, it is their plan for conquer. They struck us on 9/11. They 
are preparing to strike us again. If we cannot pull together across 
party lines to defeat this enemy to our security and our way of life, 
shame on us, particularly if we are stopped from doing so by momentary 
partisan political ambitions.
  So I am going to vote for the Warner amendment--I believe it is a 
significant step forward--for the reasons I have said, because of the 
timetable at the end particularly. I am going to respectfully vote 
against the Levin amendment. I hope the Levin amendment comes up first, 
and if it is not passed, I hope there is an overwhelming bipartisan 
vote for the Warner amendment.
  I cannot resist one final quote from the great Vandenberg--succeeded 
by another great Senator, I might say, from Michigan, Mr. Levin--and 
this is that famous speech on January 10, 1945,

[[Page 25861]]

when he abandoned his long-time isolationism and embraced an 
internationalist foreign policy, and, boy, did his words speak directly 
to us in our circumstances in Iraq and around the world today. I hope 
they give us pause. I hope in some sense--frankly, they give us a bit 
of discomfort about some of the things that have happened in the 
political consideration of the war.
  Here is what Vandenberg said:

       There are critical moments in the life of every nation, 
     which call for the straightest, the plainest and most 
     courageous thinking of which we are capable. We confront such 
     a moment now. . . .

  And we do today, as well.
  Vandenberg continued:

        . . . It is not only desperately important to America, it 
     is important to the world. It is important not only to this 
     generation, which lives in blood . . .

  As ours sadly does, as the people who were in the Trade Towers and 
the Pentagon and Jordan over the weekend and so many other places 
around the world.

        . . . It is important to future generations if they shall 
     live in peace. No man in his right senses will be dogmatic in 
     such an hour.

  I digress to thank the Senator from Virginia for coming across the 
aisle a long way. I thank the Senator from Michigan for the work he did 
to make his amendment as inclusive and broad as it was so that it 
enabled the Senator from Virginia to do that.
  Vandenberg ended:

       Each of us can only speak according to his little lights--
     and pray for a composite wisdom that shall lead us to a high, 
     safe ground.

  That is exactly what we need with regard to Iraq today. We have to do 
what is best for our country. We have to do what is best for the 
150,000 Americans who are there. We have to do what best enables us to 
do what we say we all want to do, which is to successfully complete 
America's mission in Iraq. The sooner we do that, what is best for our 
country and our great military, the sooner we will succeed in Iraq, and 
the sooner we will be able to bring our brave soldiers home.
  This compromise amendment offered by Senator Warner, building on the 
excellent work Senator Levin has done, is an enormous step forward 
toward that higher ground. I thank them both for the work they have 
done.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there are rare moments in the life of the 
Senate that one shall never forget. I thank the Senator not just 
because he has indicated support for my amendment but for the Senator's 
very extraordinary observations about the times, the difficulty, and 
the need to have bipartisanship and to leave our politics at the 
water's edge. As I said earlier, I take responsibility for adopting 
this course rather than the earlier draft I had prepared.
  I say to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, it is an 
expression of how close we really are on the fundamental things. The 
sole point of difference is how each Senator shall read the last 
paragraph. It is as simple as that. I read it as lending to the world 
an interpretation of what we have done and what we will do in the 
future as embracing some definitive timetable, and the President will 
have to every 90 days address those key words and in doing so could 
well complicate and jeopardize the next 120 days, which this Senator 
thinks is so critical.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend from 
Connecticut, particularly for his repeated reference to a Senator from 
Michigan whom we all hold in such huge esteem--particularly Michigan, 
but it is not limited, obviously. We just put his portrait out in the 
reception room, one of the two Senators we have added in that reception 
room. I believe there are only seven Senators whose portraits are 
there. One of them is now Senator Vandenberg. I quote him often for 
many purposes, including the bipartisan foreign policy that he 
espoused.
  As the Senator from Connecticut pointed out, he also urged us to give 
our very best thinking and not to worry about being mischaracterized or 
being challenged in terms of patriotism because all of us, I believe, 
agree that when we give our best assessment of the path forward, the 
success in Iraq, that we are all acting in the best of faith.
  I know every colleague I either know of or do not know of is 
operating in the best of faith, total support for our troops, total 
support for their families, and how we can best succeed in Iraq. I 
believe we have to make some changes in our course. This amendment 
explicitly suggests some of those changes in course. It will hopefully 
make it more likely that we will succeed in Iraq.
  One thing I know for sure, and that is that unless the Iraqis take 
hold, unless they put their political house in order, unless they do 
what this amendment says in both versions, that they make the political 
compromises and the tough political decisions that are necessary for 
them to be unified against the insurgency, unless they do that, there 
is no chance that they are going to succeed against this insurgency. 
They must come together politically. That is what this amendment says.
  This amendment provides that they also must understand that we are 
not there for an unlimited period of time, because if they do believe 
that we are there for an unlimited period of time, they are less likely 
to make the political compromises which must be made for them to unite 
against the insurgency. That is the reason the message is so important. 
Are we there for an unlimited period of time, as long as you need us? 
Is that the right message? Or is the right message that we are not 
there for an unlimited period of time, we are not setting a date for 
departure, but we are putting you on notice, folks, you need to get 
your political house in order so that you can defeat, with our 
assistance, that insurgency. And without that kind of coming together, 
that military success is either unachievable or far more difficult.
  That is the purpose of this amendment, and that is why the few words 
that were in this version, which the Senator from Virginia would 
change, are important words, to let the Iraqis know that the American 
military forces are not going to be there indefinitely, because, again, 
if they think we are there as long as they need us, which is the way 
the administration has phrased it, it is less likely that they are 
going to make the very difficult compromises that need to be made in 
order to put together a modified constitution around which all Iraqi 
factions can rally.
  That is one of the purposes of this amendment. The other purpose is 
on the reports, which already, in this amendment which has been agreed 
to by my friend from Virginia, this amendment as written and as agreed 
to--there is no change to this--requires a schedule for meeting 
conditions. It requires a listing of variables that could alter a 
schedule. It requires that reasons be provided for any subsequent 
changes to that schedule.
  What is one of the conditions? One of the conditions is that there be 
a campaign plan that must be met to provide for the transition of 
security responsibility to Iraqi security forces. So that is one of the 
stated conditions, that there be this campaign plan provided to the 
Congress, and that plan provide for the transition of security 
responsibility to Iraqi security forces.
  Three times we make reference to a schedule and we make very clear 
the conditions which must be laid out as to which conditions need to be 
met when, including what are the number of the battalions in the Iraqi 
Armed Forces that can operate independently or take the lead in 
counterinsurgency operations--all that seems to be agreed to. We have a 
schedule. We have to lay out the conditions. One of the conditions is 
how many battalions of Iraqi Armed Forces need to be able to operate 
independently. We lay all of that out.
  But then in the last paragraph, when we use the words ``estimated 
dates'' rather than ``schedule,'' for some reason the use of the words 
``estimated dates'' creates a problem. Maybe it is not the words 
``estimated dates,'' maybe it is the words ``phased redeployment,'' but 
I would again remind my colleagues that, in our sense of the Senate, we 
set forth a goal that, in

[[Page 25862]]

order to succeed in Iraq, we have to have significant transition in the 
year 2006, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead, thereby creating 
the conditions for the phased redeployment of the United States forces. 
That is a goal stated and apparently agreed to by my good friend from 
Virginia.
  There is much in common here. I think the Senator from Connecticut is 
right. There is clearly a sense we have to do some things here to make 
it more likely that we are going to succeed in Iraq. That has to be 
everybody's goal, regardless of what our positions were going in or how 
critical we are of the way this war is run. Our goal is to maximize the 
chances for success in Iraq.
  But our amendment does have some differences. We should not paper 
over those differences. There are two differences, which the Senator 
from Virginia has pointed out and I have pointed out. I guess that is 
where it is going to rest when the Senate votes tomorrow.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, our magnificent service men and women, 
along with allies and partners, are supporting the Iraqis as they 
develop their own concepts of democracy. Jointly we are improving 
infrastructure, improving the internal security, and together 
confronting the extremists.
  By any fair objective political measure, the people of Iraq are 
making progress. In 1 year, the Iraqis elected a transitional 
government, ratified a constitution, and are preparing to elect a 
permanent parliamentary government on December 15th.
  During many hearings and briefings, the senior military commanders, 
particularly General Abizaid has stressed that the extremist militant 
jihadists are focusing on dominating a geographic area that extends 
from Spain to Indonesia. The tragic events in Jordan underscore the 
accuracy of that military analysis.
  The al-Qaida group in Iraq claimed responsibility for the tragic 
attacks in Jordan against innocent Arab civilians. While portions of 
Iraq remain focal points for terrorist attacks, the threat extends far 
beyond.
  This enemy seeks neither compromise nor coexistence with the United 
States or others who do not share their world vision. The United 
States, along with partners and allies, must continue their strong 
resolve and effectively address this threat. The civilized world has no 
choice.
  Of equal importance to the military mission in Iraq is the 
development of political structures and reconstruction of the 
infrastructure. I, like many of you, have made a number of trips to 
Iraq: I have seen progress.
  Now I would like to specifically address the pending amendments 
related to our policy to achieve our military, political, and 
reconstruction goals in Iraq. While there are similarities, the 
amendments differ on several major points.
  Both amendments recognize the magnificent work being done by our 
Armed Forces; the unwavering support of their families at home; the 
importance of political developments to take place in Iraq next year; 
the necessity to put Iraqi Security Forces in the lead in securing 
Iraq; and the requirement to keep the American people well informed of 
all aspects of the military, political, and reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq.
  Both amendments call for the President to submit a quarterly report 
on our progress in Iraq. While Congress already receives a number of 
reports and Members and committees in both bodies receive briefings 
from civilian and military leaders, this report from the President 
would become the most comprehensive report on the situation in Iraq.
  These are the three important differences between the two amendments.
  No. 1 the reporting timeline--section c. The Warner-Frist amendment 
calls for the first report 90 days after the enactment of the Act. 
Ninety days allows the President sufficient time to assemble this very 
wide-ranging report. A report of this scope will require close 
consultation with all departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government; American diplomats in Iraq and in the region; United States 
allied and partnered nations; and our military leaders here and in the 
theater of operations.
  The Levin amendment would allow for just 30 days of coordination and 
consultation before submitting the initial report. I believe that is 
insufficient time to produce a report as comprehensive as this.
  No. 2 is section c. The Levin-Reid amendment calls for a completely 
unclassified report. The Warner-Frist amendment directs that the report 
be unclassified to the extent possible. This is an important 
distinction. Some information on international negotiations and 
agreements, and plans for Iraq's domestic security will be an integral 
part of the development of Iraqi security forces, this may be too 
sensitive to be presented in an unclassified forum. The Warner-Frist 
amendment allows the President to produce a classified annex if the 
President and his advisors believe it is necessary.
  No. 3 is a campaign plan with estimated dates for phased withdrawal--
section c(7). The Levin-Reid amendment asks for a campaign plan with 
estimated dates for the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces to be 
published in the unclassified report. I believe that any program for 
the withdrawal of American combat forces must be conditions-based, and 
linked to specific, responsible benchmarks not just dates on a 
calendar, per se. While I agree that we must continue to make it clear 
to the Iraqis that a program for withdrawal is a common goal, any 
announcement of immediate withdrawal or even speculation of withdrawal 
before a secure and democratic Iraq is in place is simply not prudent.
  I am concerned that the release of a timeline such as that in the 
last paragraph of the Levin-Reid amendment now that announces our 
withdrawal plans, even with estimated dates, could promote speculation 
and send an erroneous message to our troops, the Iraqi people, our 
coalition partners, and the terrorists.
  I urge you to vote for Warner-Frist amendment and that we follow 
Levin and Reid, rather than an entire new amendment to show how much we 
do agree on and that this is an effort to seek partisanship.
  We are down to two differences: the word ``indefinite,'' which to me 
precludes the chance--could be construed as we would not leave a very 
small unit there to facilitate the logistic transfer, the need to bring 
up to a level of acceptability the armaments the Iraqis have; and the 
continuation of some security work as well as training. But I will not 
belabor the point. I was very specific in the careful choice of words 
substituted for ``indefinite.''
  The last paragraph--every Senator has to decide for himself or 
herself the clear meaning of the English language and whether that 
cannot be construed by many to invoke the thought of a timetable.
  I say to my good friend, we have had a very good debate tonight. How 
fortunate we are that our distinguished colleague, a long-time member 
of the committee, the Senator from Connecticut, joined us.
  I think we have done a good service to our colleagues who, in a very 
brief period tomorrow, will be required to focus on this and cast their 
votes accordingly.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I hope we have performed that service. I 
know we all tried in good faith to do it. I am perfectly content, as 
the Senator from Virginia is, that our colleagues read that last 
paragraph, read the paragraph before that making reference three times 
to schedules, read the entire resolution we have written, and then 
determine as to which is the better message to send to the Iraqis.
  I am perfectly content to leave it rest there.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think the matter now is that the Senate 
should go off the bill and I will proceed to do morning business.
  Mrs. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank Chairman Warner and ranking Member 
Levin for their leadership in bringing the fiscal year 2006 Defense 
authorization bill, S. 1042, to the floor and shepherding it through to 
final passage after months of unfortunate delays.

[[Page 25863]]

  Due to procedural limitations associated with the managers' amendment 
which included my amendments, it was impossible to have original 
cosponsors added. The following Senators are cosponsoring certain of my 
amendments:
  Senators Chafee and DeWine would like to cosponsor my amendment to 
provide for mental health counselors under TRICARE, S.A. 2456; Senators 
Nelson of Florida, Talent, Roberts and Harkin would like to cosponsor 
my amendment to require a report on predatory lending directed at 
members of the Armed Forces and their dependents, S.A. 2468.

                          ____________________