[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 11443-11447]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




             THE CASE FOR A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) is recognized 
for 60 minutes.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, ``China is a sleeping giant. Let her lie and 
sleep, for when she awakens, she will astonish the world,'' wrote 
Napoleon Bonaparte. I would like to title this speech ``The Case for a 
Special Relationship With China.''
  Great nations almost always miss important changes outside their 
world. Such errors threaten their future in ways they never dreamed. 
History also has examples of leaders who saw challenges early and 
responded well.
  The leaders of Great Britain's late empire entirely missed the rise 
of the United States. Britain suffered years of combat in World Wars I 
and II before their American allies joined the fight. During both wars, 
the British Empire teetered in the balance. Conversely, President 
Truman wisely perceived his challenge in the Soviet Union and responded 
well. His actions contributed mightily to the winning of the Cold War.
  In the 19th century, not everyone missed the rise of the United 
States. As early as 1835, Alexander de Tocqueville saw in the future 
clearly when he wrote, ``Americans are already able to make their flag 
respected. In a few years, they will be able to make it feared.''
  Looking from Westminster across the Thames River in 1870, the British 
Empire's leaders did not share de Tocqueville's view. It was an easy 
mistake for them to make. Queen Victoria presided over the largest 
economic block on Earth. In the glare of an empire where the sun never 
set, her ministers largely ignored the significance of their American 
cousins.
  Well-schooled leaders of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were 
distracted by a number of small wars at the fringe of their empire, 
Abyssinia, South Africa, Egypt and Sudan, to name a few. In 1868, The 
Illustrated London News warned, ``We can ill afford a perpetual 
succession of little wars,'' but few took notice. European continental 
leaders were equally unaware of the American change that was under way 
in their century. German Chancellor Bismarck discounted the United 
States when he wrote, ``There is a providence that protects fools, 
drunkards, children and the United States of America.''
  After only one single Victorian generation, America's economy grew to 
be twice the size of Britain's. By 1900, many of the British Empire's 
leaders dimly perceived the threat from Germany but remained unaware of 
how their world had changed across the Atlantic. It was hard for many 
leaders to take America seriously when Belgium's Armed Forces 
outnumbered the U.S. Army.
  As a result of their ignorance, England's leaders entered the First 
World War without the backing of the American arsenal. In 3 short 
years, from 1914 to 1917, they exhausted the wealth of the empire. 
Finally, America joined the allies of World War I, but only on 
President Wilson's terms. It took British leaders two generations of 
conflict to understand how important America had become to them.
  Today, London's policy towards the United States is rightfully called 
the ``special relationship.'' Are there changes under way which call 
for American attention? Could the leaders of America's foreign policy 
make a similar mistake? In our vision of America's future, are there 
any countries deserving another special relationship?
  Our history is filled with examples of countries where economic 
growth rapidly turned into political and military power. The rise of 
Japan, Germany and even some Gulf states show that economic expansion 
has an inevitable political and military impact. For the United States 
to be effective in foreign policy, the President needs advisers who see 
the world not just as it is but as it will become. When the White House 
advisers fail to outline strategic change, they doom our President to 
using short-term expedience to cope with a long-term threat.
  With a clear strategic view, the advisers of President Truman served 
our country well. Writing his famous long telegram from the rubble of 
1946 Moscow, U.S. Foreign Service Officer George Kennan correctly 
outlined the emerging threat from the Soviet Union. By removing 
President Roosevelt's friendly ``Uncle Joe'' veneer from Stalin, George 
Kennan warned his President clearly about the coming Cold War. The 
Soviet Union, in his view, was becoming a colossus, demanding more than 
short-term American expedience. The struggle between East and West 
could only be won with a strategic plan by the West.
  Truman's answer to the challenge of the Cold War was massive. He 
backed his short-term military defense of South Korea with a long-term 
set of new institutions: the Marshall Plan, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, the 
Strategic Air Command, the United Nations and the Voice of America, to 
name a few.
  After four decades of struggle, the East abandoned the Berlin Wall. 
In the heady days after communism's fall, many felt the U.S. stood 
unopposed at the dawn of a new Pax Americana. Francis Fujiyama asked in 
the Washington Post, ``is this the end of history?''
  History hardly ended, but the idea of American supremacy is now 
strong. America's Armed Forces won stunning victories: 1991 in Kuwait, 
1995 in Bosnia, 1999 in Kosovo and 2003 in Iraq. Who can challenge 
America?
  Despite our ascendency, we must ask the question, is there a major 
change in the world for which the U.S. should prepare? As Truman did in 
the 1940s, should the United States create institutions that respond to 
this change?
  The American view of foreign policy has more to do with our European 
past than our Asian present. By a two-to-one margin, Americans believe 
that our policy towards Europe is more important than Asia, but our 
trade with

[[Page 11444]]

Asia surpassed Europe a generation ago. Today, American trade with Asia 
totals 50 percent more than our trade with Europe. The U.S. State 
Department has just 579 full-time Americans stationed in Asia, compared 
to over 1,300 in Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
Asian economies are both larger and growing faster than Europe. Beyond 
the Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
growth rates of China and India clearly show that most of our history 
in the 21st century will be written in Asia.
  One country looms large across the future of the United States, 
China. China's absence from the first rank of world powers is a 
historical anomaly. Throughout recorded history, the Chinese people 
were responsible for many of the advances of modern society: paper, 
gunpowder, even spaghetti.
  Seventy years before Columbus, China's famous explorer, Admiral Cheng 
Ho, mapped much of the Arab world from a ship that was twice the size 
of the Santa Maria. But for the Emperor's decision to recall the fleet, 
China would have discovered Europe, not the other way around.
  As recently as the 1830s, China produced one-third of the Earth's 
wealth. Most of her advances and talent were squandered by corrupt 
governments, wars and a Chinese dictatorship. Despite a massive 
population and storied culture, China declined into socialist poverty. 
Under Mao, the Chinese people lost two generations of progress and were 
home to the worst famine of the 20th century. But following Mao 
Zedong's death, Deng Xiaoping led a Chinese economic reform of historic 
proportions. It is very difficult for many Americans today to 
understand the breadth and scope of this historic change.
  When we accurately look at today's China, we note it produces more 
steel than the United States, consumes twice the grain of the United 
States, has built highways twice the length of Germany and France 
combined, graduates three times the number of engineers as India, and 
is home to over 200 million cable TV subscribers. It replaced Mexico as 
America's number two trading partner, and it replaced America as 
Japan's number one trading partner. There are 200 cities with 
populations over 1 million, and the economy doubles every 8 years. We 
now estimate that its economy will be larger than the United States in 
the next decade.
  China is not only growing year to year, it has sustained a growth 
rate of over 9 percent annually for a generation. Given the difference 
in price of many domestic goods in China, economists now debate how to 
measure the size of the Chinese economy, using a traditional gross 
domestic product or a more up-to-date purchasing power parity to take 
into account the lower cost of Chinese domestic goods.
  Either way, the effect of China's sustained growth has profound 
proportions. Under a GDP measurement, the United States economy now 
stands at $11 trillion, whereas China's economy stands at only $1.5 
trillion; but using purchasing power parities, our $11 trillion economy 
stands next to China's $7 trillion economy.
  Using purchasing power measurements, the International Monetary Fund 
projects China will be home to the world's largest economy as early as 
2007, during the next American President's administration. Koishi 
Ishiyama recently wrote that China's rise can be compared to the Shock 
and Awe operation in Iraq.
  Foreign direct investment did not significantly exist in China before 
1980, and while such investment in all other developing countries fell 
in 2002, it rose by 15 percent in China, netting $52 billion in new 
investments.
  The pace of China's growth is also accelerating. In the next 10 
years, the City of Beijing will double its supply of housing. The 
Chinese highway system and the number of cable TV subscribers will also 
double in size. While this change is dimly seen in official Washington, 
it is having a profound effect on the Chinese people.
  China's hosting of the 2008 Olympic games will be one of many 
upcoming international events in China. China last year became the 
third country on Earth to orbit a human in one of its own space 
vehicles.

                              {time}  1800

  Next year, China plans to orbit a two-man vehicle, the Shenzhou VI, 
on its way to building its own space station and lunar rover.
  China's progress can be overstated. Over 200 million Chinese still 
live on less than $1 a day. There is a great gap now opening between 
the poorer western provinces of China and the new-found wealth of 
China's east coast. Environmental challenges also loom, including over 
100 of China's cities with air pollution exceeding the World Health 
Organization's guidelines for sulfur dioxide.
  The World Bank's World Development Report still ranks China at number 
76 out of 129 countries measured for personal income; and despite 
progress, the World Bank estimates that Chinese per capita income 
totals just $1,000 per year.
  Such low numbers, though, hide profound progress. Between 1978 and 
1998, the World Bank estimates the number of poor people in the world 
fell by 8 million. The number of people who were poor outside China 
actually rose by 82 million. But the world's total numbers were 
compensated by the profound reduction in Chinese poverty. From 1978 to 
1999, Chinese adult illiteracy fell from 37 percent to 17 percent, 
while infant mortality dropped from 41 per live births in 1978 to 30 in 
1999.
  Changes in China had an impact on Americans as well. Motorola now 
employs over 10,000 people in China and owns the country's best-
recognized trademark. By last year, over 1,500 U.S. firms invested $25 
billion in China. One U.S. corporate executive advised the Congress 
that his top three issues in Washington were China, China, and China.
  The story of Wal-Mart shows the profound change that is under way 
both in China and in the United States. Unlike traditional retailers 
such as Sears Roebuck or J.C. Penney, Sam Walton recognized the 
importance of China and the advantage of its lower-cost merchandise. 
Relying heavily on Chinese suppliers, Wal-Mart grew to become America's 
largest employer. Selling in nearly every town in America, Wal-Mart 
doubled its purchases of Chinese goods to $12 billion per year. And 
last year, Wal-Mart sold 10 percent of everything that China made. In 
many ways, the face of all-American Wal-Mart is really the face of 
China, Incorporated.
  There are many examples of how China's transformation influenced 
America's private sector. Like British merchant bankers who understood 
America's rise and bankrolled the Union Pacific Railroad, companies 
like Boeing, General Electric, Baker MacKenzie, and hundreds of other 
U.S. private sector interests understand what is happening and are 
risking a great deal to capitalize on the opportunities presented by 
the rise of China.
  But this understanding is not well understood by America's 
government. Like their British Government forefathers that missed 
America's rise, there is little evidence that the Federal Government 
perceives or is moving to realign the world to the rise of China. Many 
European powers discounted turn-of the-century America and its puny 
Armed Forces. Many Americans likewise dismissed the capabilities of the 
People's Liberation Army and its potential to change the course of 
Asian history. By China's own plan, military modernization ranks fourth 
in their list of four modernizations.
  Following the recent victories of America's Armed Forces, the raw 
size of a country's army is no longer evidence of its future prowess in 
battle. The People's Liberation Army, numbering 2.4 million, still 
stands as the world's largest; but it looks anachronistic and unable to 
enforce the will of China's leaders very far from its borders.
  A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force under former Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown estimated last year that China was ``at least 2 
decades behind the United States in terms of

[[Page 11445]]

military technology and capability.'' According to the Pentagon, 
Chinese military leaders closely studied NATO's operation over Kosovo 
and described it as the first ``no-contact'' war.
  In the post-Cold War world, Deng Xiaoping gave a key directive to the 
Chinese security establishment based on his ``24-character strategy'' 
and that was, ``keep cool-headed to observe. Be composed to make 
reactions. Stand firmly. Hide our capabilities. Bide our time. Never 
try to take the lead, and be able to accomplish something.''
  While seeking short-term opportunities with the United States, the 
Pentagon reported, ``China's leaders assert the United States seeks to 
maintain a dominant strategic position while containing the growth of 
Chinese power, ultimately dividing and Westernizing China.''
  Much of China's military budget and plans were influenced by scenes 
of conflict in the Balkans and Iraq played out on televisions tuned to 
the 24-hour news channels. After the U.S. victory in Kosovo, China's 
leaders seriously considered upgrading the fourth-ranked priority they 
attach to their military. The army developed a new response doctrine 
called the ``Three Attack and Three Defenses,'' focusing on attacking 
stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and helicopters, while defending 
against precision strikes, electronic warfare, and enemy 
reconnaissance. Chinese Air Force chief of staff Lieutenant General 
Zheng Shenxia noted that without adopting a preemptive doctrine, the 
chances of a PLA victory are limited.
  In November 2002, China overhauled its Politburo Standing Committee, 
the center of the Chinese Government decision-making. Every member of 
the politburo was replaced except Hu Jintao. Following this shakeup, 
senior leaders reaffirmed their emphasis on economic growth, but did 
increase funding for military modernization. Acknowledging its weakness 
in the face of such complete U.S. victories, Chinese leaders tempered 
their sense of vulnerability, knowing that unlike Kosovo, China is a 
nuclear power. Its 2002 defense White Paper, in contrast to its 2000 
White Paper, did not explicitly criticize U.S. deployments in Asia.
  The main mission of the Chinese military is to fight and win a 
conflict over Taiwan. In March 2002, Chinese Finance Minister Xiang 
Huaicheng announced a 17.5 percent increase in its official defense 
spending. While China reports an official defense budget of 
approximately $20 billion, its actual spending ranges to twice or three 
times that level, totaling $45 billion to $67 billion annually. The 
Department of Defense and the Council on Foreign Relations both 
estimate that annual spending in real terms could increase three to 
four-fold over the levels I just quoted by 2020. Most defense 
modernization spending occurs outside the public defense budget.
  Chinese military spending in this range roughly equals the $65 
billion spent by Russia and dramatically exceeds the $43 billion 
Japanese defense budget or the $38 billion British military budget. A 
three-fold increase in spending by China would put their military 
budget above all other nations, except the United States.
  China's rising military budget masks a structural problem in its 
military. Since large armies no longer guarantee success, China has cut 
the size of her armed forces from 1997 to 2000 by reducing 500,000 men, 
including 11 percent of her naval personnel, 12 percent of her air 
force personnel, and 18 percent of her army personnel. Sixty of 100 
maneuver divisions were collapsed into the remaining structure of 40 
divisions and 40 brigades. The air force retired older aircraft, 
dropping from over 5,000 aircraft at the end of the 1990s to 3,500 now. 
Of the remaining aircraft, only 150 are modern fourth-generation 
fighters. China still regards its military as too ``infantry-heavy'' 
with an army so large as to ``impede rapid deployment and equipment 
modernization.''
  By reducing the size of the armed forces, China provided funding 
dedicated to military modernization. The air force is adding advanced 
SU-30MKK fourth-generation fighter aircraft, AA-12/ADDER active-radar 
guided air-to-air missiles, and a new SU-30 naval variant capable of 
carrying air-launched, anti-shipping cruise missiles. The Navy added 
four SOVREMENNYY-class guided missile destroyers and produced its own 
new design SONG-class diesel-electric submarines, the first with 
quieter skewed propellers. It took delivery of four quiet KILO-class 
diesel-electric submarines and has another eight submarines under 
contract, all equipped with a new 3M-54E Novator Alpha anti-shipping 
cruise missile. Given the sum of investment and rapid modernization, 
China did forgo one important upgrade, and her navy has now shelved 
plans for its own aircraft carrier.
  The pace of development accelerated for China's army. The land forces 
are developing a light tank, an amphibious tank, and an amphibious-
armored personnel carrier, all added to over 1,500 type-96 main battle 
tanks that are already delivered. This kind of new equipment is now 
flowing to China's revamped three airborne and two marine brigades.
  The Ministry of Defense now emphasizes recruitment, retention, and 
more training for officers and key NCOs. Training now emphasizes small-
scale specialized maneuvers under the new doctrine of fighting a 
limited war under high-tech conditions. All infantry divisions now have 
armor, up from only half in 1997.
  Since 1989, China has been cut off from most U.S. and European 
military technology. Its defense establishment cannot innovate as fast 
as it could if it had access to foreign equipment. China's leaders 
responded with a foreign policy emphasizing cooperation and good 
relations with the United States. Over time, such a strategy could 
reopen their access to key Western technologies, even in the military 
field.
  The transformation of China's new military power is clearest in its 
missile force. China maintains a limited force, including 20 nuclear 
missiles capable of hitting targets in the United States. A number of 
U.S. Government agencies project that this rise in the missile force 
will lift by a factor of three to over 60 missiles capable of striking 
the United States, using the new CSS-4 Mod 2 ICBM. This Chinese force 
will be augmented by the brand-new solid-fuel DF-31 ICBM and an 
entirely new generation of Chinese nuclear submarines, the 094-class, 
carrying a naval variant of the DF-31. China is also developing two 
other classes of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is 
also developing a heavy-lift space launch vehicle, capable of lifting 
25 tons into low orbit by 2007.
  These developments pale when compared to China's expanding arsenal of 
medium-range missiles all aimed at Taiwan. China currently has a force 
of 450 such missiles and is adding 75 each year. Beyond large nuclear 
additions to China's armed forces, China places a very high priority on 
information warfare. The PLA believes that the U.S. Department of 
Defense is too dependent on networks that are vulnerable to attack. By 
attacking these systems, planners in China's army believe the U.S. 
forces could be degraded ``anonymously.''
  The anonymity of information attacks could play a key role even now. 
The House of Representatives recently reported regular attempts by 
computer systems located in China to enter the main computer server of 
the House Committee on Armed Services. The Pentagon may have referred 
to this when it recently reported that China ``places unusual emphasis 
on a host of new information warfare forces instead of information 
superiority and the system of systems approaches popular in the United 
States.''

                              {time}  1815

  There have been several official references about leveraging China's 
growing presence on the Internet, including references to a ``people's 
war'' in ``net warfare'', suggesting a stronger role in nationalist 
hacking.
  China also has a commitment to electronic warfare equaled only by the 
United States. Unlike many countries now totally dependent on U.S. 
leadership in this exotic field, China is developing electronic jamming 
aircraft for

[[Page 11446]]

several variants and may have several programs to develop escort 
jammers on transports, tactical aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicle 
platforms. It has equipped the Su-30 with anti-radiation missiles that 
work on the same principle of U.S. weapons that were so crucial to our 
own victories. China's anti-radiation missile, the FT-2000, is 
described in their sales brochures as an ``AWACS killer.'' The PLA is 
also producing state-of-the-art technology to improve intercept, 
direction finding and jamming. It may also be producing jammers for use 
against America's most successful weapon, the satellite-guided JDAM 
munition that so accurately uses the U.S. Global Positioning System.
  Their efforts also include producing laser weapons, such as the man-
portable ZM-87, advertised for blinding human vision and electro-
optical sensors, radio-frequency weapons and possibly a ground-based 
anti-satellite weapon. They have also invested considerably in 
developing short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles, including 
an unmanned combat aerial vehicle.
  According to the Chinese military publication Junshi Wenzhai, China 
has already produced an ``Assassin's Mace'' or trump card to counter 
U.S. superiority in the Western Pacific. One article identifies five 
major, quote, Assassin's Maces, unquote, including fighter bombers, 
submarines, anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and mines designed to destroy 
foreign aircraft carriers. These systems would be backed by new 
research by China on other technologies, including kinetic energy and 
low-observable platforms.
  This research can be accelerated by acquiring foreign technologies 
such as the recent activities of two Chinese students at universities 
collecting information on Terfenol-D, an invention of the U.S. 
Department of Energy's Ames laboratory.
  These developments show that China's growing economic power may 
already be translating into military power. It is clear that most large 
American companies already perceive the size and importance of China. 
What is not clear is if the U.S. Government has made a similar 
intellectual leap to understand the new geography of the 21st century.
  In 2002, the U.S. State Department conducted a major study of the 
needs of the U.S. Government in China. The Beyond China 2000 Action 
Plan cut 55 people from permanent U.S. Government desks in China. The 
State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs noted the 
decision reflected, quote, hard-nosed decisions, unquote. Congress 
recently ordered the State Department to review the future needs of the 
U.S. Government in China by 2010. In its February report, it is 
difficult to see what measures the State Department used to justify 
reducing the size of the U.S. Government in China.
  In 1975, the new U.S. liaison officer in Beijing under Ambassador 
George Herbert Walker Bush, who later became president, processed 651 
non-immigrant visas to the United States. In 2003, U.S. consular 
officers handled 320,000 such applications. From a handful, the number 
of Chinese students rose to over 60,000 in the U.S. last year.
  Only 38 Americans registered with the Beijing liaison office in 1975. 
Today, over 3,600 Americans are registered in addition to over 1 
million American tourists visiting China each year. The State 
Department admitted to Congress noting that staffing in the U.S. 
embassy in Beijing and the Consulates General is currently inadequate 
to the growing workload.
  The workload of the U.S. Government in China is growing for other 
reasons. In 2001 alone, China joined the international coalition 
against terrorism, the World Trade Organization, hosted the Asian-
Pacific Economic Conference, and won the bidding of the 2008 Olympic 
games. These issues came in addition to key concerns regarding nuclear 
nonproliferation, human rights, intellectual property, and religious 
freedom.
  The State Department projects that the number of U.S. Government 
agencies wishing to station personnel permanently in China will rise 
from 12 agencies to over 20 by 2010. Several agencies, including the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, developed but then halted 
plans to deploy in China. The United States broke new ground on a new 
embassy complex last February. With the new embassy, the State 
Department plans only a modest increase in official Americans stationed 
in China from 960 to 1,200.
  Plans to expand America's eyes and ears in China do not depend only 
on the size of our embassy in Beijing. They also depend on increasing 
the number of Americans in the diplomatic service who can master a very 
difficult language. In 2000, the State Department launched its China 
2000 Initiative. The mission of the Initiative was to develop 
infrastructure to meet the projected physical and human needs, 
including language. This Initiative is very small, modestly increasing 
the number of Chinese students in the State Department annually from 
only five to only 15. The Initiative also includes some advanced 
training for just five students in Beijing and a mail program for 
lessons to only 30 other students to maintain Chinese language 
proficiency.
  Such efforts appear grossly inadequate compared to China's central 
role in the 21st century. With the largest trade surplus, the largest 
economy, the largest military budget outside the United States, China 
deserves a special relationship with the United States.
  In November, 2002, a task force under Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi 
released their report designating China as Japan's top foreign policy 
priority for the future. The decision makes sense for Japan but, given 
China's growth, its position on the U.N. Security Council, and the 
future size of its economy, it may make sense for the United States to 
do this as well.
  Our country has been the home of the world's largest economy for 130 
years, but that is about to change; and this change will be one of the 
most profound shifts of the new century. There was a time early in the 
history of the United States when our national income was not at the 
top of the international heap. Today, under our Pax Americana, it may 
be difficult for us to reconnect with our forefathers and mothers who 
were forced to depend only on diplomacy in the face of very long odds.
  Avidly, we retell parts of U.S. history, the Revolution, the Civil 
War, and the victories of World War I and II, all to stoke American 
pride; and these examples are used to confirm the superiority of our 
own ideals. But American history has less-well-known examples of when 
we struggled without our traditional advantage in material and money.
  I put this question to the House, when was the last time that U.S. 
Armed Forces faced a military from a country whose economy was larger 
than our own? One summer day in August, 1814, comes to mind. British 
soldiers and marines marched on in Washington in one of the last acts 
of the War of 1812. U.S. forces met them in what we now call the Battle 
of Bladensburg. The battle went so badly for the Americans that British 
called it the ``Bladensburg races'' because U.S. forces ran away so 
quickly. Britain's 85th Foot Regiment still displays eagle-flagged 
standards of two American regiments captured that day. The following 
day British forces burned the Capitol and Executive Mansion to the 
ground.
  History reminds us that the United States has not and will not always 
be the Nation on Earth with the largest economy. With an America of 
unquestioned commercial dominance, we can afford to make diplomatic 
mistakes. In a world where America holds fewer cards, we cannot afford 
miscalculation.
  We are quickly nearing a world in which China will play a central 
role in the diplomatic life of the United States. British diplomats 
before the world wars would have scoffed at the notion of their 
American cousins playing a central role in world politics. Let us hope 
that the new American diplomats of the 21st century understand how 
quickly the post Cold War world has changed.
  Our President Truman set the record of his time for being an 
unpopular

[[Page 11447]]

president. In 1946, he stood at just 32 percent in the polls. 
Thankfully, he steeled his heart and made the tough decisions needed to 
design a successful campaign through the Cold War against the Soviet 
Union. America and freedom won the Cold War without fighting World War 
III.
  When we look towards the 21st century and China's coming role in its 
history, will our leaders lay the foundation for America's diplomatic 
success? I ask that question to the House tonight.
  And I thank Reed Bundy of my staff for helping me prepare these 
remarks.

                          ____________________