[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 17]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 23242-23243]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




               U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 7, 2004

  Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to draw your attention to a 
shift in U.S. military strategy towards Latin America that has largely 
gone unnoticed. In the last few years the nation has been increasingly 
preoccupied with fighting terrorism, and defense and budgetary 
appropriations have overwhelmingly focused on the Middle East. Yet the 
U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom), encompassing the Caribbean Sea, the 
Gulf of Mexico, and parts of the Atlantic Ocean and monitoring 33 
countries to our south, has quietly expanded its traditional counter-
narcotics mission to that of counter-terrorism operations. All of this 
is occurring in a region more or less devoid of the fundamentalist 
Islamic terrorists currently threatening America. This change in 
approach has gone so far as to redefine terrorism, with drug-runners 
being termed ``narco-terrorists.'' As a result, the U.S. is 
subsequently increasing its assistance to Latin American militaries. 
Since many nations in the region are young and relatively fragile 
democracies, their strengthened armies have raised fears about a 
possible reemergence of limits on free speech, human rights violations 
or even a return to military governments.
  The following research memorandum about Washington's post-transition 
political and economic strategy for the region was authored by Eleanor 
Thomas and Lindsay Thomas, research associates at the Washington-based 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs. The Washington-based Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, 
non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has 
been described on the Senate floor as being ``one of the nation's most 
respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.''

 U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) Struggles to Justify Its Role in the 
                             War on Terror

 This analysis was prepared by Eleanor Thomas and Lindsay Thomas, COHA 
                          Research Associates.

       After decades of U.S. meddling in the Western hemisphere in 
     the course of its Cold War crusade and subsequent War on 
     Drugs, Washington has found a new justification for its 
     heavy-handed intervention in the region. While there is 
     little evidence that the rest of the hemisphere is a breeding 
     ground for anti-American terrorist networks, the U.S. 
     Southern Command (SouthCom) is attempting to promote such a 
     misinterpretation to further its own self-serving agenda and 
     above all, to guarantee its funding. Under its current 
     commander, General James Hill, SouthCom has linked drug 
     trafficking and armed leftist Latin American political 
     movements to terrorist threats against U.S. national 
     security. By extending the definition of terrorism to cover 
     every bellicose act, the White House has rendered the term 
     practically meaningless; it has become the definition du jour 
     to provide Washington with an opportunity to continue its 
     interventionist tactics based upon its antiterrorist crusade.


                          Terrorism Discovered

       Two years ago, SouthCom received Congressional approval for 
     a ``mission expansion.'' Previously largely limited to 
     counter-narcotics activities and the promotion of ``regional 
     cooperation,'' its duties are now increasingly being framed 
     within the War on Terror. According to Lisa Haugaard, 
     Executive Director of the Latin American Working Group, 
     SouthCom is ``clearly using rhetoric to justify [its] 
     budgets.'' In November, General Hill will relinquish his 
     command to Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock, but not 
     before ensuring that SouthCom remains at the forefront of 
     Washington's War on Terror. Through the distortion of the 
     definition of terrorism, the term has become little more than 
     a rhetorical device. By invoking the word ``terrorism'' on 
     Capitol Hill, General Hill and his successor are pursuing 
     additional resources for future expanded military initiatives 
     that will likely strengthen Latin American military 
     establishments, which are too often infamous for their long 
     records of violent oppression during the 1970s and 1980s. 
     This maneuvering can be seen as a purely self-interested 
     tactic that will stress the importance of Latin American 
     armed forces throughout the region.


                   A New Twist to a Familiar Mission

       Since September 11, 2001, national defense priorities and 
     budgetary appropriations have concentrated on U.S. concerns 
     in the Middle East. SouthCom's area of responsibility--
     encompassing all of Central and South America and the 
     Caribbean--has remained of secondary importance as Washington 
     has increasingly defined its international strategy according 
     to the War on Terror. With al Qaeda seen as the gravest 
     threat to U.S. national security, and with Latin America 
     seemingly not a major claimant to such terrorist cells, aside 
     from the tri-border area, SouthCom's operations are not a 
     priority for the Pentagon. Perhaps because of this reduced 
     role, Congress in 2002 granted SouthCom approval to expand 
     its mission priorities. Military aid and training in Latin 
     America, which previously were focused on counter-narcotics 
     operations, have now been re-tasked as counter-terrorism 
     responsibilities. Preying on the terrorist fears that are 
     currently dominating Washington's defense plan, SouthCom 
     claims that it is now pursuing narcoterrorists to justify its 
     expanded congressionally-approved budget.


                          redefining terrorism

       SouthCom's new shift towards terrorism is more ominous than 
     it first appears. In March, General Hill gave his annual 
     report on SouthCom's activities before the House Armed 
     Services Committee. According to his testimony, the commander 
     reported that the U.S. must be alert to two ``growing 
     threats'' to national security: the ``traditional'' danger of 
     ``narcoterrorists and their ilk,'' and the ``emerging'' 
     menace of ``radical populism'' that taps into the ``deep-
     seated frustrations of the failure of democratic reforms.'' 
     Hill's somewhat skewed assessment of the Latin American 
     situation suggests that ultimately any political opposition, 
     arguably a necessary element in any healthy democracy, can be 
     seen as a threat to American national security. The Bush 
     administration over the past years has instructed its 
     ambassadors to Bolivia, Nicaragua and El Salvador to inform 
     local authorities that although Washington respects free 
     elections, it will not necessarily respect electoral results 
     if the ``wrong'' people are elected. Former SouthCom 
     commander General Charles Wilhelm told COHA that while ``I 
     don't think any Latin American countries pose a specific 
     threat... there is a threat to the U.S. if existing 
     democracies are being undermined.'' However, by 
     characterizing the region's struggles for social and economic 
     equality as threats to U.S. security, SouthCom not only could 
     be viewed as erroneously dismissing the importance of such 
     movements, but could also divert attention away from the 
     actual terrorist threats currently directed at the U.S.


                southcom's history of counter operations

       SouthCom's official priorities have historically ranged 
     from ``counter-drug operations'' and ``engineering and 
     medical exercises'' to ``security assistance'' and 
     ``military-to-military contact.'' By aiming to strengthen 
     militaries in the region, SouthCom under Hill has left behind 
     a controversial legacy in Latin America. General Hill's 
     recommendations to Congress and Lieutenant General Craddock's 
     statements during his Senate confirmation hearing showed a 
     firm commitment to ``maintain and broaden our consistent 
     military-to-military contacts as a means of irrevocably 
     institutionalizing the professional nature of those 
     militaries with which we have worked so closely over the past 
     several decades.''
       Because U.S. law prohibits the direct training of foreign 
     armed forces, the U.S. military's involvement in such matters 
     is often classified as ``security assistance.'' However, 
     there are no safeguards in place to ensure that the Pentagon 
     provides Congress with detailed information regarding its 
     participation in current military-to-military interaction. 
     Nor does Congress hold SouthCom closely accountable for its 
     commitment to instruct Latin American militaries in the 
     institutionalization of respect for human rights. It was this 
     existing accountability loophole throughout the 1970s and 
     1980s that allowed the Pentagon, through the infamous School 
     of the Americas as well as bilateral SouthCom missions, to 
     both directly and covertly train the commanders of the death 
     squads associated with Argentina's ``dirty war'' and the 
     brutal contra campaigns that oppressed Nicaragua's civilian 
     population during that country's unforgiving conflict.
       The strengthening of Latin American armed forces to more 
     effectively control drug trafficking, gang violence and so-
     called political insurgents has recently been used to justify 
     SouthCom's new terrorism priorities. This could create a 
     dangerous precedent for the reemergence of the de facto 
     limits on free speech, human rights violations or even a 
     return to the grim days of military rule that so traumatized 
     the region in recent decades. Although violent crime plagues 
     much of Latin America, defining it as a U.S. national 
     security concern, and therefore justifiable as a valid 
     SouthCom mission, will only continue the questionable trend 
     of expanding U.S. military aid, cooperation and training 
     throughout the hemisphere. While many Latin American 
     militaries are still struggling to overcome the bitter 
     effects and damaged reputations resulting from decades of 
     human rights abuses and institutionalized corruption, it may 
     be dangerous to instruct them in anti-terror tactics that 
     could later be used to suppress their own citizens. Without a 
     well-established commitment to protecting civil rights and 
     proper limitations on the autonomy of military institutions, 
     any renewed U.S. effort to fund and train rogue militaries 
     could lead to an expansion of their power and an abuse of 
     their authority, which could hinder the democratic process. 
     Moreover, some Latin American nations have not

[[Page 23243]]

     yet reached a level of political maturation nor have 
     maintained a commitment to democratic principles that are 
     necessary to ensure such abuse will not occur.


          colombia--latin america's supposed terrorist hotbed

       According to General Hill, the ``narcoterrorists in 
     Colombia remain the largest and most well known threat in our 
     region.'' However, Hill fails to support this claim that 
     narcoterrorists pose such a direct security threat to the 
     U.S. In fact, the term narcoterrorist, while full of 
     threatening implications, is rarely clearly defined by the 
     U.S. government and its military agencies. At his 
     confirmation hearing, Lieutenant General Craddock did attempt 
     to define the highly dubious concept: ``the terms insurgents 
     or guerrillas are less applicable today than in the past. I 
     believe the term narcoterrorists is more appropriate, given 
     the fact that the center of gravity for these groups is the 
     incredible financial support they get from illicit drug 
     trafficking.'' The lack of clarity in Craddock's explanation 
     inadvertently reveals how SouthCom arbitrarily reclassified 
     the country's leftist armed political opposition, denominated 
     as guerrillas during the Cold War and drug traffickers in the 
     1990s, as a blanket terrorist threat. In an attempt to link 
     the situation in Colombia to Washington's global mission, 
     Craddock explained, ``supporting the government of Colombia's 
     efforts to defeat illicit narco-trafficking also directly 
     supports the global War on Terror.'' This assertion is a 
     convenient attemot to validate this new allusion without any 
     supporting evidence. The government's arbitrary use of 
     inflammatory language and its efforts to rationalize 
     Washington's allocation of $1.5 billion for Plan Colombia 
     have failed to overcome its disappointing achievements in the 
     War on Terror as Colombia had played no part in the 9/11 
     terrorist attacks.
       For the past four years, the U.S. government has funded 
     Plan Colombia as part of a patently ineffective War on Drugs. 
     Even the head of the White House Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy John Walters, upon returning from a recent 
     South American visit, reported that Washington's anti-drug 
     strategy has failed.
       Despite SouthCom's dubious reports of its strategy's 
     success, Plan Colombia's failures are numerous. Colombia's 
     supply and the U.S.' demand for drugs remain essentially 
     unchanged. While U.S. armed forces are already overextended, 
     SouthCom is now seeking to further involve U.S. military 
     personnel in Colombia's protracted civil war by requesting an 
     increase from 400 to 800 military officers and from 400 to 
     600 private contractors allowed to be present in the country. 
     Critics contend that the now militarized Plan Colombia has 
     failed to effectively address the country's armed forces' 
     proclivity for human rights violations. Additionally, in its 
     own annual human rights report, the State Department has 
     maintained that the U.S.-trained Colombian military continues 
     to associate with illegal rightwing paramilitary groups--
     Colombia's prime human rights violators. This subject is 
     continually under-addressed in SouthCom's public statements. 
     Following in the footsteps of the U.S. Patriot Act, the 
     Colombian Congress has passed anti-terror legislation that 
     allows the military to arbitrarily conduct searches and tap 
     the telephones of citizens without a warrant. U.S. support, 
     along with high funding for Colombia, has contributed to a 
     flawed domestic policy in the South American country. The 
     latest attempts to recast the nation's perpetual unrest as a 
     terrorism problem that threatens U.S. national security not 
     only represents little regard for the facts and a twisting of 
     reality, but is simply the latest stage in the repeating of a 
     foreign policy project that has never worked.


      guantanamo bay--southCom's contribution to the war on terror

       SouthCom's insistence that it is engaged in responsible 
     security practices and upholds human rights values awaits 
     final judgment, especially considering its jurisdiction over 
     the terrorist detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since 
     its creation as a prison facility in 2002, Camp X-ray has 
     faced consistent criticism from groups such as Amnesty 
     International (AI) which claim U.S. officials have sanctioned 
     illegal practices at the facility. Prisoner testimony and 
     photographs have established that suspected al Qaeda 
     detainees have been held without trial or proper legal 
     representation and may have suffered some of the same torture 
     tactics that took place at the now infamous Abu Ghraib prison 
     in Iraq. AI alleged in its report that ``despite public 
     commitments to the humane treatment of detainees, it 
     subsequently has been revealed that the U.S. administration's 
     decision not to apply provisions of the Geneva Conventions to 
     those being held in Guantanamo may have been motivated by a 
     desire to apply harsher interrogation techniques than it 
     perceived would be allowed under the Geneva Conventions.'' 
     Though SouthCom officers may be just one link in the chain of 
     command, the detention facility is ultimately located within 
     its region of responsibility. While SouthCom continues to 
     lobby Congress for increased funding, Camp X-ray remains a 
     glaring black mark that contrasts with SouthCom's professed 
     support for legal procedures and human rights practices.


              finding the causes, not just the terrorists

       In the tumultuous history of U.S.-Latin American relations, 
     Washington has developed a strategy wherein various political 
     and military means have been used to deal with a range of 
     challenges and security threats posed by its southern 
     neighbors. As the world leader in the war on Communism, the 
     United States carried out regime change in Latin America with 
     singular tenacity. This included the training of the 
     Nicaraguan contras, the support of brutal dictatorships in 
     Guatemala, the endorsement of General Augusto Pinochet's 
     repressive regime in Chile, and the backing of the 
     particularly savage Argentina military junta after it came to 
     power in 1976.
       In an attempt to adapt to its post-9/11 anti-terrorism 
     focus, the U.S. has amalgamated drug trafficking and 
     ``radical populism'' into its terrorist fighting tactics. 
     This has been particularly evident in its policy formulations 
     regarding Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela. While the previous 
     eras, inspired first by the Cold War and then by the War on 
     Drugs, turned out to be based on a very sketchy rationale, 
     they were more solidly rooted than the current War on Terror. 
     Domestic conflicts throughout Latin America do not arise out 
     of thin air. The urgent social conditions and volatile 
     political environs that went unacknowledged by the U.S. in 
     previous decades account for the instability that the region 
     is currently experiencing. The causative agents behind the 
     new threat of terrorism are no different. As the Latin 
     American Working Group argues in its report on terrorism, 
     ``while law enforcement action against terrorists is 
     essential, the most sustainable way to combat broader support 
     for terrorist activities is to address the conditions that 
     foster it--poverty, lack of social and economic development, 
     and undemocratic and repressive regimes that leave their 
     citizens scant hope of bettering their lives, and hence open 
     space for those offering extreme alternatives.''

                          ____________________