[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 17]
[House]
[Pages 23923-23930]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              IRAN NONPROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2005

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the Senate bill (S. 1713) to make amendments to the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 related to International Space Station 
payments, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                                S. 1713

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation 
     Amendments Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Director of Central Intelligence's most recent 
     Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
     Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
     Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 
     2003, states ``Russian entities during the reporting period 
     continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related 
     goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, 
     India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining 
     technology and materials from Russian entities helped 
     accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and 
     continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian 
     efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-
     sufficiency in missile production.''
       (2) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in testimony before the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on February 
     16, 2005, that ``Tehran probably will

[[Page 23924]]

     have the ability to produce nuclear weapons early in the next 
     decade''.
       (3) Iran has--
       (A) failed to act in accordance with the Agreement Between 
     Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
     Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 
     19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards 
     Agreement'');
       (B) acted in a manner inconsistent with the Protocol 
     Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards, signed at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly 
     referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'');
       (C) acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations 
     under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
     done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
     entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the 
     ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''); and
       (D) resumed uranium conversion activities, thus ending the 
     confidence building measures it adopted in its November 2003 
     agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, 
     France, and Germany.
       (4) On September 24, 2005, the Board of Governors of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally declared 
     that Iranian actions constituted noncompliance with its 
     nuclear safeguards obligations, and that Iran's history of 
     concealment of its nuclear activities has given rise to 
     questions that are within the purview of the United Nations 
     Security Council.
       (5) The executive branch has on multiple occasions used the 
     authority provided under section 3 of the Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) to impose sanctions on entities that have engaged 
     in activities in violation of restrictions in the Act 
     relating to--
       (A) the export of equipment and technology controlled under 
     multilateral export control lists, including under the 
     Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile 
     Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the 
     Wassenaar Arrangement or otherwise having the potential to 
     make a material contribution to the development of weapons of 
     mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missile systems to 
     Iran; and
       (B) the export of other items to Iran with the potential of 
     making a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass 
     destruction programs or on United States national control 
     lists for reasons related to the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction or missiles.
       (6) The executive branch has never made a determination 
     pursuant to section 6(b) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
     2000 that--
       (A) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of 
     mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering 
     such weapons;
       (B) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the 
     law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and 
     intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated 
     and continues to demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek 
     out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and 
     technology that could make a material contribution to the 
     development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or 
     of ballistic or cruise missile systems; and
       (C) no entity under the jurisdiction or control of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, has, during the 1-year 
     period prior to the date of the determination pursuant to 
     section 6(b) of such Act, made transfers to Iran reportable 
     under section 2(a) of the Act.
       (7) On June 29, 2005, President George W. Bush issued 
     Executive Order 13382 blocking property of weapons of mass 
     destruction proliferators and their supporters, and used the 
     authority of such order against 4 Iranian entities, Aerospace 
     Industries Organization, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, 
     Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, and the Atomic Energy 
     Organization of Iran, that have engaged, or attempted to 
     engage, in activities or transactions that have materially 
     contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, 
     the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their 
     means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering 
     such weapons), including efforts to manufacture, acquire, 
     possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items.

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 
                   RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
                   PAYMENTS.

       (a) Treatment of Certain Payments.--Section 7(1)(B) of the 
     Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking the period at the end and inserting a 
     comma; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
     ``except that such term does not mean payments in cash or in 
     kind made or to be made by the United States Government prior 
     to January 1, 2012, for work to be performed or services to 
     be rendered prior to that date necessary to meet United 
     States obligations under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation 
     on the Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed 
     at Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 
     27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of 
     understanding, or contract related thereto.''.
       (b) Exception.--Section 6(h) of the Iran Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
     amended by inserting after ``extraordinary payments in 
     connection with the International Space Station'' the 
     following: ``, or any other payments in connection with the 
     International Space Station,''.
       (c) Reporting Requirements.--Section 6 of the Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(i) Report on Certain Payments Related to International 
     Space Station.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall, together with each 
     report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives a 
     report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom 
     the United States Government has, since the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 
     2005, made a payment in cash or in kind for work to be 
     performed or services to be rendered under the Agreement 
     Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
     Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, 
     and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, 
     agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related 
     thereto.
       ``(2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       ``(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each 
     entity or person identified in the report; and
       ``(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of 
     the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the 
     achievement of the objectives of the United States Government 
     to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile 
     systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly 
     provided support for acts of international terrorism, as 
     determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), 
     section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
     U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.

     SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 
                   TO MAKE SUCH ACT APPLICABLE TO IRAN AND SYRIA.

       (a) Reports on Proliferation Relating to Iran or Syria.--
     Section 2 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public 
     Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``TO IRAN'' and inserting 
     ``RELATING TO IRAN AND SYRIA''; and
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (i) by inserting ``or acquired from'' after ``transferred 
     to''; and
       (ii) by inserting after ``Iran'' the following: ``, or on 
     or after January 1, 2005, transferred to or acquired from 
     Syria''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``Iran'' the 
     following: ``or Syria, as the case may be,''.
       (b) Determination Exempting Foreign Persons From Certain 
     Measures.--Section 5(a) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
     2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``transfer to Iran'' and 
     inserting ``transfer to or acquire from Iran or Syria, as the 
     case may be,''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Iran's efforts'' and 
     inserting ``the efforts of Iran or Syria, as the case may 
     be,''.
       (c) Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection 
     With the International Space Station.--Section 6(b) of the 
     Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting 
     ``Relating to Iran and Syria'';
       (2) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``to Iran'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``to or from Iran and Syria''; 
     and
       (3) in paragraph (3), by striking ``to Iran'' and inserting 
     ``to or from Iran or Syria''.
       (d) Definitions.--Section 7(2) of the Iran Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C) to read as follows:
       ``(C) any foreign government, including any foreign 
     governmental entity; and''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``subparagraph (B) or 
     (C)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), 
     including any entity in which any entity described in any 
     such subparagraph owns a controlling interest''.
       (e) Short Title.--
       (1) Amendment.--Section 1 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act 
     of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended 
     by striking ``Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000'' and 
     inserting ``Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act''.
       (2) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation, 
     document, or other record of the United States to the Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act of 2000 shall be deemed to be a 
     reference to the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act.


[[Page 23925]]


  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos) each will control 20 minutes.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I request the time in opposition if neither 
gentleman is opposed to the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos) opposed to the bill?
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, no, I am not. I am supporting the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1 of rule XV, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul) will control 20 minutes in opposition.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on S. 1713, the bill 
under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Lantos) and ask unanimous consent that he control 
that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and, of 
course, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) for the leadership that 
has been demonstrated in getting this legislation to the floor.
  One of America's challenges as we seek global security and stability 
is stopping the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies.
  Several years ago, we enacted the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 
to give the United States several tools in our fight against 
proliferation to Iran, one of which was a restriction on U.S.-Russian 
space cooperation. As a member of both the Committee on International 
Relations and the Committee on Science, I was deeply involved in that 
aspect of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
  While many of the INA's tools have helped and should be continued, 
the limitation on space cooperation has not been effective and is now 
counterproductive. So, today, we have an opportunity to both correct 
and strengthen that legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the amended version of 
Senate bill 1713. First and foremost, the bill strengthens the tools 
available to fight proliferation to, and from, Iran. This bill also 
provides urgently needed relief for NASA so that the United States can 
maintain a continued presence on the International Space Station and 
enables cost-effective commercial partnerships to support the Space 
Station. This latter benefit also strengthens non-proliferation, 
because over the past decade we have learned that commercial ties 
between the United States and Russian aerospace companies have been an 
effective tool against proliferation. We need to employ such carrots 
along with our non-proliferation sticks.
  The changes put in place by S. 1713 will prevent a major setback for 
America's space program, and that is one of the most important things 
we are talking about today. It will prevent this setback by ensuring a 
continued and uninterrupted presence, an American presence, on the 
International Space Station.
  Cooperation with Russia, just as similar cooperation with Russia by 
the State of Israel in terms of space policy, will help us achieve 
America's space goals while maintaining our commitment to non-
proliferation.
  This bill needs to be passed. There is a time element here, and I 
would like to thank all those who have been involved in trying to get 
this legislation to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in opposition to the bill, but I want to make it very clear 
that the portion of the bill that the gentleman from California was 
speaking about I strongly endorsed. Matter of fact, I had a similar 
bill that would have made the same corrections, but I would like to 
make two points about this portion of the bill.
  The one is that the corrections were necessary because we had placed 
sanctions on Iran, and there was an unintended consequence. It actually 
harmed NASA and harmed our relationships with Russia. This is making a 
correction and I think that is good, and I strongly support that part 
of the bill.

                              {time}  1845

  But it goes to show that sanctions per se are not necessarily good. 
We might just use as an example not having sanctions on a country like 
China. We do better talking with and getting along with China as we 
become trading partners rather than adversaries. So even countries that 
seem to be adversarial, there are some downsides to putting on 
sanctions.
  Actually, the portion of the bill that I rise in objection to is the 
portion that was amended dealing with Syria. I consider this a 
significant change in our law. There has been very little discussion on 
this. This makes the bill quite different from the Senate bill. But 
once again, I think it is doing things that could come back to haunt 
us, and that is expanding our authority and the President's authority 
to place sanctions on Syria, of course always with good intentions; but 
too often bad things can happen.
  In 1998, a bill came up on the suspension calendar. It was considered 
noncontroversial and was called the Iraq Liberation Act. It passed 
overwhelmingly, but at that particular time, I took the time in 
opposition to point out that there could be some unintended, or maybe 
some intended, consequences that at that time the Congress was not 
admitting to, and that it could lead to war. And, of course, that was 
the first stepping stone to the current war that we are in.
  Although this particular bill is not nearly as strong as what the 
Iraq Liberation Act was, this nevertheless is a step as far as I am 
concerned in the wrong direction.
  The basic thing that happens here is we are expanding tremendously 
the power to place sanctions on Syria, and this comes in light of the 
publication of the U.N. investigation on Hariri's murder, and there is 
a tremendous move right now to move on to the next regime change in the 
Middle East. To me, I believe we are overstepping our bounds and 
looking for more trouble.
  We have essentially zero right to decide who should head foreign 
states. Once we decide that we know what is best for foreign countries 
and we can actually pick a head of state, I think it leads to trouble. 
I could give Members every bit of reason why we ought to change the 
King of Saudi Arabia, as we should change the King of Syria; and yet 
Saudi Arabia gets a lot of support from us.
  There was a recent report in a newspaper today, whether it is factual 
or not it is still frightening, it said that the administration was 
actually putting feelers out and asking Israel and Italy to nominate a 
replacement for Assad. This means we are moving in that direction.
  One of the reasons we are supposed to be doing this and looking 
closely to Syria is they present a destabilizing element in the Middle 
East. That in itself is stretching it. They are struggling to stabilize 
and survive with the pounding they are getting internationally. We 
forget that Syria actually sent troops into the first Persian Gulf war 
dealing with Kuwait. But those kinds of things are easily forgotten.
  The truth is the Mehlis Report is rather vague. There is no way it 
ties it to Assad. There is no proof of that whatsoever. As a matter of 
fact, Der Spiegel, a German magazine, reported today that the most 
important information that the Mehlis Report cites comes from an 
informer who was a convicted swindler and felon. That is one of the 
sources of the information they are using to try to tie this into 
Syria.

[[Page 23926]]

  If you want to talk about destabilization of a region, all we have to 
do is look at 150,000 troops in a country 6,000 miles from our borders. 
If we talk about the responsibility of somebody being assassinated, we 
might ask the question how many dozens of Iraqi administrators have 
been assassinated in Iraq since we have been in charge. So there are 
two different ways we can look at that. My deep concern is that we are 
moving in the direction of expanding our presence and expanding the war 
in that region.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. Five years ago, 
Congress approved far-reaching legislation to stop the flow of nuclear 
missiles and other sensitive technology to the ayatollahs of terror in 
Tehran. By a unanimous vote, Congress commanded that those who aid in 
the development of Iran's destabilizing nuclear and missile programs be 
exposed and sanctioned.
  The need for the Iran Nonproliferation Act is stronger today than it 
was 5 years ago. The Iranian regime continues to seek aggressively a 
nuclear weapons capability by exploiting allegedly peaceful nuclear 
facilities to produce nuclear weapons materials. Iran is also 
developing long-range missile systems capable of destabilizing the 
entire Middle East and beyond. The Iranians are accomplishing this task 
with the active assistance of Russia and other irresponsible actors on 
the international scene.
  Fortunately, Mr. Speaker, in large part due to the farsighted 
initiatives such as the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the world no longer 
trusts Tehran. Just this past month, the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna voted to find Iran in 
violation of its nuclear safeguards obligations. And absent any 
dramatic turnaround by Iran, the United States must and will demand 
that Iran's violations be reported to the U.N. Security Council at the 
next meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency this coming 
November.
  The legislation before us today is designed to preserve the core of 
the Iran Nonproliferation Act while allowing for continued cooperation 
with the Russians in support of our national space program.
  It is unfortunate, Mr. Speaker, that this legislation is necessary. I 
wish that the Russians had ceased their missile-related cooperation 
with the Iranians so Congress would not be forced to carve out this new 
exception. Moscow's deliberate decision to flaunt international norms 
on weapons of mass destruction just shows how far away the Russian 
regime is from being a responsible international actor.
  But we are compelled to pass this legislation because the United 
States needs to continue paying Russia for rides for American 
astronauts to the International Space Station and for other space 
services. Because the President cannot certify that Russia has ended it 
missile cooperation with Iran, and with the space shuttle still 
experiencing difficulties in its return to service, this exemption has 
proved necessary.
  But, Mr. Speaker, at the end of the day, the Iran Nonproliferation 
Act is emerging even stronger than before. My good friend, the chairman 
of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and I made changes to the bill which will focus 
even greater attention on Russia's destabilizing cooperation with Iran. 
The Hyde-Lantos provisions will make governments, not just individuals 
and business entities, newly vulnerable to sanctions for trade in 
weapons of mass destruction with the Iranian regime. It will also help 
ensure that Iran does not spread dangerous technology in the future.
  Our bill also applies the provision of the Iran Nonproliferation Act 
for the first time to the authoritarian regime in Damascus. This action 
will help ensure that whatever happens to the regime of Bashir Assad in 
the near term as it faces international condemnation richly deserved 
for its direct complicity in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the 
Prime Minister of neighboring Lebanon, it cannot develop weapons of 
mass destruction.
  Mr. Speaker, the leadership cabals in both Tehran and Damascus are 
aggressively seeking to develop such weapons that would threaten the 
entire Middle East and the region beyond. Our legislation marks an 
important step in focusing greater attention on these emerging threats 
while preserving key aspects of our own space program. I urge all of my 
colleagues to support this most important and urgent piece of 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. DeLay), a Member whose leadership has been a major factor in 
the passage of so much historic legislative reform that has gone 
through this body.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California, and I 
appreciate the work that you all have done. I rise in strong support of 
this legislation and also to commend everyone on both sides of the 
aisle and both sides of the Capitol who helped develop this legislation 
in the recent months.
  The legislation before us will correct an unintended consequence of 
the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Under that 2000 act passed by a 
Republican Congress and signed into law by President Clinton, the 
United States will soon find itself unable to manage many of its 
investments in space and unable to continue to develop and conduct 
vital scientific experiments aboard the International Space Station.
  Under that 2000 act, by next April, NASA would be severely limited in 
its ability to maintain an American scientific crew on the ISS, let 
alone monitor the billions of dollars in investments that the American 
people have made in the program.
  The bill before us will carve out an exemption in the 2000 act for 
NASA's relationships with Russian companies that build and maintain the 
vehicles and machinery that provide the services that help us in our 
partnership with them on the International Space Station. Among the 
most critical of these relationships are those that allow American 
astronauts access to the Russian Soyuz, a crew rescue vehicle, docking 
components for our own spacecraft, and other critical equipment and 
services.
  The United States' permanent presence in space today depends on our 
ongoing partnership with the Russian Federal Space Agency and other 
international partners. The President's new vision for space 
exploration depends on America's investment and involvement in the ISS 
so that we can develop the science necessary to prepare our astronauts 
for long-term exposure to microgravity and radiation.
  The experiments planned in coming years aboard the ISS can only be 
conducted in space, and NASA's future missions to the Moon and Mars 
depend on those experiments. Meanwhile, the potential gap between the 
retirement of the space shuttle and the deployment of NASA's new crew 
exploration vehicle would, without this legislation, leave the United 
States without continual access to space at a time at the end of this 
decade when we need it the most.
  This bill ensures NASA has the flexibility it needs to meet America's 
challenges in space. I urge all Members to support it.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to reiterate that the portion of the bill that deals with our 
ability to pursue our space program I strongly endorse. It is the 
portion that deals with Syria that was added on at the last minute that 
I am concerned about.
  I want to say that portion of the bill, I believe, further 
destabilizes the Middle East and we should move with great caution. We 
have been warned. We should be prepared for a broader war in the Middle 
East as plans are being laid for the next U.S.-led regime change in 
Syria.
  A U.N. report of the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri elicited 
this comment from a senior U.S. policy maker: ``Out of a tragedy comes 
an extraordinary strategic opportunity.'' This statement reflects the 
continued

[[Page 23927]]

neoconservative, Machiavellian influence on our foreign policy.

                              {time}  1900

  The ``opportunity'' refers to the long-held neoconservative plan for 
regime change in Syria, similar to what was carried out in Iraq.
  This plan for remaking the Middle East has been around for a long 
time. Just as 9/11 served the interests of those who longed for changes 
in Iraq, the sensationalism surrounding Hariri's death is being used to 
advance plans to remove Assad.
  Congress already has assisted these plans by authorizing the 
sanctions placed on Syria last year. Harmful sanctions, as applied to 
Iraq in the 1990s, inevitably represent a major step toward war since 
they bring havoc to so many innocent people. Syria already has been 
charged with developing weapons of mass destruction based on no more 
evidence than was available when Iraq was similarly charged.
  Syria has been condemned for not securing its borders by the same 
U.S. leaders who cannot secure our own borders. Syria was castigated 
for placing its troops in Lebanon, a neighboring country, although such 
action was invited by an elected government and encouraged by the 
United States. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon elicited no suicide 
terrorist attacks, as was suffered by Western occupiers.
  Condemning Syria for having troops in Lebanon seems strange 
considering most of the world sees our 150,000 troops in Iraq as 
unwarranted foreign intervention. Syrian troops were far more welcome 
in Lebanon.
  Secretary Rice likewise sees the problem in Syria that we helped to 
create as an opportunity to advance our Middle Eastern agenda. In 
recent testimony she stated that it was always the administration's 
intent to redesign the greater Middle East, and Iraq was only part of 
that plan. And once again we have been told that all options are still 
on the table for dealing with Syria, including war.
  The statement that should scare all Americans and the world is the 
assurance by Secretary Rice that the President needs no additional 
authority from Congress to attack Syria. She argues that authority 
already has been granted by the resolutions on 9/11 and Iraq. This is 
not true, but if Congress remains passive to the powers assumed by the 
executive branch, it will not matter. As the war spreads, the only role 
for the Congress will be to provide funding lest they be criticized for 
not supporting the troops. In the meantime, the Constitution and our 
liberties here at home will be further eroded as more Americans die.
  This escalation of conflict with Syria comes as a result of the U.N. 
report concerning Hariri's death. When we need an excuse for our 
actions, it is always nice to rely on the organization our 
administration routinely condemns, one that brought us the multi-
million-dollar oil-for-food scandal and the sexual crimes by U.N. 
representatives.
  It is easy to ignore the fact that the report did not implicate 
Assad, who is targeted for the next regime change. The U.N. once 
limited itself to disputes between nations; yet now it assumes the 
U.N., like the United States, has a legal and moral right to inject 
itself into the internal policies of sovereign nations. Yet what is the 
source of this presumed wisdom? Where is the moral imperative that 
allows us to become the judge and jury of a domestic murder in a 
country 6,000 miles from our shores?
  Moral, constitutional, and legal arguments for a less aggressive 
foreign policy receives little attention in Washington, but the law of 
unintended consequences serves as a thorough teacher for the slow 
learners and the morally impaired.
  Is Iraq not yet a headache for the proponents of the shock and awe 
policy? Are 2,000 lives lost not enough to get their attention? How 
many hundreds of billions of dollars must be drained from our economy 
before it is noticed? Is it still plausible that deficits do not 
matter? Is the apparent victory for Iran in the Shiite theocracy we 
have created in Iraq not yet seen as a disturbing consequence of the 
ill-fated Iraq regime change effort? When we have our way with the next 
election in Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes a governing party, what do we 
do then?
  If our effort to destabilize Syria is no more successful than our 
efforts in Iraq, then what? If destabilizing Syria leads to the same in 
Iran, what are our options? If we cannot leave now, we will surely not 
leave then. We will be told we must stay to honor the fallen to prove 
the cause was just.
  We should remember Ronald Reagan's admonition regarding this area of 
the world. Ronald Reagan reflected on Lebanon in his memoirs, 
describing the Middle East as a ``jungle'' and Middle Eastern politics 
as ``irrational.'' It forced him to rethink his policy in the region. 
It is time we do some rethinking as well.
  This bill today does not help.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to be equally divided 
between the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), and I ask unanimous consent that 
they be allowed to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe). Is there objection to the request 
of the gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman), a distinguished member of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on 
International Relations, and a member of the Committee on Science, and 
as a member of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, and, in fact, 
the ranking member of International Terrorism and Nonproliferation 
Subcommittee, I am well aware of the conflict of two goals of the 
Federal Government. One of those is to meet our obligations to the 
international space station. The other is to use every device possible 
to try to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to try to 
prevent Russia from assisting in that process.
  For me, these goals are not of equal weight. The supreme goal and 
objective and obligation of the Federal Government is to protect our 
people. Iranian nuclear weapons could be smuggled into our cities, and 
I would say that we should adopt no legislation and leave on the books 
current law that puts one objective, and that is limiting Iranian 
nuclear weapons, as the sole objective that is embodied in our 
statutes.
  But, in fact, some balance is going to be struck, and it is not going 
to be the overwhelming balance that I would strike, a balance in favor 
of doing everything possible to limit Iranian nuclear weapons 
development and giving far less weight to meeting our international 
space station obligations.
  I want to take this opportunity to commend the ranking member and the 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations and of the 
Committee on Science and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Rohrabacher) for doing a very good job of trying to narrowly tailor 
this legislation, to try to balance those two goals in not the way I 
would, but in a way that I have to concede is reasonable. And for that 
reason I will not ask for a recorded vote on this bill. I recognize 
that if this bill does not pass in this form, it is as likely to get 
worse as it is to get better because, in fact, my colleagues have 
labored very effectively and have taken some input from me to create a 
bill which is tailored to the twin objectives.
  Now, I would hope the day would come when the President of the United 
States could certify to this Nation that Russia is doing everything 
possible to help us prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and in 
any case was not helping Iran to develop those terrible weapons. But 
until that day comes, present law says that we cannot contract with 
agencies of the Russian Government space program no matter what for 
various space-related activities.
  As I understand this bill in its final revised form, and I see most 
of the principal authors of the amendment to it here on the floor, and 
I know the rest will correct the record tomorrow if I misstate 
anything, but I would yield to anyone here to correct me if I am

[[Page 23928]]

wrong, the bill in its present form creates a very limited exception to 
present law. It allows NASA to contract with Russian Government space 
agencies only when those agencies are the only available seller of 
goods and services necessary to meet our obligations to the 
international space station.
  There are two important aspects of that understanding. One is the 
language that I said, the only available seller of essential goods and 
services. That is to say this bill does not authorize us to turn a 
blind eye to Russian space agency cooperation with the nuclear plans of 
Tehran just because the Russian space agency is the cheapest or the 
most convenient or a few days faster. It allows us to ignore those 
important Iran nonproliferation goals only when it is absolutely 
necessary and only when necessary to meet our own obligations to the 
space station, not obligations of other countries.
  To reiterate, not only is this bill limited to situations where it is 
necessary, not merely convenient, for us to contract with the Russian 
space agency, but it is also a requirement that we are meeting our 
obligations to the international space station, not a circumstance when 
we are paying the Russians to meet their own obligations or the 
obligations of some other country.
  So I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. And to put it in 
context, I think this bill does a good job of striking what is the best 
balance we are likely to see in this legislative process between our 
goals.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Boehlert), a Member who was both the senior member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as serving as 
chairman of the Committee on Science.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this amended 
version of S. 1713.
  Let me start by thanking the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) for working so cooperatively 
with us for so long on this issue, which is of great concern to both of 
our committees over which both of our committees have jurisdiction. I 
also want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert), the 
chairman of our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, who, as always, has 
helped to keep our eye on the ball and has pressed to make sure we got 
this done. The gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the 
gentleman from California's (Mr. Calvert) predecessor, who serves on 
both committees, played a similarly dogged role. And if one has been 
exposed to the Rohrabacher machine, they know he is persistent. All of 
us have cosponsored the bill before us today.
  Finally, I want to thank the administration, including NASA and the 
State Department and the National Security Council, for being willing 
to consider a variety of approaches, and I want to thank the gentleman 
from Tennessee (Mr. Gordon), my ranking Democrat on the Committee on 
Science, for being a thoughtful participant as we examined different 
ways to deal with this issue.
  The puzzle we had to solve with dealing with the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act was how to enable the U.S. to continue to man the 
international space station without reducing our vigilance with regard 
to nonproliferation. I have been clear all along that, for me, 
maintaining nonproliferation is a far more important goal than is 
continuing to have Americans aboard the space station.
  But from the point of view of space policy, we had another goal here, 
too. We wanted to make sure that Russia, or any other foreign nation, 
could not bring our space program to a screeching halt or whatever the 
equivalent would be in the vacuum of space. Therefore, we wanted to try 
to write this bill in a way that would create an incentive for NASA to 
contract with new suppliers that would not be dependent on foreign 
technology to get U.S. personnel or supplies to and from the Space 
Station.

                              {time}  1915

  These are all tough goals, goals that have had their critics, goals 
that create winners and losers, goals that seek to balance competing 
national needs. And I think with this version of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act, we have come as close as anyone possibly could to 
accomplishing our goals.
  The bill enables the U.S. to continue to use the International Space 
Station unimpeded. The bill, in effect, allows the status quo to 
continue until 2012, when presumably the U.S. will have access to a new 
crew exploration vehicle to carry astronauts and commercial firms to 
move cargo. We will see if the budget enables that to actually happen 
on that schedule, but it is a plausible position.
  The bill encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are not 
dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future by setting a 
specific end date for our current relationship with the Russians. And 
the bill minimizes the harm to the nonproliferation regime by requiring 
the act to be reviewed again in 2012, by making it clear that no 
individual entity that violates the act can receive U.S. money and by 
adding Syria to the countries listed in the act, and, finally, by 
requiring clear reporting of payments under the act.
  The Senate deserves credit for moving all parties toward compromise; 
and our version, I would say, perfects that compromise by adding Syria 
and by making it clear that we have a true deadline. Under our bill, no 
funds can be used in violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act after 
2012, even if the funds are made available before 2012 and even if they 
are made available pursuant to an agreement that existed before that 
date.
  So I think we are where we have to be on this bill in order that we 
are going to protect the space program while protecting the world from 
nuclear weapons. These issues are never easy and nonproliferation 
necessarily involves a lot of guesswork about what is and what is not 
working; but this is a responsible, thoughtful compromise.
  In closing, let me again thank the Members of the Committee on 
International Relations and their staff, particularly Walker Roberts, 
for working so cooperatively with us and for continuing to push for 
tighter, but reasonable, language.
  I want to thank our staff on the Committee on Science, particularly 
Bill Adkins, for ensuring that we always took into account all the 
implications of the proposed language.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, which 
incorporates a truly thoughtful and effective compromise.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding back my time, I want to pay 
public tribute to two outstanding members of our staff, David 
Abramowitz and David Fite, who did extraordinary work on this very 
complex piece of legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no additional requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  First of all, thank you very much to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lantos) and all those on the other side of the aisle and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), who has done such great work 
in our committee and on issues dealing with Iran and trying to secure 
the safety of our country as well as the Middle East. The gentleman has 
my respect; and as he knows, he has had my cooperation in the past, and 
we appreciate his cooperation on this effort as well.
  This legislation needed to come to the floor, and we needed that type 
of bipartisan cooperation as well as cooperation with the Members on 
this side of the aisle and the hard work of the staff of both the 
Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Science to 
ensure that we were able to get this legislation passed in time to 
prevent what would have been an embarrassment, a major embarrassment, 
to the United States of America, which would have done irreparable 
damage to our credibility.
  Our space program would have been humiliated by the elimination of 
America's presence on the International Space Station, having an

[[Page 23929]]

International Space Station, which we paid for, then to be occupied and 
controlled by Russians. We have, by this effort today, and by this 
cooperation, prevented that shortcoming, that humiliation from 
happening.
  But let me note, it was never the intent of the authors of this part 
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act that we should ever come to a crisis 
like this. I can say that with certainty, because I was the one who was 
involved with writing this portion of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. I 
felt at that time we should have taken care of this issue a long time 
ago with carrots rather than sticks.
  I went to both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration 
years ago to ask them to offer Russia an alternative to being involved 
with Iran in terms of building nuclear facilities. The Clinton 
administration did not act and the Bush administration did not act to 
prevent this crisis that we are averting right now at the last minute 
from happening.
  Thus, for the record, let us note that, yes, we have averted a 
crisis; but a long time ago, positive and responsible actions by either 
the Clinton administration or the Bush administration could have 
prevented this from happening in a most important way.
  Let me note, cooperation with Russia in the space program is not 
inherently bad. It is something that is inherently good. It places the 
Russian scientists working on positive programs such as cooperation 
with America's space program. Israel itself is very involved with the 
Russians in their space program. Russian rockets launch Israeli 
satellites. Thus, we know that it is not inherently tied to Iran, the 
cooperation with Russia in space matters.
  But let us make sure that by passing this today we in no way are 
belittling the argument about the importance of dealing with Iran's 
development of nuclear weapons. This should be of concern to each and 
every one of us, and passage of this bill does not lessen that concern 
whatsoever.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hyde-Lantos 
amendments to S. 1713, a bill passed by the Senate on September 21, 
2005 amending the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to authorize new 
payments to Russia in support of the international space station. The 
Hyde-Lantos amendments, which have been authored on a bipartisan basis, 
would provide a substitute text for the Senate bill.
  The Senate bill is defective in significant respects. Chief among 
these would be a reduction in United States leverage over Russian 
technology transfers to Iran's weapons programs. The Hyde-Lantos 
substitute text would remedy this and other deficiencies in the Senate 
bill by more carefully balancing space cooperation interests with our 
nonproliferation interests.
  In particular, the substitute text would permit NASA to make payments 
to Russia for the next six years, up to January 1, 2012, as provided in 
the Senate version. But, it would eliminate the ambiguity in the Senate 
version, whereby payments and services might be rendered well beyond 
January 1, 2012. Instead, the substitute text would clearly establish 
that no payments or services may take place after that date unless 
Congress provides additional authority through new legislation or the 
Executive Branch makes the determination required under existing law 
concerning an end to Russia's support for Iran's weapons programs.
  During my discussion of the substitute text with NASA Administrator 
Griffin, he expressed support for our version of the bill provided one 
small concern could be resolved. His concern centered on a 
parenthetical expression, which he felt might constrain negotiation of 
arrangements with Russia before new payments could commence. I agreed 
to strike the relevant language on the express understanding, which Mr. 
Griffin accepted, that, while the substitute text as revised would 
permit any necessary arrangement for payments in order to fulfill 
existing United States obligations under the space station agreement, 
it would not permit payments for new obligations. During consideration 
of the bill a question arose concerning whether this limitation would 
restrict NASA's ability to purchase international space station re-
supply services from U.S. companies using Russian content, should NASA 
conclude that this is necessary to meet U.S. obligations under the 
space station agreement. In my opinion, this would not be the case, 
assuming the bona fides of the Russian suppliers.
  In addition, the substitute text makes three changes to the 
underlying law, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. First, the Act 
would henceforth be applicable to Syria, as well as to Iran. Second, 
the Act would cover weapons technology exported to other countries by 
Iran and Syria (as well as weapons technology imported by them). Third, 
``foreign persons'' would hereafter be defined to include foreign 
governmental entities, in addition to individuals and business 
organizations.
  I consider these changes to the underlying law to be both necessary 
and timely in light of two recent developments. The first concerns 
charges by the United Kingdom that either Iran, or Iranian-backed 
Hezbollah, is supplying explosives technology used by insurgents 
against coalition forces in Iraq. The second is the very troubling UN 
report implicating Syria in the February 14th massive bombing 
assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-
Hariri.
  In light of NASA's support and the enhancements to United States 
nonproliferation interests we have made to the bill, I am optimistic 
that the Senate will have little difficulty agreeing to this substitute 
text.
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 1713, as amended, 
which strengthens the Nation's nonproliferation principles and 
objectives while allowing NASA to meet its operational and programmatic 
needs with regard to the International Space Station (ISS), as called 
for in the President's Vision for Space Exploration. I am pleased to be 
a cosponsor of such important legislation with my colleagues and 
friends, Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, Chairman Boehlert, and 
Congressman Rohrabacher. This amendment is timely. NASA must revise its 
agreement and contractual arrangements with the Russian Federal Space 
Agency quickly in order to ensure uninterrupted training beyond October 
2005. The next ISS crew is scheduled to fly on the Russian Soyuz in 
April 2006. If this amendment is not enacted, INA restrictions will 
prevent a continued presence of U.S. crew onboard the ISS and limit 
U.S. presence onboard the ISS to Space Shuttle visits. We could lose 
our leadership role on the International Space Station.
  I know this amendment has been negotiated and discussed by many of my 
colleagues, who recognize the extreme importance of passing a measure 
which allows NASA to continue with its current role on the Space 
Station. I am a sponsor of this legislation and, at the same time, I 
have been concerned that we not be so restrictive on NASA to prevent 
them from doing their mission. S. 1713 as amended grants NASA the 
authority to procure urgent required goods and services from Russia, 
including crew rescue, to allow continuing ISS operations in the most 
safe and effective way possible. Some of these goods and services will 
be required from 2012 to the end of the program's operation. Moreover, 
ISS is an operational program that continues to evolve, requiring 
enough flexibility to deal with emerging issues over time. 
Consequently, Congress may need to address this issue again at a later 
date. We should be watchful as we move forward that we are able to 
maintain the ISS and to retain our leadership role.
  As the Chairman of the House Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I am 
mindful of the importance of a continued American presence in space. 
This amendment moves in the right direction by supporting those Russian 
entities which are compliant, while helping to solve near-term problems 
for NASA and its international partners.
  Without legislative action, NASA will have limited access to the ISS 
until the U.S. Crew Exploration Vehicle is ready to be deployed. I urge 
my colleagues to pass S. 1713 as amended as expeditiously as possible. 
I also salute my colleagues for bringing this important legislation to 
the floor in such a timely manner and plan to offer my support as we 
pass this legislation today in the House of Representatives.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in strong support of 
the amendment offered by Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos.
  Iran and Syria remain threats to the security and stability of the 
Middle East and the world whether it is from their continued support of 
terrorists to their desire to obtain unconventional weapons.
  Iran continues to thumb its nose to the IAEA and the international 
community on its desire to obtain nuclear weapons.
  According to the British, Iran is providing weapons to terrorists 
attacking coalition troops and working hard to destabilize Iraq even 
though it is not in the region's interests.
  Syria keeps its border with Iraq open thus allowing foreign fighters 
to illegally enter Iraq and carry out terrorists plots.
  These terrorists are working against the Iraqi people's quest for 
freedom and democracy.
  Iran is not the only neighbor Syria has been working hard to 
destabilize.

[[Page 23930]]

  Last week, the UN released the findings of its investigation into the 
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and I 
don't think any of us in this House were surprised to see that they 
pointed a finger at the regime of Syria's President Bashar Assad.
  Before his death the former prime minister had become one of the most 
vocal opponents of the Syrian occupation.
  This report names high level Syrian and Lebanese government officials 
who plotted to assassinate this outspoken leader.
  I hope that our actions today will show President Assad that our 
resolve is strong.
  Mr. Speaker, Syria must change its ways and begin to contribute to 
international peace and security rather than undermine it.
  I urge all my colleagues to support this important amendment.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to clarify a confusing or 
mistaken impression that may have been left by one of my colleagues 
during the House floor debate on S. 1713, the Iran Nonproliferation 
Amendments Act of 2005, for which I served as the majority floor 
manager.
  The purpose of enacting S. 1713, as amended by the House, is twofold: 
to strengthen our nonproliferation tools in dealing with Iran and also 
Syria, and at the same time enable necessary cooperation between NASA 
and U.S. businesses with their Russian counterparts on the 
International Space Station. Just to be clear, in no way does S. 1713 
favor our space goals at the expense of effectiveness in 
nonproliferation. In fact, the time-limited authority we give NASA to 
purchase, either directly or through U.S. companies, Russian space 
goods and services, is in my view a net plus for nonproliferation, not 
a minus.
  That said, I want to stress that the legislation the House adopted, 
and the intent of that legislation, allows NASA significant flexibility 
in using Russian space goods and services to support the assembly and 
operation of the International Space Station between now and January 1, 
2012. NASA is free to make payments pursuant to the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on ISS ``or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of 
understanding, or contract related thereto.'' As Chairman Hyde pointed 
out in his floor statement, this means that after enactment of this 
legislation, NASA can enter into new arrangements to meet our needs 
regarding ISS, but that NASA will not enter into new obligations beyond 
or unrelated to the ISS.
  The primary limitations with respect to ISS payments are the sunset 
date of January 1, 2012, and the existing statutory requirement that 
the specific Russian entities to be paid have not been sanctioned as 
proliferators under the earlier sections of the Iran Nonproliferation 
Act.
  I point all of this out because my friend and colleague, Mr. Sherman, 
mistakenly suggested during the floor debate that the phrase 
``necessary to meet United States obligations'' added to the Hyde-
Lantos substitute to S. 1713 implies that NASA could not purchase 
Russian goods or services if any other alternative was available. That 
is certainly not the plain meaning of the phrase, nor the intent behind 
it. However, because Mr. Sherman explicitly invited correction, I am 
doing so here in some detail.
  Here are three examples of arrangements that are wholly consistent 
with the legislative text, the Senate and House floor statements by the 
architects of this legislation, and the Administration's request for 
relief, but which would not be allowed under Mr. Sherman's 
interpretation.
  First, NASA has stated it wants to use the Russian Soyuz crew capsule 
to exchange long-term ISS research crews, even during the time the 
Space Shuttle is flying, because this will allow the Shuttle astronauts 
to focus on the job of assembling the Space Station to meet our 
international partner commitments during the Shuttle's limited 
remaining lifetime. Under the previously negotiated agreements between 
our countries, Russia is no longer obligated to provide NASA with Soyuz 
crew transport seats. Therefore, in this example, NASA would not be 
paying Russia for an obligation they have promised to us. However, 
because NASA could theoretically use the Space Shuttle as an 
alternative to carry out crew transfer, albeit at some risk and a cost 
to our other ISS commitments, Mr. Sherman's inference would suggest 
NASA cannot do this. Given that the primary exigency for adopting this 
legislation is enabling continued U.S. occupation of ISS beyond April 
of next year, which requires payment for training and launch to ISS of 
a NASA astronaut on the next Soyuz launch, Mr. Sherman's interpretation 
is incorrect.
  Second, Chairman Hyde's statement explicitly makes clear that cargo 
resupply services to ISS using technology developed by Russian 
companies would be legal under the amended Act, again within the 
limitations I stated above. This would be the case regardless of 
whether the Space Shuttle might technically be available to deliver 
cargo to ISS, namely through the middle of 2010.
  Third, some bidders may wish to use a very reliable and capable U.S. 
launch vehicle, one which the Defense Department uses right now to 
launch critical military satellites, and which happens to incorporate 
Russian rocket engines. Nothing in this bill was meant to preclude such 
activities, even though there might be similar launch vehicles which do 
not use Russian rocket engines. Mr. Hyde's statement makes this clear.
  Beyond those examples, I would offer the words of House Science 
Committee Chairman Boehlert as further disputation of Mr. Sherman's 
reading. In his floor statement, Chairman Boehlert declares that ``by 
setting a specific end date for our current relationship with the 
Russians'' the bill ``encourages NASA to find commercial firms that are 
not dependent on the Russians to carry cargo in the future.'' While I 
may disagree with that goal or a sunset date's effectiveness as a 
management tool, if Mr. Sherman's reading were true, the sunset date 
would be superfluous, because once a U.S. provider whose service had no 
Russian content emerged, NASA would be barred from any further 
payments, let alone purchases, from companies which do use some Russian 
content. Clearly Chairman Boehlert's interpretation is the same as 
Chairman Hyde's and my own: Russian content is allowed up until the 
January 1, 2012 date.
  Finally, I would just echo the comments made by Chairman Calvert 
during the floor debate: the ISS program requires long-term flexibility 
for NASA to safely and cost-effectively execute both for our taxpayers 
and to meet our international commitments. We are partners with Russia 
in the Space Station. Both NASA and its commercial providers need to be 
able to exchange goods and services at ISS with nonproliferation 
compliant Russian entities for the lifetime of the station, 
particularly as we seek to engage the U.S. private sector in ISS 
operations. Last week the House made clear that even in a time of great 
concern over the manifest threat from Iran, we want NASA and industry 
to have this ability at least through January 1, 2012.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Poe). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) that the 
House suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill, S. 1713, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate bill, as amended, was 
passed.
  The title of the Senate bill was amended so as to read: ``An Act to 
make amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 related to 
International Space Station payments, and for other purposes.''.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________