[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 15]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 20792-20793]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        MEETING OF THE IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CAUCUS

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. THOMAS G. TANCREDO

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                      Tuesday, September 20, 2005

  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, please submit the following transcript 
from the June 25, 2005 meeting of the Iranian Human Rights and 
Democracy Caucus for the Record.

       Congressman Tom Tancredo: We are going to be talking about 
     the election in Iran and the aftermath of the election. 
     According to reports the mullahs employed a variety of 
     methods to get Mahmood Ahmadinejad elected and including the 
     use of 5 million national ID cards of the deceased, voting 
     with unofficial ID cards, voting with both passports and 
     birth certificates outside of Iran to allow the mullahs men 
     to write in their votes twice, paying $15.5 million 300,000 
     members of the parliamentary Bassij force in support of a 
     particular candidate, buying votes for $35.00 each in many 
     provinces, furthermore in recent years we have learned 
     critical information about the mullahs of nuclear program. 
     Since then the international community has come to better 
     appreciate the extent of Iran's involvement in terrorist 
     activity abroad, nuclear ambitions and interference in Iraq, 
     Lebanon and Palestine. It would be a monumental error if we 
     assume that the mullahs are reformable, can tolerate 
     intellectually progress and regional or international peace. 
     I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and I 
     hope they can illuminate for us Iran's recent elections and 
     their implications for the U.S. and the world.
       Dr. Kenneth Katzman (Excerpt): Congressional Research 
     Service--The twists and turns of the Iranian presidential 
     election in 2005 might indicate that Iranian politics are 
     more vibrant and less scripted than some experts, and some 
     Administration officials appear to believe. On the other 
     hand, Bush Administration criticism of the Council of 
     Guardians' heavy hand in candidate selection--and eliminating 
     of all women candidates from the competition--is accurate. . 
     . . Although Iranian voters apparently did not vote for him 
     because of his foreign policy positions, his victory has now 
     ensured a hardliner lock on virtually all major 
     institutions--the Supreme Leadership, the Council of 
     Guardians, 6 clerics appointed by Khamenei plus 6 jurists 
     appointed by the judiciary, the Majles, the Expediency 
     Council, and now the presidency and government ministries. 
     The 86-seat Assembly of Experts is elected. Reformists are 
     now virtually shut out. . . . Potential alterations to 
     Tehran's bargaining strategies at the nuclear talks with the 
     so-called ``EU-3'', Britain, France, and Germany, are perhaps 
     harder to judge. During his second round campaign, 
     Ahmadinejad pointedly criticized the Foreign Ministry 
     negotiators as too willing to make dramatic concessions in 
     order to reach a deal with the EU-3. Those penalties will 
     likely be the subject of discussion between the United States 
     and its European allies.
       Professor Raymond Tanter (Excerpt): Iran Policy Committee--
     With regard to the turnout in the June 2005 Iranian 
     elections, a Council on Foreign Relations analyst referenced 
     Iran's notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security to 
     validate the regime's announced turnout numbers. . . . I 
     think if disinformation means anything it means that you 
     don't go to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to find 
     out what the turnout is! I've heard reports from some of the 
     smaller cities in Iran that the opposition-led boycott was 
     very effective. The turnout was between 10 percent and 20 
     percent not the regime's inflated figure of over 50 percent. 
     It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that the 
     lower the turnout rate, the less the legitimacy of that 
     government. . . . In addition, the so-called election was 
     actually a ``selection'' because the Supreme Leader Khamenie 
     handpicked candidates in advance of the vote. He started 
     nearly two years ago to have the revolutionary guards take 
     control over all organs of the regime. This power play did 
     not begin a month before the June elections. There was some 
     internal dissent, and Khamenie thought it was important for 
     him to control all organs of power. . . . President Bush 
     deserves credit for condemning the ``sham selections'' and 
     hence de-legitimizing them in advance.
       Here is a three-point plan of the Iran Policy Committee to 
     facilitate regime change in Iran. First, remove the 
     Mujaheddin-e Khalq from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
     list. Secondly, expand U.S. funding for Iranian opposition 
     groups and nongovernmental organizations committed to 
     democratic change in Iran, including the Mujaheddin-e Khalq 
     and related groups. Thirdly, invite Iranian opposition 
     leaders to the White House and to the Congress; these leaders 
     would include leaders of the Mujaheddin-e Khalq and members 
     of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
       Congressman Tom Tancredo: It does seem, listening to you, 
     there is a ray of sunshine and you both have just let shine 
     on this because, would we be Pollyannaish to think and that 
     it is good that he is going to disavow any foreign investment 
     and therefore any internationalization of the economy, those 
     oil revenues will be less effective perhaps and the mischief 
     making, then they otherwise would be if the economy were to 
     thrive under a more expansive or more open arrangement.
       Congressman Tom Tancredo: I would like to recognize a 
     member who has joined us, congressman Clay.
       Congressman William Lacy Clay: I appreciate hearing from 
     Dr. Tanter and the other witnesses here, defined out their 
     take on the recent elections in Iran. Let me also say that 
     it's OK to mention Florida, you can also mention Ohio. This 
     is a bipartisan committee [laughter] I'm delighted to be 
     here, it's a pleasure, thank you.
       Ilan Berman (Excerpt): American Foreign Policy Council--. . 
     . A great deal of think has been spilt in recent weeks in an 
     attempt to game the Iranian elections. The art of predicting 
     have the next president is going to be has been elevated to 
     high drama, certainly on the editorial pages that we've all 
     read. Also I think it's important to note that most of this 
     analysis has been spectacularly wrong, not just wrong but 
     spectacularly wrong. . . . The power centers within the 
     Islamic Republic are fully consolidated under the leadership 
     of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In the past, the outgoing 
     President Mohammad Khatami had succeeded on a very notable 
     but very few and far between occasions on breaking with the 
     clerical leadership and doing so publicly. With the rise of 
     Mr. Ahmadinejad such descent is more than likely going to 
     become a thing of the past. Given his political leanings and 
     his revolutionary credentials he is likely to steer the 
     Iranian presidency into the out right rubber stamp of the 
     clerical leadership. That is the first implication. . . . 
     Second is that Mr. Ahmadinejad's ascendance to power actually 
     mirrors a deeper political shift that has taken place within 
     that the Iranian politics over the last couple of years. The 
     reformists we now all see are in retreat and internal 
     political changes have shifted power and shifted power 
     dramatically to a cadre of clerical hardliners who are 
     committed to revitalizing and even expanding the Islamic 
     revolution. . . . Iran in short, constitutes a mounting 
     strategic challenge to the United States and also to U.S. 
     objectives and the broader Middle East and the war on terror. 
     Unfortunately, and I use the same caviar and the Dr. Katzman 
     did, that these are my views alone, the White House seems to 
     have failed to articulate a comprehensive strategy towards 
     addressing, not only the nuclear program but also the broader 
     strategic threat from the Iranian regime and I think I'd like 
     to conclude by saying that this is a high time in a good 
     benchmark for us to urge to change that policy and to 
     actually adopt a proactive approach.
       Question from VOA: I'm wondering what the future relations 
     between Iran and the United States and I see it as stage that 
     there is a divergence between the European in the U.S. 
     concerns. The EU is welcoming the elections and the Americans 
     are denouncing the elections. What do you see as the future 
     of Iran, U.S. EU relations and negotiations on the nuclear 
     issue?
       Congressman Tom Tancredo: I think we will have quite a 
     tussle over the possibility of sanctions we mentioned earlier 
     that if they do have an effect and I would imagine that will 
     be arguing with our friends in Europe about things like that. 
     Is not surprising to me that we see this divergence of 
     opinion between Europe and the United States with regard to 
     Iran but I have to admit myself that I have a hard time 
     understanding the opinions that are being expressed about the 
     president. I think to some degree our State Department is a 
     reflection of Europe. We're going to be very pragmatic about 
     this, we may not like it but that's the way it is and

[[Page 20793]]

     we'll make the best of it. That's the pragmatic view and I 
     think that Europe takes that and I would say the more 
     realistic view is that we have to change the situation. The 
     status quo is not acceptable, it's far too dangerous. But I 
     don't know that my opinion will be the one taken by the 
     administration.

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