[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 21437-21439]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         THE 2005 BRAC PROCESS

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak on the Base Realignment 
and Closure, or BRAC, process that occurred this year. I have always 
voted to authorize base closure rounds in deference to the Department 
of Defense's stated need to restructure our military facilities to meet 
current and future needs. Nevertheless, the ceding of significant 
authority by Congress to an

[[Page 21438]]

independent commission is an extraordinary step that should not be 
undertaken frequently or lightly. When Congress does lend its power to 
an independent commission, we retain the responsibility to closely 
monitor the commission's deliberations and actions. I have done so with 
respect to the 2005 BRAC Commission, naturally paying the closest 
attention to the issues before the Commission that affect Iowans.
  My observation of the Commission's final deliberations raised some 
concerns about the information and reasoning used in making its 
decisions. I followed up with a letter to the Commission to clarify 
these concerns and have recently received a response that did nothing 
to allay my concerns. As a result, I have now concluded that I do not 
have full confidence that this was a thorough and fair process.
  A joint resolution to disapprove the 2005 BRAC recommendations has 
been introduced in the House and has just been marked up by the House 
Armed Services Committee. It will now be considered under expedited 
procedures. I would urge my colleagues in the House to approve this 
resolution. Obviously, if this resolution is not approved by the House, 
Senate action will be meaningless. But, if the Senate does take up such 
a resolution, I will vote to disapprove the 2005 BRAC recommendations.
  The BRAC Commission is charged with reviewing the recommendations of 
the Department of Defense and altering those recommendations if they 
are found to deviate substantially from the BRAC criteria. On that 
basis, the Quad Cities community in Iowa and Illinois challenged some 
recommendations for the Rock Island Arsenal and did not challenge 
others.
  One issue on which I thought we had a clear-cut case of a substantial 
deviation of the BRAC criteria was the proposed move of the U.S. Army 
Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, or TACOM, organization at the 
Rock Island Arsenal to the Detroit Arsenal. This proposal was 
essentially a footnote to a consolidation of what is called inventory 
control point functions from 11 separate organizations around the 
country that would now report to the Defense Logistics Agency. The 
consolidation of inventory control point functions would affect 52 
people at TACOM Rock Island and was not challenged by the community. 
However, the DOD recommendation then, puzzlingly, proposed to move the 
rest of the approximately 1,000 employees of TACOM Rock Island to the 
TACOM Headquarters at the Detroit Arsenal in Michigan.
  The facilities at the Detroit Arsenal are already strained to 
capacity. The base is encroached on all sides and has no room to grow. 
In fact, the Detroit Arsenal is rated far lower in military value than 
the Rock Island Arsenal. Moving in 1,000 new employees will require 
major military construction. That includes building two parking garages 
to replace the already limited parking space that would be used up. 
What's more, because of higher locality pay in the area, it will cost 
significantly more in the long term to pay those employees at the new 
location. You also lose some unique facilities currently used by TACOM 
Rock Island, like a machine shop and live fire range. In addition, 
there will be no space to house the outside contractors currently 
embedded with TACOM Rock Island, who would also need to move but aren't 
counted in the BRAC data.
  The Quad Cities community challenged this proposed move on the basis 
of military value, and the enormous costs both up front and in the long 
run. In fact, the move would cost the taxpayers millions of dollars 
more out into the future. This point was made clear when Commissioner 
Skinner visited the Rock Island Arsenal. It featured prominently in my 
testimony before three BRAC Commissioners at the regional hearing in 
St. Louis. My colleagues, Senators Durbin, Obama, and Harkin and 
Representative Evans also made this point at the regional hearing. This 
was followed by a detailed presentation by community representatives. 
Members of our bistate congressional delegation reinforced this point 
in follow-up phone calls to commissioners. Finally, community 
representatives and congressional staff met with the BRAC Commission 
staff to make sure they knew about the costs.
  When it came time for the final deliberations, the Commission 
considered the TACOM move with the consolidation of inventory control 
point functions. I question this approach to start with since the TACOM 
move was completely unrelated to the other moves in the recommendation. 
It was obvious by Commissioner Skinner's questions to the BRAC staff 
that considering these unrelated moves in one recommendation confused 
the commissioners. Commissioner Skinner asked twice how the move being 
considered would affect another move from the Rock Island Arsenal to 
the Detroit Arsenal that he believed would be considered separately. He 
had to be corrected twice by staff who explained that it was all part 
of one recommendation.
  Furthermore, despite all the briefings from the community, the BRAC 
staff presented a summary of the community's concerns that omitted the 
critical issue of the long-term costs of the move. The summary's only 
reference to cost was a relatively minor concern that the number of 
positions to move were underestimated. When Commissioner Skinner asked 
how increased estimates of the military construction costs at the 
Detroit Arsenal would affect the payback, the BRAC staff responded that 
``Payback with the new scenario, new MILCON, is $1.8 billion savings 
over 20 years, still a large savings.'' However, that figure refers to 
the entire recommendation package, not just the otherwise unrelated 
TACOM move. I believe that response by the BRAC staff was 
intellectually dishonest and misleading.
  The disturbing fact is that the TACOM move will actually squander 
$128.23 in taxpayer money. I pointed out this problem in a message 
delivered to Commissioner Skinner before the Commission's final vote on 
the BRAC report, but no action was taken. Only after the final vote has 
the Commission admitted to me in a letter that the TACOM move, taken by 
itself, would cost $128.23 million over the 20 year time frame used in 
their estimate. The Commission's letter also confirmed that the 
Commissioners were never briefed about the cost of the TACOM move by 
itself.
  In its response to me, the BRAC Commission continued to justify 
considering the cost of the TACOM move in terms of the net present 
value of the entire recommendation. However, in reference to another 
portion of the same recommendation regarding a cryptological unit at 
Lackland Air Force Base, the slide used by the BRAC staff for its 
presentation read, ``The extent and timing of potential costs outweigh 
potential savings with no payback of investment.'' The same could have 
been said about the TACOM portion of the recommendation. The Commission 
then voted to overturn the portion of the recommendation to realign 
Lackland Air Force Base. In this case, the Commission did consider one 
portion of the larger recommendation separately, including a staff 
analysis of the payback for just that portion of the recommendation, 
and voted to overturn that component of the larger recommendation. The 
Commission's justification for its failure to do so with respect to the 
TACOM portion of that recommendation therefore falls flat.
  In fact, there is evidence that the selective presentation of facts 
by the BRAC staff resulted in Commissioners misunderstanding the issue 
when voting. In justifying his decision on the TACOM move in an 
interview with the Rock Island Argus, Commissioner Skinner said of the 
BRAC staff's analysis, ``They said there's still significant payback by 
doing that and that was the major objection that they (the community) 
had.'' Commissioner Skinner should have known the most about this 
proposed move from his site visits to both the Rock Island Arsenal and 
the Detroit Arsenal, but his statement is inaccurate. It seems clear 
from this quote that he was misled by relying on the faulty 
presentation by the BRAC staff.
  Of course, while cost is a major consideration in BRAC, it is not the 
only

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consideration. Still, if a recommendation contains significant costs, 
like the TACOM move, there must be a very compelling case for an 
increase in military value to justify the costs. In this case, I think 
it is clear that more is lost in terms of military value than is 
gained. Moreover, the Commission never got to this point since the BRAC 
staff represented that the move was justified based on cost.
  I don't believe that DOD made this recommendation based on a 
conclusion that consolidating TACOM in one location would increase 
military value in the first place. Several smaller components of TACOM 
in other locations were not proposed for consolidation. Still, if there 
was a compelling case for merging the two TACOM organizations together, 
then why wasn't the Rock Island Arsenal considered as a receiving site? 
The Rock Island Arsenal could accommodate all the personnel at Detroit 
Arsenal without major military construction, possibly even allowing 
Detroit Arsenal to be closed entirely. The Rock Island Arsenal was 
never considered as a receiving installation by DOD since it was 
assumed to be closing during much of DOD's internal BRAC process.
  In fact, the preliminary assumption that the Rock Island Arsenal 
would close is why it was not considered as a receiving site for the 
consolidation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 
Installation Management Agency, and Civilian Personnel Operations 
Center. In the case of the Civilian Personnel Operations Center, the 
BRAC staffer who presented this issue to the Commission pointed out 
that this was not fair and equal treatment, which is a violation of the 
BRAC rules. The Commission then voted to overturn the recommendation 
based on the fairness issue. I asked the BRAC Commission to answer why 
this same logic did not apply to their actions in each of these areas. 
The response stated that each recommendation was developed and briefed 
separately by DOD supporting different initiatives. This does not 
answer my question as to why the Commission did not overturn each of 
these recommendations on the basis of fairness as they did, rightly, 
with the Civilian Personnel Operations Center.
  For instance, like the Civilian Personnel Operations Center at the 
Rock Island Arsenal, the Defense Finance and Accounting site was ranked 
No. 1 in military value of all such sites. Given the low labor costs 
and room to expand, it would be an ideal location to which to 
consolidate other sites if it were given fair and equal consideration. 
The Commission even questioned the sites chosen by DOD as receiving 
sites based on higher costs and lower value. Yet, in the end, the 
Commission chose to rearrange the sites to receive the consolidation 
and keep open two smaller sites with lower value than Rock Island. At a 
minimum, the Commission should have voted to keep open the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service at the Rock Island Arsenal based on the 
same fairness consideration as the Civilian Personnel Operations 
Center. Ideally, it should have chosen the Rock Island Arsenal as a 
receiving site.
  I knew going into this BRAC process that the Rock Island Arsenal 
could lose jobs. In fact, I am relieved that DOD did not recommend full 
closure as first contemplated. Moreover, as I testified before the BRAC 
Commission, if it was determined that an organization would be more 
efficient and less expensive somewhere else, then I could have lived 
with that. On this basis, I was even prepared for the BRAC Commission 
to disagree with my assessment about the proposals for the Rock Island 
Arsenal that I didn't think made any sense.
  However, what I saw in the BRAC Commission's final deliberations took 
me by surprise. The Commission did not refute the concerns raised by 
the community. No evidence was produced that the TACOM move made 
economic sense or would be more efficient. Instead, the staff gave a 
misleading presentation that gave the impression that the move made 
economic sense when it did not, based on the data used by the 
Commission. That doesn't mean I absolve the Commissioners from 
responsibility in this either. Four of them had seen a presentation by 
the community and all of them had been contacted by Members of 
Congress. They had a responsibility to challenge the staff when the 
staff analysis didn't match what they had heard previously. In this 
respect, both the BRAC staff and the Commissioners failed in their 
responsibilities. In the end, what I have seen has caused me to lose 
confidence in the work of the BRAC Commission. As a result, I cannot 
endorse their final product.
  I ask unanimous consent to have the Rock Island Argus article to 
which I referred printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    Skinner: Arsenal Dodged a Bullet

                           (By Edward Felker)

       Washington--BRAC Commissioner Samuel K. Skinner on Thursday 
     said the Rock Island Arsenal ``dodged a major bullet'' in the 
     base closing process by losing jobs but not closing 
     completely.
       During a brief interview, Mr. Skinner, who visited the 
     Arsenal on behalf of the commission, defended the panel's 
     vote to send 1,129 Quad-Cities jobs to the Detroit Arsenal. 
     The panel approved the move despite protests that the 
     transfer will cost too much and not further Army integration.
       Mr. Skinner said that he looked into arguments that the 
     Detroit Arsenal did not have the space for the incoming 
     workers, but was satisfied that additional construction costs 
     will not hamper expected savings to the taxpayers.
       ``They said there's still significant payback by doing 
     that,'' he said of the BRAC staff's review of the move, ``and 
     that was the major objection that they had.''
       He said the commission felt it was only fair to keep open 
     the Arsenal's 251-job Civilian Personnel Office and Civilian 
     Human Resource Agency. It was originally slated to move to 
     Fort Riley, Kan., as part of a sweeping consolidation of 
     defense personnel offices.
       But Mr. Skinner urged the panel to delete it because it was 
     targeted as part of a complete closure of the Rock Island 
     Arsenal, and the move was never re-examined after the 
     Pentagon decided to keep the Arsenal open.
       ``They had no chance to be heard, it wasn't even 
     considered, and on that basis it wasn't fair. So we got a 
     little life,'' Mr. Skinner said.
       He also defended the closure of the Arsenal's 301-job 
     Defense Finance and Accounting Service office. The commission 
     voted to keep other offices open that the Pentagon targeted 
     for closure, but Mr. Skinner said they were on bases of 
     higher military and had the worst economic closure impact 
     among DFAS locations.
       He said the overall result for the Arsenal was better than 
     it could have been. ``They dodged a major bullet. Not 
     perfect, but it could have been a lot worse.''

     

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