[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 13579-13581]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                      LOGICAL WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to talk about an issue which 
is beginning to be much more of an issue in this Congress, and 
certainly in this country, and that is the question of how long are we 
going to stay in Iraq?

[[Page 13580]]

  There are those who think that we should stay endlessly, apparently. 
The military is preparing for a couple of years of staying. Last week a 
couple of oil workers from Iraq came through talking to various Members 
of Congress. These 55-year-old Iraqi oil workers said there will be no 
peace in Iraq until the occupation is over. Until you leave, the 
present conditions will continue.
  Now, there are a lot of people who still believe the President. 
Remember, this is the President that told us that there were weapons of 
mass destruction and there were connections to al Qaeda, and that now 
they have the White House saying we are in the last throes of the 
insurgency.
  But when you talk to Iraqis who live on the ground, work on the 
ground, work in the oil industry, they said we are at 1\1/2\ billion 
barrels a day, and we will never get any more than that until we are 
able to get some peace and calm and some investments to come in and 
change the oil industry.
  Now, you say, well, that is just two oil workers. Well, 82, remember 
that number, 82 Iraqi Parliamentarians have sent a letter to their 
Speaker of the House demanding that the U.S. withdraw its troops from 
Iraq.
  Those are not wild-eyed people in the United States who are calling 
for the withdrawal of American troops. This is 82 members of the Iraq 
Parliament who were elected. I mean, we say they have a democracy over 
there. Some of these leaders come from the United Iraqi Alliance, which 
is a collection or a coalition of religious Shiite parties that has a 
majority of the 275 seats.
  So, again, we are not talking about a splinter group somewhere, we 
are talking about people in the main governing group in the Iraqi 
Parliament are calling for an end. Their demand is still, although not 
a majority, it is a large majority, and it has not been endorsed by the 
Prime Minister yet.
  But the demand will certainly come from an ever greater number of 
Parliamentarians as time goes on. At the moment, most Iraqi politicians 
already wish the United States would leave, but are afraid that the 
guerilla movement will kill them without U.S. protection.
  This letter has not been released in the United States. You have to 
find it somewhere on the Web. Now, in this House we have a group called 
Out of Iraq Caucus.
  And the question is, what are we up to? What do we really want to do? 
Well, I think you ought to have a plan. And there are certainly a lot 
of plans that have been laid out. One of them is laid out by Gerald 
Helman, who was a former Ambassador of the United States, who says, 
first of all, the United States should have a phased withdrawal to be 
completed in 1 year.

                              {time}  1915

  Why is that? Because you do not want to create chaos. If we walked 
away tomorrow, we would have chaos.
  The second thing he says, by prearrangement before that withdrawal 
occurs, the Iraq and Arab League, or collection of Arab states, would 
ask the United Nations Security Council to establish a transition 
political, economic development, and peace enforcement authority to 
assist the Iraqi Government in its recovery efforts. And finally, the 
United States could offer logistical support. We are really the only 
ones capable of doing it, and the financial support as well as the 
military units on a transitional basis under U.N. command, under U.N. 
command.
  I think we can handle a Brit or a German or somebody being in 
command. The United States, Japan and the other oil Arabs can 
contribute money and NATO could provide much of the staff, planning and 
headquarters personnel, but competent boots on the ground will be hard 
to find. They are going to have to use some of our people. We all 
watched the United Nations do this very same thing in Cambodia. Most 
people were unaware of it, but that is exactly the method.
  We have to begin the process of withdrawal from Iraq. There is no way 
we are going to win it all and have peace and harmony as long as we are 
viewed as conquerors and occupiers, and 82 members of the Iraqi 
parliament have asked. That must be only the beginning.

                          Helman on UN Option

       Ambassador Gerald B. Helman writes: ``. . . On replacing 
     the US with the UN in Iraq[:] It seems clear that US public 
     opinion is ready for a real exit strategy. But I suspect that 
     the Administration has not yet given up its hope of turning 
     Iraq into a long-term strategic base and asset allowing 
     control of the Middle East and the oil that goes with it. And 
     to turn it all over to the UN would be humiliating. Much 
     would depend upon how the process is rolled-out. Here's an 
     example:
       The US would announce a phased withdrawal, to be completed 
     one year hence;
       (by prearrangement) Iraq and the Arab League (or a 
     collection of Arab states) would ask the UNSC to establish a 
     transition political, economic development and peace 
     enforcement authority to assist the Iraqi Government in its 
     recovery efforts; and
       The US would offer logistical (we're the only one capable) 
     and financial support, as well as military units, on a 
     transitional basis, under UN command (we might be able to 
     swallow the humiliation if the commander is a Brit or 
     German). The UK, Japan, the oil Arabs and others can 
     contribute lots of money. NATO could provide much of the 
     staff, planning and headquarters personnel. But competent 
     boots on the ground might be harder to come by.
       I agree that the Cambodia operation (and, more recently, 
     East Timor) could serve as a model. While Cambodia was a 
     mixed success, it was nevertheless a success.''
                                  ____


     The United Nations Strategy as a Resolution of the Iraq Crisis

       The United States has failed militarily in Iraq, and the 
     situation there is deteriorating rapidly. A protracted 
     guerrilla war is increasingly becoming an unconventional 
     civil war. The US can mount operations against infiltrators 
     on the Syrian border, but cannot permanently close off those 
     borders. The US can prevent set piece battles from being 
     fought by militias. It cannot prevent night-time raids. Seven 
     bodies showed up Sunday in East Baghdad, executed. They were 
     almost certainly victims of this shadowy sectarian war.
       Eighty-two Iraqi parliamentarians have sent a letter to the 
     speaker of the house demanding that the United States 
     withdraw its troops from Iraq. Some of the leaders of this 
     movement come from the United Iraqi Alliance, the coalition 
     of religious Shiite parties that has a majority of the 275 
     seats. Their demand is still that of a (sizeable) minority 
     and has not been endorsed by Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. 
     The demand will certainly come from an ever greater number of 
     parliamentarians as time goes on. At the moment, most Iraqi 
     politicians already wish the US would leave, but are afraid 
     that the guerrilla movement would kill them without US 
     protection.
       As its allies draw down their forces in the next few 
     months, the US looks increasingly as though it is going it 
     alone in Iraq. As a unilateral power there, it lacks 
     legitimacy. It is not going to be able to stay in that 
     country, and will not be given permanent bases there by an 
     elected Iraqi government.
       The United States will eventually have to go to the United 
     Nations and request that it send a peace-enforcing mission to 
     Iraq, as the US military withdraws. The relevant model is the 
     UNTAC experience in Cambodia, which, while it had substantial 
     flaws, was also a relative success. In the long term, perhaps 
     5-10 years, the Iraqi government may develop its own military 
     that could keep order. That development is far enough off, 
     however, that there is likely to be a significant gap between 
     the time the US leaves and the time the Iraqis can fend for 
     themselves.
       A US withdrawal without a United Nations replacement would 
     risk throwing Iraq into civil war. Such a civil war, 
     moreover, would very likely not remain restricted in its 
     effects only to Iraqi soil. A civil war in Iraq would 
     certainly lead to even more sabotage of petroleum production, 
     reducing Iraq's production from the current 1.5 million 
     barrels a day to virtually nothing. If a civil war broke out 
     that drew in Iran, the unrest could spread to Iran's oil-rich 
     Khuzistan province, which has a substantial Arab population, 
     and which has seen political violence in recent months. The 
     instability could also spread to Saudi Arabia's Eastern 
     Province, which is traditionally Shiite but dominated since 
     1913 by the anti-Shiite Wahhabis.
       If the petroleum production of Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
     was put offline by a vast regional conflict that involved 
     substantial terrorism and sabotage, the price of oil would 
     skyrocket. Only 80 million barrels of petroleum are typically 
     produced daily in the world. Much of that is consumed by the 
     producing country. What is special about the countries of the 
     Gulf is that they have relatively small populations and 
     little industry, and therefore export a great deal of their 
     petroleum. Saudi Arabia produces 9 million barrels a day, and 
     can do 11 in a pinch. Iran produces 4 million. Iraq could 
     produce 3 million on a good day without sabotage. If nearly 
     20 percent of the world's petroleum supply

[[Page 13581]]

     became unavailable, and given ever increasing demand in China 
     and India and political instability in Venezuela and Nigeria, 
     the price could rise so high that it would throw the world 
     into a Second Great Depression.
       The old dream of James Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger that 
     the United States could in such an emergency simply occupy 
     and secure the Saudi oil fields has been shown to be a 
     dangerous fantasy. Petroleum is produced in a human security 
     environment. Where the political structures are felt by a 
     substantial portion of the population to be illegitimate, 
     they can and will simply sabotage the petroleum pipelines and 
     refineries.
       The US cannot risk this scenario, which while a little 
     unlikely, is entirely possible as a consequence of its 
     withdrawal from an Iraq that it radically destabilized.
       The United Nations force put into Iraq should be a peace-
     enforcing, not a peace-keeping, force. That is, its rules of 
     engagement should allow robust military operations to prevent 
     the parties from massacring one another, and UN troops should 
     always be permitted to defend themselves resolutely if 
     attacked. Further, the United States should lend the United 
     Nations forces close air support upon their request.
       Moreover, the UN must at the same time enter into serious 
     negotiations with the warring parties (Kurds, Shiites, Sunni 
     Arabs) to seek a political settlement.
       Satish Nambiar writes: ``It is a matter of record that it 
     is not possible to have successful peacekeeping without a 
     determined and successful peace process. Peacekeeping and 
     peacebuilding activities are not self-sustainable, they have 
     to be nurtured by a process of negotiations, or peacemaking, 
     during which the parties to the conflict are made to redefine 
     their interests and develop a commitment to a political 
     settlement. The fact that most successful missions in the 
     last decade, or even the partially successful ones--Namibia, 
     El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique--were the result of 
     years of negotiations, in which many third-party 
     international actors, including the USA, participated, is no 
     accident. Although the wars in these areas went on for a long 
     time, they illustrate that it is better to take the time to 
     get the details of a settlement right, than to initiate a 
     peacekeeping process that is flawed in its concept and 
     content, as so glaringly made apparent in the inadequately 
     planned and prepared United Nations deployment in the former 
     Yugoslavia and Somalia. It takes firm political resolve and 
     unified concerted action from outside actors to make the 
     parties to the conflict come to terms with one another, and 
     work towards a negotiated settlement.''
       All Iraqis would see the United Nations as having more 
     legitimacy than the United States. The UN would be much more 
     likely to be able to negotiate a settlement among the Sunnis 
     and Shiites than is the US. And, the world has more troops 
     than the US does. (The Europeans are over-stretched, so the 
     force would mainly come from the global South. Iraq does not 
     want neighbors involved, so South and Southeast Asia seem 
     likely providers of troops.)
       Would the Iraqi government accept a United Nations military 
     mission? Almost certainly. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has 
     often attempted to involve the UN, and would welcome such a 
     development. The Sunni Arabs would also much prefer to deal 
     with the UN than with the US.
       Would the United Nations be willing to take it on? It would 
     be a very hard sell. But remember that if the members of the 
     military mission succeeded, they would have gained enormous 
     good will from the Iraqi government, which would soon be able 
     to pump 5 million barrels of petroleum a day. That is, 
     participation could be worth billions in future contracts. 
     The US could also provide substantial incentives. For 
     countries like Pakistan, India, and Malaysia, such benefits 
     could prove decisive.
       Would the Americans be willing to cede Iraq to the blue 
     helmets? It is not impossible. US Secretary of Defense Donald 
     Rumsfeld appears to want to draw down US troop strength in 
     Iraq on a fairly short timetable, and even he must realize 
     the need for a replacement. Of course, the Bush 
     administration may well resist this move right to the end. 
     But that makes this plan an ideal platform for the Democratic 
     Party in 2006 and 2008. Instead of Kerry's vague 
     multilateralism, let us specify an UNTAC-like mission for the 
     UN. The entire world depends on Gulf petroleum; the entire 
     world should step up to ensure security for Iraq and the 
     region. The US will continue to have to bear a significant 
     share of the costs, but these would become bearable if 
     several allies shared them.
       As recently as the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower still 
     saw the United Nations as a noble project essential to the 
     welfare of the United States, and he denounced the 1956 
     invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel for 
     endangering the UN ideal. Ironically, the Bush 
     administration's attempt to do a unilateral end run around 
     the United Nations could afford the American Left the 
     opportunity to make international cooperation and 
     international law popular again with the US public. The 
     alternative for Americans is to continue to squander blood 
     and treasure on a task too big for one country, even the 
     world's sole superpower.
                                  ____


              45 Dead, Dozens Wounded in Guerrilla Attacks

       The Associated Press reports that a guerrilla wearing a 
     bomb belt walked into a restaurant near the Green Zone in 
     downtown Baghdad that was popular with Iraqi police and 
     soldiers, and detonated his payload, killing 23 and wounding 
     45. Patrick Quinn writes: ``The Baghdad bomber detonated his 
     explosives-laden vest at the Ibn Zanbour restaurant, 400 
     yards from the main gate of the heavily fortified Green 
     Zone--U.S. and Iraqi government headquarters. The cafe was 
     popular with Iraqi police and soldiers. The dead included 
     seven police officers. The bodyguards of Iraqi Finance 
     Minister Ali Abdel-Amir Allawi and 16 other police were 
     injured, police and hospital officials said. The minister was 
     not in the restaurant.''
       Quinn's details make me wonder if the finance minister 
     sometimes did eat at Ibn Zanbour, and if the guerrillas 
     thought he might be there. At the very least, wounding a 
     man's bodyguards is a pretty obvious threat against his 
     person. Allawi is related to current Vice Premier Ahmad 
     Chalabi and to former interim Prime Minister Iyad * * *

                          ____________________