[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 18]
[Senate]
[Pages 24245-24246]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              PRIVATIZATION OF AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today the Transportation Security 
Administration, TSA, will begin receiving applications from U.S. 
airports that wish to participate in the Screener Partnership Program. 
This program will allow airports to hire security screeners employed by 
private-sector companies to provide baggage and passenger security 
screening at their facilities for the first time since September 11, 
2001.
  In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, security screening at U.S. 
airports was federalized because commercial airplanes were turned into 
guided missiles. Those attacks demonstrated that the then current 
airport security system was not working. Less than two weeks later, the 
Government Accountability Office, GAO, testified before the Senate 
Commerce Committee that screeners were deficient at detecting 
threatening objects and were not given sufficient training by employers 
and access controls to secure areas in airports were weak.
  The congressional conferees of the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, ATSA, also concluded that ``a fundamental change (is 
required) in the way (the U.S.) approaches the task of ensuring the 
safety and security of the civil air transportation system.''
  It is the responsibility of the administration and the Congress to 
ensure that aviation security does not fall back to the pre-9/11 status 
quo. Congress understood the need to evaluate how well a federalized 
workforce would compare to a privately employed workforce prior to 
allowing privatization which is why the ATSA included a 3-year screener 
pilot program involving five U.S. airports.
  Despite this pilot program, the Department of Homeland Security 
Inspector General testified at a House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee hearing on April 22, 2004, that there was not 
sufficient basis to determine conclusively whether the pilot airport 
screeners performed at a level equal to or greater than that of the 
federal screeners. GAO, also testifying at the hearing, said, ``Little 
performance data is currently available to compare the performance of 
private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects.'' 
Before the Nation's airports return to commercially hired and trained 
screening workforces, we must make sure there has truly been adequate 
analysis of the performance of private airport screeners prior to 
allowing privatization.
  In a November 16, 2004, press release announcing the commencement of 
its Screener Partnership Program, TSA stated, ``An evaluation earlier 
this year concluded there was little difference in the performance or 
cost of the private and federal screening forces.''
  TSA is relying on a study that both the DHS IG and GAO found to be 
inconclusive. Given the high stakes involved in airport security, I am 
concerned that the decision to begin this program is being made without 
sufficient data.
  In addition, I have concerns about TSA's ability to award and 
administer contracts with private screening companies based on a 
September 2004 DHS IG report that found TSA mismanaged a contract with 
Boeing to install Explosive Detection Systems, EDS, and overpaid Boeing 
by approximately $49 million. According to the IG report, contractor 
performance was not evaluated for each year of the contract until 
approximately a full calendar year later. Most troubling is that TSA 
rejected some of the IG's key criticisms, which makes me question the 
manner in which it will manage future contracts. Moreover, I believe we 
must also consider whether contractual mismanagement could lead to 
lapses in security. Are the right standards and policies in place to 
ensure that private screeners will provide the same security as 
federalized screeners, and is TSA equipped to enforce them?
  As the ranking member of the Financial Management Subcommittee and 
the Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, I have long worked on the 
challenges of Federal acquisitions. I want to make sure that DHS, which 
is a composite of 22 legacy agencies, has the people and tools needed 
to solicit and manage the Screener Partnership Program. Just this week 
I contacted Secretary Ridge to express my concern about the $49 million 
overrun of the Boeing EDS installation contract. That wasted money 
could have gone a long way towards helping Honolulu International 
Airport in my home State of Hawaii install inline EDS machines.
  My interest is to improve the management of contracts and the 
collection of timely and accurate information and to stop erroneous and 
improper payments to contractors. For that reason I was pleased to work 
with my good friend, Senator Fitzgerald, in passing legislation to 
bring the Department of Homeland Security under the Chief Financial 
Officers Act, CFO.

[[Page 24246]]

The Department runs the risk of becoming a morass of hidden contract 
costs and poorly managed programs without a strong CFO to ensure 
accountability and transparency.
  I would, however, like to commend TSA for honoring a commitment made 
by Admiral Stone at his confirmation hearing before the Governmental 
Affairs Committee that Federal screeners at airports which chose to use 
a private workforce give TSA screeners the right of first refusal for 
jobs. It is important that the substantial investment made by the 
Federal Government in the hiring, the training, and the deployment of 
Federal screeners not go to waste.
  I plan to monitor very carefully how this plan develops, both in 
terms of the level of security provided to the traveling public and the 
level of transparency and accountability of the contracts.

                          ____________________