[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 25890-25891]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               GEORGIA AND THE TRUTH ABOUT SOUTH OSSETIA

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the republic of 
Georgia, America's ally in the war on terror and partner in Iraq.
  I am not sure if you are aware of this, but the republic of Georgia 
has dispatched 150 of its troops to participate in the coalition that 
liberated Iraq and is now assisting in the rebuilding of that country. 
Last month, the Georgian government announced that it would nearly 
quintuple its number of forces in Iraq.
  In recent weeks, much has been heard and seen of the political crisis 
in Ukraine. A little more than 1 year ago, a similar crisis befell 
Georgia following its November presidential election. As with Ukraine, 
the election results appeared rigged in favor of the ruling party 
candidate.
  As we all know, the people of Georgia, through a group of brave, 
young reformers, patriots, and democrats, brought about historic 
political change in that country. Known now as the Rose Revolution, the 
forces of democracy, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, prevailed in Georgia 
and forced then-President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. During the 
past year, President Saakashvili's government has dramatically reformed 
the Georgian government, instituting far-reaching political, economic, 
and legal reforms. And, just last month, the U.S. Senate passed S. Res. 
472 honoring the 1-year anniversary of the Rose Revolution and 
recognizing the achievements the Georgian government has made in 
democratizing that country.
  I would like to focus the remainder of my remarks on a small region 
in the republic of Georgia called South Ossetia, a place I'm sure 
relatively few Americans have heard of. But the potential for violence 
in this region was highlighted by the vicious terrorist attack in 
September of this year against a school in North Ossetia--in Beslan, 
Russia, just over the border from Georgian South Ossetia.
  In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and many republics gained 
independence, including Georgia. But almost since the beginning, some 
in Russia did not accept the end of the Soviet empire. Russian overt 
and covert pressure worked to undermine the new-found sovereignty among 
bordering countries. No former republic was subject to more pressure 
than Georgia. Russia refused to withdraw its troops--a refusal that 
continues even today, some 13 years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.
  In South Ossetia (in north central Georgia), as well as in Abkhazia 
(in western Georgia), disputes broke out shortly after independence. In 
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian forces aided ethnic 
separatists as a way to weaken Georgia. They sent arms, money, 
``volunteers'' and military advisers. In South Ossetia, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin negotiated a ceasefire in 1992 and forced 
Georgia to accept Russian and North Ossetian ``peacekeepers.'' In 1994, 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE) took 
responsibility for diplomatic efforts and monitoring in South Ossetia 
with the full support of the Georgian government. In 1999, the OSCE 
added monitoring of the Chechen-Georgian border, and later the Ingush 
and Dagestani portions of the Georgian border.
  For 10 years following the OSCE's involvement in South Ossetia, 
several things happened. First, it became clear that the OSCE was 
unwilling or unable to take effective measures to resolve the 
separatist conflict--chiefly because Russia has a veto in the OSCE. The 
``peacekeeping'' force has the Georgians out-numbered and out-gunned by 
South Ossetians, North Ossetians, and Russians. Any effort to expand 
the OSCE beyond its limited monitoring role or limited geographical 
area is opposed by Russia. The OSCE mission is unable to monitor 
Russian violations of Georgian airspace and only rarely uncovers 
illegal arms shipments. While individuals working in the OSCE mission 
perform admirably under difficult conditions, the unavoidable fact 
remains: the OSCE mission in Georgia is deeply and structurally flawed.
  The second major development was in the economy of South Ossetia. 
Deeply isolated from the rest of Georgia but having a land link to the 
Russian Federation, South Ossetia became a giant smuggler's market--in 
effect criminalizing its entire economy. Cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, 
arms, and foodstuffs all came in duty-and-tax free. A massive open-air 
black market operated with impunity in Tskhinvali, the provincial 
capital of South Ossetia. Profit from the contraband smuggling and sale 
was distributed among Russian border guards, Russian military officers, 
and corrupt South Ossetian officials. Some foreign diplomats even 
suggested this smugglers paradise was positive because it provided 
employment and low-cost goods.
  Earlier this summer, Georgian President Saakashvili decided the long-
festering status quo was unacceptable--as it would be to the head of 
state of any democracy. What leader could tolerate separatists armed 
and sustained by a foreign power, the same foreign power that refuses 
to withdraw its own illegally stationed troops? What leader could 
tolerate a massive contraband market supplied directly from Russian 
territory and operating under the noses of international monitors? What 
leader could tolerate threats against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia 
while foreign ``volunteers'' from Kuban, Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester 
arrived to fight Georgians--as happened in July 2004? What leader could 
tolerate separatists whose loyalty is to a foreign country and whose 
closest connections are with the intelligence services and criminal 
mafias of that country?
  It should surprise no one that President Saakashvili began to take 
steps for the peaceful reincorporation of South Ossetia into Georgia. 
It should surprise no one that the Russian media portrayed President 
Saakashvili as rash, reckless, and irresponsible for his efforts. 
Surprisingly, Russian propaganda was picked up by some in the western 
media who portrayed democratically elected President Saakashvili's 
efforts toward national integration as impulsive or erratic. They were 
not. They were a legitimate effort to reach a peaceful resolution in 
accordance with international law.
  In July, South Ossetian forces captured Georgian policemen operating 
legally in Georgian territory. The Georgian police were disarmed, 
detained, and paraded in a deliberately humiliating fashion--made to 
kneel in the town square before Ossetian women while TV cameras filmed 
everything. Yet, Georgia did not retaliate. In July, Georgian forces 
intercepted an illegal shipment of air-to-ground missiles for 
helicopters. The Russians claimed they were for their ``peacekeepers'' 
who didn't even have helicopters--a claim so dubious as to be 
ludicrous. Yet, the Georgians promptly offered to return the missiles 
to the Russians.

[[Page 25891]]

  Despite relentless provocations, Georgia continues to search for a 
peaceful political solution. President Saakashvili has offered far-
reaching autonomy status for South Ossetia, including complete freedom 
to use the Ossetian language--the issue that originally sparked 
conflict in 1991. Georgia has continually tried to expand the mandate 
and mission of the OSCE, including monitoring of the vital road link at 
the Roki tunnel between Georgia and Russia. Russia blocks any 
expansion, and the OSCE remains paralyzed.
  This is where things stand today. On one side is a democratic ally of 
the United States backed by international law. On the other side is a 
criminal regime sustained by Russians who have not reconciled 
themselves to the loss of the Soviet Empire. The United States needs to 
do more to help our Georgian friends. We should work with the European 
Union on a joint diplomatic approach so that democratic Georgia is not 
outnumbered and to avoid the ever-present Russian veto. In the OSCE and 
the U.N., we should push for expanded monitoring and for genuine 
peacekeeping forces independent of Russian military and intelligence 
forces. If this draws a Russian veto, let Russia explain its veto. In 
the wake of appropriate sympathy for all the Russian victims of 
separatist terrorism, we should force Russia to explain and justify its 
continued support for separatists in Georgia. We must also be clear 
about the ultimate outcome. There will be no independence and there 
will be no incorporation into Russia for South Ossetia. The only 
solution for South Ossetia is within a sovereign Georgia.
  Finally, the U.S. should increase our assistance to Georgia, 
especially our military assistance. The Georgia Train and Equip 
Program, GTEP, was very successful in improving Georgian capabilities 
so that terrorists in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge were killed, apprehended, 
or forced out. Unfortunately, GTEP was halted after the training of one 
battalion. GTEP should be reinstated to further increase Georgian 
capabilities. A strong Georgia is the best guarantee of deterring 
Russian or South Ossetian military action. A strong and secure Georgia 
is the best guarantee for the patience required for a multilateral 
diplomatic solution. And a strong and secure Georgia is in America's 
interest. Despite all the problems Georgia faces internally and 
externally, they have deployed troops to fight at our side in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. Georgia is a steadfast ally in the war on 
terror.

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