[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3122-3124]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                 IRAQ INTELLIGENCE AND POSTWAR PLANNING

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in recent weeks, Americans have witnessed 
a steady stream of reports that raise grave questions about the 
accuracy of statements made by senior Bush administration officials 
leading up to the war in Iraq.
  The unequivocal administration pronouncements that Saddam Hussein 
possessed weapons of mass destruction, was pursuing nuclear 
capabilities, and had close ties with al-Qaida have not been proven or 
been proven unequivocally wrong.
  Implications of these intelligence failures are far-reaching. While 
Saddam Hussein may be in prison, just this week CIA Director Tenet 
indicated America is still the target of terrorists who seek to kill as 
many Americans as possible in any way available to them.
  At no time in our Nation's history has the integrity of the people 
who use intelligence and the people who produce intelligence been more 
vital to national security. Americans need to have confidence in both 
our policymakers and our intelligence community. To rebuild that 
confidence, Americans have a right to know how the administration and 
how our intelligence community could have been so wrong on matters of 
such grave import.
  For a failure this massive, every aspect of America's national 
security policymaking process should be put under the microscope: How 
we collect information, how we analyze it, how it gets interpreted by 
administration officials, and how the Senate performs its oversight 
responsibilities.
  Much of the discussion about our Iraq intelligence failures thus far 
has

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focused on our incorrect assessments of the threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein. While important, there is another vital piece of this story 
that has been overlooked until this point. That is, the 
administration's failure to plan for postwar Iraq and the consequences 
that would arise from toppling Saddam Hussein.
  The administration's myopic approach to planning for post-Saddam Iraq 
continues to have consequences for the safety of our troops and the 
long-term security of our Nation and its interests. As a result, it is 
critical that the Nation learn more about why the administration failed 
to plan for the contingencies of a post-Saddam Iraq. As officials from 
the Bush administration, the United Nations, and the Iraq Governing 
Council seek to reach agreement on the administration's third and 
latest proposal for forming the first official post-Saddam government, 
we would be wise to look back at what went wrong.
  A thorough, bipartisan investigation is warranted.
  What makes the unfolding evidence of insufficient post-war planning 
most troubling is that, in this instance, contrary to the questions of 
weapons of mass destruction, it appears that our intelligence was 
right.
  There was a consensus among the intelligence community that removing 
Saddam would be the easiest part of our efforts to secure and rebuild 
Iraq.
  Our intelligence community, our military, and numerous independent 
groups all concurred in the assessment that our gravest challenges 
would come in the days after Saddam was ousted.
  The greatest difficulty, all agreed, would come in the days following 
the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Senior administration policymakers were 
repeatedly warned by other officials within the government, as well as 
a raft of independent outside experts, to plan accordingly.
  Months before the start of the conflict, these officials and experts 
carefully examined these issues and offered concrete proposals to 
maximize our chances for bringing about a stable Iraq while minimizing 
the risks to our troops and our taxpayers.
  For instance, as far back as March 2002, a year before the invasion, 
the State Department was working on a $5 million project entitled the 
Future of Iraq. Experience from previous conflicts demonstrated the 
importance of preparing in advance for our postwar duties.
  And experience from the past gave us all a guide as to what to expect 
in Iraq.
  Although there were many other officials and organizations making 
similar assessments, the State Department's Future of Iraq project 
provides some useful insights into the information available to the 
administration had it chose to listen.
  In its 13-volume study plus a one-volume summary and overview, the 
Future of Iraq project reached some prescient conclusions.
  First, the project said Iraq would be disorderly after liberation and 
stressed that the days immediately after liberation would be critical--
to both those who seek to work with us and those who do not.

       The removal of Saddam's regime will provide a power vacuum 
     and create popular anxieties about the viability of all Iraqi 
     institutions . . . the traumatic and disruptive events 
     attendant to the regime change will affect all Iraqis, both 
     Saddam's conspirators and the general populace.

  Second, this report stressed the importance of restoring basic 
services as quickly as possible after the regime change. The report 
``stressed the importance of getting the electrical grid up and running 
immediately--[this is] key to water systems, jobs. [This] could go a 
long way to determining Iraqis attitudes' toward coalition forces.''
  Third, the report warned about the problems created by a wholesale 
demobilization of the Iraqi military.

       The decommissioning of hundreds of thousands of trained 
     military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could create 
     social problems.

  Each of these conclusions should have waved a red flag to 
administration officials: if addressed effectively, the transition will 
be smoother; if ignored, the transition will be more difficult. More 
difficult for our troops and more difficult for the Iraqi people.
  Unfortunately, the administration apparently chose to ignore these 
and many other similar findings offered up by other groups. In fact, 
news reports indicate that White House and senior Defense Department 
civilian officials actually worked to exclude people who worked on or 
shared the views contained in the Future of Iraq report--views that 
have proven to be 100 percent correct.
  One of the most comprehensive reports about this issue can be found 
in James Fallows' article in the January/February 2004 Atlantic Monthly 
entitled ``Blind into Baghdad.''
  I highly commend this article to my colleagues.
  Unfortunately, the many warnings about post-war Iraq fell upon deaf 
ears in the administration. For a variety of reasons, senior 
administration officials in the White House and senior civilians in the 
Defense Department ignored these warnings, instead apparently opting to 
rely on dubious sources to back up their rosy predictions about how our 
troops would be received by Iraqis and how smooth the transition would 
be.
  For example, the administration was repeatedly pressed for an 
estimate before the start of the war on the number of troops and the 
cost of the operation.
  Even though press reports indicate administration officials had 
signed off on a war plan in November 2002 that spelled out the size of 
the forces necessary for an Iraq mission, the administration 
persistently claimed not to know the size of the forces needed or their 
cost.
  As late as February 2003, 2 months after the President had authorized 
the deployment of 200,000 troops to the region and less than 2 months 
before the start of the conflict, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz 
said, ``Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until 
we get there on the ground.''
  Even worse, the administration suggested that there would be no cost 
at all.
  Administration officials stated that the proceeds from the sale of 
Iraqi oil would be used to pay for the American military presence.
  On March 27, 8 days after the war had started, Wolfowitz was again 
pressed on a figure and indicated that whatever it turned out to be, 
Iraq's oil supplies would keep it low: ``There's a lot of money to pay 
for this. It doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing 
with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and 
relatively soon.''
  In April, after more than a month of conflict, Andrew Natsios, the 
director of USAID, said the total cost to the taxpayer would be no more 
than $1.7 billion. ``We have no plans for any further-on-funding for 
this.''
  The administration either knew better at the time or should have 
known better.
  And our troops and the American people certainly deserved better. 
Over 500 Americans have been killed and over 3,000 wounded in Iraq. 
Unfortunately, these numbers are likely to continue to grow before our 
mission there is complete.
  We have already appropriated over $150 billion for this operation, 
and this cost could easily double before we are through.
  Let me take another example--the administration's statements about 
the post-war environment we would encounter and the challenges we would 
face.
  Although there are a few instances where administration officials 
went on the record before the war warning that a war with Iraq could 
require a lengthy commitment, administration officials repeatedly 
painted the most optimistic portrait possible in order to gain support 
for its strategy.
  Vice President Cheney's remarks 3 days before the start of the war 
typify much of what the administration was telling the American public.
  When asked if the American people are prepared for a long, costly 
battle with significant casualties, the Vice President said, ``Well, I 
don't think it's likely to unfold that way . . . because I really do 
believe we will be greeted as liberators.''

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  This tragic miscalculation allowed the administration to abandon the 
intelligence-based, analytical process needed to plan successfully for 
the occupation of Iraq. The administration sent a smaller force than 
our senior military officials initially recommended.
  Our personnel were not suitably prepared for the immense economic, 
social, and political complexities that we should have known would 
inevitably arise after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And our troops and 
the American people were not adequately equipped for the guerrilla 
tactics that have become all too common since President Bush declared 
an end to major combat operations.
  Overall, the administration's overly optimistic attitude about post-
war Iraq has contributed to a far more costly and arduous effort than 
needed to be the case.
  Mr. President, not long ago, many of my colleagues and I had the 
honor of having dinner with more than 100 soldiers and their families 
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. These soldiers had all been wounded 
while serving their country in Iraq. I hope my colleagues will take the 
opportunity to visit these young men and women. After seeing first-hand 
the kind of people our country has produced, I have never been more 
proud to be an American.
  As I think of my night with these brave men and women who have 
sacrificed so much and asked for so little in return, I cannot help but 
think: Did we do right by them? Did we do everything possible to put 
them in a position to succeed at the least possible risk? Did we 
provide them with a plan for success and the tools needed to carry it 
out?
  In a statement last year, General Anthony Zinni, one of the most 
respected and distinguished military leaders this country has produced, 
commented on what we owed those who we placed in harm's way.
  He said:

       They should never be put on a battlefield without a 
     strategic plan, not only for the fighting--our generals will 
     take care of that--but for the aftermath and winning that 
     war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept this, if 
     we accept this level of sacrifice without that level of 
     planning?

  The administration based its post-war planning on blind hope, and 
hope is not a plan. We owe it to our troops and ourselves to determine 
whether we did everything we could to succeed in Iraq. Our success in 
Iraq and future conflicts depends on it. Our need to ensure that we do 
right by our troops demands it.
  I yield the floor.

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