[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19176-19177]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




           CONGRESS' EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AGRICULTURE SECURITY

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr President, I have come to the floor again to speak 
about the ability of the United States to prevent and respond to a 
terrorist attack on American agriculture, a topic that I believe 
deserves more attention from the Congress and the administration.
  That is why I commend the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry for holding a hearing on agroterrorism last week. This was 
their first hearing on the subject, and I welcome their interest 
because I have been pursuing the passage of legislation on agriculture 
security for the past 3 years.
  I first introduced agriculture security legislation, S. 2767, the 
Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, which was referred to the 
Agriculture Committee, in the 107th Congress. Unfortunately, it was not 
acted upon in that Congress. I reintroduced my legislation in the 108th 
Congress and again in the 109th. I am pleased that S. 573, the 
Agriculture Security Assistance Act, was included in S. 975, the 
Project Bioshield Act of 2005, and I thank the bill's chief sponsor, 
Senator Lieberman, for that inclusion.
  The strong potential for the American food supply system to be a 
target of terrorist attack and the severe repercussions such an attack 
would cause are widely accepted among experts. At the July 20 
Agriculture Committee hearing, Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant 
Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
FBI, testified:

       Most people do not equate terrorist attacks with 
     agroterrorism. But the threat is real, and the impact could 
     be devastating.

  Another witness, Dr. Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food 
Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, FDA, added:

       A terrorist attack on the food supply could have both 
     severe public health and economic consequences, while 
     damaging the public's confidence in the food we eat.

  According to the Department of Agriculture, USDA, the United States 
food and fiber system accounts for approximately 12 percent of our 
gross domestic product and employs 17 percent of the U.S. workforce. 
Yet the infrastructure that composes this sector of the economy, which 
is central to American prosperity, is often not viewed as critical as 
power lines, bridges, or ports.

[[Page 19177]]

We cannot underestimate our dependence on America's breadbasket.
  On March 9, 2005, the same day I introduced my two agriculture 
security bills, S. 572, the Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act, 
and S. 573, the Government Accountability Office, GAO, released a 
report I requested entitled, ``Much is Being Done to Protect 
Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain'' 
(GAO-05-214). The GAO report reviews the current state of agriculture 
security in the United States and points to a number of key areas where 
improvement is necessary, such as the inability of USDA to deploy 
animal disease vaccines in 24 hours and the lack of foreign animal 
disease knowledge among USDA-certified veterinarians.
  GAO also confirmed information I had received from the National 
Association of Agriculture Employees that the agricultural mission of 
Customs and Border Protection, CBP, was insufficiently prioritized. GAO 
found that the number of agricultural inspections at U.S. borders had 
declined by 3.4 million since the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, 
took over the border inspection responsibility from USDA.
  In February 2005, I wrote to then-DHS Undersecretary for Border and 
Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson expressing my concern over the 
decline in border inspections because I know how important they are to 
the economy of Hawaii--home to more endangered species than any other 
State. In response, I received a commitment from DHS to hire additional 
agriculture specialists at CBP to ensure the agricultural mission does 
not go unmet.
  Also noted in the GAO report were shortcomings in DHS's Federal 
coordination of national efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The 
Federal agencies involved in agriculture security--DHS, USDA, FBI, and 
FDA, to name a few--claim they are working closely with each other. 
However, one only need look at the June 2004 incident in Washington 
State, where 18 cattle developed chromium contamination, to see that 
there are communication gaps at the Federal level. Agroterrorism was 
suspected, yet neither USDA nor DHS were notified.
  In May 2004, representatives from the FBI, FDA, and USDA gave a 
presentation at an agroterrorism conference in Kansas City, MO, on 
lessons learned from the Washington outbreak which included a slide 
stating that the following agencies should be contacted if 
agroterrorism is suspected: a State's Department of Agriculture, FDA, 
USDA, FBI, local law enforcement, and State and county public health 
officials.
  Why was the Department of Homeland Security not on the list?
  It is apparent that Federal coordination remains inadequate if 
notification of DHS is considered unnecessary by other responding 
agencies.
  To ensure a comprehensive and coordinated approach to agroterrorism, 
my bills address many of the concerns raised by GAO and others. The 
Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act will: increase communication 
and coordination between DHS and State, local, and tribal homeland 
security officials regarding agroterrorism; ensure agriculture security 
is included in State, local, and regional emergency response plans; and 
establish a task force of State and local first responders that will 
work with DHS to identify best practices in the area of agriculture 
security.
  The Agriculture Security Assistance Act will: provide financial and 
technical assistance to States and localities for agroterrorism 
preparedness and response; increase international agricultural disease 
surveillance and inspections of imported agricultural products; require 
that certified veterinarians be knowledgeable in foreign animal 
diseases; and require that USDA study the costs and benefits of 
developing a more robust animal disease vaccine stockpile.
  I look forward to working with the Agriculture Committee as 
agriculture security legislation moves forward. As ranking member of 
the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, I will continue to make agroterrorism a priority for the 
Federal Government, and I ask my colleagues to join me in this quest.

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