[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 5925-5929]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
    REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES--TREATY DOCUMENT 107-7

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 16, Treaty Document No. 
107-70, on today's Executive Calendar.
  I further ask that the treaty be considered as having passed through 
its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation 
of the resolution of ratification; further, that the committee 
conditions and understandings be agreed to, that any statements be 
printed in the Congressional Record as if read, and that the Senate 
immediately proceed to a vote on the resolution of ratification; 
further, that when the resolution of ratification is voted upon, the 
motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, the President be notified 
of the Senate's action, and that following the disposition of the 
treaty, the Senate return to legislative session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered. The treaty will be considered to 
have passed through the various parliamentary stages up to and 
including the presentation of the resolution of ratification.
  The resolution of ratification reads as follows:

      [(Treaty Doc. 107-7)  The Protocol to the Agreement of the 
 International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United 
            States, with 2 conditions and 8 understandings;]

       Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),

     SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS 
                   AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United 
     States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 
     America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. 
     Doc. 107-7) subject to the conditions in section 2 and the 
     understandings in section 3.

     SEC. 2. CONDITIONS

       The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is 
     subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding 
     upon the President:
       (1) Certifications regarding the national security 
     exclusion, managed access, and declared locations.--Prior to 
     the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, 
     the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional 
     Committees that, not later than 180 days after the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification--
       (A) all necessary regulations will be promulgated and will 
     be in force regarding the use of the National Security 
     Exclusion under Article 1.b of the Additional Protocol, and 
     that such regulations shall be made in accordance with the 
     principles developed for the application of the National 
     Security Exclusion;
       (B) the managed access provisions of Articles 7 and 1.c of 
     the Additional Protocol shall be implemented in accordance 
     with the appropriate and necessary inter-agency guidance and 
     regulation regarding such access; and
       (C) the necessary security and counter-intelligence 
     training and preparation will have been completed for any 
     declared locations of direct national security significance.
       (2) Certification regarding site vulnerability 
     assessments.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to 
     the appropriate congressional Committees that the necessary 
     site vulnerability assessments regarding activities, 
     locations, and information of direct national security 
     significance to the United States will be completed not later 
     than 180 days after the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification for the initial United States 
     declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (in 
     this resolution referred to as the ``Agency'') under the 
     Additional Protocol.

     SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDINGS.

       The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is 
     subject to the following understandings:
       (1) Implementation of additional protocol.--Implemenation 
     of the Additional Protocol will conform to the principles set 
     forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United States 
     Permanent Representatives to the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the 
     Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (2) Notification to congress of added and deleted 
     locations.--
       (A) Added locations.--The President shall notify the 
     appropriate congressional Committees in advance of declaring 
     to the Agency any addition to the lists of locations within 
     the United States pursuant to Article 2.a(i), Article 
     2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 
     2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the 
     Additional Protocol, together with a certification that such 
     addition will not adversely affect the national security of 
     the United States. During the ensuing 60 days, Congress may 
     disapprove an addition to the lists by joint resolution for 
     reasons of direct national security significance, under 
     procedures identical to those provided for the consideration 
     of resolutions under section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159).
       (B) Deleted locations.--The President shall notify the 
     appropriate congressional Committees of any deletion from the 
     lists of locations within the United States previously 
     declared to the Agency pursuant to Article 2.a.(i), Article 
     2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 
     2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the 
     Additional Protocol that is due to such location having a 
     direct national security significance, together with an 
     explanation of such deletion, as soon as possible prior to 
     providing the Agency information regarding such deletion.
       (3) Protection of classified information.--The Additional 
     Protocol will not be construed to require the provision, in 
     any manner, to the Agency of ``Restricted Data'' controlled 
     by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
       (4) Protection of confidential information.--Should the 
     President make a determination that persuasive information is 
     available indicating that--
       (A) an officer or employee of the Agency has willfully 
     published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in any manner 
     or to any extent contrary to the Agreement between the United 
     States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 
     America and the Additional Protocol, any United States 
     confidential business information coming to him or her in the 
     course of his or her official duties relating to the 
     implementation of the Additional Protocol, or by reason of 
     any examination or investigation of any return, report, or 
     record made to or filed with the Agency, or any officer or 
     employee thereof, in relation to the Additional Protocol; and
       (B) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial 
     losses or damages to a United States person;

     the President shall, not later than 30 days after the receipt 
     of such information by the executive branch of the United 
     States Government, notify the appropriate congressional 
     Committees in writing of such determination.
       (5) Report on consultations on adoption of additional 
     protocols in non-nuclear weapon states.--Not later than 180 
     days after entry into force of the Additional Protocol, and 
     annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional Committees a report on measures 
     that have been taken or ought to be taken to achieve the 
     adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
     agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states party to the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (6) Report on united states assistance to the agency for 
     the purpose of additional protocol implementation and 
     verification of the obligations of non-nuclear weapon 
     states.--Not later than 180 days after the entry into force 
     of the Additional Protocol, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate

[[Page 5926]]

     congressional Committees a report detailing the assistance 
     provided by the United States to the Agency in order to 
     promote the effective implementation of additional protocols 
     to safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states 
     party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
     verification of the compliance of such parties with Agency 
     obligations.
       (7) Subsidiary arrangements and amendments.--
       (A) The subsidiary arrangement.--The Subsidiary Arrangement 
     to the Additional Protocol between the United States and the 
     Agency, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998 contains an 
     illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of accepted United 
     States managed access measures.
       (B) Notification of additional subsidiary arrangements and 
     amendments.--The President shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional Committees not later than 30 days after--
       (i) agreeing to any subsidiary arrangement with the Agency 
     under Article 13 of the Additional Protocol; and
       (ii) the adoption by the Agency Board of Governors of any 
     amendment to its Annexes under Article 16.b.
       (8) Amendments.--Amendments to the Additional Protocol will 
     take effect for the United States in accordance with the 
     requirements of the United States Constitution as the United 
     States determines them.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       In this resolution:
       (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'' 
     means the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the 
     United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for 
     the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 
     America, with Annexes and a Subsidiary Agreement, signed at 
     Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (3) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 
     1970.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today the Senate considers the Additional 
Protocol to the Agreement between the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Regarding Safeguards in the 
United States.
  Last February, at the National Defense University, President Bush 
called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol, and today, 
I am pleased to bring this resolution of ratification to the floor on 
behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  The United States signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna on June 
12, 1998, and President Bush submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002. 
The State Department submitted the implementing legislation to Congress 
on November 19, 2003. At the administration's request, I introduced the 
implementing legislation in the Senate last December.
  Since Senate ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 
the NPT, in 1969, and our Voluntary Offer to accept IAEA safeguards in 
1980, 188 states have now approved the NPT. The NPT and the IAEA's 
existing safeguards agreements sufficed to forestall nuclear weapons 
programs in the world's advanced industrial states, several of which 
were weighing the nuclear option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, the NPT 
and the IAEA's existing safeguards agreements have been insufficient to 
prevent the diversion of resources in Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
determined to cheat. At the same time, we have witnessed an increase in 
the global availability of nuclear weapons materials, reprocessing and 
enrichment technologies. To ensure that materials and technologies are 
devoted only to peaceful uses, it is in the interest of the United 
States that the IAEA have the power to conduct intrusive inspections 
and verify imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment in 
states suspected of diverting resources to a weapons program. The 
Additional Protocol, when universally ratified and implemented by all 
member states of the IAEA, will not solve all of our proliferation 
problems, but Senate ratification will further ensure that U.S. efforts 
to persuade all member states to adopt the Additional Protocol will be 
supported by concrete U.S. action.
  When the NPT was constructed, in order to gain its acceptance by 
states without weapons or complete fuel cycles, the world allowed for 
peaceful uses of the atom by states who forswore weapons. This was an 
outgrowth of the U.S. ``Atoms for Peace Program.'' Thus, Article IV of 
the NPT states:

       Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting 
     the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
     develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
     peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity 
     with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

  Those last words, ``in conformity with Article I and II of this 
Treaty,'' are key in our consideration of the Additional Protocol. Non-
Nuclear Weapon States under Article II of the NPT are obliged not to 
undertake any steps toward development of a weapon, and in so doing, 
secure their right to peaceful uses of the atom; peaceful uses verified 
by the IAEA under safeguards. When the Committee on Foreign Relations 
reported the NPT to the Senate in 1968, it did so with some 
reservations concerning this safeguards system. As the committee report 
noted:

       [T]he implementation of the treaty raises uncertainties. 
     The reliability and thereby the credibility of international 
     safeguards systems is still to be determined. No completely 
     satisfactory answer was given to the Committee on the 
     effectiveness of the safeguards systems envisioned under the 
     treaty. But [the Committee] is equally convinced that when 
     the possible problems in reaching satisfactory safeguards 
     agreements are carefully weighed against the potential for a 
     worldwide mandatory safeguards system, the comparison argues 
     strongly for the present language of the treaty.

  Today, many have come to the realization that the existing framework 
of the NPT, as verified by status quo safeguards, is unable to provide 
adequate verification of Non-Nuclear Weapon States' obligations and 
alert the world community to broken commitments to the IAEA and under 
the NPT.
  I believe that acting today to ratify the Additional Protocol will 
put us back on the right track, a track toward complete verification 
and effective enforcement of Article II.
  In 2003, the international community was confronted with two cases 
involving declared Non-Nuclear Weapon States violating their 
commitments under the NPT by pursuing nuclear weapon programs.
  Iran's clandestine drive toward a nuclear weapons capability was 
partly exposed by an Iranian resistance group and confirmed by the 
IAEA. Then, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom concluded separate 
negotiations with Tehran in which the regime agreed to abandon its 
uranium enrichment program and to cease all efforts to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Iran signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA last 
December. In January, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi appeared to 
hedge on Iran's commitment by suggesting that Tehran had agreed ``to 
the suspension, not stopping, of the uranium enrichment process.'' 
Then, last February, in his latest report on Iran, IAEA Director 
General ElBaradei noted that inspectors had found in Iran technical 
designs for so-called ``P-2'' centrifuges similar to those the Agency 
discovered in Libya, designs not declared to the IAEA. Iran has also 
failed to declare a pilot uranium enrichment facility, importation of 
many nuclear fuel cycle components, and experiments with plutonium 
separation.
  Lastly, with regard to Iran, there are extremely disturbing press 
accounts of inspectors finding traces of highly enriched Uranium-235, 
which could have but one use, in a nuclear weapon. The United States 
has made no secret of our view that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
  In Libya, we witnessed an important nonproliferation success. 
Following intense negotiations with the Bush administration and the 
United Kingdom, Libya admitted that it had WMD programs and agreed to 
abandon these efforts and work with international treaty regimes to 
verify Libya's commitment. I applaud President Bush and his team for a 
victory in the war against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Through our experience in Libya, we have learned of the 
extent of the nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan's ``father 
of the bomb,''

[[Page 5927]]

A.Q. Khan. Similarly, we have also seen the dangers posed by exports of 
sensitive technologies by many European and Asian countries that 
contributed to Libya's nuclear weapons program. It is important to note 
in this regard how the Additional Protocol incorporates and provides 
for reporting on the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, NSG, Trigger List items 
in Annex II as well as uranium mining, enrichment and reactor 
activities in Annex I.
  Events in Iran and Libya are important to our consideration of the 
Additional Protocol. In 1980, the Senate ratified the U.S. commitment 
to voluntarily accept safeguards to demonstrate a firm commitment to 
the IAEA and to the NPT. As a Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, 
the United States is not required to accept any safeguards. Our 
decision sent an important message to the world: the preeminent 
superpower, with a large civilian nuclear power industry, could accept 
IAEA safeguards.
  The Additional Protocol seeks to fill holes in the existing patchwork 
of declarations and inspections. It will require the declaration of 
many locations and activities to the IAEA not previously required, and 
allow, with less than 24 hours' notice, inspections of such locations.
  The United States, as a declared Nuclear Weapon State party to the 
NPT, may exclude the application of IAEA safeguards on its activities. 
Under the Additional Protocol, the United States also has the right to 
exclude activities and sites of direct national security significance 
in accordance with its National Security Exclusion contained in Article 
1.b. This provision is crucial to U.S. acceptance of the Additional 
Protocol and provides the basis for the protection of U.S. nuclear 
weapons-related activities, sites, and materials as a declared nuclear 
power.
  The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or 
disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are 
increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in 
the United States, the administration has assured the Committee on 
Foreign Relations that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in the 
United States is very low. Nevertheless, should an inspection under the 
Additional Protocol be determined to be potentially harmful to U.S. 
national security, the United States has the right, through the 
National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection.
  For the past 9 months, the majority and minority staffs of the 
committee have been working closely with the administration to craft a 
resolution of ratification that will gain broad support in the Senate. 
On January 29, the committee held a hearing with administration 
witnesses. On March 4, the resolution of ratification before the Senate 
today was approved at a committee business meeting by a vote of 19 to 
0. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for their cooperation in this 
effort. I am pleased to inform all Members that the administration 
fully supports the committee's recommended resolution of ratification, 
without changes.
  In sum, I believe the Additional Protocol is necessary to further 
ensure effective verification and enforcement of the Article II 
obligations of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Continued enjoyment of 
Article IV rights should come only with an increase in our ability to 
verify compliance with obligations to the IAEA and under the NPT. I do 
not believe that the Additional Protocol will be a burden for the 
United States, given that our ratification and implementation of the 
Protocol does not constitute a statement about U.S. adherence to 
nonproliferation commitments, but rather as a demonstration of our 
continued leadership in furtherance of the nonproliferation objectives 
contained in it. It is a first step toward realization of the 
objectives set forth by President Bush last February.
  I urge my colleagues to support the committee's resolution of 
ratification and to ratify the Additional Protocol.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to recommend that the 
United States Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the 
Additional Safeguards Protocol between the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Ratification of the 
Additional Protocol will make a real contribution to U.S. nuclear non-
proliferation efforts, and it will do so without putting at risk any 
sensitive national security information.
  As my colleagues surely know, the Additional Protocol is an outgrowth 
of the world's discovery in 1991 that Iraq had come perilously close to 
developing a nuclear weapon, without the IAEA realizing it. One reason 
for Iraq's near-success was that the IAEA was allowed to inspect only 
those facilities that Iraq declared to it. If a uranium enrichment 
facility was across the hall from a declared facility--and in some 
cases it was about that bad--the IAEA had no mandate to inspect it. We, 
the world, and the IAEA itself realized that a revised safeguards 
regime was needed.
  The Additional Protocol that was developed to address this concern 
requires a signatory to provide yearly reports covering more nuclear 
facilities than those included in the declarations required by the so-
called ``comprehensive'' safeguards agreements that have defined the 
IAEA's role in recent decades. It also allows the IAEA to inspect non-
declared facilities, if the organization believes that illegal nuclear 
activities may be taking place there. This is a significant expansion 
of IAEA inspection rights, and it's something that the United States 
rightly wants to be adopted by all the non-nuclear weapons states under 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT).
  The United States, as a recognized nuclear weapons state under the 
NPT, is not required to provide information to the IAEA or to accept 
IAEA inspections. In 1967, however, when the NPT was being negotiated, 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson announced that the United States would 
voluntarily submit to safeguards on nuclear materials. He did this to 
assuage the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states that feared that the 
five nuclear weapons states would otherwise enjoy an unfair commercial 
advantage regarding their nuclear power industries. Accordingly, a 
U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement, also known as the ``Voluntary Offer,'' 
has been in place since 1980. Truth be told, this Voluntary Offer is 
more symbolic than real; until 1994, the IAEA only applied safeguards 
to two commercial power reactors and two fuel fabrication facilities in 
the United States, from a list of 250 eligible facilities. In recent 
years, it has inspected only sites for which the United States 
requested inspections, like the site where we store the highly enriched 
uranium we removed from Kazakhstan.
  Our willingness to accept IAEA safeguards helped to secure the 
world's agreement to the NPT. Similarly, our stated willingness to 
accept the Additional Protocol was crucial to gaining the world's 
agreement, in 1995, to the indefinite extension of the NPT. And our 
ratification of the Additional Protocol will strengthen our ability to 
convince more non-nuclear weapons states to sign their own additional 
protocols.
  When the Additional Protocol enters into force, the United States 
will submit additional information on civil nuclear facilities on an 
annual basis and identify additional civilian facilities, a small 
number of which might someday be inspected. All implementation 
activities under the Additional Protocol will be subject to a 
``National Security Exclusion,'' however, that will allow our 
Government to exclude the application of the Additional Protocol 
wherever it would result in ``access by the Agency to activities with 
direct national security significance to the United States or to 
locations or information associated with such activities.'' Just as 
under the Voluntary Offer, the United States will retain the trump card 
of not declaring a facility, not submitting certain information, or 
denying or halting an inspection if our national security interests 
come into play. If we decide to permit an IAEA inspection, we will also 
have the right to employ ``managed access'' to protect national 
security information. (All countries will have the right to use managed 
access to protect confidential

[[Page 5928]]

business information; because the United States is a recognized nuclear 
weapons state, we will have the right to use managed access more 
broadly.)
  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has looked carefully at how 
our special rights would be invoked and whether sensitive facilities 
will be prepared to accept an IAEA inspection if the President or the 
interagency process decides to permit that inspection. We are satisfied 
that a Federal agency with a legitimate national security concern will 
have no difficulty ensuring that sensitive information is protected.
  The resolution of ratification that the Committee recommends will 
ensure that the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol does not enter into force 
until the President certifies that all the necessary regulations will 
be in place and all the necessary site vulnerability assessments will 
have been completed within 180 days of entry into force. (No reporting 
to the IAEA is required until 180 days after entry into force, so no 
inspections of newly-declared facilities would occur before then.) The 
resolution of ratification also addresses the protection of classified 
and proprietary information, the addition or deletion of locations from 
U.S. reports to the IAEA, U.S. intent to use its special rights as a 
nuclear weapons state under the NPT, and the adoption of subsidiary 
arrangements or amendments under the Additional Protocol. In short, the 
Committee has covered all the bases to ensure that adoption of the 
Additional Protocol will support our nuclear non-proliferation policy 
without endangering sensitive national security information.
  The resolution of ratification also calls for annual reports on U.S. 
efforts to get all the non-nuclear weapon states to adopt additional 
protocols and on U.S. help to the IAEA to conduct effective 
inspections. Those are important efforts that every member of this body 
should support. For all the difficulties it faces in gaining access to 
sites of concern, the IAEA has shown a real determination to get into 
those sites. Getting more states to sign and implement additional 
protocols will help the IAEA to gain that access. And once they get in, 
IAEA inspectors have shown a real ability to uncover information that 
rogue states thought they had concealed. But they are vitally dependent 
upon member states--and especially the United States--for the equipment 
and training that enable them to know what to look for and how to 
detect it in a manner that is scientifically valid, maximizes detection 
capabilities, and preserves a chain of custody so as to leave no doubt 
about the validity of their analysis.
  U.S. ratification of our Additional Protocol is only one step among 
many that are needed to make nuclear non-proliferation work. Even to 
bring the Additional Protocol into force, we will then need to enact 
implementing legislation; the Executive branch will then have to 
promulgate appropriate regulations; and preparations for possible IAEA 
inspections will have to be completed.
  In addition, the United States must marshal all its foreign policy 
tools to move states of concern away from nuclear weapons and to foster 
further international cooperation on non-proliferation. Some good work 
has been done in recent months. Libya signed an agreement with the 
United States and the United Kingdom to give up its weapons of mass 
destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative was created and cooperating states 
agreed to coordinate their interdiction efforts while adhering to 
international law. The permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council agreed on a draft resolution to bar proliferation to non-state 
entities.
  At the same time, however, much remains to be done. For example, 
North Korea continues to move toward having a large enough nuclear 
arsenal that it might contemplate using it, or even selling or giving 
away some of its nuclear weapons or fissile material. Meanwhile, 
although we have engaged in six-party talks that included North Korea, 
both we and the North Koreans have yet to give our negotiators the 
authority to get down to business and discuss a phased agreement under 
which North Korea would gradually dismantle all its nuclear weapons and 
long-range ballistic missile programs, in return for various security 
assurances and diplomatic or economic benefits. So nothing significant 
has yet been achieved on the diplomatic front, while the clock keeps 
ticking on the nuclear weapons front. And we face the risk that South 
Korea, a crucial player on this issue, will develop a policy that is at 
odds with ours.
  The situation regarding Iran is also difficult, although much has 
been achieved in the last year. Exposure of Iran's two decades of lying 
and deception regarding its nuclear activities has led Iran to sign the 
Additional Protocol and to permit IAEA inspections that have proven 
quite embarrassing to Iran. Pursuant to an agreement with the foreign 
ministers of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Iran has also 
agreed to suspend all its uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
activities. Iran has tried to backtrack on its commitments, and I 
personally have no confidence that Iran has come clean on its nuclear 
weapons efforts. So we must continue to press Iran to realize that its 
national interest will best be served by rejecting nuclear weapons. We 
must work to maintain solidarity with our European allies, with the 
Russian Federation, with Japan, and with the IAEA to send the message 
that Iran's real choice is between international acceptance and world 
rejection. I don't think that Iran wants to become another North Korea. 
We must make clear that the path of nuclear weapons can lead only to 
such a fate, and also that the path of non-proliferation will lead to a 
better future for Iran and all of its people.
  We must also work to make the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime still more effective. One element of the NPT is a promise to 
non-nuclear weapons states that, in return for forswearing nuclear 
weapons, they will enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. 
That bargain has become frayed. Iran, Iraq and North Korea have all 
used their ostensibly civilian facilities to mask covert weapons 
programs.
  In Iran and North Korea, we were at least able to sound the alarm. 
Both states had secret efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium and were caught. In Iraq, however, absent the 
Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein might have obtained highly enriched 
uranium without anybody realizing it.
  A smarter state, using a civilian program as the rationale, could 
build uranium enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing cells, and 
the like--and properly report these efforts to the IAEA. It could 
acquire weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, and place 
the material under IAEA safeguards. In other words, it could become a 
potential nuclear weapons power without violating safeguards. Then it 
could withdraw from the NPT, and develop and assemble nuclear weapons 
in a short time.
  That's the challenge we need to address. How do we counter not just 
states that do things in a ham-handed manner, but states that 
skillfully exploit the loopholes of the NPT? The Additional Protocol 
can help make it much harder to hide a covert nuclear program, if we 
persuade the rest of the world to sign such protocols as well. But how 
can we combat the ``breakout'' scenario?
  One idea gaining currency is to allow non-nuclear weapons states to 
continue to possess civilian nuclear programs, but not a closed nuclear 
fuel cycle. A state could have civilian nuclear reactors to produce 
electrical power, but must import the nuclear reactor fuel and return 
any spent fuel. This would ensure that a state did not obtain fissile 
material needed for a nuclear weapon.
  IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei would allow only 
multinational facilities to produce and process nuclear fuels, and give 
legitimate end-users assured access to these fuels at reasonable rates. 
Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Dr. William Perry recently endorsed this 
proposal, adding that states that refuse this bargain should

[[Page 5929]]

be subject to sanctions. President Bush has not endorsed multinational 
facilities, but called upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 
refuse to export enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state 
that does not already possess full scale enrichment and reprocessing 
plants.
  Any agreement on revising the nuclear non-proliferation regime will 
be difficult to achieve. Non-nuclear weapons states will ask what they 
will get for surrendering a well established right. States with nuclear 
fuel industries may worry that they will go out of business if only a 
few multinational facilities are allowed to operate enrichment and 
reprocessing activities. But the United States and other concerned 
states should set a goal of reaching a consensus in time for next 
year's NPT Review Conference. We have a window of opportunity, and we 
should use it.
  There is another bargain central to the NPT, one that this 
administration largely prefers to ignore. In return for forswearing 
nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states received a commitment from 
the five permanent nuclear powers, reaffirmed as recently as 2000, to 
seek eventual nuclear disarmament.
  Nobody, including me, expects the United States to give up its 
nuclear deterrent any time in the foreseeable future. But the 
administration's drive to research and possibly produce new nuclear 
weapons--including low-yield nukes--is a step in the wrong direction. 
It signals to the rest of the world that even the preeminent global 
power needs new nuclear weapons to assure its own security.
  The administration threatens to take another backward step on a 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. An FMCT has been a U.S. objective for 
eight years, and this administration castigated other countries for 
preventing negotiations from starting. Now that there is a chance of 
success, however, the administration says that we may refuse to 
negotiate. This only undermines solidarity with our allies, which have 
worked for years to help us convince other countries to negotiate.
  For all the flaws of the NPT, it is an essential treaty. It has been 
vital to encouraging states like Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South 
Africa, Brazil and Argentina to end their nuclear weapons programs. The 
United States must work to improve the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, and it must also do all that it can to abide by the bargains 
between the nuclear ``haves'' and the nuclear ``have nots'' that 
underlie world willingness to eschew the most awesome and awful weapons 
mankind has ever invented.
  In conclusion, I want to congratulate and thank my chairman, Senator 
Dick Lugar, for his fine leadership in bringing this resolution of 
ratification to fruition. It was not an easy task, and he demonstrated 
exceptional leadership. I am grateful also to our staffs, especially 
Ken Myers, III and Thomas Moore on the majority side, and Edward Levine 
and Jofi Joseph on the Democratic side. Finally, I want to commend the 
interagency committee that worked with us, and especially Ms. Susan 
Koch of the National Security Council staff. She is a real 
professional, and we would not have gotten to this day without her.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask for a division vote on the resolution 
of ratification.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. A division vote is requested. 
Senators in favor of the resolution of ratification will rise and stand 
until counted.
  Those opposed will rise and stand until counted.
  On a division vote, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted 
in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

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