[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17213-17246]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1042, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1042) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2006 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Frist modified amendment No. 1342, to support certain youth 
     organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America and Girl 
     Scouts of America.
       Inhofe amendment No. 1311, to protect the economic and 
     energy security of the United States.
       Inhofe-Collins amendment No. 1312, to express the sense of 
     Congress that the President should take immediate steps to 
     establish a plan to implement the recommendations of the 2004 
     Report to Congress of the United States-China Economic and 
     Security Review Commission.
       Inhofe-Kyl amendment No. 1313, to require an annual report 
     on the use of United States funds with respect to the 
     activities and management of the International Committee of 
     the Red Cross.
       Lautenberg amendment No. 1351, to stop corporations from 
     financing terrorism.
       Ensign amendment No. 1374, to require a report on the use 
     of riot control agents.
       Ensign amendment No. 1375, to require a report on the costs 
     incurred by the Department of Defense in implementing or 
     supporting resolutions of the United Nations Security 
     Council.
       Collins amendment No. 1377 (to amendment No. 1351), to 
     ensure that certain persons do not evade or avoid the 
     prohibition imposed under the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act.
       Durbin amendment No. 1379, to require certain dietary 
     supplement manufacturers to report certain serious adverse 
     events.
       Hutchison-Nelson of Florida amendment No. 1357, to express 
     the sense of the Senate with regard to manned space flight.
       Thune amendment No. 1389, to postpone the 2005 round of 
     defense base closure and realignment.
       Kennedy amendment No. 1415, to transfer funds authorized to 
     be appropriated to the Department of Energy for the National 
     Nuclear Security Administration for weapons activities and 
     available for the robust nuclear earth penetrator to the Army 
     National Guard, Washington, District of Columbia, chapter.
       Allard-McConnell amendment No. 1418, to require life cycle 
     cost estimates for the destruction of lethal chemical 
     munitions under the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
     program.
       Allard-Salazar amendment No. 1419, to authorize a program 
     to provide health, medical, and life insurance benefits to 
     workers at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, 
     Colorado, who would otherwise fail to qualify for such 
     benefits because of an early physical completion date.
       Dorgan amendment No. 1426, to express the sense of the 
     Senate on the declassification and release to the public of 
     certain portions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into the 
     Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and to urge the 
     President to release information regarding sources of foreign 
     support for the hijackers involved in the terrorist attacks 
     of September 11, 2001.
       Dorgan amendment No. 1429, to establish a special committee 
     of the Senate to investigate the awarding and carrying out of 
     contracts to conduct activities in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
     to fight the war on terrorism.
       Salazar amendment No. 1421, to rename the death gratuity 
     payable for deaths of members of the Armed Forces as fallen 
     hero compensation.
       Salazar amendment No. 1422, to provide that certain local 
     educational agencies shall be eligible to receive a fiscal 
     year 2005 payment under section 8002 or 8003 of the 
     Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
       Salazar-Reed amendment No. 1423, to provide for Department 
     of Defense support of certain Paralympic sporting events.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am very pleased the Senate has turned to 
this important legislation. It was first brought up Wednesday night 
with activity on Thursday and again on Friday. I thank all those who 
participated.

[[Page 17214]]

  I am reminded that at 2 o'clock today, all first-degree amendments 
need to be filed in view of the pending cloture motion. This is a 
motion which the distinguished leader, Mr. Frist, and I will discuss, 
together with others. It ripens tomorrow morning. So as a protection, I 
ask Senators to consider their own interests in the context that it 
could be ripened, but that decision has not yet been made.
  At this time, even though the distinguished ranking member is not 
with me, there is a matter by the Senator from Maine about which I hope 
she will find the opportunity at this time to address the Senate. I 
yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maine.


             Amendments Nos. 1489, 1490, and 1491, En Bloc

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
committee for his courtesy. I ask that the pending amendment be set 
aside, and on behalf of the Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Thune, I 
call up three amendments that are at the desk.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the 
amendments en bloc.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for Mr. Thune, 
     proposes amendments numbers 1489, 1490, and 1491, en bloc.

  The amendments are as follows:


                           Amendment No. 1489

   (Purpose: To postpone the 2005 round of defense base closure and 
                              realignment)

       On page 371, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

     SEC. 2887. POSTPONEMENT OF 2005 ROUND OF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE 
                   AND REALIGNMENT.

       The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part 
     A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) 
     is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 2915. POSTPONEMENT OF 2005 ROUND OF DEFENSE BASE 
                   CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT.

       ``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this part, the round of defense base closure and realignment 
     otherwise scheduled to occur under this part in 2005 by 
     reasons of sections 2912, 2913, and 2914 shall occur instead 
     in the year following the year in which the last of the 
     actions described in subsection (b) occurs (in this section 
     referred to as the `postponed closure round year').
       ``(b) Actions Required Before Base Closure Round.--(1) The 
     actions referred to in subsection (a) are the following 
     actions:
       ``(A) The complete analysis, consideration, and, where 
     appropriate, implementation by the Secretary of Defense of 
     the recommendations of the Commission on Review of Overseas 
     Military Facility Structure of the United States.
       ``(B) The return from deployment in the Iraq theater of 
     operations of substantially all (as determined by the 
     Secretary of Defense) major combat units and assets of the 
     Armed Forces.
       ``(C) The receipt by the Committees on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives of the report on 
     the quadrennial defense review required to be submitted in 
     2006 by the Secretary of Defense under section 118(d) of 
     title 10, United States Code.
       ``(D) The complete development and implementation by the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     of the National Maritime Security Strategy.
       ``(E) The complete development and implementation by the 
     Secretary of Defense of the Homeland Defense and Civil 
     Support directive.
       ``(F) The receipt by the Committees on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives of a report 
     submitted by the Secretary of Defense that assesses military 
     installation needs taking into account--
       ``(i) relevant factors identified through the 
     recommendations of the Commission on Review of Overseas 
     Military Facility Structure of the United States;
       ``(ii) the return of the major combat units and assets 
     described in subparagraph (B);
       ``(iii) relevant factors identified in the report on the 
     2005 quadrennial defense review;
       ``(iv) the National Maritime Security Strategy; and
       ``(v) the Homeland Defense and Civil Support directive.
       ``(2) The report required under subparagraph (F) of 
     paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than one year 
     after the occurrence of the last action described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E) of such paragraph.
       ``(c) Administration.--For purposes of sections 2912, 2913, 
     and 2914, each date in a year that is specified in such 
     sections shall be deemed to be the same date in the postponed 
     closure round year, and each reference to a fiscal year in 
     such sections shall be deemed to be a reference to the fiscal 
     year that is the number of years after the original fiscal 
     year that is equal to the number of years that the postponed 
     closure round year is after 2005.''; and
       (2) in section 2904(b)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``Congressional 
     Disapproval'' and inserting ``Congressional Action'';
       (B) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``the date on which 
     the President transmits such report'' and inserting ``the 
     date by which the President is required to transmit such 
     report''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``such report is 
     transmitted'' and inserting ``such report is required to be 
     transmitted'';
       (C) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
       (D) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(2) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or 
     realignment recommended by the Commission in a report 
     transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if 
     a recommendation for such closure or realignment is specified 
     as disapproved by Congress in a joint resolution partially 
     disapproving the recommendations of the Commission that is 
     enacted before the earlier of--
       ``(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date by 
     which the President is required to transmit such report; or
       ``(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session 
     during which such report is required to be transmitted.''; 
     and
       (E) in paragraph (3), as redsignated by subparagraph (C), 
     by striking ``paragraph (1)'' and inserting ``paragraphs (1) 
     and (2)''.


                           Amendment No. 1490

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and 
 implement a national space radar system capable of employing at least 
                            two frequencies)

       At the end of subtitle B of title IX, add the following:

     SEC. 912. NATIONAL SPACE RADAR SYSTEM.

       The Secretary of the Air Force shall proceed with the 
     development and implementation of a national space radar 
     system that employs at least two frequencies.


                           Amendment No. 1491

 (Purpose: To prevent retaliation against a member of the Armed Forces 
    for providing testimony about the military value of a military 
                             installation)

       On page 371, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

     SEC. 2887. TESTIMONY BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN 
                   CONNECTION WITH THE 2005 ROUND OF DEFENSE BASE 
                   CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT.

       (a) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that the Secretary of Defense should permit any member of the 
     Armed Forces to provide to the Defense Base Closure and 
     Realignment Commission testimony on the military value of a 
     military installation inside the United States for purposes 
     of the consideration by the Commission of the Secretary's 
     recommendations for the 2005 round of defense base closure 
     and realignment under section 2914(d) of the Defense Base 
     Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of 
     Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       (b) Protection Against Retaliation.--No member of the Armed 
     Forces may be discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, 
     harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against 
     because such member provided or caused to be provided 
     testimony under subsection (a).

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendments now be set aside.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before my distinguished colleague leaves 
the floor, she had the courtesy, as she always does, to show me the 
amendments. One of them relates to BRAC. The distinguished Senator from 
South Dakota offered a BRAC amendment the other night. I glanced at 
this one. It seems to be similar in form, but I have not had a chance 
to examine it.
  The purpose of my colloquy with the Senator would be to encourage 
Senators who are concerned about the important issues on BRAC to take 
note that we had an extensive colloquy between myself and the 
distinguished Senator from South Dakota, with the Senator from 
Michigan, the ranking member joining in, the other evening on the 
subject. I hope that other Senators who may be cosponsors or otherwise 
interested in this issue will find the opportunity to examine the 
original amendment and this amendment and that we hopefully today can 
have a continuation of this important debate on the issues relating to 
BRAC which are of great concern to a number of colleagues.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would accept the comments of the 
distinguished chairman of the committee. This is a very important issue 
to many of us. I understand the chairman and

[[Page 17215]]

the ranking member did debate this issue at some length last week. I am 
sure the chairman is correct in saying we would all benefit from 
reading that colloquy as we prepare to debate these issues further and 
ultimately cast our votes.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. I do bring to the 
attention of colleagues that today is a good opportunity for debate 
such that we can have a vote on it as quickly as the proposers and 
others think it is appropriate.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeMint). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1492

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up an amendment that Senator Levin 
has offered, which is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendments are 
set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Reed], for Mr. Levin, 
     for himself, and Mr. Reed proposes an amendment numbered 
     1492.

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To make available, with an offset, an additional $50,000,000 
    for Operation and Maintenance for Cooperative Threat Reduction)

       At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 330. ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Increased Amount for Operation and Maintenance, 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.--The amount authorized 
     to be appropriated by section 301(19) for the Cooperative 
     Threat Reduction programs is hereby increased by $50,000,000.
       (b) Offset.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by 
     section 201(4) for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation, Defense-wide activities, is hereby reduced by 
     $50,000,000, with the amount of the reduction to be allocated 
     as follows:
       (1) The amount available in Program Element 0603882C for 
     long lead procurement of Ground-Based Interceptors is hereby 
     reduced by $30,000,000.
       (2) The amount available for initial construction of 
     associated silos is hereby reduced by $20,000,000.

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, this amendment was offered by Senator Levin 
and myself would do several very critical and important things. First, 
the amendment would increase funding for the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program by $50 million. The offset would be twofold: $30 
million would be taken from the long lead procurement of ground-based 
interceptors as part of the National Missile Defense Program and 
another $20 million would be taken from the funding for initial 
construction for silos to house these interceptors.
  Essentially what Senator Levin is doing with this provision is to 
recognize the fact that a more immediate threat to the United States 
rests with literally thousands of locations where nuclear material 
might be housed from the breakup of the old Soviet Union, and other 
locations that need attention with respect to the reduction of these 
materials. I believe the greatest threat we face in this country is the 
fact that--hopefully not, but the situation where a terrorist might 
gain control of these materials, bring them into this country and use 
them with devastating effect.
  So this amendment recognizes the most immediate threat comes from 
these materials and therefore is putting additional resources from the 
National Missile Defense Program, modest changes, to approach this 
major effort with respect to cooperative threat reduction.
  The funds would come from our ground-based midcourse defense system. 
The interceptors and silos where the offsets occur are now currently 
being deployed at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California. Because of recent developments, we have an opportunity to 
address the critical issue of loose nukes by transferring these funds. 
I would argue this is a most worthy cause. The offset will not affect 
the missile defense system at all. In fact, as we understand it, in the 
last several months the missile defense system has been reevaluating 
itself, looking at whether the technical issues are challenging, in 
fact, and have not conducted tests as they thought they could over the 
last several months. So I think now is the opportune time to put more 
resources in cooperative threat reduction.
  We are all aware, as I have mentioned before, that the greatest 
threat to us today is the possibility that terrorists will acquire 
nuclear weapons or nuclear material and use it with devastating effect 
against us. Of course, one country with enormous amounts of this 
nuclear material is Russia.
  It is estimated that Russia has approximately 16,000 nuclear weapons 
stored at between 150 and 210 sites. While that is a significant 
reduction from the 40,000 weapons at the end of the Cold War, it is 
still a huge number of weapons and also a large number of storage 
sites.
  Indeed, there is some imprecision about where all the sites might be. 
Of course, we have also heard reports of potential sites for, if not 
nuclear material, other dangerous material in former components of the 
Soviet Union, the newly independent states. So this is a challenging 
issue we have to face.
  Only about 25 percent of the total number of weapons sites have 
received any upgrades in the past five years. Many of them still lack 
adequate security and safeguards. At the rate planned for in the fiscal 
year 2006 budget request, it would be around 2011 or 2012 before the 
work at only a portion of the sites would be completed to bring them up 
to levels of security and safety that we would feel confident this 
nuclear material would not be stolen, misplaced or somehow find itself 
in the world community.
  The Defense Department only expected work to be scheduled on one or 
two sites in fiscal year 2006 so they budgeted approximately $60 
million in the process. But then in February, when President Bush and 
President Putin met at the summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, the two 
agreed on a way to address security upgrades at 15 key nuclear weapons 
sites. With this agreement, we have the opportunity to accomplish in 2 
years what we thought would take 10.
  The issue, of course, is funding. The total cost of these upgrades is 
approximately $350 million. With this amendment, we are adding $50 
million to this project, which is not the total needed but will allow 
for a good start. Again, this is a huge breakthrough that occurred 
after the President's budget submission. It is a major opportunity we 
simply must take advantage of.
  As I have indicated before, the proposal of Senator Levin is to move 
this $50 million into cooperative threat reduction from the National 
Missile Defense Program. I think it is useful to look at this program 
to indicate where these transfers are possible, available, and even 
desirable.
  When President Bush first took office in 2001, he made missile 
defense one of his highest priorities. In May 2000, President Bush said 
America must build effective missile defense based on the best 
available options at the earliest possible date. Missile defense must 
be designed to protect all 50 States, our friends, allies, and deployed 
forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue nations or accidental 
launches. President Bush's first major action was to significantly 
increase funding for missile defense.
  Since fiscal year 2002, approximately $45 billion, including fiscal 
year 2006 requests, has been provided for missile defense. That is $45 
billion and here we are talking about a transfer of $50 million from 
that huge program. This amount is half of what has been spent on 
missile defense since President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense

[[Page 17216]]

Initiative in 1984. We have seen a huge acceleration of funding with 
respect to missile defense. Another aspect of President Bush's plan for 
missile defense was that the systems would be developed and acquired 
under an approach called spiral development. As the Congressional 
Research Service succinctly summarizes: A major consequence of the 
administration's proposed evolutionary acquisition strategy is that the 
Missile Defense Program would not feature the familiar phases and 
milestones of the traditional DOD acquisition system. Another 
consequence is the Missile Defense Agency cannot provide Congress with 
a description of its final missile defense architecture, the 
capabilities on any near or longer term system, the specific dates by 
which most elements of the emerging architecture are to be tested and 
deployed, or an estimate of the eventual costs of the Missile Defense 
Program.
  So President Bush's plan was to spend an enormous amount of money in 
a short period of time with little plan and no traditional checks and 
balances with respect to traditional procurement programs.
  This program has, in fact, come under self-generated pressures. Tests 
that were proposed to be conducted over the last several months have 
been postponed and cancelled. There is a hard relook at the technology. 
There is potential here, but certainly there is not the kind of 
progress that would justify the robust spending to date and certainly 
not indicate that they need an additional $50 million to keep doing 
what they are doing.
  In the past, we have looked very carefully at this program of 
national defense. Like so many others, I believe if we can produce--and 
I think we can ultimately--a workable system to protect this country, 
protect its allies, our troops in the field, we have to do that, but we 
have to do it with deliberate speed, and I would emphasize deliberate 
speed, not all-out haste, which generally means waste.
  I believe we should pursue this system, but I also believe we should 
take the time to determine that the technology, which is 
extraordinarily complex, is mature and effective. So beginning in 2002, 
I offered amendments which I felt would improve the Missile Defense 
Program. In the fiscal year 2003 bill, I introduced an amendment 
requiring a report on flight testing of the ground-based midcourse 
defense, or the GMD, system. In fiscal year 2004, I offered an 
amendment which would direct that the Missile Defense Agency provide 
information on procurement, performance criteria, and operational test 
plans for ballistic missile defense programs. In fiscal year 2005, I 
introduced an amendment requiring operationally realistic testing and 
independent evaluation of the ballistic missile defense system.
  All of these amendments were modified by the majority. Then they were 
passed. Indeed, it is unclear if they were not modified whether they 
would have passed.
  Furthermore, when the Missile Defense Agency met these requirements, 
in many instances details and quality of reporting were lacking. For 
the most part, the Missile Defense Agency has been doing what it wants 
to do with very little detailed supervision by the Congress and it has 
led to a situation now where the program is being seriously looked at. 
We certainly have not made the kind of technological breakthrough which 
was anticipated. One thing is certain, we have spent a great deal of 
money in this pursuit.
  Now, where we are today, interceptor tests are the critical tests 
which involve a real missile defense interceptor hitting a real target 
missile. These tests are the only means to truly assess whether a 
missile defense system has the chance of working against a real enemy 
missile. There is nothing elaborate or sensational in this proposition. 
In order to see if a system works, one has to take it out and use it. 
One missile has to be fired against another missile and knock down the 
intruding missile. If that is done with enough frequency and enough 
confidence, then the system is ready to go.
  The first intercept flight test of the system was conducted in 
December 2002 and it failed. Six days after that test failure, 
President Bush announced the United States would deploy the missile 
defense system. Usually such announcements are reserved for success, 
not failure. In effect, it is almost like looking at a new, expensive 
jet fighter prototype going down the way, malfunctioning and then 
turning around and saying let us buy a lot of them, let us put them in 
the sky. That is not what most people believe is the appropriate 
criteria for being operational.
  Over the next 2 years, seven other planned tests were cancelled. Yet, 
in September 2004, the system was declared nearly operational, with six 
interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and two interceptors at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base. Three months later, in December 2004, the Missile Defense 
Agency then conducted the only second integrated flight test on a 
multibillion system. It too failed, and the system was now described as 
operational in the near future.
  On February 14, there was another integrated flight test and it too 
failed. After these three consecutive failures, Lieutenant General 
Obering, director of the Missile Defense Agency, established an 
independent review team to examine test failures and recommend steps 
for improving the test program. The team made some very interesting 
observations.
  First, I believe they confirmed suspicions that there was a rush to 
deployment, a rush not justified by the technology, its maturity, and 
by the operational techniques that were necessary to deploy it, but 
simply to get it deployed. The team report states:

       There were several issues that led to the flight test 
     failures of the Integrated Flight Tests . . . With the focus 
     on rapid deployment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
     system, there was not always adequate opportunity to fully 
     ground test the system prior to each flight attempt. Again, 
     skipping over critical steps to rush to a deployment. The 
     team also found:
       Schedule has been the key challenge that drives daily 
     decision making and planning in the program.

  Not the technological maturity of the system, not technical issues, 
but schedule was driving the technology, not the other way around.
  The independent review team also took issue with the spiral 
development and lack of testing. Again, in their words:

       Due to the lack of application of a few well-known 
     verification specification and standards by the GMD program, 
     failure evidence suggests that some problems might have been 
     during the launch. The team feels that considerable 
     opportunity exists to improve the confidence in the 
     reliability of hardware and software by adopting industry 
     best practices that exist as specification and standards.

  In effect saying, we have to have requirements, we have to have 
standards, we have to have specifications, we have to be able to 
measure this program and its components before we rush to deploy it, 
much of it echoing comments made on this floor by myself and many 
others.
  The team report further states:

       There are not enough ground tests available to verify/
     validate system operational performance and reliability. The 
     Joint Program office should consider redirecting some 
     production assets for ground tests to gain a higher 
     confidence in the GMD system performance.

  The GMD review team would again recommend, in their words:

       The Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program enter a new 
     phase focused on Performance and Reliability Verification, in 
     which Missile Defense Agencies make tests and mission success 
     the primary objective. The new phase should validate the 
     technical baseline and should be event driven rather than 
     schedule driven.

  In effect, build on success, don't build based on schedule.

       General Obering also requested Rear Admiral Kate Paige to 
     direct a Mission Readiness Task Force to study the review 
     team's recommendations and put the program on a path to 
     flight test and management success.
       The Mission readiness task force, under the Admiral, made 
     the following recommendation: Four interceptors previously 
     planned for near-term operational deployment will be diverted 
     to serve as ground test missiles. There will be a significant 
     increase in ground testing of all systems, components, and 
     processes before resuming flight testing. Contractors will be 
     held accountable for their performance. The first flight test 
     will not be an intercept test and the first

[[Page 17217]]

     intercept test will not take place for more than a year.

  Let me commend General Obering and the Missile Defense Agency for 
implementing these recommendations. I believe they will go a long way 
toward improving the missile defense system, an objective we all share. 
However, I note these recommendations sound very familiar and one could 
only contemplate how much effort and money would have been saved if we 
had approached the system this way from the beginning--not rushing to 
failure, but building for success.
  There are presently six ground-based interceptors in silos at Fort 
Greely and two in silos at Vandenberg Air Force base. The 
administration also requested, and the Congress has already approved, 
most of the funding for these 30 interceptors. As I have noted, there 
has yet to be a successful flight test of these interceptors, so we are 
already buying an additional 30 interceptors when we do not know how to 
make the first 6 work. I think a responsible approach is to slow the 
allocation of funds for the procurement of these interceptors until 
they are proven operational and to use that funding for more pressing 
needs. This amendment does that.
  The President's budget request seeks long-lead funding for 10 
operational interceptors and 8 flight test interceptors, 18 missiles in 
all. However, the actual production rate capacity for the interceptors 
is 1 per month, or 12 per year. That means the Defense Department is 
seeking funds for more missiles than they can build in 1 year. There is 
no need to pay for more interceptors than can be built in 1 year.
  Instead, we can provide 1 year's worth of funding for 1 year's worth 
of missiles--12 instead of 18. This amendment will not cause a break in 
the production line.
  I also note the House Armed Services Committee, in its fiscal year 
2006 Defense authorization bill, reduced the long-lead funding for five 
of the operational interceptors. The administration has not indicated 
that the proposed reduction would cause any serious problems for the 
program.
  I also want to state that the President's budget request includes $53 
million in long-lead funding for eight test missiles. It is essential 
to produce missiles for testing. This amendment would not reduce that 
funding for the test missiles at all. We realize we are in the test 
phase. The problem becomes we are attempting to buy operational 
missiles before we are sure the test missiles will really work. That, I 
think, is at the heart of much of the criticism.
  Our missile defense systems are robustly funded in this bill with 
about $7 billion. What this amendment does is take money that cannot 
even be spent this year and allocate it to a new opportunity to prevent 
loose nukes, which is truly an imminent threat, an existential threat 
to this country. This amendment, which enhances security by funding one 
program without causing any harm to another program, is a win-win 
situation, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  We are trying to exploit a diplomatic breakthrough that was 
engineered by President Bush in his meeting with President Putin that 
allows the expansion, rapidly, of inspection and securing of sites in 
the former Soviet Union and Russia. We are taking a truly modest amount 
of money, given about $6 or $7 billion for overall missile defense, and 
using that to try to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear materials across the globe, which is the most serious threat 
that we face as a nation.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might ask my distinguished colleague 
a question or two. We are all good, strong supporters of the CTR 
program. But I am informed that you are taking $50 million from the 
missiles. I will address that question momentarily. But I think the 
Senate should know this--and I ask if I am in error, if the Senator 
would correct me, if not now, perhaps one of your staff members, in due 
course, could assist. The Senate should know there is $500 million of 
unspent 2005 money in the CTR program. The amendment would take this 
program, which as you point out has some test problems, and to give it 
the body blow this amendment would render, for $50 million will 
virtually cause a very severe perturbation in the production line. The 
Senator is familiar with how the production lines work. There are 
estimates of cost up to as much as $270 million to restart the line at 
some point in the future. But with $500 million for 2005 unexpended in 
CTR, I hope, if colleagues look at this amendment fairly and 
practically, maybe judge it on the merits--the use of these funds, to 
me, is not a justification for supporting the amendment.
  Mr. REED. I thank the Chairman for the question. My understanding is 
that the production cycle for the system, these interceptors, is 12 per 
year. Yet the budget is asking for more than that. So I don't think 
taking $50 million--as I understand the amendment, $30 million taken 
from long-lead, ground-based interceptors--taking $30 million away I do 
not think would upset the production line schedule. There is no intent 
to do that, and I think the effect would not be to do that also.
  With respect to your point, which I think is well taken, about the 
buildup in funds in the comprehensive threat reduction, some of that--
we will check more dutifully--but some of that to my knowledge is the 
result of the inability to agree on a way to deal with some of these 
sites. We hope that difficulty has been substantially reduced by 
President Bush and President Putin's discussion in Bratislava. Now that 
they have agreed on a framework, they can start applying this money.
  Also, again, I think this money would be well spent, would not 
disrupt the production of the missile systems, and just the sheer 
scale--this is $50 million total, $30 million from the ground-based 
interceptors, $20 million for initial construction of silos and housing 
for the interceptors--again, this is truly long-lead procurement. We 
have, in my view, and I believe that of Senator Levin, much more of a 
problem in the site in Russia that contains the nuclear materials.
  We have all heard the horror stories of people being able to walk in, 
walk around, and walk out of these sites without anybody interfering 
with them--no electronic equipment or sensors that would detect or 
report their presence to anyone's attention. So our view--my view, 
speaking for myself--is that this money could be much better spent, 
without disrupting the missile defense program, by applying it to 
comprehensive threat reduction.
  Frankly, $500 million is an impressive amount of money that has not 
yet been spent, but we all recognize, if any of this material made its 
way outside these sites and got into the hands of irresponsible people, 
it would be serious.
  Mr. WARNER. I agree with the Senator's premise but I wouldn't want 
Senators to believe that, if I am correct, the shortage of money is in 
CTR. I am informed there is, in the bank, $500 million of 2005 
unexpended funds. Does the Senator want to address that now?
  Mr. REED. I could say, Mr. President, we will try to determine this, 
but unexpended does not mean that it is not committed. Some of these 
funds could in fact be committed to specific sites already so that 
money can't be spent again elsewhere. We will try to get a number on 
that.
  But the scale of the problem, the number of sites--it is in the 
order, just within Russia, of 200 sites.
  Mr. WARNER. I am a big supporter of CTR. I happened to be in the room 
on the day CTR was born--by Sam Nunn. I will never forget it. I have 
followed the program. I have been a supporter. I think there is quite a 
bit of funding in this budget for CTR right now. I point out, if the 
Senator is persuaded by the fact that CTR needs the money more than the 
missile program--and I will argue the point strenuously that is not the 
case--there is quite a bit of money. We are way into the 2005 cycle. As 
a matter of fact, September is on the horizon.
  So I hope the Senator could carefully research that point, come back, 
and if I am in error, I would certainly like to hear his views.
  I point out the current bill is consistent with the President's 
program

[[Page 17218]]

that allocated $50 million toward this next tranche of the long-lead, 
cumulative money for ground-based interceptors. If you take $30 million 
out of the $50 million, I assure you, that does considerable disruption 
to the production line.
  Then I point out the amount available for construction of associated 
silos, reduced by $20 million. I wonder if you might take the chance to 
check on the fact that the President's budget in this bill only 
allocates $13.5 million to the initial construction of the associated 
silos, and therefore your $20 million is considerably in excess of the 
$13.5 million.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, my information indicates the fiscal year 
2006 budget for expansion, there is $20.682 million. I will ask my 
staff to coordinate with your staff.
  Mr. WARNER. We will have our staffs check those figures. I thank the 
Senator.
  Mr. President, I would like to vigorously oppose this amendment for 
the following reasons. The impact of the amendment would be, first and 
foremost, to send a message that we are not supporting, as a nation, 
wholeheartedly the ballistic missile defense capabilities to defend 
ourselves. It is clear North Korea has capabilities. This program was 
engendered in large measure, and accelerated in large measure because 
of the threat posed by North Korea.
  I noted here recently that Japan is now building its missile defense 
system. So it is not that the United States alone, in the world of 
nations, considers it a threat; other nations consider the North Korean 
capabilities a threat. It is correct we have had these test bans, but 
the failures that more or less have been in the mechanical phase--
somehow the missile is adjusted in its launch pad as opposed to the 
actual failure of the missile itself. And then I will address this 
question of the break in production which could result--assuming the 
program is restarted in its full measure--maybe up to $270 million is 
one estimate I have been given to restart it.
  Again, I agree with the sponsors of the amendment that the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is an important national security 
issue for the defense of our homeland against the growing threats. But 
asking us to choose between missile protection and CTR is a false 
choice. We need both. This bill funds the President's requested amount 
fully for both programs.
  The bill before the Senate authorizes the requested amount of $415.5 
million for CTR programs within the Department of Defense and $1.6 
billion for other nonproliferation efforts in the Department of Energy. 
There is a very strong recognition in this bill before the Senate, the 
authorization bill, of the importance of CTR. There is no current need 
for extra CTR funds. That is our basic proposition. They have in the 
bank very substantial amounts from 2005. They are unexpended. Whether 
they have been committed, I will have that checked. With a backlog that 
large and only roughly 70 days left in the fiscal year--that is an 
awful lot of money if someone is going to try to commit it and expend 
it in that period of time.
  The President's budget for missile defense, on the other hand, has 
already taken a considerable amount of cuts. Due to last-minute 
decisions made at the Department of Defense as the fiscal year 2006 
budget was being finalized, the missile defense budget request was 
reduced by $1 billion in 2006 and $5 billion overall between 2006 and 
2011.
  The sponsors of this amendment argue we should not provide long-lead 
funding for the GBI missiles 31 to 40 because of test failures. I am 
mindful of the recent difficulties encountered by the GMD system test 
program, but it is my view and that of the Department--and, indeed, 
independent authorities have looked at this problem--that these 
difficulties do not represent serious technological hurdles by the GMD 
program. Indeed, such problems are to be expected during the R&D and 
development phase of complicated weapons systems.
  To get at the root cause of the testing problems, the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency, to his great credit, commissioned the 
Independent Review Team, called the IRT, to examine the recent GMD test 
failures. The IRT found, one, that no fundamental GMD system design 
flaws are related to the recent test failures. Moreover, this 
independent panel found no evidence that major modifications of the 
current system hardware or software will be required. In other words, 
it is unlikely that future testing will find some major fault in the 
system that will require costly retrofit to the already fielded and 
those in production line of the GBIs.
  For those of my colleagues concerned about testing, I point out that 
this bill before you contains a provision--developed in a bipartisan 
fashion during the committee's markup--which requires the Missile 
Defense Agency, the service operational test agencies, and the Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation to plan and conduct tests that 
demonstrate the operational capability of the ballistic missile defense 
system. The bill also reallocates $100 million from longer-term 
development efforts to GMD testing, consistent with the recommendations 
of the Independent Review Team.
  The current and growing threat posed to our country by long-range 
ballistic missiles argues for proceeding without delay with the 
Department's approach of concurrent testing and fielding of ballistic 
missile defense capabilities for the homeland.
  Some of my colleagues suggest that because the current system is not 
fully proven, we should not procure additional missile interceptors. To 
this I would respond that General Cartwright, Commander of U.S. 
Strategic Command--the senior military official charged with advising 
the Secretary of Defense and the President on missile defense matters--
has testified, with respect to the current GMD system, that ``in an 
emergency, we are in fact in the position that we are confident that we 
can operate and employ it.''
  In addition, the Pentagon's chief independent weapons tester, the 
Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, noted in his most recent 
Annual Report to Congress that ``the test bed architecture is now in 
place and should have some limited capability to defend against a 
threat missile from North Korea.''
  In my view, it is a good thing that we have some capability--albeit 
limited--to defend the homeland against long-range missiles. For as 
General Cartwright testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
in April, ``we have a realistic threat here; we have an imperative.''
  General Cartwright is referring to CIA and DIA estimates that the 
North Korean Taepo-Dong 2 ballistic missile is capable of reaching the 
United States with a nuclear warhead--and that North Korea could resume 
flight testing of the Taepo-Dong 2 at any time. The Defense 
Intelligence Agency also estimates that Iran will have the capability 
to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM, by 2015.
  We simply can't wait until the threat is upon us to deploy missile 
defenses; we can't wait until the GMD system is fully and completely 
tested before we start providing some measure of protection against 
this threat. It is our responsibility to field what capabilities 
currently exist, even while we continue to test and improve the system. 
By continuing to field missile defenses today, we send a message to 
potential adversaries that we will not be deterred or coerced by their 
possession of long-range ballistic missiles.
  In summary, I ask my colleagues to reject the amendment offered by 
Senator Levin. This amendment would needlessly delay the fielding of a 
ballistic missile defense capability to protect the homeland. As the 
Commander of STRATCOM warns, the threat is real. We must continue on 
the current path of fielding available capabilities--even while testing 
continues to improve the system over time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President I express my gratitude to the distinguished 
chairman and other members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

[[Page 17219]]

for the work they do. The chairman has worked long and hard to try to 
bring this bill to the Senate floor and do things in the best interest 
of our country, and others have worked with him. I appreciate that.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today as an ardent supporter of the 
F/A-22 Raptor. I am pleased that the Armed Services Committee has 
agreed to authorize appropriations for 24 F/A-22 Raptors. However, I am 
deeply troubled that the Department of Defense has made the decision to 
only purchase this extraordinary aircraft through fiscal year 2008, in 
effect, limiting the number of Raptors to 180. This is far below the 
381 aircraft that the Air Force has repeatedly stated are required for 
that service to meet its responsibilities as outlined in the National 
Defense Strategy.
  Over the past year and half, I have made two trips, to be briefed on 
the capabilities of this extraordinary aircraft. The first was to 
Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, where our pilots are learning to fly the 
Raptor and second to Langley Air Force, VA, where the first operational 
F/A-22 units will be based. As a result of these meetings and 
discussions with the pilots who are training to fly the aircraft and 
the ground personnel who are learning to maintain the Raptor, I have 
come to conclusion that purchasing sufficient numbers of Raptors is 
absolutely vital to our national security.
  Over the past 30 years, the United States has been able to maintain 
air superiority in every conflict largely due to the F-15C. However, 
with the great advancements in technology over the past several years, 
the F-15 has struggled to keep pace. For example, the F-15 is not a 
stealth aircraft and its computer systems are based on obsolete 
technology. My colleagues should remember that the F-15 first flew in 
the early 1970s. During the ensuing years, nations have been 
consistently developing new aircraft and missile systems to defeat this 
fighter.
  Realizing that the F-15 would need a replacement, the Air Force 
developed the F/A-22 Raptor. The result is a truly remarkable aircraft.
  The F/A-22 has greater stealth capabilities than the F-117 Nighthawk. 
This is a powerful attribute when one remembers that it was the 
Nighthawk's stealth characteristics that enabled that aircraft to 
penetrate the integrated air defenses of Baghdad during the first night 
of the 1991 gulf war.
  The Raptor is also equipped with super-cruise engines. These engines 
do not need to go to after-burner in order to achieve supersonic 
flight. This provides the F/A-22 with a strategic advantage by enabling 
supersonic speeds to be maintained for a far greater length of time. By 
comparison, all other fighters require their engines and these are 
foreign fighters, as well--to go to after-burner to achieve supersonic 
speeds. This consumes a tremendous amount of fuel and greatly limits an 
aircraft's range.
  The F/A-22 is also the most maneuverable fighter flying today. This 
is of particular importance when encountering newer Russian-made 
aircraft which boast a highly impressive maneuver capability.
  Yet a further advantage resides in the F/A-22's radar and avionics. 
When entering hostile airspace, one F/A-22 can energize its radar 
system, enabling it to detect and engage enemy fighters far before an 
enemy's system effective range.
  However, one of the most important capabilities of the Raptor is 
often the most misunderstood. Many critics of the program state that, 
since much of the design work for this aircraft was performed during 
the Cold War, it does not meet the requirements of the future, I 
believe that this criticism is misplaced. The F/A-22 is more than just 
a fighter, it is also a bomber. In its existing configuration it is 
able to carry two 1,000 pound GPS-guided JDAM bombs and the aircraft 
will also be able to carry the Small Diameter Bomb. In 2008, the F/A-
22's radar system will be enhanced with a ``look-down'' mode enabling 
the Raptor to independently hunt for targets on the ground.
  All of these capabilities are necessary to fight what is quickly 
emerging as ``the'' threat of the future--the anti-access integrated 
air defense system. Integrated air defenses include both surface to air 
missiles and fighters deployed in such a fashion as to leverage the 
strengths of both systems. Such a system could pose a very real 
possibility of denying U.S. aircraft access to strategically important 
regions during future conflicts.
  It should also be noted that--for a comparably cheap price--an 
adversary can purchase the Russian SA-20 surface-to-air missile. This 
system has an effective range of approximately 120 nautical miles and 
can engage targets at greater then 100,000 feet, much higher then the 
service ceiling of any existing American fighter or bomber. The 
Russians have also developed a family of highly maneuverable fighters, 
the Su-30 and 35s, which have been sold to such nations as China. Of 
further import, 59 other nations have fourth generation fighters.
  It has also been widely reported in the aviation media that the F-
15C, our current air superiority fighter, is not as maneuverable as 
newer Russian aircraft, especially the Su-35. However, the F/A-22 is 
designed to defeat an integrated air defense system. By utilizing its 
stealth capability, the F/A-22 can penetrate an enemy's airspace 
undetected and, when modified, independently hunt for mobile surface-
to-air missile systems. Once detected, the F/A-22 would then be able to 
drop bombs on those targets. Some, correctly state that the B-2 bomber 
and the F-117 could handle these assignments. However, the F/A-22 
offers the additional capability of being able to engage an enemy's air 
superiority fighters such as the widely proficient Su-35. Therefore, 
the Raptor will be able to defeat, almost simultaneously, two very 
different threats that until now have been handled by two different 
types of aircraft.
  I should like point out that these potential threats are not just 
future concerns, but they are here today. For example, last year the 
Air Force conducted an exercise called Cope India, as part of our 
effort to strengthen relations with India. The Indian Air Force has a 
number of Su-30 MKKs, an aircraft which is very similar to a version of 
aircraft sold in large quantities to the People's Republic of China. 
During this exercise, it has been widely reported in the aviation and 
defense media that the Indian Air Force's Su-30s won a number of 
engagements when training against our Air Force's F-15s.
  So let me be clear on this point: a developing nation's air force was 
able to defeat the F-15. This was a stunning event and one that 
requires our immediate attention.
  Despite the obvious advantages, and now necessity, of this aircraft, 
the Department of Defense has made the decision to purchase only 180 F/
A-22s.
  Some argue that the cost of this aircraft is too high.
  In response, the supporters of the 
F/A-22 devised a new procurement strategy called ``Buy to Budget.'' 
This strategy capped the total cost for the procurement of the aircraft 
and forced the Air Force and the Raptor's primary contractor, Lockheed 
Martin, to cut the cost of plane. These efforts have so far been 
successful, and two years ago an additional F/A-22 was procured solely 
based upon savings.
  I am also pleased to state that recent articles in the media report 
that the ``fly-away'' price for an F/A-22 is now approximately $130 
million, down from $185 million an aircraft. Officials of the 
manufacturer are quoted as saying that each new lot of Raptors costs on 
average 13 percent less than its predecessor. The manufacturer also 
believes that this price can be further brought down to the $110 
million range. Now, of course, this is still a lot of money. However, 
when compared to similar aircraft such as the nonstealth Eurofighter, 
which costs approximately $110 million an aircraft, coupled with the 
estimated cost, as high as $90 million, for a new F-15, one easily 
concludes that the F/A-22 is much better deal than its critics contend.

[[Page 17220]]

  I wish to reiterate a point that is deeply troubling. I have always 
listened very closely when our servicemembers have outlined their 
equipment requirements based upon the national security goals that our 
Government has outlined. As I have studied this issue, I have been 
struck by the unanimous opinion of all the members of the Air Force to 
whom I have spoken.
  What is their expert opinion? That if the Air Force is to succeed in 
the tasks outlined in our National Defense Strategy that they require 
additional F/A-22 aircraft.
  I should also add that this is not just the opinion of those 
stationed here in Washington but the opinion of the pilots and ground 
crew in the field such as those of Tyndall Air Force Base and Langley 
Air Force Base. They were truly excited about the F/A-22 Raptor's 
potential.
  They understand that this aircraft will ensure American dominance of 
the skies for the next half century.
  These young men and women stand ready to sacrifice so much for us, we 
owe them the best that our country has to offer. Therefore, I 
respectfully urge my friends in the Department of Defense to rethink 
their plans for this aircraft and provide our warfighters sufficient 
numbers of this remarkable fighter/bomber.
  I ask that the pending amendment be set aside so I can call up 
another amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1516

  Mr. HATCH. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], for himself, Mr. Inhofe, 
     Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Chambliss, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1516.

  Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding the investment 
  of funds as called for in the Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master 
                         Plan of the Air Force)

       On page 66, after line 22, insert the following:

     SEC. 330. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING DEPOT MAINTENANCE.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate finds that--
       (1) the Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan of the 
     Air Force reflects the essential requirements for the Air 
     Force to maintain a ready and controlled source of organic 
     technical competence, thereby ensuring an effective and 
     timely response to national defense contingencies and 
     emergency requirements;
       (2) since the publication of the Depot Maintenance Strategy 
     and Master Plan of the Air Force in 2002, the service has 
     made great progress toward modernizing all 3 of its Depots, 
     in order to maintain their status as ``world class'' 
     maintenance repair and overhaul operations;
       (3) one of the indispensable components of the Depot 
     Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan of the Air Force is the 
     commitment of the Air Force to allocate $150,000,000 a year 
     over 6 years, beginning in fiscal year 2004, for 
     recapitalization and investment, including the procurement of 
     technologically advanced facilities and equipment, of our 
     Nation's 3 Air Force depots; and
       (4) the funds expended to date have ensured that 
     transformation projects, such as the initial implementation 
     of ``Lean'' and ``Six Sigma'' production techniques, have 
     achieved great success in reducing the time necessary to 
     perform depot maintenance on aircraft.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the Air Force should be commended for the 
     implementation of its Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master 
     Plan and, in particular, meeting its commitment to invest 
     $150,000,000 a year over 6 years, since fiscal year 2004, in 
     the Nation's 3 Air Force Depots; and
       (2) the Air Force should continue to fully fund its 
     commitment of $150,000,000 a year through fiscal year 2009 in 
     investments and recapitalization projects pursuant to the 
     Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan.

  Mr. HATCH. Today I rise to propose an amendment that is cosponsored 
by fellow members of the Senate Air Force Depot Caucus, specifically 
Senators Inhofe, Bennett and Chambliss. Before I proceed to discuss the 
merits of my amendment, I thank publicly my colleagues, and their 
staffs, of the depot caucus, not only for their assistance in 
supporting this amendment, but for the tireless work that we have all 
performed over the past several years to modernize and recapitalize our 
Nation's Air Force Depots.
  Why is that important? Why do we need our Air Force Depots? Simply 
put, today the United States boasts the most formidable military that 
the world has ever known. However, history has shown, that a 
technologically superior force can be defeated if the weapons systems 
being utilized by that force cannot be maintained or repaired in a 
timely fashion.
  Mindful of this lesson, the Department of Defense and Congress have 
created an infrastructure designed to meet the unique sustainment 
challenges faced by a nation that harnesses the advantages of 
technology on the battlefield. It bears remembering that one of our 
Nation's primary means of maintaining this advantage is through the 
integrated sustainment support provided by the Air Force's depots. This 
is true for the maintenance of tactical aircraft, such as the F-16 and 
A-10, which is performed in my home State of Utah at Hill Air Force 
Base. Tactical aircraft require this level of maintenance due to the 
stress caused by supersonic flight and high-g turns. Our tanker and 
airlift fleets also require this level of service due to corrosion and 
metal fatigue.
  Equally impressive, this support is accomplished while simultaneously 
providing supply chain management for millions of components and pieces 
of equipment. However, what makes our depots truly vital to national 
security is their ability to provide immediate support during periods 
of conflict or urgent need. In fact, no one matches our Nation's depots 
in meeting the critical ``surge'' requirements of our Nation.
  Unfortunately, during the 1990s, our Nation did not make the 
necessary investments in our depots to build and procure 
technologically advanced facilities and equipment technologies. 
Therefore, the depots were not meeting their full potential. Congress 
and the Air Force identified this problem and, I am proud to say, 
worked together to find a solution. That solution was the Air Force 
Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan. This strategy reaffirmed 
our Nation's commitment to the ``essential requirement for the Air 
Force to maintain a ready and controlled source of organic technical 
competence to ensure an effective and timely response to national 
defense contingencies and emergency requirements.''
  But more than just a piece of paper articulating lofty goals, this 
strategy committed the Air Force to allocating $150 million a year for 
6 years in order to achieve the objectives of maintaining the depots 
status as ``world class'' maintenance repair and overhaul operations.
  One of the most clear examples of how this money has been 
constructively allocated can be found in the success of the initial 
implementation of revolutionary lean production techniques at our 
Nation's depots. Lean manufacturing principles, first developed by the 
Toyota Corporation, aim to eliminate waste in every area of production. 
In practice, workers are no longer just responsible for a specific 
section of production. Workers are challenged to develop new skills and 
trades so they are responsible for more portions of the production 
process.
  The results have been outstanding. Workflow days, the days it takes 
to provide maintenance to a part or system, are down. At Hill Air Force 
Base, the C-130 and F-16 aircraft maintenance lines have achieved and 
sustained 100-percent on-time delivery rates, a large extent due to the 
efficiencies created by lean techniques. When you tour our depots, you 
can sense the excitement and renewed pride the workers have, in part, 
because of the lean processes and the new tools and infrastructure 
provided by the funds allocated by the Depot Strategy which make lean 
possible. This has truly been a successful investment.

[[Page 17221]]

  Another example of how the funds allocated under the Depot Strategy 
are assisting the war fighter while providing value to the taxpayer can 
be found in a project in this year's Defense authorization bill. Hill 
Air Force Base is home to one of only two Carnegie Mellon-rated capable 
maturity model level 5 software centers in the Department of Defense. A 
level 5 designation facility indicates that the facility is in the top 
2 percent of all software development centers. In addition, Hill's 
Software Engineering Division affords the Air Force a $40-per-hour 
labor rate savings over its major industry competitors.
  For these reasons, the Air Force decided to increase the amount of 
work performed by the division by 176,000 direct product standard 
hours. However, the existing building is full and unable to support the 
increase in personnel necessary to accomplish this new workload. The 
funding allocated under the Depot Maintenance Strategy provides the 
solution, and this bill authorizes appropriations to build a new 
extension to the facility. Not too bad when it has been determined that 
this project will pay for itself in 8.75 years.
  We are only halfway through the 6-year investment plan as called for 
by the Depot Maintenance Strategy. I rise with my colleagues to say to 
the Air Force: Well done. But I must add--and this is the essential 
point of my amendment--the Air Force must keep going. The depots have 
made enormous progress in even further efficiently supporting the war 
fighter, which now is more important than ever. However, if we are to 
support our war fighters in the manner in which they deserve, this 
investment must continue. The first steps have been made. Completing 
the full 6 years of Depot Strategy modernization funding is an 
essential component to ensure we will always provide the best to the 
men and women who risk so much to keep us free.
  Mr. President, I also desire at this time to thank three individuals 
who have been steadfast supporters of the Depot Maintenance Strategy.
  First, I must recognize retiring Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
Nelson Gibbs, who is one of the authors of Depot Strategy. We would not 
be where we are today without his support and guidance. I wish him well 
in his well-deserved retirement. I also wish to thank the implementers 
of the Strategy, GEN Lester Lyles, the former commander of Air Force 
Materiel Command and its present commander, and my good friend, GEN 
Gregory Martin. You will not find two finer officers who have ever 
served. To them I say: Thank you for your leadership and guidance in 
modernizing our infrastructure so we can most efficiently and 
effectively support the war fighter. I thank them.
  I thank my colleagues, all of whom support this as well.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor to my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will first make a comment or two.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may the manager of the bill address the 
Senate for a moment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Oklahoma yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the way we run is the managers usually try 
to get recognition.
  What we would now like to do, Mr. President, is to have the Senator 
from Oklahoma address his amendments--for what period of time?
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a few minutes to 
respond to some of the substance of the two subjects discussed by the 
Senator from Utah. Then I would like to describe the amendments I have 
offered. It will probably take me 20 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The Senator from Florida desires recognition, so I would ask the 
Senator from Florida if he could give a rough estimate of the time he 
would like following the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Fifteen minutes. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator from Oklahoma now be recognized for a period not to exceed 20 
minutes, to be followed by the Senator from Florida.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Could we act on the UC request, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, let me say I was listening 
intently while the senior Senator from Utah talked about the F/A-22. I 
would like to add one thing that perhaps he assumes everyone is aware 
of, but I keep finding people are not aware of it, and that is the 
Chief of the Air Force now, General Jumper, not too long ago, I think 
1997, made a very courageous observation. He called to the attention of 
the American people that the Russians were making--at that time he was 
referring to the Su-30, a strike vehicle, that it was actually better 
than anything we had in our inventory, our F-15 or F-16.
  I think a lot of people assumed automatically that when we go onto 
the battlefield America has the very best of equipment. That is not 
true. It is kind of scary when you think about a strike vehicle that is 
out there that has greater capability than our very best and the fact 
that the American people expect the United States to have the best of 
everything.
  I have talked on this floor many times about the fact that our 
artillery piece is not as good as one that is made in five different 
countries. The old Paladin technology is World War II technology. That 
is something we are going to correct with our future combat system.
  But I commend the Senator from Utah for his comments about the F/A-
22. When we get the joint strike fighter and the F/A-22, we will be 
back in a position where we will be sending our young people out there 
with the best of equipment. We need to get there as rapidly as 
possible.
  I also want to make a comment about the depot funding plan amendment 
that is offered by Senator Hatch. It supports the important and vital 
work being performed by our aircraft depot facilities.
  Since the Bush administration came into office, we have seen a 
renewed interest in the Air Force's depots. To kind of fill us in where 
we are right now with that, I can remember when the last Secretary of 
the Air Force came in, his first trip was to Tinker Air Force Base to 
see how creative they were, to kind of personally examine the kind of 
work they were doing. He recognized we have to handle the problem that 
has been there for many, many years; that is, we need to have an in-
house capability for depot maintenance on core issues.
  The problem has always been: How do you define the core issue? The 
core issue is not an easy thing to describe and define. But until it is 
properly defined, we have been using the ratio of 50-50; in other 
words, to have the in-house capability to handle 50 percent of the 
functions in the case of a war so we would not be held hostage to a 
single source contractor.
  The key to this overall reinvigoration has been the Air Force's Depot 
Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan that will ensure America's air and 
space assets are ready to rapidly respond to any national security 
threat. Because of this plan we have begun a restoration and 
modernization of our Air Force's three depot facilities located in 
Oklahoma, Utah, and Georgia, which will ensure the United States is 
able to maintain world-class aircraft repair and overall facilities.
  If we are to realize the end result of this Maintenance Strategy and 
Master Plan, it is incumbent upon Congress to fulfill the Air Force's 
commitment for allocating $150 million a year, over a 6-year period, 
for recapitalizing, investing, and procuring advanced facilities, 
equipment, and operation. This funding began in fiscal year 2004, and 
significant in-roads have already been made.
  In one year alone, with this funding support, the Air Mobility 
Command reported that the rate of aircraft grounded due to parts issues 
decreased by 37.6 percent. It bettered its flying hour goal by 922,000 
hours. The rate of aircraft incidents due to parts issues decreased by 
23.4 percent. Logistics response time increased by 20.4 percent. And 
the level of spare parts in stock improved by 5.5

[[Page 17222]]

percent. Such improvements are an indication of the impact of this 
funding, and this was only a single 1-year period.
  We have spoken frequently in this body about the advanced age and 
challenges of some of our most critical low-density, high-demand 
aircraft, such as the C-130 tactical airlifter, and the KC-135 
refueling tanker. The average age of the C-130 E and H models flying 
today is 40 years. The average age of the KC-135 E and R models flying 
today is 44 years. We went through some arduous times, several years 
ago--about 15 years ago--getting the C-17 on line. It was a recognition 
that we have to modernize this fleet. I am very thankful we have 
increased the numbers as the years have gone by. No one would have ever 
believed, prior to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the need we 
would have on these heavy-lift vehicles.
  We could go on and on, but the point we want to make is, if we are 
going to keep our aging fleet of aircraft flying, we must not only 
maintain them but we must also modify them and give them the latest 
technology, avionics and things, so we will provide our young people 
with the same advantage that some of our prospective opponents would 
have.
  At our Air Force depots today, we require engineers and fabrication 
technicians to solve ever-challenging design and structural problems 
due to aircraft stress and fatigue that were never anticipated when the 
aircraft were manufactured. But because of age, we are seeing such 
flaws. The civilian aviation industry recapitalizes, buying new 
aircraft when their planes are no longer feasible to fly. 
Unfortunately, our Air Force does not have such a luxury. The effort 
the Air Force has started with the Depot Maintenance Strategy and 
Master Plan must be sustained, and Congress must provide the necessary 
resources.
  In light of this, I applaud the sense of the Senate being offered by 
Senator Hatch. This has been a problem we have seen coming. We know it 
is there. We have been able to now give our depots some of the same 
resources, some of the same modernization. They have, on a competitive 
basis, proven they can do a very good job.


                           Amendment No. 1313

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have two amendments I have already 
filed. The second amendment is going to require a new number. The two I 
am going to be discussing are the ICRC amendment. I have several 
cosponsors of the amendment, including Senator Kyl. I ask unanimous 
consent that Senator Enzi be added as a cosponsor to amendment No. 
1313.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. The other amendment has a new number. We have talked 
about it before. It is the U.S.-China Commission amendment. It is now 
No. 1476. It is my intention to make a few comments about these two and 
then to ask for the yeas and nays. We would like to get to a vote on 
these amendments by tonight.
  First, the amendment concerning the ICRC. I simply want to clarify 
some people's thinking that the ICRC is not the American Red Cross. 
This is the International Committee on the Red Cross. It has no 
relationship to the American Red Cross.
  My first concern is for American troops. The ICRC has been around 
since 1863 and has been there for American soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and marines throughout two world wars. I thank them for that work. 
Likewise and moreover, I thank all Americans for military service to 
America. I did have occasion to be in the U.S. Army. It was the best 
thing that ever happened in my life. In my continuing preeminent 
concern for American troops, however, I am compelled to note some 
concerns and pose some questions about a drift in focus of the ICRC 
away from its core principles in its mission statement. Indeed, I fear 
the ICRC may be harming the morale of our American troops by 
unjustified allegations that detainees and prisoners are not being 
properly treated.
  For example, an ICRC official visited Camp Bucca, a theater 
internment facility for enemy prisoners that is, as of January 2005, 
being operated by the 18th Military Police Brigade and Task Force 134, 
near Umm Qasr in southern Iraq. As of late January 2005, the facility 
had a holding capacity of 6,000 prisoners but only held 5,000. These 
prisoners were being supervised by 1,200 Army MPs and Air Force airmen. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, citing a Defense Department 
source, the ICRC official told U.S. authorities:

       You people are no better than and no different than the 
     Nazi concentration camp guards.

  I ask unanimous consent that this entire article be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks about the ICRC.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  The Senate Armed Services Committee has now held 13 hearings on the 
topic of prisoner treatment.
  Sometimes we get bogged down in all the detail and we forget about 
the overall picture, the big picture. And I'm shocked when I found, 
only last Tuesday, from the Pentagon's report, that after 3 years and 
24,000 interrogations, there were only three acts of violation of the 
approved interrogation techniques authorized by Field Manual 3452 and 
DOD guidelines.
  The small infractions found were found by our own government, 
corrected and now reported. In all the cases no further incidents 
occurred. We have nothing to be ashamed of. What other country attacked 
as we were would exercise the same degree of self-criticism and 
restraint. Again, keep in mind, 24,000 interrogations, and they only 
found three. And they were found by us, not somebody else snooping 
around.
  Most, if not all, of these incidents are at least a year old. I am 
very impressed with the way the military, the FBI, and other agencies 
conducted themselves. The report shows me that an incredible amount of 
restraint and discipline was present at Gitmo.
  Having heard a lot about the Field Manual 3452, I asked, ``Are the 
DOD guidelines, as currently published in that manual, appropriate to 
allow interrogators to get valuable information, intelligence 
information, while not crossing the line from interrogation to abuse?'' 
The answer from Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, Commander of U.S. Southern 
Command was, ``I think, because that manual was written for enemy 
prisoners of war, we have a translation problem, in that enemy 
prisoners are to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions--
that doesn't apply. That's why the recommendation was made and I 
affirmed it. We need a further look here on this new phenomenon of 
enemy combatants. It's different, and we're trying to use, I think, a 
manual that was written for one reason in another environment.''
  Lt. Gen. Randall M. Schmidt, the senior investigating officer said, 
``Sir, I agree. It's critical that we come to grips with not hanging on 
a Cold War relic of Field Manual 3452, which addressed an entirely 
different population. If we are, in fact, going to get intelligence to 
stay ahead of this type of threat, we need to understand what else we 
can do and still stay in our lane of humane treatment.''
  Brig. Gen. John T. Furlow, the investigating officer, stated, ``Sir, 
in echoing that, F.M. 3452 was originally written in 1987, further 
updated and refined in 1992, which is dealing with the Geneva question 
as well as an ordered battle enemy, not the enemy that we're facing 
currently. I'm aware that Fort Huachuca's currently in a rewrite of the 
next 3452, and it's in a draft form right now.''
  It is clear that our military has humane treatment placed at the 
forefront of their concerns.
  At the same time I want to ask: What other country would freely 
discuss interrogation techniques used against high-value intelligence 
detainees during a time of war when suicide bombers are killing our 
fellow citizens?
  That was disturbing to me. The last of the many hearings we had was 
one where they were describing in detail our interrogation techniques, 
knowing

[[Page 17223]]

full well that the terrorists are watching on live TV and training 
their people on how to handle those. I think it is something on which 
we have gone far enough. That is another subject we will be discussing 
in a few minutes.
  In the past 15 years, the United States has provided more than $1.5 
billion in funding to the ICRC. I ask for some accountability for the 
use of this money and a modicum of oversight. For example, I think it 
is fair to ask: How is our money being spent? What are the activities 
of the ICRC to determine the status of American POWs/MIAs, unaccounted 
for since World War II? What were the efforts of the ICRC to assist 
America's POWs held in captivity during the Korean war, the Vietnam 
war, and other subsequent conflicts? Has the ICRC exceeded its mandate, 
violated established practices or principles, or engaged in advocacy 
work that exceeds the ICRC's mandate as provided under the Geneva 
Convention? That essentially is what this amendment does.
  At this point I will read the very last paragraph of the Wall Street 
Journal article. It says:

       We are trying to understand how a representative of an 
     organization pledged to neutrality and the honest 
     investigation of detainee practices could compare American 
     soldiers to Nazi SS. And considering the timing and content 
     of several ICRC confidentiality breaches concerning the U.S. 
     war on terror, it's fair to ask if similar views aren't held 
     by a substantial number in the organization.
       The world needs a truly neutral humanitarian body of the 
     sort the ICRC is supposed to be. But the Camp Bucca 
     incident--in addition to leaked Gitmo and Abu Ghraib 
     reports--is evidence it isn't currently up to the task.

                               Exhibit 1

              [From the Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2005]

                          As Bad as the Nazis?

       The International Committee of the Red Cross is granted a 
     privileged status to inspect the conditions of prisoners of 
     war and other detainees in return for confidentiality. But in 
     recent years it has demonstrated a habit of selective media 
     leaks damaging to American purposes. This is the backdrop for 
     two recent incidents that make us think the U.S. should 
     reconsider the ICRC's role.
       The first concerns a story we heard first from a U.S. 
     source that an ICRC representative visiting America's largest 
     detention facility in Iraq last month had compared the U.S. 
     to Nazi Germany. According to a Defense Department source 
     citing internal Pentagon documents, the ICRC team leader told 
     U.S. authorities at Camp Bucca: ``You people are no better 
     than and no different than the Nazi concentration camp 
     guards.'' She was upset about not being granted immediate 
     access shortly after a prison riot, when U.S. commanders may 
     have been thinking of her own safety, among other 
     considerations.
       A second, senior Defense Department source we asked about 
     the episode confirmed that the quote above is accurate. And a 
     third, very well-placed American source we contacted 
     separately told us that some kind of reference was made by 
     the Red Cross representative ``to either Nazis or the Third 
     Reich''--which understandably offended the American soldiers 
     present.
       The world needs a truly neutral humanitarian body of the 
     sort the ICRC is supposed to be. But the Camp Bucca 
     incident--in addition to the leaked Gitmo and Abu Ghraib 
     reports--is evidence it isn't currently up to the task.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have been informed I will be asking for 
the yeas and nays for two different amendments. I will do that after 
explaining the second amendment.
  I know the Senator from Florida, under UC, now has 15 minutes. My 
time is about to expire. I would ask unanimous consent that at the 
conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Florida, I be recognized 
to present what was amendment 1312 and now is No. 1476. And at the 
conclusion, I will be asking for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized following the 
Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 15 
minutes, followed by the Senator from North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I want to speak on the Defense 
bill to point out a major national asset with regard to our military 
preparation. What I am about to say actually involves some subterranean 
negotiations that are going on outside of the light of day on another 
bill, on the Energy conference bill, but it relates directly to what we 
are doing here. I want to point it out.
  One of the great national assets we have is off the coast of Florida 
called restricted airspace. As you can see, off the northeast coast of 
Florida from Cape Canaveral north all the way to Savannah, GA is a 
considerable bit of restricted airspace. You will also notice on this 
map of the peninsula of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico that almost the 
entire area of the Gulf of Mexico off of the State of Florida is 
restricted airspace. It is not any puzzle to understand when the 
Atlantic fleet, U.S. Navy training, was shut down on the island of 
Vieques off of Puerto Rico, that most of that training came here to 
northwest Florida. Not only because of the major military facilities at 
Pensacola, Whiting, Eglin Air Force Base, Tindale Air Force Base, 
where, by the way, we have been talking about the FA-22, the training 
for the pilots is at Tindale Air Force Base right here. The training 
for the pilots for all branches of Government for the new F-135, the 
joint fighter, is done at Eglin Air Force Base. Why? Because we have 
the restricted airspace in which that training can occur and where 
land, sea, and air exercises can be coordinated. That is a major 
national asset.
  Alas, people, certain interests, want to come out here and drill for 
oil in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. You can't be conducting these 
military maneuvers, this training that is so essential to our mission 
in the Department of Defense, you can't be doing that if you have to 
worry about oil rigs on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico below. That 
is the same right over here on the east coast, a battle I had to wage 
15, 20 years ago when it was proposed to drill from Cape Hatteras, NC 
all the way south to Fort Pierce, FL. Ultimately, we won that battle 
with the recognition by the DOD and NASA that you can't have oil rigs 
where you are dropping the solid rocket boosters from the space shuttle 
and where we are dropping the first stages of the expendable booster 
rockets coming out of the Cape Canaveral Air Force station.
  We took on this fight a month or so ago when the Energy bill was here 
and we won this fight, thanks to the agreement of the chairman and the 
ranking member of the Energy Committee that they would not support any 
amendments that would allow drilling out here in the eastern gulf.
  Speaking of that, just so you can see how dramatic it is that the 
eastern gulf does not have this drilling, I want you to look at this 
particular map of the gulf coast--Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Florida. You will notice the drilling, as represented by the 
green, is where the oil is. The geology shows that there is no drilling 
in the eastern gulf. There is no oil there. But there is another reason 
there are not rigs there, besides the dry holes they came up with, and 
it is all of that area is restricted air space. Now, all well and good.
  Mr. President, we have just intercepted an e-mail from the White 
House, and it is an e-mail sent to energy conference conferees--
something that has some significance to the occupant of the chair. 
Attached is the administration's proposal. The proposal would allow for 
new leasing activities in the eastern gulf. They define it in Louisiana 
waters as defined by the use of seaward lateral boundaries. They go on 
in this White House e-mail to say:

       Interior and the Office of Management and Budget have 
     signed off on this language.

  Well, let's sound the alarms because here is what they plan to do. We 
went through this drill a couple months ago when the Energy bill was 
here. Why? We got the chairman of the Energy Committee and the ranking 
member to agree to oppose these amendments--this is in the 
Congressional Record--because this line, which is the Florida-Alabama 
line, beyond which there is no leasing in any of the waters of the 
gulf, well, suddenly, they are going to draw the line of the State of 
Louisiana, which is over here, to be a line that comes out here and 
goes into the eastern Gulf of Mexico, under the fiction

[[Page 17224]]

that that line would be the waters of Louisiana and, thus, giving a 
pretext to invade the waters off of Florida, including the waters 
underneath the restricted airspace, to allow oil and gas drilling.
  The administration is pushing a proposal in the conference between 
the House and the Senate that does not have such a provision in either 
bill. To the contrary. The House took a position against drilling in 
the eastern gulf, and the Senate did likewise in the agreement of the 
chairman and the ranking member.
  So I want to alert the Senate. I hope this is not going to be the 
case because we are down to a week before everybody wants to go home 
for the August recess and do all of their town hall meetings, and so 
forth. I know there is the interest in passing an energy conference 
bill, if they reach agreement. Clearly, I don't want to slow up the 
energy conference bill if they reach agreement. But, of course, if the 
representations and the agreements that were made in good faith are 
broken--in fact, that were made on the floor of the Senate and are part 
of the Congressional Record--if those agreements are broken, this 
Senator from Florida will have no choice.
  This would represent a reversal of administration policy because this 
administration has pledged to uphold the moratorium on the Outer 
Continental Shelf from drilling until the year 2012. Although a portion 
right there is not included within the moratorium, nevertheless, the 
line they have drawn clearly includes other portions of the moratorium. 
It is a reversal of administration policy.
  It would also give this area, called lease-sale 181, to the State of 
Louisiana. If lease-sale 181 is part of the State of Louisiana, off of 
the coast of Florida, then why did the administration negotiate in 2001 
to cut back lease-sale 181 from 6 million acres to a million and a half 
acres, so it would not go over the Florida-Alabama line? There are all 
kinds of inconsistencies here. It is purely--call it what it is; it is 
an intent to drill for oil and gas off of the coast of Florida.
  I can tell you that 18 million people in Florida don't want oil rigs 
off their shores. In the first place, the geology shows, along with 
many dry holes, that there is not much oil and gas. In the second 
place, we have an extraordinary $50 billion a year tourism industry 
that depends on what? It depends on what is depicted in this picture. 
This other picture is not what we want. This is a photograph from a 
month and a half ago when we had the Energy bill on this floor of 100 
pelicans that were killed as a result of an oil spill off of 
Louisiana--that is a recent photograph--and another 400 were severely 
damaged. We don't want that. We want the other.
  The third reason is one I had explained at the outset. This is what 
we want for the defense of our country. We want to continue to do our 
training. We want all of that training that has come from Puerto Rico 
to go unhampered off of the coast of Florida, where land, sea, and air 
military exercises can be coordinated without the threat of 
interference from oil rigs below.
  The fourth reason is the coast of Florida has something besides our 
natural beauty and beaches. It has some of the most pristine and 
ecologically sensitive estuaries, rivers, and bays that come into the 
gulf. That is a very important place to keep so that the balance of 
nature can occur with the oceans.
  For all of these reasons, I wanted to share with the Senate that I 
hope I don't have to be out here later this week making these speeches 
again because I took it at face value and in good faith that the 
representations that were made here were going to stick. If they do 
not, then the Senator from Florida will have to judge accordingly.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1313

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, so we can get procedurally back where we 
should be, I ask unanimous consent that the current amendment be set 
aside for the consideration of amendment No. 1313.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the Senator brings up this matter--
and he has the floor--I wonder if I can clarify this among my 
colleagues, to try to accommodate others. We have Senator Dorgan to be 
recognized under the previous unanimous consent. I understand 10 
minutes would be sufficient there.
  Mr. REED. Fifteen minutes, I believe.
  Mr. WARNER. We are anxious to get going, but we will do 15 minutes. I 
see the Senator from Colorado here. I know the Senator from Arizona and 
the Senator from South Carolina called within the hour. They need time. 
Can the Senator advise me as to what his desires might be?
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I think 10 minutes would be fine. I was 
going to make an argument on an amendment that will be presented. I 
don't know where it is before us. I do have a couple of amendments I 
would like to propose. I think for the debate on those two amendments 
and a floor statement, I probably need 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator from Colorado could be recognized 
following Senator Dorgan, I would like to reserve an hour for myself 
and Senator McCain and Senator Lindsey Graham.
  Mr. REED. Senator Levin will need some time, also.
  Mr. WARNER. He will certainly get that time. I ask unanimous consent 
for that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REED. Would the Senator restate the UC?
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Oklahoma 
continue for about 10 minutes; Senator Dorgan for 15 minutes; the 
Senator from Colorado for 10 minutes; and 1 hour equally divided 
between Senators Warner, McCain, and Graham.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REED. Reserving the right to object, I just want to protect the 
ability for Senator Levin to have time.
  Mr. WARNER. He can be recognized following the hour of three of us.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 
No. 1313.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1476

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask that amendment No. 1313 be set aside 
for the consideration of amendment No. 1476, which I send to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1476.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress that the President should 
       take immediate steps to establish a plan to implement the 
  recommendations of the 2004 Report to Congress of the United States-
             China Economic and Security Review Commission)

       At the end of title XII, insert the following:

     SEC. 1205. THE UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 
                   REVIEW COMMISSION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The 2004 Report to Congress of the United States-China 
     Economic and Security Review Commission states that--
       (A) China's State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) lack adequate 
     disclosure standards, which creates the potential for United 
     States investors to unwittingly contribute to enterprises 
     that are involved in activities harmful to United States 
     security interests;
       (B) United States influence and vital long-term interests 
     in Asia are being challenged by China's robust regional 
     economic engagement and diplomacy;
       (C) the assistance of China and North Korea to global 
     ballistic missile proliferation is extensive and ongoing;

[[Page 17225]]

       (D) China's transfers of technology and components for 
     weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems 
     to countries of concern, including countries that support 
     acts of international terrorism, has helped create a new tier 
     of countries with the capability to produce WMD and ballistic 
     missiles;
       (E) the removal of the European Union arms embargo against 
     China that is currently under consideration in the European 
     Union would accelerate weapons modernization and dramatically 
     enhance Chinese military capabilities;
       (F) China's recent actions toward Taiwan call into question 
     China's commitments to a peaceful resolution;
       (G) China is developing a leading-edge military with the 
     objective of intimidating Taiwan and deterring United States 
     involvement in the Strait, and China's qualitative and 
     quantitative military advancements have already resulted in a 
     dramatic shift in the cross-Strait military balance toward 
     China; and
       (H) China's growing energy needs are driving China into 
     bilateral arrangements that undermine multilateral efforts to 
     stabilize oil supplies and prices, and in some cases may 
     involve dangerous weapons transfers.
       (2) On March 14, 2005, the National People's Congress 
     approved a law that would authorize the use of force if 
     Taiwan formally declares independence.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--
       (1) Plan.--The President is strongly urged to take 
     immediate steps to establish a plan to implement the 
     recommendations contained in the 2004 Report to Congress of 
     the United States-China Economic and Security Review 
     Commission in order to correct the negative implications that 
     a number of current trends in United States-China relations 
     have for United States long-term economic and national 
     security interests.
       (2) Contents.--Such a plan should contain the following:
       (A) Actions to address China's policy of undervaluing its 
     currency, including--
       (i) encouraging China to provide for a substantial upward 
     revaluation of the Chinese yuan against the United States 
     dollar;
       (ii) allowing the yuan to float against a trade-weighted 
     basket of currencies; and
       (iii) concurrently encouraging United States trading 
     partners with similar interests to join in these efforts.
       (B) Actions to make better use of the World Trade 
     Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism and 
     applicable United States trade laws to redress China's unfair 
     trade practices, including China's exchange rate 
     manipulation, denial of trading and distribution rights, lack 
     of intellectual property rights protection, objectionable 
     labor standards, subsidization of exports, and forced 
     technology transfers as a condition of doing business. The 
     United States Trade Representative should consult with our 
     trading partners regarding any trade dispute with China.
       (C) Actions to encourage United States diplomatic efforts 
     to identify and pursue initiatives to revitalize United 
     States engagement with China's Asian neighbors. The 
     initiatives should have a regional focus and complement 
     bilateral efforts. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
     forum (APEC) offers a ready mechanism for pursuit of such 
     initiatives.
       (D) Actions by the administration to hold China accountable 
     for proliferation of prohibited technologies and to secure 
     China's agreement to renew efforts to curtail North Korea's 
     commercial export of ballistic missiles.
       (E) Actions by the Secretaries of State and Energy to 
     consult with the International Energy Agency with the 
     objective of upgrading the current loose experience-sharing 
     arrangement, whereby China engages in some limited exchanges 
     with the organization, to a more structured arrangement 
     whereby China would be obligated to develop a meaningful 
     strategic oil reserve, and coordinate release of stocks in 
     supply-disruption crises or speculator-driven price spikes.
       (F) Actions by the administration to develop a coordinated, 
     comprehensive national policy and strategy designed to meet 
     China's challenge to maintaining United States scientific and 
     technological leadership and competitiveness in the same way 
     the administration is presently required to develop and 
     publish a national security strategy.
       (G) Actions to review laws and regulations governing the 
     Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 
     including exploring whether the definition of national 
     security should include the potential impact on national 
     economic security as a criterion to be reviewed, and whether 
     the chairmanship of CFIUS should be transferred from the 
     Secretary of the Treasury to a more appropriate executive 
     branch agency.
       (H) Actions by the President and the Secretaries of State 
     and Defense to press strongly their European Union 
     counterparts to maintain the EU arms embargo on China.
       (I) Actions by the administration to discourage foreign 
     defense contractors from selling sensitive military use 
     technology or weapons systems to China. The administration 
     should provide a comprehensive annual report to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress on the nature and scope of 
     foreign military sales to China, particularly sales by Russia 
     and Israel.
       (J) Any additional actions outlined in the 2004 Report to 
     Congress of the United States-China Economic and Security 
     Review Commission that affect the economic or national 
     security of the United States.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, this amendment is similar to one that I am 
not going to offer that was previously going to be offered, No. 1312. 
There have been several changes made, so a new number is assigned to 
it.
  Mr. President, in October 2000, Congress established the United 
States-China Security Economic Review Commission to act as a bipartisan 
authority on how our relationship with China affects our economy, 
China's military and weapons proliferation, and our influence in Asia.
  For the past 5 years, the Commission has been holding hearings and 
issuing annual reports to evaluate ``the national security implications 
of the bilateral trade and economic relationship with the United States 
and the People's Republic of China.'' Their job is to provide us in 
Congress with the necessary information to make decisions about the 
complex situation. However, I fear their reports have gone largely 
unnoticed.
  This has been very disturbing. I have had occasion to give four 
rather lengthy speeches concerning the recommendations. I will not be 
redundant, and I certainly will not take the time I took previously, 
but it is something that is very significant. This was a bipartisan 
commission, made up of Democrats and Republicans, some Members of 
Congress, and some former Members of Congress. They came out with 
recommendations over a period of years.
  I found the recommendations of the Commission's 2004 report--this is 
the most recent approach--objective, necessary, and urgent, and I am 
offering an amendment to express our support for these viable steps.
  This amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that China should, 
first, reevaluate its manipulated currency level and allow it to float 
against other currencies. In the Treasury Department's recent report to 
Congress, China's monetary policies are described as ``highly 
distortionary and pose a risk to China's economy, its trading partners, 
and global economic growth.''
  Second, the appropriate steps ought to be taken through the World 
Trade Organization to hold China accountable for its dubious trade 
practices. Major problem issues, such as intellectual property rights, 
have yet to be addressed.
  Third, the United States should revitalize engagement in the Asian 
region, broaden our interaction with organizations such as ASEAN, which 
is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Our lack of influence 
has been demonstrated by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization recently 
demanding that we set a troop pullout deadline in Afghanistan. This 
clearly shows we do not have much influence there.
  Fourth, the administration ought to hold China accountable for 
proliferating prohibited technologies. Chinese companies, such as 
NORINCO, have been sanctioned frequently and yet the Chinese Government 
refuses to enforce their own nonproliferation agreements.
  Fifth, the U.N. should monitor nuclear, biological, and chemical 
treaties and either enforce these agreements or report them to the 
Security Council. The United States-China Commission has found that 
China has undercut the U.N. in many areas, undermining what pressures 
we have tried to apply on problematic states, such as Sudan and 
Zimbabwe.
  Sixth, the administration ought to review the effectiveness of the 
one-China policy in relation to Taiwan to reflect the dynamic nature of 
the situation. The Defense Department's annual report to Congress, 
released 2 days ago, states that China's military ``sustained buildup 
affects the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.'' We have been watching 
this for a number of years. We have also been watching the growth and 
enhancement of China's conventional military capability. We have known 
about their nuclear capability for some time. Now we see, as the 
Senator from Utah was mentioning a few

[[Page 17226]]

minutes ago, that countries are buying these superior strike vehicles 
from Russia, such as the SU-30s. China, in one purchase, I understand, 
bought some 240. One has to stop and think about this. It puts them in 
the position to have better strike vehicles than we do. Of course, we 
have seen the buildup, the effect on their relationship in the Taiwan 
Strait.
  Seventh, various energy agencies should encourage China to develop 
its strategic oil reserve in order to avoid a disastrous economic 
crisis if oil availability becomes unstable. We have to understand that 
we have a serious problem in this country with the fact that we are 
relying upon foreign countries for some 65 percent of the oil we 
import. We are now starting to compete with China which has that great 
problem, too.
  As one travels around and looks at countries such as Iran, Sudan, 
Nigeria, and other countries where they are establishing 
relationships--we have seen what they are doing in Venezuela right 
now--we have to recognize they are going to be our chief competition in 
becoming self-sufficient in our ability to fight a war without 
dependency upon foreign countries.
  Eighth, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
called CFIUS, should include national economic security as a criterion 
for evaluation and the chairmanship to be transferred to a more 
appropriate chair allowing for increased security precautions.
  Right now CFIUS has actually reviewed some 1,500 cases of purchases 
by foreign countries, and they have only questioned 24. They relented 
on those and only stopped one. That is 1 out of 1,500. There is 
something wrong. We see some things that are going on right now, such 
as Unocal, that have received a lot of publicity. This is a very strong 
recommendation. In fact, I have a separate resolution that covers just 
this issue and this alone. It will recommend that the chairmanship be 
changed from the Secretary of Treasury to the Secretary of Defense.
  Ninth, the administration should continue its pressure on the EU to 
maintain its arms embargo on China. The recent Defense Department 
report states the EU would not have the capability to monitor and 
enforce any limits if the arms embargo is lifted.
  Tenth, penalties should be placed on foreign contractors who sell 
sensitive military use technology or weapons system to China from 
benefiting from U.S. defense-related research development in production 
programs. What is going on is sales are taking place to China on 
technology that has been subsidized by the United States. In other 
words, we are putting ourselves in a situation where our national 
security would be impaired by our own research for which we have paid.
  Eleventh, the administration should also provide a report to Congress 
on the scope of foreign military sales to China.
  Finally, Congress should support the recommendations of the 
Commission's 2004 report to Congress. Unless our relationship with 
China is backed up with strong action, they will never take us 
seriously. We will certainly see more violations of proliferation 
treaties. It is happening over and over. We are looking at it right 
now. They continue to manipulate regional global trade through currency 
undervaluation and other unhealthy practices. They will develop 
unreliable oil sources and energy alliances with countries that 
threaten international stability. They will continue to escalate the 
situation over Taiwan, raising the stakes in a game neither country can 
win.
  In today's world, we see how the unpaid bills of the past come back 
to haunt us in full. Ignoring these problems is unacceptable.
  The United States-China Commission was created to give us in Congress 
a clear picture about what is going on. They have done their job. It is 
time for us to do our job.
  I repeat, this is a commission that has been working now for 4 years. 
It is a bipartisan commission. These are specific recommendations. This 
amendment is a sense of the Senate to follow these recommendations.
  This is amendment No. 1476.


                      Amendment No. 1312 Withdrawn

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I withdraw amendment No. 1312.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, amendment No. 1312 is 
withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 1476

  Mr. INHOFE. We are considering amendment No. 1476. I ask for the yeas 
and nays on amendment No. 1476.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, am I now recognized for 15 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, my colleague has sought to have the yeas 
and nays on his amendment. Let me do the same. I have two amendments 
pending. Should there be cloture invoked on this underlying bill, as my 
colleague from Oklahoma has suggested, I would like my amendments to be 
considered prior to cloture. I have an amendment No. 1429, which is 
offered. I ask for the yeas and nays on both of my amendments. Then I 
will speak on the amendments ever so briefly.
  I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendments Nos. 1426 and 1429

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask that we consider amendment 1429. I 
previously filed that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to make that the 
regular order. The amendment is now pending.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 
No. 1429.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set 
aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we consider 
amendment No. 1426, which I previously filed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can make that the regular order. 
The amendment is now pending.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 
No. 1426.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I will briefly describe amendment No. 
1426. I thank my colleagues for their cooperation. That amendment one 
that I described at some length on Friday. It has to do with the joint 
inquiry of the two Intelligence Committees into the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001. It has to do with the 28 pages in this joint 
inquiry that have been redacted and classified as top secret. The 
American people should see these 28 pages. The chairman and the ranking 
member of the Intelligence Committee at the time said they believe the 
American people should see these 28 pages. The Government of Saudi 
Arabia said the American people deserve to see these 28 pages. This 
book went to the White House for publication. The White House redacted 
it and classified it as top secret.
  I have read the 28 pages. My colleagues have had an opportunity to 
read them. My former colleague from Florida, who was chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, described the question of whether the 
hijackers on 9/11--and 15 of the 19 were Saudi citizens--whether the 
hijackers received support from foreign interests and, if so, what kind 
of support, which foreign interests. The American people have a right 
to see this.
  I hope the Senate will finally vote on asking the President to 
declassify these pages and give the American people the right to 
understand what is in those 28 pages.

[[Page 17227]]

  Again, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the ranking 
member, a Republican and a Democrat, believed at the time those 28 
pages should not have been classified.
  I will now turn to amendment No. 1429. It deals with waste, fraud, 
and abuse in contracting in Iraq, and it deals especially with 
Halliburton, but not exclusively with Halliburton. I have offered this 
amendment previously as well.
  It is unbelievable to me the billions and billions of dollars being 
spent. A substantial portion of it is being wasted. We know that, and 
yet no one seems to care or do much about it.
  Let me show some charts, if I may. This is a chart of someone who 
testified before a policy committee hearing I held. This fellow--you 
cannot see his face--this fellow in the blue striped shirt testified. 
He was in Iraq when this picture was taken. This is Saran-wrapped 
bundles of 100-dollar bills, some millions of dollars in 100-dollar 
bills. He said in this particular area they often played football with 
these Saran-wrapped bundles of 100-dollar bills.
  What was he doing with bundles of 100-dollar bills? The area where 
this cash was stored, subcontractors in Iraq were told: Bring a bag 
because we pay in cash; bring a bag. Show up here and want to get paid 
for whatever you are doing? Bring a bag because we pay in cash.
  Let me talk for a moment about the five hearings we held. We heard 
about cash transactions that were unrecorded, $9 billion that was 
unaccounted for. ``Uncle Sam Looks into Meal Bills: Halliburton Refunds 
$27 Million as Result.'' A company that was a Saudi subcontractor doing 
business through Halliburton billed the Government for 42,000 meals a 
day, but they only served 14,000 meals to our troops. Let me say that 
again. They were charging the Government for 42,000 meals served every 
day to our troops; they were only serving 14,000 meals.
  This was not the first time Halliburton has been questioned about 
this. This was in February 2004.
  Also in February 2004, ``Halliburton Faces Criminal Investigation.''
  They focus on efforts to solicit bids that transport fuel to Baghdad. 
Prices Halliburton charged for that work were substantially higher than 
the cost of trucking in fuel from Turkey. Pentagon launches criminal 
investigation for possible fraud.
  ``Ex-Halliburton Workers Allege Rampant Waste.'' Said one employee: 
They did not control costs at all. Their motto was do not worry about 
costs. It is cost plus.
  Henry Bunting--who testified, incidentally, before one of our Policy 
Committee hearings--said that they spent $7,500 a month to rent 
ordinary vehicles, cars and trucks, when the vehicles could have been 
rented for less than $2,000 a month through the Internet. He also held 
up some towels. He said they had purchased monogrammed towels for 
$7.50--these are hand towels for the troops--that should have cost 
$2.50. Why $7.50? Because Halliburton wanted their logo on the towels.
  Now it is May. In February, they talked about overcharging 42,000 
meals when they only served 14,000 meals. Now it is May of last year, 4 
months later, and the Pentagon says: We are suspending $159 million in 
meal charges to Halliburton for feeding soldiers because the fact is 
they were charging for meals they were not serving.
  They are still engaged in the same contract, still cheating, and 
nobody does a thing about it.
  ``Millions in U.S. Property Lost.'' Halliburton lost $18.6 million in 
Government property in Iraq. Auditors could not account for 6,975 items 
on the ledgers of Halliburton's unit.
  ``Halliburton is Unable to Prove $1.8 Billion in Work, Pentagon 
Says.'' This has gone on and on. Has Congress done a thing about it, 
any oversight hearings? None. Nobody seems to care much.
  Let me read from a hearing we held in the Policy Committee, a hearing 
we held because the oversight committees do not hold these hearings. 
Let me read what the top civilian in the Corps of Engineers, who is 
engaged in these contracts and approves these contracts, said. This is 
a woman named Bunnatine Greenhouse. She rose to the highest level in 
the Corps of Engineers for civilian employees, and now she is losing 
her job because she was honest. Here is what she said: I can 
unequivocally state that the abuse related to contracts awarded to 
Halliburton represents the most blatant and improper contract abuse I 
have witnessed during the course of my professional career.
  This courageous lady comes forward to testify to say these things, 
and now her career pays a price for it because we do not want to upset 
the good old boy network around here. They want to give a sweetheart 
deal to a company, suspend the rules, and give a sweetheart deal. They 
cheat you, cheat you again and again, do not worry about it. Do a 
little investigation down at the Pentagon, but don't anybody in 
Congress call attention to it. It would be uncomfortable and 
embarrassing to somebody.
  In 1941, Harry Truman, the Senator from Missouri, served in this 
Chamber. He was a flinty, tough independent. A member of his own party 
was in the White House, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. A Democrat in the 
Senate took on the task of identifying the waste, abuse, and fraud that 
was occurring in spending on our defense. They held hearing after 
hearing, and they unearthed a massive amount of fraud, waste, and 
abuse. I am sure that was uncomfortable for the Democrat in the White 
House, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because a Democrat Senator was 
leading the fight. He did it through the Truman Committee that took a 
hard look at this kind of fraud and abuse.
  My amendment would reestablish a Truman-type committee, with Members 
of both parties on it. When we are shoving tens of billions of dollars 
out the door to companies such as Halliburton in sole-source contracts, 
somebody has to watch the cash register.
  We had a fellow named Rory testify recently at the Policy Committee. 
Again, we are holding hearings only because there are not aggressive 
oversight hearings held in the rest of the Congress because the 
majority party worries it would embarrass somebody. So Rory comes to 
testify. He is running a food service unit for Halliburton in Iraq and 
he says: We are getting food that is in some cases over a year expired 
on the date stamp for the food. What do they do? They are told: Feed it 
to the troops.
  We get food that comes in on a convoy that has been attacked. What do 
they do? The supervisors say go into those trucks and remove the 
shrapnel and remove the bullets and save the bullets as souvenirs for 
the Halliburton supervisors and feed the food to the troops.
  Yes, this fellow ran one of those agencies. Here is what he said: 
When I was an employee for Halliburton and they were doing this sort of 
thing, we were told if a Government auditor comes around, do not dare 
talk to the Government auditor. If you do, one of two things will 
happen: You will either be sent to a fire zone in Iraq, one under 
attack, one with significantly more danger than where you work now, or 
you will be fired summarily. Do not talk to Government auditors.
  The question is: When will someone care enough to begin to take a 
hard look at the money we are spending? Nearly $200 billion has gone 
out of here, all of it emergency funding, none of it paid for. A 
substantial portion of that goes to contractors and much of it sole-
source contractors, no-bid and cost-plus contracts. The American 
taxpayers, in my judgment, are paying the price for very substantial 
abuse and very substantial waste and fraud.
  The moment someone comes to the Senate floor and mentions the word 
``Halliburton,'' they say: You are attacking the Vice President. I am 
not. The Vice President used to run Halliburton Corporation. He does 
not and has not since the year 2000. None of the examples I have cited 
have happened prior to that time, they have happened since that time. 
This is not the Vice President's corporation. It is not on his watch as 
CEO of Halliburton. But these are sweetheart contracts, sole-source 
contracts.

[[Page 17228]]

  Fifty thousand pounds of nails are ordered to the country of Iraq, 
and they are the wrong size. So if one wants some nails, they are 
laying on the ground somewhere there in the sand, just another piece of 
waste. Seventy-five hundred dollars to rent a vehicle for a month. Buy 
new trucks for $85,000, get a flat tire, leave them by the roadside to 
be trashed. Buy new trucks for $85,000 and have a fuel pump plugged, 
leave them by the roadside to be trashed and looted. All of that comes 
from testimony from people who used to work for Halliburton. They have 
come before our Policy Committee and told these stories that describe 
outrageous amounts of waste, fraud, and abuse. The question is: Why 
does no one in this Congress seem to care? My hope is that this 
Congress would agree to create a Truman-type committee, a committee of 
Republicans and Democrats that would take a hardnosed, flinty look at 
how money is being spent.
  How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, some of my colleagues have said they would 
like a vote on their amendments prior to cloture. My hope is that we 
will not have a cloture vote, by the way. I think the best Defense 
authorization bills that we have had in the Congress have been those 
that have been debated on the Senate floor for a week or two where we 
have had a substantial opportunity to think through and debate 
significant and difficult issues. So I would hope we will not have a 
cloture vote tomorrow. If in fact we do, I will join my colleague from 
Oklahoma and others who suggest that I would like a vote prior to 
cloture because his amendments and mine would fall postcloture. That is 
one of the dilemmas of cloture.
  Clearly, my amendment deals with something that is very important, 
that attends to the money we are spending on defense and the money we 
are going to authorize to be spent on defense, but because of the way 
it is written and the subject, it will fall postcloture. For that 
reason, I hope we will not invoke cloture tomorrow.
  I thank my colleagues for the time and hope they will seriously 
consider both amendments I have described today.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank our colleague. It will be given careful 
consideration. It relates to an important subject matter.
  I understand the Senator from Colorado has about 10 minutes, followed 
by Senators McCain, Graham, and Warner for 1 hour.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the chairman for yielding me 10 minutes.
  There are three amendments that I have offered and I would like to 
ask for their consideration, and then I wish to make some comments 
relating to one of them and then finally some comments on the Levin 
missile defense amendment offered earlier today.


                           Amendment No. 1419

  I ask unanimous consent that we set aside the pending amendment, and 
I ask for the consideration of amendment No. 1419.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. I ask for the yeas and nays on that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1383

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would ask unanimous consent to lay aside 
that amendment, and I ask for the consideration of amendment No. 1383. 
That amendment has been previously filed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1383.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To establish a program for the management of post-project 
 completion retirement benefits for employees at Department of Energy 
                       project completion sites)

       On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3114. MANAGEMENT OF POST-PROJECT COMPLETION RETIREMENT 
                   BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
                   PROJECT COMPLETION SITES.

       (a) Program Authorized.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a 
     program under which the Secretary shall use competitive 
     procedures to enter into an agreement with a contractor for 
     the plan sponsorship and program management of post-project 
     completion retirement benefits for eligible employees at each 
     Department of Energy project completion site.
       (2) Requirement of no reduction in total value of 
     retirement benefits.--The total value of post-project 
     completion retirement benefits provided to eligible employees 
     at a Department of Energy project completion site may not be 
     reduced under the program required under paragraph (1) 
     without the specific authorization of Congress.
       (b) Agreement for Benefits Management.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall, in 
     accordance with procurement rules and regulations applicable 
     to the Department of Energy, enter into the agreement 
     described in subsection (a) not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the physical completion date for the Department of 
     Energy project completion site covered by the agreement.
       (2) Terms of agreement.--The agreement under this section 
     shall--
       (A) provide for the plan sponsorship and program management 
     of post-project completion retirement benefits;
       (B) fully describe the post-project completion retirement 
     benefits to be provided to employees at the Department of 
     Energy project completion site; and
       (C) require that the Secretary reimburse the contractor for 
     the costs of plan sponsorship and program management of post-
     project completion retirement benefits.
       (3) Renewal of agreement.--The agreement shall be subject 
     to renewal every 5 years until all the benefit obligations 
     have been met.
       (c) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after signing of 
     the agreement described in subsection (a), the Secretary of 
     Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report on the program established under such subsection.
       (2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall describe--
       (A) the costs of plan sponsorship and program management of 
     post-project completion retirement benefits;
       (B) the funding profile in the Department of Energy's 
     future year budget for the plan sponsorship and program 
     management of post-project completion retirement benefits 
     under the agreement entered into under subsection (b);
       (C) the amount of unfunded accrued liability for eligible 
     workers at the Department of Energy project completion site; 
     and
       (D) the justification for awarding the agreement entered 
     into under subsection (b) to the selected contractor.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Physical completion date.--The term ``physical 
     completion date'' means--
       (A) the date of physical completion or achievement of a 
     similar milestone defined by or calculated in accordance with 
     the terms of the completion project contract; or
       (B) if the completion project contract specifies no such 
     date, the date declared by the site contractor and accepted 
     by the Department of Energy that the site contractor has 
     completed all services required by the project completion 
     contract other than close-out tasks and any other tasks 
     excluded from the contract.
       (2) Department of energy project completion site.--The term 
     ``Department of Energy project completion site'' means a 
     site, or a project within a site, in the Department of 
     Energy's nuclear weapons complex that has been designated by 
     the Secretary of Energy for closure or completion without any 
     identified successor contractor.
       (3) Post-project completion retirement benefits.--The term 
     ``post-project completion retirement benefits'' means those 
     benefits provided to eligible employees at a Department of 
     Energy project completion site as of the physical completion 
     date through collective bargaining agreements, projects, or 
     contracts for work scope, including pension, health care, 
     life insurance benefits, and other applicable welfare 
     benefits.
       (4) Eligible employees.--The term ``eligible employees'' 
     includes--
       (A) any employee who--
       (i) was employed by the Department of energy or by contract 
     or first or second tier subcontract to perform cleanup, 
     security, or administrative duties or responsibilities at a 
     Department of Energy project completion site; and
       (ii) has met applicable eligibility requirements for post-
     project completion retirement benefits as of the physical 
     completion date; and

[[Page 17229]]

       (B) any eligible dependant of such an employee, as defined 
     in the post-project completion retirement benefits plan 
     documents.
       (5) Unfunded accrued liability.--The term ``unfunded 
     accrued liability'' means, with respect to eligible 
     employees, the accrued liability, as determined in accordance 
     with an actuarial cost method, that exceeds the present value 
     of the assets of a pension plan and the aggregate projected 
     life-cycle health care costs.
       (6) Plan sponsorship and program management of post-project 
     completion retirement benefits.--The term ``plan sponsorship 
     and program management of post-project completion retirement 
     benefits'' means those duties and responsibilities that are 
     necessary to execute, and are consistent with, the terms and 
     legal responsibilities of the instrument under which the 
     post-project completion retirement benefits are provided to 
     employees at a Department of Energy project completion site.


                           Amendment No. 1506

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay that 
amendment aside, and I ask for the consideration of amendment No. 1506.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself and Mr. 
     Salazar, proposes an amendment No. 1506.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Energy to purchase certain 
essential mineral rights and resolve natural resources damage liability 
                                claims)

       On page 378, between lines 10 and 11, insert the following:

     SEC. 3114. ROCKY FLATS ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Essential mineral right.--The term ``essential mineral 
     right'' means a right to mine sand and gravel at Rocky Flats, 
     as depicted on the map.
       (2) Fair market value.--The term ``fair market value'' 
     means the value of an essential mineral right, as determined 
     by an appraisal performed by an independent, certified 
     mineral appraiser under the Uniform Standards of Professional 
     Appraisal Practice.
       (3) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``Rocky 
     Flats National Wildlife Refuge'', dated July 25, 2005, and 
     available for inspection in appropriate offices of the United 
     States Fish and Wildlife Service and the Department of 
     Energy.
       (4) Natural resource damage liability claim.--The term 
     ``natural resource damage liability claim'' means a natural 
     resource damage liability claim under subsections (a)(4)(C) 
     and (f) of section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
     Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
     9607) arising from hazardous substances releases at or from 
     Rocky Flats that, as of the date of enactment of this Act, 
     are identified in the administrative record for Rocky Flats 
     required by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
     Pollution Contingency Plan prepared under section 105 of that 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 9605).
       (5) Rocky flats.--The term ``Rocky Flats'' means the 
     Department of Energy facility in the State of Colorado known 
     as the ``Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site''.
       (6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Energy.
       (7) Trustees.--The term ``Trustees'' means the Federal and 
     State officials designated as trustees under section 
     107(f)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
     Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
     9607(f)(2)).
       (b) Purchase of Essential Mineral Rights.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, such amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under subsection (c) shall be available to the 
     Secretary to purchase essential mineral rights at Rocky 
     Flats.
       (2) Conditions.--The Secretary shall not purchase an 
     essential mineral right under paragraph (1) unless--
       (A) the owner of the essential mineral right is a willing 
     seller; and
       (B) the Secretary purchases the essential mineral right for 
     an amount that does not exceed fair market value.
       (3) Limitation.--Only those funds authorized to be 
     appropriated under subsection (c) shall be available for the 
     Secretary to purchase essential mineral rights under 
     paragraph (1).
       (4) Release from liability.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     any natural resource damage liability claim shall be 
     considered to be satisfied by--
       (A) the purchase by the Secretary of essential mineral 
     rights under paragraph (1) for consideration in an amount 
     equal to $10,000,000;
       (B) the payment by the Secretary to the Trustees of 
     $10,000,000; or
       (C) the purchase by the Secretary of any portion of the 
     mineral rights under paragraph (1) for--
       (i) consideration in an amount less than $10,000,000; and
       (ii) a payment by the Secretary to the Trustees of an 
     amount equal to the difference between--

       (I) $10,000,000; and
       (II) the amount paid under clause (i).

       (5) Use of funds.--
       (A) In general.--Any amounts received under paragraph (4) 
     shall be used by the Trustees for the purposes described in 
     section 107(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
     Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 
     9607(f)(1)), including--
       (i) the purchase of additional mineral rights at Rocky 
     Flats; and
       (ii) the development of habitat restoration projects at 
     Rocky Flats.
       (B) Condition.--Any expenditure of funds under this 
     paragraph shall be made jointly by the Trustees.
       (C) Additional funds.--The Trustees may use the funds 
     received under paragraph (4) in conjunction with other 
     private and public funds.
       (6) Exemption from national environmental policy act.--Any 
     purchases of mineral rights under this subsection shall be 
     exempt from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 
     U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
       (7) Rocky flats national wildlife refuge.--
       (A) Transfer of management responsibilities.--The Rocky 
     Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001 (16 U.S.C. 668dd 
     note; Public Law 107-107) is amended--
       (i) in section 3175--

       (I) by striking subsections (b) and (f); and
       (II) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as 
     subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively; and

       (ii) in section 3176(a)(1), by striking ``section 3175(d)'' 
     and inserting ``section 3175(c)''.
       (B) Boundaries.--Section 3177 of the Rocky Flats National 
     Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001 (16 U.S.C. 668dd note; Public Law 
     107-107) is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(c) Composition.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     refuge shall consist of land within the boundaries of Rocky 
     Flats, as depicted on the map--
       ``(A) entitled `Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge';
       ``(B) dated July 25, 2005; and
       ``(C) available for inspection in the appropriate offices 
     of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
     Department of Energy.
       ``(2) Exclusions.--The refuge does not include--
       ``(A) any land retained by the Department of Energy for 
     response actions under section 3175(c);
       ``(B) any land depicted on the map described in paragraph 
     (1) that is subject to 1 or more essential mineral rights 
     described in section 3114(a) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 over which the 
     Secretary shall retain jurisdiction of the surface estate 
     until the essential mineral rights--
       ``(i) are purchased under subsection (b) of that Act; or
       ``(ii) are mined and reclaimed by the mineral rights 
     holders in accordance with requirements established by the 
     State of Colorado; and
       ``(C) the land depicted on the map described in paragraph 
     (1) on which essential mineral rights are being actively 
     mined as of the date of enactment of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 until--
       ``(i) the essential mineral rights are purchased; or
       ``(ii) the surface estate is reclaimed by the mineral 
     rights holder in accordance with requirements established by 
     the State of Colorado.
       ``(3) Acquisition of additional land.--Notwithstanding 
     paragraph (2), upon the purchase of the mineral rights or 
     reclamation of the land depicted on the map described in 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) transfer the land to the Secretary of the Interior 
     for inclusion in the refuge; and
       ``(B) the Secretary of the Interior shall--
       ``(i) accept the transfer of the land; and
       ``(ii) manage the land as part of the refuge.''.
       (c) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Secretary for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology 
     Site for fiscal year 2006, $10,000,000 shall be made 
     available to the Secretary for the purposes described in 
     subsection (b).

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, No. 1506 deals with the mineral rights at 
Rocky Flats. This basically will provide for the Secretary to purchase 
these mineral rights. There is money that has been provided for this in 
previous legislation and that is pending. This allows for the transfer 
of those mineral rights on Rocky Flats. It is based on the owner of the 
mineral rights being willing to sell.

[[Page 17230]]

  In 2001, I successfully inserted a provision in the National Defense 
authorization bill that authorized the creation of the Rocky Flats 
National Wildlife Refuge. Under this legislation, the Department of 
Energy was required to transfer most of the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site to the Department of Interior for the purposes of 
creating a wildlife refuge to preserve Colorado's rare Front Range 
habitat.
  Earlier, 2 months ago, the Departments of Energy and Interior signed 
a memorandum of understanding that stipulated how and when the 
Department of Energy would transfer the management of most of the Rocky 
Flats Environmental Technology Site to the Department of Interior. 
However, this memorandum of understanding was incomplete. It completely 
deferred the issue of the disruptive surface mining of privately owned 
mineral rights that is occurring on the site until later this year. 
This deferral did not meet the legislation requirement under the Rocky 
Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act and represented a critical 
impediment to the closure of Rocky Flats.
  The Department of Interior contended that surface mining such as that 
now occurring at Rocky Flats is fundamentally contrary to its refuge 
management goals, and makes the achievement of refuge purposes on those 
lands impossible.
  To better understand this issue, I requested that the Department of 
Energy hire an independent contractor to conduct an appraisal on the 
value of the mineral rights. The independent contractor determined the 
owners and provided a preliminary cost estimate as to the fair market 
value of those mineral rights containing sand and gravel.
  After the appraisal was completed, my staff personally contacted each 
mineral rights owner. I wanted to see if they would be interested in 
selling if they were offered money for the fair market value of the 
mineral rights. I also reassured them that the owners would not be 
forced to sell if they didn't want to.
  Shortly thereafter, it was brought to my attention that the purchase 
of mineral rights could be included as part of a comprehensive natural 
resource damage settlement. I am pleased to announce that the State of 
Colorado, my colleague from Colorado, Senator Salazar, and I have 
worked out legislation providing for such an arrangement. I am 
confidant that this arrangement will be acceptable to the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Interior.
  Under the amendment I am introducing today, the Secretary of Energy 
will be required to purchase essential mineral rights necessary to 
transition Rocky Flats to a national wildlife refuge.
  The Secretary can only purchase these mineral rights once the 
following conditions are met: (1) The owner of the minieral right is a 
willing seller; (2) the Secretary purchases the mineral right at fair 
market value; and (3) the Trustees for Rocky Flats release the 
Department from its natural resource damage liabilities under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, CERCLA.
  Also included in this legislation is a provision that states that if 
the owner of the mineral right refuses to sell, the Secretary of Energy 
may satisfy the Department's natural resource liability obligation by 
paying the trustees of the site an amount equal to the fair market 
value of the mineral right owned by the unwilling seller.
  I believe this amendment makes too much sense for us to pass up. We 
have winners, winners, and winners. It is certainly a win for the State 
of Colorado--the State mechanism that would provide more dollars for 
Colorado than most likely would have been gained through the normal 
natural resources damages settlement process. The owners of the mineral 
rights win because they now have an opportunity to sell their mineral 
rights at fair market value, a possibility that never existed before. 
The Department of Energy wins because it is able to pay off its natural 
resource damage liabilities that would have arisen under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980. The Department of Interior wins because this legislation would 
remove the last impediment to the memorandum of understanding between 
Interior and the Department of Energy so that Interior can move forward 
with creating a wildlife refuge at Rocky Flats. Most importantly, the 
people of Colorado win because now they will be able to enjoy the 
pristine beauty and splendor of the Rocky Mountain's Front Range 
through the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge. Hundreds of acres of 
rare xeric tallgrass prairie will be preserved. The natural wildlife in 
the refuge will be protected.
  As I said, this is a win-win proposal. Everyone gains. I urge my 
colleagues to support my amendment.


                           Amendment No. 1492

  I rise in opposition to the Levin missile defense amendment. This 
amendment eliminates $30 million--there has been $50 million 
requested--for long-lead funding for ground-based interceptor missiles 
31-40 and $20 million for associated silo construction. The $50 million 
would be used to plus-up the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which 
is already fully funded at $415.5 million, with an additional $1.6 
billion for DOE nonproliferation programs.
  The CTR currently has $500 million in unobligated funds for 2005. So 
I would hope we could keep these provisions in the current 
authorization bill.
  DOD already directed a $1 billion reduction in MDA funding in fiscal 
year 2006 and $5 billion in 2006 through 2011. To add upon that an 
additional reduction in long-term funding puts this program in 
jeopardy. We need to have those long-term plans in place, funded, 
because they are very important to the security of this Nation.
  This amendment would unnecessarily delay the fielding of ground-based 
interceptors in 2009 and 2010. We simply cannot afford such a delay 
because the threat is ``real and imminent,'' as General Cartwright has 
testified. The CIA and DIA assess North Korea as ready to flight test 
an ICBM that can reach the United States, and Iran may have such a 
capability in 2015, according to the DIA.
  A production break, by the way, would cost $270 million to restart, 
so there is a cost in delaying these funds.
  Despite recent test failures, the technology is mature enough to 
proceed with fielding even though we continue to test and improve 
reliability.
  STRATCOM, the Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation, and the 
Independent Review Team agree that the ground-based midcourse defense 
test bed has some limited capability. The Independent Review Team also 
found no fundamental design flaws with the GMD system, and that we need 
to concentrate on manufacturing quality control.
  I happen to be in favor of more operational testing. The MDA is 
pursuing a prudent approach by delaying further testing until 
reliability issues are addressed. Four flight tests were scheduled for 
2006, starting in October and ending with an intercept next September. 
Also, the SASC adopted the Nelson amendment that directs increasing 
cooperation between independent testing agencies and MDA, and calls for 
more operationally realistic testing that will be evaluated by the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
  I have been out to visit the southern parts of the test bed. I am 
convinced our technology is there. I am convinced the threat is real. 
As a result, I think we need to move forward and we need to move 
forward in a long-term way so the manufacturers who provide the 
missiles and technology for the program have some reliable source of 
revenue as we move forward. We should not interrupt the program. The 
agencies that are responsible for administering the program need to 
have that funding there so they can continue to plan in the future for 
the defense of this country.
  There is an emerging threat. There is a threat that continues to 
emerge, I would say, from North Korea. I think we have to be concerned 
about Iran.
  I have always been a strong proponent of missile defense. I think 
this particular amendment that Senator

[[Page 17231]]

Levin has introduced tends to make it difficult for us to meet our 
long-range goals, to protect the borders of this country, and protect 
the American people from some type of missile attack. In today's 
environment, it is important that we have that insurance for the future 
of America.
  I wanted to make the comments on the Levin amendment because I think 
it is ill-advised in light of the state of the world today.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
chairman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, under the unanimous consent requirement, 
Senator McCain, Senator Graham, and I are now recognized for an hour. I 
ask our distinguished colleague from Arizona--I would like to amend 
that to allow Senator Salazar to go for 2 minutes. I request that 
unanimous consent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Colorado is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1506

  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Arizona, also my 
friend from Virginia, and my friend from Rhode Island for agreeing to 
let me speak for a couple of minutes on this amendment.
  The amendment both Senator Allard and I are proposing, amendment No. 
1506, is very important as we move forward with the Department of 
Energy complex. We have created a great model for the rest of our 
country as to how we clean up the remnants of the Cold War. How we do 
this in an appropriate fashion to bring the cleanup of Rocky Flats to 
completion is a very important part of our Nation's efforts to clean up 
these facilities.
  Amendment No. 1506 is a great step in the right direction because it 
will help us bring to conclusion, in a final form, the cleanup at Rocky 
Flats. I commend my colleague from Colorado, Senator Allard, for his 
leadership on this effort over the years. I also commend him and both 
of our staffs for having worked out the issues with the Department of 
Energy and Department of Interior over the weekend.
  I also want to inform my colleagues that I have had a hold on four 
nominees who had been passed out of the committee, out of the Energy 
Committee. I am lifting the holds on Jill Sigal, David Hill, James 
Rispoli, and Thomas Weimer so that they can move forward and hopefully 
be confirmed by the Senate before we get into the August recess.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we now turn to the three Senators. I would 
like to take 1 minute to address both Colorado Senators.
  I followed with interest your amendments. I do hope we now have on 
the record a clear statement of support by the Secretary of Energy. Am 
I correct in that?
  Mr. ALLARD. As I have discussed with the Chairman's staff--I assume 
you are talking about the amendment on the mineral rights.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. ALLARD. That provision is before the OMB, so I cannot publicly 
state their position until we get a decision back from OMB.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  Now, Mr. President, we would like to commence the 1 hour. I yield the 
floor so Senator McCain can gain recognition. But I would want to say 
this is a subject that is enormously important. I commend Senator 
McCain and Senator Graham. It merits the full attention and hopefully 
the support of the Senate. These are issues that go far beyond just the 
question of detention. It goes to the perception of the great Nation of 
which we are privileged to be citizens, the United States of America, 
as it relates to how we treat those people who come into our custody in 
the course of defending freedom, on battle fields, and elsewhere in the 
world. I have such great respect for Senator McCain.
  I yield the floor.


                    Amendment No. 1557, as Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to modify my amendment No. 1557, which is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside, 
and I call up amendment No. 1557, which is at the desk. I ask the clerk 
continue the reading of the amendment because it is short and 
important.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, Mr. Graham, and Ms. Collins, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1557, as modified:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS 
                   UNDER THE DETENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Limitation on Interrogation Techniques.--
       (1) In general.--No person in the custody or under the 
     effective control of the Department of Defense or under 
     detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be 
     subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not 
     authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field 
     Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.
       (2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to with 
     respect to any person in the custody or under the effective 
     control of the Department of Defense pursuant to a criminal 
     law or immigration law of the United States.
       (3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed to affect the rights under the United States 
     Constitution of any person in the custody or under the 
     physical jurisdiction of the United States.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I asked that amendment be read because 
there may be various interpretations of what this amendment is and what 
it means. What it means to the sponsors--and I am grateful to my 
friend, Senator Warner, the distinguished chairman of the committee, 
and Senator Graham and others, including Senator Collins and others who 
have supported this. Basically, it says the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Intelligence Interrogation shall be the document that governs 
interrogation of prisoners who are under Department of Defense custody.
  Some of us may like to see this expanded to treatment of prisoners 
who are under custody of different agencies of Government. This applies 
to the Department of Defense.
  Before I proceed further, I ask my friend from Virginia--as he knows, 
we have two amendments. One is this one which we have just read, and 
the other one concerning cruel and inhumane treatment, which we are 
sort of still working on. Is it the desire of the Chairman we take up 
both amendments at this time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest we take up the other one--you 
and I have discussed it--as soon as the other one is completed because 
I am a cosponsor on the one that is now pending.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the distinguished chairman. For the information 
of my colleagues, the second amendment, which would be before the 
Senate for consideration at a different time, basically says that cruel 
and inhumane treatment will not be inflicted upon any prisoner, and we 
would adhere to the Geneva Conventions as well as other international 
agreements concerning the treatment of prisoners.
  But on this issue it says this amendment would prohibit cruel and 
inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners in the detention of the 
U.S. Government, and it is basically fairly straightforward and simple, 
as I read.
  The Army Field Manual and its various editions have served America 
well, through wars against both regular and irregular foes. The manual 
embodies the values Americans have embraced for generations while 
preserving the ability of our interrogators to extract critical 
intelligence from ruthless foes. Never has this been more important 
than today in the midst of the war on terror.
  I think we all agree to fight terrorism we must obtain intelligence.

[[Page 17232]]

But we have to ensure that it is reliable and acquired in a way that is 
humane. To do otherwise not only offends our national morals but 
undermines our efforts to protect the Nation's security.
  Abuse of prisoners harms--harms, not helps--us in the war on terror 
because inevitably these abuses become public. When they do, the cruel 
actions of a few darken the reputation of our honorable country in the 
eyes of millions. Mistreatment of our prisoners also endangers U.S. 
servicemembers who might be captured by the enemy--if not in this war, 
then in the next.
  I want to emphasize to some of my friends who say that we should do 
anything that is necessary to extract intelligence, No. 1, torture 
doesn't work; No. 2, if extraneous or extraordinary actions have to be 
taken--and there may be cases, and we will get into this in the next 
amendment, where someone has information that it is believed poses an 
immediate threat to the United States--then I would suppose that it 
would be entirely appropriate, under law, that the President of the 
United States could make that judgment and take whatever actions are 
necessary. In the meantime, the Army Field Manual authorizes 
interrogation techniques that are proven effective in extracting 
lifesaving information from the most hardened prisoners. It also 
recognizes that torture and cruel treatment are ineffective methods 
because they induce prisoners to say what their interrogators want to 
hear, even if it is not true.
  It is consistent with our laws and, most importantly, our values. Our 
values are different from those of our enemies. When colleagues or 
others may come on this floor and say: Well, they do it, others do it, 
al-Qaida does it, other nations in the world do it, what differentiates 
us, the United States of America, from other countries is the fact that 
we do not. We do not abuse human rights. We do not do it. I would argue 
the pictures, terrible pictures from Abu Ghraib, harmed us--not only in 
the Arab world, which is an area of great concern but it also harmed us 
dramatically amongst friendly nations, the Europeans, many of our 
allies.
  Of course, they were appalled. Of course, we were all appalled. As we 
go through this later on, there were interesting exchanges between the 
civilian general counsel in the Pentagon and the military judge 
advocate general's--members of the judge advocate general, who were 
deeply concerned about regulations that were proposed for adoption, and 
exhibited very serious and fundamental concerns. For a short period of 
time, unfortunately, those objections by the uniform lawyers in the 
Pentagon were overruled, and we went through a period of time--thank 
God only a few months--where interrogation techniques were allowed 
which were then repealed, I am happy to say.
  Our friends in London and elsewhere find themselves confronting the 
same evil that we do. Preserving the common values we hold dear is more 
important than ever. We fight not just to preserve our lives and 
liberties but our morals, and we will never allow the terrorists to 
take those from us. In this war that we must win--that we will win--we 
should never fight evil with evil.
  As I said, the amendment I am offering would establish the Army Field 
Manual as the standard for interrogation of all detainees held in 
Department of Defense custody. The manual has been developed by the 
executive branch for its own uses, with a new edition written to take 
into account the needs of the war on terror for the new classified 
annexes due to be issued soon.
  The advantage of setting a standard for interrogation based on the 
field manual is to cut down on the significant level of confusion that 
still exists with respect to which interrogation techniques are 
allowed. Two weeks ago, the Committee on Armed Services held hearings, 
under the chairmanship of Senator Lindsey Graham, with a slew of high-
level Defense Department officials from regional commanders to judge 
advocate generals from the various branches to the Department's deputy 
general counsel.
  A chief topic of discussion was what specific interrogation 
techniques are permitted, in what environment, with which DOD 
detainees, by whom and when. The answers included a whole lot of 
confusion. We got a bunch of contradictory answers. Several: I would 
have to take a look at that. A few: Let me get back to you.
  Let's think about that for a second. If at the highest level of the 
Pentagon they do not know what exact techniques are allowed and what 
aren't, what is going on in the prisons? What is going on with the 
soldiers, the sergeant, the corporal, those who are supposed to do the 
actual interrogations? What we are trying to do is make sure there are 
clear and exact standards set for interrogation of prisoners which have 
held for other wars and are now being updated to take into 
consideration the kind of war that we are in.
  Confusion results in the kind of messes that once again could give 
America a black eye around the world. We need a clear, simple, and 
consistent standard. We will have it in the Army Field Manual on 
interrogation. That is not my opinion but that of many more 
distinguished military legal minds than mine.
  I received a letter recently from a group of people, 11 former high-
ranking military officers, including RADM John Hutson and RADM Don 
Guter, who each served as the Navy's top JAG, and Claudia Kennedy, who 
was Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence. These and other 
distinguished officers believe that the abuses took place in part 
because our soldiers received ambiguous instructions which, in some 
cases, authorized treatment that went beyond what the Field Manual 
allows and that had the Manual been followed across the board we could 
have avoided the prisoner abuse scandal.
  I am not sure we could have, Mr. President, but wouldn't any of us 
have done whatever we could to have prevented that?
  I ask unanimous consent this letter, dated July 22, 2005, be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    July 22, 2005.
       Dear Senator McCain: We strongly support your proposed 
     amendments to the Defense Department Authorization bill 
     concerning detainee policy, including requiring all 
     interrogations of detainees in DOD custody to conform to the 
     U.S. Army's Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation (FM 
     34-52), and prohibiting the use of torture and cruel, inhuman 
     and degrading treatment by any U.S. government agency.
       The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on 
     terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured 
     by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have 
     held dear for generations. For many years, those values have 
     been embodied in the Army Field Manual. The Manual applies 
     the wisdom and experience gained by military interrogators in 
     conflicts against both regular and irregular foes. It 
     authorizes techniques that have proven effective in 
     extracting life-saving information from the most hardened 
     enemy prisoners. It also recognizes that torture and cruel 
     treatment are ineffective methods, because they induce 
     prisoners to say what their interrogators want to hear, even 
     if it is not true, while bringing discredit upon the United 
     States.
       It is now apparent that the abuse of prisoners in Abu 
     Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere took place in part because 
     our men and women in uniform were given ambiguous 
     instructions, which in some cases authorized treatment that 
     went beyond what was allowed by the Army Field Manual. 
     Administration officials confused matters further by 
     declaring that U.S. personnel are not bound by longstanding 
     prohibitions of cruel treatment when interrogating non-U.S. 
     citizens on foreign soil. As a result, we suddenly had one 
     set of rules for interrogating prisoners of war, and another 
     for ``enemy combatants;'' one set for Guantanamo, and another 
     for Iraq; one set for our military, and another for the CIA. 
     Our service members were denied clear guidance, and left to 
     take the blame when things went wrong. They deserve better 
     than that.
       The United States should have one standard for 
     interrogating enemy prisoners that is effective, lawful, and 
     humane. Fortunately, America already has the gold standard in 
     the Army Field Manual. Had the Manual been followed across 
     the board, we would have been spared the pain of the prisoner 
     abuse scandal. It should be followed consistently from now 
     on. And when agencies other than DOD detain and interrogate 
     prisoners, there should be no legal loopholes permitting 
     cruel or degrading treatment.
       The amendments proposed by Senator McCain would achieve 
     these goals while preserving our nation's ability to fight 
     the war

[[Page 17233]]

     on terror. They reflect the experience and highest traditions 
     of the United States military. We urge the Congress to 
     support this effort.
       General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC).
       Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (Ret. USA).
       Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (Ret. USA).
       Major General Melvyn Montano (Ret. USAF Nat. Guard).
       Rear Admiral Don Guter (Ret. USN).
       Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN).
       Brigadier General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC).
       Brigadier General James Cullen (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General David R. Irvine (Ret. USA).
       Brigadier General Richard O'Meara (Ret. USA).
       Ambassador Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson.
       Former Vietnam POW Commander Frederick C. Baldock (Ret. 
     USN).
       Former Vietnam POW Commander Phillip N. Butler (Ret. USN).
                                  ____

       General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC)--General Hoar served as 
     Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. After the first 
     Gulf War, General Hoar led the effort to enforce the naval 
     embargo in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and to enforce 
     the no-fly zone in the south of Iraq. He oversaw the 
     humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Kenya and Somalia 
     and also supported operations in Rwanda, and the evacuation 
     of U.S. civilians from Yemen during the 1994 civil war. He 
     was the Deputy for Operations for the Marine Corps during the 
     Gulf War and served as General Norman Schwarzkopf's Chief of 
     Staff at Central Command. General Hoar currently runs a 
     consulting business in California.
       Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (Ret. USA)--General Gard is 
     a retired Lieutenant General who served in the United States 
     Army; his military assignments included combat service in 
     Korea and Vietnam. He is currently a consultant on 
     international security and president emeritus of the Monterey 
     Institute for International Studies.
       Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy (Ret. USA)--General 
     Kennedy is the first and only woman to achieve the rank of 
     three-star general in the United States Army. Kennedy served 
     as Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, Commander of 
     the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and as Commander of the 
     703d military intelligence brigade in Kunia, Hawaii.
       Major General Melvyn Montano (Ret. USAF Nat. Guard)--
     General Montano was the adjutant general in charge of the 
     National Guard in New Mexico from 1994 to 1999. He served in 
     Vietnam and was the first Hispanic Air National Guard officer 
     appointed as an adjutant general in the country.
       Rear Admiral Don Guter (Ret. USN)--Admiral Guter served as 
     the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 2000 to 2002. Admiral 
     Guter is currently CEO of Vinson Hall Corporation/Executive 
     Director of the Navy Marine Coast Guard Residence Foundation 
     in McLean, Virginia.
       Rear Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN)--Admiral John D. 
     Hutson served as the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 1997 
     to 2000. Admiral Hutson now serves as President and Dean of 
     the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, New Hampshire.
       Brigadier General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC)--General 
     Brahms served in the Marine Corps from 1963-1988. He served 
     as the Marine Corps' senior legal adviser from 1983 until his 
     retirement in 1988. General Brahms currently practices law in 
     Carlsbad, California and sits on the board of directors of 
     the Judge Advocates Association.
       Brigadier General James Cullen (Ret. USA)--General Cullen 
     is a retired Brigadier General in the United States Army 
     Reserve Judge Advocate General's Corps and last served as the 
     Chief Judge (IMA) of the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals. 
     He currently practices law in New York City.
       Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote (Ret. USA)--General Foote 
     was Commanding General of Fort Belvoir in 1989. She was 
     recalled to active duty in 1996 to serve as Vice Chair of the 
     Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual 
     Harassment. She is President of the Alliance for National 
     Defense, a non-profit organization.
       Brigadier General David R. Irvine (Ret. USA)--General 
     Irvine is a retired Army Reserve strategic intelligence 
     officer and taught prisoner interrogation and military law 
     for 18 years with the Sixth Army Intelligence School. He last 
     served as Deputy Commander for the 96th Regional Readiness 
     Command, and currently practices law in Salt Lake City, Utah.
       Brigadier General Richard O'Meara (Ret. USA)--Brigadier 
     General Richard O'Meara is a combat decorated veteran who 
     fought in Vietnam before earning his law degree and joining 
     the Army's Judge Advocate General Corps. He retired from the 
     Army Reserves in 2002 and now teaches courses on Human Rights 
     and History at Kean University and at Monmouth University.
       Ambassador Douglas ``Pete'' Peterson--Ambassador Peterson 
     served as the ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
     until 2001. Prior to his diplomatic posting, Ambassador 
     Peterson served three terms as a member of the United States 
     House of Representatives, representing the Second 
     Congressional District of Florida. He served 26 years in the 
     United States Air Force having served in worldwide 
     assignments as a fighter pilot and commander. He is a 
     distinguished combat veteran of the Vietnam War and was 
     incarcerated as a POW during that conflict for more than six 
     years. He completed his military service in 1981 and has 
     extensive experience in the private sector.
       Commander Frederick C. Baldock (Ret. USN)--Commander 
     Baldock was a Navy pilot and is a combat veteran of the 
     Vietnam War. His plane was shot down over North Vietnam in 
     1966, and he spent seven years in captivity as a POW.
       Commander Phillip N. Butler (Ret. USN)--Commander Butler 
     was a Navy pilot and is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War. 
     His plane was shot down over North Vietnam in 1965, and he 
     spent nearly eight years in captivity as a POW.

  Mr. McCAIN. I read from the letter:

       We strongly support your proposed amendments to the Defense 
     Department Authorization bill concerning detainee policy, 
     including requiring all interrogations of detainees in DOD 
     custody to conform to the U.S. Army's Field Manual on 
     Intelligence Interrogation (FM 34-52), and prohibiting the 
     use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by 
     any U.S. government agency.
       It is now apparent that the abuse of prisoners in Abu 
     Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere took place in part because 
     our men and women in uniform were given ambiguous 
     instructions, which in some cases authorized treatment that 
     went beyond what was allowed by the Army Field Manual. 
     Administration officials confused matters further by 
     declaring that U.S. personnel are not bound by longstanding 
     prohibitions of cruel treatment when interrogating non-U.S. 
     citizens on foreign soil. As a result, we suddenly had one 
     set of rules for interrogating prisoners of war, and another 
     for ``enemy combatants;'' one set for Guantanamo, and another 
     for Iraq; one set for our military, and another for the CIA. 
     Our service members were denied clear guidance, and left to 
     take the blame when things went wrong. They deserve better 
     than that.
       The United States should have one standard for 
     interrogating enemy prisoners that is effective, lawful, and 
     humane. Fortunately, America already has the gold standard in 
     the Army Field Manual. Had the Manual been followed across 
     the board, we would have been spared the pain of the prisoner 
     abuse scandal. It should be followed consistently from now 
     on. And when agencies other than DOD detain and interrogate 
     prisoners, there should be no legal loopholes permitting 
     cruel or degrading treatment.

  This is signed by GEN Joseph Hoar, LTG Robert Gard, LTG Claudia 
Kennedy, MG Melvyn Montano, RADM Don Guter, RADM John Hutson, BG David 
Brahms, BG James Cullen, BG Evelyn Foote, BG David Irvine, BG Richard 
O'Meara, et cetera, and all of these people, including General Hoar, 
served as Commander in Chief United States Central Command. These are 
very credible people. If we had chosen, we could have gotten many more 
signatories to this amendment.
  We are Americans. We hold ourselves to humane standards of treatment 
no matter how terribly evil or awful they may be. To do otherwise 
undermines our security, and it also undermines our greatness as a 
nation. We are not simply any other country. We stand for a lot more 
than that in the world: a moral mission, one of freedom and democracy 
and human rights at home and abroad.
  We are better than the terrorists, and we will win because we are 
better than they are. The enemy we fight has no respect for human life 
or human rights. They don't deserve our sympathy. But this is not about 
who they are--it is not about who they are. It is about who we are. 
These are values that distinguish us from our enemies.
  President Bush understands that the war on terror is ultimately a 
battle of ideas, a battle we will win by spreading and standing firmly 
for the values of decency, democracy, and the rule of law. I stand with 
him in this commitment. By applying to ourselves the basic standards we 
rightly preach to others, I believe we will only increase our 
effectiveness as the world's ultimate champion of liberty.
  I thank Senator Warner and Senator Graham and others who have shown 
an interest. Senator Warner has had a series of hearings for a long 
period of time. I believe we can do a great service for the military 
and for the country if we adopt this simple two-paragraph

[[Page 17234]]

amendment that basically says that prisoners will be treated according 
to the Army Field Manual, which, by the way, is the tradition of 
treatment of prisoners for many wars.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain. I have been 
privileged to know him ever since I was Secretary of Navy in the 
closing years of the war in Vietnam. I know no military family that has 
served our Nation with greater distinction than the McCain family. This 
is a subject about which my dear friend has knowledge that none of us 
possess. I have absolute confidence they are doing the right thing.
  The two of us do have some technical differences of opinion. His 
amendment is predicated on the Army Field Manual which he mentioned is 
being revised. The current Army Field Manual basically dealt with 
State-sponsored conflict. I have every reason to believe that the 
follow-on manual, in due course, presumably in both classified and 
unclassified form, will be completed.


                           Amendment No. 1566

  There is another approach here. I ask unanimous consent, if it is 
agreeable, to set the McCain amendment aside temporarily and ask 
amendment 1566 be brought up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. And in no way do I wish it to substitute for Senator 
McCain's amendment. This is a complicated subject.
  Essentially, my amendment simply says it will be the Secretary of 
Defense that will establish uniform standards and procedures for two 
separable subjects, detention and interrogation.
  While I have not had a chance to go through in detail the Army's 
Field Manual, I am not sure there is the emphasis placed on the 
detention rule in such a manner as equivalent to the detention and 
regulation that will be and is on the interrogation. Those responsible 
for detention are often quite different than those responsible for 
interrogation. If there is any mistreatment in the course of the 
detention, depending on the timing between such treatment and the 
follow-on interrogation, it seems to me we have a problem.
  Therefore, my amendment entrusts to the Secretary of Defense the task 
to put together basically all of the objectives as enunciated by my 
distinguished friend from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia, [Mr. Warner], proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1566.

  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide for uniform standards and procedures for the 
   interrogation of persons under the detention of the Department of 
                                Defense)

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. UNIFORM STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR TREATMENT OF 
                   PERSONS UNDER DETENTION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE.

       (a) Uniform Standards and Procedures Required.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall establish uniform standards and 
     procedures for the detention and interrogation of persons in 
     the custody or under the control of the Department of 
     Defense.
       (b) Consistency With Law and Treaty Obligations.--The 
     standards and procedures established under subsection (a) 
     shall be consistent with United States law and international 
     treaty obligations.
       (c) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--The standards and procedures established 
     under subsection (a) shall apply to all detention and 
     interrogation activities involving persons in the custody or 
     under the control of the Department of Defense, and to such 
     activities conducted within facilities controlled by the 
     Department of Defense, regardless of whether such activities 
     are conducted by Department of Defense personnel, Department 
     of Defense contractor personnel, or personnel or contractor 
     personnel of any other department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government.
       (2) Exception.--The standards and procedures established 
     under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any 
     person in the custody or under the control of the Department 
     of Defense pursuant to a criminal law or immigration law of 
     the United States.
       (d) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall affect 
     such rights, if any, under the Constitution of the United 
     States of any person in the custody or under the control of 
     the Department of Defense.
       (e) Notice to Congress of Revision.--Not later than 60 days 
     before issuing any revision to the standards and procedures 
     established under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense 
     shall notify, in writing, the congressional defense 
     committees of such revision.
       (f) Deadline.--The standards and procedures required by 
     subsection (a) shall be established not later than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. WARNER. There are considerable parallels between the two 
amendments, with the exception that the subject should be adjusted to 
the Secretary of Defense. He may well designate the Army Field Manual 
as his work product, but then I would need, under the amendment, the 
assurance that equal emphasis is put on the detention phase as well as 
the interrogation phase.
  Recent history has shown we must have uniform standards for detention 
and interrogation across the Department of Defense. We cannot have 
different standards for different theaters.
  Soldiers, as Senator McCain pointed out, have to be trained and well 
understand the rules and regulations as they relate to both detention 
and interrogation. That is the goal of the McCain amendment. I 
wholeheartedly support it. It is best to entrust the entire subject to 
the Secretary of Defense and hold him accountable, as opposed to the 
designation of the specific document which is in the process of being 
changed.


                    Amendment No. 1557, As Modified

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to 
consideration of the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burr). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, seeing our other colleague, Senator 
Graham, I yield the floor. But I also see Senator McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.


                           Amendment No. 1566

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a brief comment on the chairman's 
amendment. Leaving it in the hands of the Secretary of Defense is what 
caused the huge amount of problems we have today.
  I have here--in fact, thanks to the tenacity of the Senator from 
South Carolina--finally, after a year and a half, 2 years, the 
memoranda that were submitted by the uniformed JAGS when the rules for 
the treatment of prisoners were set up the first time, I say to my 
friend from Virginia. They all objected to it. They were overruled by 
the Secretary of Defense and the general counsel.
  So now, if I understand it, the amendment of my dear friend from 
Virginia is going to return that to the Secretary of Defense. I urge 
him to read these memoranda which we finally got thanks to, again, the 
Senator from South Carolina: treating OEF detainees inconsistently with 
the Conventions; arguably lowers the bar for the treatment of U.S. POWs 
in future conflicts, even when nations agree with the President's 
status determination. Many would view the more extreme interrogation 
techniques as violative of international law, other treaties, or 
customary international law; perhaps violative of their own domestic 
law. This puts the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
criminal accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic courts or 
international fora, to include the ICC.
  I remind my colleagues, these are the memoranda that were sent to 
comment on the Secretary of Defense guidelines for interrogations of 
prisoners, which were overruled. And then, a couple months later, they 
were rescinded.
  So in all due respect, my friend from Virginia has a degree of 
confidence in the Secretary of Defense which, frankly, is not validated 
by what took place and many argue is one of the reasons why we had Abu 
Ghraib.
  So I thank my colleague and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could reply to my good friend, you 
are

[[Page 17235]]

absolutely right. And I know that chapter as you do and have studied 
it. But under the law, the Secretary of Defense is still the head of 
the Department, and as such I suppose he can alter the field manual of 
the Army and make it less in the present form and in the revised form 
in due course. But I think it is important we have a clear chain of 
authority and accountability. I look up the chain, and there are the 
laws established by the Secretary of Defense as opposed to those who 
might be involved in drawing up the Army Field Manual. I presume the 
Secretary of the Army is at the top of that pyramid.
  But that is the reason I put in this amendment. I say to my good 
friend from Arizona, I hope we can sort this out before final passage 
and possibly amend it. I will withdraw mine because I want you to take 
the lead in every respect on this important amendment.
  If I might add, I say to my friend from Arizona, there is another 
important amendment you needed to get completed.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thought my colleague wanted me to wait 
on the additional amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, whatever.
  Mr. McCAIN. But I will be glad to proceed. Why don't we let the 
Senator from South Carolina talk, and then maybe, if it is all right, I 
will offer the other amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. I am glad to yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request. I ask 
unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to amendment No. 1557, 
which is the field manual amendment to which they have been referring.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I could be recognized just for 1 minute 
to comment on this amendment, and then I will yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first of all, I congratulate Senator 
McCain. I do not think there is anybody in this body who speaks with 
greater authority on the subject matter he has spoken to in this 
amendment. I commend him for the distinction he is making. It is a 
critical distinction. In addition to the fact that the field manual is 
there for everybody to see and has historic meaning, the difference 
between the McCain amendment and the one which was offered by the 
Senator from Virginia--another difference--is that the field manual is 
a public document. You can read what is in the field manual. The 
Secretary of Defense memoranda too often have been classified 
``unavailable.'' We have been spending sometimes months and years 
trying to just find out what is in those memoranda.
  So there is a very important difference between these two amendments 
in a number of regards. I very much believe that the first amendment, 
amendment No. 1557, is the way which is most consistent with our 
values. It makes it very clear, in public, what the authorities are and 
what the standards and criteria are. The contrast between that and 
something amorphous, which gives the Secretary of Defense a power he 
already has anyway, which is to issue regulations but to do so in 
secret and in a classified way, leads to more vagueness, more 
uncertainty, more conflict, more inability of Congress to perform 
oversight.
  So I commend the Senator from Arizona for this amendment. I believe 
the differences between these two amendments are significant.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I accept my good friend's critique, but I 
do point out, as the Army Field Manual is under revision, there will be 
both a classified and unclassified portion of that manual.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I could just comment briefly on that, at 
least with the unclassified portion, we have access to it, unlike the 
documents that are issued by the Secretary of Defense memoranda. They 
are classified, but they are also, too often, unavailable to Congress. 
They just use one excuse after another not to make those memoranda 
available to Congress. So there may be a classified version of the 
field manual, but at least Congress has access to that unclassified 
version.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am well aware of the efforts of my good 
friend from Michigan to get documents from the Department of Defense 
and his modest success and some lack of success.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina such time as he deems necessary.
  Could the Chair advise us as to the amount of time remaining under 
the hour that I requested?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 20 
minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. That is the full time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 13 minutes. The 
Senator from Arizona has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, we will allocate the time among the three of us in 
an equitable way.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                    Amendment No. 1557, As Modified

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator McCain's 
amendment. The point that Senator Warner is making, I fully understand. 
But I think we are at a crossroads in the war on terror. Guantanamo Bay 
has great potential to make us safer as a nation. But one of the 
problems we have experienced in this war is a problem of image. It is a 
new kind of enemy with a lot of nuances. But one thing we cannot do as 
a nation is forget who we are, what got us here for 200-something 
years. We can fight this enemy aggressively, no-holds-barred, go after 
them, and not lose who we are.
  Senator McCain is addressing one of the problems we have found crop 
up in different areas of the world when it comes to noncitizen foreign 
terrorists, and that is how you interrogate and stay within the 
boundaries of who you are as a people and not getting your own people 
in trouble by cutting corners.
  So the reason I am supporting his amendment--and we are not just 
saying: Secretary of Defense, come up with a solution here--is because, 
after a lot of thought and study, it is clear to me that the Army Field 
Manual gives you everything you need to aggressively interrogate and 
seek good intelligence from foreign noncitizen terrorists held at GTMO 
and any other place under DOD control.
  Mr. President, I would like to submit for the Record several memos 
that have just been recently declassified. They were requested on 
October 7 of last year by myself, Senator Levin, and Senator McCain. 
The first one is a 27 February 2003 memo from BG Kevin M. Sandkuhler, 
U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC. The next one is from MG 
Thomas J. Romig, U.S. Army, the Judge Advocate General, dated 3 March 
2003. The next is from MG Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General 
of the U.S. Air Force, dated 6 February 2003. The next is from RADM 
Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Navy, dated 6 February 
2003. The next is Rear Admiral Lohr, dated 13 March 2002. And the final 
memo is from Major General Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. 
Air Force, dated 5 February 2003. I ask unanimous consent those 
memorandums be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                           Department of the Navy,


                               Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,

                                Washington, DC, February 27, 2003.
     Memorandum for General Counsel of the Air Force
     Subject: Working Group Recommendations on Detainee 
         Interrogations

       1. In addition to comments we submitted 5 February, we 
     concur with the recommendations submitted by the Navy (TJAG 
     RADM

[[Page 17236]]

     Lohr), the Air Force (TJAG MGen Rives), and the Joint Staff 
     Legal Counsel's Office. Their recommendations dealt with 
     policy considerations, contention with the OLC opinion, and 
     foreign interpretations of GC IV (Civilians) and customary 
     international law, respectively.
       2. The common thread among our recommendations is concern 
     for servicemembers. OLC does not represent the services; 
     thus, understandably, concern for servicemembers is not 
     reflected in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is silent 
     on the UCMJ and foreign views of international law.
       3. We nonetheless recommend that the Working Group product 
     accurately portray the services' concerns that the 
     authorization of aggressive counter-resistance techniques by 
     servicemembers will adversely impact the following:
       a. Treatment of U.S. Servicemembers by Captors and 
     compliance with International Law.
       b. Criminal and Civil Liability of DOD Military and 
     Civilian Personnel in Domestic, Foreign, and International 
     Forums.
       c. U.S. and International Public Support and Respect of 
     U.S. Armed Forces.
       d. Pride, Discipline, and Self-Respect within the U.S. 
     Armed Forces.
       e. Human Intelligence Exploitation and Surrender of Foreign 
     Enemy Forces, and Cooperation and Support of Friendly 
     Nations.
                                              Kevin M. Sandkuhler,
             Brigadier General, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC.

                      [SECRET/NOFORN] DECLASSIFIED

   Comments on Draft Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations

       1. Change p. 54, fifth paragraph, to read as follows (new 
     language italic):
       ([S/NF]U) Choice of interrogation techniques involves a 
     risk benefit analysis in each case, bounded by the limits of 
     DOD policy and law. When assessing whether to use exceptional 
     interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to 
     the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and 
     self-image which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at 
     other times due to perceived law of war violations. DOD 
     policy indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in 1979 
     and subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the 
     culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing 
     high benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit 
     of the law of war and humane treatment of all persons in U.S. 
     Armed Forces custody. In addition, consideration should be 
     given to whether implementation of such techniques is likely 
     to result in adverse impacts for DOD personnel who are 
     captured or detained [become POWs,] including possible 
     perceptions by other nations that the United States is 
     lowering standards related to the treatment of prisoners and 
     other detainees, generally.
       2. Add to p. 68, a paragraph after the seventh paragraph 
     that reads:
       (U) Comprehensive protection is lacking for DOD personnel 
     who may be tried by other nations and/or international bodies 
     for violations of international law, such as violations of 
     the Geneva or Hague Conventions, the Additional Protocols, 
     the Torture Convention, the Rome Statute of the ICC, or the 
     Customary International Law of Human Rights. This risk has 
     the potential to impact future operations and overseas travel 
     of such personnel, both on and off duty.
                                  ____

         Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                    Washington, DC, March 3, 2003.


   MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

     Subject: Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working 
         Group to Access the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues 
         Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. 
         Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the 
     Department of Defense (DOD) General Counsel of a number of 
     serious concerns regarding the draft Report and 
     Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, 
     Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of 
     Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on 
     Terrorism (Final Report). These concerns center around the 
     potential Department of Defense (DOD) sanctioning of detainee 
     interrogation techniques that may appear to violate 
     international law, domestic law, or both.
       2. (U) The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Department of 
     Justice (DOJ), provided DOD with its analysis of 
     international and domestic law as it relates to the 
     interrogation of detainees held by the United States 
     Government. This analysis was incorporated into the subject 
     draft Report and forms, almost exclusively, the legal 
     framework for the Report's Conclusions, Recommendations, and 
     PowerPoint spreadsheet analysis of the interrogation 
     techniques in issue. I am concerned with several pivotal 
     aspects of the OLC opinion.
       3. (U) While the OLC analysis speaks to a number of 
     defenses that could be raised on behalf of those who engage 
     in interrogation techniques later perceived to be illegal, 
     the ``bottom line'' defense proffered by OLC is an 
     exceptionally broad concept of ``necessity.'' This defense is 
     based upon the premise that any existing federal statutory 
     provision or international obligation is unconstitutional per 
     se, where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the 
     President, acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as 
     essential to his capacity to wage war. I question whether 
     this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S. 
     courts or in any international forum. If such a defense is 
     not available, soldiers ordered to use otherwise illegal 
     techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or 
     personal liability arising from a civil lawsuit.
       4. (U) The OLC opinion states further that customary 
     international law cannot bind the U.S. Executive Branch as it 
     is not part of the federal law. As such, any presidential 
     decision made in the context of the ongoing war on terrorism 
     constitutes a ``controlling'' Executive act; one that 
     immediately and automatically displaces any contrary 
     provision of customary international law. This view runs 
     contrary to the historic position taken by the United States 
     Government concerning such laws and, in our opinion, could 
     adversely impact DOD interests worldwide. On the one hand, 
     such a policy will open us to international criticism that 
     the ``U.S. is a law unto itself.'' On the other, 
     implementation of questionable techniques will very likely 
     establish a new baseline for acceptable practice in this 
     area, putting our service personnel at far greater risk and 
     vitiating many of the POW/detainee safeguards the U.S. has 
     worked hard to establish over the past five decades.
       5. (U) I recommend that the aggressive counter-resistance 
     interrogation techniques under consideration be vetted with 
     the Army intelligence community before a final decision on 
     their use is made. Some of these techniques do not comport 
     with Army doctrine as set forth in Field Manual (FM) 34-52 
     Intelligence Interrogation, and may be of questionable 
     practical value in obtaining reliable information from those 
     being interrogated.

                                              Thomas J. Romig,

                                         Major General, U.S. Army,
     The Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Air Force, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 6, 2003.


                         MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/GC

     From: AF/JA
     Subject: Comments on Draft Report and Recommendations of the 
         Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational 
         Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the 
         U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) Please note that while I accept that the Department 
     of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), speaks for the 
     Executive Branch and that its legal opinions in this matter 
     are to be followed, I continue to maintain that DoJ/OLC's 
     opinions on several of the Working Group's issues are 
     contentious. Others may disagree with various portions of the 
     DoJ/OLC analysis. I believe we should recognize this fact and 
     therefore urge that certain factors should be prominently 
     provided to the DoD/GC before he makes a final recommendation 
     to the Secretary of Defense. I recommend the following 
     specific modifications to the draft report dated 4 February 
     2003:
       a. Page 2, add the following sentence to the end of 
     paragraph 2:
       It should be noted that several of the legal opinions 
     expressed herein are likely to be viewed as contentious 
     outside the Executive Branch, both domestically and 
     internationally.
       b. Page 54, change fourth full paragraph to read as 
     follows:
       (U) Choice of interrogation techniques involves a risk 
     benefit analysis in each case, bounded by the limits of DOD 
     policy and law. When assessing whether to use exceptional 
     interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to 
     the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and 
     self- image, which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and 
     at other times due to perceived law of armed conflict 
     violations. DoD policy, indoctrined in the DoD Law of War 
     Program in 1979 and subsequent service regulations, greatly 
     restored the culture and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by 
     establishing high benchmarks of compliance with the 
     principles and spirit of the law of war, and humane treatment 
     of all persons in U.S. Armed Forces custody. U.S. Armed 
     Forces are continuously trained to take the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. While the detainees' 
     status as unlawful belligerents may not entitle them to 
     protections of the Geneva Conventions, that is a legal 
     distinction that may be lost on the members of the armed 
     forces. Approving exceptional interrogation techniques may be 
     seen as giving official approval and legal sanction to the 
     application of interrogation techniques that U.S. Armed 
     Forces have heretofore been trained are unlawful. In 
     addition, consideration should be given to whether 
     implementation of such techniques is likely to result in 
     adverse impacts for DoD personnel who become POWs, including 
     possible perceptions by other nations that the United States 
     is lowering

[[Page 17237]]

     standards related to the treatment of prisoners, generally.
       Alternatively, change the last paragraph on page 68, to 
     read as follows:
       (U) The cultural and self-image of the U.S. Armed Forces 
     suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at other times due 
     to perceived law of armed conflict violations. DoD policy, 
     indoctrinated in the DoD Law of War Program in 1979 and 
     subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the culture 
     and self-image of U.S. Armed Forces. U.S. Armed Forces are 
     continuously trained to take the legal and moral ``high-
     road'' in the conduct of our military operations regardless 
     of how others may operate. While the detainees' status as 
     unlawful belligerents may not entitle them to protections of 
     the Geneva Conventions, that is a legal distinction that may 
     be lost on the members of the armed forces. Approving 
     exceptional interrogation techniques may be seen as giving 
     official approval and legal sanction to the application of 
     interrogation techniques that U.S. Armed Forces have 
     heretofore been trained are unlawful. General use of 
     exceptional techniques (generally, having substantially 
     greater risk than those currently, routinely used by U.S. 
     Armed Forces interrogators), even though lawful, may create 
     uncertainty among interrogators regarding the appropriate 
     limits of interrogations, and may adversely affect the 
     cultural self-image of the U.S. armed forces.
       c. Page 68, add the following new paragraphs after the 
     sixth full paragraph:
       (U) Several of the exceptional techniques, on their face, 
     amount to violations of domestic criminal law and the UCMJ 
     (e.g., assault). Applying exceptional techniques places 
     interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal 
     accusations domestically. Although one or more of the 
     aforementioned defenses to these accusations may apply, it is 
     impossible to be certain that any of these defenses will be 
     successful as the judiciary may interpret the applicable law 
     differently from the interpretation provided herein.
       (U) Other nations are likely to view the exceptional 
     interrogation techniques as violative of international law 
     and perhaps violative of their own domestic law. This places 
     interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal 
     accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic courts or in 
     international fora, to include the ICC.
       d. Page 68, add the following new paragraphs after the 
     eighth full paragraph:
       (U) Employment of exceptional interrogation techniques may 
     have a negative effect on the treatment of U.S. POWs. Other 
     nations may disagree with the President's status 
     determination regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
     detainees, concluding that the detainees are POWs entitled to 
     all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Treating 
     OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions arguably 
     ``lowers the bar'' for the treatment of U.S. POWs in future 
     conflicts. Even where nations agree with the President's 
     status determination, many may view the exceptional 
     techniques as violative of other law.
       2. (U) Should any information concerning the exceptional 
     techniques become public, it is likely to be exaggerated/
     distorted in both the U.S. and international media. This 
     could have a negative impact on international, and perhaps 
     even domestic, support for the war on terrorism. It could 
     likewise have a negative impact on public perception of the 
     U.S. military in general.

                                                Jack L. Rives,

                                              Major General, USAF,
     Deputy Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 6, 2003.
     Subj: Working Group recommendations relating to interrogation 
         of detainees.

       1. Earlier today I provided to you a number of suggested 
     changes, additions, and deletions to the subject document.
       2. I would like to further recommend that the document make 
     very clear to decision-makers that its legal conclusions are 
     limited to arguably unique circumstances of this group of 
     detainees, i.e., unlawful combatants held ``outside'' the 
     United States. Because of these unique circumstances, the 
     U.S. Torture Statute, the Constitution, the Geneva 
     Conventions and customary international law do not apply, 
     thereby affording policy latitude that likely does not exist 
     in almost any other circumstance. (The UCMJ, however, does 
     apply to U.S. personnel conducting the interrogations.)
       3. Given this unique set of circumstances, I believe policy 
     considerations continue to loom very large. Should service 
     personnel be conducting the interrogations? How will this 
     affect their treatment when incarcerated abroad and our 
     ability to call others to account for their treatment? More 
     broadly, while we may have found a unique situation in GTMO 
     where the protections of the Geneva Conventions, U.S. 
     statutes, and even the Constitution do not apply, will the 
     American people find we have missed the forest for the trees 
     by condoning practices that, while technically legal, are 
     inconsistent with our most fundamental values? How would such 
     perceptions affect our ability to prosecute the Global War on 
     Terrorism?
       4. I accept the premise that this group of detainees is 
     different, and that lawyers should identify legal 
     distinctions where they exist. It must be conceded, however, 
     that we are preparing to treat these detainees very 
     differently than we treat any other group, and differently 
     than we permit our own people to be treated either at home or 
     abroad. At a minimum, I recommend that decision-makers be 
     made fully aware of the very narrow set of circumstances--
     factually and legally--upon which the policy rests. Moreover, 
     I recommend that we consider asking decision-makers directly: 
     is this the ``right thing'' for U.S. military personnel?

                                              Michael F. Lohr,

                                    Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy,
     Judge Advocaate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                   Washington, DC, March 13, 2002.


              MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR FORCE GENERAL COUNSEL

     Subject: Comments on the 6 March 2003 Detainee Interrogation 
         Working Group Report

       1. My comments on subject report are provided below. These 
     comments incorporate and augment those submitted by my action 
     officer earlier this week. New comments are highlighted 
     within the previously submitted text.
       1. (U) Page 2, second paragraph: Add new penultimate 
     sentence to read, ``In addition this paper incorporates 
     significant portions of work product provided by the Office 
     of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice.'' In 
     the last sentence change ``by a Department . . .'' to ``by 
     the Department . . .'' Finally, add new footnote to reference 
     the OLC opinion to read ``Memorandum dated March xx, 2003., 
     Re: xxxxxxxxxx.
       Rationale: this WG paper contains large segments of DOJ 
     work product, rather than being ``informed'' by DOJ. We 
     believe the OLC opinion should be incorporated by reference 
     into the WG report.
       2. (U) Page 24, second paragraph, last sentence: delete.
       Rationale: this sentence is not true. There are domestic 
     limits on the President's power to interrogate prisoners. One 
     of them is Congress's advice and consent to the US 
     ratification to the Geneva Conventions that limit the 
     interrogation of POWs. The willingness of the Executive, and 
     of the Legislative Branch, to enforce those restrictions is a 
     different matter.
       3. (U) Page 24, footnote 20: delete or rewrite to read, 
     ``This is the stated view of the Department of Justice.''
       Rationale: Mr. Yoo clearly stated that he believes the 
     viability of these defenses is greatly enhanced by advance 
     Presidential direction in the matter. He specifically 
     recommended obtaining such direction in writing.
       4. (U) Page 26, first full paragraph, first sentence: 
     delete.
       Rationale: this statement is too broad. The similar 
     language used at the end of the following paragraph is more 
     accurate.
       5. (U) Page 29, second paragraph, fifth sentence: Rewrite 
     sentence to read, ``A leading scholarly commentator . . .'' 
     and later in the sentence change ``. . . section 2340 would 
     be justified under . . .'' to ``. . . section 2340 should be 
     justified under . . .''
       Rationale: There is only one article written by one person 
     cited. Also the quoted language from the commentator 
     indicates his view that torture should be permissible, not a 
     statement that international law allows such.
       6. (U) Page 29, second paragraph, last sentence: delete.
       Rationale: this conclusion is far too broad but the general 
     principle can be inferred from the discussion.
       7. (U) Page 31, para d, third sentence and penultimate 
     sentences: delete.
       Rationale: This analogy is inapt. There is nothing in law 
     enforcement that would authorize the use of torture or 
     excessive force against persons for intelligence gathering.
       8. (U) Page 41, second paragraph, penultimate sentence: 
     delete.
       Rationale: it is not clear what the meaning of the sentence 
     is.
       9. (U) Page 59, second paragraph: it is unclear if SECDEF 
     must approve exceptional techniques on a case-by-case basis, 
     or just approve their use generally.
       10. (U) Page 63, footnote 86. The text of this footnote 
     does not correspond to its citation in the paper. It appears 
     that the current text of footnote 86 belongs as part of the 
     discussion of API in the paragraph above, or as part of the 
     text of footnotes 83 or 84. Footnote 86 should detail the 
     rationale for the Justice Department determination that GCIV 
     does not apply.
       11. (U) Page 67, technique 26: Add last sentence to read, 
     ``Members of the armed forces will not threaten the detainee 
     with the possible results of the transfer, but will instead 
     limit the threat to the fact of transfer to allow the 
     detainee to form their own conclusions about such a move.''
       Rationale: threatening the detainee with death or injury 
     (by the transfer) may be considered torture under 
     international law.
       12. (U) Page 72, second paragraph: in the last sentence 
     replace ``protections of the Geneva Conventions'' with 
     ``protections of the third Geneva Convention.''

[[Page 17238]]

       Rationale: clarity
       13. (U) Page 72, second paragraph: add new last sentence to 
     read: ``Under international law, the protections of the 
     fourth Geneva Convention may apply to the detainees.''
       Rationale: this view is shared by Chairman's Legal and all 
     the services.
       14. (U) Page 72, third paragraph: at the beginning add, 
     ``In those cases where the President has made a controlling 
     executive decision or action . . .''
       Rationale: this is the standard by which the President may 
     ``override'' CIL.
       15. (U) Page 73, sixth paragraph: Add new last sentence to 
     read, ``Presidential written directive to engage in these 
     techniques will enhance the successful assertion of the 
     potential defenses discussed in this paper.''
       Rationaie: much of the analysis in this paper is premised 
     on the authority of the President as delegated/directed, in 
     writing, to SECDEF and beyond. This point needs to be made 
     prominently.
       16. (U) Matrix Annex, Technique 33: delete.
       Rationale: It is not clear what the intent of this 
     technique is. If it loses its effectiveness after the first 
     or second use, it appears to be little more than a gratuitous 
     assault. Other methods are equally useful in getting/
     maintaining the attention of the detainee. It also has the 
     potential to be applied differently by different individuals.
       17. (U) Page 75, first paragraph, in the discussion re 
     technique 36: Rewrite 3rd to last and penultimate sentences 
     to read, ``The working group believes use of technique 36 
     would constitute torture under international and U.S. law 
     and, accordingly, should not be utilized. In the event SECDEF 
     decides to authorize this technique, the working group 
     believes armed forces personnel should not participate as 
     interrogators as they are subject to UCMJ jurisdiction at all 
     times.''
       This is a correct statement of the positions of the 
     services party to the working group, who all believe this 
     technique constitutes torture under both domestic and 
     international law.
       18. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. My action 
     officer in this matter is CDR Steve Gallotta.

                                              Michael F. Lohr,

                                    Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy,
     Judge Advocate General.
                                  ____

         Department of the Air Force, Office of the Judge Advocate 
           General,
                                 Washington, DC, February 5, 2003.


                         memorandum for saf/gc

     From: AF/JA
     Subject: Final Report and Recommendations of the Working 
         Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues 
         Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. 
         Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)

       1. (U) In drafting the subject report and recommendations, 
     the legal opinions of the Department of Justice, Office of 
     Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), were relied on almost exclusively. 
     Although the opinions of DoJ/OLC are to be given a great deal 
     of weight within the Executive Branch, their positions on 
     several of the Working Group's issues are contentious. As our 
     discussion demonstrate, others within and outside the 
     Executive Branch are likely to disagree. The report and 
     recommendations caveat that it only applies to ``strategic 
     interrogations'' of ``unlawful combatants'' at locations 
     outside the United States. Although worded to permit maximum 
     flexibility and legal interpretation, I believe other factors 
     need to be provided to the DoD/GC before he makes a final 
     recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.
       2. (U) Several of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic 
     criminal law and the UCMJ (e.g., assault). Applying the more 
     extreme techniques during the interrogation of detainees 
     places the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
     criminal accusations domestically. Although a wide range of 
     defenses to these accusations theoretically apply, it is 
     impossible to be certain that any defense will be successful 
     at trial; our domestic courts may well disagree with DoJ/
     OLC's interpretation of the law. Further, while the current 
     administration is not likely to pursue prosecution, it is 
     impossible to predict how future administrations will view 
     the use of such techniques.
       3. (U) Additionally, other nations are unlikely to agree 
     with DoJ/OLC's interpretation of the law in some instances. 
     Other nations may disagree with the President's status 
     determination regarding the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
     detainees; they may conclude that the detainees are POWs 
     entitled to all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 
     Treating OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions 
     arguably ``lowers the bar'' for the treatment of U.S. POWs in 
     future conflicts. Even where nations agree with the 
     President's status determination, many would view the more 
     extreme interrogation techniques as violative of other 
     international law (other treaties or customary international 
     law) and perhaps violative of their own domestic law. This 
     puts the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of 
     criminal accusations abroad, either in foreign domestic 
     courts or in international fora, to include the ICC.
       4. (U) Should any information regarding the use of the more 
     extreme interrogation techniques become public, it is likely 
     to be exaggerated/distorted in both the U.S. and 
     international media. This could have a negative impact on 
     international, and perhaps even domestic, support for the war 
     on terrorism. Moreover, it could have a negative impact on 
     public perception of the U.S. military in general.
       5. (U) Finally, the use of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have 
     operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. Our forces are trained 
     in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they enter 
     active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict 
     and code of conduct training have been mandated by Congress 
     and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict when our POWs were 
     subjected to torture by their captors. We need to consider 
     the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation 
     techniques as giving official approval and legal sanction to 
     the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. forces 
     have consistently been trained are unlawful.

                                                Jack L. Rives,

                                              Major General, USAF,
                                    Deputy Judge Advocate General.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Now, over time, we are going to learn more about what 
these memos tell us, but basically these memos are telling us that the 
proposed interrogation techniques dealing with the war on terror, 
suggested by the Department of Justice, sent over to Department of 
Defense, were such a deviation from the normal way of doing business 
that it would get our own people in trouble. It was such a deviation 
from the normal way of doing business that we would lose the moral high 
ground in fighting the war on terror.
  General Rives sums up:

       Finally, the use of the more extreme interrogation 
     techniques simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have 
     operated in recent history. We have taken the legal and moral 
     ``high-road'' in the conduct of our military operations 
     regardless of how others may operate. Our forces are trained 
     in this legal and moral mindset beginning the day they enter 
     active duty. It should be noted that [the] law of armed 
     conflict and code of conduct training have been mandated by 
     Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam conflict when our 
     POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need to 
     consider the overall impact of approving extreme 
     interrogation techniques as giving official approval and 
     legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques 
     that U.S. forces have consistently been trained are unlawful.

  He talks about a slippery slope that we are about to embark on that 
will result in some of our own people being subject to being court-
martialed because the Uniform Code of Military Justice has many 
provisions dictating how you will treat someone who is in your custody 
as a detainee. And they were trying to tell the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Defense civilian lawyers: Do not go down this 
road. You are going to bite off more problems than it is worth.
  Admiral Lohr says that some of the techniques would violate the 
torture statute. I will read in more detail later what these memos are 
telling us the rules of the road are. But these are not from the ACLU. 
These are not from people who are soft on terrorism, who want to coddle 
foreign terrorists. These are all professional military lawyers who 
have dedicated their lives, with 20-plus year careers, to serving the 
men and women in uniform and protecting their Nation. They were giving 
a warning shot across the bow of the policymakers that there are 
certain corners you cannot afford to cut because you will wind up 
meeting yourself.
  What Senator McCain is trying to do is build upon their advice by 
putting in place an interrogation technique that this country can be 
proud of, that we all will understand, and that can be implemented to 
make us safer without having a black eye throughout the world.
  I asked the question--when I went to GTMO with the chairman about a 
week or 2 ago--to all the interrogators there: Is there anything 
lacking in the Army Field Manual that would inhibit your ability to get 
good intelligence? And they said no. I asked: Could you live with the 
Army Field Manual as your guide and do your job? They said yes.
  The reason the Army Field Manual is a good source is because it has 
been part of who we are for years. People are trained on it. What was 
happening is, the Department of Justice, understandably, after 
September 11, wanted to

[[Page 17239]]

come up with the most aggressive techniques possible to deal with 
foreign terrorists. But the JAGS are telling us you cannot look at this 
one event in isolation. You have to understand what we have been 
standing for for 60 years and what the law actually says. The DOJ's 
interpretation of the torture statute from a lawyer's point of view was 
absurd. And the JAGS were telling the policymakers: If you go down this 
road, you are going to get your own people in trouble. You are on a 
slippery slope. You are going to lose the moral high ground. This was 
2003. And they were absolutely right.
  To Secretary Rumsfeld's credit, when he heard about the working group 
having problems with the DOJ's suggested interpretations of 
``interrogation,'' he reconvened and the techniques changed. But as 
Senator McCain has said very well, we need to bring certainty to this 
process of interrogating foreign terrorists to make sure we can get 
good, reliable information. We can do it in a way that people 
understand, our troops will not get in trouble, and we can show the 
world we are truly a rule-of-law nation.
  There is nothing inconsistent with interrogating people to get good 
information to protect our country and using the Army Field Manual. 
What has got us in trouble is when we try to make it up as we go, when 
we forget who we are, when we will not listen to people who have worn 
the uniform, who are in uniform, telling us: Do not go down this road, 
our people are trained to do it one way, you are confusing the heck out 
of them.
  What have we learned in the last 2 years? If you know what the rules 
are about interrogating anybody, come tell me because I can't figure it 
out. I have spent 20 years as an Air Force lawyer myself. There is much 
confusion, and confusion in war is dangerous. Anyone who misunderstands 
what we are doing here in terms of our view of terrorists is playing 
politics. No one supporting this amendment wants a foreign noncitizen 
terrorist not to be aggressively detained, prosecuted, if appropriate, 
and interrogated to make our country safer. We can prosecute, we can 
detain, and we can interrogate aggressively, but we have to have rules 
that our people can understand and don't deviate from who we are as a 
Nation. That is why I am supporting this amendment.
  Everyone who works at GTMO dealing with the 500 foreign noncitizen 
terrorist suspects, enemy combatants, has told me, because I asked the 
question, if you use the Army Field Manual, we have everything within 
that manual we need to do the job right. If you use the Army Field 
Manual, we will be back in a good place with the law. We will be back 
in a place where our people can understand what is going on. We will 
again capture the moral high ground which is the ultimate way to win 
this war.
  There is no downside to this. The upside is huge. We are able to get 
good information, not get our people in trouble, and have a better 
image in the world. That is why I am supporting this amendment.
  I have included these memos for the record. It would serve every 
Senator well to spend 5 or 10 minutes reading through them because 
these people were telling us in 2003, if you go down this road, the 
road we chose initially, you are going to get everybody involved in 
trouble. That is exactly what happened.
  I yield the floor.


                    Amendment No. 1556, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have amendment No. 1556 at the desk. I 
ask unanimous consent for its modification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, is it the desire that I call up 1556 at 
this time?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, Mr. President, I suggest that we have amended the 
present one which is referred to as the Army Field Manual, and I am a 
cosponsor on that. Now there is a second amendment. I submitted to the 
Senator a suggestion, I believe that is----
  Mr. McCAIN. It is modified.
  Mr. WARNER. Let's bring that up now and have that pending.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
No. 1556 be considered at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Reserving the right to object, I know the discussion 
has been going on about the field manual issue. Is the Senator now 
going to that amendment or are we leaving that amendment? I would like 
to at least make a few remarks about that subject.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the field manual amendment has been laid 
aside for the moment. This goes to a second amendment which is----
  Mr. SESSIONS. Was there a unanimous consent request made for that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair heard a unanimous consent request to 
move to a new amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And the Chair asked if there was objection. 
Did the Senator from Alabama object?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I object at this point because I don't understand what 
we are doing. I want to be able to speak on the amendment dealing with 
the field manual.
  Mr. WARNER. I believe the Senator has just come on the floor. We have 
been on this now for about 45 minutes covering the parameter of the 
issues that would be brought up. I respect his desire to speak. We will 
try to accommodate you at any point. I would urge that we allow the 
Senator from Arizona to perfect this amendment and then in due course 
he will speak to it. I will speak to it, and we will lay it aside. And 
we will find the time for the distinguished Senator from Alabama to 
speak.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Well, everybody has spoken for it. Nobody has spoken 
against it.
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask, maybe we could take a maximum of 5 minutes, 
3 or 4 minutes on this amendment, for which I had unanimous consent, 
and then go back to allow the Senator from Alabama to speak.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  Mr. SESSIONS. That would be fine. If I could have 10 minutes, if I 
could share a few thoughts on the previous amendment in the next 10 
minutes, I would be happy.
  Mr. WARNER. We definitely will make that happen. But I want to 
inquire of the Senator from South Carolina, you also have a third 
amendment. I am not sure of the status. You have it at the desk. You 
have spoken to it.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I would like at this time to submit it to the desk if I 
may.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to propose this 
amendment, the Senator from Alabama be allowed to speak for 10 minutes, 
the amendment be set aside, and the Senator from South Carolina be 
allowed to propose his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think that is a very orderly manner in 
which to accommodate. Then the Senator from Alabama--let's get the time 
remaining and I will yield some of my time to the Senator from Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion on the floor right now is to call 
up, as I understand it, amendment No. 1556 by the Senator from Arizona 
as modified.
  Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Ms. STABENOW. Reserving the right to object, I don't intend to 
object, I understand we are working out some amendments. I also have an 
amendment I would like to offer. I wanted to raise, as the agreement is 
being put together, that I have the opportunity to do that.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will assure you, working with the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan, we will arrange--he has time 
immediately following the 1 hour being divided between three Senators 
and now a fourth. I want to make sure we have the time remaining to 
satisfy the needs of the Senator from Alabama. We now are proceeding on 
the second McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to reporting amendment No. 
1556 by the Senator from Arizona?

[[Page 17240]]


  Mr. McCAIN. As modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. As modified. Without objection, it is so 
ordered. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1556, as modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1073. PROHIBITION ON CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING 
                   TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS UNDER 
                   CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       (a) In General.--No individual in the custody or under the 
     physical control of the United States Government, regardless 
     of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to 
     cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
       (b) Presidential Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the 
     prohibition in subsection (a), on a case-by-case basis, if 
     the President--
       (A) determines that the waiver is required for a military 
     or national security necessity; and
       (B) submits the appropriate committees of Congress timely 
     notice of the exercise of the waiver.
       (2) The authority of the President under paragraph (1) may 
     not be delegated.
       (c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall not be 
     construed to impose any geographical limitation on the 
     applicability of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or 
     degrading treatment or punishment under this section.
       (d) Limitation on Supersedure.--The provisions of this 
     section shall not be superseded, except by a provision of law 
     enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act which 
     specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the provisions 
     of this section.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (2) The term ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
     punishment'' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment 
     or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
     Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as 
     defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and 
     Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
     Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
     Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 1984.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we would like to have the Senator from 
Arizona take such time as he desires to explain this. I wish to be 
added as a cosponsor to this amendment. Then we will yield the floor to 
the Senator from Alabama to speak for up to 10 minutes on the subjects 
of these three amendments. Then the balance of the time will be 
accorded to the Senator from South Carolina to bring forth his 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will notify the Senators that the 
Chair is still working under the original previous order of an hour 
equally divided, 20 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina, 20 
minutes to the Senator from Virginia, and 20 minutes to the Senator 
from Arizona.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Would the Chair advise of the three 
Senators in the original order, what is the time remaining for each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 2 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from Virginia has 9 minutes remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I can't hear the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 9 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from South Carolina has 2 minutes--10 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield from my 9 minutes such time as the Senator from 
Arizona may need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, with all due respect to the chairman, I 
don't think that is going to quite work because the Senator from 
Alabama needs 10 minutes. And if you are using your 9 and I only have 
2, that doesn't get it done. I ask unanimous consent that I have 3 
minutes to discuss my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. That is an additional 3 minutes. I ask unanimous consent 
that following that, the Senator from Alabama be recognized for 10 
minutes in addition to the unanimous consent agreement, and then the 
Senator from South Carolina be allowed to propose his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this 
amendment and the previous amendment, No. 1557.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request to ask for 
the yeas and nays on two amendments at this time?
  Without objection, it is in order to so request.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Warner, Senator Lindsey Graham, and Senator Collins be added as 
cosponsors. I believe we are still scheduled for a vote at 5:30.
  Mr. President, this amendment would prohibit cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment of persons in the detention of the U.S. Government. 
The amendment doesn't sound like anything new. That is because it 
isn't. The prohibition has been a longstanding principle in both law 
and policy in the United States. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted in 1948 states simply that: No one shall be subject to 
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the U.S. 
is a signatory, is the same. The Binding Convention Against Torture, 
negotiated by the Reagan administration, ratified by the Senate, 
prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. On last year's DOD 
authorization bill, the Senate passed a bipartisan amendment 
reaffirming that no detainee in U.S. custody can be subject to torture 
or cruel treatment as the U.S. has long defined these terms. All of 
this seems to be common sense and in accordance with longstanding 
American values.
  I will be glad to explain that amendment more if anyone wants. In the 
meantime, I know the Senator from Alabama is waiting.
  I yield back the remainder of my time on this amendment. I ask 
unanimous consent we return at this time to amendment No. 1557, 
according to the previous unanimous consent agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Alabama is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will withhold, I want to endorse the 
McCain amendment. Essentially what he is doing is codifying what is 
policy now. I think it is of such importance that it would require this 
bill to do so.
  I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 1557

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will share a little bit of the history 
of what has happened, as I recall it. I am sorry, I just got back from 
Alabama and was not able to participate earlier in the debate. We have 
had maybe 29 hearings involving prisoner abuse. That is a lot of 
hearings. I serve on the Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. 
Probably 20 of those have been in those 2 committees of which I have 
been a member and tried to participate as much as I could in each one 
of them. I remember that the U.S. military announced they had problems 
in Abu Ghraib with prisoner abuse. They indicated they were conducting 
an investigation of it. Members of the Senate, like dogs that chase a 
car down the road, sometimes I thought they thought they were making 
the car go because they were chasing it.
  The military commenced, on its own accord, an investigation that has 
culminated in the conviction of a number of people who have gone to 
jail for rather substantial periods of time for violating the policies 
of the Department of Defense and the laws of war on those prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib. It took

[[Page 17241]]

place on a midnight shift and was not justified. It was beyond the law, 
and they have been punished for it. That has been morphed into 
allegations about what happened at Guantanamo.
  We apprehended 17,000 prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. We brought 
700 to Guantanamo. There are only 500 left. Some of those are the worst 
of the worst. Allegations were made that they were being abused. A 
thorough investigation has been conducted of that. Once again, we had a 
committee hearing to rehear the report. General Schmidt said there were 
24,000 investigations. He found three areas in which he felt things had 
gone awry at Guantanamo. All happened right quickly after 9/11, not 
going on now, because I was there at Guantanamo Friday a week ago and 
they absolutely assured us, Senator Graham and others who were with us, 
Chairman Warner, that nothing like that is going on today.
  But what were the three complaints? Mr. Khatani, the 20th hijacker, 
he found, had been abused cumulatively, three different things 
happened. He was interrogated for 20 hours. He was made to listen to 
loud music. And at certain times he had been put in shackles. The 
general found that was not torture under the definition of torture. It 
was not inhuman. But together, they violated the standards the U.S. 
military adheres to, and he felt that was in error.
  One individual was screaming loudly repeatedly and would not stop. 
Someone said he should be stopped. They found some duct tape, and 
Americans, I guess, are good with that. They put it around his mouth. 
He took it off, and they did it again. He took it off, and they did it 
again. So they put it all the way around his head. He felt that was an 
abuse. A woman interviewer-interrogator, perhaps losing her temper, or 
whatever, issued a threat to one of the prisoners and their family. 
There were 3 out of 24,000 matters in Guantanamo.
  So, first, I reject the idea that this Defense Department and our 
Army and our military is out of control, is confused about what their 
powers and duties and responsibilities are. I reject that. I don't 
believe that is accurate.
  Now, the field manual is good. We had a number of witnesses before 
the committee. In one of the many hearings, General Taguba and several 
others, when asked, or they just volunteered that the current rules of 
interrogation under the field manual aren't appropriately applicable to 
all the kinds of new threats we face today and the kind of prisoners we 
deal with today. These prisoners today are not under the Geneva 
Conventions and aren't prisoners of war. They are unlawful combatants. 
They sneak into countries. They don't wear a uniform. They don't carry 
their arms openly. They make bombs. They direct them not at military 
targets but at men, women, and children who are going about their 
peaceful business. So it is indisputable that the Geneva Conventions 
don't apply to them.
  We have a statute in this country that prohibits torture of anybody 
in our control, and that statute stands firm and clear, and that is 
certainly a basis for a criminal prosecution for anybody who goes too 
far in interrogating witnesses.
  Now, you are limited in what you can do when you interrogate a 
prisoner of war. We are told to give only name, rank, and serial 
number, and others have similar instructions from their countries. You 
are limited as to how much you can interrogate them and how much you 
can expect them to say. These people are not prisoners of war. They are 
terrorists, unlawful combatants, determined to savage the peaceful 
people of Spain and their railroad, the people of London, or the people 
of New York City. Thank God that because we have been aggressive and 
been after them and obtained intelligence from interviews and 
interrogation and techniques within the rules of warfare, we have been 
able to prevent another attack on this country--Lord be praised--for 
almost 4 years now. It can happen again at any time.
  I am proud of what our men and women are doing. I was at one of the 
committee hearings when a young lieutenant commander in the Navy 
testified that the prosecutor blocked him from interviewing a witness. 
He told him what to do. He told him he could only plead guilty.
  I said: Sir, you are a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy--I was 
in a JAG officer slot. Unlike Senator Graham, I was not trained at the 
JAG officer school. But I had some training in it and taught the laws 
of warfare to our soldiers in the Army Reserve. At any rate, this guy 
said he was ordered by the prosecutor.
  I said: I never heard of a defense counsel saying a prosecutor could 
order them around.
  He said: Well, he told me I could not see the prisoner.
  I said: You could not see the prisoner?
  He said: Except at limited times.
  It was out of this that he came up with this bizarre allegation that 
he was somehow defending the terrorist. He was given a letter, and he 
said he could only represent him to plead guilty. The letter that 
appointed him to defend the guy said he was to represent him in all 
categories. I was disappointed in the quality of his complaints. I 
don't think they held up to be nearly what he was saying publicly. 
Whatever got into people's craw about how these matters were handled is 
a bit out of whack.
  Let's say this: The field manual is the manual that controls our 
handling of a lot of things in the Army, including interrogation. But 
the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the 
military, and these kinds of prisoners, as the witnesses told us in 
committee, were not contemplated when the field manual was written. 
Different techniques could be legitimate against them that would not be 
legitimate against lawful combatants--the kinds of people we have seen 
so many times in the history of warfare. It is a weird thing. We should 
not treat them inhumanely. It is an order of the President that we 
cannot. We cannot torture them. We have a criminal statute that defines 
that and says you cannot do it. You can go to jail if you do.
  I ask unanimous consent for 2 more minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I wonder if 
we can line up some time at this point. I will not object, but after he 
is recognized, I believe then the majority has additional time for 
another amendment going up to what time?
  Mr. WARNER. We are operating under an original 1-hour agreement that 
was modified to give 10 minutes to the Senator from Alabama. I think 
under the original 1 hour the Senator from Virginia has time and the 
Senator from South Carolina has time. Would I be correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from 
Virginia has 9 minutes remaining. The Senator from South Carolina has 
10 minutes remaining. We still show the Senator from Arizona, Mr. 
McCain, with 2 minutes remaining.
  The Chair also notifies Senators that under the previous order, at 5 
o'clock, the Senate is to go to 30 minutes of debate on the Americans 
with Disabilities resolution.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is followed by a vote, is my 
understanding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it is scheduled for 5:30.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately 
following the completion of those three time periods on the Republican 
side, I be allocated 10 minutes on this side, which I will provide 
equally between the junior Senator from Michigan, the Senator from 
Washington, and myself, so that four amendments can be introduced and 
laid aside.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, and I do not wish to 
object, it seems to me that reality dictates that in 6 minutes we will 
go on the ADA; am I correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. In effect, the Senator from South Carolina, unless he 
wants to take the 6 minutes and put his amendment in, we would have to 
come back to it at the conclusion of the ADA. Would that be acceptable?

[[Page 17242]]


  Mr. GRAHAM. I don't want to stop Senator Sessions from finishing. I 
can come back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent request right now is 2 
additional minutes for the Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, we have not had any time 
prior to the ADA matter, and it was intended that we have some time. 
There is a prepared UC that would perhaps assist us, which has been 
handed to us. I wonder if the manager will read this.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
notwithstanding the previous order, the Senate resume consideration of 
S. 207 at 5:15 today, with 15 minutes to debate under the control of 
Senator Harkin. I further ask that following the use or yielding back 
of the time, the Senate proceed to a rollcall vote on the resolution as 
under the previous order.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I ask that that be modified 
to allow 10 minutes between 5:15 and 5:30 to be granted to this side 
for the introduction of those amendments. They will be introduced, with 
a minute on each, and then set aside.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe that will accommodate our 
distinguished colleague from South Carolina to introduce his amendment 
beginning now, concluding at 5:10, at which time the Chair will 
recognize the junior Senator from Michigan for a period not to exceed 5 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. No.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, can we include my 2 minutes?
  Mr. LEVIN. The junior Senator from Michigan, 2 minutes; the Senator 
from Washington, 2 minutes; and me for 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator modify the unanimous consent 
request?
  Mr. WARNER. I do so to accommodate Senator Levin. We have 2 minutes 
now for the Senator from Alabama to complete his remarks before the 
Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the 
Senator from Alabama?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, does that include the UC 
which the Senator from Virginia read?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The separate unanimous consent request of the 
Senator from Virginia would incorporate that. There is one request for 
2 additional minutes for the Senator from Alabama; 9 minutes for the 
Senator from Virginia--
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, the Democratic leader is 
going to want 2 minutes prior to the vote on leadership time, or prior 
to 5:15. You all figure it out.
  Mr. WARNER. We certainly want to accommodate the Democratic leader. 
The Senator from South Carolina indicated that perhaps he would like to 
take up his amendment following the vote, giving him then such time as 
he requires, and giving the Senator from Michigan such time as he may 
require. So perhaps let us allocate the remaining time between now and 
5:15 between the Senator from Alabama, the two colleagues on that side, 
and the distinguished Democratic leader.
  Mr. GRAHAM. That is acceptable to me.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, following the completion of the rollcall 
vote, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from South Carolina be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Chair understands the now-modified 
unanimous consent request, it is a request that the Senator from 
Alabama be recognized for 2 additional minutes, the time between that 
and 5:15 would be the Senator from Michigan, and at 5:15, under the 
previous order, the Senate would consider the Americans with 
Disabilities resolution, followed by a vote at 5:30, followed by the 
Senator from South Carolina being recognized to offer his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Reserving the right to object, I would like to be able to 
state some general areas of agreement and disagreement concerning 
Senator Sessions' statement. Is that possible when I introduce my 
amendment?
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield. We need only 7\1/2\ 
minutes before 5:15. I wonder if the chairman will agree to this: After 
Senator Sessions, go to the Senator from South Carolina for 5 minutes, 
and then come to me.
  Mr. WARNER. That is acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will try to conclude and sum this up.
  This country was attacked by a very dangerous group of people. I 
certainly respect my colleagues' concern and commitment that our 
prisoners be treated humanely and consistent with the rules of war. I 
have also said that the rules of the Geneva Conventions do not apply to 
these unlawful combatants. The field manual is an Army Department of 
Defense document that sets the rules for our conduct. But the DOD can 
alter that.
  As I understand what this amendment would do, it would make the field 
manual, with regard to the section involving interrogation and 
intelligence, the equivalent of law; that before the Army or Department 
of Defense could make any changes in those field manuals, somebody 
would have to offer legislation in the House and the Senate, which 
would be subject to a filibuster and maybe we could fix it and maybe we 
could not. It becomes force of law. I think that is a mistake.
  Finally, alterations in procedure by which these prisoners or 
detainees were handled was done with review by the Department of 
Justice. We had Attorney General Gonzales, when he was White House 
counsel and Attorney General, testify about how it came about and all 
the legal research that went into it. We had the Department of Defense 
leadership discuss this. They reviewed it. The generals reviewed the 
heightened techniques personally, individually, and carefully on a 
case-by-case basis, and they recommended this general at Guantanamo, 
Miller, be disciplined because these combination of events exceeded 
what was proper. It was overruled later, but that is how seriously they 
take this.
  I don't think this is the way to fix this situation. Some prisoners 
need to be handled differently than others. We should not bind by law 
what the field manual states.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Under the 
unanimous consent agreement, the Senator from South Carolina is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to build on what Senator 
Sessions said. If this amendment did the things suggested, I would 
support it. One, the Army Field Manual is being revised, as we speak, 
with two groups in mind--lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. The 
amendment says that the Army Field Manual be the guide in whatever form 
it is in. It does not lock in this version. They are going to have a 
version part of it classified so our enemy does not have a chance to 
prepare for interrogation techniques that deal with lawful combatants 
and unlawful combatants.
  The reason we are doing that is because what the JAGs told us over 2 
years ago. The common thread among our recommendations is concern for 
servicemembers.
  If we put people on the line in this war in terror, we want to give 
them everything they need as far as equipment. If we put people on the 
line in terms of handling detainees, we want to give them everything 
they need, the tools to get good information, but what we do not want 
to do is put our own people at risk.
  We are trying to armor all our vehicles. What we are trying to do 
with the people who are holding these terrorists and interrogating them 
is not getting them in trouble. The Office of Legal Counsel, on 27 
February 2003, from a Marine general, not exactly the ACLU, said:

       The common thread among our recommendations is concern for 
     our service members. The Office of Legal Counsel does not 
     represent the services, thus understandably concern for 
     service members does not

[[Page 17243]]

     reflect in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is violent 
     on the foreign views of international law.

  This is what the judge advocate general of the Army said:

       I recommend the aggressive counterresistant interrogation 
     techniques under consideration be vetted with the Army 
     intelligence community before a final decision on their use 
     is made. Some of these techniques do not comport with Army 
     doctrine as set forth in the Field Manual, FM 34-52, 
     intelligence interrogation, and may be of questionable 
     practical value in obtaining reliable information of those 
     being interrogated.

  What we are trying to do is have a guide our troops can understand 
with two parts--one for lawful combatants and one for unlawful enemy 
combatants. We will know what the rules of the road will be. We are 
putting congressional approval on those rules.
  We have had the White House, Congress, and eventually the courts 
saying you can aggressively interrogate prisoners not covered by the 
Geneva Conventions. We have been all over the board for the last couple 
of years. We are trying to bring it together in symmetry where the 
military can write the rules. They know better than I do. I am not 
saying I am an expert on interrogations. They are going to write the 
rules the way they need to be written, and Congress is going to say you 
are good to go.
  These JAGs were telling us you have confused concepts, so we are 
trying to do away with that confusion to make it stronger, not weaker, 
to make us better at gathering intelligence and avoid the problems we 
have had in the last 2 years.
  I think it is a very smart thing to do. I look forward to trying to 
help change it if it needs to be changed, but nobody is locking the 
military into a set of rules that does not allow them to aggressively 
get what they need to make us safe. We are trying to provide the 
military and all those in charge of detainees clear guidance so they 
will have the flexibility they need and we will not get our people in 
trouble. That is what we have been working on for 2 years. We are at a 
point where we can actually accomplish something that will be good for 
this country, good for the military, and help win this war on terror. 
Part of this war is about image.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. SESSIONS. It did say ``not authorized in the field manual.'' But 
the Senator from South Carolina interprets that to mean that the 
military could amend it at any point in time.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I think that is more acceptable, but even then the 
policies in the field manual should reflect the executive branch, it 
seems to me, being able to use extraordinary events and extraordinary 
circumstances.
  Mr. GRAHAM. And it will be. There will be a section that is specific 
for unlawful enemy combatants. That is not a traditional way to deal 
with them versus POWs.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Michigan has the time remaining up to 5:15 p.m. under his control.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.


                           Amendment No. 1435

 (Purpose: To ensure that future funding for health care for veterans 
        takes into account changes in population and inflation)

  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I thank my friend and distinguished 
colleague. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment, 
and I call up amendment No. 1435.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Ms. Stabenow], for herself, Mr. 
     Johnson, Mr. Akaka, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Nelson of 
     Florida, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Salazar, Mrs. Lincoln, and Mr. 
     Corzine, proposes an amendment numbered 1345.

  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in the Record of July 23, 2005 under ``Text 
of Amendments.'')
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, today's soldiers are tomorrow's 
veterans, and America has made a promise to these brave men and women 
to provide them with the care they need and deserve. Senator Johnson 
and I and others are offering an amendment today to provide full 
funding for VA health care to ensure that the VA has the resources 
necessary to provide quality care in a timely manner to our Nation's 
sick and disabled veterans.
  The Stabenow-Johnson amendment provides guaranteed funding for 
America's veterans from two sources. First, the legislation provides an 
annual discretionary amount that would be locked in for future years at 
the 2005 funding levels and, second, in the future, the VA would 
receive a sum of mandatory funding that would be adjusted year to year 
based on the changes in demand from the VA health care system and the 
rate of health care inflation.
  This is about whether we are going to fully support our brave men and 
women who are fighting today and have fought in the past and will fight 
tomorrow, whether we are going to continue to debate year to year 
whether there is adequate funding for veterans health care or whether 
we will make a statement in this bill that part of national defense is 
making sure that when our men and women come home and put on the 
veteran's cap, they will, in fact, be assured that the health care they 
need will be there, not dependent on the Appropriations Committee 
entirely, not dependent on what happens year to year, but knowing there 
is a full commitment that we have made to them for veterans health 
care.
  I will speak further at a later time. I understand there are other 
colleagues who wish to speak on other amendments. I simply ask 
colleagues to support this very important commitment, keeping our 
promises to our veterans, starting with the fact that we say very 
loudly and clearly that veterans health care, in the full amount 
needed, will be available to each and every one of our brave veterans.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Washington.


                           Amendment No. 1348

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the 
pending amendment aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I come to the floor this afternoon to 
call up two amendments, and in the event cloture is invoked on the 
underlying bill, I will ask for the yeas and nays on both amendments.
  First, I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 1348 and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1348.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To amend the assistance to local educational agencies with 
 significant enrollment changes in military dependent students due to 
force structure changes, troop relocations, creation of new units, and 
                        realignment under BRAC)

       Strike section 582 of the bill and insert the following:

     SEC. 582. ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES WITH 
                   SIGNIFICANT ENROLLMENT CHANGES IN MILITARY 
                   DEPENDENT STUDENTS DUE TO FORCE STRUCTURE 
                   CHANGES, TROOP RELOCATIONS, CREATION OF NEW 
                   UNITS, AND REALIGNMENT UNDER BRAC.

       (a) Availability of Assistance.--To assist communities 
     making adjustments resulting from changes in the size or 
     location of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     make payments to eligible local educational agencies that, 
     during the period between the end of the school year 
     preceding the fiscal year for which the payments are 
     authorized and the beginning of the school year immediately 
     preceding that school year, had (as

[[Page 17244]]

     determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Education) an overall increase or reduction 
     of--
       (1) not less than 5 percent in the average daily attendance 
     of military dependent students enrolled in the schools served 
     by the eligible local educational agencies; or
       (2) not less than 250 military dependent students enrolled 
     in the schools served by the eligible local educational 
     agencies.
       (b) Notification.--Not later than June 30, 2006, and June 
     30 of each of the next 2 fiscal years, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall notify each eligible local educational agency 
     for such fiscal year--
       (1) that the local educational agency is eligible for 
     assistance under this section; and
       (2) of the amount of the assistance for which the eligible 
     local educational agency qualifies, as determined under 
     subsection (c).
       (c) Amount of Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Education, make assistance 
     available to eligible local educational agencies for a fiscal 
     year on a pro rata basis, as described in paragraph (2).
       (2)  Pro rata distribution.--
       (A) In general.--The amount of the assistance provided 
     under this section to an eligible local educational agency 
     for a fiscal year shall be equal to the product obtained by 
     multiplying--
       (i) the per-student rate determined under subparagraph (B) 
     for such fiscal year; by
       (ii) the overall increase or reduction in the number of 
     military dependent students in the schools served by the 
     eligible local educational agency, as determined under 
     subsection (a).
       (B) Per-student rate.--For purposes of subparagraph (A), 
     the per-student rate for a fiscal year shall be equal to the 
     dollar amount obtained by dividing--
       (i) the amount of funds available for such fiscal year to 
     provide assistance under this section; by
       (ii) the sum of the overall increases and reductions, as 
     determined under subparagraph (A)(ii), for all eligible local 
     educational agencies for that fiscal year.
       (d) Disbursement of Funds.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     disburse assistance made available under this section for a 
     fiscal year, not later than 30 days after the date on which 
     the Secretary of Defense notified the eligible local 
     educational agencies under subsection (b) for the fiscal 
     year.
       (e) Consultation.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out 
     this section in consultation with the Secretary of Education.
       (f) Reports.--
       (1) Reports required.--Not later than May 1 of each of the 
     years 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the assistance provided under 
     this section during the fiscal year preceding the date of 
     such report.
       (2) Element of report.--Each report described in paragraph 
     (1) shall include an assessment and description of the 
     current compliance of each eligible local educational agency 
     with the requirements of part A of title I of the Elementary 
     and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.).
       (g) Funding.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Department of Defense for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 
     2008 for operation and maintenance for Defense-wide 
     activities, $15,000,000 shall be available for each such 
     fiscal year only for the purpose of providing assistance to 
     eligible local educational agencies under this section.
       (h) Termination.--The authority of the Secretary of Defense 
     to provide financial assistance under this section shall 
     expire on September 30, 2008.
       (i) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Base closure process.--The term ``base closure 
     process'' means the 2005 base closure and realignment process 
     authorized by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
     1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 
     2687 note) or any base closure and realignment process 
     conducted after the date of the enactment of this Act under 
     section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, or any other 
     similar law enacted after that date.
       (2) Eligible local educational agency.--The term ``eligible 
     local educational agency'' means, for a fiscal year, a local 
     educational agency--
       (A)(i) for which not less than 20 percent (as rounded to 
     the nearest whole percent) of the students in average daily 
     attendance in the schools served by the local educational 
     agency during the preceding school year were military 
     dependent students that were counted under section 8003(a)(1) 
     of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 7703(a)(1)); or
       (ii) that would have met the requirements of clause (i) 
     except for the reduction in military dependent students in 
     the schools served by the local educational agency; and
       (B) for which the required overall increase or reduction in 
     the number of military dependent students enrolled in schools 
     served by the local educational agency, as described in 
     subsection (a), occurred as a result of--
       (i) the global rebasing plan of the Department of Defense;
       (ii) the official creation or activation of 1 or more new 
     military units;
       (iii) the realignment of forces as a result of the base 
     closure process; or
       (iv) a change in the number of required housing units on a 
     military installation, due to the military housing 
     privatization initiative of the Department of Defense 
     undertaken under the alternative authority for the 
     acquisition and improvement of military housing under 
     subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code.
       (3) Local educational agency.--The term ``local educational 
     agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 8013 of 
     the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     7713).
       (4) Military dependent student.--The term ``military 
     dependent student'' means--
       (A) an elementary school or secondary school student who is 
     a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces; or
       (B) an elementary school or secondary school student who is 
     a dependent of a civilian employee of the Department of 
     Defense.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add Senator 
Kennedy as a cosponsor of that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment No. 1348.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1349

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the 
pending amendment aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up 
amendment No. 1349 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1349.

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To facilitate the availability of child care for the children 
   of members of the Armed Forces on active duty in connection with 
  Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom and to assist 
   school districts serving large numbers or percentages of military 
 dependent children affected by the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, or by 
            other Department of Defense personnel decisions)

       At the end of subtitle E of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 653. CHILD CARE FOR CHILDREN OF MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES 
                   ON ACTIVE DUTY FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
                   OR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

       (a) Child Care for Children Without Access to Military 
     Child Care.--
       (1) In general.--In any case where the children of a 
     covered member of the Armed Forces are geographically 
     dispersed and do not have practical access to a military 
     child development center, the Secretary of Defense may, to 
     the extent funds are available for such purpose, provide such 
     funds as are necessary permit the member's family to secure 
     access for such children to State licensed child care and 
     development programs and activities in the private sector 
     that are similar in scope and quality to the child care and 
     development programs and activities the Secretary would 
     otherwise provide access to under subchapter II of chapter 88 
     of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable 
     provisions of law.
       (2) Provision of funds.--Funds may be provided under 
     paragraph (1) in accordance with the provisions of section 
     1798 of title 10, United States Code, or by such other 
     mechanism as the Secretary considers appropriate.
       (3) Priorities for allocation of funds in certain 
     circumstances.--The Secretary shall prescribe in regulations 
     priorities for the allocation of funds for the provision of 
     access to child care under paragraph (1) in circumstances 
     where funds are inadequate to provide all children described 
     in that paragraph with access to child care as described in 
     that paragraph.
       (b) Preservation of Services and Programs.--The Secretary 
     shall provide for the attendance and participation of 
     children in military child development centers and child care 
     and development programs and activities under subsection (a) 
     in a manner that preserves the scope and quality of child 
     care and development programs and activities otherwise 
     provided by the Secretary.

[[Page 17245]]

       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Department of Defense $25,000,000 
     to carry out this section for fiscal year 2006.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``covered members of the Armed Forces'' means 
     members of the Armed Forces on active duty, including members 
     of the Reserves who are called or ordered to active duty 
     under a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) 
     of title 10, United States Code, for Operation Enduring 
     Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom.
       (2) The term ``military child development center'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 1800(1) of title 10, 
     United States Code.

     SEC. 654. EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES 
                   ENROLLING MILITARY DEPENDENT CHILDREN.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Help 
     for Military Children Affected by War Act of 2005''.
       (b) Grants Authorized.--The Secretary of Defense is 
     authorized to award grants to eligible local educational 
     agencies for the additional education, counseling, and other 
     needs of military dependent children who are affected by war 
     or dramatic military decisions.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Eligible local educational agency.-- The term 
     ``eligible local educational agency'' means a local 
     educational agency that--
       (A) had a number of military dependent children in average 
     daily attendance in the schools served by the local 
     educational agency during the school year preceding the 
     school year for which the determination is made, that--
       (i) equaled or exceeded 20 percent of the number of all 
     children in average daily attendance in the schools served by 
     such agency during the preceding school year; or
       (ii) was 1,000 or more,
     whichever is less; and
       (B) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as impacted 
     by--
       (i) Operation Iraqi Freedom;
       (ii) Operation Enduring Freedom;
       (iii) the global rebasing plan of the Department of 
     Defense;
       (iv) the realignment of forces as a result of the base 
     closure process;
       (v) the official creation or activation of 1 or more new 
     military units; or
       (vi) a change in the number of required housing units on a 
     military installation, due to the Military Housing 
     Privatization Initiative of the Department of Defense.
       (2) Local educational agency.--The term ``local educational 
     agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 9101 of 
     the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     7801).
       (3) Military dependent child.--The term ``military 
     dependent child'' means a child described in subparagraph (B) 
     or (D)(i) of section 8003(a)(1) of the Elementary and 
     Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7703(a)(1)).
       (d) Use of funds.--Grant funds provided under this section 
     shall be used for--
       (1) tutoring, after-school, and dropout prevention 
     activities for military dependent children with a parent who 
     is or has been impacted by war-related action described in 
     clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subsection (c)(1)(B);
       (2) professional development of teachers, principals, and 
     counselors on the needs of military dependent children with a 
     parent who is or has been impacted by war-related action 
     described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subsection 
     (c)(1)(B);
       (3) counseling and other comprehensive support services for 
     military dependent children with a parent who is or has been 
     impacted by war-related action described in clause (i), (ii), 
     or (iii) of subsection (c)(1)(B), including the hiring of a 
     military-school liaison; and
       (4) other basic educational activities associated with an 
     increase in military dependent children.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to 
     the Department of Defense such sums as may be necessary to 
     carry out this section for fiscal year 2006 and each of the 2 
     succeeding fiscal years.
       (2) Special rule.--Funds appropriated under paragraph (1) 
     are in addition to any funds made available to local 
     educational agencies under section 582, 583 or 584 of this 
     Act or section 8003 of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
     Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7703).

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 
No. 1349.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their 
consideration. I will come to the floor later to discuss both of these 
amendments, but essentially they deal with the children of our Guard 
and Reserve. I think all of us understand the impacts to families 
across our country. Our members from home have been called up for Guard 
and Reserve duty.
  The first amendment I offered will help schools handle the sudden 
changes in student enrollment and help schools handle base closures, 
deployment, and force realignments. And the second amendment will make 
sure our military students get the counseling and support they need. 
Our Guard and Reserve families are spread across our States, not 
necessarily close to a base, and the schools are impacted across this 
country. When they are impacted, our children are impacted.
  Both of these amendments will help all of our students in our schools 
make sure they reach the goals we all desire. I will be here again 
later to talk about both of these amendments. I thank the managers for 
their consideration in allowing me to call them up at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the 
pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1494

(Purpose: To establish a national commission on policies and practices 
        on the treatment of detainees since September 11, 2001)

  Mr. LEVIN. I call up amendment 1494, cosponsored by Senators Kennedy, 
Rockefeller, and Reed of Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report the 
amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr. 
     Kennedy, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Reed, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1494.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment would establish an 
independent commission on the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Guantanamo, and elsewhere. U.S. policies, and too often 
practices, in the treatment of detainees have veered off the course 
which was established by decades of U.S. leadership in international 
humanitarian law and has been a champion of the Geneva Conventions on 
the treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees.
  Our troops serve honorably and courageously across the globe. Their 
honor is besmirched when some of those who are captured are abused. Our 
troops' future security is jeopardized when people we detain are not 
treated as we rightfully insist others treat our troops when they are 
captured.
  The amendment we are proposing today would help reaffirm the values 
we cherish as Americans. It would protect our troops should they be 
captured. It is going to be argued that there have been dozens of 
inquiries and hundreds of interviews and thousands of pages provided to 
Congress, but the fact is that huge gaps and omissions remain.
  First, we do not know the role of the CIA and other parts of the 
intelligence community in the mistreatment of detainees or what 
policies apply to these intelligence personnel.
  Second, we do not know what the policies and practices of the United 
States are regarding the rendition of detainees to other countries 
where they may be interrogated using techniques that would not be 
permitted at U.S. detention facilities.
  Third, we have insufficient information on the role of contractors in 
U.S. detention and intelligence operations.
  Fourth, the detention and interrogation of detainees by special 
operations forces need close examination.
  Fifth, we are still missing key documents, including legal documents, 
from the Office of Legal Counsel.
  Sixth, there are just too many significant questions which have been 
left unanswered.
  I hope we can appoint an independent commission on the treatment of 
these detainees, on policies involved, patterned after the 9/11 
Commission. We owe it to our military personnel who might someday be in 
enemy custody to demonstrate our commitment to the humane treatment of 
detainees, to

[[Page 17246]]

strengthen our standing, to object and to take appropriate action 
against anyone who would mistreat an American prisoner of war.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might bring to the attention 
of the Senate that we now have 215 amendments offered on this bill; 27 
amendments have been proposed and are pending, a number desiring to 
have rollcall votes. I know of five rollcall votes that I think are 
ready to go. I ask the Senator, might we advise our leaders that we can 
continue tonight with rollcall votes and hopefully that can be 
facilitated.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would have to check with our leadership on that. In 
terms of continuing tonight, I surely would be happy to do that, but 
let me check with our leaders.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague because it is 
important that we keep momentum going forward on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I mentioned to Senator Warner I would be 
saying this. He suggested the possibility of votes tonight. My response 
to him privately, and now publicly, is we would be happy to try to see 
if we could work out additional amendments that are pending where we 
could agree on rollcall votes tonight. I will work with Senator Warner 
to see if those amendments can be identified mutually during this 
rollcall vote.

                          ____________________