[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 2]
[House]
[Pages 1637-1643]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    WAS AMERICA AT WAR IN THE 1990S?

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I am joined tonight by my colleague from 
Georgia. What we would like to talk about tonight is the issue of 
whether America is at war. Were we at war in the 1990s? What was the 
reaction of the administration in the 1990s? What do we see in the year 
2000 and beyond? And what have we found about the weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq?
  First, were we a country at war during the 1990s? We have all the 
examples of the attacks on the United States. In 1993, the World Trade 
Center was bombed. In 1996, our military barracks were bombed in Saudi 
Arabia. Our embassies were attacked in Africa. The USS Cole was 
attacked in 2000. In 1995, two unidentified gunmen killed two U.S. 
diplomats and wounded a third in Karachi. A Palestinian sniper opened 
fire on tourists atop the Empire State Building. In 2000, a bomb 
exploded across the street from the U.S. embassy in Manila. It is not 
only the high-profile attacks that we should be concerned about, but 
what we saw during the 1990s was a pattern of attacks against the U.S., 
against our embassies, against our economic interests, against our 
military personnel, and against American civilians.
  If we take a look at the quotes and the things that folks said about 
the 1990s and what was going on specifically, and maybe focused more on 
Iraq than anywhere else, you kind of get a feeling as to whether in the 
1990s people in the administration understood the threat that terrorist 
groups and that Saddam Hussein posed to the United States.
  The question that some ask today, or the facts that they state today 
is that, well, you know, this all came up after 2001, that the data was 
fabricated.
  What did Bill Clinton say during his administration? February 17, 
1998:
  ``Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut U.N. inspectors. They've 
harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, 
literally spirited evidence out of the back doors. And they will be all 
the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. We simply 
cannot allow that to happen.''
  Again continuing, President Clinton in 1998:
  ``There should be no doubt Saddam's ability to produce and deliver 
weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to the peace of that 
region and the security of the world. There is no more clear example of 
this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety 
of his people, the stability of his region and the security of all the 
rest of us. In the next century, the community of nations may see more 
and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a rogue state with 
weapons of mass destruction ready to use them or provide them to 
terrorists who travel the world. If we fail to respond today, Saddam 
will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with 
impunity. I have no doubt he would use them again if permitted to 
develop them.'' A clear case that on February 17, 1998, President 
Clinton was not only aware of the threats that Saddam Hussein and Iraq 
posed but that the threat extended to people like Saddam and to 
different terrorist organizations.
  I do not know if my colleague from Georgia has any other quotes from 
President Clinton or not. I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. GINGREY. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Yes, certainly I do.

[[Page 1638]]

Here is one, and I quote, from President Clinton:
  ``Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it 
had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM would then 
uncover evidence that gave a lie to those declarations, Iraq would 
simply amend the reports.''
  Another quote, again from President Clinton:
  ``And someday, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal, and I 
think every one of you who has really worked on this for any length of 
time believes that, too.''
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time, in comments by President Bill 
Clinton at the meeting of the National Security Council, comments on 
the bombing of strategic interests in Iraq: ``I am convinced the 
decision I made to order this military action, though difficult, was 
absolutely the right thing to do. It is in our interest and in the 
interest of people around the world. Saddam has used weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles before. I have no doubt he would use 
them again if permitted to develop them.''
  I yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Here are another couple of quotes. Again, President 
Clinton:
  ``We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his 
neighbors.''
  President Clinton again:
  ``We have learned through harsh experience that the only answer to 
aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination and, when 
necessary, action.''
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. There is no doubt that in the 1990s the Clinton 
administration, or at least the President, voiced the concerns about 
terrorist organizations, Iraq and specifically Saddam Hussein; but it 
was not only the President. The Vice President, May 23, 2000, during a 
conference breakfast with the American-Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee:
  ``Despite our swift victory and our efforts since, there is no doubt 
in my mind that Saddam Hussein still seeks to amass weapons of mass 
destruction. You know as well as I do that as long as Saddam Hussein 
stays in power, there can be no comprehensive peace for the people of 
Israel or the people of the Middle East. We have made it clear that it 
is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone.''
  Al Gore, May 23, 2000: ``We have made it clear that it is our policy 
to see Saddam Hussein gone.''
  Mr. GINGREY. Just listen to former, actually Senator Gore at the time 
and former Vice President Gore in a speech, a major policy speech made 
on September 29, 1992 by then Senator Al Gore, and I quote:
  ``He, Saddam, had already launched poison gas attacks repeatedly and 
Bush''--referring to Bush I--``looked the other way.''
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. If the gentleman will yield, this is the Vice 
President, or at that point in time the Senator?
  Mr. GINGREY. The Senator running for Vice President.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Referring to Bush I, and, what, accusing him of 
inaction?
  Mr. GINGREY. Absolutely.
  I will finish that quote:
  ``He, Saddam, had already conducted extensive terrorism activities 
and Bush looked the other way. He was already deeply involved in the 
effort to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 
and he, President Bush, looked the other way.
  ``Well, in my view the Bush administration was acting in a manner 
directly opposite to what you would expect with all of the evidence 
that it had available at the time. Saddam Hussein's nature and 
intentions were perfectly visible.'' Again, a major policy speech made 
by then Senator and Vice Presidential candidate Al Gore, September 29, 
1992.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. We go on through the administration. Remarks by 
Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State:
  ``In this struggle our adversaries are likely to avoid traditional 
battlefield situations because there American dominance is well 
established. We must be concerned instead by weapons of mass 
destruction and by the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden 
bombs. These unconventional threats endanger not only our Armed Forces 
but all Americans and America's friends everywhere.''
  Madeleine Albright in the Clinton administration got much of this 
right in perceiving the threat, as was so brutally proved on September 
11.
  Mr. GINGREY. If the gentleman will yield, continuing on, then 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as quoted in the Chicago Tribune, 
November 16, 1997: ``Hussein's weapons will not discriminate if and 
when they are used, and therefore it is important for the region to 
understand that he is a threat.''

                              {time}  1800

  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, we are going to talk a little bit more 
about some of these quotes, and then we will talk about exactly what 
the Clinton administration did in the 1990s as they laid out the threat 
from terrorist organizations, as they laid out the threat from Saddam 
and Iraq.
  Madeleine Albright, subject: Tonight's air strikes against strategic 
targets in Iraq. ``This is a moment of grave determination. We have 
decided to use force because other means simply have not worked. 
Saddam's capacity to develop and brandish such armaments poses a threat 
to international security and peace that cannot be ignored. Month after 
month we have given Iraq chance after chance to move from confrontation 
to cooperation. We have explored and exhausted every diplomatic action. 
We will see whether force can persuade Iraq's misguided leaders to 
reverse course and to accept at long last the need to abide by the rule 
of law and the will of the world.''
  It took 3 years before inspectors on a limited basis were ever 
allowed back.
  I yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, I think it would be informative to people 
who are paying attention, and I think all Americans are paying 
attention and they are listening to a lot of political rhetoric during 
this Presidential election year and the criticism that they are hearing 
not only from the leaders of our military, from the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, but especially to the Secretary of Defense, the honorable 
Donald Rumsfeld.
  Listen to what former Secretary of Defense William Cohen had to say: 
``Noted again Tuesday that in the past Iraq imported enough material to 
produce up to 200 tons of the deadly chemical agent VX, `theoretically 
enough to kill every man, woman, and child' on earth. Finding and 
eliminating all such chemical and biological warfare stocks must be an 
international priority.'' L.A. Times, November 26, 1997, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen under the Clinton administration.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, he goes on in another talk with an 
interview with Katie Couric on December 18. ``One of reasons we are 
taking this action,'' and this is the Secretary of Defense, ``is we 
don't want to see it taken with chemical or biological agents, but we 
do know,'' not we estimate, we think, ``but we do know that Iraq has 
been in process of building that kind of capability. But we're looking 
at the intelligence very closely. We anticipate there will be terrorist 
attacks in a variety of areas of the globe, and we are taking whatever 
precautions we can against it.''
  Remember those words, because we will get back to it in a few 
minutes. ``We are taking whatever precautions we can against it.''
  And what is against it? The variety of terrorist attacks in all areas 
of the globe.
  I yield to my colleague.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, this next quote from former President Bill 
Clinton, I think, really speaks to it as much as any that we have given 
tonight, and here is the quote: ``In the next century, the community of 
nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now, a 
rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or 
provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals 
who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, 
Saddam, and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be 
emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity,

[[Page 1639]]

even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security 
Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.''
  And what was done then, Mr. Speaker? It was just drawing lines in the 
sand and then another line in the sand and another line in the sand and 
a dare and a double dare and a double-dog dare, and nothing was 
happening to deal with this until, of course, we had to strike the 
strike on 9/11 that resulted in over 3,000 lives lost.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, here we go on and we go back to President 
Clinton on February 17, 1998, talking about the kind of environment 
that we see in Iraq and the kind of folks that we are trying to work on 
and taking a look at denial and deception. But how did Iraq work? This 
is President Clinton's description in 1998:
  ``Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it 
had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM,'' that is, 
the UN inspectors, ``would then uncover evidence that gave lie to those 
declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports.
  ``Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM. They've harassed 
the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally 
spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect facilities as 
inspectors walked through the front door. And our people were there 
observing it and had the pictures to prove it.
  ``If he refuses or continues to evade his obligations through more 
tactics of delay and deception, he and he alone will be to blame for 
the consequences.''
  September 9: ``We've pushed and pushed some more to help UNSCOM,'' 
this is Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, ``break through the 
smokescreen of lies and diction put out by the Iraqi regime . . . ''
  `` . . . UNSCOM was able for the first time to conduct inspections of 
sensitive sites where it found new evidence that Iraq had lied about 
the size of its chemical weapons stock.''
  These are really interesting quotes, considering the debate. We have 
gone into this war situation with a number of allies, but the President 
has been critiqued because there were not enough partners in the 
process.
  Here is what President Clinton said in a debate with Robert Dole on 
October 6, 1996: ``Sometimes the U.S. has to act alone, or at least has 
to act first. Sometimes we cannot let other countries have a veto on 
our foreign policy.''
  Madeleine Albright's quote in 1998: ``I am going to explain our 
position. And while we always prefer to act multilaterally, we are 
prepared to go unilaterally.''
  President Clinton, Time Magazine, 1998: ``Would the Iraqi people be 
better off if there was a change in leadership? I certainly think they 
would be.'' Remember, by the year 2000, the official policy of the 
United States was regime change in Iraq.
  1998, President Clinton: ``If we fail to respond today, Hussein, and 
all those who would follow in his footsteps,'' and I think the 
President was referencing terrorist organizations that would attack 
America and other freedom-loving people around the world, ``and all 
those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by 
the knowledge that they can act with impunity.'' This is President 
Clinton.
  And ``what if he fails to comply and we fail to act? . . . Some day, 
some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal.'' President Clinton, 
August 31, 1998.
  What we are seeing throughout the 1990s, whether it is President 
Clinton, whether it is the Vice President, whether it is the Secretary 
of State, or whether it is the Secretary of Defense, there is a clear 
pattern that the Clinton administration, rightfully so, identified 
terrorist threats, Saddam Hussein, and Iraq as a threat to the people 
of Iraq, as a threat to Israel, as a threat to the stability of the 
Middle East, and as a threat to the United States and the rest of the 
world.
  I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, continuing on the line of reason the 
gentleman from Michigan is presenting, again Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright in 1998, in fact, November 23, and this was in Time 
Magazine: ``Up to now we've had diplomacy backed by force. Now we need 
to shift to force backed by diplomacy.''
  And listen to what she says less than a month later: ``Month after 
month we have given Iraq chance after chance to move from confrontation 
to cooperation, and we have explored and exhausted every diplomatic 
action. We will see now whether force can persuade Iraq's misguided 
leaders to reverse course and to accept at long last the need to abide 
by the rule of law and the will of the world.''
  These were remarks made by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 
the night of the air strikes, the very limited air strikes, against 
strategic targets in Iraq, her comments made December 16, 1998.
  What happened over the next 2 years? Nothing. These limited air 
strikes did nothing, and Saddam continued with his weapons of mass 
destruction, his terrorism on his own people, his refusal to let the 
weapons inspectors come back into the country and make sure he was 
complying with the U.N. resolutions.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, there are those who say that this 
administration was the first to try to create a link between al Qaeda 
and Iraq. That is absolutely wrong.
  In 1998, again with the attack on the plant in Sudan: ``U.S. 
officials who declined to be identified told reporters that there were 
contacts as the Sudanese company was being developed between Al Shifa 
officials and Iraqis working on their country's VX program. `Iraq is 
the only country we are aware of that had planned to use WMD,' the 
officials said. The officials also said there is evidence linking Osama 
bin Laden. Defense Secretary Cohen has publicly stated that bin Laden 
had some financial interest in contributing to this particular facility 
in Khartoum.''
  Where is that? How do we know if Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
said that? ``We know that he, bin Laden, had contributed to this 
particular facility,'' Secretary of Defense William Cohen, New York 
Times, August 29, 1998.
  Another quote: ``And indeed we have information that Iraq has 
assisted in the chemical weapons activity in Sudan.'' That is an op-ed 
by Samuel Berger, the national security advisor, the Washington Times, 
October 16, 1998.
  He goes on in that activity: ``And, indeed, we have information that 
Iraq has assisted in the chemical weapons activity in Sudan . . . We 
had information linking bin Laden to the Sudanese regime and the Al 
Shifa plant.'' National security advisor, Samuel Berger, op-ed, October 
16 in the Washington Times.
  It is interesting. This link between Saddam Hussein, Iraq, terrorist 
organizations, and the threat that they combine to depose the United 
States and the rest of the world is not new. It has been outlined 
through the 1990s.
  I yield to my colleague.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from Michigan will allow 
me, I would just like to shift a little bit now and talk about the 
testimony and put it in the right, proper context that we are hearing 
from David Kay.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, let us not go there yet, all right? 
Because every year there is something that is put out. It is called the 
Report on Global Terrorism. And if my colleague will take a look, he 
has got the 1999 review of Iraq. I have got the 1998.

                              {time}  1815

  Here is what it says in 1998. The global terrorism overview of state-
sponsored terrorism. Iraq continues to provide safe haven to a variety 
of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal 
Organization, the Arab Liberation Front, and the former head of the now 
defunct 15 May Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several 
bombings of U.S. aircraft.
  In December, press reports indicated that Abu Nidal had relocated to 
Iraq and may be receiving medical treatment. Abu Nidal's move to 
Baghdad

[[Page 1640]]

would increase the prospect that Saddam may call on the ANO to conduct 
anti-U.S. attacks.
  Iraq also provides bases, weapons and protection to the MEK, a 
terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. Back in 1998, 
through much of the 1990s, it was clear, at least in the global 
terrorism overview of state-sponsored terrorism, Iraq has consistently 
been identified as a state sponsor of terrorism on a global basis.
  What did the report say in 1999?
  I yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Well, Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international 
terrorism in 1999. Although Baghdad focused primarily on the anti-
regime opposition, both at home and abroad, it continued to provide 
safe haven and to support various terrorist groups.
  Many press reports stated that according to a defecting Iraqi 
intelligence agent, the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned to bomb 
the offices of Radio Free Europe in Prague. Radio Free Europe offices 
include Radio Liberty, which began broadcasting news and information to 
Iraq in October of 1998. The plot was foiled when it became public in 
early 1999.
  The Iraq opposition publicly stated its fears that the Baghdad regime 
was planning to assassinate those opposed to Saddam Hussein. A 
spokesman for the Iraqi National Accord in November said that the 
movement security organs had obtained information about a plan to 
assassinate its secretary general, Dr. Allawi, and a member of the 
movement's political bureau, as well as other Iraqi leaders.
  Iraq continued to provide safe haven to a variety of Palestinian 
rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal Organization; the Arab 
Liberation Front, ALF; and the former head of the now defunct 15 May 
Organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of United 
States aircraft.
  Iraq provided bases, weapons and protection to the MEK, an Iranian 
terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. In 1999, MEK 
cadre based in Iraq assassinated or attempted to assassinate several 
high-ranking Iranian government officials, including Brigadier General 
Ali Sayyad Shirazi, deputy chief of Iran's Joint Staff, who was 
actually killed in an assassination attack.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. If I now take a look at the report on global terrorism 
in 2001, what does it say?
  In addition, the regime continued to provide training and political 
encouragement to numerous terrorist groups, although its main focus was 
on dissident Iraqi activity overseas. But Iraq provided bases to 
several terrorist groups, including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the MEK, the 
Kurdistan Worker's Party, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal 
Organization.
  In 2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP, 
raised its profile in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by carrying out 
successful terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. In recognition of 
the PFLP's growing role, an Iraqi vice president met with the former 
PFLP secretary, General Habbash, in Baghdad. In January 2001, there was 
continued Iraqi support for the intifadah. Also in mid-September, a 
senior delegation from the PFLP met with an Iraqi deputy prime 
minister. Baghdad also continued to host other Palestinian rejectionist 
groups, including the Arab Liberation Front and the 15 May 
Organization. There is no doubt that Iraq continued its connection with 
terrorist organizations.
  What happened in 2002? I yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Well, Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism 
in 2002, that is what they did. Throughout the year, the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service, IIS, laid the groundwork for possible attacks 
against both civilian and military targets in the United States and 
other Western countries. The IIS reportedly instructed its agents in 
early 2001 that their main mission was to obtain information about 
United States and Israeli targets. The IIS also threatened dissidents 
in the Near East and Europe and stole records and computer files 
detailing anti-regime activity.
  In December of 2002, the press claimed Iraq intelligence killed Walid 
Ibrahim Abbas al-Muhah al-Mayahi, a Shi'ite Iraqi refugee who was 
living in Lebanon and a member of the Iraqi National Congress. Iraq was 
a safe haven, a transit point and an operational base for groups and 
individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel and 
other countries.
  Baghdad overtly assisted two categories of Iraqi-based terrorist 
organizations, Iranian dissidents devoted to toppling the Iranian 
Government and a variety of Palestinian groups opposed to peace with 
Israel. The groups include the Iranian Mujahedeen-e-Khalq and the Abu 
Nidal Organization, although Iraq reportedly killed its leader.
  The Palestinian Liberation Front, PLF, and the Arab Liberation Front, 
ALF. In the past year, the PLF increased its operational activities 
against Israel and sent its members to Iraq for training for future 
terrorist attacks.
  Baghdad provided material assistance to other Palestinian terrorist 
groups that are in the forefront of this intifadah. The Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Hamas, and the 
Palestine Islamic Jihad are the three most important groups to which 
Baghdad has extended outreach and support efforts. Saddam paid the 
families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian 
terrorism, channeling $25,000 since March through the ALF alone to 
families of suicide bombers, both in Gaza and on the West Bank. Public 
testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled 
checks captured by Israel in the West Bank verify the transfer of a 
considerable amount of Iraqi money.
  The presence of several hundred al Qaeda operatives fighting with the 
small Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al Islam in the northeastern corner 
of Iraqi Kurdistan where the IIS operates is well documented. Iraq has 
an agent in the most senior levels of Ansar al Islam as well.
  In addition, small numbers of highly placed al Qaeda militants were 
present in Baghdad and areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. It is 
inconceivable that these groups were in Iraq without the knowledge and 
acquiescence of Saddam's regime.
  In the past year, al Qaeda operatives in Northern Iraq concocted 
suspect chemicals under the direction of senior al Qaeda associate Abu 
Mussab Zarqawi; and they tried to smuggle them into Russia, Western 
Europe, and the United States for terrorist organizations and 
operations. Iraq is a party to five of the 12 international conventions 
and protocols relating to terrorism.
  That is what Iraq has been doing in the year 2002.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. I think the record is relatively clear. In many ways, 
the Clinton administration in the 1990s got the message. After the 
World Trade Center bombing, after the U.S. barracks bombings, after our 
embassy bombings, after the USS Cole and as American civilians were 
attacked around the world, the rhetoric was very, very good.
  The rhetoric that came out of the Clinton administration said we are 
at war. We are prepared to punish and hold those accountable who have 
attacked us. We are willing to go in and preemptively attack and be on 
the offense against those who may attack us in the future; and we may 
even go it alone, because we will not allow another country to hold 
veto over American national security.
  They defined the war. They said we are at risk at home and abroad. 
Civilian, military individuals would be at risk; our allies would be at 
risk. Madeleine Albright identified that it would be an unconventional 
war. Parts of it would be conventional; parts of it would be 
unconventional. Some battles would be in the open; some would be in 
secret. We would use both conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction. It is a violent and a dangerous world. Truck bombs, 
improvised explosive devices, small labs for chemical and biological 
weapons, weapons that could be delivered by plane, ships, missiles, or 
backpacks.
  You go back to the one quote I think you had from, I am not sure if 
it was

[[Page 1641]]

the President or Al Gore, but I got the quotes here again.
  From William Cohen: ``We anticipate there will be terrorist attacks 
in a variety of areas of the globe and we are taking whatever 
precautions we can against it.''
  Al Gore in 2000: ``We have made it clear that it is our policy to see 
Saddam Hussein gone.''
  I am not sure what quote my colleague has over there, but we ought to 
take a look at what the Clinton administration did in the 1990s.
  Mr. GINGREY. I think what the gentleman so clearly pointed out is the 
previous administration made the case against Saddam Hussein. They made 
the case based on the intelligence that they were receiving at that 
time. What they did is they talked the talk, and we have spent some 
time here this evening giving you some quotes, various members, 
including the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. It is a consistent message through all levels of their 
policy chain.
  Mr. GINGREY. Absolutely. The point I was going to make is they were 
willing, the previous administration, to talk the talk; but what they 
were not willing to do was to walk the walk.
  This administration has walked the walk; and because of that, this 
world is a safer place with the capture of Saddam Hussein.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. There is an interesting article I would like to 
reference that talks a little bit about what the previous 
administration did during the 1990s. The article is ``Show Stoppers,'' 
and it is out of the Weekly Standard, January 26, 2004. It is written 
by Richard Shultz, who is director of International Security Studies at 
the Fletcher school, Tufts University, and director of research at the 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in Washington, D.C.
  He brings up an interesting point. America has the best trained 
military in the world, regular Army; but then we also have some very 
special folks, Special Operations folks.
  Remember, the policy as he lays out here was that we were prepared to 
preemptively and offensively attack those individuals who we thought 
might be a threat to the United States. We knew who they were. The 
Clinton administration identified al Qaeda; they identified bin Laden 
as being threats. We heard that in our quotes tonight.
  But what Richard Shultz goes on to point out, he says not once during 
the 1990s, even though we on occasion might have known where bin Laden 
was, we knew where his terrorist camps were, not once did we take and 
use our Special Operations forces to neutralize the capability of these 
folks who we were relatively confident and who the Clinton 
administration were selling the American people on that these were a 
threat to the American public and to our military and to our allies 
around the world.
  We never used our Delta Force, we never used our Seals, we never used 
our Rangers to kill or capture bin Laden or attack al Qaeda training 
bases.
  Mr. GINGREY. If the gentleman will yield further, one of the most 
preposterous facts is that during of the previous administration in the 
late 1990s, Osama bin Laden was offered up to our country, and we 
refused to accept him saying that he was not that much of a threat. We 
did not need him.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Taking back my time, Mr. Shultz goes on to talk about 
the Clinton administration's desire for preemptive and offensive 
actions. But they never took the step. Terrorism is a crime, they said. 
They said we will prosecute it afterwards. We will not use our forces 
for minimizing the capability of these people to wage war against us. 
It does not meet the Pentagon's definition of war. We are risk-averse.
  That sent a very clear message to terrorist organizations and rogue 
regimes like Iran, Iraq, Syria and a number of other countries that 
said the United States is not going to do anything.

                              {time}  1830

  They may respond, but even if we attack their battle ships, even if 
we attack their embassies or their barracks, they will not respond or 
they will respond in a very minimal way, and they will allow us to keep 
moving forward and to prepare other attacks.
  I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. No 
question, when we keep drawing lines in the sand and making threats and 
dares and double dares, as was done by the previous administration, 
attack after attack after attack, the other side is rightly going to 
assume that you are just so much bluster, that you are no threat. So 
they continue in their terroristic ways, and that really is essentially 
what has happened. Thank God that this President, our 43rd President, 
George W. Bush, had the courage to finally say, enough is enough.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, a couple of other things. We never used 
our Special Operations forces. But with all of this discussion about 
what capabilities do we have in intelligence, it is helpful to have a 
discussion as to what the Clinton administration did during the 1990s 
with intelligence. From 1992 to 1999, the intelligence agency, we 
decreased the number of agents we had in the field by 27 percent, we 
decreased the number of stations or locations that we had around the 
world by 30 percent, and we decreased the number of assets. What is an 
asset? An asset is a spy. We reduced the number of assets we had by 40 
percent. We gutted our human intelligence capability. We have 
phenomenal satellites and different things that can do wonderful things 
in trying to help us figure out what is going on, but unless we have 
the human intelligence to determine intent and planning or to go inside 
of a building and see what is going on inside of a building and to hear 
and be part of the discussions, we cannot figure out exactly what is 
going on; and even if we have those people in certain places, it is 
still difficult to pull together the entire practice.
  But the reason we were kind of blind in Iraq in 2000 is that Bill 
Clinton's administration, President Clinton's administration, gutted 
our human intelligence. I yield to the gentleman.
  Mr. GINGREY. Well, no question. And of course it reminds me, thinking 
back, of I think it was the Clinton administration had decided that 
they wanted to have a nicer, a nicer, kinder, gentler intelligence 
agency; and anybody that was ever known to have jaywalked or spit on 
the sidewalk, they were not eligible to be an intelligence officer 
because they did not project that image.
  I am going to tell my colleagues right now, it is clear that when the 
going gets tough, the tough get going; and we need tough people. And as 
the gentleman from Michigan was saying, we cut down on the number of 
personnel involved in intelligence operations and the kind of people 
that we need to deal with these people on an international basis. This 
is dangerous work, and we need tough, dangerous people to fight fire 
with fire. We did not have that in the previous administration.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, what my colleague is 
talking about is that in 1995 and 1996 the Clinton administration 
implemented what was called the Deutsch Doctrine. John Deutsch was the 
director of the CIA. And, after some things happened in 1995, the 
Deutsch Doctrine becomes the official policy of the CIA.
  What does the Deutsch Doctrine say? It does what my colleague said, 
although maybe not quite as strict as what my colleague said; but it 
said, we are not going to recruit as human assets those individuals who 
have human rights records or who have criminal records; we are not 
going to recruit those kinds of people to spy for the United States. As 
a matter of fact, we are not only going to not recruit those people in 
the future, we are going to go and do what is called the ``Deutsch 
scrub.'' We are going to go back and take a look at those people who 
are working for us today. They have made that choice, they have left 
the dark side, they are spying for the United States, they are giving 
us the information that we need to be safe, but the Clinton 
administration says, thanks,

[[Page 1642]]

but no thanks. You have a dark record in your background, you are out 
of here, leaving these people in no man's land and saying, well, let me 
see. I was a bad guy, I came over to the good side, and now you are 
cutting me loose.
  It was a chilling effect for the work of the CIA and the people that 
were doing the work in the CIA. It was a chilling effect, obviously, 
for those spies who were spying for us and now were cut off; and the 
basic message was, you are not good people to do business with. They 
think, one day you are going to use us, and the next day we are out in 
the cold.
  We get to 2000. And I wonder how many people in Saddam's cabinet 
room, when we watch him sitting at the table, I wonder how many of them 
had clean human rights records. I mean, remember, they hung thousands 
of people in their jails. There is evidence they might have used 
chemical or biological testing on some of their prisoners. They killed 
over 300,000 of their own people. They gassed the Kurds, they gassed 
the Iranians. Sitting in that room, I do not think there were a lot of 
Eagle Scouts. I yield to my colleague.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, there is no question that I am sure there 
were no Eagle Scouts. When we are dealing with an international 
terrorist, a brutal, rogue dictator like Saddam Hussein and the 
terrorists associated with him, the only thing they understand is an 
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. And it is like our military 
leaders have said many times in testifying before Congress, before 
committees, before the Committee on Armed Services, if the die-hards 
insist, they are going to die hard, and we have given it to them. I 
commend the President for that, and I think this world is a safer place 
because of it. It is not over, and we do not need to be thinking about 
an exit strategy until it is over. Our men and women deserve better 
than that. Many of them have paid the ultimate sacrifice, and they 
deserve a victory, and we shall have a victory.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, candidate Governor Bush in 1999, he echoed 
the understanding of the threat that President Clinton, Vice President 
Gore, and others laid out. He called to mind an earlier time when free 
people were confronted with what he called rapid change and momentous 
choices. In was the 1930s, Nazi Germany is rearming, the British are 
reluctant to respond. Winston Churchill outlines to the people, the 
United Kingdom, what they are facing. Winston Churchill: ``The era of 
procrastination, of half measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, 
of delays is coming to a close. In its place, we are entering a period 
of consequences.''
  For the United States, that day of consequences, the day where we 
suffered the consequences of half measures, of soothing and baffling 
expedience, of delays through the 1990s, we suffered that day of 
consequence on 9-11, 2001.
  We want to move on a little bit and talk a little bit about what Dr. 
Kay has found relative to what the National Intelligence Estimate 
indicated we might find, and this is the backdrop of what President 
Clinton outlined during the 1990s and the Clinton administration 
outlined during the 1990s about the dangers of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 
It is in the backdrop of what happened on 9-11, 2001; and the National 
Intelligence Estimate indicated that since inspections ended in 1998, 
Iraq has maintained its chemical and biological weapons effort. What 
has Dr. Kay found? This is from a statement by Dr. Kay on the ``Interim 
Progress Report.'' He talks about discovering dozens of WMD-related 
program activities. Concealment efforts. So it is very, very public 
that Dr. Kay has recognized and found that the National Intelligence 
Estimate said Iraq has maintained its chemical and biological weapons 
effort programs. I did not say weapons; I said programs. It is exactly 
what Dr. Kay found when he got to Iraq.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, in regard to that, I just wanted to point 
out, and I started to mention this a little bit earlier, that Dr. Kay 
was a consultant to the Iraqi Survey Group. The Iraqi Survey Group is 
1,300 individuals in Iraq continuing, as we speak tonight, continuing 
to look for weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi Survey Group is not 
led by consultant Dr. David Kay; the Iraqi Survey Group is commanded by 
Lieutenant General Keith Dayton. Dr. Kay worked for General Dayton as a 
consultant, and General Dayton told a group of us when we were in Iraq 
over the Christmas season that Dr. Kay had been out of Iraq for over a 
month, and I do not think that Dr. Kay has been back in Iraq since that 
time.
  So it is very possible that he does not actually know what the Iraqi 
Survey Group is doing and what they are finding right now. I will tell 
my colleagues one thing that they are finding. We talk about weapons of 
mass destruction. If we want to very narrowly define that as chemical 
weapons or nerve gas or biological anthrax, that is one definition of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  But I am going to tell my colleagues, the ultimate weapon of mass 
destruction was found in Iraq; and he was in a little hole just south 
of Tikrit, and we got rid of him. And in the process of looking for 
these other weapons of mass destruction, what have we found? Hundreds, 
literally hundreds of mass graves with thousands, hundreds of thousands 
of people, his own people that Saddam had gassed, and also untold 
numbers of caches of weapons of conventional destruction. My colleagues 
tell me one of these road-side devices is not a weapon of mass 
destruction or a shoulder-mounted SA-7 rocket from Russia or a grenade 
launcher? Absolutely. We are finding and destroying as we continue to 
seek, and I truly believe that we will find those chemical and 
biological weapons.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, the National 
Intelligence Estimate said, if left unchecked, Iraq probably will have 
a nuclear weapon during this decade.
  Here is what Dr. Kay had to say, George Stephanopoulos, October 5, 
2003: ``I think if they had, if someone had given them the enriched 
material or the plutonium, I think that it would have taken them a year 
or less to fabricate a weapon from that material. They had the 
capability, they had the knowledge, once given the proper material to 
very quickly develop a nuclear weapon.''
  I yield to my colleague from Georgia.
  Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Speaker, this is a comment, speaking of Dr. Kay's 
report, here is what Dr. Kay says, among many things that Dr. Kay is 
saying. There is something to link them, Saddam, to weapons of mass 
destruction, and that is the equipment. The equipment was on the 
prohibited list that had to be declared. The fact that they did not 
declare the equipment, not only did they not declare it, it was 
imported equipment. A lot of it we dated was imported from after 1998 
in spite of U.N. sanctions.
  He went on to say, another quote from Dr. Kay: ``We tend to, when we 
analyze a failure, look at our own failures and forget there is another 
side to the equation.''
  Again, this is Dr. Kay: ``I am convinced the Iraqis tried to deceive 
us and, in part, they tried to deceive us and others into believing 
that they really did have those weapons.''
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, here we have NIE key judgments: In view of 
most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
  Here is the interview, or here is his testimony in front of the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services last week or a week and a half ago. 
The NIE concluded that Iraq could build its first nuclear weapons when 
it acquires efficient weapons-grade material. Do you think that is 
accurate?
  Kay: Yes. You have to realize that this was a country that had 
designed and gone through a decade-long nuclear program. They knew the 
secrets.
  Mr. Speaker, much of the assessment that was done, the National 
Intelligence Estimate, was pretty accurate. Obviously, the expectation 
of finding stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, I thought we 
would find them quicker. We have not found them. Dr. Kay believes that 
there is a high probability that they do not exist and we may not find 
them, but recognizes that

[[Page 1643]]

he has talked about and he has seen the Iraqis' ability to gut, and 
they looted their information files and burned the records, destroyed 
the records.

                              {time}  1845

  They were great at denial and deception. They loved to bury things. 
Not only did Saddam Hussein go in a spider hole, but they took Mig-29s, 
pulled them out in the countryside, dug a hole, had the cockpit open 
and filled them with sand and dirt and buried them. There were things 
that were moved to Syria.
  I think Dr. Kay with the interviews and things he has done has a very 
good assessment, but he will acknowledge that the search is not 
complete. That particular part he says is 85 percent complete, but 
there will always be a level of uncertainty because of how well the 
Iraqis did denial and deception.
  Mr. GINGREY. He went on to say, and again this is part of the Dr. 
Kay's report, ``The surprising thing we have found in the biological 
program is a vast network of laboratories. It is now over two dozen 
labs that were not declared to the U.N. even though they had equipment 
and were clearly conducting activities that were declarable. Now, quite 
frankly, we are not sure fully what they were doing right now. They had 
biological and chemical production equipment in them. Most of them are 
relatively small by historic Iraqi standards. They are mostly in houses 
and residential areas. Some are in business establishments. One was in 
a hospital. These are facilities that at the minimum carried out 
research and development and kept the scientific skill level.''
  When you think about the fact that it took us months and months to 
find Saddam in the country, a country the size of California, buried in 
a six-by-three-foot hole south of Tikrit, and probably would not have 
found him without accurate, absolutely, the most accurate human 
intelligence, I do not think it is surprising that we are having 
difficulty finding these weapons of mass destruction.
  There are any number of things that he could have done with them, 
from shipping them out of the country, to destroying them, to burying 
them, to putting them in very small vials. It does not take a 
footlocker to store some of these weapons of mass destruction. They are 
easily hidden.
  So we need to keep looking, absolutely. The Iraqi Survey Group under 
General Dayton will continue that search.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for joining me in 
this Special Order this evening. I think we firmly established that the 
record clearly outlines that, for the last decade and more, Iraq has 
been identified as a terrorist regime, dangerous to its neighbors, its 
own people and the rest of the world.
  As a matter of fact, I think in one of the quotes that the gentleman 
went through, then-Senator Al Gore attacked the previous Bush 
administration for not doing enough to rein in Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 
And this was a President who took them to war once and that was not 
enough. This was an administration that talked about attacking 
unilaterally.
  The Clinton administration laid the foundation for the dangers of the 
Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein. They did not respond. September 11 
happened. It is a whole new world. The threat was outlined. The 
intelligence was there. The President responded. And the Iraqi people, 
as the gentleman and I have found out as we have gone over there, the 
Iraqi people are better off and are thankful that Saddam has been 
removed from power and that they can move and move forward in building 
a free and democratic Iraq.

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