[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[House]
[Pages 11276-11282]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




       STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2003

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 1086) to encourage the 
development and promulgation of voluntary consensus standards by 
providing relief under the antitrust laws to standards development 
organizations with respect to conduct engaged in for the purpose of 
developing voluntary consensus standards, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Senate amendment:
       Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

  TITLE I--STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2003

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Standards Development 
     Organization Advancement Act of 2003''.

     SEC. 102. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) In 1993, the Congress amended and renamed the National 
     Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (now known as the National 
     Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 
     4301 et seq.)) by enacting the National Cooperative 
     Production Amendments of 1993 (Public Law 103-42) to 
     encourage the use of collaborative, procompetitive activity 
     in the form of research and production joint ventures that 
     provide adequate disclosure to the antitrust enforcement 
     agencies about the nature and scope of the activity involved.
       (2) Subsequently, in 1995, the Congress in enacting the 
     National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 
     U.S.C. 272 note) recognized the importance of technical 
     standards developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies 
     to our national economy by requiring the use of such 
     standards to the extent practicable by Federal agencies and 
     by encouraging Federal agency representatives to participate 
     in ongoing standards development activities. The Office of 
     Management and Budget on February 18, 1998, revised Circular 
     A-119 to reflect these changes made in law.
       (3) Following enactment of the National Technology Transfer 
     and Advancement Act of 1995, technical standards developed or 
     adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies have replaced 
     thousands of unique Government standards and specifications 
     allowing the national economy to operate in a more unified 
     fashion.
       (4) Having the same technical standards used by Federal 
     agencies and by the private sector permits the Government to 
     avoid the cost of developing duplicative Government standards 
     and to more readily use products and components designed for 
     the commercial marketplace, thereby enhancing quality and 
     safety and reducing costs.
       (5) Technical standards are written by hundreds of 
     nonprofit voluntary consensus standards bodies in a 
     nonexclusionary fashion, using thousands of volunteers from 
     the private and public sectors, and are developed under the 
     standards development principles set out in Circular Number 
     A-119, as revised February 18, 1998, of the Office of 
     Management and Budget,

[[Page 11277]]

     including principles that require openness, balance, 
     transparency, consensus, and due process. Such principles 
     provide for--
       (A) notice to all parties known to be affected by the 
     particular standards development activity,
       (B) the opportunity to participate in standards development 
     or modification,
       (C) balancing interests so that standards development 
     activities are not dominated by any single group of 
     interested persons,
       (D) readily available access to essential information 
     regarding proposed and final standards,
       (E) the requirement that substantial agreement be reached 
     on all material points after the consideration of all views 
     and objections, and
       (F) the right to express a position, to have it considered, 
     and to appeal an adverse decision.
       (6) There are tens of thousands of voluntary consensus 
     standards available for government use. Most of these 
     standards are kept current through interim amendments and 
     interpretations, issuance of addenda, and periodic 
     reaffirmation, revision, or reissuance every 3 to 5 years.
       (7) Standards developed by government entities generally 
     are not subject to challenge under the antitrust laws.
       (8) Private developers of the technical standards that are 
     used as Government standards are often not similarly 
     protected, leaving such developers vulnerable to being named 
     as codefendants in lawsuits even though the likelihood of 
     their being held liable is remote in most cases, and they 
     generally have limited resources to defend themselves in such 
     lawsuits.
       (9) Standards development organizations do not stand to 
     benefit from any antitrust violations that might occur in the 
     voluntary consensus standards development process.
       (10) As was the case with respect to research and 
     production joint ventures before the passage of the National 
     Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, if relief 
     from the threat of liability under the antitrust laws is not 
     granted to voluntary consensus standards bodies, both 
     regarding the development of new standards and efforts to 
     keep existing standards current, such bodies could be forced 
     to cut back on standards development activities at great 
     financial cost both to the Government and to the national 
     economy.

     SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 2 of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 4301) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) The term `standards development activity' means any 
     action taken by a standards development organization for the 
     purpose of developing, promulgating, revising, amending, 
     reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary 
     consensus standard, or using such standard in conformity 
     assessment activities, including actions relating to the 
     intellectual property policies of the standards development 
     organization.
       ``(8) The term `standards development organization' means a 
     domestic or international organization that plans, develops, 
     establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards 
     using procedures that incorporate the attributes of openness, 
     balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and 
     consensus in a manner consistent with the Office of 
     Management and Budget Circular Number A-119, as revised 
     February 10, 1998. The term `standards development 
     organization' shall not, for purposes of this Act, include 
     the parties participating in the standards development 
     organization.
       ``(9) The term `technical standard' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 12(d)(4) of the National Technology 
     Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995.
       ``(10) The term `voluntary consensus standard' has the 
     meaning given such term in Office of Management and Budget 
     Circular Number A-119, as revised February 10, 1998.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) The term `standards development activity' excludes 
     the following activities:
       ``(1) Exchanging information among competitors relating to 
     cost, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or 
     distribution of any product, process, or service that is not 
     reasonably required for the purpose of developing or 
     promulgating a voluntary consensus standard, or using such 
     standard in conformity assessment activities.
       ``(2) Entering into any agreement or engaging in any other 
     conduct that would allocate a market with a competitor.
       ``(3) Entering into any agreement or conspiracy that would 
     set or restrain prices of any good or service.''.

     SEC. 104. RULE OF REASON STANDARD.

       Section 3 of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 4302) is amended by 
     striking ``of any person in making or performing a contract 
     to carry out a joint venture shall'' and inserting the 
     following: ``of--
       ``(1) any person in making or performing a contract to 
     carry out a joint venture, or
       ``(2) a standards development organization while engaged in 
     a standards development activity,

     shall''.

     SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON RECOVERY.

       Section 4 of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 4303) is amended--
       (1) in subsections (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1) by inserting 
     ``, or for a standards development activity engaged in by a 
     standards development organization against which such claim 
     is made'' after ``joint venture'',
       (2) in subsection (e)--
       (A) by inserting ``, or of a standards development activity 
     engaged in by a standards development organization'' before 
     the period at the end, and
       (B) by redesignating such subsection as subsection (f), and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall not be construed 
     to modify the liability under the antitrust laws of any 
     person (other than a standards development organization) 
     who--
       ``(1) directly (or through an employee or agent) 
     participates in a standards development activity with respect 
     to which a violation of any of the antitrust laws is found,
       ``(2) is not a fulltime employee of the standards 
     development organization that engaged in such activity, and
       ``(3) is, or is an employee or agent of a person who is, 
     engaged in a line of commerce that is likely to benefit 
     directly from the operation of the standards development 
     activity with respect to which such violation is found.''.

     SEC. 106. ATTORNEY FEES.

       Section 5 of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 4304) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by inserting ``, or of a standards 
     development activity engaged in by a standards development 
     organization'' after ``joint venture'', and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect 
     to any person who--
       ``(1) directly participates in a standards development 
     activity with respect to which a violation of any of the 
     antitrust laws is found,
       ``(2) is not a fulltime employee of a standards development 
     organization that engaged in such activity, and
       ``(3) is, or is an employee or agent of a person who is, 
     engaged in a line of commerce that is likely to benefit 
     directly from the operation of the standards development 
     activity with respect to which such violation is found.''.

     SEC. 107. DISCLOSURE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY.

       Section 6 of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act of 1993 (15 U.S.C. 4305) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as 
     subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively,
       (B) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'', and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) A standards development organization may, not later 
     than 90 days after commencing a standards development 
     activity engaged in for the purpose of developing or 
     promulgating a voluntary consensus standards or not later 
     than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Standards 
     Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003, whichever 
     is later, file simultaneously with the Attorney General and 
     the Commission, a written notification disclosing--
       ``(A) the name and principal place of business of the 
     standards development organization, and
       ``(B) documents showing the nature and scope of such 
     activity.

     Any standards development organization may file additional 
     disclosure notifications pursuant to this section as are 
     appropriate to extend the protections of section 4 to 
     standards development activities that are not covered by the 
     initial filing or that have changed significantly since the 
     initial filing.'',
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in the 1st sentence by inserting ``, or a notice with 
     respect to such standards development activity that 
     identifies the standards development organization engaged in 
     such activity and that describes such activity in general 
     terms'' before the period at the end, and
       (B) in the last sentence by inserting ``or available to 
     such organization, as the case may be'' before the period,
       (3) in subsection (d)(2) by inserting ``, or the standards 
     development activity,'' after ``venture'',
       (4) in subsection (e)--
       (A) by striking ``person who'' and inserting ``person or 
     standards development organization that'', and
       (B) by inserting ``or any standards development 
     organization'' after ``person'' the last place it appears, 
     and
       (5) in subsection (g)(1) by inserting ``or standards 
     development organization'' after ``person''.

     SEC. 108. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter or modify 
     the antitrust treatment under existing law of--
       (1) parties participating in standards development activity 
     of standards development organizations within the scope of 
     this title, including the existing standard under which the 
     conduct of the parties is reviewed, regardless of the 
     standard under which the conduct of the standards development 
     organizations in which they participate are reviewed, or
       (2) other organizations and parties engaged in standard-
     setting processes not within the scope of this amendment to 
     the title.

TITLE II--ANTITRUST CRIMINAL PENALTY ENHANCEMENT AND REFORM ACT OF 2003

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
     Enhancement and Reform Act of 2003''.

    Subtitle A--Antitrust Enforcement Enhancements and Cooperation 
                               Incentives

     SEC. 211. SUNSET.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
     provisions of sections 211

[[Page 11278]]

     through 214 shall cease to have effect 5 years after the date 
     of enactment of this Act.
       (b) Exception.--With respect to an applicant who has 
     entered into an antitrust leniency agreement on or before the 
     date on which the provisions of sections 211 through 214 of 
     this subtitle shall cease to have effect, the provisions of 
     sections 211 through 214 of this subtitle shall continue in 
     effect.

     SEC. 212. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle:
       (1) Antitrust division.--The term ``Antitrust Division'' 
     means the United States Department of Justice Antitrust 
     Division.
       (2) Antitrust leniency agreement.--The term ``antitrust 
     leniency agreement,'' or ``agreement,'' means a leniency 
     letter agreement, whether conditional or final, between a 
     person and the Antitrust Division pursuant to the Corporate 
     Leniency Policy of the Antitrust Division in effect on the 
     date of execution of the agreement.
       (3) Antitrust leniency applicant.--The term ``antitrust 
     leniency applicant,'' or ``applicant,'' means, with respect 
     to an antitrust leniency agreement, the person that has 
     entered into the agreement.
       (4) Claimant.--The term ``claimant'' means a person or 
     class, that has brought, or on whose behalf has been brought, 
     a civil action alleging a violation of section 1 or 3 of the 
     Sherman Act or any similar State law, except that the term 
     does not include a State or a subdivision of a State with 
     respect to a civil action brought to recover damages 
     sustained by the State or subdivision.
       (5) Cooperating individual.--The term ``cooperating 
     individual'' means, with respect to an antitrust leniency 
     agreement, a current or former director, officer, or employee 
     of the antitrust leniency applicant who is covered by the 
     agreement.
       (6) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given it 
     in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act.

     SEC. 213. LIMITATION ON RECOVERY.

       (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (d), in any civil 
     action alleging a violation of section 1 or 3 of the Sherman 
     Act, or alleging a violation of any similar State law, based 
     on conduct covered by a currently effective antitrust 
     leniency agreement, the amount of damages recovered by or on 
     behalf of a claimant from an antitrust leniency applicant who 
     satisfies the requirements of subsection (b), together with 
     the amounts so recovered from cooperating individuals who 
     satisfy such requirements, shall not exceed that portion of 
     the actual damages sustained by such claimant which is 
     attributable to the commerce done by the applicant in the 
     goods or services affected by the violation.
       (b) Requirements.--Subject to subsection (c), an antitrust 
     leniency applicant or cooperating individual satisfies the 
     requirements of this subsection with respect to a civil 
     action described in subsection (a) if the court in which the 
     civil action is brought determines, after considering any 
     appropriate pleadings from the claimant, that the applicant 
     or cooperating individual, as the case may be, has provided 
     satisfactory cooperation to the claimant with respect to the 
     civil action, which cooperation shall include--
       (1) providing a full account to the claimant of all facts 
     known to the applicant or cooperating individual, as the case 
     may be, that are potentially relevant to the civil action;
       (2) furnishing all documents or other items potentially 
     relevant to the civil action that are in the possession, 
     custody, or control of the applicant or cooperating 
     individual, as the case may be, wherever they are located; 
     and
       (3)(A) in the case of a cooperating individual--
       (i) making himself or herself available for such 
     interviews, depositions, or testimony in connection with the 
     civil action as the claimant may reasonably require; and
       (ii) responding completely and truthfully, without making 
     any attempt either falsely to protect or falsely to implicate 
     any person or entity, and without intentionally withholding 
     any potentially relevant information, to all questions asked 
     by the claimant in interviews, depositions, trials, or any 
     other court proceedings in connection with the civil action; 
     or
       (B) in the case of an antitrust leniency applicant, using 
     its best efforts to secure and facilitate from cooperating 
     individuals covered by the agreement the cooperation 
     described in clauses (i) and (ii) and subparagraph (A).
       (c) Timeliness.--If the initial contact by the antitrust 
     leniency applicant with the Antitrust Division regarding 
     conduct covered by the antitrust leniency agreement occurs 
     after a State, or subdivision of a State, has issued 
     compulsory process in connection with an investigation of 
     allegations of a violation of section 1 or 3 of the Sherman 
     Act or any similar State law based on conduct covered by the 
     antitrust leniency agreement or after a civil action 
     described in subsection (a) has been filed, then the court 
     shall consider, in making the determination concerning 
     satisfactory cooperation described in subsection (b), the 
     timeliness of the applicant's initial cooperation with the 
     claimant.
       (d) Continuation.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to modify, impair, or supersede the provisions of 
     sections 4, 4A, and 4C of the Clayton Act relating to the 
     recovery of costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's 
     fee, and interest on damages, to the extent that such 
     recovery is authorized by such sections.

     SEC. 214. RIGHTS, AUTHORITIES, AND LIABILITIES NOT AFFECTED.

       Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to--
       (1) affect the rights of the Antitrust Division to seek a 
     stay or protective order in a civil action based on conduct 
     covered by an antitrust leniency agreement to prevent the 
     cooperation described in section 213(b) from impairing or 
     impeding the investigation or prosecution by the Antitrust 
     Division of conduct covered by the agreement;
       (2) create any right to challenge any decision by the 
     Antitrust Division with respect to an antitrust leniency 
     agreement; or
       (3) affect, in any way, the joint and several liability of 
     any party to a civil action described in section 213(a), 
     other than that of the antitrust leniency applicant and 
     cooperating individuals as provided in section 213(a) of this 
     title.

     SEC. 215. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Restraint of Trade Among the States.--Section 1 of the 
     Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1) is amended by--
       (1) striking ``$10,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$100,000,000'';
       (2) striking ``$350,000'' and inserting ``$1,000,000''; and
       (3) striking ``three'' and inserting ``10''.
       (b) Monopolizing Trade.--Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 
     U.S.C. 2) is amended by--
       (1) striking ``$10,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$100,000,000'';
       (2) striking ``$350,000'' and inserting ``$1,000,000''; and
       (3) striking ``three'' and inserting ``10''.
       (c) Other Restraints of Trade.--Section 3 of the Sherman 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 3) is amended by--
       (1) striking ``$10,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$100,000,000'';
       (2) striking ``$350,000'' and inserting ``$1,000,000''; and
       (3) striking ``three'' and inserting ``10''.

                     Subtitle B--Tunney Act Reform

     SEC. 221. PUBLIC INTEREST DETERMINATION.

       (a) Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (A) the purpose of the Tunney Act was to ensure that the 
     entry of antitrust consent judgments is in the public 
     interest; and
       (B) it would misconstrue the meaning and Congressional 
     intent in enacting the Tunney Act to limit the discretion of 
     district courts to review antitrust consent judgments solely 
     to determining whether entry of those consent judgments would 
     make a ``mockery of the judicial function''.
       (2) Purposes.--The purpose of this section is to effectuate 
     the original Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney Act 
     and to ensure that United States settlements of civil 
     antitrust suits are in the public interest.
       (b) Public Interest Determination.--Section 5 of the 
     Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 16) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), by inserting at the end the 
     following: ``Upon application by the United States, the 
     district court may, for good cause (based on a finding that 
     the expense of publication in the Federal Register exceeds 
     the public interest benefits to be gained from such 
     publication), authorize an alternative method of public 
     dissemination of the public comments received and the 
     response to those comments.'';
       (2) in subsection (e)--
       (A) in the matter before paragraph (1), by--
       (i) striking ``court may'' and inserting ``court shall''; 
     and
       (ii) inserting ``(1)'' before ``Before''; and
       (B) striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including 
     termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement 
     and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated 
     effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether 
     its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive 
     considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment 
     that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether 
     the consent judgment is in the public interest; and
       ``(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition 
     in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally 
     and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations 
     set forth in the complaint including consideration of the 
     public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of 
     the issues at trial.
       ``(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require 
     the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the 
     court to permit anyone to intervene.''; and
       (3) in subsection (g), by inserting ``by any officer, 
     director, employee, or agent of such defendant'' before ``, 
     or other person''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Scott) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner).


                             General Leave

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1086.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Wisconsin?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1086, the Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003. This

[[Page 11279]]

legislation contains several important revisions to America's antitrust 
laws.
  Title I of the legislation contains limited antitrust protection for 
standards development organizations. Technical standards play a 
critical role in fostering competition and promoting public health and 
safety. Without standards there would be no compatibility among broad 
categories of products and less confidence in a range of building, 
fire, and safety codes that promote the public welfare.
  In the United States, most standards development is conducted by 
private nonprofit organizations known as Standards Development 
Organizations, or SDOs. This approach reflects the fact that private 
organizations are better able to keep up with the rapid pace of 
technological change. Congress has recognized the importance of SDOs 
and requires Federal agencies to adopt standards issued by these 
organizations whenever possible.
  Over the last several years, the critical efforts of SDOs have been 
undermined by sometimes frivolous antitrust lawsuits. The growing 
frequency of these claims against SDOs stifles their ability to obtain 
technical information, hampers their effectiveness, and undermines the 
public goals that the SDOs advance.
  I introduced this bill to remedy this problem. This legislation 
codifies the rule of reason for antitrust scrutiny of SDOs which 
requires courts to assess whether the standards-setting activities of 
an SDO are procompetitive. It also limits the SDOs civil liability to 
actual, rather than treble, damages, and provides for the recovery of 
attorneys fees to substantially prevailing parties in antitrust actions 
against these organizations.
  To receive these limited safeguards, H.R. 1086 requires the SDO to 
inform Federal antitrust authorities of the scope and nature of their 
activities and to devise and issue standards in a fair and open process 
prescribed by the legislation.
  The Senate amendment we consider today also contains important 
bipartisan provisions that deter antitrust violations while 
strengthening antitrust enforcement efforts. Title II harmonizes the 
treatment of criminal antitrust offenders and other white collar 
criminals by increasing maximum prison terms for criminal antitrust 
violations from 3 to 10 years while increasing maximum individual fines 
for antitrust violations from $350,000 to $1 million. These provisions 
send an unmistakable message to those who consider violating the 
antitrust laws that if they are caught they will spend much more time 
considering the consequences of their actions within the confinement of 
their prison cells.
  Title II also increases maximum corporate fines for antitrust 
violations from $10 million to $100 million. This considerable increase 
sends a clear signal to corporate officers and board members that a 
decision to violate antitrust laws will be severely punished.
  Title II of the legislation also contains important modifications to 
the antitrust leniency program used by the Department of Justice to 
facilitate the detection and prosecution of antitrust violations. Under 
existing practice, parties that cooperate with Federal antitrust 
authorities to uncover violations may not be subject to government 
prosecution, but remain liable in civil actions brought by private 
parties. The bill creates an additional incentive for corporations to 
disclose antitrust violations by limiting their liability in related 
civil claims to actual damages. Furthermore, while a cooperating party 
would be liable only for damages attributable to that party's conduct, 
noncooperating conspirators will remain jointly and severally liable 
for treble damages for the misconduct of all of the conspirators.
  As a result, the full scope of antitrust remedies against 
nonparticipating parties will remain available to the government and 
private antitrust plaintiffs.
  Finally, the legislation clarifies the Tunney Act. This act gives 
Federal district courts some authority to review the merits of civil 
antitrust settlements with the United States before they enter final 
consent decrees.

                              {time}  1515

  Specifically, district courts in which an antitrust suit is brought 
must assess whether these decrees are ``in the public interest.'' The 
bill provides legislative guidance to the district courts by listing 
specific factors to be considered during this analysis. In addition, 
the legislation facilitates the transmission of comments received 
during Tunney Act proceedings by allowing Federal judges to order their 
publication by electronic or other means.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1086 contains important provisions that enhance the 
effectiveness of the antitrust laws and the authority of antitrust 
enforcement agencies to implement them.
  The legislation is truly bipartisan and bicameral in nature, and 
while several people deserve credit for this legislation, I would like 
to recognize the late Committee on Science Chief Counsel Barry 
Beringer. Barry's hard work and dedication brought this legislation to 
the floor last year, and his decades of dedication and service brought 
great credit to this House. I urge my colleagues to support the 
legislation.
  Pursuant to the general leave already granted, I will be placing into 
the Record a statement of legislative history that the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and I have agreed to, and I ask that it appear 
in the Record at the end of my statement.

    Supplemental Legislative History for H.R. 1086, the ``Standards 
 Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003'' as Enrolled by the 
                            House and Senate

       When the House passed H.R. 1086, the ``Standards 
     Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003,'' it only 
     contained provisions directed at including standards-
     development activities undertaken by certain standards 
     development organizations (SDOs) within the treatment 
     accorded certain joint ventures by the National Cooperative 
     Research and Production Act ``NCRPA.'' The Senate-passed 
     version of H.R. 1086, which substantially incorporates the 
     provisions of the House-passed version in its Title I, also 
     contains an additional title, the ``Antitrust Criminal 
     Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2003.'' The following 
     legislative history is submitted on behalf of the House 
     Committee on the Judiciary jointly by Chairman Sensenbrenner 
     and Ranking Member Conyers:

                Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1086


title I--``standards development organization advancement act of 2003''

       Section 101 contains the short title.
       Section 102 sets forth the findings and purposes of the 
     bill as they relate to standards development activities and 
     standards development organizations (SDOs). The findings 
     explain the purpose(s) behind the original enactment and 
     subsequent amendment of the National Cooperative Research and 
     Production Act (NCRPA). The findings also discuss how passage 
     of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 
     1995 (NTTAA) unintentionally heightened the vulnerability of 
     SDOs to antitrust litigation. The findings also explain how 
     SDOs generally do not stand to benefit from any antitrust 
     violation that might occur during the voluntary consensus 
     standards development process. Finally, this section finds 
     that continuing to subject SDOs to potential treble damages 
     liability under the antitrust laws could impede pro-
     competitive standards development activity.
       Section 103 adds to the existing definitions contained in 
     section 2 of the NCRPA: The term ``standards development 
     activity'' is defined as ``any action taken by a standards 
     development organization for the purpose of developing, 
     promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting, or 
     otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or 
     using such standard in conformity assessment activities, 
     including actions relating to the intellectual property 
     policies of the standards development organization.'' The 
     definition of ``standards development activity'' excludes the 
     following activities: exchanges of information, including 
     competitively-sensitive information, among competitors 
     relating to cost, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or 
     distribution of any product, process, or service that is not 
     reasonably required in order to develop or promulgate a 
     voluntary consensus standard or in order to use the standard 
     in conformity assessment activities; agreements or other 
     conduct that would allocate a market among competitors; and 
     agreements or conspiracies that would set or restrain prices 
     of any good or service.
       The definition of ``standards development activity'' is 
     broad enough to encompass any action taken by an SDO in 
     ``developing, promulgating, revising, amending. reissuing, 
     interpreting or otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus 
     standard, or using such standard in conformity assessment 
     activities, including actions relating to the intellectual 
     property policies of the SDO.'' The

[[Page 11280]]

     ``Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 
     2003'' is not intended to change or influence existing 
     intellectually property policies currently utilized by 
     various SDOs (including but not limited to, patent searches), 
     nor to affect or influence new intellectual property policies 
     that may be developed in the future. Such policies are 
     vitally important to ensuring a level playing field among all 
     users of a standard that incorporates patented technology. In 
     addition, the legislation is not intended to change or alter 
     the application of existing antitrust laws with respect to 
     intellectual property. The legislation also seeks to 
     encourage disclosure by intellectual property rights owners 
     of relevant intellectual property rights and proposed 
     licensing terms. It further encourages discussion among 
     intellectual property rights owners and other interested 
     standards participants regarding the terms under which 
     relevant intellectual property rights would be made available 
     for use in conjunction with the standard or proposed 
     standard.
       The term ``standards development organization'' is defined 
     as ``a domestic or international organization that plans, 
     develops, establishes or coordinates voluntary consensus 
     standards . . . in a manner consistent with Office Management 
     and Budget (OMB) Circular Number A-119, as revised on 
     February 10, 1998.'' The definition includes only the 
     voluntary consensus standards body conducting the particular 
     standards development activity, and does not include firms 
     participating in the standards development activity.
       The term ``technical standard'' is defined by reference to 
     section 12(d)(4) of the NTTAA. The term ``voluntary consensus 
     standard'' is defined with reference to revised OMB Circular 
     A-119.
       Section 104 amends section 3 of the NCRPA to apply the rule 
     of reason standard to SDOs with respect to covered standards 
     development activities in which they are engaged.
       Section 105 amends section 4 of the NCRPA to include 
     properly structured standard-setting activity undertaken by 
     SDOs as eligible for the protections set forth in that 
     section, provided that such activities have been previously 
     disclosed to the antitrust agencies in accordance with the 
     requirements of the NCRPA, as amended.
       Section 106 amends section 5 of the NCRPA to include SDOs, 
     in their involvement in covered standards development 
     activities, within the scope of the NCRPA scheme for awarding 
     attorneys' fees to substantially prevailing parties.
       Section 107 amends section 6 of the NCRPA to apply the same 
     disclosure requirements to SDOs as a condition for obtaining 
     the detrebling of damages. In order to obtain the detrebling, 
     the required disclosures must occur not later than 90 days 
     after either the date the SDO commences the standards 
     development activity or the date H.R. 1086 is enacted, 
     whichever is later.
       Section 108 provides that the legislation shall not be 
     construed to alter or modify the antitrust treatment of 
     parties participating in a covered standards development 
     activity, except for the SDO conducting the activity, nor of 
     anyone engaged in standard-setting processes that are not 
     within the scope of the legislation.


 title II--``antitrust criminal penalty enhancement and reform act of 
                                 2003''

    Subtitle A--Antitrust Enforcement Enhancements and Cooperation 
                               Incentives

       Section 201 contains the short title.
       Sections 211-214 strengthen the Antitrust Division's 
     corporate criminal leniency program, by providing that an 
     antitrust leniency applicant who cooperates satisfactorily 
     with the Division in its criminal investigation and 
     prosecution can also receive limited damages exposure in a 
     related private civil action in exchange for satisfactorily 
     cooperating with the private plaintiffs. As Senator Kohl, the 
     co-sponsor of S. 1797 (which included the leniency 
     provisions) stated, these provisions ``will remove a 
     significant disincentive to those who would be likely to seek 
     criminal amnesty and should result in a substantial increase 
     in the number of antitrust conspiracies being detected.'' 
     (Statement of Senator Kohl (co-sponsor of S. 1797) upon 
     introduction of the measure, 149 Cong. Rec. S13520 (daily ed. 
     October 29, 2003)).
       Section 211 states that sections 211-214 of the title shall 
     sunset five years after the date of enactment, except with 
     respect to ``an applicant who has entered into an antitrust 
     leniency agreement on or before'' the sunset date.
       Section 212, defines: ``Antitrust Division'' as ``the 
     United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division''; 
     ``antitrust leniency agreement'' as ``a leniency letter 
     agreement, whether conditional or final, between a person and 
     the Antitrust Division pursuant to the Corporate Leniency 
     Policy of the Antitrust Division in effect on the date of 
     execution of the agreement; ``antitrust leniency applicant'' 
     as ``the person who has entered into the agreement'' 
     described above; ``claimant'' as a ``person or class that has 
     brought, or on whose behalf has been brought, a civil action 
     alleging a violation of section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act 
     (Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1) prohibits 
     contracts or combinations in restraint of trade; section 3 
     (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3) applies Sec. 1 to the District of Columbia 
     and to territories) or any similar State law,'' but 
     specifically excludes plaintiffs who are states or 
     subdivisions of states with respect to civil actions brought 
     to recover damages sustained by the state or subdivision 
     (i.e., civil actions not brought as parens patriae); 
     ``cooperating individual'' as ``a current or former director, 
     officer, or employee of the antitrust leniency applicant who 
     is covered by the agreement''; and ``person'' as the term is 
     defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton 
     Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12).
       Section 213 states that conduct covered by a ``currently 
     effective antitrust leniency agreement'' will subject an 
     antitrust leniency applicant and its cooperating individuals, 
     as defendants in a private or state enforcement antitrust 
     action, to liability only for the actual portion of damages 
     suffered by the claimant ``attributable to the commerce done 
     by the applicant in the goods or services affected by the 
     violation'' so long as the court in which the civil action is 
     brought determines ``that the applicant or cooperating 
     individual . . . has provided satisfactory cooperation to the 
     claimant. . . .'' The section does not alter existing 
     provisions of the antitrust laws with respect to recovery of 
     costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
       Satisfactory cooperation shall include ``providing a full 
     account to the claimant of all facts known to the applicant 
     or cooperating individual . . . that are potentially relevant 
     to the civil action'' and ``furnishing all documents or other 
     items that are potentially relevant to the civil action . . . 
     that are in the possession, custody, or control of the 
     applicant or cooperating individual . . . wherever they are 
     located.'' The section's use of the term ``potentially 
     relevant'' is intended to preclude a parsimonious view of the 
     facts or documents to which a claimant is entitled. Documents 
     or other items in the applicant's possession, custody, or 
     control must be produced even if they are otherwise arguably 
     located outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.
       If the leniency applicant has applied for a leniency 
     agreement ``after a State, or subdivision of a State, has 
     issued compulsory process in connection with an investigation 
     of allegations of violations of either sections 1 or 3 of the 
     Sherman Act or any similar State law based on conduct covered 
     by the antitrust leniency agreement or after a civil action . 
     . . has been filed,'' the court must consider the timeliness 
     of the applicant's initial cooperation with the claimant. 
     Thus, this section is not intended to allow antitrust 
     defendants in a private lawsuit or state parens patriae 
     investigation or enforcement action to apply to the 
     Department of Justice at the last minute to avoid full 
     treble-damage liability.
       The court in which the civil action is brought is empowered 
     to determine whether the necessary cooperation has occurred. 
     The power of the court is the same whether the court is a 
     state or federal court and whether the antitrust claims have 
     been brought under state or federal laws. That cooperation 
     includes providing full factual disclosure of all facts, 
     documents, or other things that are relevant or potentially 
     relevant. Because many leniency agreements may be with 
     organizations rather than individuals, the section provides 
     that any antitrust leniency applicant must use its ``best 
     efforts'' to obtain and facilitate cooperation from 
     individuals. Recognizing that there are discovery tools that 
     plaintiffs can use in discovery of entities, this section is 
     intended to require cooperation of entities in such 
     discovery. For example, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), a 
     corporation or another entity may be noticed or subpoenaed to 
     provide a corporate representative to testify on its behalf. 
     If the leniency applicant is an organization, individuals 
     employed by the organization may also qualify for reduced 
     private damages exposure if they cooperate to the court's 
     satisfaction.
       Section 214 clarifies that the subtitle does not affect the 
     right of the Antitrust Division ``to seek a stay or 
     protective order in a civil action based on conduct covered 
     by an antitrust leniency agreement,'' to prevent the leniency 
     applicant's cooperation ``from impairing or impeding'' a 
     Division investigation or prosecution. It also states that 
     the subtitle does not create any right to challenge the 
     decision of the Division concerning whether to grant a 
     leniency agreement; nor does it affect the joint and several 
     liability of any of the parties to civil antitrust actions 
     covered by the subtitle other than the ``antitrust leniency 
     applicant and cooperating individuals. . . .'' In combination 
     with section 213, the rule of construction in this section 
     preserving the application of joint and several liability as 
     to all defendants other than the leniency applicant provides 
     an additional incentive to corporations and individuals who 
     have violated the antitrust laws to be the first to cooperate 
     with the government and private litigants. While the 
     antitrust leniency applicant who cooperates with civil 
     plaintiffs will be liable only for single damages caused by 
     its own unlawful conduct, the remaining defendants will be 
     fully, jointly and severally liable for the treble damages 
     the conspiracy caused, minus only the amount actually paid by 
     the leniency applicant. This could have the effect of 
     increasing the amount of damages the remaining defendants are 
     ultimately required to pay.

[[Page 11281]]

       Section 215 increases, for violations of sections 1-3 of 
     the Sherman Act, statutory maximum monetary penalties from 
     $350,000 to $1 million for individuals and business 
     organizations other than corporations, and from $10 million 
     to $100 million for corporations; and increases maximum jail 
     sentences from three years to 10 years. These increases 
     reflect Congress' belief that criminal antitrust violations 
     are serious white collar crimes that should be punished in a 
     manner commensurate with other felonies. This section will 
     require the United States Sentencing Commission to revise the 
     existing antitrust sentencing guidelines to increase terms of 
     imprisonment for antitrust violations to reflect the new 
     statutory maximum. No revision in the existing guidelines is 
     called for with respect to fines, as the increases in the 
     Sherman Act statutory maximum fines are intended to permit 
     courts to impose fines for antitrust violations at current 
     Guideline levels without the need to engage in damages 
     litigation during the criminal sentencing process.
       For example, Congress does not intend for the Commission to 
     revisit the current presumption that twenty percent of the 
     volume of commerce is an appropriate proxy for the pecuniary 
     loss caused by a criminal antitrust conspiracy. This 
     presumption is sufficiently precise to satisfy the interests 
     of justice, and promotes efficient and predictable imposition 
     of penalties for criminal antitrust violations. Comments to 
     the guidelines provide that if the actual overcharge caused 
     by cartel behavior can be shown to depart substantially from 
     the presumed ten percent overcharge that underlies the twenty 
     percent presumption, this should be considered by the court 
     in setting the fine within the guideline fine range.

                     Subtitle B--Tunney Act Reform

       Section 221 makes clear that Congress intends for the 
     district court reviewing an antitrust consent decree to go 
     beyond merely considering whether entry of the decree would 
     ``make a mockery of the judicial function,'' (this is 
     currently the standard in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
     Circuit) and that the purpose of this section is ``to 
     effectuate the original Congressional intent in enacting the 
     Tunney Act. . . .''
       The Public Interest Determination provision first amends 
     the existing Tunney Act by allowing, for good cause shown, 
     dissemination of public comments on proposed antitrust 
     consent decrees and responses to them by an alternative to 
     publication in the Federal Register; replaces ``may'' with 
     ``shall'' in its directions to district courts reviewing 
     consent decrees; adds to the factors that a reviewing court 
     must consider, in determining whether the proposed decree is 
     in the public interest, ``whether its terms are ambiguous'' 
     and ``the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition 
     in the relevant market or markets''; clarifies that nothing 
     in the section shall be construed as requiring the court to 
     hold an evidentiary hearing or to permit anyone to intervene; 
     and specifies that the written or oral communications made on 
     behalf of a defendant, which the defendant is required to 
     describe to the court under section 5(g) of the Clayton Act, 
     include communications ``by any officer, director, employee, 
     or agent of such defendant, or other person.''

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1086, the Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003. This measure has 
strong bipartisan support in the Committee on the Judiciary, the House 
and the Senate, as is evidenced by its cosponsors. It provides 
important and significant improvements to our antitrust laws. We passed 
the bill last year, and it passed the Senate more recently with 
amendments, and we are here today to approve the identical version of 
the bill.
  Title I of the bill recognizes that organizations set thousands of 
standards that keep us safe and provide uniformity for everything from 
fire protections to computer systems to building construction. When all 
DVDs are the same size, competitors can manufacture to the standard and 
compete. When all plugs are the same size, anybody can sell a lamp 
without having to insist on a particular brand name because they know 
all lamps have the standard plugs. Without the relief in this bill, 
industries may be reluctant to agree on a standard out of fear that 
treble antitrust damages may be available.
  So this title provides a common sense safe harbor for standards 
development organizations. Those who voluntarily disclose their 
activities to Federal antitrust authorities will only be subject to 
single damages should a successful antitrust suit arise. Those who 
refuse to disclose their activities or those who take actions beyond 
their disclosures will be subject to the treble damages under the 
antitrust statutes.
  The bill does not exempt anyone from antitrust laws but applies the 
rule of reason to standards development organizations that are acting 
in an open and forthright manner. If a violation is found, the 
organizations are still liable for damages, but single damages, rather 
than treble damages, which would now apply. However, organizations that 
commit specific serious antitrust violations, such as conspiring about 
standards on price, market share or territory division, will still be 
fully liable for their actions.
  The rationale for the more favorable treatment of standards 
development organizations under these circumstances is that standards 
development organizations, as nonprofits that serve a cross-section of 
an industry, are unlikely themselves to engage in anticompetitive 
activities; and, without the risk of treble damages, they can be more 
innovative in their effort to develop standards which enhance product 
quality and safety while reducing costs.
  Title II of the bill, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 
Reform Act of 2003, increases the maximum criminal penalties for 
antitrust violations so that the disparity is eliminated between the 
treatment of criminal white collar offenses and antitrust criminal 
offenses.
  This title also incorporates a leniency provision that encourages 
participants in an illegal conspiracy to turn in their co-conspirators. 
This provision allows the Department of Justice to limit the damages of 
the cooperating company's civil liability to actual, rather than 
treble, damages. The Department of Justice will only grant such 
leniency if the company provides adequate and timely cooperation to 
both the government and any subsequent private plaintiffs in civil 
suits. And because the remaining conspirators remain jointly and 
severally liable to treble damages, the victims' potential recovery is 
not reduced by leniency in this situation.
  Finally, Title II of the bill reforms the Tunney Act to strengthen 
the Act's requirements that courts review antitrust consent decrees in 
a meaningful manner, not simply as a rubber stamp to such decrees.
  H.R. 1086 is an important bill that modernizes and enhances 
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. I would like to commend the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman 
from Michigan (Ranking Member Conyers) for their leadership and 
cooperative efforts on this bill, and I urge my colleagues to support 
it.
  Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letters for the 
Record:

         Committee on Education and the Workforce, House of 
           Representatives,
                                     Washington, DC, May 28, 2004.
     Hon. William M. Thomas,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Longworth House Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Thomas: Thank you for your May 17, 2004 
     letter regarding H.R. 3908, the ``To provide for the 
     conveyance of the real property located at 1081 West Main 
     Street in Ravenna, Ohio.'' I agree that the Committee on Ways 
     and Means has jurisdiction over matters concerning the Social 
     Security Act and the effect this bill would have on 
     provisions within your Committee's jurisdiction. While these 
     provisions are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
     Ways and Means, I appreciate your willingness to work with me 
     in moving H.R. 3908 forward without the need for additional 
     legislative consideration by your Committee.
       I agree that this procedural route should note be construed 
     to prejudice the jurisdictional interest and prerogatives of 
     the Committee on Ways and Means on these provisions or any 
     other similar legislation and will not be considered as 
     precedent for consideration of matters of jurisdictional 
     interest to your Committee in the future.
       I thank you for working with me regarding this matter and 
     look forward to continuing our work and cooperation on this 
     bill and similar legislation. This letter and your response 
     will be included in the Congressional Record during the floor 
     consideration of this bill. If you have questions regarding 
     this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.
           Sincerely,
                                                     John Boehner,
                                                         Chairman.

[[Page 11282]]

     
                                  ____
                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                     Washington, DC, May 17, 2004.
     Hon. John A. Boehner,
     Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, Rayburn 
         House Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Boehner: I am writing concerning H.R. 3908, 
     ``To provide for the conveyance of the real property located 
     at 1081 West Main Street in Ravenna, Ohio,'' which was 
     introduced on March 4, 2004, and referred to the Committee on 
     Education and the Workforce.
       As you know, the Committee on Ways and Means has 
     jurisdiction over matters concerning the Social Security Act. 
     Sec. 1 of H.R. 3908 would convey a property purchased using 
     federal funds authorized under Titles III and IX of the 
     Social Security Act, and thus falls within the jurisdiction 
     of the Committee on Ways and Means. However, in order to 
     expedite this legislation for floor consideration, the 
     Committee will forgo action on this bill. This is being done 
     with the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice 
     the Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or 
     its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar 
     legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 3908, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration.
           Best regards,
                                                      Bill Thomas,
                                                         Chairman.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1086, the 
standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003. This 
measure has enjoyed bipartisan support in the Judiciary Committee, the 
House, and the Senate. It provides important and significant 
improvements to our antitrust laws.
  Title I of the bill recognizes that standards development 
organizations set thousands of standards that keep us safe and provide 
uniformity for everything from fire protections to computer systems to 
building construction. This Title provides a common sense safe harbor 
for these organizations. Those that voluntarily disclose their 
activities to federal antitrust authorities will only be subject to 
single damages should a lawsuit later arise. Those who refuse to 
disclose their activities, or those who take actions beyond their 
disclosure, will still be subject to treble damages under the antitrust 
statutes.
  This bill does not exempt anyone from the antitrust laws, but it does 
apply the rule of reason to standards development organizations. 
Therefore the pro-competitive market effects will be balanced against 
the anti-competitive market effects of an action before a violation of 
the antitrust laws is found. Organizations that commit per se 
violations--making agreements or standards about price, market share or 
territory division, for example--will still be fully liable for their 
actions.
  The rationale for such favored treatment is that standards 
development organizations, as non-profits that serve a cross-section of 
an industry, are unlikely themselves to engage in anti-competitive 
activities. However, if free from the threat of treble damages, they 
can increase efficiency and facilitate the gathering of a wealth of 
technical expertise from a wide array of interests to enhance product 
quality and safety while reducing costs.
  Title II, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 
of 2003, increases the maximum criminal penalties for antitrust 
violations so that the disparity is eliminated between the treatment of 
criminal white collar offenses and antitrust criminal violations. At 
this point, I do not see any reason to revise downward the current 
Sentencing Guideline presumption that twenty percent of the volume of 
commerce is an appropriate proxy for the pecuniary loss caused by a 
criminal antitrust conspiracy.
  This Title also incorporates a leniency provision that encourages 
participants in illegal cartels to turn against their co-conspirators. 
This provision allows the Department of Justice to limit the damages of 
the cooperating company's civil liability to actual, rather than treble 
damages. The Department of Justice will only grant such leniency if the 
company provides adequate and timely cooperation to both the government 
and any subsequent private plaintiffs in civil suits. And because the 
remaining conspirators remain jointly and severally liable for treble 
damages, the victims' potential total recovery is not reduced by 
leniency applicant's reduced damages. The central purpose of this 
provision is to bolster the leniency program already utilized by the 
Antitrust Division so that antitrust prosecutors can more effectively 
go after antitrust violators. The Department of Justice has assured me 
that it will always use these new tools cognizant of the needs of 
victims.
  Finally, Title II of the bill reforms the Tunney Act to strengthen 
the Act's requirement that courts review antitrust consent decrees in a 
meaningful manner, rather than simply ``rubber-stamping'' such decrees.
  H.R. 1086 is an important bill that modernizes and enhances the 
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. I'd like to thank the Chairman for 
his cooperative efforts on this bill and in writing the supplemental 
legislative history. We worked hard together on both and I'm very proud 
of the final product. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, as a co-sponsor of this 
legislation, I support H.R. 1086, ``The Standards Development 
Organization Advancement Act of 2003.''
  This Act amends the National Cooperative Standards Development Act to 
provide antitrust protections to specific activities of standard 
development organizations (SDOs) relating to the development of 
voluntary consensus standards.
  Among other provisions, H.R. 1086 amends the NCRA to limit the 
recovery of antitrust damages against SDOs if the organizations pre-
disclose the nature and scope of their standards development activity 
to the proper antitrust authorities. H.R. 1086 also amends the NCRA to 
include SDOs in the framework of NCRA that awards reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the substantially prevailing party.
  The provisions of H.R. 1086 protect SDOs, and in turn, SDOs help 
protect consumers and the public. SDOs are non-profit organizations 
that establish voluntary industry standards. These standards ensure 
competition within various industries, promote manufacturing 
compatibility, and reduce the risk that consumers will be stranded with 
a product that is incompatible with products from other manufacturers.
  The nature of the standards development process requires competing 
companies to bring their competitive ideas to the voluntary standards 
development process. When one of the companies believes its market 
position has been compromised by the standards development process that 
company will likely resort to litigation. It is not uncommon for the 
SDO to be named as a Defendant. For non-profit organizations like SDOs, 
litigation can be very costly and disruptive to their operations, and 
treble antitrust damages can be financially crippling.
  Under H.R. 1086, the recovery of damages against SDOs is limited if 
the organizations pre-disclose the nature and scope of their standards 
development activity to the proper antitrust authorities. Furthermore, 
SDOs are only liable for treble damages under antitrust laws if they 
fail to disclose the nature and scope of their voluntary standards 
setting activity.
  H.R. 1086 strikes a good balance. It does not grant SDOs full 
antitrust immunity, but it provides SDOs with protection from treble 
damages when they provide proper disclosure.
  H.R. 1086 also benefits the consumer. It enables the SDOs to develop 
industry standards that promote price competition, intensify corporate 
rivalry, and encourage the development of new products.
  Mr. Speaker, I support H.R. 1086.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time as well.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) that the 
House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, 
H.R. 1086.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate amendment was 
concurred in.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________