[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 12516-12528]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




   PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4567, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2005

  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 675 and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 675

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 4567) making appropriations for the Department 
     of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     2005, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill 
     shall be dispensed with. All points of order against 
     consideration of the bill are waived. General debate shall be 
     confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally 
     divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Appropriations. After general 
     debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 
     five-minute rule. Points of order against provisions in the 
     bill for failure to comply with clause 2 of rule XXI are 
     waived except as follows: the proviso under the heading 
     ``United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
     Technology''; the proviso under the heading ``Customs and 
     Border Protection, Automation Modernization''; the proviso 
     under the heading ``Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
     Automation Modernization''; the final proviso under the 
     heading ``Transportation Security Administration, Aviation 
     Security''; the words ``notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law'' under the heading ``State and Local Programs''; the 
     second proviso under the heading ``National Pre-Disaster 
     Mitigation Fund''; section 512; the final proviso in section 
     513; sections 514, 515, 519, and 520; all after the word 
     ``met'' in section 524; section 525, and subsection 526(b). 
     Where points of order are waived against part of a paragraph 
     or section, points of order against a provision in another 
     part of such paragraph or section may be made only against 
     such provision and not against the entire paragraph or 
     section. During consideration of the bill for amendment, the 
     Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord priority in 
     recognition on the basis of whether the Member offering an 
     amendment has caused it to be printed in the portion of the 
     Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 8 
     of rule XVIII. Amendments so printed shall be considered as 
     read. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for 
     amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the 
     House with such amendments as may have been adopted. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill 
     and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

                              {time}  1345

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fossella). The gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart) is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of 
debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
New York (Ms. Slaughter) pending which I yield myself such time as I 
may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded 
is for the purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 675 is an open rule that provides for 
the consideration of H.R. 4567, the Fiscal Year 2005 Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act. The rule provides 1 hour of 
general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations.
  I would like to take a moment to reiterate that we bring this rule 
forward under a fair and open rule. Appropriations legislation has 
historically been brought forth with open rules, and we continue to do 
so in order to allow each and every Member the opportunity to submit 
their amendments for consideration, as long as they are germane under 
the rules of this House.
  Nearly one year ago, Mr. Speaker, I stood on this floor and proudly 
brought forward a rule for the very first Homeland Security 
Appropriations bill. We have accomplished so much in that one year to 
protect our homeland and further establish this important department. 
We continue that work in coordination with the underlying legislation.
  In my remarks last year, I spoke about our ability to fund first-
responders and ensure that they are always equipped on a State and 
local level to protect the Nation. This year, we provide $4.1 billion 
for first-responders, including high threat areas, firefighters and 
emergency management. This brings the total appropriated by Congress 
for first-responders since September 11, 2001, to $26.7 billion.
  I also indicated last year the productive start to the Container 
Security Initiative. I am proud to report that in the underlying bill 
we have more than doubled funding to $126 million. That is as part of 
this increase in funding, the United States will be expanding this 
initiative throughout the world to stop terrorism before it reaches our 
shores. As a Member from a district whose daily well-being, including 
our economy, depends on large ports, I continue to strongly endorse 
this program.
  While continuing important programs, this legislation begins new 
efforts to strengthen homeland defense. It is well-known that the Coast 
Guard must receive funding to upgrade its infrastructure while 
addressing emerging challenges. The underlying legislation provides 
$679 to the Deepwater Program, designed to allow capital acquisition 
for the future strength of the Coast Guard, on the frontline of 
homeland defense.
  The Coast Guard Integrated Support Command in Miami is essential to 
the safety and security of residents. The Coast Guard in south Florida 
coordinates regional plans aimed at hurricane safety, recreational 
boater safety, and, most importantly, protection of our coastline from 
terrorism and drug trafficking.
  While I am extremely pleased with the end result we have before us 
today,

[[Page 12517]]

I also believe in the future we have to somehow find additional funding 
for the In-Line Explosive Device Security, or EDS. The legislation 
before us includes $269 million for the project, a good start, but the 
Federal cost share for this important technology at Miami International 
Airport alone, which is in my Congressional district, will top $200 
million.
  In-line systems will allow for more screeners to be redeployed at 
passenger checkpoints. In-line EDS systems increase efficiencies and 
reduce costs associated with baggage screening. This next generation of 
security technology for our Nation's airports will yield great results.
  H.R. 4567 is a good bill, Mr. Speaker. It is a testament to our 
changing world that Congress is able to respond to security concerns 
abroad while ensuring that the homeland remains secure. The first 
responsibility of government is to protect its citizenry, and we are 
able to respond with priority funding for this important Department of 
Homeland Security.
  We bring this legislation forth under a fair and open rule, as I have 
stated before, and I would like to reiterate.
  I would like to thank the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Young) and 
the gentleman from Kentucky (Chairman Rogers) for their extraordinary 
leadership on this very important issue. I urge my colleagues to 
support both the rule and the underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me the 
customary 30 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, much is being said about how tight fiscal restraints are 
this year. We know that is so, but it is not an excuse for our current 
budget constraints. Just a few years ago, the Federal Government had a 
budget surplus of $3 trillion. Today, the government is facing historic 
deficits upward of $7 trillion. Bad fiscal policy has hamstrung the 
Federal Government's abilities to invest the sums necessary to protect 
the Nation from terrorism. The tight budget numbers are the result of 
tax giveaways to people who least need it, the people that the ``Oracle 
of Omaha,'' Warren Buffett, has said owe the most to the country and 
pay far too little.
  It is good for the Nation that overall funding for the Department of 
Homeland Security has increased. However, the increase is not enough. 
The cost of securing the Nation is high, but throwing dollars at the 
threat is not the solution. We must spend homeland security funds 
wisely, and all homeland security activities must be coordinated within 
the department itself and with State and local governments.
  But well into its second year, the department is still 
underachieving. Several years into our own war on terrorism, the 
department has not developed a comprehensive threat vulnerability 
assessment. How can we protect the people of this country when we act 
blindly without this basic information necessary to develop and 
implement a comprehensive homeland security plan?
  Recent reports have shown that airports are not any safer despite the 
creation of Transportation Security Administration. There is no 
coordination of homeland security functions along the southern or along 
the northern border.
  I represent the second busiest gateway between the United States and 
Canada, and the need to increase the resources along the over 4,000-
mile border between the U.S. and Canada is great. For years, little 
attention was paid to our northern border. But if we are to maintain 
the $1 billion a day trade between the United States and Canada while 
maintaining U.S. safety and security, we have to provide the resources 
to do it. We must create a northern border coordinator to ensure our 
dollars are invested prudently and that Federal, State and local 
authorities are working together.
  I am extremely troubled by the $300 million cut to funding for our 
first-responders, the people on the ground valiantly protecting our 
communities with too few resources and lots of overtime. How can we 
justify cutting funding for police officers, firefighters and EMTs, who 
are the first people on the scene to respond to a terrorist attack? 
Money has been awarded to States and localities, but the process is so 
cumbersome and lengthy that local governments have difficulty actually 
spending the first-responder grant money.
  It is also imperative that we take threat, vulnerability, and 
strategic importance into account when we allocate the first-responder 
dollars. High threat areas with high population densities certainly 
deserve attention and dollars. Areas of strategic importance need and 
deserve Federal assistance. And, as I mentioned, the border crossings 
at Buffalo and Niagara Falls are the second busiest portals between the 
United States and Canada. This entry port is tactically important to 
the security of the United States. Terrorists could use this entrance 
to gain access to the country or use the bridges as a means to slip 
weapons into the country. Western New York's strategic position and 
role are vital to national safety. Such areas need the resources to 
secure the northern border without disrupting the important commerce 
between the United States and Canada.
  Mr. Speaker, another issue that greatly bothers me, and is an insult 
to every taxpayer in this country, are the corporate expatriates, 
American companies that incorporate abroad in order to skip out on 
their tax obligations to this country. These corporations earn millions 
of dollars from the Federal Government. According to the General 
Accounting Office, corporate expatriates cost this country an estimated 
$5 billion in lost tax dollars, and yet they continue to receive $2.7 
billion in government contracts. That is a disgrace.
  Accenture, the scion of Arthur Andersen of infamous Enron fame, 
recently received a $10 billion contract to build a foreign traveler 
tracking system known as US-VISIT. During committee consideration of 
the homeland security appropriations, the gentlewoman from Connecticut 
(Ms. DeLauro) and the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Berry) offered an 
amendment to ensure that companies incorporated outside the United 
States for tax purposes could not enter into contracts with the 
Department of Homeland Security. It makes sense. The DeLauro-Berry 
amendment would void the Accenture contract by barring any contracts 
with corporate expatriates before, on or after the date of enactment.
  H. Res. 675 protects the first part of the DeLauro-Berry amendment, 
which will probably disappear in conference, but it specifically 
refuses to protect the second provision in the amendment that would 
invalidate the $10 billion contract with Accenture.
  Bloomberg News reported that Accenture posted increases in American 
earnings from $247.3 billion in 2002 to $566.9 billion in 2003, doubled 
in one year, while the company reduced its tax liability to $143 
million from $382 million. During that same time period, Federal 
procurement records show that in 2002 Accenture benefited from Federal 
contracts worth $450 million, of which $250 million were related to 
military or homeland security functions, another disgrace.
  At this time, when unemployment levels have remained consistent since 
December 2003, it is important that we as public servants and as agents 
of the Federal Government do everything we can to keep jobs in this 
country. We should not reward companies that incorporate outside the 
United States in order to avoid Federal taxes.
  Think of the advantage it gives them in bidding against American 
companies. Expatriate corporations like Accenture have a huge 
structural advantage over companies that stay in America, employ 
Americans and pay their fair share of taxes. It is our duty to support 
the American companies. Giving the largest contract yet awarded by the 
Department of Homeland Security to an expatriate company contradicts 
the principles and ideals that I was sent here to uphold.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page 12518]]


  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).
  Ms. DeLAURO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule. Last 
night the Committee on Rules issued a rule that even experts in this 
House on House rules could not initially decipher. On the one hand, 
they finally acted to close loopholes in the Homeland Security Act 
which allowed corporate expatriates to continue to receive government 
contracts, after the House voted 318 to 100 in July 2002 to prohibit 
those contracts. But, on the other hand, and it seems there is always 
another hand these days, they specifically left open a provision that 
would have prevented just such a contract from going through.
  Under this rule, it is almost certain that Accenture will be able to 
retain a massive $10 billion contract with the Homeland Security 
Department. This runs directly counter to the will of the Committee on 
Appropriations. Last week, on a strong bipartisan vote of 35 to 17, the 
Committee on Appropriations voted in favor of an amendment which I 
offered along with the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Berry) to close 
loopholes in the Homeland Security Corporate Expatriate Contracting Ban 
and to stop the department from moving forward on this $10 billion 
contract to Accenture.

                              {time}  1400

  This is a company which reported that its American earnings increased 
by over $319 million in 2003 while, at the same time, its U.S. tax 
liability decreased by $239 million. Yet, today, the Republican 
leadership is hiding behind technicalities to reward a company which 
has shunned its American citizenship in order to reduce their tax 
liability. It is wrong. It is shameful. You ask any American worker or 
a responsible corporation that pays their taxes, and yet they go 
overseas so that they will not have to pay their taxes, and whether 
they are a Democrat or a Republican, they will tell you that going 
offshore, not to pay your taxes and coming back for a $10 billion 
contract from the Federal Government, it is an outrage.
  This company set up a shell corporation overseas and put two tax-
paying American companies, companies which employ thousands of 
Americans in many of our districts, at a competitive disadvantage. This 
sends a terrible message to every good corporate citizen in America. We 
cannot afford to reward companies who shun American citizenship at the 
expense of loyal American businesses and contractors. It offends our 
values as Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this rule.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Berry).
  Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this rule for a very simple reason: my 
citizenship in the United States of America is not for sale.
  In the State of Arkansas, when they began to call up the National 
Guard and Reserves to serve, they went willingly. They are still there. 
They are doing their job. In Arkansas, we have some really wonderful 
companies. One of those companies is Wal-Mart. What Wal-Mart did was 
this: they said the employees that we have that are in the National 
Guard and Reserves that are going to have to take a pay cut to serve, 
we are going to make up the difference. We are going to give them out 
of our pockets that money, and they did. And those men and women in 
uniform today who are on the battlefield are having to pay taxes on 
that generous contribution that Wal-Mart is making to them.
  That is an honorable and proper thing to do.
  But now, we have the Committee on Rules determined to make it 
possible for a company of questionable reputation at best, called 
Accenture, that chose to renounce their American citizenship and 
renounce any obligation that they might have to our men and women on 
the battlefield and say to the whole world, money is the most important 
thing to us. That is what we care about, money. We will give up our 
American citizenship. That is what they said, and that is what they 
did.
  But this rule makes it possible for them to get by with it and get a 
$10 billion contract from the Department of Homeland Security. I cannot 
imagine why in the world the Department ever agreed to give them that 
contract in the first place. It is absolutely irresponsible. I do not 
understand why the leadership on the Republican side decided to take 
this out of the bill. I do not understand that. I know that people work 
hard to develop a good Department of Homeland Security bill, and the 
American people deserve better, and if we allow this company to thumb 
their nose at being an American and turn around and give them a $10 
billion contract paid for by hard-working Americans that pay their 
taxes and do not complain about it, we have done the wrong thing.
  I urge this House to reject this rule and have the Committee on Rules 
come back to us with a good rule.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Doggett).
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, two companies decide to compete for a 
government contract. This happens, in fact, with dozens of companies, 
hundreds of companies all over America seeking different government 
contracts and wanting business that is funded by the taxpayers. Of 
these two companies, however, one of them has chosen to denounce its 
American citizenship when it is time to pay its taxes, by moving 
overseas and declaring that it is a company organized in Hamilton, 
Bermuda.
  The other company is an American company, not only when it comes time 
to put their hand out to get a government contract, but also when it 
comes time to put their hand out to pay the taxes that they earned on 
their American business.
  Now, which one of those companies has the competitive advantage? The 
one that stayed home and was patriotic to America, or the one that 
dodged its taxes and has lower overhead because it has lower taxes? I 
think the answer is rather obvious.
  Yet this Republican leadership has defended a practice that 
encourages corporations to dodge their taxes and to head off to Bermuda 
or Barbados or somewhere else. Then, to add insult to injury, the same 
tax-dodging corporation that wants the protection of American troops 
when it comes to national security, and of our law enforcement here at 
home when it comes to homeland security, these same corporations that 
have dodged their fair share of our homeland security and national 
security expenses, recognizing the permissiveness of this House 
Republican leadership and of the Bush administration, come back to the 
American taxpayer and say, not only do we not want to pay our fair 
share of the taxes; we also want your share of the taxes. We want 
government business. We want what other taxpayers, including our 
competitors, have paid for; we want their tax monies so we can earn 
more money that we can dodge taxes on while we are staying in Bermuda.
  Mr. Speaker, I oppose this rule, because that is exactly what the 
Committee on Rules, with the encouragement of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, has approved. It gives the competitive advantage to the 
corporation that dodges its taxes.
  Just the night before last in the Committee on Ways and Means, we 
heard an official from the Treasury Department again oppose corporate 
expatriation proposals that have been approved in the other body with 
wide bipartisan support, because they really do not want to stop this 
trend of these corporations dodging their responsibilities by going to 
Bermuda.
  Now, with Accenture, the accent has been on tax avoidance. They have 
now been awarded a $10 billion contract that a bipartisan vote in the 
full House Appropriations Committee would have put a stop to. But the 
House Republican leadership, with its typical permissive attitude, has 
blessed that.

[[Page 12519]]

  So now Accenture, ahead of the pack, will get $10 billion in a 
government contract while it avoids taxes.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), the ranking member of the 
Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, we have now gone about 1,000 days since the 
attack on this country on 9/11, and this bill is supposed to deal with 
our efforts to protect the homeland. I think that to evaluate how good 
those efforts are, we need to compare the challenges with the resources 
that we are applying to meet those challenges. And if we do, I think 
there will be no doubt that we are mistakenly trying to do this job on 
the cheap.
  Let me give my colleagues some examples of inadequacies in this 
appropriations bill.
  Air cargo. Air cargo is a huge threat to the safety of the flying 
public. If the public understood what a tiny percentage of cargo that 
is shipped on passenger planes is actually inspected, they would be 
shocked. It is a tiny percentage. We ought to do something about that. 
This bill prevents us from doing that.
  The gentleman from Florida discussed correctly the need for more in-
line explosive detection devices at airports. We wanted to try to do 
that in the bill; but, again, we are precluded from doing that by the 
budget ceiling. The chairman of the committee himself has indicated how 
important that is. Yet we are not going to be able to make any 
significant advances on that front under this bill.
  If we take a look at the problem that we have with military pilots 
being able to communicate with commercial pilots, if you have a 
terrorist incident or a potential terrorist incident and a military 
aircraft is trying to track a civilian aircraft, it would be kind of 
nice if those two pilots could talk directly to each other and to the 
ground. But right now, we do not have the software system in place that 
will enable that to happen. That is a dumb omission.
  We also have some problems with respect to ports.
  Now, the new idea in protecting our ports is to establish inspectors 
at foreign ports so that they can review what goes into those cargo 
container boxes before they ever leave that port on their way to the 
United States. But we have a big problem. There are only 20 ports out 
of the 45 major ports that we need to cover where we have that kind of 
inspection activity going on; we have none going on in China, and China 
imports three times as much through cargo shipping as does Hong Kong, 
for instance.
  Worse yet, the inspectors on the job in those foreign ports are 
assigned temporary duty for about 6 months apiece. They cannot get to 
know the territory; they cannot get to know the people they work with 
in those ports during that time. They should be long-term assignments, 
but we do not have the money in the bill to do that.
  The northern border. The PATRIOT Act, with all of its problems, the 
PATRIOT Act required that we have a specific number of inspectors on 
the northern border. We are 2,000 short of the number that was 
supposedly guaranteed by the PATRIOT Act. First responders, those are 
the policemen, the firemen who deal with the incidents where they occur 
in the local community, on the ground, we have been told by the Rudman-
Hart Commission that there is about $90 billion worth of need that we 
need to address. We have only met about 15 percent of that need.
  We have fewer firefighters in this country today than we had on 9/11. 
Do you call that progress?
  And then, we have the massive problems in the Homeland Security 
Agency. Of the 500 career slots in that agency, or roughly 500 career 
slots, 171 of them are vacant. Twenty-five percent of the slots in that 
agency are filled by political appointees. Is it any wonder that there 
is considerable chaos?
  More than a year after the reorganization, that agency still does not 
have a phone directory. I was talking to a fellow 2 days ago who was 
trying to talk to the Homeland Security Agency about getting a 
contract, to meet a need that they were advertising; he did not even 
know who to call or how to find out because they do not have a phone 
directory.

                              {time}  1415

  It does not make a lot of sense.
  General Zinni has made the point that when it comes to dealing with 
this terrorist threat that we have a lot of tactical activities going 
on but not very many strategic. I just think we need to face the fact 
this bill is not adequate.
  And then, as has already been mentioned by several other Members, it 
has this weird feature which allows the Homeland Security Agency to 
give a contract that would be valued up to $10 billion to a company for 
the purpose of tracking who crosses our borders, they want to give that 
contract to a company that has already jumped our borders and decided 
they will locate for tax purposes in Bermuda. That means they duck 
their taxes, and your constituents and mine get the privilege of making 
up the difference.
  Great deal. Great deal. That is why I would urge every Member of this 
House to vote against the previous question on the rule so we can offer 
amendments to correct these problems and to vote against the rule if we 
cannot bring down the previous question.
  Mr. Speaker, I am inserting in the Record at this point the text of 
the comments I made in the report accompanying the Homeland Security 
Appropriation bill made in order by this rule.

                     Additional Views of David Obey

       It has been a thousand days since al Qaeda launched its 
     first successful attack within U.S. borders. Since that time 
     many changes have taken place inside our country and in the 
     way we deal with other nations around the world. Most of 
     those changes have been justified as steps that were 
     necessary to insure that nothing like September 11th ever 
     happens again. But how much progress have we really made? How 
     far have we come in reducing the likelihood that it will 
     happen again?
       One thousand days has often been viewed as a period of time 
     for communities and even whole nations to stop and take 
     stock. What have we done right? What have we done wrong? What 
     are our largest remaining areas of vulnerability? What are 
     our prospects of getting hit again?
       I think our efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks can 
     be divided into three stages. The first step was to hit al 
     Qaeda and hit them hard. Take the battle to them. Destroy 
     their leadership; their ability to communicate; their ability 
     to raise and transfer funds; their ability to obtain weapons 
     and to move members between countries and most importantly, 
     their capacity to organize attacks against the United States.
       The second step was to understand the factors in the Arab 
     and Muslim worlds that feed this kind of senseless anger and 
     why that anger has been directed toward the United States. 
     Why did so many ordinary people in the Muslim world cheer on 
     September 11th and what does it take to reduce or at least 
     redirect the anger that is now so focused on us.
       Thirdly, what are we doing to upgrade our defenses here at 
     home? What goals have we set? Do they make sense? How well 
     have we performed in reaching those goals?


                        Attack Against Al Qaeda

       With respect to the first goal, I think the United States 
     has for the most part performed well particularly if we look 
     at the early stages of our effort and if we view al Qaeda as 
     an organization, rather than an idea or a cause. The 
     organization's leadership has been significantly diminished. 
     While a number of its most senior leaders have survived, the 
     best evidence indicates that they have grave difficulty 
     communicating with others in the organization or playing any 
     kind of day-to-day leadership role. Significant numbers of 
     lesser figures in the organization are still at large and 
     they are very dangerous. But they face much greater 
     challenges moving about the world, receiving the training 
     necessary to successfully execute large scale attacks and 
     getting the materials and support necessary to launch such 
     attacks.
       The initial phases of our attack against al Qaeda were 
     highly successful. The planning and execution of the 
     overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a high-water mark 
     in our efforts against terrorism. The initial cooperation 
     that we received in the wake of September 11th--from our 
     traditional allies in Europe and also from nations across the 
     globe that have at times been less than friendly to U.S. 
     interests was also impressive.


                      losing focus in afghanistan

       But somehow, we lost our focus. Having destroyed the 
     Taliban's capability to rule Afghanistan we did not move 
     aggressively to insure that the government that we support

[[Page 12520]]

     in its stead could fill the void. We did not invest anything 
     like the level of resources for Afghanistan that was needed 
     to make rapid, noticeable changes in the quality of life. 
     Because of that, in a large portion of the country, we did 
     not have the leverage to strengthen the hand of central 
     government, extend the rule of law, and deny terrorists safe 
     haven. We also did not sufficiently exert our influence to 
     insure that the Afghan army that we were attempting to build 
     was representative enough of the various ethnic and tribal 
     groups across the country to become a credible force for 
     stability and unification.
       But the attack on al Qaeda began to loose steam outside of 
     Afghanistan as well. Talented intelligence operatives with 
     highly specialized knowledge of Arab culture, language and 
     political behavior were diverted from the listening posts and 
     operations centers across the Arab world where al Qaeda 
     activity was most likely to surface to undertake a quite 
     different mission. Financial resources, talented 
     administrators and trainers who might have helped our allies 
     in the Arab world improve their own military and intelligence 
     capabilities against indigenous terrorist organizations were 
     also diverted. The striking momentum that characterized the 
     early phases of our efforts against Al Qaeda has greatly 
     dissipated. The organization has lost much of its backbone, 
     but many of its pieces are still out there attempting to 
     reorganize and regenerate the segments that have been lost. 
     We no longer have the focus to our effort to insure that that 
     does not happen.
       Still, you would have to say that our efforts against al 
     Qaeda have been a success--at least if al Qaeda is viewed 
     simply as an organization. The problem is that al Qaeda is as 
     much as idea as it is an organization and ideas are hard to 
     kill. Bullets can kill organizations--they sometimes only 
     strengthen ideas.
       As General Anthony Zinni said recently in a lecture before 
     the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while we 
     may be winning the war on terrorism on a tactical level, on 
     the strategic level we don't appear to even have a plan.
       Osama bin Laden never intended al Qaeda to be the command 
     structure for the jihad against the United States. The term 
     ``al Qaeda'' means simply, ``the base.'' Bin Laden wanted to 
     create a network to support and encourage jihad. He wanted to 
     attack and overthrow the Arab governments around the world 
     that he viewed as corrupt and out of sync with his views on 
     the teachings of the Koran and he wanted to attack the 
     foreign power that stood behind most of those governments--
     the United States. Bin Laden's challenge was to create a 
     blueprint that could be used for such attacks and to inspire 
     large numbers of disgruntled members of the Arab and Muslim 
     world to follow that blueprint. He wanted to create a 
     movement that represented more than a small army of 
     terrorists--a movement that could bring down moderate Arab 
     governments and, with the overwhelming support of Arab 
     peoples, drive the United States from the Middle East.


                      American Image in Arab World

       While bin Laden has suffered huge organizational setbacks 
     over the past thousand days, he has been enormously 
     successful in progress made toward his one strategic 
     objective. He has captured the attention of the Arab world 
     and much of the Muslim world. To a remarkable degree he has 
     even won their sympathies, and in some instances, their 
     commitment. If we wish to reverse that, we must begin to 
     think strategically as well as tactically. We must succeed in 
     our efforts to take the second step, to reshape the image of 
     the United States in the Arab and Muslim worlds. We must not 
     only strengthen the determination of our friends in the 
     region to resist terrorism but also encourage them to address 
     the underlying problems that feed it. Even for many of the 
     brightest and most industrious young people in many Arab 
     countries, hope is in short supply. While the energy 
     resources of the region have brought great wealth to a few, a 
     chance has largely been missed for many governments to use 
     those resources to build opportunity economies.
       How we change our image in the Arab world and what policies 
     we should pursue to accomplish it is an issue that will spark 
     debate and some division in this country. That debate needs 
     to begin and it is the responsibility of leaders in both the 
     executive and legislative branches to begin it.


                     Upgrading Our Defenses At Home

       Given how poorly we have done over the past thousand days 
     in stemming the anti-American passions in the Middle East, it 
     is even more important that we do a good job in the third 
     step required for a successful strategy: upgrading our 
     defenses here at home.
       In evaluating our performance on that front, it is 
     important that we distinguish motion from movement. I am 
     afraid that in many respects we have had more activity than 
     we have had progress.
       On September 11th, we had more than 130 agencies and 
     activities of the federal government engaged in some aspect 
     of homeland security. Those pieces of the bureaucracy were 
     spread across most of the Departments of the federal 
     government. There was no central capacity to oversee or 
     monitor how well they worked together. Many of these agencies 
     had only a fraction of the resources necessary to accomplish 
     the security tasks that experts in the field believed could 
     prevent future attacks.
       So, after a thousand days, what has changed?


                     Homeland Security On The Cheap

       Well, we are certainly spending more money. The government 
     is spending about $5 billion a year more just on airport 
     baggage and passenger screening. We have expanded the size of 
     the customs service and the immigration service. We have 
     bought new equipment in our ports to screen cargo coming into 
     the United States from international shipping and we have had 
     a significant growth in law enforcement activities. But if 
     you compare the challenge we face with the resources we are 
     using to meet those challenges, it is clear we are trying to 
     do this on the cheap. We are like someone with a good paying 
     job who must get to work on time every day in order to keep 
     that job. But instead of building the most reliable car he 
     can find, he gets a fifteen year old model--one that will get 
     him there most of the time but will eventually cost him his 
     good paying job.
       Failure in establishing our defenses against terrorism 
     places lives at risk. It also puts at risk our capacity as a 
     society to generate wealth. Although the greatest loss would 
     most certainly be measured in human life, penny pinching on 
     necessary security is foolhardy from a simple economic 
     perspective.


              This legislation continues funding failures

       Many in government, including the President and the 
     Attorney General, have warned that we are likely to be 
     attacked by terrorists on our homeland within the next nine 
     months. Given this information, you would think that we would 
     be doing everything humanly possible to improve the security 
     of our homeland. The legislation accompanying this report is 
     the prime vehicle to provide the resources to do that. 
     Unfortunately, it represents a stark failure to improve 
     protection of our citizens in any meaningful way against the 
     wide-ranging scope of the threat facing us today.
       The fact is that we are not doing all we can to protect 
     Americans from another terrorist attack. The legislation 
     accompanying this report provides an increase of $2.8 billion 
     or 9.4 percent over the previous year. Yet excluding Project 
     Bioshield and user fees, the bill is only $1.1 billion or 5 
     percent above the previous year. Despite the Department's 
     huge security responsibilities, this is only slightly above 
     inflation.
       This legislation provides a resource level equal to only 
     slightly more than inflation for our customs and border 
     protection and enforcement operations and for port security. 
     Worse, this legislation cuts funding for programs designed to 
     improve the response capabilities of our local police, 
     firefighters and emergency responders by $327 million or 
     seven percent from 2004.


               OMB's homeland security spending analysis

       OMB has prepared an analysis of homeland security spending 
     which is seriously flawed. Programs that were not counted as 
     homeland security a few years ago have now suddenly been 
     shifted into the homeland security category in order to 
     convey the impression of a greater increase in effort than 
     has actually taken place. Nonetheless, the OMB exercise is 
     instructive for getting a big picture sense of what we are 
     doing to address critical security issues. In total, OMB 
     argues that we have gone from spending $20 billion a year--or 
     about two tenths of one percent of GDP in fiscal 2000--to $46 
     billion a year, or less then four-tenths of one percent 
     today. That means that, even based on OMB accounting, our 
     increase in homeland security spending has been less than two 
     tenths of one percent. To provide some perspective on that 
     number, the share of GDP paid in federal taxes has dropped 
     from 20.8% to 16.4% during that same period--a decline of 
     4.4% or twenty two times the size of the increase in spending 
     to protect against terrorism.
       Another perspective on the level of effort we have made 
     thus far is the oft-used analogy of Pearl Harbor. Pearl 
     Harbor led us to the creation of the concept of Gross 
     Domestic Product. The Roosevelt Administration believed that 
     it might require 50% of our total output to take on the 
     Germans and the Japanese simultaneously. They asked the 
     Commerce Department to develop a method of measuring national 
     output. They not only produced the concept that is now used 
     around the world to measure economic activity, but they were 
     also actually able to reach that goal of spending nearly half 
     of the nation's output on the war effort.
       We do not need to put 50% of our output into this war or 
     even 5%. Whether you think that our war effort in Iraq is 
     associated with the war on terror or is a separate and 
     competing activity, expenditures related to that activity 
     account for more than 1% of GDP--more than twice as much as 
     we are spending on activities directly related to protecting 
     the homeland. Given that fact, it is blatantly ridiculous to 
     pretend that we cannot afford what we need to protect against 
     terrorist attacks.
       Another major attack could erase a trillion or two trillion 
     dollars from the total

[[Page 12521]]

     valuation of the New York Stock Exchange. It could 
     substantially slow the pace of economic growth for a year or 
     more. Again, the most important consequence of a terrorist 
     attack is the loss of human life, but penny pinching on 
     homeland security makes no sense. Even if we consider only 
     the economics of the issue, the Institute for the Analysis of 
     Global Security found that the cost of the 9/11 attack was 
     nearly 2 trillion dollars, including the loss in stock market 
     wealth, lower corporate profits and higher discount rates for 
     economic volatility.
       Now it should be noted that the Administration's FY 2005 
     budget attempts to make a case that in future years we can 
     reduce the size of federal deficits from the current record 
     levels and still afford additional tax cuts. In making that 
     case their projections for future year spending levels in 
     various categories of the budget are revealing. Homeland 
     Security spending is essentially locked into place at current 
     levels. In fact, what OMB is telling us is that unless the 
     American people or the Congress force a change in priorities, 
     what we have now for securing the nation is all that we are 
     going to get and could decline by as much as $900 million.
       But the question we should be asking is: Are we really 
     doing enough? Are there things that we really ought to be 
     doing that the resource levels we have allocated to the 
     problem prevent us from doing?


                     aviation security gaps remain

       One lesson from September 11th that virtually no one could 
     miss is the need to secure our airlines and our airways. We 
     have spent considerably more on this objective than on any 
     area of homeland security. But there are a surprising number 
     of resource issues still unaddressed with respect to 
     protecting our airways.
       For example, we still do not have an effective system of 
     explosive detection. Put more directly, it is still much too 
     easy to get explosive materials onto passenger airlines.
       The Transportation Security Administration has identified 
     equipment that could have provided us with that capability. 
     It's expensive, (it would have cost close to $3 billion to 
     install the equipment nationwide) but it would have 
     dramatically improved our capacity to detect explosive 
     materials. It also would have significantly reduced the 
     number of screeners required in airports around the country. 
     In fact, the savings in TSA personnel costs from the use of 
     this equipment was estimated to be large enough to offset the 
     entire cost of the equipment.
       The Transportation Security Administration proposed to OMB 
     that the agency purchase much of the needed equipment when it 
     was preparing its plans to meet the 2002 explosive detection 
     requirement set in law. But OMB decided that the expense 
     could not be accommodated within the tight, arbitrary limits 
     for homeland security spending which the President and the 
     Director of OMB had decided to impose. Republicans in 
     Congress then adopted a budget resolution that did not 
     provide the Appropriations Committee with the latitude to 
     move forward with the purchase. As a result we do not have an 
     effective system of detecting explosive materials and that 
     failure is due entirely to artificial constraints on 
     resources and incompetent budgeting. TSA has recently 
     acknowledged that the more expensive machines would pay for 
     themselves within 3 to 5 years.
       Following September 11th there was broad recognition of the 
     fact that we needed to restart the sky marshals program and 
     insure that there were enough marshals on domestic and 
     international passenger flights so that potential highjackers 
     would always have to think twice about the likelihood that a 
     sky marshal might be present on a targeted flight.
       Now the exact number of marshals that the President and the 
     Congress agreed were necessary has remained classified. But 
     few people realize that we are no longer operating at that 
     level. No one has come forward with convincing arguments that 
     the level was too high or that adequate safety can be assured 
     at a lower level. We have simply once again allowed arbitrary 
     budget limits, applied to one small portion of the budget, to 
     drive a decision that may unnecessarily put a great many 
     Americans at risk. Under the President's budget submission 
     for Fiscal 2005, we will have 20% fewer sky marshals than the 
     President and the Congress agreed that we needed just two 
     years ago. That is in spite of the fact that there has been a 
     significant increase during that period in the number of 
     domestic and international flights and in the number of 
     passenger miles flown.
       We have had--and continue to have--serious communications 
     problems between military pilots who have the ultimate 
     responsibility to insure that commercial aircraft are not 
     used to crash into buildings (and the commercial aircraft and 
     the FAA system that controls them). Quite simply, military 
     and commercial flight systems cannot easily and quickly talk 
     to one another and the potential that leaves for 
     miscalculation and mistakes it horrific.
       Despite the fact that this problem could be solved for 
     relatively little money, the military felt the commercial 
     system should foot the problem and the FAA and the airlines 
     felt it should be addressed in the military budget. OMB 
     decided the cheapest solution was not to decide.
       Finally, last fall, I decided for them. The $10 million 
     that was needed was earmarked in the Defense Appropriation 
     bill. I suppose that's a good ending to the story, except 
     that the delay in funding means that the system will not be 
     operative until 2006. That gives you one more thing to think 
     about when you board a plane. It also provides more than a 
     little insight into how decisions about homeland security are 
     being sorted out within the executive branch.


                          rail vulnerabilities

       These examples of inaction with respect to airway security 
     are serious, but they do not begin to compare with the nearly 
     total abdication of our responsibility to assure the safety 
     of rail transportation. As the recent attacks in Spain have 
     demonstrated, our enemy is not wedded to attacks on any 
     single transportation mode. He will watch and wait until he 
     finds a vulnerability that can be exploited.
       Rail is vulnerable in two ways. One is from attacks against 
     our freight rail system that handles a huge portion of the 
     materials, products and chemicals that allow our economy to 
     function. The second is from attacks (like those in Spain) 
     against the roughly 13 million Americans who use passenger 
     rail systems each day.
       Luckily, the Department of Transportation and other 
     agencies in the executive branch began a process of sharing 
     classified threat information with the nation's rail freight 
     carriers in the late 1990s. The plans developed as a result 
     of that process are in place and provide a foundation for 
     significant security upgrades. But the plans are dependent 
     upon the federal government meeting certain obligations it 
     accepted during the planning process. Under those plans 
     federal security forces are specifically required to monitor 
     tracks and facilities. Not only have we failed to do that but 
     we have not even designated the agency or department that 
     will supply the forces or establish a means of training them.
       As disquieting as the lack of progress in securing our 
     heavy freight and passenger rail systems may be, the security 
     efforts on behalf of transit systems is even worse.


                  lack of progress in transit security

       The White House has failed to mediate the dispute between 
     the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation over 
     who is actually in charge of transit security. A General 
     Accounting Agency report recommending a resolution of the 
     issue has been rejected by both departments. The impasse 
     continues despite the fact that it is halting any significant 
     progress in securing the systems and despite the fact that 
     transit systems have been the most frequent worldwide targets 
     of terrorist attacks.
       Neither Department is willing to spend even a small 
     fraction of the security related costs most experts feel is 
     necessary. Department of Transportation security funding for 
     transit systems totals $37 million in the current year and 
     the Department of Homeland Security has allocated only $115 
     million over the past two years. This legislation contains 
     only $111 million for rail and transit security needs. In 
     contrast, the transit industry estimates that $6 billion is 
     needed for security training, radio communications systems, 
     security cameras and limiting access to sensitive facilities.
       What is the Department of Homeland Security's answer to 
     these unmet needs?
       They testified this spring that more funds are not 
     necessary until they have had a better opportunity to define 
     the problem. Now, that is an orderly approach, which we 
     should applaud as long as the Department can guarantee al 
     Qaeda's cooperation with their schedule. My concern is that 
     the Department is likely to get some help they have not asked 
     for in developing a definition of the transit security 
     problem.
       The Department has clearly become aware of how vulnerable 
     they are to criticism about their lack of serious attention 
     to transit issues. Only two weeks ago, in a classic move to 
     cover their bureaucratic backsides, they issued a directive 
     to transit systems ordering them to take a series of actions 
     that the Department's own data collection system indicates 
     have already been completed by the vast majority of transit 
     authorities across the country.


                    cargo container vulnerabilities

       Since September 11 the vulnerability that has most troubled 
     many experts has been maritime cargo and the exposure of our 
     ports to a nuclear, chemical or biological attack from a 
     weapon placed in a shipping container. As the president of 
     the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Tom Donohue, has pointed out, 
     such an event could cause death and destruction on a scale 
     far beyond the attacks launched on September 11. It could 
     virtually shut down our global trading system for an extended 
     period of time. The economic consequences would be almost 
     incalculable. Terms like ``economic downturn'' or 
     ``recession'' would not begin to describe the aftermath.
       The Bush Administration has spent billions looking for new 
     technologies with the capacity to knock a nuclear warhead out 
     of the sky if it were launched in the nose cone of an 
     intercontinental ballistic missile. It has invested heavily 
     in the development of

[[Page 12522]]

     other technologies that are intended to serve that purpose 
     but probably cannot. But they seem unresponsive to the fact 
     that a rogue or a terrorist organization can simply place 
     such a weapon in a shipping container and explode it upon 
     arrival in New York Harbor or in Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
     New Orleans or Boston. A ship can bring into this country a 
     far less complicated weapon than one which could be placed on 
     an ICBM. It can be massive in size and its does not need to 
     even be thermonuclear in order to cause massive numbers of 
     casualties, destruction and economic chaos.
       So what have we done to protect ourselves? Protecting our 
     ports is not unlike protecting our airports. We need to have 
     multiple security perimeters. The first should be overseas. 
     That requires a whole new approach to cargo inspection. It 
     requires that our inspectors leave the United States, 
     establish cooperative relationships with port security 
     officials in countries around the world that ship to the 
     United States. It requires that they establish a system of 
     certification and best practices with major exporters around 
     the world.
       This is not a Democratic proposal. This is roughly the 
     proposal that George Bush's own appointed head of the Customs 
     Service, Bob Bonner, took to the White House in months 
     immediately following September 11th. It is the proposal that 
     the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, headed by former 
     Senators Rudman and Hart had endorsed. It is the proposal 
     that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has written editorials to 
     support.
       But the White House waited until last year to request the 
     first dime for this effort. Whatever presence the United 
     States has had in foreign ports over the past one thousand 
     days has been entirely as a result of Congressional increases 
     to homeland security spending--increases that were opposed by 
     the White House, increases that the White House threatened at 
     various stages in the legislative process to veto, and 
     increases which on one occasion the White House did veto.
       Last year, the White House reversed themselves and finally 
     requested a portion of the funds that were needed for 
     container security. Their position changed from, ``we can't 
     afford it'' to ``we needed to wait.'' That is a turnaround 
     and I suppose we should welcome it. But the $126 million that 
     the president has proposed for FY2005, and is contained in 
     this legislation, will not adequately fund the program. It 
     will not even allow us to fully staff the 45 foreign ports 
     where DHS had planned to inspect all manifest documents. It 
     will not permit our current foreign inspection programs to 
     become permanent. We are currently in only 17 ports. We 
     currently have no container security presence in China, the 
     biggest U.S. trading partner in terms of cargo containers. 
     The number of cargo containers arriving to the U.S. from 
     China is more than three times those arriving from Hong Kong.
       More troubling than the mere question of resources is the 
     lack of political or bureaucratic clout behind this critical 
     initiative. If having inspection agents working with foreign 
     customs officials is to be a truly effective means of 
     understanding what is in foreign ships before they leave for 
     U.S. ports, it requires developing long term relationships 
     between our agents and those who control the foreign ports we 
     wish to monitor.
       This involves a new level of training and expertise for our 
     customs agents. It involves establishing continuity in the 
     relationship we have with host governments in terms of what 
     we expect to get and what incentives we can provide to those 
     who cooperate. Nothing could be more destructive to this 
     effort than to rotate in and out of foreign ports agents with 
     only a few months of experience based on a deliberate system 
     of staffing through temporary assignment. But that is 
     precisely what we have done. In the few foreign ports where 
     we do have a presence, that presence is a U.S. customs 
     officer detailed there on a six-month temporary duty 
     assignment. Those agents don't even know what the problems 
     were between the U.S. and the host government when the 
     program was initiated. They are certainly not people that 
     officials of the host government would want to invest much 
     time in getting to know--they will be gone before there is 
     any pay off from developing a relationship.


                          port vulnerabilities

       If the overseas effort to identify the contents of cargo 
     containers is the outer perimeter for protecting our ports, 
     the ability of the Coast Guard to interdict, board and 
     inspect U.S. bound shipping at sea is the next perimeter. Yet 
     the Coast Guard's capacity to perform that function has also 
     been restrained by lack of resources. The Administration 
     frequently states that the Coast Guard is now boarding all 
     vessels that are deemed to be ``high interest.'' That means 
     80% of all other vessels are not boarded.
       Observing, tracking and controlling ships as they approach 
     and enter into American waters is the next perimeter in 
     securing our ports. Systems have been developed that are very 
     similar to the systems by which air traffic control directs 
     airplanes entering into U.S. airspace and approaching U.S. 
     airports. These systems, however, are available in only nine 
     ports, leaving 45 major ports without such a system. Again, 
     this is penny wise and pound foolish. It is also a bad 
     decision in terms of long-term cost effectiveness. More 
     automated systems permit more rapid detection of ships that 
     are not following control directives; they can be operated by 
     fewer people and are long-term cost savers.
       And, inside our ports, there are numerous critical issues. 
     One is preventing unauthorized persons from having access to 
     ships, containers or post storage areas. A second is 
     protecting hazardous chemicals and materials from attack. The 
     Coast Guard estimated that the 185 commercial seaports in the 
     United States would need about $7 billion to assess 
     vulnerabilities and take necessary action to correct those 
     vulnerabilities. These port authorities do not, in most 
     instances, have the revenue raising authority to pay any 
     significant portion of these costs. This year was the first 
     time the Administration requested any money whatsoever for 
     this purpose, and it only requested $46 million. The Congress 
     has been able to appropriate only $587 million or less than 
     10% of the money needed to do the job. This legislation 
     includes an additional $125 million for port security, which 
     will keep us on the slow-moving path to addressing all of our 
     port vulnerabilities.


                       securing our land borders

       Another major priority has been securing our land borders--
     in particular, the 3000 mile U.S. border with Canada or 5000 
     miles if we include Alaska. Despite our continuing strong 
     economic and political ties to Canada, the situation of the 
     two nations with respect to potential terrorist attacks is 
     quite different. Canada's smaller role in world affairs and 
     the image of Canada in the eyes of the international 
     community make it a much less likely target of attack than 
     the U.S. At the same time, Canada's vast geography and 
     relatively small population have led to far more lenient 
     immigration policies than those in place in the United 
     States.
       As a result there will continue to be significant 
     differences between the two countries on how external 
     security concerns are managed. That means that the question 
     of how to control our border and the movement of people and 
     cargo across that border is suddenly a matter of much greater 
     concern.
       Recognizing that concern, the Congress included language in 
     the Patriot Act calling for the tripling of the number of 
     border agents and inspectors on the Canadian border above the 
     levels we maintain on September 11th. As of October 2003, we 
     were still more than 2000 people short of this goal. In 
     addition, there was a clear need for significant additional 
     equipment on the Canadian border to insure that those new 
     people would be efficiently put to work: equipment like air 
     stations, radiation monitors, and surveillance equipment.
       To date we have fewer than 4000 agents and inspectors on 
     the border. In other words, about one third of the positions 
     promised in the Patriot Act are still unfilled. The FY 2005 
     budget promises no increases from current levels. And the 
     President' out-year budget projection provides a strong 
     indication that personnel strength at the border will 
     actually decline rather than increase over the next five 
     years. With respect to equipment, we have provided the first 
     air station (again one not requested by the Administration) 
     and some radiation monitors, but have made no critical 
     investments in things such as surveillance equipment.


            preparing those who respond to terrorist attacks

       The events of September 11th made clear that the brave men 
     and women serving in the police, fire and emergency medical 
     units in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, District of Columbia 
     and Maryland needed a significant amount of additional 
     equipment and training to more effectively respond to the 
     types of attacks that occurred on that day. It was also 
     apparent that first responder units across the nation did not 
     have most of the equipment they would need to deal with a 
     nuclear, chemical or biological attack.
       The needs of local first responders were spelled out in 
     considerable detail in the Rudman-Hart reports. But the 
     federal government has already allowed most of the burden to 
     fall on local governments. Since the capacity of those local 
     governments to support such investments in the tough economic 
     times is limited, progress in equipping first responders has 
     been minimal.
       Of the $98 billion in first responder needs identified by 
     the Rudman-Hart report, the Feds have provided less than 
     $14.5 billion, or 15%. As a result only 13% of fire 
     departments can effectively respond to a hazmat incident. An 
     estimated 57,000 firefighter's lack the personal protective 
     clothing needed in a chem-bio attack. An estimated \1/3\ of 
     firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained 
     breathing apparatus and nearly half of the available units 
     are 10 years old. Only half of all emergency responders on 
     shift have portable radios. And we still have massive needs 
     for interoperable communications equipment. On site emergency 
     personnel working for different agencies need to be able to 
     talk to each other. We will probably never know how many 
     victims in the World Trade Centers could have been saved if 
     they had known that they needed to evacuate the buildings. We 
     know that was a communication problem of disastrous 
     proportions.
       This legislation cuts funding for programs designed to 
     improve the response capabilities of our local police, 
     firefighters and

[[Page 12523]]

     emergency responders by $327 million or seven percent from 
     2004. These professionals are put on the front line risking 
     their lives every day. They are especially put at risk when 
     terrorists attack our homeland, as we saw from the number who 
     died at the World Trade Center. These professionals need to 
     be prepared for the various types of attacks we may face and 
     they are not fully prepared today. It is disgraceful that 
     this legislation provides less funding in this area, not 
     more.
       These are only a few examples of where corners have been 
     cut in establishing the line of defense here at home.


                inadequate homeland security leadership

       But there is more to the story than simply talking about 
     resources. In many instances, we have not had the leadership 
     necessary to organize available resources in effective ways.
       Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, the White House identified 133 separate agencies 
     and activities within the federal government that played a 
     role with respect to homeland security. The creation of a 
     Department was the Administration's answer as to how to 
     better manage and coordinate those disparate activities. The 
     problem, however, is that only 22 of those 133 activities 
     became part of the new department. A total of 111 agencies 
     and activities, including the FBI, the CIA, the Defense 
     Department and many other key components of the overall 
     effort remained on the outside.
       But for whatever reason, the effort to have centralized 
     control and coordination of all of those activities within 
     the White House was diminished. When Tom Ridge went to DHS 
     his replacement within the White House was not given the same 
     clout to knock heads together and insure that Departments and 
     agencies are working together toward a common mission. Too 
     frequently, we have had 112 units of government headed off on 
     their own with no central coordination, as Attorney General 
     Ashcroft's press conference and the reaction within the 
     administration to that press conference last week so clearly 
     demonstrated.
       And even within the new department there have been serious 
     problems. In its first year of operation, DHS has 
     disappointed even those with low expectations. Bureaucratic 
     snarls have been so intense that on its first anniversary the 
     Department still did not have a working phone directory. My 
     staff has been asking for one for more than six months and 
     has yet to receive it. It has also been reported that when 
     callers phone the Department's hotline number, it just rings 
     and rings. Members of Congress from the President's own party 
     have expressed grave concerns about the inability of the 
     Department to respond to requests for information in any kind 
     of a reasonable time frame.
       One possible cause of the rampant chaos at the department 
     has been the injection of a huge number of political 
     appointees. Since the creation of the Department more than 
     one quarter of all personnel who have been hired for 
     departmental operations have been political appointees. These 
     individuals often appear more fixated on positioning 
     themselves politically than on the nuts and bolts security 
     problems, which the Department must address. We have seen a 
     huge number of press releases promoting the Departments 
     efforts but we have few concrete efforts worthy of such self-
     promotion. We, for instance, still do not have regulations 
     regarding the licensing and registration of hazardous 
     material truckers nor do we the detailed guidance for flight 
     and cabin crew training to prepare for potential threat 
     conditions which was mandated by the Aviation and 
     Transportation Security Act more than two years ago.
       Typically, political appointees remain in their appointed 
     positions for less than 24 months. At that point, they are 
     off to some other part of the administration or headed back 
     into the private sector. That means building true long-term 
     competency within any Department is heavily dependent on 
     recruiting a committed professional career staff. But the 114 
     political appointees now swarming the halls at DHS have--if 
     anything--impeded that process. Of the 500 career positions 
     needed to run the department, 171 remain vacant. One of the 
     most critical positions in any Department is that of Budget 
     Director. In only 14 months DHS has had three budget 
     directors.
       Ironically, this legislation provides funding that is 
     sixty-two percent higher than this year for Departmental 
     Operations. Even though we were told that formation of the 
     Department of Homeland Security would not cost us a dime, it 
     now appears that the Administration has realized that this 
     was not true: $65 million is provided in this legislation for 
     the Department's headquarters and $70 million is provided for 
     the ``security-critical'' new personnel system. I do not 
     question the need for this funding. But I do think that it is 
     instructive that these are higher priorities for the 
     Administration and the Committee majority than are protecting 
     our border, ports, transit, and aviation system.
       Instead, this $135 million could have been used to purchase 
     and install hundreds of additional radiation portal monitors 
     at our borders and ports. The Committee majority admits that 
     it is, and I quote this report, ``aware of a need for over 
     1,000 more'' radiation portal monitors than are funded by the 
     Committee.
       Instead, this $135 million could have been used to inspect 
     a much greater percentage of air cargo for explosives than we 
     do today. While the Committee report calls for a doubling of 
     the screening for explosives of cargo carried on passenger 
     airplanes, this ``doubling'' still leaves a large percentage 
     of such cargo at risk.
       Instead, this $135 million could have been used to secure 
     additional critical infrastructure, like chemical facilities, 
     transit systems and ports. The Committee majority agreed with 
     the Administration's plan to have only thirty-five percent of 
     protective actions that it recommends actually implemented 
     for ``first tier priority critical infrastructure 
     components''. What this means is that sixty-five percent of 
     the actions the Department recommends to protect the public 
     will not be implemented next year.
       The Administration and the Committee majority seem to be 
     very patient when it comes to protecting our citizens on our 
     homeland. Unlike them, I remain unconvinced that terrorists 
     will wait a decade for their next attack.


                 congress should not abdicate its role

       About a year and a half ago I spoke to a group of reporters 
     at the National Press Club about where the country stood at 
     that time in protecting itself against terrorist attacks. I 
     feel that the coverage of that event was fair and I think we 
     exposed some problems that, as a result of that coverage, 
     have been fixed. But I also think that the press and the 
     public have a presumption that this is such a complex issue 
     that we simply have to trust the President and his advisors 
     in the Executive Branch to do what is right. I think many of 
     my colleagues in Congress have felt the same way. While I 
     understand people's tendency to leave this complex calculus 
     to the ``experts,'' I think this town is currently awash in 
     new information about the decision making process within this 
     administration which indicates that is a bad idea!
       First of all, that is not the approach to decision making 
     that the Constitution requires of us. It is our job to 
     second-guess. When so much is at stake, the Congress, the 
     press and the public have the clearest possible obligation to 
     insure that the decision making within the Executive Branch 
     is measured, deliberate, based on the best available 
     information, and consistent with the quality of judgment 
     befitting the seriousness of the risks to which we are 
     exposed. Had that happened in the wake of 9/11 or even a year 
     and a half ago there are many points in this statement that I 
     might have been able to leave out.
       One problem in all of this, frankly, is that it was hard 
     for the press and the public to believe much of what I 
     reported a year and a half ago. While the facts presented in 
     that statement were well documented they presented a picture 
     of executive branch decision-making that was wholly 
     inconsistent with what the nation or the press corps wanted 
     to believe. It was hard to accept the idea that in this 
     moment of great national crisis we did not have systematic 
     methods of screening information, examining policy choices, 
     debating the pluses and minuses of each alternative, and 
     making strategic choices based on an exhaustive effort to 
     find the best possible alternative. But in recent months we 
     have learned time and time again that this was not the nature 
     of decision-making within this administration.
       Ron Suskind, using the exhaustive notes and papers of 
     Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, tells of an extraordinary 
     decision making process in which information is collected on 
     the basis of decisions that preceded them. Richard Clarke 
     describes a process both before and after 9/11 that was quite 
     similar. So does Bob Woodward.
       My own experience with the President himself, demonstrates 
     that this President has listened as infrequently to those in 
     the Congress who know something about homeland security as he 
     did to our allies or the career American military before 
     rushing into Iraq.
       But any one who has been listening these last few months is 
     pretty well aware of the fact that we were not vigilant and 
     were not picking up on clear information of elevated threat 
     levels prior to 9/11. We did not respond in the summer of 
     2001 to that threat in the same manner that we responded 18 
     months earlier when similar threat information triggered a 
     massive response to the millennium threat. We did not have an 
     orderly or honest process to measure the pluses and minuses 
     of invading Iraq. People at the highest levels silenced, 
     dissent and criticism and irreversible actions were taken 
     based on flawed information.
       We based our plans for security and reconstruction of Iraq 
     on intelligence from a single organization outside of this 
     government which both the State Department and the CIA said 
     was unreliable. Unfortunately, that is all spilt milk. Even 
     if we understand those mistakes, we can't go back and try it 
     again.
       What I am talking about today is not spilt milk. We can 
     correct these policy mistakes and we can possibly correct 
     them in a time frame that will prevent the next attack. It 
     all depends on whether we are ready to get real.
       Now, I am not optimistic by nature. Perhaps it is merely my 
     nature that leads me to

[[Page 12524]]

     believe that the cauldron that is today boiling in Southwest 
     Asia, North Africa and the Middle East will likely spill over 
     once more onto the shores of North America. If we are not 
     ready, I do not want to look myself in the mirror for the 
     rest of my life and wonder why I didn't ask tougher questions 
     or insist on more responsible and responsive policies. I 
     think the overall performance of our government to date in 
     the area of homeland security merits a greater sense of 
     skepticism and urgency on the part of the press and the 
     general public as well.
       We lived in a more dangerous world prior to September 11th 
     than most Americans realized. Our efforts to making the world 
     safer have met with mixed results and the numbers of persons 
     who wish us harm and will go to great lengths to inflict harm 
     have grown steadily during the past thousand days. Clearly 
     some of our efforts have done little more than fed the flames 
     of discontent and hatred.
       That places even greater pressure on our last lines of 
     defense, protecting our borders, our transportation systems 
     and our capacity to respond to terrorist acts in this country 
     if, God forbid, they are again committed. But as the facts I 
     have today outlined well document, those efforts remain under 
     funded and poorly managed. The President proposed that we 
     have 20% fewer sky marshals than we had a little more than a 
     year ago. We have hired only two-thirds the people that the 
     Patriot Act mandated for protecting our Northern Border. We 
     have invested one-tenth what is needed to protect our ports. 
     We have only just begun to take the steps needed to protect 
     our rail and transit systems. Our first responders have only 
     a fraction of the tools they need. And worse still, the 
     agencies that have been entrusted with the responsibilities 
     are still wallowing in bureaucratic chaos.
       As we saw last week the Justice Department and the Homeland 
     Security Department are still in the business of surprising 
     each other. Simply hoping that these problems will somehow 
     work out is not unlike the wishful thinking that many engaged 
     in as they prepared to invade Iraq. Misinformation and bad 
     planning can lead to excruciatingly painful results. The time 
     to reexamine our security, our security budgets and our whole 
     thinking in this area is now. The Congress must act to put a 
     stop to this mindless, non-information based approach to 
     policy and national strategy. It is as likely to prove 
     catastrophic in the defense of our homeland as it has been in 
     installing democracy in Iraq.
       Congress may control nothing more than the purse strings--
     but that is enough. The Congress has all the power it needs 
     to reopen this discussion, insure that assumptions are well 
     founded, the information is the best available, the 
     management is sound and the resources are adequate. What it 
     will take to significantly improve the systems that protect 
     this nation is small in the relative scheme of things--a few 
     tenths of a percent of GDP may be no more than we are now 
     spending on Iraqi reconstruction and one-twentieth of what we 
     have handed out in tax breaks. Given the stakes, we cannot 
     afford to do less.


       amendment offered in committee to provide $3 billion more

       That is why I offered an amendment in Committee to provide 
     $3 billion to fix some of the most critical security holes.
       Our homeland security agencies could do more with this 
     additional funding--
       They could put more radiation and surveillance monitors at 
     our borders and ports;
       They could increase surveillance on our transit systems;
       They could increase surveillance by local police of 
     critical infrastructure facilities;
       They could improve the ability of our police and 
     firefighters to communicate with each other and be suited 
     properly;
       They could inspect additional containers coming into the 
     United States;
       They could put more air marshals on flights;
       They could increase our stockpile of antibiotics;
       They could increase air patrols of our borders; and
       They could fix some holes in our current aviation security 
     screening system.
       This $3 billion, however, would have only been available to 
     do this if the President agreed. It is disappointing and 
     shortsighted that the Committee voted along party lines not 
     even to give him that choice.
       The Chairman of the Committee said during markup that he 
     would probably support my amendment if he had additional 
     budget allocation. The budget allocations are severely 
     restricted because the Administration has decided that tax 
     cuts and the costs of a war should go hand-in-hand. This 
     squeezes spending on virtually everything else.
       We need to stop being penny-wise and pound-foolish. We need 
     to push the Department of Homeland Security to make needed 
     security investment now, so that we can be protected 
     tomorrow. If we do not make those investments until tomorrow, 
     our protection may come too late.

  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to 
the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Kolbe).
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. I 
do rise in support of this rule and against the argument that has been 
made by the gentlewoman from Connecticut and to some extent by the 
gentleman from Wisconsin, which is that we should defeat the previous 
question in order to amend the rule because the Committee on Rules did 
not make in order an amendment which was added in the committee by the 
gentlewoman from Connecticut.
  That amendment should not be made in order. It is not in order on 
this bill. It is a sweeping amendment that would change the entire tax 
laws of the United States. It would change all of our rules and 
regulations that we are required to adhere to under the World Trade 
Organization, and it ought to be thoroughly debated and vetted in the 
proper venue, in the Committee on Appropriations, and not on the floor 
of this House as an amendment. So it is indeed correct that it is not 
made in order and should be stricken. But let me talk just a moment 
about the substance of this.
  The idea here is that somehow that Accenture should not be allowed to 
bid on the US-VISIT program. The idea is that Accenture is avoiding 
paying U.S. taxes and has some sort of unfair competitive advantage, 
but that is simply not true. Neither the employees of Accenture are 
avoiding paying taxes, nor is the company avoiding paying any taxes on 
any of its obligations or any of its profits that are made here in the 
United States. The company pays its taxes on all of its U.S.-generated 
income. In fact, its effective tax rate for the year 2004 is 34.8 
percent.
  Now, the national average for all corporations is 19 percent. The tax 
rate for its two major competitors for this bid were Lockheed Martin 
and Computer Sciences Corporation and their tax rates were 31.3 percent 
and 28 percent respectively. That is based on their last 10-K filing. 
So it is simply false to say that this is a company that is not paying 
its taxes. It does not receive any tax advantage by having its ultimate 
parent incorporated in Bermuda. So here we have a company that is 
actually paying higher taxes than its competitors who bid on this. It 
is paying much higher taxes than the average corporate rate.
  So it is simply not true to say that Accenture is trying to avoid 
paying taxes.
  The second assumption that is wrong in this argument is that 
Accenture has done a corporate inversion. That is that they 
incorporated, they went to Bermuda in order to avoid paying this taxes. 
It is not a corporate inversion. It did not move its place of 
incorporation from the U.S. to Bermuda with the intent of avoiding 
paying U.S. taxes. If has never been a U.S.-based corporation and it 
has never operated under a U.S. parent corporation. In fact, the 
General Accounting Office in the report that it did in October 2002 
about corporate inversions did not even list Accenture as a government 
contractor that undertook a corporate inversion.
  Finally, there is the faulty assumption that only the U.S. companies 
should provide products and services to the Federal Government.
  Nothing, Mr. Speaker, nothing could be further, more wrong-headed 
than that. We rely, we are a service based economy, and we rely very 
heavily on being able to bid and open up contracts in other countries. 
We have worked in the World Trade Organizations in all the trade 
negotiations in order to try to make sure that we had good provisions 
in there for procurement, government procurement contracts. This would 
just invite the kind of retaliation that would say that our 
corporations, our major contractors cannot bid on an airport being 
built in Tokyo or a major oil contract in Saudi Arabia. It invites that 
kind of retaliation because it says that we are not going to abide by 
our own World Trade Organizations rules.
  I would say in closing, Mr. Chairman, this amendment that was added 
in the Committee on Appropriations is the simply paying politics 
application with the award of this contract. It is based on faulty 
assumptions to score some political points. Any delay in implementing 
contracts puts the American

[[Page 12525]]

people at risk. It would further delay a vitally important contract to 
us, and I urge that we approve the previous question and approve this 
rule.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Sabo), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. SABO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. 
Slaughter) for yielding me time.
  I rise in opposition to the rule on the fiscal year 2005 Homeland 
Security appropriations bill. The President's 2005 Homeland Security 
budget request falls short. This bill represents an improvement; 
however, I have serious concerns about some of the program funding 
levels and the policy decisions which a rule would prevent us from 
addressing.
  The rule fails to waive points of order against the Obey amendment. 
The bill contains deep cuts in first responder funding, which is $327 
million below 2004 enacted levels. The House-passed budget resolution 
and the resulting Homeland Security allocation restricts this bill from 
doing more to protect our borders and ports and other critical 
infrastructure.
  To address some of the most critical needs, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) offered an amendment in the Committee on 
Appropriations to provide a contingent Homeland Security emergency 
reserve of $3 billion available to the President upon request. The 
amendment is common sense, yet Members cannot vote on it because this 
rule fails to waive points of order against it.
  The Committee on Rules also failed to make in order an amendment that 
I offered the Committee on Appropriations on chemical plant security. 
My amendment would direct the Department of Homeland Security to 
require both vulnerability assessments and security plans for chemical 
facilities and to provide oversight of the action taken by these 
facilities to improve security. The decisions on which chemical 
facilities must comply would be left to the department based on risk.
  It is widely known that chemical facilities are clear terrorist 
threats and there are about 3,000 such U.S. facilities where a release 
would affect over 10,000 Americans.
  Despite years of such warnings from many experts, the General 
Accounting Office reported in 2003 that no comprehensive information 
exists on the security vulnerabilities facing the chemical industry, 
and many facilities have neither assessed their vulnerability nor their 
security. We should not wait any longer to protect this glaring 
problem, but this rule prevents us from taking prudent action.
  As Warren Rudman recently said, ``You have to only look at television 
footage from Bhopal in India when an accident occurred to recognize how 
serious a disaster this would be. If you were terrorists and you 
decided to cause a major disaster, why would you not go to a plant 
that, if you could penetrate it and blow a part of it up, would cause 
fumes to waft over the entire area to kill who knows how many people?''
  Last, I am disappointed that this rule leaves unprotected the most 
critical element of the CAPPS II passenger prescreening provision. This 
bill language mandates that the GAO review the methodology used by TSA 
to determine which passengers may be terrorists.
  This is the most sensitive aspect of the CAPPS II, with broad 
implications for Americans' privacy and civil liberties, and GAO has 
not yet been able to review it.
  In closing, I believe this rule prevents the House from addressing 
some of the most critical Homeland Security funding and policy issues. 
I urge Members to defeat the previous question and, if that is 
defeated, to defeat the rule.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Flake). The gentlewoman from New York 
(Ms. Slaughter) has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Turner).
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose this rule 
because I felt very strongly that this House should be given the 
opportunities to provide what I believe to be the essential additional 
funding to protect the homeland.
  This Congress and this House has had a long tradition of supporting 
national defense in a bipartisan way. If you look at the additions that 
we have made in spending in the area of national defense, particularly 
in light of the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have spent in the 
neighborhood of an additional $150 billion or so in the defense of this 
effort.
  The truth of the matter is, our additional spending on homeland 
security dwarfs by way of comparison and yet in both instances we are 
at war. We are at war against an enemy who desires to destroy us, an 
enemy who will exploit our vulnerabilities, and what we should be doing 
is debating in an open way whether or not we believe we should be 
prepared to deal effectively with these threats.
  We need to install radiation portal devices immediately in our ports. 
We need to provide sufficient security funding for our rail and public 
transits. We need to provide the Coast Guard with additional funds to 
protect our ports. We need to be sure that we install explosive 
detection equipment in our airports. We need to have inspectors and 
personnel at our northern and southern borders sufficient to do the 
job. We need to fund adequately our first responders. The list goes on. 
But I frankly believe, Mr. Speaker, that this House if given the choice 
would provide additional dollars for homeland security. I regret that 
this rule denies us this opportunity.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman have any further 
speakers?
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. No, Mr. Speaker, we do not.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
to close.
  Mr. Speaker, when the previous question is called I will ask for a no 
vote. It seems that hardly a day goes by that we do not turn on 
television and hear some new report on a terrorist plot around the 
world. Some of the most recent reports have indicated terrorists may be 
planning attacks in the United States this summer. Just the other day 
authorities arrested a man in Ohio allegedly planning to blow up a 
shopping mall.
  With news like this it is little wonder that the security of our 
Nation weighs heavily on the minds of our constituents. Unfortunately, 
the bill before us today does not provide an adequate level of funding 
to give our communities the resources that they need to keep America 
and its people safe. Excluding Project BioShield, the Homeland Security 
appropriations bill barely keeps up with inflation, and it even cuts 
funding for programs to help our police, firefighters and emergency 
personnel 7 percent.
  How do we expect to keep our Nation secure when we are cutting 
funding for the very people tasked with keeping our constituents safe.
  It does not have to be this way, Mr. Speaker. Last night at the 
Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) brought 
forth a very important and responsible amendment that would have 
provided an additional $3 billion to the Department of Homeland 
Security in a contingent emergency reserve. As the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) pointed out in his testimony, this money could be 
used to increase the number of air marshals on planes or to address the 
problems in our current aviation security screening system.

                              {time}  1430

  It could provide for more radiation and surveillance monitors at our 
borders and ports and allow for increased inspection of shipping 
containers coming into the country. It could be used to increase 
surveillance in our transit systems and to improve communications 
between police, firefighters and other first responders.

[[Page 12526]]

  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, we will not get a chance to vote on more 
money for security at our borders or on our transit systems or for our 
first responders because the amendment by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Obey) was defeated on a straight party line vote.
  So today, Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote no on the previous 
question. If the previous question is defeated, I will offer an 
amendment to the rule that will make in order the amendment of the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey). This fund represents a tiny 
fraction of the money that has gone towards rebuilding Iraq. I do not 
think it is asking too much to make sure that our own Nation is fully 
protected and that emergency monies are available should they be 
needed.
  In the 2 years since the creation of the Homeland Security 
Department, we have found a number of areas that need more resources. 
The monies contained in the contingency fund could provide a much-
needed shot in the arm for these programs and services that may have 
vulnerabilities. Mr. Speaker, this should not be a partisan issue. The 
safety of our Nation and its citizens is of utmost importance to all of 
us in this House.
  Today this Congress can put aside partisanship and act to protect 
America's homeland by giving the Department of Homeland Security the 
additional resources provided in the Obey amendment to meet our most 
urgent security concerns.
  I am confident that all Americans and all Members of this House 
support that sentiment. So I urge Members on both sides of the aisle to 
vote no on the previous question.
  Let me emphasize that a no vote will not stop the House from taking 
up the Homeland Security appropriations bill. It will not prevent other 
amendments from being offered under this rule. However, a yes vote will 
prevent the House from considering this badly-needed amendment to 
create an emergency contingency fund for homeland security and preserve 
that department's ability to more fully protect Americans against 
terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the 
amendment immediately prior to the vote on the previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Flake). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentlewoman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I urge Members to vote no on the previous 
question and yield the balance of my time.
  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I also believe that homeland security should not be a 
partisan issue. That is why I am so proud of the work that the 
leadership and that the Committee on Appropriations and especially the 
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Young) and the gentleman from Kentucky 
(Chairman Rogers) have brought forth, they have expended and brought 
forth with regard to this critical issue.
  The legislation before us spends $33 billion, Mr. Speaker, on 
homeland security, $33 billion. Just in the area of first responders, 
Federal assistance for those first responders since September 11, 2001, 
almost $27 billion have been appropriated by this Congress. I am very 
proud of the way in which this Congress has responded to the threat, 
has acted to protect our homeland security. This is very important 
legislation that we have before us today. It is time that we get to the 
underlying legislation and that we pass it out.
  So accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I urge a yes vote on the previous 
question, on the rule and on the underlying legislation.
  The material previously referred to by Ms. Slaughter is as follows:

Previous Question for H. Res. 675--Rule on H.R. 4567, Fiscal Year 2005 
                    Homeland Security Appropriation

       At the end of the resolution, add the following:
       Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     resolution, the amendment printed in section 3 shall be in 
     order without intervention of any point of order and before 
     any other amendment if offered by the Representative of 
     Wisconsin or a designee. The amendment is not subject to 
     amendment except for pro forma amendments or to a demand for 
     a division of the question in the committee of the whole or 
     in the House.
       Sec. 3. The amendment referred to in section 2 is as 
     follows:
       At the end of title I, insert the following:

                      Contingent Emergency Reserve

       For additional expenses, not otherwise provided for, 
     necessary to support operations to improve the security of 
     our homeland due to the global war on terrorism, 
     $3,000,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, 
     That such amount is designated as an emergency requirement 
     pursuant to section 402 of S. Con. Res. 95 (108th Congress), 
     as made applicable to the House of Representatives by H. Res. 
     649 (108th Congress): Provided further, That the funds made 
     available under this heading shall be available only to the 
     extent that an official budget request for all of the funds 
     is transmitted by the President to the Congress and includes 
     designation of the amount of that request as an emergency and 
     essential to support homeland security activities: Provided 
     further, That funds made available under this heading may be 
     available for transfer for the following activities:
       (1) up to $1,200,000,000 for ``Office for State and Local 
     Government Coordination and Preparedness, State and Local 
     Programs'';
       (2) up to $200,000,000 for ``Office for State and Local 
     Government Coordination and Preparedness, Firefighter 
     Assistance Grants'';
       (3) up to $450,000,000 for ``Transportation Security 
     Administration, Aviation Security'';
       (4) up to $50,000,000 for ``Transportation Security 
     Administration, Maritime and Land Security'';
       (5) up to $550,000,000 for ``Customs and Border Protection, 
     Salaries and Expenses'';
       (6) up to $100,000,000 for ``Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement, Air and Marine Interdiction, Operations, 
     Maintenance, and Procurement'';
       (7) up to $50,000,000 for ``Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement, Federal Air Marshals'';
       (8) up to $100,000,000 for ``Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement, Salaries and Expenses''; and
       (9) up to $300,000,000 for bioterrorism preparedness 
     activities throughout the Federal Government:

     Provided further, That the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall notify the Committees on Appropriations 15 days prior 
     to the transfer of funds made available under the previous 
     proviso: Provided further, That the transfer authority 
     provided under this heading is in addition to any other 
     transfer authority available to the Department of Homeland 
     Security.

  Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the 
balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous 
question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  Pursuant to clauses 8 and 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on 
ordering the previous question on H. Res. 675 will be followed by five-
minute votes, as ordered, on adopting H. Res. 675; adopting H. Res. 
674; passing H.R. 4517; and suspending the rules and passing H.R. 4545.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224, 
nays 205, not voting 4, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 243]

                               YEAS--224

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest

[[Page 12527]]


     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--205

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Alexander
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Case
     Chandler
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Herseth
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lynch
     Majette
     Maloney
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--4

     DeMint
     Hastings (FL)
     Osborne
     Platts


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Boozman) (during the vote). Members are 
advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1502

  Ms. WATSON, Mr. GUTIERREZ, Mr. PASTOR and Mrs. McCARTHY of New York 
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 234, 
noes 197, not voting 2, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 244]

                               AYES--234

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Bass
     Beauprez
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Bradley (NH)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Burgess
     Burns
     Burr
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chocola
     Coble
     Cole
     Collins
     Cooper
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gingrey
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall
     Harris
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herseth
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Majette
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neugebauer
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nunes
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--197

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Becerra
     Bell
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown, Corrine
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Cardoza
     Carson (IN)
     Case
     Chandler
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (TN)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley (CA)
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harman
     Hill
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley (OR)
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum

[[Page 12528]]


     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Michaud
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Sabo
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner (TX)
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--2

     DeMint
     Hastings (FL)
       


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised that 2 
minutes remain in this vote.

                              {time}  1512

  Ms. CARSON of Indiana and Mr. RAHALL changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________