[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 7991-7992]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




    H.R. 2239--REPRESENTATIVE HOLT'S VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED 
                           ACCESSIBILITY ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. BARBARA LEE

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 28, 2004

  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to add my voice to the chorus of 
support for my colleague, Rush Holt's, Voter Confidence and Increased 
Accessibility Act of 2003, H.R. 2239.
  As a proud co-sponsor of this important piece of legislation, I 
believe very strongly that we need to ensure a voter-verifiable paper 
audit trail for direct recording electronic voting machines, or touch 
screen machines as they are commonly called, in order to ensure the 
validity of the election process.
  The modernization of voting equipment and the switch to computers 
encouraged by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 has generated 
considerable concern among my constituents that the voting process may 
be subject to manipulation from unknown sources.
  These concerns have been magnified by the complexities involved in 
maintaining the integrity of computer systems, training poll workers in 
proper setup, operation, and troubleshooting, and educating the public 
on the proper operation of these touch screen machines.
  Listening to these concerns and understanding the importance of 
earning the public's trust in these new systems in order to carry out a 
fair election in California, last year our Secretary of State, Kevin 
Shelley, convened an Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force to provide 
recommendations on the best ways to address these issues.
  Based on the discussions and recommendations that grew out of this 
task force, the Secretary of State concluded last November that a voter 
verified paper audit trail should be required on all touch screen 
voting machines used in California.
  Beginning on July 1, 2005, the Secretary of State will require all 
local jurisdictions purchasing new touch screen machines to ensure that 
they contain a voter verified paper audit trail system that is fully 
accessible to all voters, including those living with disabilities and 
those for whom English is a second language.
  Local jurisdictions that are currently using touch screen machines 
without the voter verified paper feature will have until July 1, 2006 
to retrofit or replace them.
  While these actions are certainly a step in the right direction, like 
Mr. Holt, I believe we must accelerate our efforts to ensure that each 
and every touch screen system employs voter verified paper technology 
as soon as possible, and at the very least by the election in November.
  I think the experience in my own district in Alameda County during 
the California primary on March 2nd, is proof enough of why the 
integrity and operation of these touch screen systems must be improved.
  Even before the vote took place on March 2nd, we knew that Alameda 
County would have problems, as the Secretary of State informed us on 
February 13th that our machines did not meet State certification due to 
last minute adjustments sought by the vendor to correct several 
perceived flaws in the system.
  But because the notice from the Secretary of State's office came so 
close to the election, the County felt that it had to conduct the 
election with the existing touch screen system, even with the 
modifications sought by the vendor because without these machines, as 
the Alameda County Registrar indicated in a letter dated February 16th 
to the Secretary, ``there will be thousands of people unable to vote.''
  On February 23rd, following a similar appeal by San Diego County, 
which utilized the same machines, and a subsequent test of the modified 
system, the Secretary of State's office

[[Page 7992]]

provided administrative approval for one-time limited use of these 
devices for the March primary.
  The fact that the voting machines' vendor sought modifications to its 
product at such a late stage just prior to the primary, and the 
position that this vendor placed both the Secretary of State's office, 
and our local registrar in Alameda County is indicative of the evolving 
nature of touch screen systems, and provides even further proof of the 
necessity of a voter verified paper audit to backup the electronic 
systems.
  Of course, that was not the end of the problem with these devices in 
my district. Having conditionally approved the touch screen devices for 
use on primary day, the Secretary of State's office strongly recommend 
to both Alameda and San Diego Counties, that an appropriate backup 
voting system should be put in place in the case of a failure in the 
electronic devices.
  And, sure enough, fail, was just what these devices did.
  Due to a number of technical issues involving the battery system of 
the machines and because of incorrect or insufficient trouble-shooting 
information provided to poll workers by the vendor, many of the touch 
screen systems in Alameda County did not operate properly when polling 
places opened on March 2nd.
  Thankfully the Alameda County Registrar had followed the Secretary of 
State's advice and provided paper provisional ballots in case the touch 
screen systems had failed. So, many voters who went to their polling 
places voted with paper ballots until the County was able to identify 
and correct the technical issues surrounding the touch screen systems.
  However in some cases, polling places ran out of these paper 
provisional ballots before the electronic devices were fixed, and as a 
result some voters were unable to cast a ballot unless they were able 
to return later in the day.
  In addition despite the initial problems with the touch screen 
systems that were overcome, several of these devices also failed for 
other reasons during the course of the day, further undermining their 
reliability.
  I won't even get into the problems that San Diego County experienced 
with these touch screen machines but let me say this.
  Despite all the problems that we experienced with the touch screen 
systems on March 2nd, without the existence of a voter verified paper 
audit trail, we still do not know if any of these touch screen machines 
failed to properly mark and tabulate each individuals vote once they 
were finally put into use.
  That is why the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 
2003 makes sense.
  I applaud my colleague for introducing it, and I urge this body to 
pass this bill so we can ensure that the public has confidence in our 
election process no matter the kind of system that is in place.

                          ____________________