[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 7]
[House]
[Pages 8485-8491]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  EXPRESSING CONCERN OF CONGRESS OVER IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS TO 
                        PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 398) expressing the 
concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce 
nuclear weapons.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 398

       Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert 
     the international community to Iran's covert nuclear 
     activities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear 
     weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
       Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to 
     produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be revealed 
     to the international community;
       Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility under construction at Natanz until February 2003, 
     after the existence of the plant and facility was revealed by 
     an opposition group;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
     Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a 
     nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
       Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
     Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly 
     enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 nuclear weapons per 
     year;
       Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General 
     of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its 
     obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to 
     report all nuclear material imported into Iran--specifically, 
     the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China in 1991--
     the processing and use of that material, and the facilities 
     involved in the use and processing of the material;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 
     to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations 
     under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear 
     material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, and to 
     cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions about 
     its nuclear activities;
       Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of 
     Governors in August 2003 that, after further investigation, 
     Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as 
     required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to 
     resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment 
     activities;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, 
     called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and 
     any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its 
     nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the Agency, and 
     to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Protocol 
     between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards 
     to strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within 
     Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate closely 
     and fully with the Agency in resolving questions about Iran's 
     nuclear program;
       Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront 
     Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director 
     General of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had 
     conducted research on uranium conversion processes at the 
     Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nuclear 
     Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such 
     activities;
       Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers 
     of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint 
     statement in which Iran indicated that it had decided to 
     suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as 
     defined by the IAEA;
       Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of 
     unspecified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had 
     satisfied international concerns about its nuclear 
     development program;
       Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran 
     further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and 
     2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium 
     hexafluoride from China;
       Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a 
     laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of 
     uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, another 
     violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had 
     irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed 
     them to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal 
     obligation to disclose such activities under its Safeguards 
     Agreement;
       Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it 
     would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement for 
     further safeguards, and would act in accordance with the 
     Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
       Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the 
     IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all 
     enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to 
     produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to 
     import enrichment related items;
       Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic 
     activities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and 
     confronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear 
     activities;
       Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the 
     IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that Iran has 
     concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities from the 
     IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obligations under its 
     Safeguards Agreement;
       Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, 
     fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the 
     Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February 24, 
     2004, found that Iran continued to engage in deception 
     regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to 
     disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more 
     advanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from 
     foreign sources, and noncredible explanations involving 
     experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that 
     is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons and a 
     firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
       Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations 
     of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and of Iran's previous 
     assurances to the IAEA and the international community for 
     full transparency;
       Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to 
     France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would suspend 
     uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly emphasized 
     that this suspension is temporary and continued to import and 
     manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and 
     equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium 
     enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
       Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan 
     Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council 
     of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to the IAEA its 
     research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium enrichment 
     centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
     intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
       (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 
     16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and President of 
     Iran's Atomic Energy Organization that Iran would present a 
     ``full picture of its nuclear activities'' and ``full 
     transparency'';
       (2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United 
     Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full 
     transparency and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
       (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of 
     September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full transparency 
     and to ``leave no stone unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its 
     peaceful objectives;
       Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed 
     to a nuclear weapons program;
       Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, 
     and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear black 
     market

[[Page 8486]]

     that Iran has used, raising the question of whether Iran, as 
     well, received a nuclear weapon design that it has refused to 
     reveal to international inspectors;
       Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian 
     Federation has recently announced that it will soon conclude 
     an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for 
     the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the need to 
     sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons 
     development program;
       Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 
     13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious 
     concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 
     did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's 
     past and present nuclear programme considered essential by 
     the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that 
     the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced 
     centrifuge associated research, manufacturing, and testing 
     activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser 
     enrichment program; and designs for hot cells to handle 
     highly radioactive materials;
       Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern 
     that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the 
     development of its enrichment technology to its current 
     extent, and that a number of other questions remain 
     unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
     Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on 
     the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, 
     extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned 
     heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding 
     the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
       Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that 
     IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a protest 
     against the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 
     2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to readmit 
     inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls into 
     serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about 
     its nuclear activities; and
       Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in 
     dealing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, 
     Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international 
     community, its receipt from other countries of the means to 
     enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA 
     Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated 
     its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not to 
     acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring), That the Congress--
       (1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's 
     continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community 
     about its nuclear programs and activities;
       (2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United 
     States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and 
     prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending 
     all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the 
     provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the 
     Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the 
     application of safeguards;
       (3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 
     years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has 
     forfeited the right to be trusted with development of a 
     nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and 
     enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, 
     and facilities;
       (4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's 
     nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-
     applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of 
     February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along 
     with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not 
     disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence 
     of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter 
     and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement 
     and the Additional Protocol;
       (5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all 
     efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to 
     immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all 
     nuclear enrichment activities, including manufacturing and 
     importing related equipment;
       (6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and 
     legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full 
     unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the 
     investigation of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new 
     openness and honesty about all its nuclear programs;
       (7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which 
     Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear 
     weapons program and to provide full, complete, and 
     transparent disclosure of all its nuclear activities has 
     enabled the IAEA to rapidly understand and verify with high 
     confidence the extent and scope of Libya's program;
       (8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to 
     resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements 
     until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently 
     ceased all nuclear weapons development activity, including a 
     permanent cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and 
     plutonium reprocessing activities;
       (9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what 
     further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to 
     persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to 
     the IAEA;
       (10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance 
     of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the 
     NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent 
     and ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United 
     States, and the international community regarding Iran's 
     military nuclear activities--
       (A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial entities 
     not proceed with the development of Iran's Azadegan oil 
     field;
       (B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French and 
     Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with their 
     agreement for further cooperation in expanding Iran's liquid 
     natural gas production field;
       (C) calls on all countries to intercede with their 
     commercial entities to ensure that these entities refrain 
     from or cease all investment and investment-related 
     activities that support Iran's energy industry; and
       (D) calls on the President to enforce the provisions of the 
     Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to discourage foreign 
     commercial entities from investing in Iran's energy industry;
       (11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any 
     nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and 
     calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran 
     and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the 
     Bushehr reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are 
     satisfied;
       (12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose 
     nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting 
     Iranian nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, 
     the United Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate 
     such assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to 
     individuals, sites, and all information related to the 
     investigations, and to immediately review and rectify their 
     export control laws, regulations, and practices in order to 
     prevent further assistance to countries seeking to develop 
     nuclear programs that could support the development of 
     nuclear weapons;
       (13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest 
     opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council 
     that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
     IAEA;
       (14) urges the President of the United States to provide 
     whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are 
     necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate 
     Iran's nuclear activities;
       (15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
     Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
     international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon 
     states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards 
     agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium 
     reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a 
     military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under 
     the NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
       (16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to 
     consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts 
     by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in 
     clandestine nuclear activities; and
       (17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and 
     currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this 
     resolution.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).


                             General Leave

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend 
their remarks and include extraneous material on H. Con. Res. 398.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Indiana?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H. Con. Res. 398, a 
resolution which condemns Iran's continued violations of its 
obligations and commitments regarding its nuclear program; expresses 
Congress' grave concern over Iran's efforts to develop the means to 
produce nuclear weapons, which threaten not only that region, but 
possibly the world; and calls for a series of steps to be undertaken by 
various parties to address this threat.

[[Page 8487]]

  I am proud to be a cosponsor of this measure, and I commend the 
gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the ranking member, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), on this bipartisan effort and 
for their leadership.
  Mr. Speaker, after getting caught with its hand in the cookie jar, 
the Iranian regime was forced to admit in the fall of 2002 that it had 
nuclear facilities that it had failed to declare to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. From that time onward, Iran has engaged in a 
systematic campaign of deception and manipulation to hide its true 
intentions and to keep its large-scale nuclear efforts a secret.
  For at least 18 years, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert 
nuclear program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the 
manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, most of which, 
according to recent IAEA reporting, are owned by military industrial 
organizations.
  It has an enrichment facility designed for the simultaneous operation 
of large numbers of centrifuges, and a large, partially-underground 
facility at Natanz, intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. 
Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment 
which uses lasers, a complex technology rarely used by even the most 
advanced countries because it is not cost efficient.
  Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional 
nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor at 
Arak, a type of reactor that would be well-suited for plutonium 
production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which 
endangers not only the region, but the world.
  According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian 
regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number of 
activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a 
small amount of plutonium. This same report noted that Iran's 
deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear 
cycle.
  Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran's nuclear program was 
not for weapons development and could not conclude that it was solely 
for ``peaceful purposes.''
  Iran's most recent breaches of its obligations include failing to 
disclose work on advanced P-2 centrifuges for uranium enrichment and 
work on Polonium 210, an element which could be used in nuclear 
explosions.
  As a result, Iran has forfeited its right to develop a nuclear fuel 
cycle and should immediately and unconditionally cease all nuclear 
enrichment activities.
  H. Con. Res. 398 enumerates a series of steps that should be 
undertaken to, number one, hold the Iranian regime accountable for its 
nuclear program; and, two, establish a clear precedent that such 
proliferation efforts, efforts which clearly threaten international 
peace and security, will not be tolerated. Those who pursue them will 
have to suffer the consequences.

                              {time}  1830

  The Iranian Government needs to think very, very strongly about that.
  Among the demands it places on the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, it urges the IAEA Board of Governors to quickly report the 
Iranian case to the U.N. Security Council for further action, which 
should include steps to prevent Iran from engaging in further 
clandestine nuclear activities. It also urges the U.N. Security Council 
to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT who violate 
their commitments forfeit their rights under this treaty.
  As President Bush said on February 11 of this year, ``Proliferators 
must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the 
material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal 
weapons.''
  Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 calls upon the international community, 
through different venues, to use all appropriate means to deter and 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all 
nuclear cooperation with Iran until certain conditions are met.
  Given the ongoing developments in the political and economic 
relationship of the European Union countries and Iran, the resolution 
calls upon the EU countries to suspend bilateral trade agreements with 
this pariah state until Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased all 
nuclear weapons development efforts. Also, given the severity of Iran's 
proliferation activities and heeding the lessons from Libya, H. Con. 
Res. 398 asks the European Union to go a step further and consider 
sanctions as a means of compelling Iran to comply with these 
international obligations and expressed commitments.
  It calls on governments whose nationals, businesses, and other 
entities are implicated in assisting Iranian nuclear activities to, 
one, fully investigate such a relationship; two, grant full access to 
the IAEA to conduct its own parallel investigations; and, three, 
immediately review and rectify export control regulations and practices 
to prevent further assistance to countries seeking a nuclear weapons 
capacity.
  These are not just in keeping with President Bush's 
counterproliferation initiatives as outlined in February of this year, 
but also affirm the tenets of the U.S.-led resolution adopted by the 
U.N. Security Council just last Wednesday.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 398 reinforces longstanding congressional 
efforts to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the funds to pursue 
and expand their threatening activities, in particular, their 
proliferation activities. It calls on all countries to take steps to 
end investment-related efforts that in some way support Iran's energy 
sector.
  This is particularly relevant given plans announced by Iran on Sunday 
aiming for a six-fold increase in its petrochemical revenues to $20 
billion a year by the year 2015. It is further relevant given, for 
example, the April 25 announcement that French oil giant Total was 
awarded a $1.2 billion contract to develop phase 11 of the massive 
South Pars gas field in Iran.
  H. Con. Res. 398, therefore, also calls for immediate enforcement of 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act with respect to Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would simply like to refer to a recent 
statement made by Iran's so-called moderate leader, Mohammad Khatami, 
while Iran was blocking access to IAEA inspectors. He said Iran ``has 
no obligation toward anybody other than what our interests require.''
  Placing this in further context, I draw my colleagues' attention to 
Iran's display last fall of its newly deployed advanced medium-range 
ballistic missiles which military analysts say could reach Israel or 
U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. Television photographs of the display 
showed one of the missile carriers with a sign that read, ``We will 
stomp on America,'' and that says it all, as far as I am concerned. We 
must stop their nuclear proliferation program.
  A terrorist state like Iran must not, cannot, be allowed to obtain a 
nuclear weapons capability, and we need to do whatever is necessary to 
stop them. Let us send a clear message to Iran, and to all other 
potential proliferators, that we will not tolerate this behavior, we 
will not sit idly by as Iran threatens our Nation, our interests, and 
global security.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to render their strong support to 
this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this important 
resolution, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to the chairman of our committee, 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and to my friend, the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Burton), for their leadership on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, for over a decade, the United States has been trying to 
alert the entire world to Iran's efforts to covertly develop nuclear 
weapons. Finally, the rest of the world seems at least ready to listen. 
Now we must convince them to act.
  For many years, Iran has deceived the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the entire world about the true

[[Page 8488]]

purpose of its supposedly peaceful nuclear energy program. The 
ayatollahs of terrorism have, through the international nuclear black 
market, acquired equipment and facilities to produce nuclear weapons-
grade uranium. As a result of IAEA inspections over the past 15 months, 
we now know that Iran has acquired designs for sophisticated uranium 
enrichment equipment and that Iran has been lying about this for years. 
Iran has even experimented with materials that could be used to 
initiate a nuclear detonation.
  Given that Iran used the same supplier network that provided Libya 
with the blueprint for a nuclear warhead, we must assume that Iran has 
an operable nuclear bomb design.
  Iran is rightly condemned as a state sponsor of terrorism responsible 
for funding numerous terrorist groups that murder and maim innocent 
civilians. Imagine then, Mr. Speaker, this terrorist state armed with 
nuclear weapons.
  This is the threat we face. Iran must not under any circumstances be 
allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. We must keep the pressure on Iran, 
as we did on Libya, to step off this most dangerous path. We must keep 
the pressure on our friends and allies in the European Union and 
elsewhere who mistakenly believe that continued trade and investment 
will somehow cause the ayatollahs to give up their multiyear quest for 
nuclear weapons.
  We must also keep the pressure on the IAEA's Board of Governors to 
again condemn Iran at their June meeting and to formally refer Iran's 
breaches of its safeguards and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
obligations to the United Nations Security Council.
  Mr. Speaker, this resolution also sets a new standard for states to 
have access to technology for peaceful nuclear purposes. It declares 
that Iran, through its repeated and flagrant violations of its 
international obligations, has forfeited the right to be trusted with 
technology that can be misused to produce weapons-grade uranium and 
plutonium.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this resolution and to send a 
message to Iran and the entire world that enough is enough. It is past 
time to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically. A nuclear Iran 
threatens us all. Driven by its extremist ideology, it might attack and 
surely could blackmail our friends in the region. Iran's nuclearization 
would spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We must not 
let that happen.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo), a member of the committee.
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I just want to add my support to this endeavor and this 
resolution. Certainly, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the 
author of the resolution, and the committee itself and the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Burton) have been extremely articulate in laying out 
the points that we should pursue and in encouraging us to bring this 
resolution and have stated, again articulately, why we should support 
it. I want to add to those issues that we have laid out some other 
things that are not specifically identified in the resolution, but I 
think are important for us to consider.
  We must recognize that much of what we know today about Iran and 
certainly what we know about its nuclear production capabilities, and 
not just capabilities, but what they have already done, comes to us not 
as a result of information identified by the international inspection 
regime. It comes to us as a result of the fact that Iranian dissidents 
have, at great risk, made this information available to the West.
  On more than one occasion, these Iranian dissidents have provided us 
with information that we now know to be accurate. It has become 
invaluable in many ways, and they should be credited for what they have 
done. It is also important to note that many of these people who have 
taken refuge in Iraq are under the control and the protection right now 
of American forces over there. It is also I think important to 
understand that Iran, the mullahs in Iran are today demanding that 
these people be returned, forcibly returned to Iran to face certain 
death. It is inconceivable I think that we would agree to such a 
situation, especially in light of the information that they have 
provided and the valuable asset that they in fact are in that part of 
the world.
  We also recognize that much of the difficulty we now face in Iraq is 
a result of Iran's interference, sending people across that border, 
inflaming the passions that we now witness in the form of acts of 
violence against Americans and American troops over there.
  So all of these things, as I say, I am glad they have been said, but 
I just did not want to let this resolution go by without a reference to 
the people who have worked so hard to bring the information forward and 
who have struggled for a long time for a free Iran. They are dedicated 
to that proposition. They are dedicated to a free secular country, a 
democratic country over there, and I think it would be certainly 
heartless, it would be a tragedy if we were to abandon them, if we were 
to actually allow them to be returned to, as I say, certain death in 
that country.
  So I just wanted to add that dimension to this debate. Again, I thank 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lantos), and the committee for bringing this resolution forward.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to my 
friend, the gentleman from the State of Washington (Mr. Baird).
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend and colleague, the 
ranking member of this committee, and the chairman for their 
initiative. I think it is long past time for this Nation to express 
grave concern and work with the international community to thwart 
Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and I applaud them for this 
resolution.
  I do, however, feel compelled to ask an inquiry of the chairman and 
the ranking member, and it is this: we have seen, I believe, a growing 
concern about possible usurpation by the administration of 
congressional authority, particularly in regard to war-making and the 
use of force. I thoroughly intend to support this sound resolution. I 
just would like clarification that the resolution does not, in its 
efforts to rein in the Iranian nuclear program, authorize the President 
to use force.
  I yield to my distinguished ranking member to address this.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding, and I am 
very pleased to respond to his inquiry.
  This resolution is not and cannot be construed to be an authorization 
for the use of force against Iran. It calls upon all of the state 
parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to take all appropriate 
measures to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, including economic sanctions and international pressure.

                              {time}  1845

  The international sanctions on Libya were ultimately successful in 
convincing Colonel Qaddafi to give up all of his programs to develop 
weapons of mass destruction. This is the model that the world community 
needs to pursue with Iraq.
  Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for that clarification. 
I intend to support this most worthy proposal, and I think it is 
important that we establish for the record that this Congress is not 
intending with this legislation to authorize the use of force without 
approval of the Congress.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I speak as the ranking Democrat on the 
subcommittee that deals with terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  I want to clarify of the backgrounds that we face with Iran. First, 
Iran has a large amount of natural gas. This natural gas is flared. 
They do not need to generate electricity with nuclear

[[Page 8489]]

plants. In fact, they can without pollution and at very low costs 
generate electricity using the natural gas that goes to waste under the 
present system.
  Second, we talk here of the Iranian government. That is very 
different from the Iranian people who among all the peoples of the 
Middle East are among those who are most pro-American and, frankly, who 
are not terribly interested in seeing their country acquire nuclear 
weapons. We should remember that weapons of mass destruction is a 
rather vague term that encompasses mustard gas on the one hand and 
nuclear weapons on the other, and we should not be confused.
  Since World War I, I doubt more than a dozen Americans have been 
killed using chemical or biological weapons. And while Saddam killed 
many using mustard gas, he did so against highly unsophisticated 
civilians in a third world situation.
  In contrast, nuclear weapons if used in an American city would kill 
hundreds of thousands of people or millions of people. We can not put 
these in the same category. And let us not think that a missile defense 
system will save us. Iran would like to have intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and the glory of just being able to push a button and see the 
missile fly off. But the government of Iran sees it is as easy to 
smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States as it is to smuggle 
into person or a bale of marijuana. A nuclear weapon is as detectable, 
it is as large as a person.
  Thus, a nuclear weapon created in Iran could be smuggled into any of 
our districts. Keep in mind that the government in Iran has sought 
again and again to kill as many Americans as possible. It is harboring 
top operatives of al Qaeda, including bin Laden's own son. It is 
harboring the individual who caused the bombings in Rihad that killed 7 
Americans. It is responsible for the deaths at Khobar Tower and earlier 
deaths of our people in Saudi Arabia, killing at least 2 dozen 
Americans.
  This is a government in Iran which, if it has nuclear weapons, will 
marry a desire to kill Americans with a capacity to kill us by the 
hundreds of thousands.
  Now, this is a great resolution. But it is only a resolution. What we 
need to do is to marry our desire to rein in the nuclear program with a 
real bill with real teeth. I have introduced to this House, and we have 
quite a number of co-sponsors for the Iran Freedom and Democracy 
Support Act. That Act would provide real money to those working for 
peace and democracy in Iran. That Act would impose real economic 
sanctions and we need to pass this resolution today or tomorrow and 
then go on to deploying real money and real economic sanctions in an 
effort to deal with the Iranian program.
  Look at what happened with Libya. They faced multi-lateral economic 
sanctions and they agreed to abandon their nuclear program. Now, they 
are getting for an investment, they are getting international air 
flights, et cetera. This administration promised us an aggressive 
defense of America. And it has given us only an invasion of Iraq which 
had apparently no weapons of mass destruction at all. North Korea has 3 
years further in developing its nuclear weapons. Iran has proceeded 
virtually unimpeded, and we have not used the tools available to us, 
not to invade but to dissuade.
  We have the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. We used it against Libya. We 
failed again and again to use it and waived it again and again when our 
so-called allies invested billions of dollars in the Iranian oil 
sector.
  Mr. Speaker, just recently we gave a wink and a nod to a $2.8 billion 
Japanese investments in the Iranian oil sector. We have given winks and 
nods as half a billion dollars has gone from the World Bank, 25 percent 
of it is our money, goes to this government that is developing nuclear 
weapons to kill our people, and year after year, we allow $150 million 
worth of caviar and carpets to come into this country providing a 
market to industries controlled by some of the most regressive forces 
in Iran.
  It is time for to us bring real economic sanctions starting with our 
own trade and stopping that $150 million of imports. Then turning to 
our allies and saying enough is enough. If you want to help us, bring 
the economic pressure. Then the people of Iran will recognize that they 
can not allow their leaders to proceed down this nuclear road. That it 
is bad for world stability and bad for their own economy.
  And we are not asking for participation in an invasion. Just for 
strict economic sanctions. We can use our economic power to do it, or 
we can continue the feckless policy that marked our behavior before 
September 11.
  This is a great resolution. We should pass it. It is only a 
resolution. It is time to bring real economic sanctions to bear. 
Otherwise, this resolution will pass. They will laugh at us in Tehran, 
and they will go forward with their nuclear program.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to compliment my colleague on a very fine 
statement.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to thank the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman). And to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Burton), I salute your concern about Iraq's nuclear activities. I join 
you in stating that I do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. 
However, I cannot support this resolution.
  I believe that if Members read the text carefully, they may agree. 
This resolution includes an endorsement I believe of the doctrine of 
preventive war. Preventive war is attacking another country that does 
not pose an imminent threat but which some might argue could pose a 
threat. This is not a legitimate or legal reason for going to war. It 
ends up being an illegal war or war not in self-defense.
  To be specific, the doctrine is, I believe, contained in part 2 of 
the resolution which reads, ``Calls upon all state parties to the 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the United 
States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.'' This clause contains two 
elements of preventive war. The first is a tacit endorsement of regime 
change, ``all appropriate means to prevent Iran.''
  All appropriate means is nearly the same language used in Senate 
Joint Resolution 54, which the Congress passed in 1998. That resolution 
called upon the President to ``take appropriate action to bring Iraq 
into compliance.''
  We did not know then that such language would be construed only 5 
years later to mean that the Congress endorsed regime change in Iraq, 
but that is what the administration construed it to mean.
  Second, I believe this clause envisions unilateral action by the 
United States. It ``calls upon the United States to use all appropriate 
means.'' That means it is a policy of Congress that the United States, 
without necessarily receiving any support from the world community, and 
without the concurrence of the United Nations, could act unilaterally. 
This combination calling on all state parties to use all appropriate 
means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and calling upon 
the United States to use all appropriate means, this combination 
endorses the doctrine of preventive war.
  This country was dragged into war with Iraq based on false statements 
to Congress. Iraq has proved to have been of little threat to the 
United States, but that did not stop the war's authors from going 
forward with the arguments that Iraq could one day be a threat.
  In this historical context, I believe it is vitally important to call 
this to the attention of Congress so that Congress can avoid giving its 
endorsement of what could prove to be an unprovoked attack, unilateral 
regime change again.
  So I oppose this resolution and I ask my colleagues to vote no.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.

[[Page 8490]]

  Mr. Speaker, let me start off by saying you cannot take one section 
of the bill, and I have great respect for the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich). He and I have been colleagues and have worked together on a 
number of bills, and I have a very high regard for him. However, let us 
look at the whole bill and not just one or two phrases in it, because I 
think it clarifies the whole intent of the bill and I think it 
illuminates the concern I think that the gentleman has.
  If we look on page 8 where the gentleman was just talking about, it 
says ``calls upon all state parties to the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, including the United States, to 
use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nuclear and other 
cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use items, until 
Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA 
for the application of safeguards.''
  But then we go over to page 10. Understand section 9 there it says it 
``further calls upon the European Union to consider what further 
measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to persuade Iran to 
fulfill its obligations and commitments to the IAEA.''
  Then you go to page 11, section C, and it says, ``calls on all 
countries to intercede with their commercial entities to ensure that 
these entities refrain from or cease all investment and investment-
related activities that support Iran's energy industry.''
  Go down to line 15 and it says, ``calls upon Russia to suspend 
nuclear cooperation with Iran.''
  The thing that I think will really allay some of the gentleman's 
concerns, on page 12, section 13, it says, ``urges the IAEA Board of 
Governors at its earliest opportunity to report to the United Nations 
Security Council that Iran is in non-compliance with its agreements 
with the IAEA; urges the President of the United States to provide 
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary 
to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear 
activities; urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
international entities to declare that non-nuclear weapons states under 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT, who commit 
violations of their safeguards agreements regarding uranium enrichment 
or plutonium reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support 
a military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the NPT 
to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities.''
  It further states on page 13, and I hope this will allay some of his 
concerns, under section 16, ``further urges the United Nations Security 
Council to consider measures necessary to support the inspection 
efforts by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in 
clandestine nuclear activities; and urges the President to keep the 
Congress fully and currently informed concerning the matters addressed 
in this resolution.''
  I do not think there is anything in there, and the gentleman and I 
are good friends, that would give the President carte blanche to go 
ahead and invade Iran or start a war with them. Although, I think it is 
important that Iran feel a little uncertainty, although I do not think 
this bill does it, a little uncertainty about what might happen if they 
continue this program.

                              {time}  1900

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I want to say that I think that the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Lantos) serve this country well and that there are probably no 
people stronger in defense of America than both of them. I have total 
confidence in that, and I just want to express my appreciation for 
being able to express my misgivings about the language of this bill, 
but I want to thank the gentlemen for the service that they are giving 
in expressing the importance of this.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Before closing, Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to my friend 
from Ohio by saying that it is not the intention of this author of this 
resolution to view this resolution as one authorizing unilateral use of 
force against Iran.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this 
resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of our time.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Before I yield back the balance of my time, I just hope that the 
Iranian leaders realize that when they continue down this path, they 
ultimately not only endanger the entire Middle East and maybe areas 
beyond, and who knows maybe ultimately the United States, but they 
endanger their own security as well; and it would be far better for 
them to start thinking about complying with the U.N. resolutions and 
stopping their nuclear program before there are problems down the road.
  This resolution, as my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Lantos), just said, does not give the President unilateral authority.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, the resolution we are considering today 
directly confronts what may become a clear and present threat to 
American security.
  For 18 years, the government of Iran has hidden information on its 
nuclear program from international inspectors. Iran is a signatory to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a regime which 
is effective only as long as its signatories are fully committed to 
full and complete disclosure of any nuclear program for any purpose. 
The international community has already given Iran the benefit of the 
doubt. With its rich natural resources, the country does not even need 
the atomic energy it claims to be producing for peaceful purposes. Why 
in the world would a country soaked in oil require a nuclear fuel cycle 
and the enriched uranium that goes along with it? Mr. Speaker, it does 
not take a detective to smell a rat on this one.
  This is very serious business. There is no greater nightmare for this 
generation of Americans that the idea of a 9/11-style attack involving 
weapons of mass destruction. Ongoing research into Libya's weapons 
program, which appears to be a model for compliance and disarmament 
among all rogue states, demonstrates that the shadowy network of 
nuclear proliferation is even deeper and more frightening than we had 
previously suspected. Putting our trust in Iran's undemocratic, 
fundamentalist leadership to voluntarily safeguard this technology of 
terror is not an option.
  With this resolution, we demand that Iran honor its stated 
commitments and obligations. The Iranian regime must grant the IAEA 
inspectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the 
investigation of its nuclear activities. And our efforts to secure 
cooperation must be in concert with our European allies and other 
responsible members of the international community. As we learned on 
March 11th of this year, no one in the civilized world is safe from 
terrorism.
  And we must be diligent, earnest, and serious in our message. This 
means that, in the short term, the IAEA must report that Iran is in 
noncompliance with its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty; 
the European Union and other allies in the war on terror must be active 
partners in sanctioning the Iranian regime economically; and the 
President should act to enforce the appropriate provisions of the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.
  Mr. Speaker, American troops have already deposed a regime whose 
cooperation on WMD disclosure was not sufficient. No one should doubt 
our resolve in keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of 
terrorists. We cannot trust the ayatollabs in Tehran to responsibly 
handle technology that could be used against American civilians. If the 
Nonproliferation regime is broken, it must be fixed. Quickly.
  I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, while all of us rightly focused on the 
continuing effort to secure and stabilize Iraq, none of us can close 
our eyes to the ominous and growing danger posed by the government of 
Iran.
  That is why I strongly support this important bipartisan resolution 
brought to the floor today by the chairman and ranking democrat on the 
Committee on International Relations (Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos).

[[Page 8491]]

  This resolution condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's 
continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the international community about its nuclear programs and 
activities.
  For example, Iran failed to properly disclose the existence of a fuel 
enrichment plant and facility at Natanz, until both were revealed by an 
opposition group.
  It confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium conversion 
processes, but only after it denied doing so.
  According to a February report by the director general of the IAEA, 
Iran continues to engage in deception regarding its nuclear activities.
  This resolution also calls on the United States, as well as all state 
parties to the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to use 
(and I quote) ``All appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.''
  The fact is, our national security demands that we do everything in 
our power to prevent Iran from developing and acquiring nuclear 
weapons.
  The Iranian government is hostile to the interests of the United 
States. It is a state sponsor of terrorism.
  It is a committed enemy of the state of Israel, our staunch ally and 
the lone democracy in this most volatile region.
  It is vital that we speak with one voice on this issue of utmost 
gravity. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, Iran has repeatedly denied that it is trying 
to develop nuclear weapons. But it is increasingly difficult to 
conceive of any other plausible explanation for its efforts to enrich 
uranium and develop other nuclear-related capabilities. And even harder 
to understand why else it would try so hard to conceal these activities 
from the international community. As reported by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has failed time and time again to comply 
with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has 
also failed to provide a full disclosure of all nuclear activities to 
the IAEA, and engaged in a pattern of lies and deception.
  Since Iran's covert nuclear program was exposed to the world in 
February 2003, IAEA inspectors have found traces of highly enriched 
uranium, discovered that Iran had reprocessed a small amount of 
plutonium, and forced Iranian officials to reveal critical information 
about advanced centrifuge designs and components. These and other 
revelations about Iran's nuclear program are even more troubling in 
light of Iran's extensive ties to international terrorist 
organizations.
  According to the just-released State Department report on Patterns of 
Global Terrorism, ``Iran remained the most active state sponsor of 
terrorism in 2003.'' The report notes that some members of al-Qaeda 
``have found virtual safehaven'' in Iran, while Iranian authorities 
continue to provide Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and 
other radical terrorist organizations with ``funding, safehaven, 
training, and weapons.''
  Iran also continues an aggressive program to develop ballistic 
missiles. According to the Congressional Research Service, Iran has 
hundreds of short-range missiles, and possibly 10-20 long-range Shahab-
3 missiles, which may be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran has absolutely no need for a nuclear deterrent. 
Over the last two and a half years, we have taken care of Iran's only 
two enemies--the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.
  Nor does Iran--with 7 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 
the second largest natural gas reserves on the planet--have a 
demonstrated need for civilian nuclear power.
  We must continue to make it clear--to our European allies, who have 
generally favored a more conciliatory approach to Iran--and to the 
unelected rulers in Tehran, who continue to lead the Iranian people 
down this perilous path--that we will not sit idly by and allow Iran to 
become a nuclear weapons state.
  This resolution is an important part of that effort, and I urge its 
adoption.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cole). The question is on the motion 
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) that the House 
suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 
398.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of 
those present have voted in the affirmative.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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