[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 22094-22105]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 10.

                              {time}  0915


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community, 
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and 
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, 
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on the 
legislative day of Thursday, October 7, 2004, amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 108-571 by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder) had 
been disposed of.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House 
Report 108-751.


                  Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Kirk:
       Page 60, after line 9, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 1018. REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
                   INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
     practicality of integrating the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration into the intelligence community.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment corrects a critical problem with our 
intelligence community and adds a needed bipartisan recommendation to 
the reforms we have in the underlying legislation. We have known for 
quite some time that the sale of elicit narcotics and terrorism go hand 
in hand. This link is now firm and is clear with regard to the 
terrorist activities and terrorist groups in Colombia. It is also clear 
in Peru, but this phenomenon has spread far beyond Latin America and is 
evident in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  Earlier this year, I traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the key 
frontier border area of such concern to the United States, and there I 
learned a new fact, that Osama bin Laden's connection to his family 
fortune has been reduced. His connection to donations to the United 
States and Europe has been reduced, but he has a new source of income. 
Osama bin Laden is now becoming one of the world's largest dealers in 
heroin. Through just one of his supply organizations, bin Laden's 
lieutenants are earning at least $28 million from the sale of narcotics 
through Pakistan.
  Let us remind ourselves of the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, 
that the attacks against the World Trade Centers, Shanksville, and the 
Pentagon cost al Qaeda only $500,000. With an annual income of $28 
million coming from the sale of illegal narcotics, we know that one of 
the key terrorist financing mechanisms is the sale of illegal 
narcotics.
  In the 9/11 Commission report, they briefly mentioned this but did 
not focus on it. When you are on the front lines in Kandahar or 
Peshawar in Pakistan, you see that this link is clear.
  Our Drug Enforcement Agency has some of the best financial maps of 
terrorist organizations in the world, and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
used to be a formal member of the intelligence community. In my 
judgment and the judgment of my bipartisan partner, the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Larsen), on this amendment, we believe that the Drug 
Enforcement Agency should become part of the intelligence community 
again, that this link between terrorism and illegal narcotics is very 
clear.
  Roughly half of the 28 terrorist organizations identified by the 
State Department in October, 2001, have links to drug activities. 
Organizations like the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the National 
Liberation Army, ELN, al Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia, Shining Path, and the United Self-Defense Forces/Group of 
Colombia. All of these in a worldwide phenomenon, depending on violence 
and terror, funded by the sale of illegal narcotics.
  This bipartisan amendment would help study the integration of the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency into the intelligence community. It is 
supported by Karen Tandy, the administrator of the DEA. It is supported 
by a number of minority members. It is supported by the attorney 
general. I urge adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment, although I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kirk amendment to H.R. 
10. This amendment requires the President to submit to Congress a 
report detailing the best way to incorporate the Drug Enforcement 
Administration into the intelligence community.
  The El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, is an asset of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency. It is located in El Paso, Texas. It is the Nation's 
singular, multi-agency, tactical intelligence center for drug, alien, 
and weapons trafficking intelligence. Supporting Federal, State, and 
local law enforcement officers, EPIC also provides information 
regarding homeland security, homeland defense and counterterrorism to 
its member agencies. During my

[[Page 22095]]

26\1/2\ year tenure with the United States Border Patrol, I was able to 
utilize the services of EPIC, leading to a personal appreciation of the 
important role that the El Paso Intelligence Center plays in homeland 
security defense.
  Currently, EPIC accomplishes its mission by processing requests for 
information received from Federal, State and local law enforcement 
personnel on persons, modes of transportation, organizations or 
addresses that are suspected of being engaged or associated with some 
type of criminal activity. Officers have 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
access to the information in its database. It gives them the ability to 
query and provide simultaneous access to a number of other Federal 
databases. The El Paso Intelligence Center provides analysis of drug 
movement events, trends and patterns. They also do research on criminal 
investigations and communication intercept exploitation in support of 
its many different customers.
  It is well known that there is a link in my opinion between illegal 
narcotics and the funding that it creates for terrorism. The El Paso 
Intelligence Center understands this link and is known around the world 
for its ability to connect the dots between actions and players.
  The DEA plays an important role in this Nation's war on terrorism and 
war on drugs, and should be more fully integrated with our intelligence 
community. For those reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Kirk 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time and thank the gentleman for his amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment and appreciate the efforts of 
the gentleman from Illinois on this issue. The intelligence community 
looks forward to an opportunity to review this issue further.
  The DEA has substantial capabilities around the world that should be 
fully utilized in an appropriate fashion. The report that is provided 
for in this amendment will assist Congress in its consideration of the 
role of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence 
community along with the other important responsibilities that the DEA 
undertakes on a daily basis. I look forward to seeing the report and 
look forward to the passage of this amendment.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Larsen).
  Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this 
amendment along with my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Kirk).
  We need to consider making the DEA part of our intelligence network. 
Before our own eyes, Afghanistan is re-emerging as the international 
leader in the heroin trade. As this problem grows, the less control our 
Nation will have over the funding sources of international terrorism. A 
direct relationship exists between terrorism and the drug trade. 
Therefore, a direct relationship is needed between the DEA and our 
intelligence agencies. The DEA not only combats the drug trade around 
the world but can gather valuable information that can transcend drug 
trafficking and reach into the shadowy corners of international 
terrorism.
  According to the State Department, 12 of the 28 terrorist 
organizations listed in the Department of State October, 2001, Report 
on Foreign Terrorist Organizations have links to foreign drug 
trafficking. One fitting example of this relationship happened in 2003 
when a seizure of hashish from a trafficking group included suspected 
al Qaeda members and involved drugs worth nearly $30 million at 
wholesale.
  The drug trade not only has a role in funding terrorists but also 
plays a significant destabilizing role in Afghanistan. Just yesterday, 
drug smugglers were implicated in a terrorist attack on Hamid Karzai's 
vice presidential candidate. Free elections in Afghanistan are a threat 
to the drug trade, just as free elections in Afghanistan are a threat 
to global terrorism.
  According to our Office of National Drug Control Policy, the 
challenging security situation in Afghanistan has complicated the task 
of fighting the war against drugs and vice versa. As the terrorists 
lose ground, the opium poppy growers win, and much of the money from 
Afghanistan's opium sales goes right back to the terrorists.
  Drug traffickers and terror networks work out of the same rule book. 
They both strive to undermine democratic institutions and engage in 
widespread violence and corruption. Both groups also depend on money 
laundering, forgery and arms deals to implement their deadly goals.
  We cannot separate international terrorism from the drug trade. They 
are intertwined. This amendment will examine the ways DEA can maintain 
its current role while sharing information to help further protect our 
Nation. I believe this amendment is in the spirit of the 9/11 
Commission recommendations and will help create and consolidate the 
whole intelligence picture that a president needs to defend our Nation. 
I urge its support.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  In closing, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen) for supporting this amendment. 
The gentleman from Texas is exactly right. El Paso Intelligence Center 
already does this. It is a critical asset but should be a formal part 
of the intelligence community, as are combatant commands that do a 
number of key tasks with regard to drug profits and terrorism.
  We know that half of the Afghan economy is now related to the sale of 
illicit narcotics. We know that the Taliban and al Qaeda depend on 
terrorist profits. We started winning the battle against narcoterrorism 
in Colombia because we took a unified campaign on this approach against 
terrorism and the sale of illegal narcotics.
  The DEA is the expert on these financial organizations. If the 9/11 
Commission said anything, it said we should attack the financial 
support for terrorism and that financial support is increasingly 
reliant on the sale of illegal narcotics, especially for Osama bin 
Laden becoming one of the number one heroin dealers in Central Asia. 
For these reasons, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Kirk) will be postponed.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 5 printed in House Report 108-751.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Sessions

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Sessions:
       At the end of title II of the bill (page 235, after line 
     21), insert the following new subtitle:

 Subtitle J--Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act 
                                of 2004

     SECTION 2211. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Prevention of Terrorist 
     Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2212. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The criminal use of man-portable air defense systems 
     (MANPADS) presents a serious threat to civil aviation 
     worldwide, especially in the hands of terrorists or foreign 
     states that harbor them.
       (2) Atomic weapons or weapons designed to release radiation 
     (``dirty bombs'') could be used by terrorists to inflict 
     enormous loss of life and damage to property and the 
     environment.

[[Page 22096]]

       (3) Variola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, an 
     extremely serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal disease. 
     Variola virus is classified as a Category A agent by the 
     Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, meaning that it 
     is believed to pose the greatest potential threat for adverse 
     public health impact and has a moderate to high potential for 
     large-scale dissemination. The last case of smallpox in the 
     United States was in 1949. The last naturally occurring case 
     in the world was in Somalia in 1977. Although smallpox has 
     been officially eradicated after a successful worldwide 
     vaccination program, there remain two official repositories 
     of the variola virus for research purposes. Because it is so 
     dangerous, the variola virus may appeal to terrorists.
       (4) The use, or even the threatened use, of MANPADS, atomic 
     or radiological weapons, or the variola virus, against the 
     United States, its allies, or its people, poses a grave risk 
     to the security, foreign policy, economy, and environment of 
     the United States. Accordingly, the United States has a 
     compelling national security interest in preventing unlawful 
     activities that lead to the proliferation or spread of such 
     items, including their unauthorized production, construction, 
     acquisition, transfer, possession, import, or export. All of 
     these activities markedly increase the chances that such 
     items will be obtained by terrorist organizations or rogue 
     states, which could use them to attack the United States, its 
     allies, or United States nationals or corporations.
       (5) There is no legitimate reason for a private individual 
     or company, absent explicit government authorization, to 
     produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer, receive, 
     possess, import, export, or use MANPADS, atomic or 
     radiological weapons, or the variola virus.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to combat the 
     potential use of weapons that have the ability to cause 
     widespread harm to United States persons and the United 
     States economy (and that have no legitimate private use) and 
     to threaten or harm the national security or foreign 
     relations of the United States.

     SEC. 2213. MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT.

       Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after section 2332f the following:

     ``Sec. 2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use--
       ``(A) an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile that is 
     guided by any system designed to enable the rocket or missile 
     to--
       ``(i) seek or proceed toward energy radiated or reflected 
     from an aircraft or toward an image locating an aircraft; or
       ``(ii) otherwise direct or guide the rocket or missile to 
     an aircraft;
       ``(B) any device designed or intended to launch or guide a 
     rocket or missile described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) any part or combination of parts designed or 
     redesigned for use in assembling or fabricating a rocket, 
     missile, or device described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(2) Nonweapon.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to any 
     device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a 
     weapon.
       ``(3) Excluded conduct.--This subsection does not apply 
     with respect to--
       ``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 
     States or any department or agency thereof or of a State or 
     any department or agency thereof; or
       ``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 
     United States or any department or agency thereof or with a 
     State or any department or agency thereof.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of 
     imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for 
     life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `aircraft' has the definition set forth in section 
     40102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code.''.

     SEC. 2214. ATOMIC WEAPONS.

       (a) Prohibitions.--Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) is amended by--
       (1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``It'';
       (2) inserting ``knowingly'' after ``for any person to'';
       (3) striking ``or'' before ``export'';
       (4) striking ``transfer or receive in interstate or foreign 
     commerce,'' before ``manufacture'';
       (5) inserting ``receive,'' after ``acquire,'';
       (6) inserting ``, or use, or possess and threaten to use,'' 
     before ``any atomic weapon'';
       (7) inserting at the end the following:
       ``b. Conduct prohibited by subsection a. is within the 
     jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce; the offense occurs outside of the United 
     States and is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(2) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(4) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.''.
       (b) Violations.--Section 222 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2272) is amended by--
       (1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``Whoever'';
       (2) striking ``, 92,''; and
       (3) inserting at the end the following:
       ``b. Any person who violates, or attempts or conspires to 
     violate, section 92 shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 
     and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 30 
     years or to imprisonment for life. Any person who, in the 
     course of a violation of section 92, uses, attempts or 
     conspires to use, or possesses and threatens to use, any 
     atomic weapon shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 and 
     imprisoned for life. If the death of another results from a 
     person's violation of section 92, the person shall be fined 
     not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisoned 
     for life.''.

     SEC. 2215. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.

       Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding after section 2332g the following:

     ``Sec. 2332h. Radiological dispersal devices

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use--
       ``(A) any weapon that is designed or intended to release 
     radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human 
     life; or
       ``(B) or any device or other object that is capable of and 
     designed or intended to endanger human life through the 
     release of radiation or radioactivity.
       ``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply with 
     respect to--
       ``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United 
     States or any department or agency thereof; or
       ``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the 
     United States or any department or agency thereof.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.

[[Page 22097]]

       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
     not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.''.

     SEC. 2216. VARIOLA VIRUS.

       Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after section 175b the following:

     ``Sec. 175c. Variola virus

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it 
     shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, 
     engineer, synthesize, acquire, transfer directly or 
     indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or 
     possess and threaten to use, variola virus.
       ``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply to conduct 
     by, or under the authority of, the Secretary of Health and 
     Human Services.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
       ``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
     foreign commerce;
       ``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and 
     is committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the 
     United States while the national is outside the United 
     States;
       ``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is 
     owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any 
     department or agency of the United States, whether the 
     property is within or outside the United States; or
       ``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom 
     jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an 
     offense under this section or conspires with any person over 
     whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an 
     offense under this section.
       ``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or 
     conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
     than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of 
     imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for 
     life.
       ``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of 
     a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to 
     use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items 
     described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than 
     $2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
       ``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from 
     a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be 
     fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or 
     imprisoned for life.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `variola virus' means a virus that can cause human smallpox 
     or any derivative of the variola major virus that contains 
     more than 85 percent of the gene sequence of the variola 
     major virus or the variola minor virus.''.

     SEC. 2217. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

       Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (a), by inserting ``2122 and'' after 
     ``sections'';
       (2) in paragraph (c), by inserting ``section 175c (relating 
     to variola virus),'' after ``section 175 (relating to 
     biological weapons),''; and
       (3) in paragraph (q), by inserting ``2332g, 2332h,'' after 
     ``2332f,''.

     SEC. 2218. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2332B(G)(5)(B) OF TITLE 18, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (i)--
       (A) by inserting before ``2339 (relating to harboring 
     terrorists)'' the following: ``2332g (relating to missile 
     systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to 
     radiological dispersal devices),''; and
       (B) by inserting ``175c (relating to variola virus),'' 
     after ``175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),''; and
       (2) in clause (ii)--
       (A) by striking ``section'' and inserting ``sections 92 
     (relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or''; and
       (B) by inserting ``2122 or'' before ``2284''.

     SEC. 2219. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1956(C)(7)(D) OF TITLE 18, 
                   UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 1956(c)(7)(D), title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting after ``section 152 (relating to 
     concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery),'' 
     the following: ``section 175c (relating to the variola 
     virus),'';
       (2) by inserting after ``section 2332(b) (relating to 
     international terrorist acts transcending national 
     boundaries),'' the following: ``section 2332g (relating to 
     missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), section 2332h 
     (relating to radiological dispersal devices),''; and
       (3) striking ``or'' after ``any felony violation of the 
     Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,'' and after ``any 
     felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'', 
     striking ``;'' and inserting ``, or section 92 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) (relating to prohibitions 
     governing atomic weapons)''.

     SEC. 2220. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS.

       Section 38(g)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2778) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' before ``(xi)''; and
       (2) by inserting after clause (xi) the following: ``or 
     (xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist 
     Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to 
     missile systems designed to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C. 
     2332g), prohibitions governing atomic weapons (42 U.S.C. 
     2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C. 2332h), and 
     variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);''.

     SEC. 2221. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Chapter 113B.--The table of sections for chapter 113B 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the 
     following after the item for section 2332f:

``2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft.
``2332h. Radiological dispersal devices.''.

       (b) Chapter 10.--The table of sections for chapter 10 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the 
     following item after the item for section 175b:

``175c. Variola virus.''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) and the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Today, I rise to offer my legislation, Prevention of Terrorist Access 
to Destructive Weapons Act, an amendment to H.R. 10. This amendment 
will aid the hard-working Federal investigators and agents on the front 
line in the war on terror by establishing a zero tolerance policy 
towards the illegal importation, possession or transfer of shoulder-
fired missiles, atomic weapons, dirty bombs, and the smallpox virus.

                              {time}  0930

  Today, maximum penalties of only 10 years in prison apply to the 
unlawful possession of shoulder-fired missiles. The same weak penalty 
also currently applies to the unlawful possession of an atomic weapon. 
Today, there is no law criminalizing the possession of dirty bombs with 
criminal intent, and the unregistered possession of the smallpox virus 
carries a maximum penalties of only 5 years in prison.
  Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United 
States, weak punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is 
simply unacceptable in light of the fact that we know that 26 terror 
groups already have shoulder-fired missiles in their possession.
  My amendment imposes stringent, mandatory minimum criminal penalties 
for these heinous crimes similar to the laws that we already use to 
prosecute drug kingpins. Specifically, for each of the weapons covered 
by the bill, unlawful possession would result in mandatory imprisonment 
for up to 30 years to life. Using, attempting, or conspiring to use, or 
possessing and threatening to use these weapons would result in 
mandatory life in prison. And if one death were to result from the 
unlawful possession of one of these weapons, this amendment would allow 
the death penalty to be applied to anyone who targets America in a 
terrorist attack.
  Although tougher penalties may not deter homicidal terrorists 
determined to attack the United States, they will help to deter those 
middlemen who are essential to the transfer of such weapons. Many of 
these middlemen aid terrorists purely for financial gain, and 
significantly tougher mandatory penalties would dramatically alter 
their cost-benefit calculations.
  When the middleman is caught importing or hiding these weapons, the 
existence of tough penalties will also assist prosecutors and 
investigators in obtaining cooperation and moving swiftly to identify 
terrorists. Long mandatory sentences, including life

[[Page 22098]]

without parole, provide a fast and powerful incentive to cooperate, as 
has already been proven in cracking the code of silence for organized 
crime. In the case of these dangerous weapons, the speed with which 
persons choose to cooperate could also save thousands of lives.
  These increased penalties are completely justified in light of the 
catastrophic destruction that could be caused by the use of any of 
these weapons, and supporting my amendment will send a strong message 
of America's resolve to win the war on terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting and 
giving Federal investigators and prosecutors the tools they have asked 
for to aid them in their fight against terrorism by supporting this 
commonsense, effective amendment.

               [From the Associated Press, Aug. 5, 2004]

                Two Arrested in Missile Sting Operation

       Washington.--Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, 
     were arrested on charges stemming from an alleged plot to 
     help a man they thought was a terrorist who wanted to 
     purchase a shoulder-fired missile, federal authorities said 
     Thursday.
       The men have ties to a group called Ansar al-Islam, which 
     has been linked to the al Qaeda terror network, according to 
     two federal law enforcement authorities speaking on condition 
     of anonymity.
       The two arrests came as FBI, Immigration and Customs 
     Enforcement and other agents executed search warrants at the 
     Masjid As-Salam mosque and two Albany-area homes, officials 
     said. The men were identified as Yassin Aref, 34, the imam of 
     the mosque, and 49-year-old Mohammed Hoosain, one of the 
     mosque's founders.
       According to law enforcement officials, the two are being 
     charged with providing material support to terrorism by 
     participating in a conspiracy to help an individual they 
     believed was a terrorist purchase a shoulder-fired missile.
       The individual was an undercover government agent and no 
     missile ever changed hands. Aref and Hoosain were allegedly 
     involved in money-laundering aspects of the plot, the 
     officials said.
       The investigation has been going on for a year and is not 
     related to the Bush administration's decision earlier this 
     week to raise the terror alert level for certain financial 
     sector buildings in New York and Washington, the officials 
     said.
       In Albany, some mosque members gathered early Thursday 
     outside the institution for morning prayers.
       More details about the case were expected to be released 
     later Thursday by the Justice Department.
                                  ____


               [From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004]

           2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al Qaeda Ally

                            (By Tony Perry)

       San Diego.--A Pakistani national and a naturalized American 
     pleaded guilty Wednesday to a conspiracy to help the Al Qaeda 
     terrorist group by selling five tons of hashish and a half-
     ton of heroin in exchange for money and four Stinger 
     missiles.
       Muhamed Abid Afridi, 30, and a naturalized citizen from 
     Inida, Ilyas Ali, 56, admitted in U.S. District Court here 
     that they planned to sell the missiles to the Taliban, an 
     ally of Al Qaeda.
       Afridi, Ali and a second Pakinstani were arrested in Hong 
     Kong in September 2002 after meeting with undercover FBI 
     agents posing as arms dealers with Stingers to sell. They 
     allegedly offered to sell the agents heroin and hashish in 
     return for missiles and money.
       ``They both had the will and the means to carry out the 
     transaction they were negotiating,'' said Assistant U.S. 
     Atty. Michael Skerlos.
       Stingers are shoulder-launched missiles distributed widely 
     by the CIA to Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army in the 
     1980s. Easy to use and deadly accurate at hitting low-flying 
     aircraft, Stingers were credited with helping the Afghans 
     demoralize and rout the much stronger Soviets.
       ``Because of the actions taken in this investigation, 
     America is safer and our citizens are more secure,'' Atty. 
     General John Ashcroft said in a statement.
       Initial meetings between Ali and the FBI agents occurred in 
     San Diego, according to court documents. Afridi and Ali are 
     scheduled to be sentenced June 29 by Judge M. James Lorenz; a 
     plea bargain recommends that each be sentenced to up to 10 
     years in prison.
       The case against the second Pakistani, Syed Mustajab Shah, 
     has a court date April 5.
       Ali was a grocer in Minneapolis before his arrest.
                                  ____


             [From Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 2001]

                      The Proliferation of MANPADS

                         (By Thomas B. Hunter)

       Man-portable surface-to-air missiles, also known as 
     MANPADs, represent a significant potential threat to military 
     and civilian aircraft.
       Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
     proliferation of SA-series MANPADs has increased, and the 
     diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of 
     US-made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s. 
     Today, MANPADs of various types are in the hands of as many 
     as 27 guerrilla and terrorist groups around the world.
       Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult 
     endeavour. Often, the only verification of use by non-state 
     actors has been post-event in nature--recovery of a used 
     launcher or fragments from expended missiles. The black 
     market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-
     to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the 
     illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking.
       The inability of governments to correctly identify seized 
     weapons also contributes to inaccurate reports. In many 
     cases, soldiers and government officials have identified 
     rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other handheld rocket 
     launchers as MANPADs. Moreover, the word `Stinger' has become 
     an all-encompassing term for any MANPAD among many civilian, 
     military, and non-state groups, further complicating efforts 
     to verify proliferation activity.
       In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft, 
     misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-
     flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by 
     MANPADs, when in fact they are usually RPGs. Attacks on 
     aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000 
     feet, are almost exclusively RPGs. Guerrilla and terrorist 
     forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft 
     role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps most clearly when 
     two US MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali 
     gunmen in October 1993.
       One popular misconception is that these missiles become 
     unusable after several years due to battery or other systems 
     failures, and are therefore useless after a period of time. 
     While it is true that all MANPAD batteries have a finite 
     shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased 
     batteries available on the open market and technically 
     proficient terrorist groups might also be able to construct 
     hybrid batteries to replace used ones.
       Other concerns include deterioration of missile propellants 
     and seeker coolant, and general storage issues. While these 
     concerns merit attention, the commonly held assumption that 
     these weapons have short shelf lives is erroneous. Most 
     missiles are hermetically sealed in launchers designed for 
     rough handling by soldiers in the field. Temperature extremes 
     are also factored into the design of these weapons, reducing 
     the threat of environmental degradation.
       Clearly, the shelf life of MANPADs is, in large part, 
     dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored. 
     However, under ideal (factory specified) conditions, some 
     versions of these weapons can remain operational for 22 years 
     or more. So while it can be assumed that some weapons have 
     not been stored in ideal conditions, many weapons previously 
     believed to be inoperative, such as the Afghan Stingers, may 
     indeed be operational.
       Furthermore, MANPADs remain a popular commodity on the 
     global black arms market. With the exception of the Soviet-
     Afghan war, these weapons are more widespread today than at 
     any time since their introduction in the late 1960s. 
     Guerrilla and terrorist organisations can obtain them with 
     relative ease, with the primary limitation being money. As 
     some of these groups increase their profits through drug 
     trafficking and other activities, the likelihood of further 
     illicit purchases will also increase.
       MANPADs have proliferated to non-state groups throughout 
     sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons can be found in the hands 
     of insurgent groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
     Congo, Ethiopia. Rwanda and Somalia.
       Of these states, Angola has seen the greatest activity. The 
     CIA covertly provided FIM-92A Stinger missiles to UNITA 
     rebels in the late 1980s as part of its effort to assist in 
     the overthrow of Angola's pro-communist government. As in 
     Afghanistan, efforts to recover the missiles following the 
     end of hostilities proved futile. Today UNITA retains an 
     unknown number of advanced weapons, which may be augmented 
     with SA-7 (NATO reporting name `Grail,' Russian name Strela-
     2) and FIM-43 Redeye missiles captured from government 
     forces.
       UNITA has also shown willingness to use them, sometimes 
     against civilian aircraft. UNITA fired missiles at three 
     World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft in June 2001, for 
     example. One plane was struck but managed to land safely at a 
     nearby airport. This attack was of particular concern in that 
     the missile struck the aircraft at an altitude of 15,000 
     feet--3,500 feet beyond the weapon's published maximum range. 
     While this is not the first report of Stinger missiles 
     reaching this height, it is clear that aircraft travelling at 
     an altitude believed to be out of the range of these weapons 
     should be aware of this proven capability.
       During the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA working in 
     conjunction with the Pakistani

[[Page 22099]]

     Army's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), delivered over 
     1,000 Stingers to Mujahideen rebels. While the rebels fired 
     many of the missiles against Soviet aircraft, hundreds 
     remained after the fighting ended in 1987. Poor bookkeeping 
     at the CIA, combined with the dispersal of the weapons to 
     numerous clans throughout the country, made accounting for 
     and recovering them impossible. The result was a 
     proliferation of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry throughout 
     the region.
       It is well-known that the rebels did not retain all of the 
     Stingers left behind after the war. Many found their way onto 
     the global grey and black arms markets and ended up in 
     guerrilla arsenals from Sri Lanka to Chechnya. With a 
     reported black market price of between US$80,000 and 
     $250,000, Stingers represent a significant profit potential 
     due in no small part to widespread demand.
       Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden also reportedly possesses 
     a number of MANPADs, including SA-7s and Stingers. As Bin 
     Laden has both the financial resources and black market 
     connections to make procurement possible, these reports are 
     probably accurate. Persistent rumours also indicate that Bin 
     Laden's personal bodyguards may be equipped with Stingers, 
     ostensibly to counter an airborne attack.
       Regardless of the veracity of the latter information, it is 
     logical to assume that Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda (`The Base') 
     network is in possession of additional MANPADs. If this is 
     true, then Al-Qaeda represents the most significant threat to 
     international civil aviation. Given Bin Laden's specific 
     threats against U.S. citizens, this threat is especially 
     relevant with regard to U.S.-owned airlines.
       While the Russian military is certainly not confronted with 
     the same threat level that it experienced in Afghanistan, the 
     increased proliferation of MANPADs to Chechen rebels has 
     dramatically increased the danger to close air support (CAS) 
     aircraft operating in theatre. A number of aircraft have been 
     shot down, including Su-25 `Frogfoot' and Su-24 `Pencer' 
     fighter-bombers. MANPADs have also shot down a number of 
     military helicopters.
       The sources of Chechen MANPADs are varied. However, a large 
     number of systems have been seized by Russian authorities, 
     indicating that the rebels have established an effective 
     pipeline for delivery. For example, three SA-7 missiles were 
     found in the territory of Ingushetia near the Russian-
     Georgian border in September 2000. Just one month later, an 
     unspecified number of SA-7s were discovered in a building 
     near Severy airport. The following month a Russian military 
     operation resulted in the seizure of four SA-7 missiles with 
     their launchers from a lorry in Dagestan. A rebel spokesman 
     later announced that the weapons were part of a shipment of 
     arms destined for use in Chechnya. The shipment reportedly 
     cost the Chechens $40,000.
       Another report indicated that Bin Laden might have 
     delivered as many as 50 Stinger missiles to the Chechens. The 
     weapons were to have been transported from either Georgia or 
     Azerbaijan and delivered in December 1999. Eight Stinger 
     missiles were reportedly airdropped in the mountains of 
     Sharoyskiy District on the night of 12-13 June 2001. The 
     source of these weapons was not reported.
       The primary MANPAD threat in the Western Hemisphere is 
     their possible future use by the two main Colombian insurgent 
     groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
     Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) and the National 
     Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN). 
     Complicating analysis of the Colombia MANPAD situation is a 
     plethora of false of misleading reporting.
       Colombian electronic and print press outlets have regularly 
     reported that both the FARC and ELN possess these missile 
     systems. Government officials have also fanned this fire by 
     issuing corroborating statements. These reports, both 
     military and civilian, cumulatively suggest that the FARC 
     currently possesses SA-7, SA-14 ``Gremlin'', SA-16 ``Gimlet'' 
     and Redeye missiles. The Redeye missiles were variously 
     reported to have come from Nicaraguan (former Contra) or 
     Syrian arsenals and the SA-series weapons from various 
     sources. There is no definitive evidence, however, to confirm 
     that any Colombian guerrilla group currently possesses 
     MANPADs of any type.
       This misreporting is usually a matter of an honest mistake 
     due to lack of familiarity with MANPADs, the Colombian 
     situation may mask an ulterior motive. While the threat to 
     the Colombian government from insurgent and narcotics 
     trafficking groups is quite real, it is well-known that 
     officials from that government have frequently overstated the 
     sophistication of rebel groups in an effort to garner greater 
     financial and political support from the USA. Given this 
     history, it is possible that MANPAD events have occasionally 
     been intentionally overstated.
       According to Colombia expert Steven Salisbury, FARC 
     commanders have admitted to possessing MANPADs. ``The FARC 
     commanders who told me the FARC has shoulder-fired SAMs 
     [surface-to-air missiles] were field commanders talking 
     privately to me,'' he said. ``They said, yes, they have 
     SAMs.'' This information given to Salisbury was corroborated 
     by two FARC block commanders as well as other guerrillas.
       Four additional factors must be highlighted. The first of 
     these is that FARC commanders have stated that they do indeed 
     possess MANPADs. The second is that both the FARC and ELN are 
     known to be aggressively seeking these weapons. The third 
     factor is that the guerrillas have received training on these 
     weapons. In one instance, a Colombian government source 
     stated that 25 guerrillas travelled to Nicaragua to attend an 
     anti-aircraft course taught by former Sandanista soldiers. 
     This course reportedly included MANPAD training as well as 
     gunnery techniques involving 0.50-calibre heavy machine guns 
     and the use of RPG-7s in the anti-air role. FARC members may 
     also have travelled to Syria and Libya to receive similar 
     training. Finally, both the FARC and ELN have the financial 
     resources to make such a purchase possible.
       With these factors in mind, it appears likely that the FARC 
     will procure at least one type of MANPAD--if it has not done 
     so already. Colombian guerrilla groups have had very little 
     difficulty obtaining weapons for use in their war against the 
     government. Well-established arms transit routes are in place 
     to facilitate these shipments. The arms pipelines through 
     which the FARC and ELN may obtain MANPADs run through the 
     following countries Albania, Belgium, Ecuador, Jordan, North 
     Korea, Peru, Romania, and Russia. Of specific concern is the 
     Russian relationship, as the FARC and Russian mafias have a 
     well-established arms-for-drugs pipeline in place. The 
     Russian mafias have demonstrated the ability to obtain 
     virtually any type of weapons system. If the Colombian 
     guerrillas are to obtain these weapons, and have not been 
     successful already, they will most likely come from this 
     black market channel.
       It must be noted that when the FARC obtains these weapons, 
     it will almost certainly use them only in critical 
     situations, such as the defence of important base camps or 
     headquarters facilities. They will most likely not be used 
     against drug-spraying aircraft or other non-threatening 
     targets due to the high value of MANPADs to the FARC 
     leadership.
       If the FARC does indeed maintain a small inventory of these 
     weapons, this is the most likely explanation for why they 
     have not yet been employed. If employed, targets would most 
     likely include Colombian Air Force CAS aircraft or possibly 
     high-value civilian flights such as aircraft transporting 
     senior government officials.
       Hizbullah probably took its first delivery of MANPADs in 
     1982 with the acquisition of a small number of SA-7s. 
     Reporting since that time indicates that these stocks were 
     supplemented with PIM-92A Stingers in the mid-1990s, provided 
     by Islamic Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. Most recently, 
     the group may have received a small number of Chinese-made 
     Qianwei (`Advanced Guard')--1 (QW-1) systems. If true, the 
     acquisition of this latter system represents a significant 
     upgrade in the surface-to-air capabilities of Hizbullah.
       The Palestinian Authority also maintains a stock of SA-7 
     missiles and launchers. Reports also indicates that the 
     Palestinians may have a small number of Stinger systems as 
     well. The source of the SA-7 weapons is unclear, but it is 
     possible some were delivered from Egypt aboard fishing boats, 
     a common local method of arms smuggling.
       For example, on 8 May 2001, Israeli security services 
     intercepted the Lebanese-flagged vessel Santorini off the 
     coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv. A search of the ship 
     revealed a large quantity of arms, including 60 mm mortars, 
     landmines, grenades, and four SA-7 missiles with launchers. 
     The shipment was reportedly sent by the Palestinian Front for 
     the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and intended for 
     use by Palestinian militants. The MANPADS were confiscated by 
     the Israelis and probably added to their own arsenal.
       Apart from the Afghan Mujahideen, the Liberation Tigers of 
     Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have enjoyed the greatest success with 
     MANPADs. LTTE guerrillas have fired an estimated 20 missiles 
     at government aircraft since 1996, shooting down three 
     helicopters and probably two fixed-wing transports. These 
     attacks killed a total of 179 personnel.
       It is estimated that the LTTE possesses SA-7, SA-1a, and 
     other MANPADs. One Chinese-built Hongying-5 (HN-5A) system 
     was also discovered during government operations; however, 
     there is no indication that the LTTE possesses additional 
     units. It is possible that this weapon was procured from 
     sources within the Burmese military.
       In December 2000 Sri Lankan news carried video of a Tamil 
     rebel holding what appeared to be a Stinger missile during an 
     October operation against the Trincomalee naval facility. 
     However, later analysis indicated this weapon was most 
     probably a double barrelled 107 mm Katyusha rocket, believed 
     to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm launcher, and 
     not a MANPAD.
       The LTTE reportedly acquired these weapons from a variety 
     of sources. Press reports indicated that the Kurdistan's 
     Worker's Party (PPK), working with the Greek 17 November 
     terrorist organisation, sold 11 Stinger missiles to the LTTE 
     in 1994. These weapons were reportedly built in Greece, which 
     is

[[Page 22100]]

     a member of European consortium manufacturing PIM-92A/C 
     Stinger systems under license from the USA. Other Stingers 
     may have been sold or donated to the Tamils by the Afghan 
     Taliban during the 1990s. LTTE weapons buyers have also been 
     reported in Cambodia and Thailand, reportedly seeking MANPADs 
     Given the Tamils success with these weapons, it is likely 
     that procurement efforts will continue.

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this did not go through the Committee on the Judiciary 
and it is somewhat complicated and it appears to be overlapping and 
recreates and reauthorizations present law. For example under title 
XVIII, chapter 10 already criminalizes the use of biological weapons; 
chapter 11(b) criminalizes chemical weapons; chapter 39 criminalizes 
nuclear weapons; chapter 4 criminalizes the use of explosives, and on 
and on.
  In addition, many of those, all of those offenses are predicates to 
18 U.S.C. (a) 2332(b) which provides for the death penalty if death 
results from any violation of those statutes.
  The only change appears to be a mandatory 30 years for attempts and 
conspiracies. There is no differentiation for a role in a conspiracy, 
relative knowledge of the crime, or even if death were an accident that 
had not been intended. What we have is new mandatory minimums.
  We have, in the Committee on the Judiciary, often cited many findings 
and recommendations from researchers, sentencing professionals, even 
the judicial branch, justices on the Supreme Court, including the chief 
justice, citing problems created by mandatory sentences. They have been 
found to be a waste of money compared to alternatives such as treatment 
or traditional sentencing. They disrupt the ability of the Sentencing 
Commission and the courts to apply an orderly, proportional, 
nondisparate sentencing system. They discriminate against minorities 
and they transfer an inordinate amount of discretion to prosecutors in 
an adversarial system.
  Mandatory minimum sentences increase disparities in sentencing 
because they do not allow distinctions between major players and bit 
players in a crime. In a recent letter to the subcommittee, the U.S. 
Judicial Conference, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, 
noted and I quote: In addition to resulting in unwarranted sentencing 
disparities, mandatory minimums often lead to treatment of dissimilar 
offenders in a similar manner by requiring courts to impose the same 
sentence on offenders, when sound policy and common sense call for 
reasonable differences in punishment to reflect differences in the 
seriousness of the conduct or danger to society.
  In other words, mandatory minimums violate common sense. That is the 
chief justice and the U.S. Judicial Conference.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill, the underlying bill, is a reorganization 
bill. We should not include controversial criminal penalties, 
especially when the Judicial Conference headed by the chief justice 
tells us that these things violate common sense. We also need to study 
the international implications of this, because when we add in the 
death penalty, we add in complications of international cooperation. 
Most countries around the world do not have the death penalty and we 
have had problems where they would not even extradite criminals to the 
United States because we have all of these death penalties.
  We need to study this, and having a floor amendment is not the 
appropriate way to legislate. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would 
defeat this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the several very important articles in my added 
materials that I have submitted speak not only to the threat to the 
United States, but also the reality of the groups who were engaged in 
the transfer, the trafficking of shoulder-fired missiles, of weapons of 
mass destruction, in terms of viruses that could be placed in the 
United States of America.
  Mr. Chairman, I respect the gentleman for not liking the minimum 
mandatory sentences. I would also say that it is up to this body, Mr. 
Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the 
Attorney General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these 
cases, to give to the frontline agents and investigators those 
abilities to find and stop those people who are perpetrators of crime, 
mass murder against the United States of America.
  Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make 
sure that we keep terrorism away from our doorsteps. I believe in 
effective law enforcement, effective use of the laws of this country, 
and making sure that we have looked at this from the perspective of the 
Attorney General of the United States and U.S. attorneys across this 
country who support this important legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that we already have in the Code 
serious penalties for all of these crimes. The appropriate way to 
legislate would be to go through the committee so that we could see 
exactly how these fit into the present sentencing scheme. I would hope 
that we defeat the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Members of this body understand that 
there is a need to make sure that we protect this country and the laws 
of this country. We have consulted with the Attorney General of the 
United States and other U.S. attorneys who are asking for this. I 
support this amendment. I believe it will help the President of the 
United States to ensure the safety of our country.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Sessions) will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Bonilla

  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Bonilla:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     (and redesignate provisions and amend the table of contents 
     accordingly):

     SECTION ___. INCREASE IN DETENTION BED SPACE.

       Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall increase by not less 
     than 2,500, in each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the number 
     of beds available for immigration detention and removal 
     operations of the Department of Homeland Security above the 
     number for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal 
     year.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  First, let me compliment the committees who put this bill together. 
They have done a great job facing very complicated circumstances. 
Specifically, they did a very good job about increasing the Border 
Patrol staff, that we need to deal with the increased flow of illegal 
immigration along the southwest border, along with other Federal agents 
that are necessary to do the job.
  Unfortunately, there was an oversight in the bill in providing bed 
space for the people that we catch. Let me

[[Page 22101]]

point out as well that the overwhelming number of them now are 
categorized as they are by the Border Patrol as OTMs, ``other than 
Mexicans,'' people trying to enter our country that have figured out a 
different way to come in versus the ports of entry on either coast or 
using other means.
  Mr. Chairman, in many cases the OTMs, are now arrested, processed, 
interrogated and released into communities because the Department of 
Homeland Security does not have enough bed space. So, believe it or 
not, in Texas alone, since January, there have been over 15,000 OTMs 
released in communities throughout the State in the neighborhood. They 
might have been introduced into any neighborhood in Texas, no matter 
where one lives.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an outrage. Homeland Security claims the 
problem is bed space, so in this amendment we deal with that problem, 
calling for 2,500 additional bed spaces in 2006 and another 2,500 in 
2007.
  This is an amendment that is supported by the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox), Chairman of Homeland Security. It is also 
supported by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz), my good friend, who 
represents an area near the Mexican border and the Gulf Coast in Texas 
and who has been working very hard on this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a nonpartisan issue. We have strong support by 
other members of the committees working on this. The gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith), my good colleague and friend from San Antonio and 
central Texas area, has been working hard on this issue as well. This 
is also something that is supported by, again no matter what ethnic 
group or political party one belongs to, especially on the southwest 
border. There is strong support by the mayors, the county judges, the 
county commissioners that are working very hard to deal with this 
illegal immigration problem every day.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just single out the wonderful 
Border Patrol agents that are patrolling day and night, sometimes 
working with fewer resources than they should have, and doing a great 
job of patrolling the border. Help is on the way for them in terms of 
manpower and hopefully this amendment, when adopted, will provide the 
bed space as well to house the illegal aliens that are coming across 
our border and taking advantage of what we now have along the Mexican 
border.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim 
the time in opposition to the amendment, although I support the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, there is no example any better of 
the failure of the administration to make America safe than is 
illustrated by the amendment offered by my colleague from Texas today. 
What the amendment says is that we need 2,500 more bed spaces so that 
we can end this deplorable, unacceptable practice of catching illegal 
immigrants who come across our borders every day from countries other 
than Mexico and seeing them immediately released into our country, 
knowing that 80 to 90 percent of them will never show up again for a 
deportation hearing.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a practice that must end, but our administration 
has allowed this to go on for year after year after year. And it is 
very unfortunate, even though I appreciate greatly the intent expressed 
by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla), my colleague, it is very 
unfortunate that all the amendment does is direct the Department of 
Homeland Security to somewhere in their budget find the money for an 
additional 2,500 beds so we can end this practice that represents a 
serious threat to the security of our country.
  The truth of the matter is the gentleman from Texas is on the 
Committee on Appropriations, and when we look at what the Committee on 
Appropriations did to try to help solve this problem, all they did was 
what the President asked for. He asked for 117 additional bed spaces, 
when the President knows that even today we have only appropriated 
money to hold 1,944 detainees who cross the border illegally every day 
and we are holding 22,500. We are stretched to the limit now.
  As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) points out, we need at 
least 2,500 more and probably 5,000 more beds, which is provided for in 
his amendment but not funded.
  Nowhere is the gap between the rhetoric of the administration on 
protecting America and the reality of the failure to protect America 
any clearer than it is right here.
  The Democrats on the House Committee on Homeland Security did a 6-
month investigation of the problems of our border. We produced a report 
entitled Transforming the Southern Border. It pointed out a lot of 
interesting facts, one of which is the one we are discussing. As our 
staff traveled along the Rio Grande south of El Paso, we took this 
picture. What it shows is a cargo van backed up to a school bus just 
across the border inside the United States, along with an 18-wheeler, 
another cargo van, and another school bus.
  As the staff flew over, nobody was to be seen who would be a part of 
our Border Patrol. So they called into the Border Patrol to tell them 
about this suspicious-looking activity. When they flew back over, the 
bus and the van and all the vehicles were gone. We do not know if they 
were exchanging illegal immigrants, illegal goods, narcotics, or 
nuclear weapons.
  As the 9/11 Commission said, our borders are porous and we must 
remedy this problem. But to do so it is going to take more than 
rhetoric.
  Mr. Chairman, when we look at what we are spending on homeland 
security today, we are spending $20 billion more than we did in the 
year of 9/11. That is a lot of money, but maybe not in an $850 billion 
discretionary budget. But last year alone, while we had increased 
homeland security spending, $20 billion, the richest 1 percent of 
Americans, those making over a million dollars, got four times the tax 
relief, almost $90 billion.
  The reality is that we have made the wrong choice. We have failed to 
make America safe. And when illegal immigrants can come across our 
borders in the numbers that they are coming, last year alone 25,000 
illegal immigrants were actually caught coming across our border from 
places other than Mexico. Every year there is close to a million that 
get across that are caught. No telling how many are not caught. But of 
those 25,000, because we did not have the detention space, the jail 
space to hold them, 80 to 90 percent of them never showed up because 
the 25,000 were given a free pass into America, released on personal 
bond.
  Mr. Chairman, it does not surprise anybody that 80 to 90 percent of 
those 25,000 never show up. They are in our country today. This failure 
to protect America is inexcusable. I think we have got to stop it.
  Mr. Chairman, I think I will vote for the amendment offered by my 
colleague, but I want to point out that we failed to fund the very 
issue he raises.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) 
for a quick question.
  Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman acknowledge in the end that he would 
vote for the amendment? I wanted to understand that clearly.
  Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, yes, 
I will vote for the amendment because I believe it is based on a 
sincere intent to solve a serious problem. But I was simply pointing 
out that it provides no funding. The gentleman's Committee on 
Appropriations only provided funding for 117 beds in next year's budget 
and there is no money to do what is provided for in this amendment. To 
simply direct the department to take it out of their hide is simply 
unrealistic.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman 
from Texas for his answer.

[[Page 22102]]

  I wanted to reiterate that in spite of the rhetoric that was just 
heard from the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), my colleague, he is 
supporting the amendment. I am delighted to hear that.
  The gentleman makes a lot of good points about problems that the 
Department of Homeland Security has faced over the last couple of 
years. I agree with the gentleman. That is why I am here trying to do 
something about it.
  But, again, in spite of the rant that we just heard about how bad the 
problem is, and I can assure the gentleman that I have probably 
delivered the same remarks in my district, and here in Washington as 
well, about the problems that the Department of Homeland Security is 
facing, but ultimately we are all here to try to do something about it.
  So I would hope that the gentleman would not only vote for the 
amendment, as he has indicated he will, but also tell his friends that 
we need this help for our good agents that are patrolling the border 
and for all of us who are trying to do something about it.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of this 
amendment. Congressman Bonilla's amendment seeks to increase alien 
detention bed space by 2,500 beds per year for fiscal years 2006 and 
2007. It is a very simple provision, but it will have a material impact 
on improving the security of our homeland and discouraging illegal 
immigration.
  In order to have a successful border security strategy, it must be 
balanced. That is why this amendment is so important. There are other 
provisions in H.R. 10 that will increase staffing levels for the Border 
Patrol and ICE investigators. These, too, are important initiatives and 
will result in many more illegal aliens and immigration violators being 
apprehended. But in order to make the best use of these new assets, we 
must have adequate facilities to detain those additional immigration 
violators who are caught, especially those considered high-risk or in 
mandatory detention categories.
  The Department of Homeland Security's Detention and Removal Office, 
or DRO, is currently authorized to fund approximately 19,000 detention 
beds. However, they consistently hold over 22,000 illegal aliens each 
day in facilities around the Nation. In the first year, this amendment 
would increase available bed space to meet the minimum demand and then 
would go above that in FY 2007 to provide additional detention 
resources to meet the expected demand that these other new border 
control initiatives will create.
  It is a well-known fact that the majority of aliens not detained and 
released, pending an immigration hearing, never return for their 
scheduled hearing but seek instead to melt into U.S. communities. There 
are approximately 300,000 non-citizens in the United States who have 
received deportation orders, but who have not left the country. There 
is no doubt that more of these individuals would have left the country 
if they had been detained in the beginning.
  Approximately 50 percent of DRO detainees are Mexicans, but there is 
a growing number of individuals from different countries, called 
``other than Mexicans'' or OTMs. Less is known about their motivation 
for coming to the U.S., and I have serious concerns about individuals 
illegally entering America who originally are from countries of 
interest with respect to terrorism. We must have the resources to 
detain these individuals to guarantee that we have an opportunity to 
verify their identity and motives, and that they are deported if 
necessary.
  In order to monitor more of the individuals that are released, DRO 
utilizes alternative methods of detention. This includes release on 
recognizance, release on bond, electronic monitoring devices (EMD), and 
the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP). While these 
alternative methods are appropriate and responsible initiatives, it is 
essential that we have sufficient detention bed space for high-risk 
individuals, those with criminal records, and repeat immigration 
violators.
  As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I would 
like to thank Mr. Bonilla for offering this critical amendment and 
request the support of my colleagues in ensuring passage. Thank you, 
Mr. Speaker, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, thousands of illegal aliens pour 
over our southern border each day. A significant number of these aliens 
are not Mexican, and cannot simply be sent back over the border.
  Border Patrol agents must process aliens from countries other than 
Mexico and are forced to release them into our communities pending a 
hearing. This is because there is not enough bed space in our detention 
facilities.
  When illegal aliens are released pending a hearing, it is estimated 
that 85 percent will never be heard from again.
  This process has become known as the ``catch and release'' program, 
and it threatens our national security.
  The Department of Homeland Security recently reported that from 
October through June over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were apprehended on 
the southern border from countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, 
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
  The hard work of our Border Patrol agents is wasted when we do not 
have enough detention space.
  The Bonilla amendment would help correct this problem by authorizing 
an increase of 2,500 detention bed spaces for each of the next two 
years.
  The lack of detention space has reached a crisis.
  Every day we are releasing aliens from dozens of countries into our 
communities. We don't know if these individuals are criminals or 
terrorists.
  The Bonilla amendment curtails the catch and release program on our 
southern border. It lets the U.S. detain illegal immigrants who enter 
our country rather than release them in our communities.
  Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment by my 
friend from Texas, and the co-chair of the House Border Caucus, Mr. 
Bonilla.
  Let me begin by thanking the gentleman for his hard work to find a 
way to stop the current ``catch and release'' policy propounded by this 
government . . . by releasing many of the illegal immigrants we are 
catching into the U.S. population. This is frightening for all of us.
  Now, the basis for this ``catch and release'' policy is a lack of 
beds for the Department of Homeland Security to hold these illegal 
immigrants from countries other than Mexico (OTMs). The gentleman's 
amendment today specifically addresses this shortcoming and I join him 
in advocating it to the House.
  We are apprehending an alarming number of OTMs with not enough space 
to detain them--forcing us to release them into our community--we need 
additional beds. The gentleman's amendment is certainly a good 
beginning and I am grateful for his efforts to end this policy.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mrs. Capito

  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mrs. Capito:
       At the end of title II add the following:
Subtitle J--Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of 
                                 20004

     SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Railroad Carriers and 
     Mass Transportation Protection Act of 2004''.

     SEC. 2112. ATTACKS AGAINST RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS 
                   TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 97 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking sections 1992 through 1993 and 
     inserting the following:

     ``Sec. 1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against 
       railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems 
       on land, on water, or through the air

       ``(a) General Prohibitions.--Whoever, in a circumstance 
     described in subsection (c), knowingly--
       ``(1) wrecks, derails, sets fire to, or disables railroad 
     on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle;
       ``(2) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or 
     with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, and 
     without the authorization of the railroad carrier or mass 
     transportation provider--
       ``(A) places any biological agent or toxin, destructive 
     substance, or destructive device in, upon, or near railroad 
     on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle; or
       ``(B) releases a hazardous material or a biological agent 
     or toxin on or near any property described in subparagraph 
     (A) or (B) of paragraph (3);
       ``(3) sets fire to, undermines, makes unworkable, unusable, 
     or hazardous to work on or use, or places any biological 
     agent or toxin, destructive substance, or destructive device 
     in, upon, or near any--
       ``(A) tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, 
     electromagnetic guideway, signal, station, depot, warehouse, 
     terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or 
     appurtenance

[[Page 22103]]

     used in the operation of, or in support of the operation of, 
     a railroad carrier, without the authorization of the railroad 
     carrier, and with intent to, or knowing or having reason to 
     know such activity would likely, derail, disable, or wreck 
     railroad on-track equipment;
       ``(B) garage, terminal, structure, track, electromagnetic 
     guideway, supply, or facility used in the operation of, or in 
     support of the operation of, a mass transportation vehicle, 
     without the authorization of the mass transportation 
     provider, and with intent to, or knowing or having reason to 
     know such activity would likely, derail, disable, or wreck a 
     mass transportation vehicle used, operated, or employed by a 
     mass transportation provider; or
       ``(4) removes an appurtenance from, damages, or otherwise 
     impairs the operation of a railroad signal system or mass 
     transportation signal or dispatching system, including a 
     train control system, centralized dispatching system, or 
     highway-railroad grade crossing warning signal, without 
     authorization from the railroad carrier or mass 
     transportation provider;
       ``(5) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or 
     with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 
     interferes with, disables, or incapacitates any dispatcher, 
     driver, captain, locomotive engineer, railroad conductor, or 
     other person while the person is employed in dispatching, 
     operating, or maintaining railroad on-track equipment or a 
     mass transportation vehicle;
       ``(6) commits an act, including the use of a dangerous 
     weapon, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury to any person who is on property described in 
     subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), except that this 
     subparagraph shall not apply to rail police officers in 
     acting the course of their law enforcement duties under 
     section 28101 of title 49, United States Code;
       ``(7) conveys false information, knowing the information to 
     be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt that was 
     made, is being made, or is to be made, to engage in a 
     violation of this subsection; or
       ``(8) attempts, threatens, or conspires to engage in any 
     violation of any of paragraphs (1) through (7);

     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
     20 years, or both.
       ``(b) Aggravated Offense.--Whoever commits an offense under 
     subsection (a) of this section in a circumstance in which--
       ``(1) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying a passenger or employee 
     at the time of the offense;
       ``(2) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying high-level radioactive 
     waste or spent nuclear fuel at the time of the offense;
       ``(3) the railroad on-track equipment or mass 
     transportation vehicle was carrying a hazardous material at 
     the time of the offense that--
       ``(A) was required to be placarded under subpart F of part 
     172 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; and
       ``(B) is identified as class number 3, 4, 5, 6.1, or 8 and 
     packing group I or packing group II, or class number 1, 2, or 
     7 under the hazardous materials table of section 172.101 of 
     title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; or
       ``(4) the offense results in the death of any person;

     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of 
     years or life, or both. In the case of a violation described 
     in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of imprisonment 
     shall be not less than 30 years; and, in the case of a 
     violation described in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the 
     offender shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 
     life and be subject to the death penalty.
       ``(c) Circumstances Required for Offense.--A circumstance 
     referred to in subsection (a) is any of the following:
       ``(1) Any of the conduct required for the offense is, or, 
     in the case of an attempt, threat, or conspiracy to engage in 
     conduct, the conduct required for the completed offense would 
     be, engaged in, on, against, or affecting a mass 
     transportation provider or railroad carrier engaged in or 
     affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
       ``(2) Any person travels or communicates across a State 
     line in order to commit the offense, or transports materials 
     across a State line in aid of the commission of the offense.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `biological agent' has the meaning given to 
     that term in section 178(1);
       ``(2) the term `dangerous weapon' means a weapon, device, 
     instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, 
     that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or 
     serious bodily injury, including a pocket knife with a blade 
     of less than 2\1/2\ inches in length and a box cutter;
       ``(3) the term `destructive device' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 921(a)(4);
       ``(4) the term `destructive substance' means an explosive 
     substance, flammable material, infernal machine, or other 
     chemical, mechanical, or radioactive device or material, or 
     matter of a combustible, contaminative, corrosive, or 
     explosive nature, except that the term `radioactive device' 
     does not include any radioactive device or material used 
     solely for medical, industrial, research, or other peaceful 
     purposes;
       ``(5) the term `hazardous material' has the meaning given 
     to that term in chapter 51 of title 49;
       ``(6) the term `high-level radioactive waste' has the 
     meaning given to that term in section 2(12) of the Nuclear 
     Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(12));
       ``(7) the term `mass transportation' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49, except that 
     the term includes school bus, charter, and sightseeing 
     transportation;
       ``(8) the term `on-track equipment' means a carriage or 
     other contrivance that runs on rails or electromagnetic 
     guideways;
       ``(9) the term `railroad on-track equipment' means a train, 
     locomotive, tender, motor unit, freight or passenger car, or 
     other on-track equipment used, operated, or employed by a 
     railroad carrier;
       ``(10) the term `railroad' has the meaning given to that 
     term in chapter 201 of title 49;
       ``(11) the term `railroad carrier' has the meaning given to 
     that term in chapter 201 of title 49;
       ``(12) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning 
     given to that term in section 1365;
       ``(13) the term `spent nuclear fuel' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 2(23) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
     of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(23));
       ``(14) the term `State' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 2266;
       ``(15) the term `toxin' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 178(2); and
       ``(16) the term `vehicle' means any carriage or other 
     contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
     transportation on land, on water, or through the air.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 97 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``RAILROADS'' in the chapter heading and 
     inserting ``RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 
     ON LAND, ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR'';
       (B) by striking the items relating to sections 1992 and 
     1993; and
       (C) by inserting after the item relating to section 1991 
     the following:

``1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against railroad carriers 
              and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
              water, or through the air.''.

       (2) The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item 
     relating to chapter 97 and inserting the following:

``97. Railroad carriers and mass transportation systems on land, on 
    water, or through the air...............................1991''.....

       (3) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by striking ``1992 
     (relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist 
     attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
     transportation systems),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to 
     terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad 
     carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
     water, or through the air),'';
       (B) in section 2339A, by striking ``1993,''; and
       (C) in section 2516(1)(c) by striking ``1992 (relating to 
     wrecking trains),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to 
     terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad 
     carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on 
     water, or through the air),''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the 
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) and the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. 
Capito).
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) the Committee on Rules, the 
Departments of Justice and Transportation, the Subcommittee on 
Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and 
the many others who are supporting me in this initiative.
  Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as well as 
the recent bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the need 
for stronger criminal laws to deal with terrorists and other violence 
has never been stronger. Intelligence reports last spring indicate that 
some terrorists might try to bomb U.S. rail lines or buses in major 
U.S. cities. We have also heard reports of so-called ``dirty bombs'' 
that can be easily transported over our extensive mass transportation 
system.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone in this body of the 
potential loss of life and disruption to our

[[Page 22104]]

economy and way of life from this modern new threat.
  In order to help meet this threat head on, I have introduced an 
amendment that revises, enhances, and consolidates two Federal criminal 
law statutes into one comprehensive statute in order to deter and more 
effectively punish terrorist acts against railroad carriers and other 
mass transportation providers.
  Specifically, under current Federal criminal law, terrorist acts 
against railroad carriers are prosecuted under the so-called ``Wrecking 
Trains'' statute which was enacted in 1940. This statute is in many 
ways outdated, full of gaps and inconsistencies, and quite literally 
inadequately addresses modern threats like radioactive materials or 
biological agents.
  Additionally, the September 11 attacks on our homeland gave rise to 
the creation of another Federal criminal statute which covers terrorist 
acts against mass transportation systems. By combining these two 
statutes to cover all forms of transportation and railway carriers, we 
can introduce more consistency, predictability, and effectiveness into 
Federal prosecutorial powers.
  First, it would reduce our criminal law's vulnerability to bogus 
legal claims and also prevent prosecutors from having to prosecute for 
lesser offenses because of discrepancies or gaps in the current law. 
Richard Reid, known as the Shoe Bomber, was actually able to have a 
charge against him dismissed because the new mass transportation 
statute did not explicitly define an airplane as a vehicle for purposes 
of prosecuting under the statute. My amendment will prevent oversights 
like this from happening.
  Secondly, my amendment will bring more consistent and uniform 
protections to all modes of railroad carriers and mass transportation 
providers.
  Third, my amendment will expand the jurisdictional reach of criminal 
law to cover more offenses, such as the release of biological agents or 
radioactive material, and cover more property if the prohibited conduct 
affects interstate commerce or travel, or communicating, or 
transporting prohibited materials across State lines.
  Fourth, my amendment will make capital punishment an option under 
aggravating circumstances that involve terrorist acts that result in 
the death of a person. If our jurisdictional system is unable to have 
this tool at their disposal in order to meet the new threats that 
terrorism has brought upon us, then we will lose a critical opportunity 
to deter and prevent more terrorism from happening.
  And fifth, my amendment protects all law enforcement, railroad 
carriers, and mass transportation providers from criminal liability if 
they are performing their duties in the course of lawful and authorized 
activities. In other words, my amendment protects conduct that should 
be protected, but does not protect conduct that should not be protected 
such as terrorist or imposters posing as rail or mass transportation 
employees.
  Mr. Chairman, overall, Congress has taken dramatic steps in the last 
3 years to improve our security here and abroad, but there is more work 
to be accomplished. I strongly urge passage of this amendment to H.R. 
10.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a 10-page amendment with mandatory minimum 
sentences, mandatory sentences of life imprisonment, and a death 
penalty provision. It has not been considered by any subcommittee or 
the full Committee on the Judiciary, and I am not sure it has even been 
considered by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We 
have information that the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure has not considered it and, in fact, may not support it.
  It appears to make, but it is not clear whether conspiracies, 
attempts and threats are subject to the same penalties as the 
underlying offense. Not only have these provisions not been considered 
by the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, but because of the 
mandatory minimum sentences, neither sentencing experts nor judges on 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission who have the responsibility to assure a 
rational and proportional sentencing system, nor any Federal judge who 
would review all the facts and circumstances of the case, will get to 
assess whether or not these sentences make any sense.
  Mr. Chairman, I remind my colleagues that the Judicial Conference has 
written a letter saying that these mandatory minimums violate common 
sense, and yet here we are asked to decide in a 5-minute debate whether 
or not they are appropriate in this case.
  Mr. Chairman, the author of the amendment indicates that we are 
trying to conform one code section to another. I would ask that we do 
that when we consider the code sections. We are going to consider the 
PATRIOT Act. That is one of the code sections involved. And the time to 
consider the PATRIOT Act and amending the PATRIOT Act is when we have 
the PATRIOT Act before us; not when we are doing a reorganization bill 
without any serious committee of jurisdiction considering the 
underlying amendment.
  I say again, Mr. Chairman, when we have death penalty, that makes 
life complicated from an international point of view. We may have 
terrorists who are caught in another country. We cannot get them 
extradited because of all of these death penalties and we need to 
consider that.
  We have heard that the Shoe Bomber was complicated as to which code 
section he was under. We have an easy case for attempted murder, plain 
and simple. It gives life imprisonment. Certainly the death penalty, if 
he had completed the act, would not have made any sense. The death 
penalty for a suicide bomber is obviously not going to be much of a 
deterrent.
  Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would consider all the 
implications and not adopt this amendment at this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott). I would like to say that in working through this 
amendment, we did work with the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We are also trying to 
reform an act here, the 1940 Wrecking Trains statute, that is sorely 
outdated and full of gaps. When it was conceived, there was no 
conception of a terrorist bombing on mass transportation. I think we 
know, obviously from the events in Spain, that that is a very real 
possibility in terms of acts of terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is to not only pull that 
1940s Wrecking Train statute into the modern era, but also to combine 
it with other mass transportation sections so that not only the 
deterrent but the prosecutorial powers are available to our prosecutors 
to be able to use the most stringent and severe punishments that could 
possibly be available to try to use as a deterrent to terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, in 2001, we considered this provision when we put it in 
the PATRIOT Act. It was inconsistent with an older version. We need to 
consider whether we want to conform the law to the newer version or to 
the older version. That is why we have committees, so we can assess 
what the appropriate punishment is.
  Mr. Chairman, 5-minute debates on the floor without committee 
consideration does not give us that opportunity. I would hope that we 
would delay consideration of this by defeating the amendment and 
consider the issue when we do the PATRIOT Act.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentlewoman from West Virginia whether 
or not conspiracies, attempts, and threats are subject to the same 
penalties as the underlying offense.

                              {time}  1000

  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from West Virginia.

[[Page 22105]]


  Mrs. CAPITO. I think there is a lot of prosecutorial discretion in 
the bill, and I think that would probably be left up to the prosecutor.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would say again, you 
have mandatory minimums in the bill which would not give anybody any 
flexibility, and if a conspiracy attempt and threat are subject to the 
same mandatory minimums as actually completing the crime, that would be 
something that we would want to consider. It is just not clear.
  If the gentlewoman wants time to respond, I will give her time.
  Mrs. CAPITO. In terms of the death penalty, I think that is 
definitely at the discretion of the prosecutor, and there are two sets 
of offenses there. One is a 20-year and one is a 30-year minimum, and I 
think that is also at the discretion of the prosecutors. That is my 
understanding.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would hope we would 
defeat the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from West 
Virginia (Mrs. Capito).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs. 
Capito) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kolbe, Chairman pro tempore of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10) 
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism 
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international 
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no 
resolution thereon.

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