[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 11142-11143]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  NATO

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, it is hard to turn on the television 
without seeing the stirring images of the Allied landings on D-Day. I 
think in the heart of every American there swells a pride in these 
scenes, and what was accomplished on that day truly stands as one of 
the most historic achievements in recorded history. I think what was on 
display on D-Day with our Allies was a commitment to freedom, a 
commitment to the rule of law, a commitment to humankind that has made 
this world a better place in which to live.
  As I reflect on these images, which we will share with our European 
allies, I am also, unfortunately, reminded of what I experienced this 
last weekend in Bratislava, Slovakia, at the NATO Parliamentary. It has 
been my privilege since being a U.S. Senator to participate in many 
NATO Parliamentaries. This time, the majority leader, Senator Frist, 
asked me to chair our trip to this important meeting. It is the first 
time I have gone when I have been the only Senator in attendance. I 
hope that does not mean there is less of an interest in security. I 
think, unfortunately, what it means is the many claims on the time of 
Senators begin to compete with what is increasingly becoming regarded 
as an institution of diminishing value. I think that is unfortunate.
  Before I left, I read a book by Robert Kagan. It is a small book, but 
its message is powerful and important. The title is ``Of Paradise And 
Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.'' Basically, the 
message is that the values that bring NATO together in the first place, 
the values that have held it together through the cold war, are values 
that are changing now and stressing NATO in ways that many are 
unwilling to face up to.
  For the Record, I would like to read the first paragraph. I think it 
says very clearly the problem. Says Mr. Kagan:

       It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans 
     share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy 
     the same world. On the all-important question of power--the 
     efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of 
     power--American and European perspectives are diverging. 
     Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little 
     differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained 
     world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and 
     cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of 
     peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel 
     Kant's ``perpetual peace.'' Meanwhile, the United States 
     remains mired in history, exercising power in a anarchic 
     Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are 
     unreliable, and where true security and the defense and 
     promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession 
     and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and 
     international questions today, Americans are from Mars and 
     Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand 
     one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not 
     transitory--the product of one American election or one 
     catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide 
     are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it 
     comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, 
     defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign 
     and defense policies, the United States and Europe have 
     parted ways.

  What we don't realize at an official level is how badly we have 
parted ways.
  But what Mr. Kagan wrote, I observed in starkest and tragic relief in 
Bratislava, Slovakia. It was not all bad. I would describe what I saw, 
in the language of that great Clint Eastwood western--I think the 
Europeans would hate a reference to a western in a speech like this--
but that title was ``The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly.''
  There was much good. Let me tell you, for me, first and foremost was 
the good that the British representatives did. I say thank God for the 
Brits and for a strong leader like Mr. Blair. They continue to provide 
a bridge between an America and a Europe going in different directions. 
It is sometimes difficult for them, but their hearts are stout and 
their backs are strong and they are great Allies. They were on D-Day 
and they are still on this day.
  Second, another good: The first meeting I attended was about the 
NATO-Russia relationship. The Russians made a presentation. It was 
great to be in a room where we were talking about issues in which 
Russia, though out of NATO, was able to communicate with NATO, express 
its feelings, its concerns. But then, after they made their 
presentation, some of the things they said caused me to wince. I was 
about to make a comment to contest a few of the points they had made, 
but I didn't need to. An Estonian did it for me, then a Latvian, then a 
Pole. They contested as equals--equals of Russia--things which they 
said were not the truth, not factual, not real, and certainly not the 
whole story.
  It was thrilling to see. I asked myself as I watched this, Why is 
this happening? Why can an Estonian stand on equal ground with a 
Russian and debate as an equal? It occurred to me with great clarity: 
Because of the U.S. military's marriage to NATO and because the U.S. 
military continues today what it did from the founding, that visionary 
founding by Congress and Harry Truman; that is, to put actual bullets 
in our budgets to provide an umbrella of security for Europe that was 
credible to the Soviet Union. It was a thrilling thing to see.
  I remember when I first came to the Senate and I was on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. I was given an assignment to help pass the first 
expansion of NATO, postfall of the Berlin Wall. Many of the questions 
raised were: What will this do to Russia coming out of communism, 
trying to come into the Western world? What will it do to a fragile 
democracy they are trying to build? Isn't this just cold war? And yet 
some of us said, while we respect those concerns, these new members--
the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians--are needed for new blood in NATO 
because we were getting stale and we needed their input. We needed 
someone in membership to understand what the boot of tyranny on the 
back of the neck was like, and they did, as we all know.
  We won that debate. The vote was large. It was lopsided. But it took 
a lot of work to make that argument successful. We did succeed and NATO 
was expanded indeed through these countries, each of which had suffered 
greatly under the Soviet Union at various times when they had uprises.
  But now I have to say that what we promised would happen in these 
countries has actually occurred. You have Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and Romania. These are not perfect democracies. But guess what they 
are. They are now democracies. They are pursuing the rule of law. They 
are allowing free enterprise. They are developing emerging middle 
classes. They have become job magnets for European capital. They are 
joining the European Union. They are now part of the free world. And 
the lever was NATO. But that is the good.
  Now I have to tell you what I thought was bad.
  Two reports were given on Saturday. They were not my reports. One was 
made by a German and one was made by a Frenchman.
  The first report was about the post-9/11 commitment that NATO had 
made with respect to Afghanistan. You will remember the only time 
article V has ever been invoked was after 9/11. We had been attacked. 
Article V says if member countries are attacked, it is an attack on 
all.
  In response to that attack and the issuance of article V, NATO was 
supposed to go to work. And they made commitments, according to this 
report, of things they would do in Afghanistan.
  According to the report which I listened to, it was readily admitted 
that a reasonable attempt was made at the first commitment and that the 
other three were not even attempted and were utter failures.
  That is what their report said. That is what I heard.
  They went on to cite the fact that helicopters were needed. Lift was 
needed so their soldiers could actually participate, but that the 
member countries of NATO wouldn't send any helicopters. The troops they 
were sending came with such operational restrictions by their 
governments that all

[[Page 11143]]

they could do was defensive work. They couldn't help in the war. They 
were restricted by their governments from making a contribution.
  Let us say the Americans were fired upon. They couldn't help. If they 
were fired upon, they could fire back. That is what the report said. I 
was stunned to hear it. But that is what I heard--four commitments; 
three were utter failures and one attempt.
  The next report was made by a Frenchman who talked about the exciting 
development in the European Union to develop a European defense 
initiative in which they would develop rapid response forces that could 
do what he described as ``St. Petersburg tasks.'' Lipservice was given 
that this could be done with NATO. But when you consider what was 
supposed to be done with NATO in fulfilling the earlier commitments, 
these St. Petersburg tasks had nothing to do with that and were 
completely unrelated to what NATO needed them to do.
  What I heard bad was there was soaring rhetoric, everybody there 
talked about their superpower, and everybody knew their budgets. While 
this rhetoric was going north, their budgets were heading south. It was 
scary.
  I made the comment that if they were going to fail in their first 
responsibility and divert limited resources to a new initiative 
connected to the EU and leave NATO hollow, that would have a serious 
negative impact on America's commitment to NATO--and it certainly would 
to this Senator's commitment to NATO. There was just quiet when I 
responded in that fashion.
  The French reporter who was making this report about the new European 
defense initiative noted how critically poor America was at 
peacekeeping, and what a poor job we do at rebuilding a country. I 
never thought that was true with Japan or Germany.
  Then a Brit responded to him. She said she had recently been in 
Bosnia and it is fact that NATO is going to turn over its operational 
responsibilities in Bosnia to this European force. She said she heard 
the Kosovars said, We don't trust the EU, we trust the Americans, which 
certainly flies in the face of the charge that we are no good at 
peacekeeping. I thanked her for noting what I did not have to say. The 
Kosovars and the Albanians believed their freedom came from American 
efforts--not European Union efforts.
  Those are the bad things. Let me tell you about the ugly things.
  When I left on Sunday to fly home, I reflected upon 9/11 and the 
article V guarantee that had been issued and how the European Union had 
not been able to, or our members in Europe had not able to, fulfill 
their Afghan responsibilities. I thought about how unfair it was to 
mothers of American troops, and we as a government have said credibly 
so that Estonians can talk to Russians as equals that if they are 
attacked we will go to war--thermonuclear war, if necessary. But if the 
United States is attacked, the response in Afghanistan--a NATO 
commitment--has been we will apply defense for ourselves, and we will 
fall short of fulfilling our promises.
  That is the first ugly thing--the first ugly realization I left with.
  The second was this: I heard from country after country in Central 
and Eastern Europe how they were being pressured as new members of the 
European Union not to be cooperative with America on security issues.
  That makes me angry. I think that is really ugly.
  I was reminded of the Commissar about a year ago when these new NATO 
members put an article in the Wall Street Journal saying they stood 
with America on the war on terrorism and the President of the French 
Republic fearing these new countries would be a Trojan horse for the 
Americans and a challenge to the Franco-German leadership of Europe 
that was opposing the American effort--that somehow they had not acted 
``well-born.'' Those are his words.
  He went on to add, warning: I was sad to learn, that is being 
administered in subtle but powerful ways to these new EU members. He 
said it could cost them membership in the EU. It has not done that.
  Then Chirac said:

       Beyond the somewhat amusing or childish aspects of the 
     matter [the matter being the letter of support in the Wall 
     Street Journal] . . . it was dangerous. It should not be 
     forgotten that a number of the EU countries will have to 
     ratify enlargement by referendum. And we already know that 
     public opinion, as always when it's a matter of something 
     new, have reservations about an enlargement, not really 
     seeing exactly what their interest is in approving it. 
     Obviously, then, [what the central Europeans have done] can 
     only reinforce hostile public opinion sentiments among the 15 
     and especially those who will hold a referendum. Remember 
     that all it takes is for one country not to ratify the 
     referendum for [enlargement] not to happen. Thus, I would say 
     that these countries have been, let's be frank, both not very 
     well brought up and rather unconscious about the dangers that 
     too quick an alignment with the American position could have 
     for them.

  I conclude with the words of Edmund Burke, that nations have no 
permanent friends, only permanent interests. I also remember the words 
of Isaiah to ancient Israel, not to lean on a weak reed.
  I say to the American people, NATO is not dead, but it is in trouble. 
As politicians promise you relief through internationalization, I ask 
the American people to consider reality, deeds, not words and empty 
budgets.
  I yield the floor.

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