[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 10]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 13287-13288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT ON U.S. INTERESTS

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, June 20, 2005

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, the death of PLO Chairman Yasser 
Arafat, the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership, and the 
government of Israel's proposed disengagement from Gaza and parts of 
the West Bank have created a high degree of optimism in the 
International Community that we are on the cusp of dramatic new 
openings in the Middle East peace process.
  As a senior Member of the House International Relations Committee, I 
have watched the often turbulent goings on in the Middle East for a few 
years to say the least, and my experience tells me that our optimism 
should be tempered by the lessons of the past. In fact, I believe we 
should take a very cautious view of the current round of Israeli 
Palestinian peacemaking, particularly with regard to Israel's 
withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.
  I have met Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and I know that he is 
a fine man. I am sure he firmly believes that this ``strategic 
retreat'' from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank is 
the best way to guarantee Israel's long-term security by allowing 
Israel to conserve and consolidate military and security resources, 
reducing opportunities for further friction with the Palestinians, and 
potentially reducing pressure on Israel to negotiate a final peace 
settlement on unfavorable terms. Personally, I will not second guess 
the Prime Minister's wisdom; I very much hope that he is right. But 
again, my experience tells me that if you take steps to appease an 
enemy you only give him a green light to put more pressure on you. In 
my opinion, it is imperative and critical to U.S. National Security 
that we as policymakers understand the consequences should the Israeli 
disengagement plan fail to live up to expectations.
  I was recently presented a copy of an interesting opinion piece by 
Ambassador Yoram Ettinger--former Minister for Congressional Affairs at 
Israel's Embassy in Washington, Israeli Consul General in Houston, and 
Director of Israel's Government Press Office; and currently editor of 
``Straight from the Jerusalem Cloakroom and Boardroom'' newsletters--
regarding the potential consequences of ceding Israeli territory to 
terrorists. I would like to have the text of this Op-Ed placed into the 
Congressional Record following my statement.

                             [May 26, 2005]

Jerusalem Cloakroom #178: The Impact of Disengagement on U.S. Interests

                          (By Yoram Ettinger)

       1. Escalated Terrorism. The morally/strategically 
     justifiable demolition of terror regimes in Iraq and 
     Afghanistan is inconsistent with the creation/bolstering of a 
     terror regime in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. The 1994-6 series 
     of disengagement from 85 percent and 40 percent of the 
     territory (and 100 percent and 95 percent of the population) 
     of

[[Page 13288]]

     Gaza and Judea and Samaria have established the largest 
     terrorist base in the world, led/harbored by PLO/PA graduates 
     of terrorist camps in Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, 
     Libya and Tunisia. Since 1993 the PA has harbored anti-U.S. 
     terrorists. U.S. GIs in Afghanistan and Iraq were encountered 
     by Palestinian terrorists.
       2. Higher U.S. Terror Casualties. The July 2000 
     disengagement from Southern Lebanon propelled Hizbullah from 
     a local, to a regional, profile, haunting U.S. GIs in Iraq 
     and Afghanistan and threatening U.S. homeland security.
       3. Contradicting U.S. War on Terrorism. Disengagement is 
     perceived, by the Mideast, as cut and run, appeasement and 
     cave-in, in sharp contrast to U.S. war on terrorism: No 
     negotiation with--and no concession to--terrorists; no 
     ceasefire with--but destruction of--terrorist regimes; no 
     political--but military--solution to terrorism.
       4. Setback to Peace. The only peace attainable in the 
     (inter-Arab) Mideast is deterrence-driven peace. 
     Disengagement undermines deterrence; hence it sets the area 
     farther from peace and closer to exacerbated terrorism and an 
     all out war. Every square inch ceded by Israel to the PA, 
     since the 1994 disengagement, has been transformed into a 
     platform of hate-education and homicide bombing.
       5. Tailwind to Anti-U.S. Terrorists. While the 1976 Israeli 
     Entebbe Operation constituted a tailwind to the U.S. war on 
     terrorism, the 1993-2005 retreat by the role-model of 
     countering terrorism (Israel) in face of the role-model of 
     terrorism (PLO/PA) has added more fuel to the fire of 
     terrorism. Disengagement has been heralded by the PLO/PA and 
     other Arabs as a crucial victory, frequently compared to the 
     U.S. flight from Beirut (1983) and Somalia (1993). It would 
     nurture Arab hope that neither the U.S. nor Israel possess a 
     marathon-like steadfastness, required for a long-term 
     victory.
       6. PA Feeds Anti-U.S. Terrorism. A correlation has existed 
     between the bolstering of PLO stock since Oslo 1993 on one 
     hand, and the exacerbation of anti-U.S. terrorism on the 
     other hand (since the 1993 Twin Towers I, through the 1995 
     Khobar Towers, the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassies, 
     the 2000 USS Cole and 2001 Twin Towers II); the wider the 
     maneuverability of the PLO/PA, the deeper the inspiration to 
     regional anti-U.S. terrorism, irrespective of (and probably 
     due to) U.S. and Israeli appeasement of--and unprecedented 
     concessions to--the PLO/PA.
       7. Undermining the Stability of Pro-U.S. Regimes (e.g. 
     Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, etc.). Disengagement would 
     enhance the profile of the PLO/PA, a lethal threat to the 
     Hashemite regime and a chief ally of radical regimes in the 
     Mideast and beyond. PLO-Hashemite relations have been a 
     classic case of zero-sumgame: The stronger the PLO the weaker 
     the Hashemites. The rise of the PLO/PA has emboldened 
     subversive anti-U.S. terrorists in Jordan and in the Gulf 
     area.
       8. Strengthening Anti-U.S. Mideast Regimes. Disengagement 
     would buttress the PLO/PA, which has been a sustained ally of 
     the Saddam and bin Laden forces, of Khomeini and his 
     successors in Iran, of the terror regime in Sudan and other 
     anti-U.S. Mideast regimes. A stronger PA would be a 
     liability--to the U.S.--in the U.N. and in the context of 
     Clash of Civilizations.
       9. Invigorating Mideast Profile of U.S. Global Rivals. The 
     strengthening of the PLO/PA would facilitate the road to a 
     re-assertive Russia in the Mideast. It would improve the 
     strategic posture of China and North Korea in the region, at 
     the expense of vital U.S. concerns, including U.S. standard 
     of living.
       10. Ignoring Plight of Christians. The 1995 disengagement 
     from Bethlehem and Beit Jallah has accelerated the flight of 
     Christians, caused by PLO/PA oppression and desecration of 
     churches.
       11. Setback to Mideast Democratization. Disengagement would 
     promote the most corrupt and repressive Arab regime in the 
     Mideast, rewarding a terrorist regime, thus dealing a blow to 
     moderate Palestinians.
       12. Undermining Israel-Egypt Peace. The 1979 peace treaty 
     disengaged Israeli and Egyptian military forces from one 
     another. The Plan of Disengagement would reengage them in a 
     terror-ridden area, thus fueling unintentional and 
     intentional confrontations. It could drag the U.S. 
     unnecessarily into such conflict. Egypt has facilitated/
     tolerated the smuggling of terror hardware, missiles and 
     mortars into Gaza. It has undermined U.S. interests in 
     Africa, in the Red Sea and in the U.N., and it has 
     spearheaded anti-Jewish Arab/Palestinian hate education (PA 
     hate education employs Egyptian school text books).
       13. PLO's Track Record of Inter-Arab Treachery. Abu Mazen 
     Abu Ala', Inc. fled Egypt (late 1950s) for subversive 
     activities. They escaped Syria (1966) for betraying their 
     hosts. They were expelled from Jordan for attempting to 
     topple the Hashemite regimes via terrorism. They exacerbated 
     a series of civil wars in Lebanon since 1975. They 
     spearheaded Saddam's invasion of Kuwait (1990), which hosted 
     them since the 1950s. Their systematic violent violation of 
     the 1993 Oslo Accords have been consistent with their inter-
     Arab back-stabbing. Disengagement would be viewed--by the 
     PLO/PA as a reward to treachery, which would vindicate the 
     aforementioned track record.

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