[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 20087-20088]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will spend a few minutes talking about 
Iraq this afternoon. I start with my conclusion and then go into the 
body of my remarks after I state what that conclusion is.
  The administration's position that we will stay as long as the Iraqis 
need us to is too open-ended and sends the wrong message to Iraqis that 
their failure to make the necessary political compromises will not 
affect how long we stay, and it makes it less likely that those 
compromises will be reached.
  Our military commanders have repeatedly stated there is no purely 
military solution in Iraq and that a political settlement is a 
necessary element for success. In view of that, I believe, unless the 
Iraqis achieve a political settlement by the end of this year, we must 
consider a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, and 
we must make that point clearly to the Iraqis now while they are in the 
process of deciding whether to come together through consensus.
  The Iraqi National Assembly approved a draft Constitution on August 
28, despite objections from the Sunni Arabs over provisions relating to 
federalism that most Sunnis believe will disadvantage the areas of 
Sunni concentration. Those provisions essentially would enable the 
Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South to establish autonomous 
regions in which most of the country's oil reserves are located. Sunni 
Arab voters who chose to boycott the last election, and thus were 
underrepresented in the National Assembly and on the constitutional 
drafting committee, registered in large numbers for the referendum on 
the Constitution scheduled for October 15, with the apparent objective 
of rejecting the existing draft. If two-thirds of the voters in 3 or 
more of Iraq's 18 provinces vote no, the Constitution will be rejected, 
and the elections scheduled for December will elect a new National 
Assembly, which will start the constitutional drafting process anew.
  Additionally, there are reports that firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada 
al-Sadr will exhort his followers to reject the Constitution because he 
favors a unified Iraq, and he sees the existing draft leading to the 
dissolution of Iraq as a single State. Muqtada al-Sadr has a huge 
following in Baghdad, which lacks oil resources, and thus is 
disadvantaged in a manner similar to the predominantly Sunni Arab 
provinces.
  Meanwhile, the administration is urging the American people to ``stay 
the course.'' That is a bumper sticker slogan not a strategy.
  Secretary Rice, among others, has stated we will be in Iraq as long 
as we are needed, adding no incentive, therefore, to Iraqis to reach a 
political settlement. An open-ended commitment to keep our troops in 
Iraq, even in the absence of a political settlement by the Iraqis, 
flies in the face of our military commander's assessment that there can 
be no military success in the absence of an Iraqi political coming 
together.
  U.S. forces, particularly the U.S. Army, are stretched thin, despite 
the unprecedented use of a large segment of our National Guard in Iraq. 
Their lengthy and repeated deployments mean that much of a unit's time 
is devoted to recovery from a previous deployment and preparation for 
the next one, thus leaving little time for training to develop war-
fighting capabilities or sustaining readiness for other contingencies. 
These actions, in turn, mean less time at home for soldiers with their 
families and lower morale, which threatens recruiting and retention.
  The level of participation of the Armed Forces of other countries has 
been disappointing, leaving the United States to bear most of the 
burden. The absence of forces from Muslim countries is deeply 
disappointing, since the outcome in Iraq has effects throughout the 
world and also impacts the future direction of Islam. While it would 
likely be unwise for Iraq's neighbors to supply any forces, the failure 
of the Arab states to express their condolences over the recent 
stampede, in which almost 1,000 Iraqis were killed, was noted angrily 
by Iraq's President and Prime Minister, as was the lack of Arab 
diplomatic representation in Baghdad.
  The administration should take advantage of the presence of so many 
national leaders at the United Nations later this week to press nations 
with substantial Muslim populations, other than those neighboring Iraq, 
to send forces to Iraq. The President should also make clear to the 
Iraqi leaders that we expect them to extend invitations to such 
nations.
  Speaking as a Senator, I delivered that message to President Talabani 
this afternoon in Senator Frist's office. It is a message that I 
delivered on a number of occasions and directly in the past to Iraqi's 
leaders in Iraq.
  U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad wrote in the Washington Post that 
one of the two standards to evaluate the Iraqi Constitution is ``its 
potential to be a national compact that brings Iraqis together and 
undermines the insurgency.''
  He went on to say:

       If Iraqi voters ratify the draft overwhelmingly, it becomes 
     a national compact. If they reject the draft, the next 
     Assembly will negotiate anew.

  He continues:

       Under all scenarios, the United States will continue to 
     encourage Iraqi leaders and communities to come together.

  But Ambassador Khalilzad failed to mention that there is another 
scenario; namely, that the Sunni Arabs vote overwhelmingly against the 
Constitution but fall short of achieving a two-thirds negative vote in 
three provinces. In such a case, the violence and insurrection is more 
likely to continue and even civil war could result. Moreover, the 
Ambassador's words fail to display urgency that Iraqis reach a 
political settlement and unwisely suggest the U.S. forces may stay in 
Iraq indefinitely until legal consensus is achieved.
  Despite the National Assembly's approval of the draft Constitution, 
the Iraqis continue to negotiate and make changes to the draft. For 
example, the Washington Post reported on September 6 that President 
Talabani said in his statement that he had agreed to changes that would 
ease concerns among Sunni Arabs that the wording of the draft loosened 
Iraqi ties to the Arab world. And Reuters reported on

[[Page 20088]]

Sunday that the United Nations is unable to start printing Iraq's draft 
Constitution because the National Assembly had not yet certified the 
text and now has set Sunday, September 18, as the date by which any 
changes to the draft Constitution can still be met.
  This week provides a critically important opportunity for the 
administration to make clear to the Iraqis that U.S. forces cannot be 
in Iraq indefinitely. We must make it clear to the Iraqis that they 
have a limited time to achieve a political settlement and that if they 
do not do so, one way or another, by the end of this year, we will 
consider a timetable for withdrawal of our forces.
  Speaking as one Senator, again, I delivered that viewpoint to 
President Talabani in Senator Frist's office earlier this afternoon.
  We cannot write a constitution for Iraq, and we should not dictate 
the compromises they need to make to achieve a political settlement. 
But we do control whether our troops stay in Iraq and how long they 
stay.
  The framework for agreement appears to be at hand. Some Shiite 
leaders reportedly have come to realize the existing draft of the 
constitution, which grants a high degree of control over natural 
resources to autonomous regions, would apply to water resources as well 
as to oil resources. That could negatively impact on the amount and 
quality of water available to predominantly Shiite areas. The Shiites 
are mainly located in the south, downstream of both the Kurds in the 
north and the Sunni Arabs in the center, who are able to dominate the 
flow of Iraq's two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates.
  If the Shiites give up their ability to form an autonomous region or 
regions, or agree to greater control by the central government over the 
country's natural resources, the Sunni Arabs might then be able to 
support a revised draft constitution which would be a critical step in 
achieving a political settlement.
  The administration needs to move quickly. Both President Talabani and 
Prime Minister Jaafari--the leading Kurd and Shiite, respectively, in 
the transitional Iraqi Government--are in Washington this week and 
available for straight talk from the President and his Cabinet.
  The United States has done and is doing more than our part in Iraq. 
It is up to the Iraqis now to step up to the political compromises 
which need to be made if Iraq has a realistic chance to defeat the 
insurgents and to become a nation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chambliss). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thune). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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