[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 7]
[House]
[Pages 9545-9547]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PR OFFENSIVE

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the President's new PR offensive in Iraq 
is offensive. The President sent Secretary Rumsfeld to Iraq. He should 
have sent him to see the Red Cross instead.
  This administration remains in denial over the prisoner abuses in 
Iraq.

[[Page 9546]]

They think creating a photo op in Iraq will somehow divert attention 
from the photos that shock the world. Justice is not a PR stunt in 
Iraq.
  The responsibility is not a sound bite from Secretary Rumsfeld 
telling Americans from Iraq that he is in charge. Accountability is not 
a mug shot from the prison where policies that shame America spun out 
of control.
  Mr. President, this is a crisis of worldwide scope. Landing on an 
aircraft, Mr. Speaker, will not help. Standing your guy up in Iraq will 
not help. Pretending it will go away will not help. Put away the 
banner, Mr. President, because America is in the midst of a crisis.
  We are just beginning to comprehend the magnitude of the abuse at one 
prison in Iraq, and we are beginning to hear of abuses that may have 
taken place elsewhere. This PR stunt will be seen around the world as 
just that, and it will only make matters worse.
  Restoring America's credibility in the world will take America 
confronting this awful thing. The people mugging for the camera are the 
people who ought to be at the center of a complete and impartial 
investigation. Anything less will be a cover-up plan in plain sight.
  The world simply will not allow it. Every day the questions and 
comments worldwide get just tougher and tougher.
  From the Gulf News, today's editorial is entitled ``Inside Afghan's 
Prisons, U.S. Abuses are Shrouded in Mystery.''
  Singapore's Straits Times newspaper carries the commentary today 
entitled ``Torture and the Politics of Ambiguity.''
  I will insert these newspaper articles into the Record at this point.

                 [From the Straits Times, May 13, 2004]

                 Torture and the Politics of Ambiguity

                          (By Michael Manning)

       Each new revelation of physical abuse, maltreatment and 
     sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by American and British 
     soldiers shocks international public opinion, leaving 
     officials to scramble desperately to contain the damage.
       United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warns 
     that more documentary evidence of wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib 
     prison lies in store, evidently in the preemptive hope that 
     the outrages stopped there.
       As a former US military intelligence interrogator, I am 
     convinced that the images from Abu Ghraib are just the 
     beginning. The wanton cruelty there is all too clearly 
     symptomatic of a systemic failure.
       But what system failed? Was it a failure of discipline and 
     training--the result of sending inexperienced and unworldly 
     reservists into poor conditions, abruptly extending their 
     deployments and then leaving them understaffed in the face of 
     a growing influx of captured insurgents? Or did the pattern 
     of abuse amount to so many orders from superiors to ``soften 
     up'' prisoners for interrogation?
       The answer is, most likely, both and neither.
       Ultimately, what gives rise to abuses such as occurred at 
     Abu Ghraib is a policy of deliberate ambiguity concerning how 
     to handle detainees. The pressure in a war setting to get 
     information that could save lives is immense. But senior 
     political and military officials--particularly in 
     democracies--prefer to avoid any association with torture.
       Ambiguity is thus a political strategy that encourages the 
     spread of implicit, informal rules of behavior, thereby 
     shifting accountability onto the lowest ranking, least 
     powerful and most expendable soldiers.
       I completed the US Army's three-month basic interrogation 
     course in the late 1980s. It was rigorous--only seven of 33 
     students finished it--as it required mastering the technical 
     minutiae of collecting, cross-checking, standardising and 
     reporting enormous masses of information.
       But the curriculum was much less meticulous concerning 
     interrogation techniques. An interrogation, we were 
     instructed, should begin with polite, direct questioning, 
     because a certain number of detainees simply want to unburden 
     themselves. If more persuasion was needed, we could offer 
     rewards for cooperation--anything from cigarettes to 
     political asylum.
       Beyond this, we were taught that we could ``apply 
     pressure.'' The term was never defined in any formal setting, 
     but the concept was not difficult to decipher. As US Army 
     General Antonio Taguba's report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib 
     put it, the ``guard force'' was ``actively engaged in setting 
     the conditions for successful exploitation of the 
     internees.''
       This obvious violation of the Army's rule prohibiting 
     participation by military police in interrogation sessions 
     does not surprise me. I was never taught that military police 
     came under a separate chain of command. On the contrary, 
     between classes, during breaks in field training and in other 
     informal settings, some of our instructors let it be known 
     through insinuation and innuendo that we could have the 
     guards beat uncooperative subjects.
       This was never said in the classroom, but it was made clear 
     the role of military police was to serve the interrogators, 
     for an interrogator's effectiveness depends on convincing the 
     detained of his omnipotence.
       The hidden rules of the game came closest to being 
     officially acknowledged during two weeks of simulated 
     interrogations towards the end of the training course. These 
     sessions involved only a student interrogator, and instructor 
     in the role of the detainee and a video camera.
       When, during a simulation, I asked an imaginary guard to 
     take away the detainee's chair, the instructor feigned being 
     removed violently. When I told the non-existent guard to hit 
     the detainee, the instructor played along. All of us knew 
     that a failed interrogation could mean being dropped from the 
     course. I was not dropped; I finished first in my class.
       For those who benefit from the politics of ambiguity, 
     international law is an indispensable prop. In his recent US 
     Senate testimony, Mr. Rumsfeld claimed that the military 
     police at Abu Ghraib were instructed to abide by the Geneva 
     conventions.
       So was I. Throughout my training as an interrogator, the 
     admonition to follow the Geneva conventions accompanied 
     virtually every discussion of ``applying pressure.'' 
     Unfortunately, like ``applying pressure,'' the Geneva 
     conventions were never defined. We never studied them, nor 
     were we given a copy to read, much less tested on their 
     contents. For many of us, the conventions were at best a 
     dimly remembered cliche from war movies that meant, ``don't 
     do bad stuff.''
       Again, the tacit rules said otherwise. One instructor joked 
     that although the Geneva conventions barred firing a 50-
     caliber machine gun at an enemy soldier, we could aim at his 
     helmet or backpack, since these were ``equipment.'' Others 
     shared anecdotes about torturing detainees.
       Whether such talk was true is irrelevant. We were being 
     conditioned to believe that the official rules set no clear 
     limits, and that we could therefore set the limits wherever 
     we liked.
       In the end, the politics of ambiguity may fail Mr. 
     Rumsfeld; all those high-resolution photographs from Abu 
     Ghraib are anything but ambiguous. If similarly shameful 
     disclosures multiply, as I believe they will, let us at least 
     hope that official apologies and condemnations may finally 
     give way to wider, more genuine accountability and reform.
                                  ____


                   [From the Gulf News, May 13, 2004]

   Farhan Bokhari: Inside Afghan Prisons, US Abuses Are Shrouded in 
                                Mystery

       The scandalous treatment of Iraqi prisoners by United 
     States military personnel and the series of condemnations 
     surrounding key US officials, most notably Defense Secretary 
     Donald Rumsfeld, are too significant to be ignored easily. 
     But one essential danger flowing from recent revelations 
     surrounding the actions of American military personnel in 
     Iraq is that similar mistreatment of prisoners in US custody 
     in Afghanistan could have occurred on the same proportion. 
     And perhaps this was easily overlooked.
       The bottom line remains that the world's so-called sole 
     superpower, eager to sermonise the rest of the world over 
     principles of democracy and basic human values, now finds 
     itself confronting fundamentally tough questions over the 
     very same values--which have theoretically stood at the heart 
     of its policy-making.
       How can the US lead the world if its actions cause more 
     inhumanity than the protection of humanity? There are no easy 
     answers to that fundamentally significant question. To make 
     matters worse, a number of Afghan and Pakistani families 
     related to the fighters nabbed during the Afghan war and 
     subsequently taken to Guantanamo Bay, are completely in the 
     dark about the fate of their near and dear ones.
       The fate of the prisoners captured by the US in Afghanistan 
     will not only continue to haunt the region surrounding the 
     central Asian country but indeed the rest of the world. 
     Vociferous criticism of US treatment of Iraqi prisoners is 
     only gathering fresh momentum.
       For many critics, no amount of denunciation of Washington's 
     policies can ever compensate for the suffering endured by a 
     large number of victims, thanks to the failure in enforcing 
     stringent codes of conduct. The fallout from the Iraqi 
     prisoners issue across the Muslim world will also carry its 
     reverberations to Afghanistan, where many Afghans remain 
     skeptical about Washington's ability to give their country a 
     new lease of life. For such sceptics, the Iraqi prisoners 
     issue triggers a two pronged painful question.
       On the one hand, this controversy raises the issue of the 
     treatment of Afghan prisoners, whose fate remains hidden from 
     the world.
       It is only the word of the US military and other 
     authorities which suggests that living conditions for Afghan 
     prisoners remain acceptable. But there's absolutely no way to 
     independently verify such claims.

[[Page 9547]]

       On the other hand, the Iraqi prisoners' issue reinforces 
     not only the message that the US remains--fundamentally--a 
     country which is hostile towards the Muslim world, but also 
     one whose actions only aggravate global crises rather than 
     provide solutions for them. At a global level, the fallout 
     from the Iraqi prisoners issue would be hard to pacify 
     without a clear-cut demonstration of political consequences 
     through steps such as US President Bush asking Rumsfeld to 
     step down.
       Without a clear message which suggests that this case has 
     sparked enough urgency in Washington that heads are beginning 
     to roll, the bitterness across the Muslim world will not even 
     begin to pacify.
       On the ground, in a country like Afghanistan, there's a 
     great urgency to quickly establish new parameters to ensure 
     transparency surrounding prisoners in different jails, be 
     they those in the custody of the US or those being held by 
     one of its allies. Apart from taking such vital measures 
     regarding the treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan, 
     Washington also needs to move decisively towards beginning to 
     resolve the issue of prisoners incarcerated in Guantanamo 
     Bay.
       Simultaneously, Washington's determination to build a new 
     political order in Afghanistan dominated by its handpicked 
     leaders also needs to be fundamentally reviewed.
       While there may not appear to be any direct clash between 
     the prisoners issue and the political future of Afghanistan, 
     the two issues are not entirely unconnected. For many 
     sceptics who look upon the US as an invading power, both 
     trends appear driven by the determination to enforce brute 
     authority. The prisoners on their own, suspected to be living 
     in sub-human conditions, may not be able to challenge 
     Washington's military authority. But there are many others 
     who would continue to be bitter about the US, drawing 
     inspiration from Washington's controversial action.
       Through time, such bitterness and anger will only translate 
     into hostility towards the US. To make matters worse in 
     Afghanistan, Washington's failure to pour billions of dollars 
     once expected by most Afghans will only begin to lay the 
     basis for frustration with the US as a problem solver. 
     Tragically though, Afghanistan may be fated to live through 
     one of its worst periods of recurring turmoil between now and 
     the end of the year, ahead of the US presidential elections.
       In its zeal to quickly solve the security problems central 
     to Afghanistan's past profile as a terrorist state, the US 
     military, with or without Washington's tacit direction, may 
     well intensify its search for so-called terrorists.
       In doing so, its likely to run up against one wall or 
     another.
       Perhaps, the search for terrorists may intensify the 
     urgency to step up the so-called interrogations of prisoners 
     caught in the Afghan war.
       The worst in the saga surrounding prisoners in the US 
     military's captivity may not be over yet.

  The BBC asked viewers and listeners to comment. From South Africa 
came this: ``The U.S. Secretary of Shame should just do the honorable 
thing and resign.''
  From Switzerland: ``Rumsfeld is the apex of an arrogant military 
lobby in the U.S., a bunch of people who have no concern for human 
rights, freedom, liberty and moral values which were seen as the 
inseparable ideology of the United States.''
  From England: ``Bush's administration has brought anarchy not 
democracy.''
  In Iraq today, Secretary Rumsfeld called himself a survivor as he 
spoke to the soldiers. This is the typical administration technique. 
Say something over and over and over and hope the people will begin to 
believe it. Fly a banner, take a picture, hope it all goes away.
  The Secretary of War should have been talking about how America's 
credibility can survive this administration. Secretary Rumsfeld should 
have been talking about how America's leadership can survive the neo-
cons. The Secretary should have been talking about how our men and 
women in Iraq can survive the new dangers they face.
  It is too much to ask, I know. The PR machine cannot grasp anything 
as obvious as worldwide outrage. They call it a focus group. Meanwhile, 
they will do everything possible to prop up Rumsfeld, even as he comes 
to symbolize a disastrous foreign policy.
  Today, Secretary Rumsfeld runs the DOD, but it no longer stands for 
the Department of Defense. Under this administration, under this 
Secretary, DOD has come to mean ``divert or deny.'' The world sees it. 
The world knows it. The administration just does not get it yet. 
November 2 is coming.

                          ____________________