[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 12096-12109]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of S. 2400, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2400) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2005 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Services, and other purposes.

  Pending:

       Kennedy amendment No. 3263, to prohibit the use of funds 
     for the support of new nuclear weapons development under the 
     Stockpile Services Advanced Concepts Initiative or for the 
     Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).
       Reid (for Leahy) amendment No. 3292, to amend title 18, 
     United States Code, to prohibit profiteering and fraud 
     relating to military action, relief, and reconstruction 
     efforts.

[[Page 12097]]

       Dodd modified amendment No. 3313, to prohibit the use of 
     contractors for certain Department of Defense activities and 
     to establish limitations on the transfer of custody of 
     prisoners of the Department of Defense.
       Smith/Kennedy amendment No. 3183, to provide Federal 
     assistance to States and local jurisdictions to prosecute 
     hate crimes.

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.


                           Amendment No. 3263

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand we now have the Defense 
authorization bill before us and an amendment to that bill, which is 
the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment; is that the regular order?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. The sponsor of that 
amendment wishes to make a few comments, and I wish to follow with a 
few comments.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is 
recognized.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Akaka be added as a cosponsor of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment No. 
3263.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I understand we have a time allocation of 
50 minutes.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is an allocation of 50 minutes on 
each side on the Kennedy amendment.
  Mr. KENNEDY. On our side, the Senator from Michigan, our ranking 
member, has been allocated 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan is allocated 10 
minutes; the Senator is correct.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 12 minutes.
  We face many different issues in foreign policy, national defense, 
and the war on terrorism. But one issue is crystal clear: America 
should not launch a new nuclear arms race.
  We want our children and grandchildren to live in a world that is 
less dangerous, not more dangerous--with fewer nuclear weapons, not 
more. But that is not the course that the Bush administration is 
taking. Even as we try to persuade North Korea to pull back from the 
brink--even as we try to persuade Iran to end its nuclear weapons 
program--even as we urge the nations of the former Soviet Union to 
secure their nuclear materials and arsenals from terrorists--the Bush 
administration now wants to escalate the nuclear threat by developing 
two new kinds of nuclear weapons for the United States--mini-nukes that 
can be used more easily on the battlefield, and bunker busters to 
attack sites buried deeply underground.
  As President Reagan would say, ``There you go again''--another major 
blunder in foreign policy. Our goal is to prevent nuclear 
proliferation. How does it help for us to start developing a new 
generation of nuclear weapons?
  It's a shameful double standard. As Mohammed El Baradei, the director 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an address to the 
Council of Foreign Relations in New York City said last month, ``there 
are some who have continued to dangle a cigarette from their mouth and 
tell everybody else not to smoke.''
  The specter of nuclear war looms even larger with the ominous 
statements of senior officials in the Bush administration that they in 
fact consider these new weapons more ``usable.'' If the Bush 
administration has its way, the next war could very well be a nuclear 
war, started by a nuclear first strike by the United States.
  It is hard to imagine a dumber idea. The amendment that the Senator 
from California and I are offering will put a halt to the Bush 
administration's plan to develop these new nuclear weapons. Just as 
``lite'' cigarettes still cause deadly cancer, lower yield nuclear 
weapons will still cause massive death and destruction. No matter what 
you call them, a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon.
  They still incinerate everything in their path. They still kill and 
injure hundreds of thousands of people. They still scatter dangerous 
fallout over hundreds of miles. They still leave vast areas that are 
radioactive and uninhabitable for years to come.
  There are few more vivid examples of the misguided priorities of the 
Bush administration. For the past 15 months, our troops in Iraq have 
been under fire every day. They were sent into battle without the 
latest and best bulletproof vests and without armored Humvees. They 
were placed at greater risk, denied the basic equipment they needed to 
protect themselves and do their jobs. Meanwhile, the Bush 
administration is urging Congress to provide hundreds of millions of 
dollars for new nuclear weapons.
  The mini-nuke has a yield of five kilotons or less. That's still half 
the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed more than 
100,000 people--at least a third of the city's population. Is it 
somehow more acceptable to produce a modern nuclear bomb that kills 
only tens of thousands instead of a hundred thousand?
  The Bush administration also has extensive plans to develop the 
``bunker buster,'' or, as the administration calls it, the Robust 
Nuclear Earth Penetrator. It would carry a nuclear warhead of around 
100 kilotons--ten times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It 
would be placed in a hardened cone capable of burrowing deep 
underground before exploding.
  Even with today's advanced technology, they would still spew 
thousands of tons of radioactive ash into the atmosphere.
  There are more effective ways to disable underground bunkers. Using 
today's highly accurate conventional weapons, we can destroy the intake 
valves for air and water. We can knock out their electricity. And we 
can destroy the entrances, preventing people and supplies from going in 
or getting out.
  In fact, by rushing to develop these weapons, the Bush administration 
misses the point. The challenge of destroying deep underground bunkers 
is not solved with nuclear weapons. It will be solved by developing 
missile cones that can penetrate deeper into the earth without being 
destroyed on impact.
  The bill before us authorizes a study of these two new nuclear 
weapons systems. It provides $9 million for the development of advanced 
concepts for nuclear weapons, the so-called ``mini-nukes,'' and more 
than $27 million for the robust nuclear earth penetrator, the so-called 
bunker busters.
  Those who support the development of these weapons suggest that it is 
only research and that the research will have little effect on the rest 
of the world. The supporters of these weapons argue that since the 
funds are limited to research, the administration will not go on to 
produce these weapons without congressional approval. That is what 
Secretary Rumsfeld claimed when he testified before the House 
Appropriations Committee in February. He said that what has been 
proposed is some funds be used to study and determine the extent to 
which a deep earth penetrator conceivably could be developed, what it 
would look like, and whether it makes sense to do it. There are no 
funds in here to do it. There are no funds in here to deploy it since 
it does not exist.
  The administration's own budget contradicts that statement. Its 
budget assumes we will spend $485 million on these weapons over the 
next 5 years. It has a detailed plan for their development and 
production. I have in my hand their projection by the Congressional 
Budget Office of the development of this program for some $485 million 
from now through 2009, and it anticipates the completion of the 
development phase in fiscal year 2007. We can see it right in their 
proposals. Then it has the continued development of the program itself.
  This is the clear indication of what the administration is intending. 
It is in their budget. It is $485 million, and it is right there just 
with regard to the bunker buster just as it is with regard to the nuke. 
We will see that it goes on through fiscal year 2009 as well. So if we 
do not adopt this amendment, we can be confident that the 
administration will build them. After that, as the administration's own 
nuclear experts have said, they will ultimately deploy them and use 
them.

[[Page 12098]]

  In fact, in our debate 2 weeks ago, my colleague from Arizona 
described a situation in which he believed they should be used. He 
claimed conventional bunker busters were incapable of knocking out 
Saddam Hussein in those early days of the war and that only nuclear 
weapons could have destroyed his deeply buried hardened bunkers.
  If that is the plan for these weapons, then the prospect is even more 
frightening for our troops, for America, and for the world. Is the 
Senator from Arizona truly suggesting we should have used a nuclear 
weapon to hit Saddam Hussein's bunkers last May? Baghdad is a city of 
over 5 million Iraqis. We would have killed hundreds of thousands of 
people, including American aid workers and journalists. We would have 
turned the entire area into a radioactive wasteland. And all to capture 
the person we captured with conventional means a few months later?
  Using a nuclear weapon to strike Saddam Hussein would have inflamed 
the hatred of America in Iraq and the Arab world far beyond anything we 
have seen in response to the prison scandal at Abu Ghraib. It would 
have poisoned our relations with the rest of the world and turned us 
into an international pariah for generations to come.
  The President told us this winter that there is a consensus among 
nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. He added that this 
consensus means little unless it is translated into action. But the 
administration's idea of action is preposterous. It only encourages a 
dangerous new arms race and promotes proliferation. By building new 
nuclear weapons, the President would be rekindling the nuclear arms 
race that should have ended with the end of the cold war.
  He has given inadequate support to nonproliferation efforts with 
Russia. With the Moscow treaty, the deep cuts in our nuclear arsenals 
would not be permanent since we could keep a large number of such 
weapons in storage, capable of being activated and used in the future.
  In January 2002, the Pentagon released a document called the Nuclear 
Posture Review, and despite subsequent efforts to downplay its 
significance, its tone of recommendations revealed the dangerous new 
direction in our nuclear policy. The double standard is clear. The rest 
of the world must abandon the development of nuclear weapons, but the 
United States can continue to build new weapons.
  As is pointed out in the Nuclear Posture Review, it talks about the 
second principal finding is the United States requires a much smaller 
nuclear arsenal under the present circumstances, but first the nuclear 
weapons are playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any other 
time in the nuclear age. Then it goes on to talk about the alternatives 
that are being developed with the smaller nuclear weapons.
  The Bush administration thinks the United States can move the world 
in one direction while we move in another; that we can continue to 
prevail on other countries not to develop nuclear weapons while we 
develop new tactical applications for these weapons and possibly resume 
nuclear testing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
  The decision the administration has made on nuclear posture reverses 
50 years of bipartisan commitment to arms control. Over the past 50 
years, we have halted and reversed the nuclear arms race, and now we 
are starting to escalate it again. It makes no sense to undermine half 
a century of progress on nuclear arms control and start going backward. 
And all for what? To deal with emerging threats we can already handle 
with conventional weapons.
  Even the House Republicans have acknowledged the flaw in the 
administration's plan. Chairman Hobson eliminated all funding for these 
mini-nukes and bunker busters, saying that the National Nuclear 
Security Administration needs to take a time out on new initiatives 
until it completes a review of its weapons complex in relation to 
security needs and budget constraints, and the administration's own new 
plan to eliminate half of our stockpiled warheads. That is the 
conclusion of the House of Representatives after extensive hearings.
  The Bush administration is asking Congress to buy something that we 
do not need and we will never use, that makes our goals for a peaceful 
world much more difficult to achieve, and that endangers us by its mere 
existence.
  Over the period of this last half century, Democrats and Republicans 
have pursued sensible arms control, engaged the world in nearly a 
global commitment to nonproliferation, and demonstrated the will of the 
United States to pursue counterproliferation when diplomacy failed to 
stop illicit flows of weapons of mass destruction.
  President Kennedy started the process that would lead to the 
nonproliferation treaty, but he could not finish it. President Johnson 
picked up where he left off and signed it, but he did not have time to 
ratify it before his term ended. President Nixon ratified it. 
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan negotiated SALT and START. 
President Bush signed START I and START II. President Clinton signed 
START III and led America through the massive post-cold-war reduction 
in its nuclear arsenal. That is the record: Democrat and Republican 
alike moving us away from nuclear escalation, and that is what this 
amendment will continue.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. I rise today in opposition to the Kennedy-Feinstein 
amendment that would strip the authorization for funding for the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator and the advanced concepts. Again, we have 
heard the argument of how somehow or another we would have further 
world peace if we just weakened America, and I could not disagree more 
with that.
  I believe we do have peace through strength, and what we have in this 
particular legislation is a study to study where the strengths are of 
our adversaries and where the proper response to those strengths would 
be. I do not think anybody has any preconceived notion of how this 
study should come out; we just think we need to know some vital 
information to make sure America remains strong.
  I am disappointed once again by the efforts of those on the other 
side of the aisle to eliminate altogether this administration's effort 
to study options for modernizing our nuclear deterrent. To me, it seems 
that sponsors of this amendment may not fully understand how important 
it is for the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, or how a 
modernized deterrent could result in a substantial reduction in our 
nuclear stockpile.
  Over the last several years, the Department of Defense closely 
examined our nuclear weapons posture. It became apparent that the cold-
war paradigm of mutually assured destruction was no longer an 
appropriate response for the United States. Increasingly, irrational 
rogue nations and nonstate actors have emerged as a greater threat to 
U.S. security than historical adversaries. As part of this examination, 
it was discovered that many of our adversaries are building 
increasingly hardened and more deeply buried facilities in order to 
protect high-value targets such as command and control nodes, ballistic 
missiles, and, in some cases, the actual development of facilities for 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Many of these buried targets are immune to our conventional weapons. 
Therefore, our ability to deter such undesired activities is greatly 
eroded.
  The need to hold these targets at risk became so apparent that in 
1994 U.S. Strategic Command and Air Combat Command issued a mission 
needs statement for a capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried 
targets.
  In 1997, the Department conducted an analysis of alternatives to 
address intelligence and strike capabilities related to defeating 
hardened and deeply buried targets. To almost everyone's surprise, the 
analysis of alternatives found that not all hardened and deeply buried 
targets could be defeated by current or conceptual conventional 
weapons.

[[Page 12099]]

  Then, in 1999, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff 
requested that a capstone requirements document for hardened and deeply 
buried targets be developed. Again, this document provided additional 
justification for a requirement for both conventional and nuclear 
weapons capable of defeating these targets.
  Meanwhile, during these military studies and analyses, the Clinton 
administration was already building and deploying an interim nuclear 
earth penetrator.
  I have noticed that the advocates of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment 
have tried to place the blame on the Bush administration. But here we 
are--the Clinton administration building and deploying an interim 
nuclear earth penetrator. Even he recognized the need and the changing 
environment in which we must act in order to maintain a strong America.
  The modified nuclear weapon was designated the B61-11 and entered 
service in April 1997. While this weapon provided a limited capability, 
it does not have capability to defeat all types of hard and deeply 
buried targets.
  With this history in mind, it surprises me that once again we are 
here to debate whether we should go forward with a feasibility study on 
a modified nuclear weapon and whether our scientists can explore 
nuclear weapon concepts.
  Let me take a moment to respond to clear up some misconceptions that 
have been suggested by the supporters of Kennedy amendment.
  First, opponents of RNEP argue that conventionally armed ``bunker 
buster'' weapons are sufficiently effective to destroy hardened and 
deeply buried targets. Clearly, advanced conventional earth penetrators 
are the weapon of choice for most hardened and deeply buried 
facilities, but according to the Department of Defense, they are not 
effective against a growing class of hardened and deeply buried 
targets. Moreover, the precise location of surface support facilities 
are not always known, and at best, we can only hope to disrupt the 
operation of a hardened or deeply buried target for a few hours or days 
at most.
  The second argument used by opponents of RNEP is that any 
modifications to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal will encourage other 
nations to develop new nuclear weapons. This argument suggests that 
there is a direct correlation between our activities and those of other 
nations. I could not disagree more with this notion.
  Over the last 10 years, we have conducted very little work on new 
nuclear weapons. Yet Pakistan and India have conducted nuclear tests. 
Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons. And, countries 
such as Iran and North Korea are secretly working to build new nuclear 
weapons. All of this activity has taken place without the U.S. taking 
any action with regard to our nuclear stockpile.
  In response to our mini-nukes, first, ``battlefield nuclear weapons'' 
would be tactical, not strategic. Second, President George H.W. Bush's 
Presidential Nuclear Initiative, announced September 27, 1991, did away 
with all U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons. In fact the Pantex plant in 
Amarillo, TX, dismantled the last battlefield nuclear weapon, the W-79 
artillery shell in 2003. The administration has no plans to change that 
decision. Nor are there plans by the Department of Defense or 
Department of Energy to research or develop ``battlefield nuclear 
weapons.'' The administration believes that nuclear weapons are 
strategic weapons of last resort.
  In fact, if the United States does not show that it is serious about 
ensuring the viability of our entire military capability, including our 
weapons of last resort, we might not be able to dissuade potential 
adversaries from developing weapons of mass destruction and deter those 
adversaries from using those weapons they already have.
  The third argument used by opponents of RNEP is that the 
administration has already decided to develop, build, and test a new 
robust nuclear earth penetrator. They point to a Congressional Research 
Service report that seems to suggest that the RNEP is not merely a 
study because the budget projections over the next 5 years are nearly 
$500 million for the program.
  To be clear, it was Congress that directed the Department of Energy 
to prepare 5-year budget profiles. The nearly $500 million outlined in 
the latest profile is only a projection of what the costs might be if 
the results of the feasibility study are reasonable, the administration 
opts to proceed, and the Congress approves the development of such a 
weapon.
  We must keep in mind that the administration cannot begin the 
development, much less build or test, a new robust nuclear earth 
penetrator without the expressed approval from Congress. Section 3117 
of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization bill makes this 
clear. It specifically states that ``the Secretary of Energy may not 
commence the engineering development phase of the nuclear weapons 
development process, or any subsequent process, of a Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator weapons unless specifically authorized by Congress.''
  The fourth argument used by opponents of RNEP, and perhaps the most 
egregious, is that the RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold. Crossing 
the nuclear threshold represents a momentous decision for any 
President. A nuclear weapon's size or purpose does not alter the 
gravity of the decision for using a nuclear weapon. No President would 
use a nuclear weapon unless it was the option of last resort.
  Therefore, to suggest that simply modernizing a nuclear weapon 
automatically lowers the rigor and deliberation in deciding to employ 
that weapon is unfounded.
  The success of our goal of assuring our allies and dissuading 
potential adversaries is dependent upon a modern, effective nuclear 
detterent that can counter today's threats. We must keep in mind that 
the current U.S. stockpile was developed for very different purposes 
than the threats that exist today. It was developed for a massive 
nuclear exchange with one nation. Today, these weapons are too powerful 
and may result in greater damage than necessary to neutralize a target.
  Moreover, these weapons continue to age, making it increasingly more 
difficult to predict their reliability. We depend upon their 
reliability, as do our allies and our troops in the field.
  We must also recognize that a modernized nuclear stockpile will 
result in significant reductions in our stockpile. If we have specific 
weapons that can hold certain targets at risk, it will not be necessary 
to have a vast inventory of strategic nuclear warheads. This path 
forward would yield substantial cost savings and, more importantly, 
demonstrate our country's commitment to reducing nuclear stockpiles 
around the world.
  For over 50 years, we, as a Congress, and every President have agreed 
that nuclear weapons are a critical element of our national security 
strategy. They remain so today. I believe a modernized detterent will 
help ensure that our adversaries are deterred tomorrow.
  Therefore, I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to 
oppose it as well.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, perhaps I do not understand all I should, 
and I certainly do not understand the term ``modernization of nuclear 
weapons.'' We have thousands of nuclear weapons in this world. We 
control thousands of them in this country. Modernization? It appears 
now in this debate to be a euphemism for building new nuclear weapons, 
designer nuclear weapons, usable nuclear weapons, the kinds of weapons 
you might use, for example, to bust into caves, the ground, bunker 
busters.
  That is the purpose of this amendment, to stop this march toward 
production of more nuclear weapons. This country ought to be leading in 
exactly the other direction.
  Let me read from Time magazine in March of 2002.

       For a few harrowing weeks last fall, a group of U.S. 
     officials believed that the

[[Page 12100]]

     worst nightmare of their lives--something even more horrific 
     than 9/11--was about to come true. In October an intelligence 
     alert went out to a small number of government agencies, 
     including the Energy Department's top-secret Nuclear 
     Emergency Search Team, based in Nevada. The report said that 
     terrorists were thought to have obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear 
     weapon from the Russian arsenal and planned to smuggle it 
     into New York City. The source of the report was a mercurial 
     agent code-named DRAGONFIRE, who intelligence officials 
     believed was of ``undetermined'' reliability. But 
     DRAGONFIRE's claim tracked with a report from a Russian 
     general who believed his forces were missing a 10-kiloton 
     device. Since the mid-'90s, proliferation experts have 
     suspected that several portable nuclear devices might be 
     missing from the Russian stockpile. That made the DRAGONFIRE 
     report alarming. So did this: detonated in lower Manhattan, a 
     10-kiloton bomb would kill some 100,000 civilians and 
     irradiate 700,000 more, flattening everything in a half-mile 
     diameter. And so counterterrorist investigators went on their 
     highest state of alert.
       ``It was brutal,'' a U.S. official told TIME. It was also 
     highly classified and closely guarded. Under the aegis of the 
     White House's Counterterrorism Security Group, part of the 
     National Security Council, the suspected nuke was kept secret 
     so as not to panic the people of New York. Senior FBI 
     officials were not in the loop. Former mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
     says he was never told about the threat. In the end, the 
     investigators found nothing and concluded that DRAGONFIRE's 
     information was false. But few of them slept better. They had 
     made a chilling realization: if terrorists did manage to 
     smuggle a nuclear weapon into the city, there was almost 
     nothing anyone could do about it.

  Our experts thought, based on some evidence from some folks in the 
intelligence community, that one nuclear weapon was missing from the 
Russian arsenal and might be detonated in the middle of an American 
city. Now, there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. 
We think, probably, between 25,000 and 30,000 nuclear weapons. One 
missing would be devastating. One of them acquired by terrorists would 
be devastating.
  Our job is not to come to the Senate these days with the Defense 
authorization bill and parrot the line of those who are reckless on 
this entire subject, saying what we really need to do is to build more 
nuclear weapons, to build bunker busters, earth-penetrator weapons, to 
talk about using them, to talk about testing nuclear weapons. That is 
not our job. It is not our responsibility.
  Our responsibility is to move in exactly the opposite direction. It 
is our responsibility to lead the way to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons, especially to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, No. 1; No. 
2, to safeguard the stockpiles of nuclear weapons that already exist--
yes, with us, with Russia and elsewhere; and then No. 3, and very 
importantly, to begin the long march toward the reduction of nuclear 
weapons.
  It ought to be our responsibility as a world leader to say we are 
going to try to do everything we can to see that a nuclear weapon is 
never again used in conflict and that we begin to reduce the stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons in this world.
  For months now, as I have heard people in positions of responsibility 
talk about the potential of designing new lower yield nuclear weapons 
or earth-penetrator nuclear weapons so that we can use them, I have 
shook my head and thought, what on Earth are they thinking about? Our 
job is to provide world leadership to try to find a way to reduce the 
stockpile of nuclear weapons in this world, to safeguard the stockpile 
of weapons that already exist, make sure terrorists never get their 
hands on one, stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and 
to terrorist organizations and begin the march toward the reduction of 
the stockpile of nuclear weapons.
  If we begin this process to talk about modernization and testing and 
building new nuclear weapons and building designer nuclear weapons, and 
finding nuclear weapons that will bust into caves, it will not leave 
this world a safer place. It will make this world a more dangerous 
place. It is, in my judgment, a reckless course.
  I hope with all my might that the amendment being offered today to 
stop this march toward the building of new nuclear weapons and the 
discussion about the plausibility of simply using nuclear weapons as 
another device in conflict, I hope with all my might we stop it dead in 
the Senate right now.
  We have a responsibility. That responsibility is world leadership.
  I mentioned the article in Time magazine. The potential of one 10-
kiloton nuclear weapon missing from the Russian arsenal acquired by 
terrorists to be detonated in an American city was devastating news to 
an intelligence community that became apoplectic about it, and should 
have been. That was just one, and there are nearly 30,000 nuclear 
weapons.
  Our responsibility is to make sure not that we build more, to make 
sure we reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger 
of nuclear weapons.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  As I mentioned before, we have a very proud tradition of moving the 
United States away from nuclear confrontation. I mentioned the start of 
that effort by President Kennedy beginning the process of 
nonproliferation. President Johnson picked up where he left off, 
although he did not have sufficient time. But President Nixon ratified 
it. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan negotiated SALT and START. 
President Bush signed START and START II and President Clinton START 
III.
  What do they know that this President does not know? Why do we have 
Republicans and Democrats moving away from the brink of nuclear 
escalation? What are we talking about? Five kilotons would cause 
280,000 casualities, 230,000 fatalities. That is what we are talking 
about with small nuclear weapons.
  This is not just modernization. The Senator from Colorado knows we 
have a very active program now being reviewed by scientists to make 
sure we have an adequate deterrent. What is the effect if you dropped a 
5-kiloton nuclear weapon on Damascus: 280,000 casualties, 230,000 
fatalities.
  Just before the first gulf war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Colin Powell, commissioned a study of the possibility of the use 
of small nuclear weapons on the battlefield. He rejected all of them 
because, he said, ``they have no battlefield utility.''
  If the Senator from Colorado can show us where we had any hearings, 
where any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified they want this 
kind of weapon, I am interested. He cannot because we have not had any 
hearings.
  This is a statement from the Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration in response to a question on April 8, 2003: I 
have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield. I have a bias in favor 
of things that might be usable.
  There it is, a statement from the No. 1 person in the administration.
  We have in the Record the 5-year program in terms of the development 
of these weapons, $485 million. We have in the Record the costs of the 
small nukes, $82 million. Why are we being asked to go ahead and walk 
down this path where we have Republican and Democrats and the Chair of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying this is a mistake?
  What in the world does the Senator from Colorado know that these 
Presidents did not know? Where is the testimony before our Armed 
Services Committee showing these will be usable?
  I withhold the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, to suggest that somehow or the other this 
particular President does not want to be a leader in reducing nuclear 
threats is absurd.
  I call to the attention of the Members of the Senate the Moscow 
Treaty which was put together at the first of this administration. He 
brought down some 8,000 warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 active warheads.
  The result from our potential adversaries is to produce more nuclear 
warheads. Our adversaries are not necessarily responding to what we do 
in the United States. Take India and Afghanistan. They are more 
interested in how each other's country is responding

[[Page 12101]]

to that issue. They are not that concerned about what is happening 
here. Despite that, they continue to be proliferating. And there is 
always the potential they could be proliferating warheads that could 
have an impact on us.
  We know our adversaries are building hard bunkers, deeply buried. 
This particular piece of legislation is not putting in place the 
engineering or development of nuclear warheads. I have just shared that 
language with my colleagues. But what we are looking at is a study. I 
think it is foolhardy and irresponsible to not even look at the facts, 
to not call for a study to see where we are in relation to the rest of 
the world. We know other countries, other than just Afghanistan, such 
as North Korea--I don't see a real stepdown as far as Russia and other 
countries around the world. We know Iran, admittedly, is looking at a 
nuclear weapons program.
  So this is an important step in making sure that America remains 
secure. I think it is a responsible step because we are saying that in 
order to maintain peace in this world we need to have a strong America. 
If we want to have some response to terrorism and that flexible threat 
we have out there, we have to have a more flexible defense posture. We 
need to look at alternatives. And, yes, I believe terrorists throughout 
the world have the potential of being a real threat to this country, 
although the main threat that is recognized today is from many of those 
countries that I cited.
  But that is why it is important to have a study. I think those people 
in the know--whether they are in the Bush administration or were in the 
Clinton administration--agree we need to stay on top of this issue. I 
think the irresponsibility would be for us to bury our heads in the 
sand and ignore the fact that the world is changing. The fact is, the 
world is changing, the threat is changing, and for us to deal with 
those potential threats, we need to look at modernizing our ability to 
deal with those changing threats. That is what the provision in this 
particular bill is all about.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment 
offered by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein to prohibit the use of funds 
for the support of new nuclear weapons development.
  Passage of this amendment would ensure that the United States will 
not develop new nuclear weapons while at the same time asking other 
nations to give up their own weapons development programs.
  Unfortunately, today we live in a world where governments and 
terrorists are seeking to create and acquire weapons of mass 
destruction. I am deeply concerned that we are not doing enough to stop 
the potential flow of weapons and weapon materials to terrorist 
organizations. Rather than devoting scarce resources to researching new 
nuclear weapons we should be securing nuclear material already in 
existence.
  The administration's plans to develop new weapons and modify old 
types of weapons will compromise U.S. security by undermining efforts 
to make worldwide cooperation on nonproliferation of nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction, WMD, more effective.
  The first Bush administration prohibited work on nuclear weapons then 
under development and halted nuclear testing except for safety and 
reliability, effectively bringing work on new weapons types to a close.
  In contrast, I believe this administration's nuclear initiatives are 
creating a new kind of arms race by expanding our weapon development 
programs.
  The United States pledged in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ``to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament.'' This is still a worthy objective.
  However, instead of strengthening nonproliferation efforts, the 
administration has requested $27.6 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator, RNEP, for fiscal year 2005. The request would continue a 
study to modify an existing weapon to penetrate completely into the 
ground before detonating, increasing its ability to destroy buried 
targets.
  The RNEP is a bad idea for a number of reasons. First, it is a common 
misconception that a weapon detonated a few meters underground creates 
less fallout. In fact, a weapon detonated at a shallow depth would 
actually create more fallout than if it were detonated on the surface.
  Nuclear testing done in the 1960s demonstrated that weapons detonated 
deep underground can produce large amounts of fallout. In order to 
prevent this during underground testing done at the Nevada Test Site, 
detonations were required to be at least 600 feet underground, with no 
vertical shaft open to the atmosphere. This scenario cannot happen in a 
battlefield situation.
  We do not have the ability to drive a weapon down to the depths that 
would be required to prevent huge quantities of fallout from occurring, 
and even if we did, the hole created by the weapon would allow the 
fallout to escape to the atmosphere. Even a low-yield RNEP would kill 
large numbers of people from both the blast and from the inevitable 
fallout that would follow.
  The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million--$15 
million a year for fiscal year 2003-2005. It is now projected to cost 
$71 million, which is too much money to research a weapon that in many 
ways duplicates what conventional weapons can do already.
  Additionally, the budget request includes figures through fiscal year 
2009 that total $484.7 million and includes placeholders for both the 
development-engineering and production-engineering phases. This may 
indicate that the RNEP study is more than just a study and is in fact 
being undertaken with the foregone conclusion that the weapon will go 
into development. This amendment would effectively stop funding for 
this weapon.
  The administration argues that these weapons programs are needed to 
increase deterrence from a new kind of threat. I do not believe these 
weapons will deter other nations or terrorists. If other nations see 
the U.S. developing new nuclear weapons, they are likely to think that 
they need new weapons for their security as well.
  We already know that terrorists are trying to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, warned the 
Armed Services Committee once again in March of al-Qaida interest in 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, CBRN, weapons.
  Director Tenet said, ``Acquiring these remains a `religious 
obligation' in Bin Ladin's eyes, and al-Qaida and more than two dozen 
other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials. Over the last year, 
we've also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN. 
For this reason, we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack.'' 
We cannot afford this risk.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment to 
stop funding new nuclear weapons development programs.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the amendment offered by Senator 
Kennedy and Senator Feinstein to prohibit the use of funds for the 
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and for the development of new nuclear 
weapons concepts.
  Both the administration's policy of pre-emptive war and the 
suggestion, reportedly included in the Nuclear Posture Review, that it 
might use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries undercut U.S. 
non-proliferation pronouncements. And these policies form the context 
in which we must evaluate administration proposals for new nuclear 
weapons research.
  Moves to make nuclear weapons just another part of the U.S. arsenal 
of usable weapons send a strong and unmistakable message to other 
countries: the only way to deter the United States is to have nuclear 
weapons of your own.
  The President's agenda for a new generation of nuclear weapons is 
included in the bill before us today, which funds the Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator, the Advanced Concepts Initiative--which could include 
low-yield nuclear weapons--and the Modern Pit Facility. Funds for the 
Robust Nuclear

[[Page 12102]]

Earth Penetrator, known as RNEP, or the bunker buster, are supposed to 
cover a ``study'' of turning existing nuclear bombs into earth 
penetrators. But what a robust study this is. The 5-year budget 
required by Congress and submitted by the Department of Energy funds 
the ``study'' at $27.6 million in fiscal year 2005, but the 5-year 
total balloons to $484.7 million.
  Last year, Congress passed amendments that required congressional 
authorization before later phases and developmental engineering of RNEP 
could take place. The price tag suggests that the administration sees 
RNEP as far more than a study; it is clearly looking ahead to the 
development and fielding of a new nuclear weapon. If so, the 
Congressional Research Service warns that the 5-year cost is far from 
the total price tag for this program.
  It is impossible to provide an estimate of total program cost because 
of the difficulty of the task at hand.
  The current nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11, can penetrate only 
to 20 feet in dry earth. According to physicist Rob Nelson from 
Princeton University, even an extremely small bunker buster with a 
yield of one-tenth of a kiloton must penetrate 140 feet underground to 
be contained. It is hard to imagine the technical feat required to 
penetrate into hardened targets to the depth necessary to prevent 
massive fallout from a nuclear weapon with the RNEP's yield, which is 
said to be far in excess of 5 kilotons. In fact, preventing the spread 
of fallout from an RNEP is impossible--and tens of thousands or 
hundreds of thousands of casualties could result from the nuclear 
fallout from such a weapon.
  U.S. nuclear tests from the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the point. The 
1962 ``Sedan'' test exploded a 100-kiloton weapon 635 feet underground. 
It produced a gigantic cloud of fallout and left a crater a quarter 
mile in diameter. To destroy a deeply buried target, an even larger 
weapon would be needed--and an RNEP would be lucky to penetrate more 
than 50 feet underground. The fallout would be immense.
  The bill before us also includes $9 million for the Advanced Concept 
Initiative that could lead to the development of new nuclear weapons, 
including low-yield nuclear weapons.
  This program raises further concerns: Will the new weapons require a 
resumption of nuclear testing, leading others to test as well? Will the 
new weapons erode the current gap between nuclear and conventional 
weapons, which helps to make nuclear war ``unthinkable'' and to deter 
other countries from developing such weapons?
  The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and low-yield nuclear weapons are 
not like regular nuclear weapons. Regular nuclear weapons are designed 
to deter an adversary; the massive destruction and civilian casualties 
they cause make nuclear weapons unlike even other weapons of mass 
destruction, with the possible exception of smallpox. But these nuclear 
weapons are different. They bridge the gap between conventional weapons 
and the city-busting weapons of the cold war. They offer the lure of a 
better way to destroy point targets.
  Supporters of new nuclear weapons argue that they, too, could deter 
an adversary, and that is true. All nuclear weapons have a deterrent 
function. But the deterrence benefits that low-yield weapons provide 
are far outweighed by both the risk that they will actually be used and 
the dangerous signal that they send to other countries--whether 
intentionally or not--that we intend to fight nuclear wars.
  These nuclear weapons blur the distinction between nuclear and 
conventional war. They begin to make nuclear war more ``thinkable,'' as 
Herman Kahn might have said. But Herman Kahn's book was ``Thinking 
About the Unthinkable.'' He understood that nuclear war was 
unthinkable, even as he demanded that we think about how to fight one 
if we had to. Looking at the foreign and defense policies of the 
current administration, I fear that they have failed to understand that 
vital point. They want to make nuclear war ``thinkable.''
  And that failure of understanding could lead to bigger failures: a 
failure to understand how to keep other countries from developing 
nuclear weapons; a failure to view nonproliferation as a vital and 
workable policy objective; and perhaps even a failure to avoid a 
nuclear war, which would do horrible damage to our country.
  Building bunker busters and low-yield nuclear weapons is not a path 
to non-proliferation. Neither is a program to do R&D on such weapons, 
while Defense Department officials press our scientists to come up with 
reasons to build them.
  Neither is a program to test those weapons--which would surely be 
necessary to develop new low-yield weapons; and which would just as 
surely be the death knell not only of the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty, but also of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  Consider what the administration has said regarding nuclear weapons: 
The Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 spoke of reducing U.S. 
reliance upon nuclear weapons. But it also reportedly listed not only 
Russia and China, but also North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya as 
potential enemies in a nuclear war.
  It spoke of possibly needing to develop and test new types of nuclear 
weapons, gave that as a reason for increasing our nuclear test 
readiness, and said that nuclear weapons might be used to neutralize 
chemical or biological agents. And in the run-up to the Iraq war, the 
administration proclaimed a doctrine of preemption against any 
potential foe that acquired weapons of mass destruction.
  Now, if you were a North Korean leader, or an Iranian or Syrian one, 
which part of those reports would you act on? The part that reduces 
reliance on nuclear weapons? Or the part that names you as a possible 
target for nuclear preemption?
  So far, we have one positive answer--from Libya, which is giving up 
its WMD program.
  But from North Korea and Iran, the response is much more disturbing. 
The Washington Post reported last month that a new National 
Intelligence Estimate would likely conclude that North Korea has 
approximately eight nuclear bombs, instead of two; and that its secret 
uranium enrichment program would be operational by 2007 and produce 
enough weapons-grade uranium for another six bombs per year. Iran was 
accelerating its nuclear weapons program, when disclosures and IAEA 
inspections exposed it and disrupted Iran's efforts. It pursued two 
means of uranium enrichment--centrifuges and lasers--and experimented 
with separating plutonium.
  Even countries that are our friends and allies worry about--and react 
to--these U.S. policies. Just last week, Brazil's new Ambassador 
reiterated his country's intent to limit the access of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to Brazil's uranium enrichment 
plant. One rationale he used was Brazil's unhappiness that the Bush 
administration would consider using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
countries.
  How shall we stem the spread of nuclear weapons? For a while, it 
seemed as though the administration's approach would be to declare war 
on every adversary that dared to go nuclear. But do we really intend to 
go to war with North Korea, if the price is the slaughter of hundreds 
of thousands of South Korean civilians? In fact, we appear now to be 
withdrawing half our ground combat forces from South Korea to send them 
to Iraq; and there are rumors that those forces will not return to 
Korea.
  Do we intend to go to war with Iran, when we cannot guarantee 
security in Iraq? The list of countries that we accuse of having 
weapons of mass destruction is long. Will we take them all on? And what 
do we do when Indian officials cite our Iraq war arguments as 
justification for a possible attack on Pakistan that could risk a 
nuclear war? Is this the world we want?
  Nobody ever said that nonproliferation was easy.
  I don't have a silver bullet; and I don't expect the President to 
have one, either. But you have to keep your eye on the ball. When 
conservatives opposed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, they said that 
countries would

[[Page 12103]]

build nuclear weapons for their own strategic reasons. That is right.
  It means that if we want to prevent proliferation, or roll it back, 
we have to affect those strategic calculations. Nonproliferation policy 
gives us a framework for those efforts.
  The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty gives us international support, 
and affects the calculations of countries whose neighbors sign and obey 
the treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group buys more time, by restricting 
exports of nuclear or dual-use materials and equipment. But in the end, 
it still comes down to other countries' strategic calculations.
  For lasting nonproliferation, we must treat the regional quarrels 
that drive countries to seek nuclear weapons. We were able to do that 
with Argentina and Brazil. As South Africa moved away from apartheid, 
we were able to do that there, as well. We are making a real effort to 
help India and Pakistan step back from the brink, and we must continue 
that effort. But we also have to address security concerns in East 
Asia, including North Korea's concerns, if we are to keep that whole 
region from developing nuclear weapons. And we have to pursue peace in 
the Middle East.
  Nor is there really an alternative to working with the international 
community.
  We don't have the ability to inspect sites in Iran; the International 
Atomic Energy Agency does have that ability. Its inspections have 
revealed much about the extent of Iran's nuclear program and have made 
it harder for Iran to pursue that program.
  We cannot close down proliferation traffic all by ourselves. The case 
of North Korea shows how much we need the help of other countries. The 
cooperation of other countries, especially including Russia and China, 
is essential. That is why the Proliferation Security Initiative is so 
important, as is our adherence to international law in implementing 
that initiative.
  Those are the paths to nonproliferation. They are long and difficult 
paths, and we do not know whether we will succeed. But we can see where 
we want to go, and we can see how working those issues will help get us 
there.
  Building a new generation of nuclear weapons will only take us on the 
opposite path. So I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein 
amendment to prohibit funding for those counterproductive weapons.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a critical 
national security amendment that I have cosponsored. I commend the 
leadership of Senator Kennedy and Feinstein and I join them today in 
offering an amendment that will eliminate funds in this year's budget 
for research and development on nuclear bunker buster. This amendment 
also deletes funding for the advanced concepts programs--money 
authorized for research on small nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, I am disappointed that this administration has 
requested these programs for this year's Department of Energy Budget. 
First and foremost, the development of these new weapons are not 
needed; the U.S. already has 6,000 deployed nuclear weapons. But most 
importantly, a U.S. decision to proceed with a new generation of 
nuclear weapons will undercut international non-proliferation efforts 
and undermine the United States' credibility on global security.
  We are currently facing a new type of national security challenge; 
our greatest goal is to prevent the nexus of terrorists and weapons of 
mass destruction. As such, it is imperative that this country's defense 
and foreign policy reflect a firm commitment to every aspect of non-
proliferation and arms control. Destroying and preventing the spread of 
current nuclear warheads remains a critical component of this 
commitment. So too is preventing the development of new types of 
nuclear weapons and materials, however small they might be and however 
limited their use.
  We invaded Iraq to change a regime that we were told posed an 
imminent threat to global security. The administration assured us that 
not only had Saddam amassed an arsenal of biological and chemical 
weapons, but he was also actively pursuing nuclear weapons as well. We 
have so far lost 840 American men and women in this effort but have yet 
to uncover traces of WMD programs in Iraq. I find it truly bizarre and 
hypocritical that the administration would plan to build new types of 
nuclear weapons at the same time it pursues military operations abroad 
with the purported objective of destroying similar materials.
  In our global war on terror, the last thing we need is more nuclear 
weapons. What we need are more troops on the ground protecting Iraqis 
and providing stability. What we need is better intelligence and law 
enforcement and enhanced efforts to collaborate with our allies on both 
priorities.
  Instead, the administration has decided that researching and 
developing new types of nuclear weapons is a priority. How we can 
credibly ask North Korea and Iran to stop their own nuclear programs 
while at the same time we develop mini nukes and bunker busters?
  Let me respond to three points the administration makes in support of 
its dangerous nuclear requests:
  First, the administration says the Pentagon must study bunker busters 
for the war on terrorism; only the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator 
(RNEP), it claims, could be used against suspected underground bunkers 
containing weapons of mass destruction. They say our amendment will tie 
the Pentagon's hands in the war on terrorism. This is not true. The 
administration's scenario in which the new nuclear explosives are used 
against suspected underground bunkers containing biological, chemical 
or nuclear weapons is highly improbable. Our intelligence about the 
location of WMD materials is not precise enough to destroy it this way. 
Just imagine launching nuclear bunker busters based on weapons 
intelligence as unreliable as that circulating before the Iraq war. 
Even if underground sites were accurately identified, the resulting 
nuclear explosions could spread the blast, radiation, and toxins over 
populated areas.
  Moreover, current conventional weapons in our arsenal can destroy 
these materials. And if we really care about the threat of WMD, then 
the proposed research money ought to be going to fund better weapons 
intelligence and improved conventional methods for putting these WMD 
sites out of commission, like blocking air intakes and external energy 
sources.
  Second, administration officials claim that the bunker buster funding 
and the mini nuke funding is just for feasibility studies and research 
and development, not for use. They claim that we are opposing the 
important scientific advances involved in researching these weapons.
  With nuclear weapons, any materials researched and developed must be 
tested. You cannot understand the physics of nuclear weapons without 
tests. Currently, the U.S. is a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, which prohibits testing nuclear weapons. If we test our new 
weapons, even at an early non-useable stage of development, we are 
immediately breaking this treaty and inviting other countries that are 
signatories to break this treaty as well.
  Finally, the proponents of the nuclear funding say that the 
administration's request only deals with a small amount of money--$9 
million for the mini nukes and around $30 million for the bunker 
busters. Relative to a Defense Budget for 2005 projected to surpass 
$440 billion dollars, they say that the sum in question--the sum our 
amendment will delete--is insignificant.
  This is also patently wrong. First, the Fiscal Year 2005 budget 
contains $9 million for mini nukes, which is a 50 percent increase from 
last year's request. What's more important is not the sum, but the 
intent. The administration has made it clear that it wants this money 
to create---and I quote the Pentagon ``a more useable'' nuclear weapon. 
This funding, however small, sends a dangerous message to other members 
of the nine country nuclear club that the U.S. is intending to use our 
nuclear arsenal.
  Second, with the bunker buster, in May 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld said 
that

[[Page 12104]]

the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetarato program ``is a study. It is nothing 
more and nothing less.'' This study was planned to cost $15 million for 
fiscal years 2003-2005. Yet this year, the Administration requested 
$27.6 million for the study, and suddenly revealed that it planned to 
spend $485 million over the next five years. That is not insignificant 
at all.
  I just returned from attending a celebration of the 60th anniversary 
of D-Day in Normandy, France. The most important military and political 
lesson learned from the D-Day battles was the necessity of 
international cooperation. I believe that this great example of multi-
lateral cooperation should be remembered and applied to current events, 
in Iraq and elsewhere. The world watched in awe as young, dedicated 
soldiers from several countries fought side by side on those beaches 
and cliffs that launched the events that would rid the world of 
fascism.
  Today, the administration's unilateral foreign policy and 
marginalization of the United Nations has fractured this alliance of 
democracies. Our relations with Europe are tense and our public 
standing in the world an all-time low. I believe that funding nuclear 
weapons in this year's budget will only provoke further antagonism 
between the United States and our allies.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe I have 10 minutes allocated to 
me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I very much support the pending amendment 
because I believe if this country is going to have any credibility in 
our argument that countries such as Iran should not be allowed to 
obtain nuclear weapons, we ourselves must reduce our own reliance on 
nuclear weapons and not move in the direction of new nuclear weapons.
  We undermine our position when we put money into a budget which says 
we are going to start doing and continue research on new types of 
weapons and on advanced concepts for nuclear weapons, when we have been 
a party to a treaty called the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
says:

       Each of the Parties to the Treaty--

  That includes us--

     undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
     measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
     early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty of 
     general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
     international control.

  We have told the Indians, we have told the Pakistanis: Do not move 
down that nuclear road.
  We have told the Iranians: We are not going to let you go down that 
nuclear road. We are going to take actions to prevent you from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. This is at the same time this administration 
is moving this country toward additional reliance on nuclear weapons, 
new types of nuclear weapons, and new uses for nuclear weapons.
  It is totally inconsistent for us to be moving in the direction we 
talk about when it comes to other countries but in the direction that 
we literally live out when we come to our own activity. Too often this 
country has been portrayed as saying that the rules that apply to 
everybody else do not apply to us. We have seen too much evidence of 
that approach recently. It has dramatically weakened our position in 
this world and strengthened the terrorists' position when we say we are 
not governed by the same rules by which everybody else is governed. 
There is a nonproliferation treaty out there, Iran. You are a member of 
that treaty, and you have to live up to it.
  Now, of course, Iran can pull out of that treaty. They can withdraw 
from that treaty, too, just as we withdrew from the ABM Treaty. But 
they are a member of that nonproliferation regime now. So we tell them: 
You have to live up to that regime. We are not going to sit by and 
allow you to get nuclear weapons.
  That is what we say over here. But over here we put millions of 
dollars into doing research on new types of nuclear weapons and new 
uses for nuclear weapons which already are in the inventory.
  This is a grave danger to us. We undermine our own security when we 
talk out of the right side of our mouth when it comes to what other 
people can do, and out of the left side of our mouth when it comes to 
our own activity.
  The effort to move toward more usable nuclear weapons is what this 
argument is all about. This is what Administrator Brooks talked about 
in answer to a question by Senator Reed, when he says:

       And I accept Senator Reed's point that . . . I have a bias 
     in favor of things that might be usable.

  Here is the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration talking about that we have to move toward more usable 
nuclear weapons. And why do we need these weapons? We are told because 
there are underground bunkers that might be the targets, and that those 
bunkers might not be reachable except through nuclear weapons.
  Can we just imagine having dropped nuclear weapons going after Saddam 
Hussein? We had this intelligence that said he was in an underground 
bunker. And that underground bunker, we were told, was something we 
could hit with a conventional weapon at the time. It was one of, 
apparently, 50 airstrikes that we used against the high-value targets 
in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein and his sons.
  Well, according to the press, there were about 50 of those 
airstrikes. Not one of them was successful. It turns out there 
apparently was not even a bunker at the one we were sure Saddam Hussein 
was in. But if there was a bunker, he was not in it. According to this 
report in the New York Times of June 13, a Central Intelligence Agency 
officer reported that Hussein was in that underground bunker at that 
site. So we went after him. We directed the airstrikes against that 
bunker.
  But then, after the main part of this war was over, we went and 
inspected where we had struck based on intelligence that there was an 
underground bunker containing Saddam Hussein. And lo and behold, not 
only wasn't there Saddam Hussein--we knew that already--but there 
wasn't even a bunker at the location.
  And the suggestion that we are going to design nuclear weapons to go 
after bunkers, despite the huge result in terms of human loss when 
nuclear weapons are used, assumes we have intelligence which is so 
reliable that we can, with great certainty, reach a leader who 
otherwise would not be reachable with conventional weapons. If anything 
has been demonstrated recently during this Iraq war, it is that our 
intelligence is not only not particularly accurate but it is wildly 
inaccurate at times.
  The idea that we project to the world that we are going to design 
nuclear weapons to go after bunkers--nuclear weapons which have yields 
which will kill tens of thousands of people if they succeed with their 
low yield--it seems to me is not only a message which undercuts our 
position against proliferation and our position in support of the 
nonproliferation treaty but a message which totally weakens us, which 
opens us up to the attacks of the terrorists who would kill us, that 
the United States lives by one set of rules when it comes to its own 
activities at the same time it wants to apply another set of rules to 
the rest of the world.
  The administration's Defense Science Board, last year, called for a 
strategic redirection of the stockpile stewardship priorities in favor 
of nuclear weapons that previously had not been provided for and 
supported.
  The legislative justification for the administration's position on 
this matter says we should be exploring weapons concepts that could 
offer greater capabilities for precision and earth penetration and 
weapons which are more ``relevant.'' More relevant nuclear weapons is 
what this is all about, relevant and usable nuclear weapons. A more 
relevant stockpile, according to their definition, will have reduced 
efficient yield.
  But when you look at what the real yield is of these so-called 
reduced

[[Page 12105]]

weapons, reduced yields, a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated at a 
depth of 25 to 50 feet would eject more than 1 million cubic feet of 
radioactive debris into the air and leave a crater about the size of 
the World Trade Center. A 100-kiloton weapon that was detonated 635 
feet below ground in Nevada formed a crater 320 feet deep and 1,200 
feet in diameter. If a target were so deeply buried that a conventional 
weapon could not effectively harm a target, neither could a low-yield 
nuclear weapon. To successfully reach one of those targets would 
require a large yield and a large yield cannot be contained.
  According to Sidney Drell, a noted physicist at Stanford University 
and a member of the NNSA advisory panel, a target buried at 1,000 feet 
would take a nuclear weapon with a yield greater than 100 kilotons to 
do any damage.
  This body is again faced with a decision: Do we want to continue to 
walk down a road which we are urging and demanding that others not 
walk? The greatest fight we must wage is against proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction that could reach the hands of terrorists.
  The determination to develop new nukes and new uses for nuclear 
weapons undermines that fight. It weakens us in that fight and it makes 
us less secure in the war against terrorism.
  I strongly urge that the pending amendment be adopted.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, how much time remains on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 18 minutes on the Democratic side and 
33 minutes on your side.
  Mr. INHOFE. When are we scheduled to have our vote?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. At the conclusion of the use or yielding back 
of the time.
  Mr. INHOFE. I see there are those wanting to be heard on the other 
side. Let me make a couple comments.
  We are talking as if this is some program that we are putting 
together. This is a feasibility study. This is something to determine 
what the costs would be, what risks are out there, what the potential 
threat is that we could be guarding against. We are talking about a 
defensive system. I have heard all of the arguments.
  Since we do have some time, I will let them use some of their time, 
and then I would like to respond so we can stay on schedule.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am very happy to join with Senator 
Kennedy in support of this amendment. I come at this from a passionate, 
moral point of view so my arguments are going to reflect that. We have 
been hearing for 2 years now that this is just a study. Yet the 
Congressional Research Service has shown in its reports that, in fact, 
it is much more than a study. This is the reopening of the nuclear door 
and the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.
  We, the strongest and most technologically proficient military on 
Earth now see fit to reopen that door and begin to study and develop a 
new generation of nuclear weapons: One, the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator, a 100-kiloton bunker buster, which at present cannot be 
developed to drive deeply enough into the ground to prevent the spewing 
of massive amounts of radioactive debris; two, something called 
advanced concepts initiative, which is the development of low-yield 
nuclear weapons, under 5 kilotons, to be used as strategic battlefield 
nuclear weapons; and three, the development of a plutonium pit facility 
with enough capacity to create up to 450 plutonium pits per year, which 
are the trigger devices in a nuclear weapon.
  I strongly believe that to proceed on this path is folly because by 
doing so we are encouraging the very nuclear proliferation we are 
seeking to prevent. In other words, we are telling other countries, 
don't do what we do, do what we say. We are practicing the ultimate 
hypocrisy. And there is now emerging evidence that others are going to 
follow this course.
  When I stood on the floor last week, I mentioned the report that 
India is beginning the development of battlefield nuclear weapons. You 
can be sure Pakistan will follow. We also know Brazil is looking at 
that opportunity as well. In April of this year, Brazil refused to 
allow IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, inspectors to 
examine a uranium enrichment facility under construction. They insisted 
that the facility will only produce low-enriched uranium, which is 
legal under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, so long as it is 
safeguarded. They also refused to fully cooperate with the IAEA's 
investigation into the nuclear black market operated by Pakistani 
scientist A.Q. Kahn.
  These are all the signs. We saw them in North Korea as well. Brazil 
appears to be rebelling against what it perceives to be a double 
standard in the global nuclear proliferation regime. It views President 
Bush's proposals, which significantly curtail the sharing of 
potentially peaceful nuclear technology, as a radical departure from 
the standards agreed to under the NPT. I am quoting from a statement 
issued by the former Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Robin Cook, and 
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a document entitled ``A 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy for the 21st Century.'' We know that 
other countries follow the example of the United States. Why are we 
doing this?
  There is good news. Last week the House Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Energy and Water eliminated all funding for these programs, 
everything--for the pit facility, for the advanced weapons concepts, 
and for the nuclear bunker buster. That was a wise decision. I believe 
the action of the House is a reflection of the growing bipartisan 
concerns that I know many of my colleagues share about this 
administration's nuclear weapons programs. That is why the Senator from 
Massachusetts and I and the Senator from Michigan and others have 
offered our amendment to eliminate funds for programs to develop new 
nuclear weapons capabilities, including the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator.
  This administration continues to argue that no new weapons production 
is currently planned. But again, the facts belie this statement.
  Ambassador Linton Brooks, head of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, stated in a recent interview that it is important, in 
his view, to maintain a manufacturing and scientific base so that the 
United States can meet the goal of ``being able to design, develop, and 
begin production of a new warhead within 3 to 4 years of a decision to 
enter engineering development.''
  That is the ball game--the development of a new warhead. It is not 
just a study; it is development.
  I mentioned the Congressional Research Service report. I was 
staggered when I saw that it concluded that the administration's long-
term budget plans, including $485 million for the robust nuclear earth 
penetrator between 2005 and 2009, casts doubt on the contention that 
the studies of a new nuclear weapon are, in fact, just studies. Why 
would the administration be including $485 million in future funds in 
its long-term budget for a robust nuclear earth penetrator if it was 
just a study? The fact is, they would not. The study doesn't cost $485 
million. The answer is that they are planning to go into the 
engineering and the development phases.
  What I find most troubling with the administration's approach is the 
suggestion that we can make nuclear weapons more usable.
  I strongly believe it must be a central tenet of the U.S. national 
security policy to do everything at our disposal to make nuclear 
weapons less desirable, less available, and less likely to be used.
  According to press reports, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review cited the 
need to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and suggested a 
``new triad''

[[Page 12106]]

which blurred the lines between conventional and nuclear forces. I keep 
mentioning that because this paper is often postulated as a throwaway--
don't pay attention to it--but it is a very important statement of 
administration policy.
  As early as 2001, this administration was creating a new triad of 
strategic forces, and one part of that would be the nuclear triad--in 
other words, the creation of new weapons that could be used along with 
conventional weapons.
  This document also names seven countries--not all of them possessing 
nuclear weapons--against which we would consider launching a nuclear 
first strike.
  So this new triad, with its emphasis on the offensive capability of 
these weapons--even in first-strike scenarios--represents a radical and 
dangerous departure from the idea that our strategic nuclear forces are 
primarily intended for deterrence. This is significant. We have always 
looked at our nuclear arsenal as a deterrent arsenal. This is now 
changing to an offensive arsenal. If you think about how the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator would be used, how low-yield nuclear weapons 
would be used, they would not be used in a defensive posture; they 
would be used as part of an offensive thrust.
  A recent report of the Pentagon's Defense Sciences Board argues that 
``nuclear weapons are needed that produce much lower collateral 
damage,'' precisely so these weapons can be more ``usable'' and 
integrated into war-fighting plans.
  Now, the problem in all of this is that there is no such thing as a 
``clean'' or usable nuclear bomb. A lot of studies have been done.
  A leader in this effort is Dr. Sidney Drell, a physics professor at 
Stanford University. He points out how the effects of a small bomb 
would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet 
underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and 
eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air.
  The depth of penetration of the robust nuclear earth penetrator is 
limited by the strength of the missile casing. The deepest our current 
earth penetrator can burrow is 20 to 35 feet of dry earth.
  Casing made of even the strongest material cannot withstand the 
physical force of burrowing through 100 feet of granite to reach a hard 
or deeply buried target--much less the 800 feet needed to contain the 
nuclear blast.
  So if a nuclear bunker buster were able to burrow into the earth to 
reach its maximum feasible penetration depth of 35 feet, it would not 
be able to be deep enough to contain even a bomb with an explosive 
yield of only 0.2 kilotons, let alone a 100-kiloton bomb like the 
robust nuclear earth penetrator.
  So given the insurmountable physics problems associated with 
burrowing a warhead deep into the earth, destroying a target hidden 
beneath 1,000 feet into rock will require a nuclear weapon of at least 
100 kilotons. So anything short of 800 feet will not contain a fallout. 
A fireball will break through the surface, scattering enormous amounts 
of radioactive debris--1.5 million tons for a 100-kiloton bomb--into 
the atmosphere. Is that what we want to be doing as a Nation?
  The 1962 Sedan nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site illustrates the 
enormous destructive effects of a 100-kiloton nuclear blast detonated 
635 feet below the surface of the Earth--far deeper than any robust 
nuclear earth penetrator can be engineered to go. The radioactive cloud 
it produced continued to rise as debris settled back to Earth, and the 
base surge of the explosion rolled over the desert. Even at 635 feet 
below the ground, the blast could not be contained.
  On the floor of the Senate last week, my friend, the distinguished 
Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, argued that because conventional earth-
penetrating munitions failed to knock out Saddam Hussein in his 
underground bunker on the eve of the Iraq war, ``only nuclear weapons 
can address the deeply buried targets that are protected by manmade, or 
even hard geology.''
  I usually, on security matters, agree with my friend. But consider 
the implications of this statement. If we had used a nuclear earth 
penetrator, we might have killed Saddam Hussein--that is, assuming we 
had the right location in the first place, and clearly our intelligence 
was not right--but at the same time the United States would have used a 
nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear weapon state, detonating it in the 
middle of a city of 5 million people. Would leveling Baghdad have been 
the right way to liberate an oppressed people from a brutal dictator? 
Of course not.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have one sentence before yielding to the 
Senator from New Mexico. This is a feasibility study. That is all it 
is. You can keep saying over and over that it is more, but it is not. 
In the 5-year plan, which says in the event the feasibility study 
recommends it, and in the event the President recommends it, in the 
event we authorize it in both the House and Senate, then you can go 
forward with it. Right now, it is a feasibility study.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at the conclusion of the remarks of our 
distinguished colleague from New Mexico, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senator from Virginia be recognized for about 6 or 7 minutes for 
the purpose of a colloquy with the Senator from Utah.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank Senator Inhofe for the 
opportunity to speak.
  The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment would prevent the NNSA from studying 
alternative technologies for our nuclear stockpile. It would also 
prevent the NNSA and DOD from studying earth-penetrating capability, 
which many military experts believe is an area where our existing 
arsenal does not provide sufficient deterrence.
  The robust nuclear earth penetrator is a study to determine how or if 
the existing B-61 and existing B-83--those are the names of nuclear 
weapons--might be modified to provide an added capability of 
underground penetration. At present, our military is unable to provide 
credible deterrence against deeply buried targets.
  Included in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget is $27.6 million 
in funding to undertake a feasibility study for the RNEP. With this 
research--and I stress research--we may be able to solve the complex 
engineering challenges and identify capabilities for both nuclear and 
conventional weapons to address the evolving tactical challenges. This 
is research not intended to replace any conventional weapon. It would 
only serve to transition from relying on large megaton city busters 
with more precise weapons, also providing funding for the NNSA to 
evaluate modification to existing weapons. It does not imply a 
commitment to build these weapons. Section 3117 of the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2004 requires that specific congressional 
authorization be obtained to move beyond a feasibility study. That has 
not been repealed and has not been changed.
  Last year, the Energy and Water appropriations bill contained 
language that prevents the NNSA and the Department of Defense from 
moving beyond a feasibility study without congressional approval. I am 
the chairman of that committee, and I intend to include similar 
language again this year.
  The Advanced Concepts Initiative will examine emerging or alternative 
technologies that could provide this country with an improved nuclear 
deterrence.
  In 2001, the Nuclear Posture Review suggested that we should keep our 
nuclear scientists engaged and thinking about what the nuclear 
stockpile of the future should look like. By denying our scientists the 
opportunity to investigate this technology and the options for our 
stockpile, we will also neglect critical research into improving the

[[Page 12107]]

safety, reliability, and security of the existing aging stockpile. It 
makes absolutely no sense to ignore technology and innovation when it 
comes to nuclear security and deterrence. I guarantee other countries 
are not limiting themselves to what they know today but are focusing on 
new possibilities for tomorrow.
  This is not an attempt to build brand-new weapons and add to the 
stockpile. I am very supportive of reducing the number of weapons we 
have deployed, and I support the President's recently announced efforts 
to take a dramatic step in that direction. I support a much smaller, 
more flexible stockpile that can respond to a variety of threats in the 
post-cold-war era.
  Last year, the Appropriations Energy and Water Development 
Subcommittee included a requirement that the President send to Congress 
a nuclear stockpile report that underlines the size of the stockpile of 
the future. This classified report is complete and defines the size and 
mission of our future stockpile. It goes beyond reductions contemplated 
by the Clinton administration. The plan proposed by the President would 
reduce the number of deployed weapons to levels consistent with the 
Moscow Treaty and its lowest level in several decades.
  But even with these reductions, we must constantly adapt to provide a 
credible deterrence to the post-cold-war era. It is not realistic to 
think we can put the nuclear genie back into the bottle. We cannot hope 
that if we ignore the evolving nuclear threat that it will go away. 
History tells us a different story.
  Despite the U.S. adopting a testing moratorium, several countries, 
including France, India, and Pakistan have tested weapons. Countries 
such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea have ignored international 
pressure to stop the development of a nuclear capability.
  The fact is, countries will pursue what is in their sovereign best 
interests, and the U.S. should not believe that we are in any different 
position. It is in our Nation's best interest to ensure that our 
weapons serve as a credible deterrent to a wide range of threats.
  I remain hopeful that we will only use our stockpile as a deterrent 
to other nuclear states. However, to be an effective deterrent, it must 
evolve to address the changing threats. We also must maintain a group 
of experts at our national labs that understand the complex science to 
support the engineering and physics to ensure our stockpile is a viable 
deterrent and is safely stored at home.
  To ensure we have an effective deterrent, we are doing the following:
  We are maintaining our nuclear deterrent. That sends a clear and 
convincing signal to our allies and our enemies that our nuclear 
capability is sufficient to deter most threats.
  We are maintaining our test readiness that allows us to hedge against 
the possibility that we may someday need to conduct a test to confirm a 
problem or verify that we resolved a problem within the stockpile.
  We are using the RNEP study to examine whether or not existing 
weapons could be adapted to improve our ability to hold at risk deeply 
buried facilities that our enemies occupy.
  We are challenging our scientists to think of a wide variety of 
options and face challenges to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is 
flexible and responsive to evolving threats. Failure to challenge our 
physicists and engineers will limit our capabilities in the future.
  It is disingenuous of our opponents to argue that these policies put 
us on an irreversible course of new weapons development. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. Congress has the ultimate responsibility in 
determining whether or not to proceed with full-scale development.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this shortsighted amendment that would 
prevent our weapons scientists from investigating the best available 
options. This research is critical to ensuring this country has an 
effective and safe stockpile that will serve as a credible deterrent to 
all existing and potential threats.
  I hope that in the process of discussing this issue, we will arrive 
at a conclusion that makes it eminently clear that the statement I have 
made regarding the 1-year feasibility study will be what we are talking 
about and what we will adopt.
  I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 26 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. And the other side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 3 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Under our unanimous consent agreement, we will recognize 
the Senator from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, our distinguished colleague from Utah 
wishes to have a colloquy with me. The colloquy represents a number of 
days of careful deliberations on a point and issue in last year's bill 
which is of great importance to him. I will follow my colleague after 
he makes his remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I intend to oppose the Kennedy-Feinstein 
amendment even though I am sympathetic with many of the arguments they 
make. I am in agreement with the idea that this is a feasibility study 
only and that the study should go forward, but my primary concern is 
that there be no nuclear testing of this particular device or any 
aspect of this particular device while the study is going on.
  It is my understanding that is part of the law accepted previously, 
but I want to make it absolutely sure. For that purpose, I intend, 
following this vote, some time during the debate, to call up my 
amendment which makes it clear that there can be no nuclear testing 
under the cover of a study of the RNEP as it is so called. That 
amendment is offered not only for myself and my colleague from Utah, 
Senator Hatch, but we are joined by Senator Collins of Maine and 
Senator Domenici of New Mexico.
  I wish to make it clear that my goal is to see to it that there be no 
nuclear testing in the name of the study unless there is a specific 
congressional vote with respect to that testing. I do not believe it 
will be necessary, but if some future administration 5, 10, 15 years 
from now were to decide they needed to do some nuclear testing, that 
there was a compelling case to do that, I want that future 
administration to have to come to the Congress and make the compelling 
case to the Congress. My amendment goes in that direction with that as 
its goal.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my understanding there are others 
who have associated with the Senator on this matter; am I not correct 
in that?
  Mr. BENNETT. That is correct. As I said, Senator Hatch, Senator 
Collins, and Senator Domenici have cosponsored the amendment, and there 
are some others who indicated they will as well.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. I think the 
observations of the Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett, are important ones. 
I will work with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to see if 
we cannot accept this amendment eventually because it, in all 
likelihood, clarifies the language that I put in the bill last year.
  I think the amendment helps to clarify the intent of the language 
last year, which in its verbiage requires a specific authorization by 
Congress to proceed with the engineering development phase or 
subsequent phase of the robust nuclear earth penetrator and, in my 
view, that includes a full-scale underground nuclear test on the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator if such test, in the judgment of the technical 
community, is deemed necessary.
  So I think the amendment can be helpful, and I will work with my 
distinguished colleagues on the other side, most specifically the 
ranking member, Senator Levin, to see whether we can adopt it.
  I thank my colleague.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his courtesy

[[Page 12108]]

and look forward to working with him and Senator Levin to see if we can 
indeed get this amendment adopted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. At this point, I yield to the junior Senator from Texas 
for such time as he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his 
courtesy in allowing me to speak briefly against this amendment which, 
as we have heard, prohibits any funding both for a feasibility study on 
the robust nuclear earth penetrator and for the advanced concepts 
initiative. My concern is the premise upon which this amendment is 
offered. If the events of the last decade have taught us anything, it 
is that weakness invites aggression by those who see that as an 
opportunity to terrorize or otherwise wreak havoc on innocent civilians 
in this country and elsewhere.
  The concept that we should somehow prohibit important research--and 
this amendment would eliminate research because, of course, production 
is prohibited by current law--the suggestion and the logic, if there is 
any, that by somehow blinding ourselves to the threat and the means to 
overcome the threats that surround us in an ever dangerous world is 
beyond me. If we have learned anything in the last decade from the time 
of the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 to the bombing of our 
American embassies in Africa to the Khobar Towers incident to the 
bombing of the USS Cole, it is that weakness in the eyes of terrorists 
and rogue nations invites aggression.
  I wonder from where the sense of moral equivalency comes that we 
often hear in this debate. There are those who have said time and again 
that if we are to try to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
around the world, how can America then conduct research on the robust 
nuclear earth penetrator and on those areas covered by the advanced 
concepts initiative? But I wonder if those who are making these 
statements truly believe America's research on such weapons systems to 
protect ourselves and to defend ourselves is somehow the equivalent of 
the actions of rogue states and terrorists. Moral equivalency is simply 
wrong.
  There are those who suggest that somehow by conducting essential 
research into hardened weapons like the robust earth nuclear 
penetrator, that may perhaps be able to protect our country and assist 
us in exposing hardened bunkers, which can contain command and control 
or perhaps even biological or other weapons of mass destruction 
research facilities, that we will start a new arms race. I detect a 
hint of perhaps the old cold war mentality that somehow they believe we 
will enter into some sort of arms race which will endanger the world.
  The truth is, America, as a fraction of its GDP, spends more on 
defense than the next 20 nations in the world. We are the only 
superpower that exists in the world and there is no risk of an arms 
race such as we saw occur with the former Soviet Union. So this is 
merely a matter of allowing us to do the basic research into weapons 
that would allow us to protect ourselves against hardened and deeply 
buried targets where laboratories could store or produce weapons of 
mass destruction. We can conduct research on these weapons as a way to 
protect ourselves and indeed make America safer.
  Finally, this amendment would eliminate the advanced concepts 
initiative. It is important to reiterate what that initiative will do. 
The initiative focuses on increasing the reliability, safety, and 
security of our existing nuclear weapons stockpile. It focuses on 
assessing the capabilities of our adversaries to ensure we avoid a 
technological surprise. It focuses on thinking up innovative methods 
for countering our adversaries' weapons of mass destruction and 
developing weapons systems requirements, and it focuses on evaluating 
concepts to meet future military requirements.
  I fail to see the wisdom of our willingness to blind ourselves to 
emerging threats in a very dangerous world. As I say, our weakness, our 
willingness to disarm ourselves and blind ourselves to the danger that 
surrounds us is an invitation to those who see that as a means for them 
to use terrorism to accomplish their political goals in this world in 
which we live.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment today. I thank the 
manager of the bill for this time and I yield back any remaining time 
to him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I understand the other side has 3 minutes 
remaining, and I think the Senator from Massachusetts wants to wind up. 
It would be our intention to yield back our time unless somebody comes 
to the floor who has not been heard. So at this point I yield to the 
Senator from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Finally, Mr. President, my friend from Texas does not 
state our amendment correctly. We are only dealing with the mini nuke 
and the bunker buster, not the safety of the stockpile or the study of 
information that happens in other countries. The fact of the matter is, 
this administration does have a plan for the development of the bunker 
buster and the small nuclear weapon. There is no doubt about it. It 
says so in its Nuclear Posture Review.
  It puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of 
nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents a 
blueprint for transforming our strategic posture. That is the beginning 
of a new arms race.
  It is not what I say; it is in their budget request that goes on for 
5 or 7 years and asks for $485 million for the bunker buster and $84 
million for the small nukes. That is what the administration basically 
wants. This is what their principal responsible officials in the 
administration have said.
  Linton Brooks:

       I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable. I 
     think that's just an inherent part of deterrence.

  Fred Celec, former deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense: If a 
hydrogen bomb can be successfully designed to survive a crash through 
hard rock or concrete and still explode, ``It will ultimately get 
fielded.''
  There it is. That is what we are dealing with. We believe, if we go 
this route, it is going to make it more difficult to achieve arms 
control in the area of nuclear arms. It is going to make our goals 
harder to realize and make the possibility of nuclear war more likely.
  Interestingly, the House of Representatives, in their conclusions on 
this same issue, provides no funds for advanced concepts research and 
the robust nuclear earth penetrator. Our bill does provide a 
significant increase in weapons dismantlement, and for security 
upgrades in the weapons complex for nuclear nonproliferation, the 
committee provides the request for $1.3 billion. We spend the resources 
on other high-priority nonproliferation needs.
  That is the conclusion of the Republican House of Representatives. 
They seem to get it.
  Rather than start into a new arms race with nuclear weapons, let us 
accept our amendment and rely on what we have relied on, which the 
Secretary of State, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin 
Powell, recognized--that these were not small nukes and were not 
battlefield weapons. They did not have a place in our military. That is 
what the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. No one is 
suggesting that he hasn't had a life and career in terms of security of 
this country.
  We have the best in terms of conventional forces. Why go ahead and 
see nuclear proliferation in terms of weapons that will create 
increased dangers for the American people?
  I yield the remaining time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is our intention to yield our time. 
However, I repeat: This is a feasibility study. It is nothing more than 
that. You can quote all these other people whose opinion is we should 
have this. It doesn't make any difference. If the feasibility study 
says we should go into R&D and production, we can do that. If the 5-
year

[[Page 12109]]

plan says they come up with that recommendation, we can do that. But, 
first, the feasibility study would have to be done. Then the President 
would have to make a request, and both Houses of Congress would have to 
authorize it. This is just a feasibility study. We voted on this last 
year. I have sent for the vote. We will have it down here to remind 
people how they voted. Nothing has changed.
  I yield the remainder of our time and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous cosent that the order for 
the quroum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we have had a very good debate. I 
thank colleagues on both sides of the aisle for participating in the 
debate this morning--the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe; Senator 
Allard; the Senator from Texas; and many of us.
  While the vote had been scheduled for a little later to accommodate 
the needs of several Senators, I ask the desk to recognize that all 
time has been yielded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Therefore, if it is agreeable with my colleague from 
Michigan, we will have a vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have no objection. However, there may be 
some Senators who relied on this vote starting later, and we ought to 
accommodate them and keep the vote open a little longer.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords), 
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), and the Senator from 
Vermont (Mr. Leahy) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Vermont (Mr. Leahy) would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 42, nays 55, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 113 Leg.]

                                YEAS--42

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Byrd
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham (FL)
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Stabenow
     Wyden

                                NAYS--55

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Dole
     Domenici
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Jeffords
     Kerry
     Leahy
  The amendment (No. 3263) was rejected.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


            Unanimous Consent Agreement--Executive Calendar

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Colorado and all 
others who participated in what I felt was one of the better debates we 
have had in some time on a very serious issue. I commend the Senator 
from Massachusetts and others for the manner in which we conducted the 
debate.
  Mr. President, I will now propound a unanimous consent request.
  I ask unanimous consent that the time from 2:15 to 3:40 be equally 
divided between the opponents and proponents of the Smith amendment No. 
3183; provided further, that at 3:40, the Senate proceed to executive 
session for the consideration en bloc of the following nominations: 
Virginia Hopkins, Ricardo Martinez, and Gene Pratter.
  I further ask unanimous consent that there be 20 minutes of debate 
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the 
Judiciary Committee, or their designees, and that at 4 o'clock today 
the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Smith amendment No. 
3183, with no amendments in order to the amendment prior to the vote.
  I further ask that following that vote, the Senate then proceed to 
consecutive votes on the confirmation of Executive Calendar Nos. 563, 
564, and 566, with 2 minutes of debate equally divided prior to each 
vote. I finally ask that following these votes, the President be 
immediately notified of the Senate's action and the Senate resume 
legislative session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, following 
this series of votes, we will return to the Defense bill. At that time, 
there has been an agreement--at least it is my understanding that a 
Crapo amendment will be laid down.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is correct.
  Mr. REID. That amendment would be set aside and Senator Cantwell 
would lay down an amendment, and we will do our best to work out a time 
to vote on those amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. REID. Following the offering of the Cantwell amendment, the next 
one in order is the amendment by Senator Durbin on our side, so people 
understand that.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, if I may inquire, we have a pending 
amendment. What is the plan for dealing with amendments that have been 
offered and set aside? Do we try to resolve these matters in 
negotiation, or is there a schedule by which we will vote on these?
  Mr. WARNER. The issue I am familiar with is the one the Senator from 
Connecticut and I debated which has sections (a) and (b).
  Mr. DODD. Correct, the contractors.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, did the Senator reach any conclusions as 
to whether he wants to amend his amendment?
  Mr. DODD. We may very well. I have not had a chance to speak with 
staff. I will be happy to speak with them in the next hour.
  Mr. WARNER. I am hoping we can act on that amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. If whoever has the floor will yield, I understand we have 
now received the documents. We received the documents which we sought 
from the Army. I have not read them yet, and I do not know if the 
Senator has had a chance to review them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. REID. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I think we will go to the 
standing order to place the Senate in recess.

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