[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 25877-25878]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL TASK FORCE REPORT

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I commend to my colleagues the November 
2004 Task Force Report of the Foreign Affairs Council entitled 
``Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent 
Assessment.''
  This nonpartisan report prepared under of the sponsorship of the 
Council and on behalf of the 11 organizations that comprise the Council 
represents the work of some of the most distinguished leaders in our 
Nation's foreign policy establishment.
  The report chronicles the impressive achievements of Secretary Powell 
and Deputy Secretary Armitage and their team over the last 4 years.
  One of Secretary Powell's greatest achievements was his effort to 
reform the leadership culture of the State Department. Through an 
increased focus on the management, training and empowerment of the 
Department's Foreign Service officers and civil servants, the Secretary 
strengthened the team of individuals who execute our Nation's foreign 
policy. Secretary Powell complemented these management changes with key 
steps to raise morale and foster team spirit.
  The Secretary has been personally committed to working with 
interested Members of Congress to strengthen the Department over the 
past 4 years. He most notably worked to improve diplomatic readiness 
including: the hiring of new officers, a commitment to long-term 
training, especially language training; and significant improvements in 
information technology infrastructure. He addressed staff shortages 
stemming from budget cuts in the Nineties by recruiting and hiring more 
Foreign Service officers, consular officers, and diplomatic security 
personnel. In the area of information technology, Secretary Powell 
provided desktop access to the Internet for all State Department 
employees worldwide and developed a state-of-the-art messaging system 
to replace the current World War II telegram system. Most recently, he 
decided to strengthen the Department's capacity to play a major role in 
planning, organizing and leading the civilian component of 
stabilization and reconstruction operations.
  Secretary Powell worked to overcome a crisis in embassy construction 
and security in which only one new safe and functional embassy was 
being built each year. The State Department is currently managing $4 
billion in construction projects in comparison to the $700 million when 
Secretary Powell took office. Committed to improvements in embassy 
security, the Secretary has overseen the construction of 13 embassies 
in 2-year period--completing these projects on time and under budget. 
Twenty-six additional embassy projects are currently underway. With 
Congressional support for full funding, this building program can be 
completed and all our departments and agencies operating overseas will 
enjoy safer and more functional work environments as soon as possible.
  The foreign policy achievements of Secretary Powell are many. Soon 
after assuming his post, the Secretary adeptly managed the crisis over 
the shoot down of an American P-3 aircraft over China. He has worked 
tirelessly to achieve United States objectives in the war on terrorism. 
He has sought to strengthen important relationships with Russia, China, 
India, Pakistan, and has provided critical support for further 
expansion of NATO. The Secretary has exhibited distinguished leadership 
promoting United States interests around the globe. He has represented 
our country honorably and ably overseas and is widely known and admired 
on every continent.
  Secretary Powell has also worked to strengthen relations on the 
domestic front. Upon assuming his position, the Secretary committed to 
improving relations between the State Department and the Congress. I 
think many who have worked with the Secretary during his tenure would 
attest to the achievement of this goal.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in commending Secretary Powell on his 
success and in wishing him well in any future endeavor he undertakes.
  I ask unanimous consent that the executive summary of this report be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment--
                             November 2004


                           executive summary

       In the summer of 2000 some 1,400 Foreign Service personnel, 
     a quarter of the officer corps, attached their names to an 
     Internet protest of their working conditions. In early 2004 
     the State Department had 200 Civil and Foreign Service 
     volunteers, more than it could handle, for the 146 positions 
     it was opening in Baghdad. The difference was Colin Powell 
     and the gifted team of senior managers he assembled at the 
     State Department.
       Secretary Powell arrived at the State Department determined 
     to fix a broken institution. He launched a two-pronged 
     strategy. First, change the leadership culture so that 
     managers at all levels focus on training, empowering and 
     taking care of their people. Second, remedy critical 
     management deficiencies: (1) restore diplomatic readiness by 
     rebuilding State's staff; (2) give State modern information 
     technology (IT); (3) focus on security of the nation (visas 
     and passports), of information and of Americans abroad, 
     including U.S. government employees (also involves holding 
     overseas staffs to the minimum necessary--right-sizing); (4) 
     assure safe, healthy and secure facilities, especially 
     overseas buildings; and (5) relate budgets to agreed 
     strategies, policies and priorities. Visa and passport 
     security required reshaping consular affairs to deal with the 
     post-


[[Page 25878]]

     9/11 world. Secretary Powell also had to address two other 
     major management issues: improving State's congressional 
     relations and overhauling public diplomacy following the 1999 
     merger of USIA into State.
       The accomplishments are extraordinary:
       Employees at all levels, Foreign Service and Civil Service 
     alike, feel empowered and respected. Morale is robust. ``One 
     Mission, One Team'' has taken root as a value.
       Leadership and management training are now mandatory for 
     all mid-level and senior officers. Career candidates for 
     Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) appointments have 
     the inside track if they have demonstrated leadership 
     qualities. The Foreign Service employee representative, the 
     American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), wants to write 
     this practice into the permanent rulebook.
       Congress has given State virtually all of the resources 
     Secretary Powell requested. Congress understands that the 
     increases for diplomatic readiness, information technology, 
     overseas buildings and diplomatic security are permanent 
     parts of the budget, not one-time catch-up costs.
       State has achieved most of its Diplomatic Readiness 
     Initiative (DRI) staffing goals. With its new, first-rate 
     recruitment and marketing program, State has redressed in 
     three years almost the entire personnel deficit of the 1990s 
     (some 2,000 employees hired above attrition) and increased 
     the diversity and quality of Foreign Service officers and 
     specialists.
       All the hardware for modern IT is now installed and on a 
     four-year replacement cycle. All desks are finally linked 
     worldwide. Information security is greatly enhanced. A new, 
     robust, state-of-the-art message and archiving system (SMART) 
     is being tested to do away with yesteryear's inadequate 
     telegrams and their risky distribution and storage.
       The new Overseas Buildings Office (OBO) has completed 13 
     safe, secure, functional buildings in two years and under 
     budget. Twenty-six more are on the way. This contrasts with 
     the pre-2002 rate of about one building per year. Congress 
     and OMB have praised OBO effusively. Security upgrades have 
     thwarted terrorist attacks at several posts.
       The Deputy Secretary personally chairs the senior reviews 
     of the Bureaus' Performance Plans (BPPs--policy-related 
     budgets) and the bureaus in turn hold ambassadors accountable 
     for their Mission Performance Plans (MPPs).
       The senior reviews include USAID. There is a first-ever 
     five-year Joint State-USAID Strategic Plan. And the new 
     State-USAID Joint Management Councils, one for policy and one 
     for management operations, are running effectively.
       There are experiments with ``virtual posts'' which aid 
     ``right-sizing'' and public diplomacy (15 of them as of 
     October 2004--see p. 6).
       Administrative operations at six embassies have qualified 
     for ISO 9000 certification (p. 12), a point of pride, 
     efficiency and service. The goal is to certify for ISO 9000 
     all administrative functions at all posts, meaning that all 
     administrative functions at all posts meet ISO (International 
     Organization for Standardization) criteria for certification 
     for administrative excellence.
       Visa operations use new IT systems and rigorously carry out 
     post-9/11 security requirements--sometimes to the detriment 
     of other U.S. programs and interests, despite energetic 
     leadership efforts to maintain ``open doors'' along with 
     ``secure borders.''
       Many of the management improvements are institutionally 
     well-rooted, partly because the new Foreign Service cohorts 
     will demand that they stay. But many are vulnerable in a 
     budget crisis, and others require more work. Key tasks:
       1. State must maintain its partnership with Congress. 
     Secretary Powell has been the critical actor in this regard, 
     but he also has enabled his senior and mid-level subordinates 
     to carry much of the load. This practice must continue.
       2. Integration of public diplomacy into the policy process 
     is still deficient. Experimentation on multiple fronts is 
     needed to make the public diplomacy function more effective. 
     Ideas include training, expansion of the ways public 
     diplomacy officers relate to the Under Secretary for Public 
     Diplomacy, and aggressive action to make public diplomacy a 
     part of all policy development.
       3. State's public affairs efforts need to go beyond 
     explaining current policies to the public. They need to 
     engage the public on a sustained basis regarding what the 
     Department of State is and what its people do, especially 
     overseas, as a way to build public confidence in the 
     institution and confidence in the policies it is explaining 
     and carrying out.
       4. Diplomatic readiness is incomplete, budget outlooks are 
     grim, and there are new needs: positions to replace those 
     reprogrammed from diplomatic readiness to cover Iraq and 
     Afghanistan; positions to provide surge capacity for crises; 
     and positions to staff the new, congressionally-proposed 
     Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. State 
     should develop a ready reserve of active-duty personnel who 
     have strong secondary skills in critical fields, plus a 
     select cadre of recallable retirees with like skills (see 
     Appendix A). Continuous attention to the recruitment system 
     is needed to remain competitive. And State must protect its 
     training resources, including those for hard language and 
     leadership/management training, from raids to cover 
     operational emergencies. Sending people abroad without the 
     requisite training is like deploying soldiers without 
     weapons.
       5. State must update its overseas consular staffing model 
     to account for post-9/11 changes in workloads and procedures, 
     so that the U.S. can truly have both ``safe borders and open 
     doors''.
       6. State has to find a way to staff hardship posts 
     adequately, using directed assignments if necessary in order 
     to assure Service discipline.
       7. State has some distance to go before it reaps the full 
     benefit of its new IT systems. The SMART system is almost a 
     year behind schedule, albeit for good reasons. More formal 
     training of users is needed and a cadre of IT coaches 
     (today's secretaries?) should be developed to help overseas 
     users. A common computerized accounting and control 
     application is still being developed: the Joint [State-USAID] 
     Financial Management System (JFMS). It is overdue.
       8. ``Right-sizing''--aligning the U.S. government presence 
     abroad to reflect our national priorities and to attain 
     policy objectives as efficiently as possible--has barely 
     begun. It should be pursued in multiple venues: interagency 
     capital cost-sharing for overseas buildings; wider use of 
     ``virtual posts'' (see p. 6); conscious use of MPPs and, with 
     White House support, the BPP senior reviews to manage the 
     overseas presence of all U.S. agencies; completion of State's 
     regional support center program; and ISO 9000 certification 
     for all overseas administrative operations that have 
     ``critical mass.''
       9. Future Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Under 
     Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries must engage fully in 
     management and leadership processes as well as in 
     congressional relations.
       10. Finally, Congress and the executive branch have a 
     series of management issues they need to examine together, 
     including: the long-term relationship between State, USAID 
     and other U.S. assistance vehicles (e.g., Millennium 
     Challenge, U.S. Global AIDS program), and where in the budget 
     and the appropriations structure it is most appropriate to 
     fund State and USAID (perhaps merged under a separate 
     ``national security account'').

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