[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 20901-20902]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


                   IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Committee on Foreign Relations be discharged from further consideration 
of S. 1713, and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report the bill by title.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1713) to make amendments to the Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2000 related to International Space Station payments.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on September 15 I introduced a bill to 
amend the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-178. The 
bill, S. 1713, provides authority for the administration to continue to 
cooperate with the Russian Federation on the International Space 
Station.
  Current law prohibits certain payments from being made to Russia. 
When Congress enacted the Iran Nonproliferation Act, INPA, it did so to 
provide the President with a means to address proliferation of 
ballistic missile-related and other dangerous dual-use technology to 
Iran. Congress passed and the President signed legislation designed to 
give the executive branch additional tools with which to address 
Russian proliferation and the proliferation of other countries that are 
transferring dangerous weapons technology to Iran. The legislation was 
also meant to enhance significantly the ability of Congress to monitor 
proliferation to Iran and oversee executive efforts to combat it.
  With regard to Russia, at the time of its enactment, the rationale 
for INPA restrictions on payments to Russia for cooperation on the 
International Space Station was that the Russian Aviation and Space 
Agency, RASA, could use any legal or operational authority it may have 
had over certain organizations and entities that might be proliferating 
to Iran to stop such activities.
  I continue to believe that Russia must prevent proliferation to Iran 
of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the 
technical know-how to make them.
  The bill I introduced last week does not condone the proliferation 
activities of Russian entities nor those of others proliferating to 
Iran. It does allow the United States to meet its obligations under the 
Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
Station. While it creates an exception for certain U.S. payments to 
Russia in support of the space station, it also mandates that Congress 
be kept aware of the specific Russian entities to which the United 
States makes payments, and that the President determine that such 
payments are not prejudicial to our nonproliferation policies with 
respect to cruise and ballistic missile proliferation to Iran or other 
state sponsors of terrorism.
  Since the introduction of S. 1713, a question has arisen as to which 
agreements might be negotiated under its authority that could, in fact, 
obligate the United States to make payments beyond the date specified 
in section 3 of that bill. It is my intention that no payments may be 
made after January

[[Page 20902]]

1, 2012. Also, I understand that NASA intends to accelerate its crew 
exploration vehicle, CEV, program so as to avoid any complications that 
might arise as a result of continued U.S. utilization of Russian-
provided technology during the period between the shuttle's retirement 
and the CEV becoming operational.
  I want to thank all my colleagues for their cooperative consideration 
of this bill. I urge the Senate to pass S. 1713.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be 
read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the 
table, and that any statements relating to the measure be printed in 
the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (S. 1713) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

                                S. 1713

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation 
     Amendments Act of 2005''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Director of Central Intelligence's most recent 
     Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 
     Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
     Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 
     2003, states ``Russian entities during the reporting period 
     continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related 
     goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, 
     India, and China. Iran's earlier success in gaining 
     technology and materials from Russian entities helped 
     accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and 
     continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian 
     efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-
     sufficiency in missile production.''
       (2) Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, the Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, stated in testimony before the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on February 
     16, 2005, that ``Tehran probably will have the ability to 
     produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade''.
       (3) Iran has--
       (A) failed to act in accordance with the Agreement Between 
     Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
     Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 
     19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards 
     Agreement'');
       (B) acted in a manner inconsistent with the Protocol 
     Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
     Safeguards, signed at Vienna December 18, 2003 (commonly 
     referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'');
       (C) acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations 
     under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
     done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
     entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly referred to as the 
     ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''); and
       (D) resumed uranium enrichment activities, thus ending the 
     confidence building measures it adopted in its November 2003 
     agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, 
     France, and Germany.
       (4) The executive branch has on multiple occasions used the 
     authority provided under section 3 of the Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) to impose sanctions on entities that have engaged 
     in activities in violation of restrictions in the Act 
     relating to--
       (A) the export of equipment and technology controlled under 
     multilateral export control lists, including under the 
     Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile 
     Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the 
     Wassenaar Arrangement or otherwise having the potential to 
     make a material contribution to the development of weapons of 
     mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missile systems to 
     Iran; and
       (B) the export of other items to Iran with the potential of 
     making a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass 
     destruction programs or on United States national control 
     lists for reasons related to the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction or missiles.
       (5) The executive branch has never made a determination 
     pursuant to section 6(b) of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
     2000 that--
       (A) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of 
     mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering 
     such weapons;
       (B) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the 
     law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and 
     intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated 
     and continues to demonstrate a sustained commitment to seek 
     out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and 
     technology that could make a material contribution to the 
     development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or 
     of ballistic or cruise missile systems; and
       (C) no entity under the jurisdiction or control of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, has, during the 1-year 
     period prior to the date of the determination pursuant to 
     section 6(b) of such Act, made transfers to Iran reportable 
     under section 2(a) of the Act.
       (6) On June 29, 2005, President George W. Bush issued 
     Executive Order 13382 blocking property of weapons of mass 
     destruction proliferators and their supporters, and used the 
     authority of such order against 4 Iranian entities, Aerospace 
     Industries Organization, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, 
     Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, and the Atomic Energy 
     Organization of Iran, that have engaged, or attempted to 
     engage, in activities or transactions that have materially 
     contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, 
     the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their 
     means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering 
     such weapons), including efforts to manufacture, acquire, 
     possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items.

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000 
                   RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
                   PAYMENTS.

       (a) Treatment of Certain Payments.--Section 7(1)(B) of the 
     Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-178; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting after ``such date'' 
     the following: ``, except that such term does not mean 
     payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United 
     States Government, to meet the obligations of the United 
     States under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the 
     Civil International Space Station, with annex, signed at 
     Washington January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 27, 
     2001, or any protocol, agreement, memorandum of 
     understanding, or contract related thereto, to January 1, 
     2012''.
       (b) Reporting Requirements.--Section 6 of such Act is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Report on Certain Payments Related to International 
     Space Station.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall, together with each 
     report submitted under section 2(a), submit to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives a 
     report that identifies each Russian entity or person to whom 
     the United States Government has, since the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 
     2005, made a payment in cash or in kind to meet the 
     obligations of the United States under the Agreement 
     Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
     Station, with annex, signed at Washington January 29, 1998, 
     and entered into force March 27, 2001, or any protocol, 
     agreement, memorandum of understanding, or contract related 
     thereto.
       ``(2) Content.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       ``(A) the specific purpose of each payment made to each 
     entity or person identified in the report; and
       ``(B) with respect to each such payment, the assessment of 
     the President that the payment was not prejudicial to the 
     achievement of the objectives of the United States Government 
     to prevent the proliferation of ballistic or cruise missile 
     systems in Iran and other countries that have repeatedly 
     provided support for acts of international terrorism, as 
     determined by the Secretary of State under section 620A(a) of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), 
     section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
     U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).''.

  Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Chair. I now yield the floor so that the 
Senator from Massachusetts can make his statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee and 
the Senator from Utah for his courtesies. I know he is eager to get on 
with the legislation, and I am particularly grateful to him for the 
courtesy that he has extended this morning.

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