[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 17]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 23243-23244]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       THE SITUATION IN SRI LANKA

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. JAMES A. LEACH

                                of iowa

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 7, 2004

  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my growing concern at 
the increasing levels of politically-motivated violence and the rising 
risks to peace in Sri Lanka.
  As my colleagues may know, Sri Lanka (or Serendib, as it was known in 
older times) is a tear drop shaped island located about 20 miles off 
the southeastern coast of India. The population of about 20 million is 
roughly three-quarters Sinhalese and a little less than 20% Tamil. The 
island was occupied by the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Dutch in 
the 17th century, and then ceded to the British in 1802. Known as 
Ceylon it became independent in 1948; the name of the country was 
changed to Sri Lanka in 1972.
  By way of background, tensions between the Sinhalese majority and 
minority Tamils, which had existed since independence, escalated 
dramatically in the early 1980s. Devastating anti-Tamil riots, as well 
as acts of repression and discrimination by the majority Sinhalese, led 
to the rise of an armed Tamil insurgency. By the mid-1980s, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the strongest Tamil 
separatist force. In a grim harbinger of the Tiger's ruthless reliance 
on violence (which includes the use of ``Black Tiger'' suicide squads), 
the LTTE came to dominate the separatist movement by systematically 
eliminating all rivals for leadership. The LTTE is currently designated 
as a terrorist organization by the United States and several other 
countries.
  Originally, LTTE sought an independent homeland for the Tamils, but 
it eventually dropped that demand and expressed a willingness to 
negotiate devolution of autonomy under a federal model of governance. 
Meanwhile, the human and financial toll of the rebellion has been 
enormous: some 64,000 people have been killed and roughly 800,000 
displaced, with commensurate losses to the island's economic growth and 
development.
  In 2002, Norway brokered a ceasefire, which is still in effect today 
and also acted as a mediator in stalled peace talks. In April 2003, 
however, the LTTE pulled out of the talks, claiming that it was being 
marginalized. In late 2003, the situation was further complicated by a 
political struggle between Sri Lanka's President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
and then Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe. In April 2004, 
Kumaratunga's party defeated Wickramasinghe in the general election and 
an ally of the President became the new prime minister. Although the 
new coalition government includes a hard-line party that is at best

[[Page 23244]]

deeply skeptical of continued negotiations with the insurgents, the 
President has nevertheless remained committed to the peace process and 
invited Norway to approach the LTTE and to resume mediation.
  Prospects for a resumption of dialogue between the government and the 
LTTE at this time, however, appear bleak.
  In the first instance, the LTTE insists that the establishment of an 
interim administration over the ``northeast''--modeled on the LTTE's 
proposed Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) that would give it 
sweeping powers over law enforcement, tax collection, military affairs, 
administration of foreign aid and other matters currently in the domain 
of the central government (GSL)--is an essential precondition for the 
resumption of peace negotiations. While at one level this stance might 
be thought to simply represent a maximalist bargaining position, at 
another level it might be thought to cast serious doubt on the 
sincerity of the LTTE's commitment to the peace process.
  Even more concerning has been the LTTE's assertion that it is 
entitled to act as the ``sole representative'' of the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. In practical terms, the LTTE's diktat means that Tamils who dare 
to advocate democratic change, independently contest elections and 
speak out against or actively oppose the Tigers will be targeted for 
assassination.
  As noted earlier, this despicable practice of eliminating critics 
goes back almost to the group's inception. It has once again become 
acute in the wake of an attempt by a senior LTTE commander named 
Colonel ``Karuna'' to break away from the organization. Beginning in 
March 2004, a new escalation of killings, attacks and abductions of the 
LTTE's suspected opponents began to take place on almost a daily basis. 
For its part, the LTTE reportedly suspects the GSL of assisting the 
Karuna faction. In any case, through mid-August 2004, according to 
human rights advocates, there have been more than 40 such murders.
  As the Indian newspaper The Hindu editorialized on September 30, ``It 
is time for all concerned to acknowledge that the LTTE has done nothing 
less than unleash a terrorist campaign amounting to a sub-guerrilla war 
against the very people it claims to represent. From the recruitment of 
children, which continues unabated despite international outrage, to 
the harassment of Muslims, the discrimination against eastern Tamils, 
and the killings of opponents, the LTTE demonstrates on a daily basis 
that its rule is by fear and terror.''
  In this troubling circumstance, it is clear that the international 
community needs to consider additional steps to put pressure on the 
LTTE to abandon its tactics of terror and prove that its days of 
violence are over.
  It is remarkable, for example, that only four countries--the U.S., 
U.K., Australia, and India--have declared the LTTE to be sponsors of 
terrorism, frozen their assets and prohibited financial transactions 
with the Tigers. It is well reported that alongside a finely tuned 
propaganda campaign, the LTTE also run a sophisticated international 
fundraising campaign. The majority of financial support comes from the 
Tamil Diaspora in countries where there is no ban on transactions with 
the Tigers, including Switzerland, Canada, and the Scandinavian 
countries. It is my understanding that the LTTE's overseas financing 
includes investments in real estate, restaurants, stocks, and money 
market funds. Even film, food festivals, and cultural events may 
contribute to insurgent income. The U.S. Department of State also 
reports that expatriate Tamil communities in Europe have been tied to 
narcotics smuggling, another potential source of funding. In this 
context, surely the stark record of LTTE terrorism demands a firmer 
response from our friends and allies abroad.
  Likewise, in view of the current stalemate in the peace process and 
the new campaign of violence by the LTTE, it is appropriate that the 
U.S. review the adequacy of current levels of security assistance to 
Colombo. In particular, in view of the mixed operational success of the 
armed forces of Sri Lanka, the Department of Defense and U.S. Pacific 
Command may want to consider increasing senior level military exchanges 
as well as boosting technical assistance. In this regard, I understand 
that in recent months senior officials with PACOM visited Sri Lanka, 
including the Jaffna peninsula.
  Similarly, given the long and sordid track record of the Tigers--
including continued abductions of child soldiers--as well as ongoing 
concerns about disappearances and other abuses in government controlled 
areas, it is also high time to place on the table an explicit inclusion 
of human rights and humanitarian considerations in either the current 
cease-fire agreement or in a separate understanding between the GSL and 
the LTTE. All parties must promptly take steps to end ongoing grave 
human rights abuses.
  Finally, it is imperative that all parties take steps to work to 
rebuild trust and schedule the promised talks as soon as possible. In 
particular, it is incumbent on the LTTE to show that it is committed to 
a political solution and to peace. Clearly, the ceasefire and a return 
to negotiations represent the best hope for Sri Lanka's future as a 
peaceful, prosperous, and unified nation. As the Department of State 
has made clear, the United States stands ready to implement commitments 
to aid in Sri Lanka's reconstruction, but this will only be possible 
through a continuation of the peace process.

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