[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 19]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 25380-25381]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                    DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, November 19, 2004

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, as the 108th Congress comes to 
an end, I want to make some observations about democratization in 
Central Asia, an energy-rich and geo-strategically important region. 
All these states are ruled by secular leaders who cooperate with 
Washington against terrorists. There are U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, to help promote stabilization in Afghanistan. This 
collaboration benefits us, as well as Central Asian presidents, and 
should certainly continue. But unfortunately, these countries are some 
of the worst human rights violators in the OSCE space. Everywhere in 
the region, super-presidents dominate the political arena, with 
parliaments and judicial systems dependent on the executive branch. 
Media are under heavy government pressure; in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, Soviet-era censorship continues in force. Equally 
characteristic of Central Asian states is corruption, which has not 
only enriched the ruling families and the favored few at the top but 
has impeded the development of free media and independent courts.
  True, much of this characterization could be said about all the post-
Soviet states to some degree, including Russia. But it is important to 
point out that there is a counter, or competing tendency in the region, 
exemplified by Georgia's Rose Revolution of a year ago. While Georgia 
has a long way to go, there is no doubt about the legitimacy or 
popularity of its leader, President Mikheil Saakashvili. Also the 
peaceful protest movement he led to overturn the results of a rigged 
election has emboldened opposition activists throughout the former 
Soviet Union to believe that society may yet be able to have a voice in 
who governs and how.
  Central Asian leaders were quick to claim that circumstances in 
Georgia were so different from their own that no parallels were 
possible. Still, the Georgian example sent shivers down their spines. 
That is one reason why the elections in Central Asia that have taken 
place this year have been, as they were in the past, carefully 
controlled, with predictable outcomes.
   Uzbekistan, for example, is holding parliamentary election in 
December. No opposition parties have been allowed to operate in 
Uzbekistan since 1992-1993. Despite pressure from Washington, Tashkent 
refused to register opposition parties this year, leaving only five 
pro-government parties to participate. Moreover, Uzbek authorities have 
contrived to keep opposition candidates from registering in single 
mandate races--even though officials told the U.S. Delegation to the 
OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Review Meeting in Warsaw in October 
that opposition candidates would be able to run. The result is obvious 
in advance: another pro-government, pocket parliament, with no 
dissenting voices and no capacity to perform any oversight of the 
executive branch. It should be noted that there have been several 
outbursts of popular dissatisfaction in Uzbekistan in the last few 
months; President Islam Karimov's tightly-run political system may be 
less stable than many suppose.
  In neighboring, oil-rich Kazakhstan, opposition parties are 
registered and were able to compete in September's parliamentary 
election. Kazakhstan had previously expressed its desire to become OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office in 2009, and many observers linked Kazakhstan's 
chances to a good grade on the parliamentary election. But the 
assessment of OSCE and Council of Europe monitors--citing numerous 
infractions and an uneven playing field for pro-government parties and 
the opposition--was critical. Kazakhstan's chances of winning the OSCE 
Chairmanship have clearly diminished. At the same time, President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev--who is under investigation for corruption by the 
U.S. Department of Justice--has announced his intention to run, yet 
again, for reelection in 2006. Some commentators speculate that he may 
hold snap elections next year, to keep his opposition off guard. Should 
he win and serve out another seven-year term, he will have been in 
office almost 25 years.
  Obviously, Mr. Speaker, Central Asian leaders do not find the 
responsibilities of the presidency too burdensome: Tajikistan's 
President Imomaly Rakhmonov last year orchestrated a referendum on 
constitutional changes that could allow him to remain in office until 
2020. True, Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia where 
Islamic political activism is tolerated. We await with interest the 
parliamentary elections, in which opposition and Islamic parties will 
participate, scheduled for next February.
  As for Turkmenistan, one of the most repressive countries on earth, 
I'm pleased to note that freedom of religion advanced a bit. The 
government of President Saparmurat Niyazov took some steps to 
liberalize the process of registration for confessions--instead of 500 
adult members per locality, now only five nationwide are needed to 
register a community. For years, only Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodoxy 
were legal; now Ashgabat has registered Baptists, Adventists, Hare 
Krishna's, and Baha'is. Moreover, the authorities released six 
Jehovah's Witnesses, although two others remain jailed along with the 
former grand mufti. These steps--taken under Western and especially 
U.S. pressure, but which we welcome nonetheless--allowed Turkmenistan 
to escape designation by the U.S. Government as a Country of Particular 
Concern this past year. However, troubling reports continue to emerge 
about limitations on religious freedom and harassment of registered and 
unregistered religious communities. We must continue to monitor the 
situation closely and encourage Turkmenistan to continue moving forward 
with reforms, as even the improved situation is far from meeting OSCE 
standards on religious freedom.
  In all other respects, however, democratization has made no progress. 
Turkmenistan remains the only one-party state in the former Soviet bloc 
and Niyazov's cult of personality continues unabated. Recently, he 
tried to discuss holding presidential elections in 2008. But in a 
farcical scene, the assembled officials

[[Page 25381]]

and dignitaries refused to hear of it. They ``insisted'' that Niyazov 
remain Turkmenistan's leader in perpetuity; he, duly humbled by their 
adulation, took the issue off the table.
  This brings us to Kyrgyzstan, in many ways the most intriguing of the 
Central Asian states. Of all the region's leaders, only President Askar 
Akaev, who has held office for almost 15 years, has announced his 
intention not to run next year for reelection--though he has phrased 
the pledge carefully if he changes his mind. Kyrgyzstan is also the 
only Central Asian country where a large-scale protest movement has 
ever seemed poised to force a Head of State out of office: in summer 
2002, thousands of people furious about the shootings of demonstrators 
in a southern district blocked the country's main road, and threatened 
a mass march on the capital, Bishkek. Ultimately, the movement petered 
out but the precedent of public activism was set.
  President Akaev's stated intention not to run again, the upcoming 
parliamentary (February 2005) and presidential (October 2005) elections 
and Kyrgyzstan's history of protest movements make for an interesting 
situation. In the next few months, Akaev must make fateful decisions: 
the most important is whether or not to run again. If he chooses to 
stay in office for another term, he risks sparking demonstrations. 
Though Kyrgyzstan is not Georgia, something akin to a Rose Revolution 
should not be excluded as a possible scenario. If Akaev opts to step 
down, however, we should not expect that he, his family and entourage 
would permit free and fair elections. More likely, he will try to 
select a successor--as Boris Yeltsin did with Vladimir Putin in 
Russia--and act to ensure his victory. But that course, too, could lead 
to protests.
  Any decision Akaev makes--with intrusive, anxious neighbors looking 
over his shoulder--is risky and might have resonance beyond 
Kyrgyzstan's borders. For that reason, the elections in Kyrgyzstan next 
year are of great interest not only to the voters of that country but 
to capitals near and far. Mr. Speaker, I hope to be able to report to 
this chamber next year that democratization has made strides in Central 
Asia.

                          ____________________