[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5175-5176]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            WAR ON TERRORISM

  Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I rise today to discuss the war on 
terrorism and the situation in Iraq on the 1-year anniversary of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  I had the honor and privilege of traveling to Iraq and Afghanistan 
over the recent recess to visit our troops. I had the similar honor of 
visiting them in the medical center at Ramstein, Germany.
  I report to my colleagues the troops with whom I met were in good 
spirits. They are, of course, eager to return home to their loved ones, 
but they are also proud of the work they are doing to stabilize Iraq 
and assist the Iraqi people in building a democratic state. I was proud 
of them, proud of the leadership of our military, and proud of all the 
troops there.
  As a veteran of World War II, I was proud to see in the troops the 
same dedication to duty, mission, and country I remember so well from 
my own comrades in arms. In Ramstein, I was impressed with the 
wonderful support our wounded were receiving from the medical staff, 
and I was equally impressed with the eagerness our wounded expressed to 
return to the sides of their comrades. In that eagerness to rejoin 
their units, they shared a bond with all their past brothers in 
uniform.
  In Iraq, I visited the newly deployed Stryker brigade in Mosul. This 
unit is demonstrating in the field for the first time a powerful new 
capability. But it has also been given the difficult objective of 
patrolling a large area. They are still waiting for Iraqi forces to be 
trained and adequately equipped to supplement their effort. Clearly, 
one reason why the security situation still remains so tenuous is the 
failure to train and field sufficient Iraqi security forces. But the 
apparent ambush of two American civilians recently by Iraqi police 
indicates even some of the newly deployed security forces cannot be 
trusted.
  According to the Coalition Provisional Authority, or CPA, we are only 
about 30,000 short of the approximately 236,000 security forces planned 
for Iraq. This may be so in terms of absolute numbers, but it is not a 
reflection of how well equipped they are, how well trained they are, 
and how well led they are.
  For example, the CPA carries about 60,000 police on payroll, but only 
2,300 of those have been fully qualified. Prior to the war, the Iraqi 
police had a well-deserved reputation for being corrupt. Reports 
continue to indicate this remains a problem and, as I mentioned, there 
are indications the security forces have been infiltrated by 
terrorists. At the same time, many of the honest policemen are being 
targeted by terrorists. On Tuesday, 11 were killed in an ambush. So one 
should view numbers with a healthy skepticism and focus on quality.

[[Page 5176]]

  I also had the opportunity to visit Balad, about 25 miles north of 
Baghdad. This will become the future center of air operations in Iraq, 
and we are now preparing a major airbase to service American troops for 
the next 3 to 5 years.
  Elsewhere, there is the intent to move American troops out of Baghdad 
and consolidate forces in fewer installations on the periphery, thus 
reducing the visibility of the American footprint. This is going to be 
a very delicate maneuver. Reducing the American presence in Baghdad has 
to be balanced by an increase in the effectiveness of Iraqi security 
forces inside the city. We could run the risk of having that city of 
about 6 million become an even safer haven for terrorists while we 
hunker down in bases on the outskirts.
  It also means we are planning for an extended stay in Iraq. While the 
administration indicates 33 countries are now contributing troops to 
Iraq, the bulk of the troops is American, and unless there is a change 
in strategy by the administration or a change in attitude by the 
international community, those troops for the foreseeable future will 
remain largely American.
  Will there be American troops in Iraq by the time of the next 
Presidential election in 2008? Right now the answer is yes.
  I was able to visit Kabul as well. So much attention and money have 
been focused on Iraq that I believe Afghanistan has been neglected to 
the detriment of our goal of defeating the terrorists who attacked us 
on 9/11.
  One example: in Iraq we hope to field an army of 27 battalions in 12 
months at a cost of $1.8 billion, while in Afghanistan we hope to field 
an army of 15 battalions in 26 months at a cost of $569 million. Yet, 
in Iraq, there is a military infrastructure of garrisons, facilities, 
and a history of a national army that Afghanistan lacks. There are huge 
cultural barriers to overcome in linguistics and ethnicity that make 
Iraq look homogenous in comparison. Our military is doing a great job 
in trying to stand up an army in Afghanistan, but it is an enormous 
job, and so far the international community is not providing sufficient 
resources either to rebuild the country or create a sustainable and 
professional security force.
  Afghanistan has an even greater problem in the lack of a civic 
administrative infrastructure. Without the creation of a strong local 
and central government, we run the risk of creating a well trained army 
that the government cannot pay for or sustain, further increasing the 
risk that the Taliban and al-Qaida terrorists could return to power.
  We need to give more attention and make a greater commitment to 
Afghanistan. In Kosovo, for example, 25 times more money was pledged on 
a per capita basis than to Afghanistan and 50 times more troops per 
capita were sent. Afghanistan needs an estimated $20 billion in 
assistance over the next 5 years but so far only $7 billion has been 
pledged and even less received. I worry that, 2 years after the fall of 
the Taliban, Afghanistan has become the forgotten war even as al-Qaida 
terrorists and Taliban remnants continue to make it their sanctuary and 
regroup their forces.
  I opposed going to war in Iraq when we did. I did not think that the 
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction was imminent, nor did I 
think we had taken sufficient time to prepare for the consequences of a 
prolonged occupation of Iraq. I was concerned that starting another 
conflict before we had squashed the al-Qaida terrorist threat in 
Afghanistan would disperse our forces and expose us to even more 
terrorist problems. To be successful in both, with the least cost to 
the United States in terms of lives and resources, required an 
international coalition and consensus along the lines of the one 
created in the first gulf war. We have yet to achieve that either in 
Afghanistan, where there is international support but insufficient 
resources, or in Iraq where the bulk of resources and personnel are 
being provided by the United States.
  We need to rebuild support for American foreign policy both abroad 
and at home. A recent Pew Foundation poll indicates that the U.S. image 
abroad remains negative in most nations. This cannot be good. For 
Americans to be secure, we need to be respected, and, as both Iraq and 
Afghanistan demonstrate, we cannot go it alone unless American citizens 
want to bear the full burden of sacrifice. We need international 
support. This does not mean sacrificing American interests to foreign 
interests, but it means working with other nations to gain a consensus 
in support of our objectives. In many we are one.
  At home, too, we need to rebuild bipartisan support for American 
foreign policy. This has been lost in the last few years. Healthy 
debate requires a willingness to listen to arguments and to accept 
those that are valid in order to develop a consensus on American 
foreign policy. This ability has been lost.
  Earlier this week, our former colleague, Bill Cohen, spoke before the 
9/11 Commission. He talked about ``the kind of poisonous atmosphere 
that existed then that continues today,'' referring to the questioning 
of President Clinton's motives when he launched attacks against al-
Qaida in Afghanistan and Sudan. Constructive criticism of strategy and 
oversight of its implementation are essential tools in sharpening the 
tip of our policy weapons. But they need to take place in an atmosphere 
where such debate is not just another arrow in the quiver of partisan 
politics.
  I pray that one of the successes of the 9/11 Commission and other 
discussions in this very political year will be a determination to 
restore comity in foreign policy.
  My recent travels in Iraq and Afghanistan have convinced me that, if 
we are to succeed in either country, we need to be prepared to remain 
in both countries for a long time, and we need to be prepared for 
additional sacrifices in terms of lives and financial resources. To 
accept that burden, there has to be a consensus in foreign policy. To 
bear that burden will require a determination to establish 
international support for our policies.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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