[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 12613-12614]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      LESSONS LEARNED FROM TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
                              SHORTCOMINGS

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                           HON. DOUG BEREUTER

                              of nebraska

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 16, 2004

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues the 
following editorial from the May 27, 2004, Lincoln Journal Star. The 
editorial highlights some of the shortcomings of the Transportation 
Security Administration and its baggage screening system. Clearly, the 
creation of a large, new Federal force is not necessarily the best way 
to address legitimate security concerns.

             [From the Lincoln Journal Star, May 27, 2004]

                Nuclear Plant Special Force Questionable

       An alarmed Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham wants more and 
     tighter security at government facilities that have 
     radioactive material that could be fashioned into nuclear 
     devices.
       No argument here. The dangers of lax security at such sites 
     are too awful to contemplate and too real to dismiss.
       According to an account from The Associated Press, Abraham, 
     in calling earlier this

[[Page 12614]]

     month for reforms, cited poor performance in mock security 
     exercises and other failings--cheating on readiness tests, 
     lost keys--by guards from private contractors.
       Chief among Abraham's solutions to the problems he found: a 
     federal police force to guard the facilities and an elite 
     force to protect areas with the most sensitive nuclear 
     weapons material.
       Sounds impressive, until you consider how the last special 
     force set up for national security has done.
       That force--the hardworking men and women of the 
     Transportation Security Administration--still hasn't proved 
     that it can reliably protect the nation's commercial 
     airports.
       To be sure, they're trying.
       Since the agency started work Nov. 19, 2002, it geared up 
     with some 60,000 people to screen passengers and their 
     luggage. Congress has since limited that number to 45,000, so 
     the agency has raised and lowered staffing at airports here 
     and there to meet demand.
       The agency professionals have confiscated thousands of 
     banned objects from often bewildered, sometimes bemused 
     travelers; guns and garrotes; straight razors and knitting 
     needles; tin snips and butter knives.
       There is also little doubt the agency has thwarted 
     dangerous incidents long before they reached any newspaper's 
     front page and for that it should be honored and thanked.
       But the Transportation Security Administration's still 
     young and still learning some hard lessons. Among them that 
     shake public faith;
       In November, a college student secreted box cutters through 
     airport checkpoints and onto at least two planes. He sent an 
     e-mail to federal authorities saying he had put the items 
     aboard two specific Southwest Airlines flights. The objects 
     were not found until five weeks later.
       In November, an Eppley Airfield baggage screener was 
     charged with dealing cocaine after 8 ounces of cocaine, 7 
     grams of crack cocaine and manufacturing equipment were found 
     in his Omaha home. According to the AP, between 1993 and 1997 
     the man was convicted of six misdemeanors including 
     obstructing an officer and disorderly conduct.
       In October, it was reported that written tests given 
     potential baggage screeners never asked applicants to show 
     they could identify dangerous objects inside luggage. In 
     addition, the investigation by the Homeland Security 
     Department--overseer of the Transportation Security 
     Administration--showed that some screeners hired by the 
     government to check baggage for bombs were given most of the 
     answers to tests.
       Also in October, the head of the Transportation Security 
     Administration acknowledged that box cutters can get through 
     airport checkpoints. But the chief, James Loy, blamed the 
     lack and sophistication of technology, not his screeners.
       There may be no way to prove that creating Loy's agency was 
     necessary. But it is easy to prove that it has been costly.
       The question is: Can Energy Secretary Abraham prove that a 
     new, specialized force to protect nuclear facilities will be 
     any more successful than the contractors already overseen by 
     his department's specialized bureaucracy, the National 
     Nuclear Security Administration?
       And if that agency is incapable, will a new expensive 
     bureaucracy do any better?
       Other federal agencies have elite forces available--the 
     Secret Service and FBI are but two. Could their highly 
     trained men and women be given another mission, supported by 
     their bureaucracy?
       Surely the money saved could be spent on creating and 
     providing the technology that Abraham says is lacking for 
     airport screeners, technology that might well benefit the 
     forces protecting the nation's nuclear weapons and power 
     plants.

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