[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 15]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 20603-20604]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              STATEMENT TO COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 15, 2005

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on September 15, 2005, I submitted the 
following statement during a hearing in the Committee on Government 
Reform entitled, ``Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons 
Learned from Katrina'':

       Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Davis, for agreeing last 
     week to hold hearings in this Committee on what went wrong 
     with the government response to Hurricane Katrina. This 
     Committee is the most important venue within the House of 
     Representatives for federal government oversight and I am 
     grateful for your leadership. Interestingly, this first 
     hearing will not focus on Hurricane Katrina and the disaster 
     in New Orleans and the surrounding area, but will focus on 3 
     other cities that are vulnerable to a natural disaster or 
     terrorist attack: Los Angeles, Miami and Washington, D.C. 
     Further, the hearing is intended to examine the local 
     response to crisis, rather than the federal response, to 
     determine how prepared we are to handle another disaster.
       Local, state and federal government all play key roles in 
     handling a disaster and disaster relief, but let's face it: 
     the federal government has the largest resources and should 
     have the greatest ability to deal with a serious disaster in 
     our nation. The first lesson we have learned from Katrina is 
     that this proved not to be the case. The federal government 
     was slow to act and the disaster was far too great for city 
     and state government to handle alone.
       The second lesson we have learned from Katrina is that we 
     have not learned the lesson from the Iraq war regarding 
     Halliburton. Halliburton overcharged the government at the 
     taxpayer's expense during the Iraq war. Days after Katrina 
     struck, Halliburton was one of the earliest companies awarded 
     no-bid contracts, to repair 3 different Navy facilities in 
     Mississippi. The flawed contracting procedures of the Iraq 
     war are rearing their ugly head in the recovery of Hurricane 
     Katrina. Congress has already appropriated $62 billion so far 
     and more is surely to come. Yet the contracts awarded have 
     been cost-plus and no bid contracts, lacking oversight and 
     transparency.
       There is an infinite number of issues on the federal level 
     that seriously need to be explored. Why aren't more steps 
     being taken to hire local displaced workers to rebuild their 
     towns and cities? How has the merger of FEMA into the 
     Department of Homeland Security played a role in FEMA's 
     ability as an agency? Why didn't FEMA's Hurricane Pam study--
     contracted out to IEA to investigate what would happen if a 
     hurricane hit the gulf coast--better prepare the federal 
     response to the Katrina disaster?
       As Chairman Davis indicated, however, we'll get into more 
     of these federal issues at future hearings.
       A very important local issue that should be considered 
     today is the morality of establishing a mandatory evacuation 
     when there are people who lack the ability to evacuate. We 
     saw this in New Orleans with Hurricane Katrina. Everyone was 
     forced to evacuate, but not everyone could. There were people 
     in hospitals and nursing homes and people too poor and 
     without cars that were simply left behind. How were these 
     people supposed to leave? How might there have been better 
     emergency plans in place to facilitate the evacuation of 
     these citizens? In one reported story, a dead body was left 
     to decay for over 2 weeks in the Algiers neighborhood of New 
     Orleans, despite swarms of local police, Louisiana state 
     troopers and the Army. Residents believed that law 
     enforcement officials left the body there purposely to 
     encourage the residents to evacuate. If their belief is true, 
     such a practice is truly shameful and must be addressed.
       Another issue related to local government observed in New 
     Orleans with the enforced racism that occurred through the 
     application of two standards of justice by law enforcement 
     officials. Local law enforcement reportedly allowed white 
     armed vigilantes to ride throughout the city but would not 
     allow the same for black residents. According to Malik Rahim, 
     a community organizer who recently ran for city council in 
     New Orleans. ``If a white person was taking something, he was 
     taking food for his family. But if a black was taking 
     something, he was looting.'' Rahim further described how the 
     white vigilantes were shooting blacks in his neighborhood 
     under the guise that they were protecting his neighborhood, 
     and were even bragging about it. He said he never before seen 
     New Orleans come so close to breaking into a race riot.
       If a race riot had broken out in New Orleans the crisis 
     situation there would have become far more disastrous. How 
     can local governments ensure that one standard of justice is 
     applied equally in times of disaster?

[[Page 20604]]

       I hope this hearing will address the many concerns raised 
     and what changes are necessary in the local planning for 
     disasters in other large cities. Moreover, I look forward to 
     the series of hearings that this Committee intends to hold 
     that will specifically look at the federal response to 
     Hurricane Katrina.

                          ____________________