[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5221-5223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         A STEW POT OF TROUBLE

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I think we have a bubbling stew pot of 
trouble brewing in Afghanistan, and we need to take stronger action 
action requested by President Karzai, by the way--soon, or much of our 
effort to root out lawlessness in Afghanistan may be undercut.
  What am I talking about? Narcotics--particularly about the 
significant increase in opium production and trafficking in 
Afghanistan. I am not challenging the significant progress

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which has been made in the past 2 years. Removing the Taliban and 
preparing the groundwork for a democratically elected government is no 
small feat. Working with our allies, we have gathered all of the right 
ingredients together to build a new Afghanistan that will benefit 
everyone--particularly the people of Afghanistan. But the outcome is 
far from certain, and it doesn't seem as if we are paying enough 
attention to the danger signs.
  According to the latest International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, released by the State Department at the beginning of this 
month, Afghanistan had the potential to produce 2,865 metric tons of 
opium in 2003. This represents almost two-thirds of the total potential 
opium production in the world. We know the havoc that drug use creates 
in a society. We know the corruption that drug trafficking encourages 
whereever it occurs. Experience has shown us that ignoring drug 
production and trafficking has only made things worse. These factors 
alone should be a reason for concern.
  We should also be concerned about who is profiting from this 
resurgence. The difference between what the Afghan farmer is getting 
and what an eightball of heroin is worth on the streets of Paris is 
astronomical. And I am certain those reaping this enormous profit are 
not the same individuals who support the Karzai government, or who are 
happy to see coalition troops there.
  The profits and instability that follow drug production wherever it 
occurs should be raising alarms for everyone involved. What is most 
worrisome, however, is we have seen these ingredients thrown together 
before, in Colombia. We can go down that same road, or we can take 
action now, before events boil over into chaos.
  Earlier this week I spoke on this floor about the connections between 
drug trafficking and terrorism. The clearest nexus between drug 
trafficking and terrorism is in Colombia, where there are three major 
terrorist organizations using drugs to fund their efforts to overthrow 
the government.
  The State Department has designated these three groups, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, the National Liberation 
Army, ELN, and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, AUC, as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. But these terrorist organizations 
began with more ideological roots, and more localized objectives.
  Together, these three terrorist organizations have killed thousands 
of innocents. Three American civilians are currently being held hostage 
by the FARC, and have not been allowed any contact with the outside 
world for over a year.
  For nearly 40 years the FARC have been pressing a pro-Marxist 
ideology. Similarly, the ELN held a more Maoist philosophy, but also 
strove for the same revolutionary objective. Initially these efforts 
were supported by donations from both the Soviet Union and Cuba. But 
that support ended with the fall of the Soviet Union.
  While not as old, the AUC began as a series of para-military groups 
initially funded by the wealthy landlords in Colombia. These groups, 
initially endorsed by the government, were created because the 
government was unable to protect these rural landlords from attacks by 
the guerrillas.
  But the end of the cold war did not mean an end to the guerrilla 
activities in Colombia. Instead, all three of these organizations were 
able to turn to the narcotics trade for funding. Because of this, their 
membership and the violence associated with each of these organizations 
has increased dramatically. It is now estimated that these groups 
receive a significant portion of their operating revenues from 
narcotics.
  With that move, much of the ideology and even the pretense of being a 
guerrilla group disappeared as well. At first, they just provided 
security and other support to the drug lords and were paid for their 
services. But that was not enough.
  Today we know that both the AUC and the FARC fight each other for 
access to the best smuggling routes into and out of Colombia. They 
fight the government to protect their drug production and 
transportation networks. They have also begun reaching out to foreign 
terrorist organizations as well, using narcotics as currency in 
exchange for guns and training.
  Until recently, these terrorist organizations were able to move 
freely throughout a significant portion of rural Colombia, forcing the 
displacement of millions of Colombians as they battled the government 
and each other over drugs and politics. Only after coming to the 
conclusion that both drug trafficking and terrorism must be addressed 
equally has there been progress in restoring the control of Colombia to 
the legitimate government.
  Fast forward to Afghanistan. Like the FARC, there are groups within 
Afghanistan, primarily operating in the remote areas of the country, 
who for ideological reasons would like to overthrow the government. The 
Taliban is perhaps the best known, but there are others as well. 
Numerous warlords also operate throughout the countryside, some whom 
have even had the blessing of the government.
  The Taliban, like the FARC after the fall of the Soviet Union, need 
to secure an alternative means of financing their operations if they 
are to survive. Our success in choking off their traditional funding 
sources has created this necessity. Opium--like coca for the FARC--is 
an easy, local, and available opportunity to do exactly that, and will 
not be a new source of revenue for the Taliban. While the Taliban 
banned opium production for a period of time when they controlled 
Afghanistan, they also taxed the trafficking and resulting profits from 
the sale of stored opium after the ban.
  Add to this equation some of the many warlords that control various 
areas of Afghanistan. Some of these warlords even worked with coalition 
forces to oust the Taliban. But most have no intention of surrendering 
any of their power or authority to the central government in Kabul, 
preferring to fight for their own fiefdoms.
  They have no interest in enforcing edicts from Kabul, or in taking 
any action that might give the central government additional 
legitimacy. Profits from opium production and trafficking are a key 
method for continuing to fund their war clan.
  These efforts are not as blatant or as well organized as what we have 
in Colombia today, but the ingredients are there. It is time we start 
connecting the dots.
  Today, several thousand U.S. and coalition soldiers are hunting down 
terrorists. These terrorists are receiving physical and financial 
support from somewhere. Meanwhile, the Karzai government is working 
furiously to establish the police, judicial, and military systems 
necessary to ensure that the people of Afghanistan can equitably govern 
themselves. But they must overcome the chaos created by 20 years of 
occupation and civil war. The last thing that they need is a well 
funded rebellion in their backyard.
  The Karzai government recognizes the dangers posed by bumper crops of 
opium. They know the profits being generated by this drug production go 
not to the Afghani people, but to the few powerful enough to move the 
opium out of Afghanistan. These drug traffickers flourish in the same 
kind of lawless environment where terrorists train.
  We need to start connecting the dots. We cannot continue to separate 
terrorism and narco-trafficking. I fear that if the United States 
narcotics policy in Afghanistan does not catch up to that of the Karzai 
government, we will be facing the same mess that we are working to 
clean up in Colombia. We have watched this pot before. We need to begin 
looking at our options now, before it boils over and we have a real 
mess.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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