[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 151 (2005), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 599-612]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

        NOMINATION OF CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to executive session for the consideration of Executive 
Calendar No. 4, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Condoleezza 
Rice, of California, to be Secretary of State.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will be 9 
hours of debate on the nomination equally divided between the two 
leaders or their designees.
  The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I yield myself as much time as I may 
require of the time on our side.
  Mr. President, I have the pleasure and honor today of speaking in 
support of the nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be our Secretary 
of State.
  As a result of her distinguished career as National Security Adviser 
to President Bush and her earlier assignment on the NSC, she is well 
known to most Members of the Senate. I admire her accomplishments, and 
I am particularly thankful for the cooperation

[[Page 600]]

she has provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to me 
personally.
  The enormously complex job before Dr. Rice will require all of her 
talents and experience. American credibility in the world, the progress 
in the war on terrorism, and our relationships with our allies will be 
greatly affected by the Secretary of State's actions and the 
effectiveness of the State Department in the coming years. Dr. Rice is 
highly qualified to meet those challenges. We recognize the deep 
personal commitment necessary to undertake this difficult assignment, 
and we are grateful that a leader of her stature is willing to step 
forward.
  I had the good fortune to get to know Dr. Rice before she assumed the 
post of National Security Adviser to President Bush. Before President 
George W. Bush was elected, I enjoyed visits with Dr. Rice when we both 
attended Stanford University meetings on foreign policy hosted by 
former Secretary of State George Shultz. Secretary Shultz, a close 
friend of many of us in the Senate, was a very early supporter of the 
then-Governor Bush of Texas. He recognized Dr. Rice's prodigious 
talents and encouraged her leadership within the Bush foreign policy 
team. At the Stanford University meetings, Dr. Rice's analytical 
brilliance and broad knowledge of world affairs were evident. During 
the campaign for the Presidency of George Bush, she established a 
trusted relationship with then-Governor Bush that has carried through 
in her work as National Security Adviser to President Bush.
  Last week, the Committee on Foreign Relations held exhaustive 
hearings on this nomination. Dr. Rice fielded questions on every 
imaginable subject for more than 10\1/2\ hours over 2 days. All 18 
members of our committee took advantage of the opportunity to ask Dr. 
Rice questions. At the hearings, she responded to 199 questions, 129 
from Democrats and 70 from Republicans. In addition, in advance of the 
hearings, members of the committee submitted 191 additional detailed 
questions for the record to Dr. Rice. Members received answers to each 
of those questions. Thus, Dr. Rice responded to a total of 390 
questions from Senators.
  In American history, few Cabinet members have provided as much 
information or answered as many questions as Dr. Rice answered during 
the confirmation process. She demonstrated that her understanding of 
U.S. foreign policy is comprehensive and insightful.
  Our hearings served not only as an examination of Dr. Rice's 
substantial qualifications but also as a fundamental debate on the 
direction of American foreign policy. I believe this debate was useful 
to the Senate and to the American people. Having the opportunity to 
question a Secretary of State nominee is a key aspect of congressional 
oversight of any administration's foreign policy. Dr. Rice 
enthusiastically embraced this function of the hearing, and at many 
points she engaged in theoretical exchanges on national security 
choices.
  Dr. Rice emphasized that support for freedom, democracy, and the rule 
of law would be at the core of U.S. foreign policy during her watch. 
She said:

       In these momentous times, American diplomacy has three 
     great tasks. First, we will unite the community of 
     democracies in building an international system that is based 
     on our shared values and the rule of law. Second, we will 
     strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats 
     to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness that 
     feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy 
     throughout the globe.

  The Secretary of State serves as the President's top foreign policy 
adviser, as our Nation's most visible emissary to the rest of the 
world, and as manager of one of the most important departments in our 
Government. Any one of these jobs would be a challenge for even the 
most talented public servant, but, as I told Dr. Rice during our 
hearings, the Secretary of State, at this critical time in our history, 
must excel in all three roles.
  Since 2001, we have witnessed terrorists killing thousands of people 
in our country and the destruction of the World Trade Center and a part 
of the Pentagon. We have seen U.S. military personnel engaged in two 
difficult and costly wars. We have seen the expansion of a nihilistic 
form of terrorism that is only loosely attached to political objectives 
and is, therefore, very difficult to deter. We have seen frequent 
expressions of virulent anti-Americanism in many parts of the Islamic 
world. We have seen our alliances, our international standing, and our 
Federal budget strained by the hard choices we have to make in response 
to terrorism.
  In this context, many diplomatic tasks must be approached with 
urgency. In particular, our success in Iraq is critical. The elections 
scheduled for January 30 must go forward, and the United States must 
work closely with Iraqi authorities to achieve the fairest and the most 
complete outcome. At the same time, we must understand that those 
forces that want to keep Iraq in chaos will commit violence and 
intimidation. Both Iraqis and the coalition will have to be resilient 
and flexible in the elections' aftermath.
  The Bush administration and the State Department also must devote 
themselves to achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; to 
coming to grips with the nuclear proliferation problems in Iran and 
North Korea; to continuing urgent humanitarian efforts in Sudan, the 
Indian Ocean region, and elsewhere; to maintaining our commitment to 
the global fight against AIDS and other infectious diseases; to 
advancing democracy in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and elsewhere; to 
repairing alliances with longstanding friends in Europe; to 
reinvigorating our economic and security relationships in our own 
hemisphere; and to engaging with rapidly changing national powers, 
especially China, India, and Russia.
  Even though this list of diplomatic priorities is daunting, it is not 
exhaustive, and it does not anticipate unforeseeable events. Just weeks 
ago, none of us could have predicted a tragic earthquake and a tsunami 
would change the face of the Indian Ocean region. Our efforts must 
include the expansion of our foreign policy capabilities so we are 
better prepared for crises that cannot be averted and better able to 
prevent those that can be.
  With this in mind, I would observe that Congress must improve its own 
performance in foreign affairs, particularly in the area of 
legislation. The enthusiasm for engaging in the details of U.S. foreign 
policy the Senate demonstrated last week, and will again demonstrate 
today, too often has been absent when it is time to perform our 
legislative duties.
  Even as Senators have cited shortcomings of administration policy in 
responding to extraordinarily difficult circumstances in Iraq and 
elsewhere, the Senate has allowed partisan fights and unrelated 
domestic legislation and disagreements over that legislation during the 
last Congress to delay the far simpler task of passing the foreign 
affairs authorization bill, for example. Now, this bill includes new 
initiatives and funding authority related to the security and 
productivity of our diplomats, our outreach to the Muslim world, our 
nonproliferation efforts, our foreign assistance, and innumerable other 
national security priorities. Yet politically motivated obstacles were 
thrown in the path of the bill almost cavalierly, as if Congress's duty 
to pass foreign affairs legislation had little connection to our 
success in Iraq or in our war against terrorism.
  Even as we do our duty to oversee the foreign policy performance of 
the executive branch, we must take a sober look at our own performance. 
We must critique ourselves with the same diligence that we have applied 
to the administration. Every Senator should reflect on the troubling 
fact that we have not passed a comprehensive foreign assistance bill 
since 1985. This means that for 20 years we have depended primarily on 
stopgap measures and bandaids applied during the appropriations process 
to govern one of the major tools of U.S. foreign policy.
  Only 24 Members of the current Senate body were here the last time we 
passed a comprehensive foreign aid bill. Our single largest foreign 
assistance program, the Millennium Challenge Account, cannot even be 
found in

[[Page 601]]

the core legislation affecting foreign assistance.
  Moreover, many aspects of our foreign assistance law have not been 
updated since the original Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Forty-four 
years ago, when our basic foreign assistance law was written, we were 
preoccupied with the Cold War, terrorism was a rare phenomenon, 
scientists had not identified the HIV/AIDS virus, the illegal trade in 
drugs was a small fraction of what it is today, dozens of present day 
countries did not exist, and only one Senator who still sits in this 
body was present.
  Congress's most basic responsibility is to write and pass good 
legislation that provides clear direction to U.S. policy. In the area 
of foreign assistance, however, we are operating under an archaic Rube 
Goldberg contraption that has been patched hundreds of times. Much of 
the underlying law is irrelevant or redundant. Other parts are 
contradictory. As a result, the law is a confusing muddle that serves 
neither the interests of U.S. taxpayers nor our national security 
goals. We are tolerating this legislation of irresponsibility at a time 
of great national vulnerability.
  Congress's failure in this area has more to do with inattention than 
with disagreement. In both 2003 and 2004, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee passed a foreign affairs authorization bill by a unanimous 
vote. In 2003, we were mere hours away from final Senate passage, when 
the bill was derailed by unrelated domestic issues.
  We have not been blocked by intractable policy disagreements but by 
our devaluation of our own legislative role in foreign policy. We need 
to make a bipartisan decision that passing a foreign affairs 
authorization bill each Congress is as important as passing a defense 
authorization bill or a homeland security authorization bill. We must 
be prepared to fulfill our own core national security responsibilities.
  Dr. Rice indicated her strong support for passage of a comprehensive 
foreign affairs bill. I know we will have a powerful advocate in Dr. 
Rice for such action.
  I would like to emphasize another critical area of national security 
policy where Dr. Rice's advocacy has been strong, consistent, and 
persuasive. During the Foreign Relations Committee hearings last week, 
I opened the question period with three questions pertaining to the 
Nunn-Lugar program and other aspects of our nonproliferation efforts. 
In each case Dr. Rice expressed the administration's strongest 
commitment to the programs and to diplomatic objectives in question. 
She stated:

       I really can think of nothing more important than being 
     able to proceed with the safe dismantlement of the Soviet 
     arsenal, with nuclear safeguards to make certain that nuclear 
     programs facilities and the like are well secured, and then 
     the blending down--as we are doing--of a number of hazardous, 
     potentially lethal materials that could be used to make 
     nuclear weapons, as well as, of course . . . the chemical 
     weapons. . . . It is just an extremely important program that 
     I think you know that we continue to push.

  In fact, the Bush administration has achieved a great deal in the 
area of nonproliferation. Dr. Rice has been a stalwart proponent of a 
robust Nunn-Lugar program. Chief among these successes is the rarely 
mentioned Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction, informally known as ``10 plus 10 over 
10.''
  Under this agreement, negotiated by the Bush administration, the 
United States will spend $10 billion over the next 10 years to 
safeguard and to dismantle the weapons of mass destruction arsenal of 
the former Soviet Union. The other members of the G8 agreed 
collectively to spend another $10 billion over the same time period. 
Our commitment of funds is primarily money that we had planned to spend 
in any event through the Nunn-Lugar program and other associated 
efforts. With this agreement, the President effectively doubled the 
funds committed to securing weapons of mass destruction in Russia with 
minimal additional obligation to American taxpayers.
  The Bush administration also has successfully recruited more than 60 
countries to join the Proliferation Security Initiative Program that 
has enhanced our ability to interdict illegal weapons of mass 
destruction shipments around the world. Through the Energy Department, 
it established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims to 
secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials globally. It has 
facilitated at several junctures the acceleration of Nunn-Lugar work at 
critical chemical weapons destruction facilities at Shchuchye in Russia 
through personal intervention by the President and by Dr. Rice. It 
finalized the deal with Libya to lay open that country's weapons of 
mass destruction programs. And it advocated passage of the IAEA 
additional protocol which greatly expands that international agency's 
ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities.
  It secured the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 in 
April 2004, which for the first time declared that weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation is illegal. It has also provided constant 
encouragement to the promising talks between India and Pakistan that 
represent the best chance in years to reduce tensions between these 
nuclear powers.
  The President supported, through personal communication to 
congressional leaders, and signed into law the Nunn-Lugar Expansion 
Act, which establishes the authority to use Nunn-Lugar moneys and 
expertise outside the former Soviet Union.
  In these cases and others, the President and his administration have 
embraced diplomacy and skillfully employed multilateralists in support 
of important nonproliferation objectives. I believe Dr. Rice's strong 
statements of support for nonproliferation programs last week 
demonstrate the Bush administration's continuing commitment to these 
vital objectives.
  Last November, I introduced two new bills to strengthen U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts, and I will be introducing these bills again 
this week. They represent the fourth installment of the Nunn-Lugar 
legislation that I have offered since 1991. In that year, former 
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and I authored the Nunn-Lugar Act, which 
established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That program has 
provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union 
safeguard and dismantle an enormous stockpile of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, the means of delivery, and related materials.
  In 1997, Senator Nunn and I were joined by Senator Domenici in 
introducing the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which 
expanded Nunn-Lugar authorities in the former Soviet Union and provided 
weapons of mass destruction expertise to first responders in American 
cities.
  In 2003, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which 
authorized the Nunn-Lugar program to operate outside the former Soviet 
Union to address proliferation threats.
  The bills I am introducing this week would strengthen the Nunn-Lugar 
program and other nonproliferation efforts and provide them with 
greater flexibility to address emerging threats. To date, the Nunn-
Lugar program has deactivated or destroyed 6,564 nuclear warheads, 568 
ICBMs, 477 ICBM silos, 17 ICBM mobile missile launchers, 142 bombers, 
761 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, 420 submarine missile launchers, 
543 submarine-launched missiles, 28 nuclear submarines, and 194 nuclear 
test tunnels. The Nunn-Lugar program also facilitated the removal of 
all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. And after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, 
fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all 
three are nuclear weapons free as a result of the cooperative efforts 
under the Nunn-Lugar program.
  In addition, the program provides the primary tool with which the 
United States is working with Russian authorities to identify, to 
safeguard, and to destroy Russia's massive chemical and biological 
warfare capacity. Countless individuals of great dedication, serving on 
the ground in the former Soviet Union and in our Government, have made 
the Nunn-Lugar program work. Nevertheless, from the beginning

[[Page 602]]

we have encountered resistance to the concept in both the United States 
and Russia.
  In our own country opposition has sometimes been motivated by false 
perceptions that Nunn-Lugar money is foreign assistance or by the 
belief that Defense Department funds should only be spent on troops, 
weapons, or other warfighting capabilities. Until recently, we also 
faced a general disinterest in nonproliferation which made gaining 
support for Nunn-Lugar funding and activities an annual struggle.
  The attacks of September 11 changed the political discourse radically 
on that subject. We have turned a corner. The public, the media, and 
political candidates are now paying more attention. In a remarkable 
moment in the first Presidential debate of 2004, both President Bush 
and Senator Kerry agreed that the No. 1 national security threat facing 
the United States was the prospect that weapons of mass destruction 
would fall into the hands of terrorists. The 9/11 Commission weighed in 
with another important endorsement of the Nunn-Lugar program saying 
that:

       Preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass 
     destruction] warrants a maximum effort--by strengthening 
     counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation 
     Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction Program.

  The report went on to say that:

       Nunn-Lugar . . . is now in need of expansion, improvement 
     and resources.

  The first new bill I have introduced is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Act of 2005. This bill, which is cosponsored by 
Senators Domenici and Hagel, would underscore the bipartisan consensus 
on Nunn-Lugar by streamlining and accelerating Nunn-Lugar 
implementation. It would grant more flexibility to the President and to 
the Secretary of Defense to undertake nonproliferation projects outside 
the former Soviet Union. It also would eliminate congressionally 
imposed conditions on Nunn-Lugar assistance that in the past have 
forced the suspension of time-sensitive nonproliferation projects.
  The purpose of the bill is to reduce bureaucratic redtape and 
friction within our Government that hinder effective responses to 
nonproliferational opportunities and emergencies.
  At last week's hearing, Dr. Rice reiterated the administration's 
strong support of the bill. She understands how important it is to 
prevent needless delays in our weapons dismantlement schedule.
  Our recent experience in Albania is illustrative of the need to 
reduce bureaucratic delays. Last year in 2004, Albania appealed for 
help in destroying 16 tons of chemical agent left over from the Cold 
War. In August of last year, I visited this remote facility, the 
location of which still remains classified. Nunn-Lugar officials are 
working closely with Albanian leaders to destroy this dangerous 
stockpile. But from beginning to end, the bureaucratic process to 
authorize the dismantlement of chemical weapons in Albania took more 
than 3 months, largely because of requirements in current law. 
Fortunately, the situation in Albania was not a crisis. But we may not 
be able to afford these timelines in future nonproliferation 
emergencies.
  The second piece of legislation that I will introduce is the 
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction Act of 2005 or CATRA. This 
legislation, cosponsored by Senator Domenici, is modeled on the 
original Nunn-Lugar Act. Its purpose is to provide the Department of 
State with a focused response to the threat posed by vulnerable 
stockpiles of conventional weapons around the world, including tactical 
missiles and man portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, as they are 
now more commonly called. Such missile systems could be used by 
terrorists to attack commercial airlines, military installations, and 
government facilities at home and abroad. Reports suggest that al-Qaida 
has attempted to acquire these kinds of weapons.
  In addition, unsecured conventional weapons stockpiles are a major 
obstacle to peace, reconstruction, and economic development in regions 
suffering from instability. My bill declares it to be the policy of the 
United States to seek out surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional 
armaments, including small arms and light weapons and tactical missile 
systems, for elimination.
  It authorizes the Department of State to carry out a global effort to 
destroy such weapons and to cooperate with allies and international 
organizations when possible. The Secretary of State is charged with 
devising a strategy for prioritizing, on a country-by-country basis, 
the obligation of funds in a global program of conventional arms 
elimination. Lastly, the Secretary is required to unify program 
planning, coordination, and implementation of the strategy into one 
office at the State Department and to request a budget commensurate 
with the risk posed by these weapons.
  The Department of State has been working to address the threats posed 
by conventional weapons. But in my judgment, the current funding 
allocation and organizational structure are not up to the task. Only 
about $6 million was devoted to securing small arms and light weapons 
during the two-year period that covered FY 2003 and FY 2004. We need 
more focus on this problem and more funding to take advantage of 
opportunities to secure vulnerable stockpiles.
  In August, I visited Albania, Ukraine, and Georgia. Each of these 
countries has large stockpiles of MANPADS and tactical missile systems 
and each has requested U.S. assistance to destroy them. On August 27, I 
stood in a remote Albanian military storage facility as the base 
commander unloaded a fully functioning MANPAD from its crate and 
readied it for use. This storage site contained 79 MANPADS that could 
have been used to attack an American commercial aircraft or 
installation. Fortunately, the MANPADS that I saw that day were 
destroyed on September 2, but there are many more like them throughout 
the world. Too often, conventional weapons are inadequately stored and 
protected. This presents grave risk to American military bases, embassy 
compounds, and even targets within the United States. We must develop a 
response that is commensurate with the threat.
  I am offering these two bills, with the hope of passing them at the 
earliest opportunity. I anticipate and welcome strong support from 
Members of the Senate that reflects the priority status of U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts.
  Mr. President, I would like to highlight another topic that is 
critical to U.S. foreign policy. This is our effort to lead the global 
fight against the horrific HIV/AIDS pandemic. During the hearings on 
Dr. Rice's nomination, she responded to several questions on the 
administration's Global AIDS initiative. I was pleased that she 
reiterated the administration's strong commitment to fighting AIDS and 
underscored the importance of paying special attention to the needs of 
women, who are contracting AIDS at an accelerated rate.
  In 2003, at the administration's urging, Congress passed 
comprehensive legislation that created the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator and pledged $15 billion over five years to address the HIV/
AIDS crisis. We must be mindful of the President's observation that, 
``Time is not on our side,'' in combating this disease. In Africa, 
nearly 10,000 people contract the HIV virus each day. The United States 
has a clear moral obligation to respond generously and quickly to this 
crisis.
  The United States has acted with unprecedented urgency in combating 
HIV/AIDS globally, and the President's emergency plan for HIV/AIDS 
Relief is showing clear signs of progress. In the first 8 months of the 
President's emergency plan, the United States has supported bilateral 
programs in 15 of the most afflicted countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean to provide anti-retroviral treatment to those living with 
HIV/AIDS. I am pleased with the emergency plan's deep commitment to 
international cooperation. In fact, tomorrow, at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Ambassador Tobias will be joining the 
leaders of the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, and the Global Fund 
to report on the progress that has been made in making

[[Page 603]]

drug treatment available to the developing world.
  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to work closely with 
the administration to make the fight against HIV/AIDS a priority. 
Charged with the oversight of the President's initiative, we will 
continue to hold hearings and briefings on the subject of AIDS and the 
progress of the President's emergency plan for AIDS Relief. In 2004, 
for instance, we held a hearing focused on the intersection of HIV/AIDS 
and hunger. At this hearing, Ambassador Randall Tobias, the Global AIDS 
Coordinator, and Jim Morris, Executive Director of the World Food 
Program, testified about the devastating effects that the HIV/AIDS 
crisis is having on agricultural workers and the food supply in sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, we explored the special nutritional needs 
of individuals who are taking antiretroviral medication.
  We are just beginning to understand how women, and young girls in 
particular, are especially vulnerable to HIV and AIDS, due to a 
combination of biological, cultural, economic, social and legal 
factors. Young girls constitute 75 percent of new infections in South 
Africa among individuals between 14 and 25 years of age. In Malawi, the 
National AIDS Commission has said that HIV and AIDS is killing more 
women than men, and that HIV-positive girls between 15 and 24 years of 
age outnumber males in the same age group by a six to one margin. Even 
in the United States, the disease is having a devastating effect on 
women, and is the leading cause of death among African American women 
ages 25 to 34.
  Not only are women and girls more vulnerable to infection, they are 
also shouldering much of the burden of taking care of sick and dying 
relatives and friends. In addition, in the vast majority of cases, they 
are the caretakers of the estimated 14 million children who have been 
orphaned by this pandemic. Grandmothers often take the responsibility 
of caring for grandchildren, and older female children often take care 
of their younger siblings.
  One such young girl is Fanny Madanitsa. Fanny is a 16-year-old girl 
living in Malawi with her two younger sisters and a brother. Life has 
been difficult for Fanny and her siblings since they lost their parents 
to AIDS. As the oldest child, Fanny must deal with the stress of taking 
care of her younger siblings. They live in a modest house and share one 
bed. Fanny dreams of being a nurse, but reaching this goal will be a 
challenge for her. She cannot always attend classes, as she sometimes 
has to look after her siblings. Because money is scarce, she has a 
difficult time paying for school materials and other costs of her 
education.
  But Fanny is more fortunate that many girls in similar circumstances. 
With the help of her Village AIDS Committee, a community-based 
organization that has organized to take care of the orphans in its 
village, Fanny and her siblings receive food, soap, school materials 
and also medicines. Through the Village AIDS Committee, which receives 
support from Save the Children, the community assists Fanny in watching 
her siblings so she can attend school.
  Last June, I introduced the Assistance for Orphans and Other 
Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2004. I will 
reintroduce this bill in the coming days. It was written with the 
support of the administration, and I have received letters from both 
the State Department and USAID endorsing its passage. My bill would 
require the United States Government to develop a comprehensive 
strategy for providing assistance to orphans and would authorize the 
President to support community-based organizations that provide basic 
care for orphans and vulnerable children.
  Furthermore, my bill aims to improve enrollment and access to primary 
school education for orphans and vulnerable children by supporting 
programs that reduce the negative impact of school fees and other 
expenses. It also would reaffirm our commitment to international school 
lunch programs. School meals provide basic nutrition to children who 
otherwise do not have access to reliable food. They have been a proven 
incentive for poor and orphaned children to enroll in school.
  In addition, many women and children who lose one or both parents 
often face difficulty in asserting their inheritance rights. Even when 
the inheritance rights of women and children are spelled out in law, 
such rights are difficult to claim and are seldom enforced. In many 
countries it is difficult or impossible for a widow--even if she has 
small children--to claim property after the death of her husband. This 
often leaves the most vulnerable children impoverished and homeless. My 
bill seeks to support programs that protect the inheritance rights of 
orphans and widows with children. I know that Dr. Rice is supportive of 
this legislation, and I am hopeful that, with bipartisan action, it 
will become law early this year.
  The AIDS orphans crisis in sub-Saharan Africa has implications for 
political stability, development, and human welfare that extend far 
beyond the region. Turning the tide on this crisis will require a 
coordinated, comprehensive, and swift response. I know Dr. Rice shares 
the view that fighting Global AIDS must be a priority for U.S. foreign 
policy. I am hopeful that, with the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief, the Global Fund, and Congressional initiatives, we can make 
great strides together in the battle against this pandemic.
  In addition, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an 
editorial that I co-authored in the January 19 edition of the 
Washington Post with Patty Stonesifer, co-chair and President of the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 19, 2005]

                      In the Footsteps of History

                          (By Dorothy Height)

       When Condoleezza Rice is sworn in as secretary of state, 
     she will be following in the footsteps of Mary McLeod 
     Bethune, the founder of the National Council of Negro Women. 
     Mrs. Bethune was the first black woman to be called upon for 
     policy help by the White House, when Republican President 
     Calvin Coolidge asked her to take part in a conference on 
     child care in 1928. She went on to work with Republican and 
     Democratic presidents while always fighting to advance the 
     interests of black women and children.
       From Sojourner Truth speaking out in the abolitionist 
     movement, to Constance Baker Motley as a voice in the 
     courtroom to Shirley Chisholm as a candidate for president, 
     African American women have braved a world that did not 
     welcome their participation.
       Ms. Rice will be the first woman of color to assume the 
     highest diplomatic post in the U.S. government. As secretary 
     of state, she will face challenges that confront women 
     everywhere. As we engage the Muslim and Arab worlds, efforts 
     are being renewed to suppress women's participation in 
     education, politics and civil society. In Africa, HIV and 
     AIDS are ravaging a generation of women and leaving millions 
     of orphans to be comforted. In Central and Eastern Europe, 
     women and girls are being sold into prostitution.
       Despite the challenges she will face, Ms. Rice's 
     appointment is a time for women of color to smile. Our nation 
     finally will put forward a face that reflects the hopes of 
     generations of black women to sit at the table of national 
     and global affairs and participate as equals.
       Many women sacrificed to make this moment possible. I pray 
     that Ms. Rice will use this profound honor and heavy burden 
     to represent our country with compassion, strength and 
     integrity, while seeking peaceful solutions and working to 
     make the world a better place for all people.

  Mr. LUGAR. This editorial entitled ``Speeding an AIDS Vaccine'' lays 
out the case for improved global coordination in this area. Achievement 
of an AIDS vaccine would save millions of lives and billions of dollars 
in treatment costs in the coming decades. I am pleased that the Bush 
administration, through the NIH, already has taken the initiative to 
establish one Vaccine Research Center and has unveiled support for a 
second one. These centers are a critical element in improving global 
cooperation on the development of an AIDS vaccine.
  Mr. President, I have cited just a small sample of critical issues on 
which work in both the executive and legislative branches is proceeding 
with good results. From my own conversations with Dr. Rice, I am 
confident

[[Page 604]]

that she understands that the President's foreign policy can be 
enhanced in the second term by a closer working relationship with 
Congress. In moving to head the State Department, she understands that 
much of this communication will depend on her. Last week's hearings 
were an excellent start. Her attitude throughout these arduous hearings 
was always accommodating and always respectful of the Senate's 
constitutional role in the nomination process. From the start she made 
clear her desire to have a wide-ranging discussion of U.S. foreign 
policy and to take all the questions that members wanted to ask.
  If confirmed, it will be her duty to use the foundation of these 
hearings to build a consistent bridge of communication to the Congress. 
As legislators, we have equal responsibility in this process. We have 
the responsibility of educating ourselves about national security 
issues, even when they are not the top issues in headlines or polls. We 
have the responsibility to maintain good foreign affairs law, even when 
taking care of this duty yields little credit back home. We have the 
responsibility to ensure that our first impulse in foreign affairs is 
one of bipartisanship. And we have the responsibility to speak plainly 
when we disagree with the administration, but to avoid inflammatory 
rhetoric that is designed merely to create partisan advantage or settle 
partisan scores.
  I believe that we have the opportunity with the beginning of a new 
Presidential term to enhance the constructive role of Congress in 
foreign policy. We have made an excellent start during the past week. I 
thank all 18 Senators who participated in the Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings and all Senators who will join in the debate today. 
I strongly urge Members to vote in favor of the nomination of Dr. Rice 
to be Secretary of State. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time 
allotted for Democratic Members under the agreement regarding the Rice 
nomination be modified as follows: The time for Senator Lieberman be 
allocated to Senator Bayh; Senator Dayton be allocated 15 minutes, 5 
minutes from Senator Boxer's time and 10 minutes from the time 
controlled by Senator Durbin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I commend my friend and colleague, the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for the way he conducted 
the hearings on the nomination for Secretary of State. I think many of 
us who were not members of the committee but followed the hearings very 
closely were enormously impressed by the conduct of the hearings, by 
the flexibility he showed in permitting Senators to follow up on 
questions so we could reach the real nub of the situation and yet to 
move the hearings along in a timely way. That is part of the long 
tradition that is associated with the chairman of the committee, and it 
is one of the reasons, among others, that he is held in such high 
regard and respect in the Senate.
  I intend to oppose Condoleezza Rice's nomination. There is no doubt 
that Dr. Rice has impressive credentials. Her life story is very 
moving, and she has extensive experience in foreign policy. In general, 
I believe the President should be able to choose his Cabinet officials, 
but this nomination is different because of the war in Iraq.
  Dr. Rice was a key member of the national security team that 
developed and justified the rationale for war, and it has been a 
catastrophic failure, a continuing quagmire. In these circumstances, 
she should not be promoted to Secretary of State.
  There is a critical question about accountability. Dr. Rice was a 
principal architect and advocate of the decision to go to war in Iraq 
at a time when our mission in Afghanistan was not complete and Osama 
bin Laden was a continuing threat because of our failure to track him 
down. In the Armed Services Committee before the war, generals advised 
against the rush to war, but Dr. Rice and others in the administration 
pressed forward anyway despite the clear warnings.
  Dr. Rice was the first in the administration to invoke the terrifying 
image of a nuclear holocaust to justify the need to go to war in Iraq. 
On September 9, 2002, as Congress was first considering the resolution 
to authorize the war, Dr. Rice said: We do not want the smoking gun to 
become a mushroom cloud.
  In fact, as we now know, there was significant disagreement in the 
intelligence community that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, but Dr. 
Rice spoke instead about a consensus in the intelligence community that 
the infamous aluminum tubes were for the development of nuclear 
weapons. On the eve of the war many of us argued that inspectors should 
be given a chance to do their job and that America should share 
information to facilitate their work.
  In a March 6, 2000, letter to Senator Levin, Dr. Rice assured the 
Congress that the United Nations inspectors had been briefed on every 
high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction missile and UAV-
related site the U.S. intelligence community has identified. In fact, 
we had not done so. Dr. Rice was plain wrong.
  The Intelligence Committee report on the prewar intelligence at page 
418 stated:

       Public pronouncements by Administration officials that the 
     Central Intelligence Agency had shared information on all 
     high and moderate priority suspect sites with United Nations 
     inspectors were factually incorrect.

  Had Dr. Rice and others in the administration shared all of the 
information, it might have changed the course of history. We might have 
discovered that there were no weapons of mass destruction. The rush to 
war might have been stopped. We would have stayed focused on the real 
threat, kept faith with our allies, and would be safer today.
  America is in deep trouble in Iraq today because of our misguided 
policy, and the quagmire is very real. Nearly 1,400 of our finest men 
and women in uniform have been killed and more than 10,000 have been 
wounded. We now know that Saddam had no nuclear weapons, had no weapons 
of mass destruction of any kind, and that the war has not made America 
safer from the threat of al-Qaida. Instead, as the National 
Intelligence Council recently stated, the war has made Iraq a breeding 
ground for terrorism that previously did not exist.
  As a result, the war has made us less secure, not more secure. It has 
increased support for al-Qaida, made America more hated in the world, 
and made it much harder to win the real war against terrorism, the war 
against al-Qaida.
  Before we can repair our broken policy, the administration needs to 
admit it is broken. Yet in 2 days of confirmation hearings, Dr. Rice 
categorically defended the President's decision to invade Iraq, saying 
the strategic decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein was the right one. 
She defended the President's decision to ignore the advice of GEN Eric 
Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, who thought that a large number of 
troops would be necessary if we went to war.
  She said:

       I do believe that the plan and forces that we went in with 
     were appropriate to the task.

  She refused to disavow the shameful acts of torture that have 
undermined America's credibility in Iraq and the world.
  When Senator Dodd asked her whether in her personal view, as a matter 
of basic humanity, the interrogation techniques amounted to torture, 
she said:

       I'm not going to speak to any specific interrogation 
     techniques . . . The determination of whether interrogation 
     techniques are consistent with our international obligations 
     and American law are made by the Justice Department. I don't 
     want to comment on any specific interrogation techniques.

  This is after Senator Dodd asked about water-boarding and other 
interrogation techniques. She continued:

       I don't think that would be appropriate, and I think it 
     would not be very good for American security.

  Yet, as Secretary of State, Dr. Rice will be the chief human rights 
official

[[Page 605]]

for our Government. She will be responsible for monitoring human rights 
globally, and defending America's human rights record. She cannot 
abdicate that responsibility or hide behind the Justice Department if 
Secretary of State.
  Dr. Rice also minimized the enormous challenge we face in training a 
competent Iraqi security force. She insisted 120,000 Iraqis now have 
been trained, when the quality of training for the vast majority of 
them is obviously very much in doubt.
  There was no reason to go to war in Iraq when we did, the way we did, 
and for the false reasons we were given. As a principal architect of 
our failed policy, Dr. Rice is the wrong choice for Secretary of State. 
We need, instead, a Secretary who is open to a clearer vision and a 
better strategy to stabilize Iraq, to work with the international 
community, to bring our troops home with dignity and honor, and to 
restore our lost respect in the world.
  The stakes are very high and the challenge is vast. Dr. Rice's failed 
record on Iraq makes her unqualified for promotion to Secretary of 
State and I urge the Senate to oppose her nomination.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, First let me thank my colleagues, Senator 
Boxer and Senator Durbin for making available this time for me to 
address the Senate regarding this nomination. I rise today to oppose 
the nomination of national security adviser Condoleezza Rice for 
Secretary of State. I do so because she misled me about the situation 
in Iraq before and after the congressional resolution in October of 
2002 authorizing that war, a resolution that I opposed. She misled 
other Members of Congress about the situation in Iraq, Members who have 
said they would have opposed that resolution if they had been told the 
truth, and she misled the people of Minnesota and Americans everywhere 
about the situation in Iraq before and after that war began.
  It is a war in which 1,372 American soldiers have lost their lives, 
and over 10,000 have been wounded--many of them maimed for life. 
Thousands more have been scarred emotionally and physically. All of 
those families and thousands of other American families whose loved 
ones are now serving in Iraq are suffering serious financial and family 
hardships, and must wonder and worry every day and night for a year or 
longer whether their husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons, and 
daughters are still alive, will stay alive, and wonder when they will 
be coming home. For many, the answer is: Not soon.
  I read in today's Washington Post that the Army is planning to keep 
its current troop strength in Iraq at 120,000 for at least 2 more 
years. I did not learn that information as a Member of Congress. I did 
not learn it as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee where I 
regularly attend public hearings, classified meetings, and top secret 
briefings. I did not learn it from the U.S. military command in Iraq 
with whom I met in Baghdad last month. I read it in the Washington 
Post, just as I read last weekend that the Secretary of Defense has 
created his own new espionage arm by ``reinterpreting an existing 
law,'' without informing most, if any, Members of Congress and by 
reportedly ``reprogramming funds appropriated for other purposes;'' 
just as I learned last weekend by reading the New York Times that the 
Administration is exploring a reinterpretation of the law to allow 
secret U.S. commando units to operate in this country.
  I also learned of official reports documenting horrible abuses of 
prisoners, innocent civilians as well as enemy combatants, at numerous 
locations in countries besides the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which 
directly contradicts assurances we have been given repeatedly by 
administration officials in the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  I might as well skip all the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings 
and meetings and top secret briefings and just read the papers--and 
thank goodness for a free and vigilant press to ferret out the truth 
and to report the truth, because we cannot get the truth from this 
administration.
  Sadly, the attitude of too many of my colleagues across the aisle is: 
Our President, regardless whether he is wrong, wrong, or wrong, they 
defend him, they protect him, and they allow his top administration 
officials to get away with lying. Lying to Congress, lying to our 
committees, and lying to the American people. It is wrong. It is 
immoral. It is un-American. And it has to stop.
  It stops by not promoting top administration officials who engage in 
the practice, who have been instrumental in deceiving Congress and the 
American people and, regrettably, that includes Dr. Rice.
  Dr. Rice, in a television interview on September 8, 2002, as the 
administration was launching its campaign to scare the American people 
and stampede Congress about Saddam Hussein's supposedly urgent threat 
to our national security, shrewdly invoked the ultimate threat, that he 
possessed or would soon possess nuclear weapons. She said that day:

       We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.

  Soon thereafter she and other top administration officials cited 
intercepted aluminum tubes as definite proof that Saddam Hussein had an 
active nuclear weapons program underway. Dr. Rice stated publicly at 
the time the tubes:

     . . . are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, 
     centrifuge programs.

  In late September of 2002, shortly before we in Congress were to vote 
on the Iraq war resolution, Dr. Rice invited me, along with I believe 
five of my Senate colleagues, to the White House where we were briefed 
by her and then-CIA Director George Tenet. That briefing was 
classified. What I was shown and told conformed to Dr. Rice's public 
statements, with no qualification whatsoever. Now, of course, we have 
been told, after an exhaustive search for 18 months by over 1,400 
United States weapons inspectors, that Saddam Hussein did not have an 
active nuclear weapons development program underway and that he 
apparently possessed no weapons of mass destruction of any kind. We 
have also been told that in the fall of 2002, right at the time of my 
meeting in the White House, right at the time of the Senate and the 
House's votes on the Iraq war resolution, the top nuclear experts at 
the U.S. Department of Energy and officials in other Federal agencies 
were disagreeing strongly with Dr. Rice's claim that those aluminum 
tubes could only have been intended for use in developing nuclear 
weapons materials.
  That expert dissent and honest disagreement--a different point of 
view--was not communicated to me then nor was it brought to me later. I 
received no phone call or letter saying: Senator Dayton just wanted to 
correct a mis-impression that I unintentionally gave you at that 
meeting. I now have information that contradicts what we were told 
then. I still believe in my own views but I want you to be aware of 
others before you cast the most important vote of your Senate career or 
even a call or communication after that vote was cast. There was 
nothing.
  When Senator Boxer rightly pressed Dr. Rice on this point in the 
Foreign Relations confirmation hearing, there was no admission even 
then of any mistake. In fact, she replied: ``I really hope that you 
will refrain from impugning my integrity. Thank you, very much.''
  There is a saying that we judge ourselves by our intentions; others 
judge it by our actions.
  I don't know what Dr. Rice's intentions were, but I do have direct 
experience with her actions. There was no slight misunderstanding, or a 
slip, or even a mistake that was limited to one meeting. This was a 
public statement made repeatedly by Dr. Rice and similar words by Vice 
President Cheney and even by President Bush as part of an all-out 
campaign, which continues even today, to mobilize public support and 
maintain public support for the invasion of Iraq and for continuing war 
there regardless of what the facts were then, or are now, and it has 
been done by misrepresenting those facts, by distorting the facts, by 
withholding the facts, by hiding the truth, by hiding

[[Page 606]]

the truth in matters of life and death, of war and peace, that 
profoundly affect our national security, our international reputation, 
and our future well-being--and will for many years to come.
  I don't like to impugn anyone's integrity. But I really do not like 
being lied to repeatedly, flagrantly, intentionally. It is wrong. It is 
undemocratic. It is un-American, and it is dangerous. It is very 
dangerous, and it is occurring far too frequently in this 
administration.
  This Congress, this Senate must demand that it stop now. My vote 
against this nomination is my statement that this administration's 
lying must stop now. I urge my colleagues to join me in this demand, 
Democrat, Republicans, Independents. All of us first and foremost are 
Americans. We must be told the truth--for us to govern our country and 
to preserve our world. That is why we must vote against this 
nomination.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial 
by Dorothy Height of the Washington Post of January 19 be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 19, 2005]

                      In the Footsteps of History

                          (By Dorothy Height)

       When Condoleezza Rice is sworn in as secretary of state, 
     she will be following in the footsteps of Mary McLeod 
     Bethune, the founder of the National Council of Negro Women. 
     Mrs. Bethune was the first black woman to be called upon for 
     policy help by the White House, when Republican President 
     Calvin Coolidge asked her to take part in a conference on 
     child care in 1928. She went on to work with Republican and 
     Democratic presidents while always fighting to advance the 
     interests of black woman and children.
       From Sojourner Truth speaking out in the abolitionist 
     movement, to Constance Baker Motley as a voice in the 
     courtroom to Shirley Chisholm as a candidate for president, 
     African American women have braved a world that did not 
     welcome their participation.
       Ms. Rice will be the first woman of color to assume the 
     highest diplomatic post in the U.S. government. As secretary 
     of state, she will face challenges that confront women 
     everywhere. As we engage the Muslim and Arab worlds, efforts 
     are being renewed to suppress women's participation in 
     education, politics and civil society. In Africa, HIV and 
     AIDS are ravaging a generation of women and leaving millions 
     of orphans to be comforted. In Central and Eastern Europe, 
     woman and girls are being sold into prostitution.
       Despite the challenges she will face, Ms. Rice's 
     appointment is a time for women of color to smile. Our nation 
     finally will put forward a face that reflects the hopes of 
     generations of black women to sit at the table of national 
     and global affairs and participates as equals.
       Many women sacrificed to make this moment possible. I pray 
     that Ms. Rice will use this profound honor and heavy burden 
     to represent our country with compassion, strength and 
     integrity, while seeking peaceful solutions and working to 
     make the world a better place for all people.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the President's nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State presents the Senate with a 
difficult decision. Dr. Rice will bring an impressive set of public 
policy and academic credentials to the job of Secretary of State. Her 
personal story is inspiring. Nonetheless, Dr. Rice's record on Iraq 
gives me great concern.
  In her public statements, she clearly overstated and exaggerated the 
intelligence concerning Iraq before the war in order to support the 
President's decision to initiate military action against Iraq. Since 
the Iraq effort has run into great difficulty, she has also attempted 
to revise history as to why we went into Iraq.
  I approach this issue as the ranking member of the Armed Services 
Committee and as a member of the Intelligence Committee. Both 
committees have devoted a great deal of time over the last 2 years to 
issues concerning Iraq, including the Intelligence Committee inquiry 
into prewar intelligence.
  These inquiries indicated major problems with the intelligence on 
Iraq and how it was exaggerated or misused to make the case to the 
American people of the need to initiate an attack against Iraq. Dr. 
Rice is a major player in that effort--a frequent and highly visible 
public voice.
  Dr. Rice is not directly responsible for the intelligence failures 
prior to the Iraq war. The intelligence community's many failures are 
catalogued in the 500-page report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 
But Dr. Rice is responsible for her own distortions and exaggerations 
of the intelligence which was provided to her.
  Here are a few of those exaggerations and distortions.
  One of the most well known was the allegation that Iraq was trying to 
obtain uranium from Africa, which was cited to demonstrate that Iraq 
was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. But our intelligence 
community did not believe it was true, and took numerous actions to 
make its concerns known--even urging the British not to publish the 
allegation in September of 2002.
  So how did it happen that President Bush in his January 28, 2003, 
State of the Union speech said that ``The British government has 
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of 
uranium from Africa''?
  When the CIA saw a draft of the President's Cincinnati speech for 
October 7, 2002, it asked the White House to delete the allegation that 
Iraq had been seeking uranium from Africa, and the White House did 
remove the reference entirely.
  On October 5, 2002, the CIA sent a memo explaining its views to 
Steven Hadley, Dr. Rice's deputy. It sent another memo to Dr. Rice and 
to Mr. Hadley on October 6, again expressing doubt about the reports of 
Iraq's attempt to get uranium from Africa.
  Finally, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence himself, 
personally called Mr. Hadley to urge that the uranium allegation be 
removed from the speech--which it was.
  This was not just some routine staff action or a low-level CIA 
analyst who called the National Security Council. It was a memorandum 
from the CIA to Dr. Rice, and the Director of Central Intelligence 
himself who called Dr. Rice's deputy to make it clear what his concerns 
were and to request the removal of the allegation.
  Yet just 3\1/2\ months later the White House put the African uranium 
allegation back into a draft of the State of the Union speech. That 
draft made no mention of the British. It was a reference like the one 
that was removed from the Cincinnati speech a few months before. It 
asserted in that draft what purported to be the view of the U.S. 
Government--that Iraq had been trying to obtain uranium from Africa.
  According to Director Tenet, shortly before the speech was delivered, 
the CIA received portions of the draft of the State of the Union to 
review, including the allegation about uranium from Africa. A senior 
CIA staff member called the National Security Council staff to repeat 
his concerns about the allegation. Instead of removing the text from 
the speech, the National Security Council and the White House changed 
the text to make reference to the British view, suggesting, of course, 
that the United States believed the British view to be accurate.
  That formula was highly deceptive. The only reason to say the 
``British have learned'' that Saddam Hussein was seeking uranium from 
Africa was to create the impression that we believed it.
  But our intelligence community did not believe it. Indeed, they had 
attempted to dissuade the British from publishing the allegation in 
September, and they successfully made several high-level interventions 
with the White House in October to have the allegation removed from the 
President's Cincinnati speech. Concerning the British report, Director 
Tenet said the CIA ``differed with the British on the reliability of 
the uranium reporting.''
  What was the role of Dr. Rice in all of this? I asked her in my 
questions for the record whether she was aware the intelligence 
community had doubts

[[Page 607]]

about the credibility of the reports, and if not, how she could not 
know, given all of the activity prior to the President's October 7 
Cincinnati speech, including the memo to her.
  In response, Dr. Rice said, ``I do not recall reading or receiving 
the CIA memo,'' and ``I do not recall Intelligence Community concerns 
about the credibility of reports about Iraq's attempts to obtain 
uranium from Africa either at the time of the Cincinnati speech or the 
State of the Union speech.''
  Frankly, I am surprised and disappointed that the National Security 
Adviser would not remember an issue of this magnitude.
  However, it was not only the President who made that allegation, Dr. 
Rice made it herself in an op-ed in the New York Times on January 23, 
2003, 5 days before the State of the Union speech, and 3\1/2\ months 
after the same allegation had been removed from the Cincinnati speech 
at the CIA's request. She wrote that Iraq's declaration to the U.N. 
``fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from 
abroad.''
  Another question I asked Dr. Rice for the record was whether, prior 
to the January 2003 State of the Union speech, she had discussed with 
Steven Hadley, her Deputy, the choice of wording in that portion of the 
speech and whether she was aware that the language had been changed to 
refer to the British rather than stating it as the U.S. Government's 
view. In her response she said:

       Yes, I did discuss with Stephen Hadley concerns the 
     intelligence community had about protecting sources and 
     methods regarding reports on Iraq's attempts to procure 
     uranium from Africa. These concerns were addressed by citing 
     a foreign government service. I do not recall any discussion 
     of concerns about the credibility of the report.

  However, the CIA requested on three separate occasions that the 
reference in the Cincinnati speech be removed entirely because the CIA 
had doubts about the credibility of the reports.
  In Dr. Rice's answers to my questions, while she failed to remember 
all the direct interventions by the CIA to have the uranium allegation 
removed from the President's Cincinnati speech, including a CIA memo to 
her, she instead relied on a single sentence from the October 1, 2002, 
national intelligence estimate, asserting that ``Iraq also began 
vigorously trying to procure uranium and yellow cake'' from Africa.
  There are four problems with her answers. First, after that national 
intelligence estimate was produced, the CIA made its multiple 
interventions with the National Security Council, including two memos 
and the call from DCI Tenet to Dr. Rice's Deputy, to have the uranium 
allegation removed from the draft October 7 Cincinnati speech because 
of the doubts about the credibility of the reports. It was then 
removed.
  So the CIA's doubts about the reporting and the White House's removal 
of that allegation from the Cincinnati speech came after the hastily 
assembled national intelligence estimate of October 1, 2002.
  Second, according to George Tenet, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, the CIA's concerns were with the credibility of the 
reports, not with sources and methods. In a statement issued in July of 
2003, he said the CIA received portions of the draft speech shortly 
before it was given and that the CIA officials ``raised several 
concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence with the 
National Security Council colleagues.'' In that statement he made no 
fewer than five references to CIA doubts about the reliability of the 
intelligence. He did not mention concerns about protecting sources and 
methods.
  Third, in relying on one erroneous sentence in the NIE, Dr. Rice did 
not mention the opposing sentence in that same NIE written by the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which stated that 
``the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in 
INR's assessment, highly dubious.'' So the NIE, which she referred to, 
also contained an explicit dissenting view on the issue of African 
uranium, but she ignored that portion of the NIE.
  Finally, and most significantly, if the State of the Union speech was 
relying upon that one sentence in the national intelligence estimate, 
it would have presented the allegation about Iraq seeking African 
uranium as something the United States believed rather than something 
the ``British have learned.''
  That is where Dr. Rice's answers unravel. If the NIE's erroneous 
statement that ``Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium 
ore and yellow-cake'' from Africa was the basis for the State of the 
Union speech representations, that speech would not have relied on the 
British view. It would have been stated as our own view. The problem is 
that it was not our view. The statement about the British learning of 
Iraq's efforts to obtain uranium in Africa was a conscious effort to 
create an impression that we believed something that we actually did 
not believe.
  Now, there are other examples in which Dr. Rice exaggerated the 
intelligence or overstated the case to help persuade the public of the 
need to go to war against Iraq. Let me cite a few.
  On September 8, 2002, Dr. Rice said on CNN:

       We do know that there have been shipments going into . . . 
     Iraq, for instance, of . . . high quality aluminum tubes that 
     are only really suited for nuclear weapons, centrifuge 
     programs.

  On July 30, 2003, she said that ``the consensus view of the American 
intelligence agency'' was that the aluminum tubes ``were most likely 
for this use''--meaning for centrifuges to make nuclear weapons.
  However, contrary to her claim, there was no certainty and no 
consensus view within the intelligence community about the use of the 
aluminum tubes. In fact, there was a fundamental disagreement, and the 
Department of Energy, which has the Nation's foremost centrifuge 
experts, and the State Department did not believe the tubes were 
intended for centrifuges. They believed the tubes were intended for 
conventional artillery rockets. Their disagreeing views were explicitly 
included in the October 2002 national intelligence estimate.
  In my questions for the record, I asked Dr. Rice why she had said 
there was a consensus when there was none. Her answer did not respond 
to my question. So the question remains: Why did she say there was a 
consensus when there was not a consensus, and why did she say they were 
``only really suited for nuclear weapons'' when they were, in fact, not 
only suitable for other purposes but, indeed, had been used for other 
purposes by Iraq--namely, for conventional artillery rockets?
  In summary, Dr. Rice made the public case against Iraq as having 
reconstituted its nuclear weapons program far stronger than was 
supported by the classified intelligence. She exaggerated and distorted 
the facts and the intelligence provided to her in order to help 
convince the American public of the need to go to war.
  Dr. Rice has also not been forthcoming on the question of when she 
knew of the differences within the intelligence community relative to 
the intended use of the aluminum tubes. Senator Biden asked Dr. Rice in 
a written question before the confirmation hearings whether she knew of 
the long-standing debate within the intelligence community at the time 
of her September 8, 2002 statement that the aluminum tubes ``are only 
really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs,'' and 
when President Bush said four days later that ``Iraq has made several 
attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for 
a nuclear weapon.''
  She simply ducked the issue, and quoted a passage from the October 
2002 NIE about a number of alleged Iraqi uranium enrichment 
activities--including the aluminum tubes--noting that the Department of 
Energy believed the tubes ``probably are not part of'' the nuclear 
program. She never answered the question of whether she was aware of 
the debate when she and the President made their erroneous statements.
  One more example. On November 15, 2002, Dr. Rice said Saddam Hussein 
had been ``helping some al Qaeda operatives gain training in CBRN 
[Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear weapons].''

[[Page 608]]

  On March 9, 2003, shortly before the war, she made a statement about 
the links between Saddam and al Qaeda, including a ``very strong link 
to training al Qaeda in chemical and biological weapons techniques.''
  On September 7, 2003, she said:

     we know there was training of al Qaeda in chemical and 
     perhaps biological warfare.

  Those comments indicated certainty that Iraq provided training in 
chemical and biological weapons to al-Qaida. But the CIA had said that 
the reports of training came from sources of ``varying reliability,'' 
and were ``contradictory,'' as the Senate Intelligence Committee report 
makes clear.
  Dr. Rice took what was a possibility and portrayed it as a fact.
  Prior to the war, senior administration officials repeatedly and 
publicly stated that the reason the United States had to be prepared to 
use military force, and then go to war against Saddam, was to disarm 
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, which Saddam was said to be 
likely to provide to terrorists like al-Qaida.
  Before the war, Dr. Rice said the following, on September 25, 2002: 
``This is a matter of disarming the Iraqi regime, because that's the 
danger, is that Saddam Hussein with nuclear, chemical, biological 
weapons will be a threat to his people, his neighbors, and to us.''
  On March 9, 2003, just 10 days before the start of the war, she said: 
``What the President is saying to the American people is . . . `I will 
not stand by until the moment when Saddam Hussein is good at delivering 
biological weapons, by unmanned aerial vehicles.' ''
  On April 10, 2003 Ari Fleischer, the President's spokesman, 
summarized the point succinctly: ``We have high confidence that they 
have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and 
it is about.''
  When questioned about this issue at her confirmation hearing on 
January 18, Dr. Rice joined the effort to rewrite the history of the 
publicly stated reasons for attacking Iraq. She said: ``It wasn't just 
weapons of mass destruction. . . . It was the total picture, Senator, 
not just weapons of mass destruction, that caused us to decide that, 
post-September 11th, it was finally time to deal with Saddam Hussein.''
  The simple fact is that before the war, the administration repeatedly 
and dramatically made the case for war on the issue of Iraq possessing 
and continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction, and the 
likelihood that Saddam Hussein would provide those weapons to 
terrorists like al Qaeda. For Dr. Rice to suggest that there were many 
other, equally compelling, reasons to go to war simply does not square 
with the reality of how the administration persuaded the American 
people and the Congress of the need for war. Her suggestion is an 
effort to revise the history of the administration's presentations to 
the American people.
  Dr. Rice again engaged in revisionist history about the Iraq military 
campaign during her nomination hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on January 18, 2005. Dr. Rice claimed: ``This was 
never going to be easy; it was always going to have ups and downs.''
  Dr. Rice's statement is striking, not because of its substance, but 
because of how it stands in contrast to what the administration was 
telling Congress and the American people in the months before the 
invasion of Iraq.
  The administration downplayed the difficulties of invading Iraq by 
claiming that we would be greeted as ``liberators'' by the Iraqi 
people. When Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki predicted that 
``several hundred thousand soldiers'' probably would be needed for the 
occupation of Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein, senior Defense 
Department officials rejected General Shinseki's assessment. Instead, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee 
before the start of the war: ``I am reasonably certain that they [the 
Iraqi people] will greet us as liberators, and that will help us to 
keep requirements down.'' He also said that ``the notion of hundreds of 
thousands of American troops is way off the mark.''
  Vice President Cheney also repeated this claim to downplay the cost 
of regime change in Iraq. During an appearance on NBC's ``Meet the 
Press'' on March 16, 2003, the Vice President said: ``The read we get 
on the people of Iraq is there is no question . . .  they will welcome 
as liberators the United States when we come to do that.''
  It was precisely the administration's rose-colored conviction that 
our troops would be hailed by the Iraqi people as liberators that 
resulted in the inexcusable failure to plan for a difficult and costly 
occupation of Iraq following the end of major hostilities.
  Similarly, administration officials grossly underestimated the costs 
to the American people of rebuilding Iraq. In March 2003, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz testified before Congress that Iraq 
``can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' The 
next month, in April 2003, the head of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development publicly estimated that the American 
taxpayers' portion of Iraqi reconstruction costs would be $1.7 billion, 
adding that there were ``no plans for any further-on funding for 
this.'' Instead, Congress has approved over $20 billion in 
reconstruction funds for Iraq, and the final bill for the American 
taxpayer could reach hundreds of billions of dollars.
  The Administration used the same rose-colored glasses in estimating 
the cost of rebuilding Iraq. Dr. Rice said there were always going to 
be ``ups and downs''. But before the war, the administration never 
talked about, never planned for, and never prepared the American people 
for the ``downs'' of rebuilding Iraq. It only focused on the ``ups''. 
So I find Dr. Rice's latest assessment that the administration never 
thought that the post-Saddam period was going to be easy to be 
startlingly at odds with the administration's claims in making the case 
for the Iraq war in the first place.
  One of my main concerns about this administration, including Dr. 
Rice, is that there appears to be no accountability for the many 
mistakes.
  Consider the case of George Tenet, the former Director of Central 
Intelligence, who covered the administration's exaggerations on Iraq. 
President Bush had been publicly saying things like ``on any given 
day,'' Saddam could provide WMD to terrorists, and that Saddam ``would 
like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and kill 
and leave no fingerprints.'' President Bush repeatedly indicated that 
Saddam might give WMD to terrorists without provocation.
  On October 7, 2002 DCI Tenet sent a letter to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee declassifying portions of its new National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iraq. That letter made clear that the intelligence 
community believed it was unlikely that Saddam would share WMD with 
terrorists, and said it would be an ``extreme step'' and a ``last 
chance to exact vengeance'' if the U.S. had already attacked Iraq.
  So there was a clear inconsistency between the views of the 
intelligence community and the public comments of the President. Yet, 
incredibly, on October 8, 2002, just a few days before the Senate was 
to vote on the resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq, 
DCI Tenet issued a statement to the press saying ``there is no 
inconsistency'' between the views in the letter and the President's 
views, which was simply false. Its motivation was transparent: An 
honest acknowledgment of inconsistency might have had a negative effect 
on the Senate vote.
  Instead of being held accountable for that critical misstatement, and 
instead of being held accountable for the October 2002 NIE, which was 
rife with errors, all in the direction of making Iraq more threatening, 
including erroneous statements not based on the underlying 
intelligence, George Tenet was awarded the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom by President Bush. That is not accountability. Accountability 
for mistakes and failures, no matter how serious, is not the hallmark 
of this administration.
  Dr. Rice's exaggerations and distortions concerning Iraq were an 
important part of the administration's effort to convince the American 
people of the need to go to war. Few things are as fateful as that 
decision.

[[Page 609]]

  Finally, Secretaries of State must be strong enough to tell a 
President what he may not want to hear. There is admittedly one recent 
glimmer of hope in that regard.
  In response to my written question, Dr. Rice did acknowledge that 
``there is of course a distinction'' between Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda when it comes to the war on terrorism. That stands in contrast to 
President Bush's claim on September 25, 2002, that ``[Y]ou can't 
distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on 
terror.''
  But that glimmer of independence is not enough to change my view that 
Dr. Rice should not be confirmed as Secretary of State.
  The Bush administration's prewar distortions and exaggerations of 
intelligence concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to 
al Qaeda were the publicly stated basis for initiating the war.
  I ask unanimous consent the questions and answers I asked of Dr. Rice 
also be printed in the Record following my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burr). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Finally, I think I have 1 additional minute. I will use 
that to conclude.
  Voting to confirm Dr. Rice as Secretary of State would be a stamp of 
approval for her participation in the distortions and exaggerations of 
intelligence that the administration used before it initiated the war 
in Iraq, and the hubris which led to the administration's inexcusable 
failure to plan and prepare for the aftermath of the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein, with tragic ongoing consequences.
  I believe we must do all we can to support our troops in their 
efforts to create a democratic government in Iraq, despite the 
circumstances we are in. But I cannot, in good conscience, give my 
approval to the mistakes and misjudgments that helped to create those 
circumstances. I will, therefore, vote against the confirmation of Dr. 
Rice to be Secretary of State.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

  Questions for the Record From Senator Carl Levin to Dr. Condoleezza 
   Rice, and Her Responses (in Conjunction With Her Nomination To Be 
                          Secretary of State)


                          Uranium From Africa

       1. The CIA had sent a memo to you and Mr. Hadley on October 
     6, 2002 concerning a draft of the President's scheduled 
     October 7, 2002 Cincinnati speech. That memo included an 
     explanation of the reasons why the CIA believed the reference 
     to Iraq's attempts to obtain uranium from Africa should be 
     deleted. The CIA had sent a previous memo to Mr. Hadley (and 
     Mr. Gerson, who was the speechwriter) the day before that 
     memo sent to you, again expressing its doubts about the 
     reports of Iraq's attempts to get uranium from Africa. 
     Finally, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, 
     called Mr. Hadley directly to ask that the reference to 
     uranium from Africa be deleted from the October 7 speech. As 
     a result of the CIA's multiple expressions of its doubts 
     about these reports, the reference was deleted, and the 
     October 2002 speech made no mention of Iraq's purported 
     attempts to obtain uranium from Africa. Given all this and 
     other activity, were you aware at that time (October 2002) 
     that the Intelligence Community had doubts about the reports 
     of Iraq's purported efforts to obtain uranium from Africa? 
     Were you aware prior to January 28, 2003, the date of the 
     President's State of the Union speech?
       Answer: I do not recall Intelligence Community concerns 
     about the credibility of reports about Iraq's attempts to 
     obtain uranium from Africa either at the time of the 
     Cincinnati speech or the State of the Union speech. I would 
     note that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report 
     on prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq stated:
       ``When coordinating the State of the Union, no Central 
     Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts or officials told the 
     National Security Council (NSC) to remove the `6 words' or 
     that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-
     Niger uranium reporting.''
       2. Prior to the State of the Union speech (January 28, 
     2003), did you ever discuss with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, George Tenet, the Intelligence Community's 
     doubts about reports of Iraq's attempts to get uranium from 
     Africa? If so, when was the first time you discussed the 
     matter with him, and how many times did you discuss the issue 
     prior to the State of the Union?
       Answer: I do not recall discussing Intelligence Community 
     doubts about such reports with Director Tenet prior to the 
     State of the Union.
       3. Prior to the State of the Union speech of January 2003, 
     did you ever discuss with Stephen Hadley, your deputy, the 
     choice of wording for the speech concerning Iraq's purported 
     attempts to obtain uranium from Africa? Prior to the speech, 
     were you aware that the language had been changed to make 
     reference to the British having learned of such efforts, 
     rather than stating it as the US Government view?
       Answer: Yes, I did discuss with Stephen Hadley concerns the 
     Intelligence Community had about protecting sources and 
     methods regarding reports on Iraqi attempts to procure 
     uranium from Africa. These concerns were addressed by citing 
     a foreign government service. I do not recall any discussion 
     of concerns about the credibility of the reports.
       4. Were you at all involved in the decision-making process 
     about the phraseology of the wording for the January 28, 2003 
     State of the Union speech concerning Iraq's purported 
     attempts to obtain uranium from Africa (``The British 
     government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
     significant quantities of uranium from Africa'')? Who was the 
     author of the wording, and was the author aware that the CIA 
     had serious doubts about the claim at least as early as 
     September 2002?
       Answer: Yes, I did discuss with Stephen Hadley concerns the 
     Intelligence Community had about protecting sources and 
     methods regarding reports on Iraqi attempts to procure 
     uranium from Africa. The State of the Union speech was 
     prepared by the President's speechwriters, in coordination 
     with other members of the executive branch. I do not know who 
     actually authored the words about Iraq's attempts to procure 
     uranium from Africa.
       5. On July 13, 2004 you said the following on Face the 
     Nation: ``What I knew at the time is that no one had told us 
     that there were concerns about the British reporting.'' Given 
     all the activity indicating CIA doubts and concerns about the 
     claim, including a CIA memo sent to you in early October 
     2002, how could you not know of the doubts and concerns?
       Answer: I do not recall reading or receiving the CIA memo 
     of October 2002. However, I was aware of the October 2002 
     National Intelligence Estimate stating ``Iraq also began 
     vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; 
     acquiring either could shorten the time Baghdad needs to 
     produce nuclear weapons.''
       6. On June 8, 2003, on ABC's This Week with George 
     Stephanopoulos, you said ``At the time the State of the Union 
     address was prepared, there were also other sources that said 
     that they were, the Iraqis were seeking yellow-cake, uranium 
     oxide, from Africa. And that was taken out of a British 
     report. Clearly, that particular report, we learned 
     subsequently, subsequently, was not credible. . . . The 
     intelligence community did not know at that time or at levels 
     that got to us that this, that there was serious questions 
     about this report.''
       How could you say such a thing when, before the State of 
     the Union speech, the CIA had told the British of its doubts 
     about the claim and urged them to remove it from their 
     dossier; when the Director of Central Intelligence had 
     personally called your Deputy, Stephen Hadley; when the DCI 
     had sent a memo on October 5 to Mr. Hadley; and when he sent 
     another memo to you and Mr. Hadley on October 6, all 
     explaining why the claim should be removed from the 
     President's October 7 Cincinnati speech, which it was. How 
     can you claim that ``the intelligence community did not know 
     at that time or at levels that got to us that this, that 
     there was serious questions about this report''?
       Answer: National Intelligence Estimates represent the 
     authoritative judgment of the Intelligence Community. CIA 
     also provided information citing Iraq's attempts to procure 
     uranium from Africa to the White House four days before the 
     State of the Union speech. I would also note that the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee concluded that no CIA analysts or 
     officials expressed doubt about the uranium reporting when 
     coordinating on the State of the Union speech.


                          Iraq: Aluminum Tubes

       7. On July 30, 2003, you said ``the consensus view of the 
     American intelligence agency'' [sic] was . . . that the 
     aluminum tubes ``were most likely for this use,'' meaning for 
     centrifuges to make nuclear weapons. However, there was no 
     consensus view on the use of the aluminum tubes; there was a 
     fundamental disagreement within the Intelligence Community, 
     and the Department of Energy and the State Department did not 
     believe the tubes were intended for centrifuges. Given that 
     there was no consensus, why did you say there was?
       Answer: The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
     established the Intelligence Community's authoritative 
     assessment on the aluminum tubes issue. It stated:
       ``Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in 
     and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength 
     aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's 
     attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines 
     and machine tools--provide compelling evidence that Saddam is 
     reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for

[[Page 610]]

     Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that 
     reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but 
     assesses that the tubes are probably not part of the 
     program.)'' A footnote noted INR's alternative view to the 
     NIE's authoritative assessment.


               No Distinction Between Iraq and al Qaeda?

       8. Do you make any distinction between Saddam Hussein and 
     al Qaeda when it comes to the war on terror, or do you think 
     they are indistinguishable?
       Answer: Yes, there is of course a distinction, but Saddam 
     Hussein did harbor terrorists and had many other ties to 
     terrorists, including contacts with al Qaeda, as the 9-11 
     Commission recognized. And he was an avowed enemy of America 
     and of our allies. The possibility that an outlaw state might 
     pass a weapon of mass destruction to a terrorist is the 
     greatest danger of our time.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate reconvenes at 2:15, the following be the order of speakers: 
Senator McConnell, Senator Byrd, Senator Hagel, Senator Allen, Senator 
Boxer, Senator Alexander, Senator Durbin, a Republican Senator, and 
Senator Feinstein.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. This will be helpful, I believe, so 
Senators can allocate their time. I would comment to the Chair this 
means that essentially the period from 2:15 to approximately 5 o'clock 
will be consumed by these Senators. But the order allows for 9 hours of 
debate, which means theoretically there could be 4 more hours-plus 
after that to accommodate other Senators.
  Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that during quorum calls 
the time be charged equally against both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. BAYH. I ask my colleague from Texas, which of us was on the floor 
first?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I do not know. I thought I was 
supposed to speak at 12:15, but if----
  Mr. BAYH. I thought I was supposed to speak at 12:10. So I guess the 
trains are not running on schedule today.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished chairman, are 
there any other speakers or are Senator Bayh and I the last two?
  Mr. LUGAR. My information is at some point Senator Salazar wishes to 
speak before the luncheons.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I would suggest, then, that Senator Bayh go next and 
I be able to follow him.
  Mr. LUGAR. And then Senator Salazar be accommodated. I ask unanimous 
consent that be the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for her 
courtesy, and I pledge I will do my best to finish in 10 minutes or 
less.
  It is a pleasure to be on the floor today with my friend and 
colleague from Indiana. I have often thought that events around the 
world, and particularly in Iraq, would have gone so much better if 
those in a position to make policy for our country had listened to his 
wise counsel and advice. It is not often I find myself in disagreement 
with my friend, but on this occasion I do.
  I rise to express my opposition to the nomination of Condoleezza Rice 
and her proposed promotion to that of the position of Secretary of 
State--not because I object to her personally; I do not; not because I 
oppose the mission of establishing freedom and democracy in Iraq; on 
the contrary, I support it; but because I believe she has been a 
principal architect of policy errors that have tragically undermined 
our prospects for success in this endeavor.
  Those in charge must be held accountable for mistakes. We must learn 
from them, correct them, so we may succeed in Iraq. If the President of 
the United States will not do this, then those in the Senate must.
  The list of errors is lengthy and profound, and, unfortunately, many 
could have been avoided if Dr. Rice and others had only listened to the 
counsel offered from both sides of the aisle.
  From the beginning of this undertaking, we have had inadequate troop 
strength to accomplish the mission. The mission was, of course, not to 
simply realize regime change in Iraq but, instead, to recognize and 
accomplish nation building at its most profound. We violated a 
fundamental tenet of planning for war, which is to plan for the worst 
and hope for the best. Instead, all too often in Iraq we have hoped for 
the best and, instead, are reaching the worst.
  The advice to have greater troop strength was not partisan. Our 
colleagues, Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, and others, virtually 
pleaded with the administration to provide for greater security through 
troop strength on the ground. Those pleas fell on deaf ears.
  We have never had a realistic plan for the aftermath of this 
conflict. The State Department made plans. They were disregarded. The 
CIA warned of the potential for a growing insurgency. Their concerns 
were dismissed. Senator Lugar held hearings that were prescient in this 
regard, pointing out the importance of planning for the aftermath and 
the inadequacy of the preparation for the aftermath before the war. The 
results of those hearings were ignored.
  This is no ordinary incompetence. Men and women are dying as a result 
of these mistakes. Accountability must be had. We dismissed the Iraqi 
Army.
  In my trip to Iraq in December, one of our top ranking officials told 
me there that things today in Iraq would be 100-percent better--100-
percent better--if we had only not dismissed the Iraqi Army; not the 
generals, not the human rights violators, not those who should be held 
accountable for their own actions, but the privates, the corporals, the 
lieutenants, the captains, those who should be on our side providing 
for stability and security in Iraq and now, tragically, are being paid 
to kill Americans because we sent them home and said they had no future 
in the Iraq that we were hoping to build.
  Likewise, we disqualified all former Baathists from serving even in 
lower levels of the bureaucracy in that country. They could have helped 
us run the nation. They could have helped us to reassure the Sunni 
community that we wanted to reincorporate them in the future of Iraq. 
Instead, many of them are fighting us today in Iraq as well.
  All of these mistakes have substantially undermined our prospects for 
success, and tragically so. The chaos that has arisen from the lack of 
security and stability has fed this insurgency.
  I asked one of our top ranking officials in Iraq in December which 
was growing more quickly, our ability to train Iraqis to combat the 
insurgency or the insurgency itself? His two-word response: The 
insurgency. Unfortunately, in some regards we have even succeeded in 
discrediting the very cause for which we are fighting and dying today. 
I listened intently to the President's inaugural address on the steps 
of this Capitol in which he spoke repeatedly about the need to advocate 
freedom and liberty and democracy around the world, not only because it 
is in our interest but because it is in the interest of peace and 
stability across the planet as a whole. In that regard he is right.
  But I could not help but recall the words of a member of the Iraqi 
Electoral Commission, a Turkoman from Kirkuk, who finally looked at me 
in Baghdad and said: Senator, you do not understand. For too many of my 
people, when they hear the word ``democracy,'' they think violence, 
they think disorder, they think death and economic disintegration.
  It does not get much sadder than that. It is heartbreaking that the 
sacrifices that have been made, the idealism of our troops, America's 
prospects for success in Iraq, our very standing in the world, have too 
often been undercut by ineptitude at the highest levels of our own 
Government.

[[Page 611]]

  I think of a visit, 6 months ago, with some of our colleagues to 
Walter Reed Army Hospital to visit with some of the soldiers who have 
returned. They are constantly on my mind. I think of their idealism, 
their heroism, their perseverance in the face of an adversity that 
those of us who are not there can hardly imagine.
  We have a moral obligation to provide better leadership than that 
which has been provided in this conflict. Too often this administration 
has suggested that the refusal to admit error, to learn from error, to 
correct error is a virtue. When lives and limbs are at stake, it is 
not.
  As a former executive of our own State, I have always believed that 
accountability for performance is vitally important to success. If this 
President will not provide it, then it is up to those of us in the 
Senate to do so.
  I believe with all of my heart that our country is strongest when we 
stand for freedom and democracy. We are attempting to accomplish the 
right thing in Iraq. We have been the authors of much of our own 
misery. As a result of that, I cannot find it in my heart or in my mind 
to vote for the promotion of Dr. Rice. Accountability is important. I 
will vote no and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I have listened to some of the debate 
on this nomination. It is unfortunate that we have lost focus about 
what we should be doing in the confirmation of the Secretary of State. 
I don't think rehashing potential mistakes some think may have been 
made in the war on terrorism, specifically in Iraq, is something that 
should be brought up as a reason to vote against Condoleezza Rice for 
Secretary of State.
  I, for one, will say mistakes have been made. I don't think war is 
ever perfect. You can't make an outline and say this is how a war is 
going to go and expect it to go in that exact way. However, I don't 
think anyone could have anticipated all that has happened or the kind 
of enemy that we face. An enemy that is willing to blow itself up to 
kill innocent people requires a different strategy and approach. We are 
making the adjustments.
  One of the leaders who has kept a steady focus on the war on 
terrorism and our efforts in Iraq is the woman who is before us today. 
It is Condoleezza Rice who has kept the steady aim and helped our 
President see all of the minefields out there. This has strengthened 
our country, to stay the course in the war on terrorism. The 
stabilization of Iraq is a step forward to promoting peace worldwide.
  Condoleezza Rice is absolutely the most qualified person to succeed a 
wonderful Secretary of State, Colin Powell. What do you want in a 
Secretary of State? What do you look for? What would foreign leaders 
look for in a Secretary of State?
  No. 1: Somebody who has a deep understanding of foreign policy. 
Condoleezza Rice has had a 25-year career in foreign policy, an 
exemplary academic background, graduating with a Ph.D. in international 
studies with a Russian focus--concentration on Russian history and 
Russian relations--cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa. She has the absolute 
ability to do this job, unquestionably, and she has the experience. For 
25 years she has served three Presidents, been a key adviser in the one 
of the most tumultuous times of our history, and after 9/11, brought 
our country together by focusing on an enemy that is a new kind of 
enemy. Condoleezza Rice has done that, and she has done a great job.
  No. 2: In looking for a Secretary of State, you want someone who is 
known to our country and known to foreign leaders. She will not be a 
stranger, speaking for our President. She is known to foreign leaders 
because as national security advisor, she has dealt with foreign 
leaders throughout the world. She has strong working relationships with 
world leaders, foreign ministers, national security advisers, and our 
closest allies. These relationships have been developed for over a 
quarter of a century. They will be valuable assets to our country and 
to her.
  Having been a Soviet affairs specialist, who worked during the Cold 
War, she helped guide our Nation's efforts to promote freedom and 
democracy throughout that part of the world in the emerging Soviet 
republics. She helped guide our Nation to promote freedom throughout 
the world, by stressing the virtues of democracy, defying those who 
suggested that communism was here to stay and Eastern Europe could not 
be liberated. With the unification of Germany and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Reagan administration made history with Condoleezza 
Rice in a key position.
  No 3: You want a Secretary of State to be a trusted adviser to the 
President. There is no doubt the President and Dr. Rice know each other 
well. The President trusts her. And when foreign leaders talk to 
Condoleezza Rice, they will know she is speaking for the President, 
through offers made and pronouncements stated. Being a trusted adviser 
to the President is very important.
  And, No. 4: You need someone who can manage a very large and 
important department of our Government with offices strewn throughout 
the world and with ambassadors reporting affairs in those countries. It 
will be important to have someone who is a good manager. She has served 
as Provost of Stanford University during her 6 years there, managing a 
diverse population.
  On a personal note, I wrote a book called ``American Heroines,'' and 
one of the interviewees I had was Condoleezza Rice. I was talking to 
contemporary women who have broken barriers, and I interviewed 
Condoleezza Rice. I asked her the question: What is the best 
preparation for the rough and tumble of your job? She said: Without a 
doubt, being provost of Stanford University, because I dealt with 1,400 
very smart people who were basically independent contractors, and I had 
to learn when to persuade, when to inform, and when to demand.
  If that isn't a recipe for Secretary of State, I don't know one: When 
to persuade, when to inform, and when to demand. Diplomats need to know 
when to do each of these and she has honed these skills during her time 
as National Security Adviser, and most certainly while managing the 
1,400-member faculty at Stanford University.
  She has become a person uniquely qualified for this position. I am so 
proud to support her. She is a woman who is unflappable and has 
comported herself with dignity through the most trying times, through 
trying hearings and trying questioning. She has dealt with the largest 
crisis that we have had in our country, surely in the last 25 years, 9/
11, finding out who the enemy is, where that enemy was being trained, 
and trying to make sure that we had a strategy to combat it.
  Condoleezza Rice will be a great Secretary of State. She will make 
her mark on this position as some of the best Secretaries of State in 
our history have done. She has the capability. She has the trusted ear 
of the President. She has the knowledge of foreign policy from 25 years 
of experience and relationships with heads of state and foreign 
ministers, friend and enemy alike, and will work well with them.
  She is going to collaborate when collaboration is called for in our 
foreign policy but more importantly, she will protect America when it 
is necessary.
  I am proud of this nomination. I am proud of the President for 
bringing her in as National Security Adviser, working with her, 
learning from her and teaching her at the same time. The relationship 
is perfect for the new challenge she will face.
  She is up to this challenge. I have every faith in her. I hope our 
colleagues will look to the future, look to what she can do, and will 
not rehash things in the past for which she was not responsible. She 
deserves the opportunity to represent our country, and, more important, 
give the President of the United States the person he wants in this 
job. As we face a very difficult 4 years, he deserves to have the 
person he chose. I hope the vote will be overwhelming.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Colorado.

[[Page 612]]


  Mr. SALAZAR. Mr. President, I rise today in relation to the 
nomination of Dr. Rice to be Secretary of State. Section 2 of Article 
II of the Constitution obligates the Senate to advise and consent on 
the President's nominees for his cabinet.
  That is a solemn duty, to be sure. So let me be clear up front that I 
will give my consent to Dr. Rice's nomination. I believe she is 
qualified for this important post and I am hopeful she will do an 
outstanding job advancing the interests and ideals of this great 
country.
  As a U.S. Senator, given the gravity of the situation facing the 
United States in Iraq, I also want to take this moment to meet my 
obligation to advise Dr. Rice and the President.
  I do this for one reason. We all serve here at the pleasure of the 
citizens of our States. Our efforts fail or succeed based on the 
informed consent of those citizens. Nowhere is that more clear than in 
the areas of war and peace. The consequences of war are clear. Like so 
many American families, my family knows the pain and sacrifice of war. 
My relatives have been killed on the soils of Europe and other places.
  In World War II, we lost nearly half a million Americans. In the war 
in Iraq, we have lost 1,371 soldiers and more than 10,000 have been 
wounded. I visited some of our young brave men and women at Walter Reed 
Army Medical Center a few weeks ago and saw the struggles and pains of 
them and their families as they suffered from the wounds of war.
  I support our troops and I pray and hope that their efforts in Iraq 
will have not been in vain and that the elections next week will usher 
in a new and free democracy in that nation.
  Nor do I rise today out of some partisan spirit. In fact, over the 
last 3 weeks I have very publicly and very clearly spoken in favor of 
two other cabinet nominees. This is a patriotic obligation, not a 
partisan exercise.
  As we look to the future, I believe strongly we must reflect on the 
past and constantly review and assess our performance for lessons 
learned for the American people. In fact, no one does a better job of 
this than the United States military. It invests great manpower and 
hours in after-action reviews to ensure that its doctrine, planning and 
execution were as good as it could have and should have been.
  Such an after-action review for the aministration would, I think, 
reveal clear concerns. There has been a general lack of candor--to our 
troops and their families, to our taxpayers and even, to some extent, 
to ourselves. Only by addressing this failure can we hope to ensure the 
continued informed consent of the American people for this historic 
undertaking in Iraq.
  This morning's paper reports that the Army is preparing to keep the 
level of U.S. troops in Iraq unchanged through the next 2 years. It is 
troubling because our troops have been told so many different things so 
many times that I fear they no longer know what lies ahead in their 
future.
  I have to believe that was a troubling headline to read for the 
150,000 families--including the more than 2,000 in Colorado--who have 
loved ones deployed to Iraq and the thousands of others who know that 
their loved ones will be redeploying to Iraq for a second or even a 
third tour.
  This morning's newspaper also reports that the administration will 
seek an additional $80 billion for ongoing operations in Iraq. This is 
over and above the more than $149 billion already appropriated for this 
effort. Compare that with what the aministration told the American 
people on January 19, 2003, when it said that this entire effort would 
cost less than $50 billion.
  I remind my colleagues that each and every dollar of this operation 
is money added to the deficit. That is money borrowed from foreign 
governments that will have to be paid for by our children.
  As troubling as that deficit is, we will soon be faced with the 
challenge of deciding how to pay for many domestic issues, including 
most importantly, the health care our veterans have earned, and some 
are arguing we should tell the American people and our veterans that we 
simply cannot afford a level of care they have come to expect.
  Lastly, I am concerned about what can only be called a lack of 
candor--and urgency--with ourselves and our decisions.
  What else could explain the massive intelligence failures that 
preceded
9/11--the failure to see what was coming from al-Qaida, despite the 
years of its hateful rhetoric and despicable actions. And what else can 
explain the slowness in creating the Department on Homeland Security, 
or the lack of support for the 9/11 Commission and its clarion call for 
intelligence reform in the face of this hateful enemy. And what else--
unless it was that, counter to all warnings from our military, we 
convinced ourselves that this effort in Iraq would be over in weeks, 
not years--can account for the fact that now, nearly 2 years since the 
start of this operation, our troops do not have the armor they need?
  I end where I began, Mr. President. My advice is simple. To succeed 
in Iraq and elsewhere in the world, we need to heed the lessons learned 
over the past years. We need to be sure our intelligence is sound 
before we commit our troops, ensure our troops are prepared, and ensure 
our citizens are informed.
  Educated, as she was, in Denver, I am confident Dr. Rice took to 
heart the candor and straight talk that we value in the West and in 
Colorado. Those will be important attributes for her to employ as she 
becomes Secretary of State.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask the Chair how much time remains on 
both sides of the aisle for debate this afternoon?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 3 hours 35 minutes. The 
minority has 3 hours 39 minutes.
  Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

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