[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 21332-21375]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REORGANIZATION--Continued

  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. Alexander). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.


                Amendment No. 3999 To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be temporarily set aside, and I call up an amendment which is 
at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, and Mr. 
     Lott, Mr. Lieberman, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Bayh, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3999 to amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 (Purpose: To strike section 402 and vest intelligence appropriations 
         jurisdiction in the Select Committee on Intelligence)

       Strike section 402 and insert the following:

     SEC. 402. JURISDICTION OVER INTELLIGENCE APPROPRIATIONS.

       Notwithstanding subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Rule XXV 
     of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence shall have jurisdiction over all proposed 
     legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other 
     matters relating to appropriation, rescission of 
     appropriations, and new spending authority related to funding 
     for intelligence matters.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't expect that this amendment should 
require a lot of debate. It is an issue that we have all talked about a 
lot. It is all a question of turf and jurisdiction. It is something 
that would never be seriously considered by this body under any other 
circumstances except that we are talking about the war on terrorism and 
the overwhelming issue of

[[Page 21333]]

how we are going to defend this Nation. I will be more than happy to 
agree to a time agreement with the appropriators who will lead the 
fight against this amendment which would be agreeable to them.
  This Chamber can be very proud of its bipartisan work that resulted 
in the overwhelming passage of S. 2845, the National Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004. That bill addressed 38 of the 9/11 Commission's 41 
recommendations to further secure our homeland. Not only the two 
managers of that bill--Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman--deserve 
our gratitude but the two leaders, as well, worked together to ensure 
the Senate acted on this important reform legislation prior to 
adjourning before the elections.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senators Lieberman, Lott, Snowe, 
Roberts, and Bayh be added as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, one of the Commission's two options which 
the Commission recommended for how best Congress can improve 
congressional structure over intelligence--the underlying resolution 
does not propose either of the Commission's two options creating either 
a joint committee modeled after the Joint Atomic Energy Committee or 
House and Senate committees with combined authorizing and appropriating 
powers.
  Let me tell you what this is all about. The Commission report was 
clear that along with the need to reform the executive branch, 
congressional reform is needed. And I quote from the report:

       The other reforms we have suggested for a national 
     counterterrorism center and national intelligence director 
     will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.

  I want to repeat that:

       The other reforms . . . will not work if congressional 
     oversight does not change too.
       Unity of effort in executive management can be lost if it 
     is fractured by divided congressional oversight.

  We can't leave this week with our job incomplete. We have to address 
the Commission's recommendations regarding the urgent need to reform 
congressional oversight, intelligence and homeland security. To do this 
in a meaningful way to carry out the important institutional reforms 
recommended by the Commission, each of us in Congress must sacrifice 
our own self-interest. We do not serve the American public well with 
shortsighted, parochial turf battles.
  The Commission acknowledges that this won't be an easy task.
  The report states:

       Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional 
     oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So 
     long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules 
     and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get 
     the security they want and need. The United States needs a 
     strong, stable and capable congressional committee structure 
     to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, 
     support and leadership.

  The Commission also stated:

       Tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient.

  It calls the congressional oversight ``dysfunctional.''
  Their recommendations clearly state that we must have a committee 
with both authorizing and appropriating authority.
  It is not any simpler nor more complicated than that.
  I have a letter from the 9/11 Commission which states:

       If Senator McCain offers an amendment in support of 
     Commission recommendations on Congressional oversight, we 
     will support it.
       We urge the Senate to adopt provisions for the strongest 
     possible reform of Congressional oversight.

  I ask unanimous consent that three letters be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  October 6, 2004.
       Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and Vice 
     Chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
     the United States (also known as the ``9/11 Commission) today 
     released the following statement:
       ``We continue to believe that reform of Congressional 
     oversight is necessary in order for the Commission's overall 
     recommendation to be effective.''
       ``If Senator McCain offers an amendment in support of 
     Commission recommendations on Congressional oversight, we 
     will support it.''
       ``The proposals of Senator McConnell and Reid constructive, 
     positive and move in the right direction. They are useful and 
     modest steps. They are not as far-reaching as those 
     recommended by the Commission.''
       ``We urge the Senate to adopt provisions for the strongest 
     possible reform of Congressional oversight.''
                                  ____



                                               John F. Lehman,

                                    New York, NY, October 7, 2004.
     Hon. John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear John: I am writing to reiterate my strong support for 
     real Congressional reform as recommended by the 9/11 
     Commission.
       As our report makes clear, the important executive branch 
     reforms that passed the Senate yesterday will not work if 
     congressional oversight does not change too. Unfortunately, 
     the McConnell/Reid proposal does not fulfill the Commission's 
     vision for comprehensive reform. The intelligence committee 
     needs real power and prominence, which is why the Commission 
     strongly recommended a new committee structure combining 
     authorizing and appropriating authority, and a simplified and 
     functional homeland security committee structure.
       I urge the Senate to make the Commission's recommendations 
     for Congressional reform as high a priority as it made our 
     other recommendations, which received an overwhelming 
     bipartisan vote of 96.2. The Congressional reforms are 
     equally important and necessary.
           Sincerely,
     John F. Lehman.
                                  ____

                                                  October 7, 2004.
     Senator John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: I write to reaffirm my strong support 
     for Congressional action to implement the recommendation of 
     the 9/11 Commission Report to strengthen Congressional 
     oversight of intelligence and homeland security.
       As you know the bipartisan 9/11 Commission was unanimous in 
     its recommendation that serious reform was necessary. In the 
     language of the Commission: ``Tinkering with the existing 
     structure is not sufficient. . . . the goal should be a 
     structure--codified by resolution with powers expressly 
     granted and carefully limited--allowing a relatively small 
     group of members of Congress, given time and reason to master 
     the subject and the agencies, to conduct oversight of the 
     intelligence establishment and be clearly accountable for 
     their work.''
       This is best implemented by establishing a single committee 
     in each house of Congress combining authorizing and 
     appropriating authorities. Therefore, I endorse your 
     amendment to the current bill which will ensure this single 
     authority.
       Thank you for your work to ensure that the recommendations 
     of the 9/11 Commission are implemented.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bob Kerrey.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, Bob Kerrey writes:

       I write to reaffirm my strong support for Congressional 
     action to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 
     Commission Report to strengthen Congressional oversight of 
     intelligence and homeland security.

  Bob Kerrey, by the way, served here for two terms, as I recall, for 
12 years.
  He further states in his letter:

       This is best implemented by establishing a single committee 
     in each House of Congress combining authorizing and 
     appropriating authorities. Therefore, I endorse your 
     amendment in the current bill which will ensure the single 
     authority.
       Thank you for your work to ensure the recommendations of 
     the 9/11 Commission are implemented.
       Sincerely, Bob Kerrey.

  I would like to point out just as way of background how we got to the 
proposal we have on the table.
  My understanding is both leaders appointed both whips--the Senator 
from Nevada and the Senator from Kentucky--as part of two 11-person 
committees to come up with recommendations.
  We met a couple times, the 11 Republicans, and discussed various 
issues, then there was another meeting of both, and then we were told 
that Senator Reid and Senator McConnell would come up with some 
recommendations. That is not exactly what I had in mind when I was 
asked to serve as part of an 11-Senator committee. Here came these 
recommendations.
  I don't want to digress but, for example, the Transportation Security 
Administration is left in the Commerce Committee. I am glad to have 
more discussions with the Senator from Kentucky about that.

[[Page 21334]]

  I asked, How could the Transportation Security Administration not be 
made part of the new Homeland Security Committee? The Transportation 
Security Administration is the heart and soul of it. His answer was--
maybe he will have a different answer--it was part of the negotiations. 
What does that mean?
  I digress. The fact is, unless we give the authorizing committee the 
proper appropriating capability, we will continue to have, as the 9/11 
Commission said, a dysfunctional oversight of intelligence. It is a 
good idea to make Intelligence Committee members permanent members and 
not have them term limited. I think it is a good idea to have it an A 
committee, although that may cause significant problems if we do not 
give the Permanent Committee on Intelligence appropriating authority.
  It is sometimes nice to have a real-world example of why we need 
this. I am not a member of the Intelligence Committee. I have no access 
to classified information. Frankly, I have never sought any because of 
the fear that some information I might have I might speak about in a 
public forum.
  There was a very expensive and very controversial intelligence 
program, and the Intelligence Committee--this is a relatively short 
time ago--the Intelligence Committee, after many hearings, extensive 
scrutiny and a thorough scrubbing of this program, determined that the 
program should be canceled. We are talking about a multibillion-dollar 
program.
  Do you know what happened? The Appropriations Committee funded it.
  So if you are the bureaucrat over in Langley or at the National 
Security Agency or any place else, where do you go? Where do you go 
when you want your projects done? Do you go to the authorizing 
committee or do you go to the appropriating committee? The power 
resides in the purse. The Golden Rule prevails around here. We all know 
the Golden Rule.
  So if we are going to have a truly effective Intelligence Committee 
oversight that can function with strength and power, we are going to 
have to give them appropriations authority. I predict after the initial 
attractiveness of serving on the Intelligence Committee, if they do not 
have appropriating authority, we will have difficulty getting people to 
serve on the authorizing committee because, again, the power is not 
there.
  We know why many of the authorizing committees are not nearly as 
important or as powerful as they used to be. It is because the 
appropriations process is what drives not only the money but also the 
policy.
  We are going to have an Omnibus appropriations bill sometime. Usually 
what happens, coincidentally, it is within 24 hours of when we go out 
of session. It always seems to work out that way. There will be 
numerous policy changes. There will be numerous moneys and earmarks put 
in. Last year there were 14,000 earmarks put in the appropriations 
bills, up from 4,000 in 1994.
  We are going to see things that will astonish some Members. For 
example, I was astonished several years ago when there was a line item 
in an appropriations bill that called for the leasing of Boeing 
aircraft. We had never had a hearing in the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. We never looked at the issue. No one even suggested it, that 
I know of, and I have been on the committee for 18 years. There was a 
line item that appeared in an appropriations bill that said we would 
lease Boeing aircraft.
  Do you know what happened since then? The GAO and the Office of 
Management and Budget determined that it was a $5.7 billion additional 
cost to the taxpayer. We now ended up, with this long trail that began 
with a line in an appropriations bill, with one of the former employees 
of the Department of Defense pleading guilty and receiving a 9-month 
prison term, saying she had rigged the contract to the benefit of 
Boeing aircraft.
  Now, why do I bring up that example? Because I can tell Members right 
now that if that had been a subject for the Armed Services Committee, 
we would have had hearings on it. We would have examined the leasing 
idea and rejected it as the ridiculous, expensive idea that it was.
  I can go with many other examples. Cruise ships that cost the 
taxpayers $200 million in loan guarantees that were half built at 
Pascagoula, MS. I can tell Members of line items in appropriations 
bills that say when the broadcasters reach 85 percent of high-
definition television in 85 percent of the homes in America, which the 
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission says will never 
happen--I could go over a long list of items that are not only money 
but also policy.
  What will happen if we do not give the authorizing Intelligence 
Committee the appropriations power? Exactly what has happened in the 
past. Projects that cost a great deal of money that the Intelligence 
Committee either approves or disapproves of are overridden in the 
appropriations process. It happens time after time after time.
  I usually pride myself in straight talk. I would be surprised if I 
win on this amendment. One of the Commissioners called me and told me, 
``I'm under intense pressure''--those are his words--``not to support 
your amendment but I will go ahead and do so.''
  There are Members of this Senate who are under intense pressure, as 
well.
  If we want to tell the American people with the justified pride that 
we take in the actions we have achieved in the Senate in the last few 
days, which is remarkable--at least from my standpoint, one of the 
prouder moments I have experienced in the number of years I have spent 
here as we have gone through an incredible process, beginning with 
hearings before Senator Collins's committee back in August, which 
culminated in a tremendous achievement and the most significant 
governmental reform since 1947--then we have done about half to three-
quarters of the job. If we do not give the authorizing committee either 
appropriating power or some kind of power, some kind of authority, then 
we will see a basically dysfunctional and toothless Intelligence 
Committee.
  The Senator from Nevada came to me and said he was going to move to 
table. I tell the Senator from Nevada, one, I want everyone to be able 
to talk, so we will just reintroduce the amendment if it is tabled, 
unless everyone gets to talk. But I also say to the Senator from Nevada 
that I would be glad to enter into a time agreement for passage of this 
legislation. I intend to get an up-or-down vote. I will reintroduce it 
unless the Senator from Nevada allows an up-or-down vote on the 
amendment. I think it is that important.
  Mr. REID. If I could, through the Chair to my friend from Arizona, I 
have no problem with an up-or-down vote. I would rather he told me he 
wanted an up-or-down vote. I would say fine. I have no problem.
  I also say to my friend, I want to make sure everyone who wants to 
speak will have the opportunity. I have no problem at all with an up-
or-down vote on this.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Bayh not be added as 
a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. My friend from Hawaii was on the floor first. Does he 
wish to speak on this matter?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, today, the Senate is considering the 
resolution which responds to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
to revamp the congressional oversight process for intelligence and 
homeland security. I would like to take this opportunity to say a few 
words about this matter.
  The Commission recommended two options for Congress to consider 
regarding intelligence oversight. First, they suggested that the 
Congress could create a joint bicameral committee modeled after the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as they said, to

[[Page 21335]]

streamline the congressional review over intelligence functions. They 
supported this idea because they believe we need to have a very 
powerful Intelligence Committee which can stand up to the 
administration and speak authoritatively for the Congress. I understand 
there is virtually no support within the Senate for this suggestion.
  The other alternative suggested by the Commission was to give the 
Intelligence Committees the authority to appropriate funds, and this is 
the matter now being discussed. The Intelligence Committee--some of the 
members--believes the inability to appropriate funds allows the 
administration to play the Intelligence Committee off against the 
Appropriations Committee. They argue this weakens congressional 
oversight. My colleagues are undoubtedly aware that granting an 
authorization committee such authority would be unprecedented in modern 
times.
  Chairman Stevens and I were surprised that neither one of us was 
contacted by the members of the 9/11 Commission as they conducted their 
review and prepared their recommendations. We were shocked that, 
without even consulting us or our House counterparts on the 
Appropriations Committee, they would recommend that Congress eliminate 
our role in intelligence oversight. As such, I cannot offer any 
personal explanation for the Commission's recommendation.
  Furthermore, their report provides scant explanation why they believe 
the Appropriations Committee should be excluded from its mission to 
fund all Federal agencies. In fact, there is not a single word in the 
9/11 Commission's report to suggest that the appropriations 
subcommittee was at fault in its oversight of the intelligence budget. 
Never once were we accused of that shortfall.
  I believe the Intelligence Committee's role in spending authority is 
already powerful enough without any new authority. Under the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 504, the intelligence 
community cannot spend appropriated funds unless the funds are 
specifically authorized. Now, I think this is worth repeating. The 
intelligence community cannot spend appropriated funds unless the funds 
are specifically authorized. As such, the Select Intelligence Committee 
already has more authority than any standing committee.
  Let me be clear about what that means. If the Appropriations 
Committee were to fund programs that were not included in the annual 
intelligence authorization bill, the appropriated funding for those 
programs cannot and will not be spent by the executive branch.
  This authority is virtually unheard of in other budget functions. The 
authority was granted to the Intelligence Committee to ensure that the 
executive branch could not use the wide latitude provided in 
appropriations law to circumvent the will of the Congress. 
Appropriations acts are written with broad authority to hide the 
amounts for classified programs in large lump sums. This ensures that 
the amounts for these programs remain undisclosed. As such, the limits 
on spending for classified programs are very broad. The authorization 
requirement ensures that both committees agree on how much should be 
spent to provide a better check on the administration.
  More important, I believe the idea of centralizing congressional 
oversight is not only a bad idea, it could be dangerous to the Nation. 
In all areas of Government, except intelligence, our system requires 
and allows public scrutiny. The media, nongovernment organizations, and 
even lobbyists all provide information and insight to Members of 
Congress on everything except intelligence.
  Congress needs to have a system of checks and balances internal to 
the legislative branch because there are no other checks. We all 
remember Iran-Contra, which was able to go unchecked even though 
multiple committees had some degree of intelligence oversight. What 
chance would we have of uncovering that type of abuse if only one 
committee were examining intelligence matters?
  We know there have been other abuses by the intelligence community. I 
remember a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
expressing outrage to discover that the National Reconnaissance Office 
was spending significantly more money to build a new headquarters than 
the chairman was aware. I recall how Chairman Stevens uncovered a slush 
fund in the same agency that had been accumulating outside of the 
knowledge of the Congress.
  Do any of my colleagues really believe that having only one committee 
perform oversight of the intelligence community's budget will provide 
more effective oversight?
  In addition, a single committee overseeing intelligence for the 
Senate would create a powerful czar. Little opportunity would exist for 
meaningful debate on intelligence budgets because so few Members would 
be aware of the details of intelligence matters. Of equal concern, a 
more powerful chairman could end up being co-opted or at least overly 
influenced by the intelligence community and potentially lose 
objectivity. The Senate would be at his or her mercy with little 
outside scrutiny. That is not an appropriate or effective form of 
oversight for the Congress.
  Having a few committees cleared for intelligence programs, such as 
Armed Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence, and each with some 
role in determining how resources are provided would ensure that fewer 
bad ideas get legislated, and it would also create more effective 
oversight and competitive analysis by the Congress.
  I also note that maintaining the link to the Appropriations Committee 
is beneficial to the intelligence community. Intelligence funding is 
protected by inclusion under the Appropriations Committee. By combining 
all appropriations resources, the committee has historically solved 
many intelligence shortfalls.
  If the Appropriations Committee is removed from intelligence matters, 
it will be less likely to support intelligence requirements. First, the 
committee will not be as knowledgeable of intelligence needs. Second, 
it is human nature for chairmen and ranking members to care about the 
programs over which they have jurisdiction. If they do not have some 
oversight over intelligence programs, they will not have the link to 
the intelligence providers or necessarily the desire to help.
  The Intelligence Committee would be subject to 302 budget reductions 
and other general reductions levied against all committees by the 
Budget Committee. To believe that they would be held harmless in 
across-the-board cuts or other cutbacks I think is very naive. Their 
funding level is more likely to be decreased than increased.
  Linking Defense and Intelligence is critical. DOD cannot operate 
without good intelligence. The Defense Subcommittee has ensured that 
intelligence resources support the needs of the warfighter. Today, the 
Defense Subcommittee reviews the recommendations of both the Armed 
Services and Intelligence Committees. The Appropriations Committee can 
minimize redundancies and make sure that the needs of both Defense and 
Intelligence are met. Separating Defense from Intelligence through the 
creation of an all-powerful Intelligence Committee would hurt oversight 
and hurt the community they hope to help.
  In recent testimony before the House Intelligence Committee former 
Deputy Defense Secretary, Defense Comptroller, and staffer to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. John Hamre stated that the 
Intelligence and Armed Services Committees worry too much about input 
and not enough about output.
  His counsel was to let the Appropriations Committee worry about input 
in the budget process, to determine what we should spend money on and 
let the authorizing committees worry about how the agencies are 
performing with these resources. He noted that the authorizing 
committees spend far too much time on the budget and therefore had 
insufficient time for oversight. I am pleased that the leadership has 
decided to recommend creating an Intelligence subcommittee on oversight 
to highlight its importance.

[[Page 21336]]

  Since the Civil War it has been the mission of the Appropriations 
Committee to balance needs among competing priorities. While the 9/11 
tragedy exposed problems with intelligence oversight, it did not expose 
problems with the appropriations process for intelligence. Certainly, 
nothing was uncovered that would be resolved by giving the Intelligence 
Committee the authority to appropriate funds.
  The intelligence budget should not be considered in a vacuum. It 
needs to be considered in conjunction with the Defense budget. While 
some speculate we can simply separate national intelligence from 
military intelligence, it is not that simple. Many programs have both 
national and military, strategic or tactical, components. Military 
personnel provide a large proportion of the intelligence community 
workforce. The Defense Department and Intelligence Community both need 
to support maintaining this relationship and benefit from doing so. It 
should remain the Appropriations Committee's responsibility to ensure 
that the needs of both defense and intelligence are met.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill that the Senate adopted yesterday 
recognizes the need for maintaining a close working relationship 
between DoD and intelligence. Creating an Intelligence Committee that 
could separate itself from all the other actors in the intelligence 
support arena would be, quite simply, a colossal mistake.
  Some of our colleagues think that the Congress needs to reorganize 
dramatically to meet the challenges of the 21st century. There are also 
those that believe that the Intelligence Committee needs to be 
stronger. The resolution that has been offered by the leadership in 
fact will provide some significant enhancements to the authority of the 
Intelligence Committee which will hopefully improve oversight. However, 
I believe the real key to better oversight is for our authorizing 
committees to focus on outputs as Dr. Hamre noted and for the 
Appropriations Committee to focus an allocating resources as 
efficiently and effectively as possible.
  I was the first chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. I have 
great regard for the work of that committee and a great fondness for 
its chairman and vice chairman. I have also served on the 
Appropriations Committee for the past 30 years. I understand the 
critical role that this committee plays in our Nation's security both 
in defense and intelligence. I can say with no false modesty that the 
work that Chairman Stevens and the committee does in overseeing the 
intelligence budget with the assistance of our very experienced 
professional staff is unmatched anywhere in Congress.
  As powerful as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was, it did not 
control appropriations. Maintaining Appropriations Committee control 
over funding would preserve a check on unlimited spending by an 
authorizing committee and would allow at least one other committee to 
have some review of Intelligence matters. I for one do not think that 
this is sufficient oversight, but it is clearly the minimum that the 
Senate should accept.
  This is a very important matter. Senator Reid and Senator McConnell 
have spent the past 3 weeks deliberating on this issue. They have 
consulted with many Members who have competing interests in this arena. 
The resolution they propose represents a compromise that balances these 
many and varied views. I cannot say I am completely happy with their 
recommendation, but I can say this: Their recommendation is far 
superior to the alternative that is being proposed by the Senator from 
Arizona.
  I urge all my colleagues to vote to support the bipartisan leadership 
and defeat the McCain amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my 
remarks, the Senator from Florida be recognized. He has kindly agreed 
to let me proceed because I am due at a conference committee meeting in 
5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. STEVENS. I yield to the Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized after the 
distinguished Senator from Florida.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I object. We can't do that. The Senator from 
Florida has been here since 2 o'clock. I think we should keep our 
regular order here.
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, the 
Senator from Florida, with all due respect, is not speaking on the 
amendment. Usually we go back and forth for and against the amendment.
  Mr. REID. He is speaking on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, this amendment realigns responsibility 
for intelligence appropriations from the Appropriations Committee to 
the Intelligence Committee. This includes all funding relating to 
intelligence, national, joint military programs, and tactical military 
funding and classified intelligence matters as in FBI and other 
Government agencies.
  I think it would be a mistake to adopt this amendment. First, it 
ignores the history of the appropriations process and the lessons we 
have learned in both Houses of Congress. In 1865, the House created the 
Appropriations Committee. The Senate followed suit in 1867. Then from 
1867 to 1885, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were 
stripped of their control over appropriations as one authorization 
committee after another gained the authority to report appropriations.
  In 1885, both Houses realized this ad hoc approach was detrimental, 
and by 1922 both the House and Senate had reinvested appropriations 
authority back into one committee in each House. History has proven 
that moving appropriations to authorization committees creates a 
decentralized appropriations process that leads to greater spending and 
less accountability. That would be even more so today under the Budget 
Act.
  In 1910, Congressman James Tawney, Chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee from 1905 to 1911, said:

       The division of jurisdiction and responsibility in the 
     matter of initiating appropriations has contributed more than 
     any single cause to the enormous increase in the 
     appropriations during recent years.

  Congressman Tawney's conclusions were backed up by a 1987 study that 
found expenditures for rivers and harbors between 1877 and 1885 rose 
sharply after the authorizing committee gained the right to 
appropriate. A book published in 1989 by Charles Stewart III contains 
similar findings. Even after accounting for price changes, economics, 
population, and territorial growth, wars and major programmatic changes 
sponsored by the authorizing committee, Mr. Stewart found the greater 
decentralization of the appropriations between 1877 and 1885 led to 
greater spending.
  Contrast those to the findings of a 1992 study conducted by James F. 
Kogan who found that deficits are rare and nonexistent when spending 
jurisdiction lies within the committee.
  Let me go now to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. They are not 
only ill informed, but they are also unfounded. Not one line in the 
Commission's report stated that the Senate and House Appropriations 
Committees were not performing effective intelligence oversight--not 
one line. Consolidating appropriations and authorization for 
intelligence matters will undermine nearly 140 years of congressional 
tradition and ignore our years of experience in such matters.
  I have heard some grumblings about how those of us who oppose 
provisions in this legislation are merely protecting turf. I am not 
interested in turf. I am interested in function as well as effective 
oversight. You cannot move the responsibilities for appropriations and 
authorizations around without having a real impact on function. And you 
certainly should not make recommendations that aim to do that without 
even discussing those broad, sweeping changes with the Members of 
Congress who are familiar with and part of the appropriations process.

[[Page 21337]]

  My colleague from Hawaii has discussed this at length. I don't want 
to be redundant, but Dr. Hamre, whom he quoted, is not alone in his 
assessment that the budget issues are overemphasized when policy and 
appropriations are jointly considered. Listen to this. Even the 9/11 
Commission acknowledged that risk on page 421 of their report, where 
they write:

       We also recommend that the Intelligence Committee should 
     have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, 
     freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the 
     budget.

  If budget issues pose such all-consuming risk to the entire oversight 
process, it is the view of this Senator that they should be used within 
a separate committee that would fully address them. This would 
encourage collaboration and coordination, the hallmarks of our 
Government system.
  The legislative appropriations process works best where there is 
friction between the committees and bodies of Congress. That is what 
the Founding Fathers believed in, a system of checks and balances. It 
is our suggestion that the organizations of our Government are founded 
upon that concept, and this amendment doesn't reflect that philosophy.
  The insights I offer are not an attempt to protect turf. They are 
recommendations I would have given to the 9/11 Commission had they 
talked to me or to my colleague from Hawaii. Given my 36 years in the 
Senate, 8 of which I have spent as chairman or ranking member of the 
Appropriations Committee, I think they are very important in this 
debate.
  Mr. President, I will speak against this amendment. I have serious 
concerns about any effort that would move appropriations 
responsibilities from the Appropriations Committee to the new 
Intelligence Committee.
  I have spent over 30 years working on defense and intelligence 
matters. I have served as the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee 
for 6 years. Those experiences give me a unique perspective on the 
appropriations process, intelligence organizations, national security 
and defense. Based on that experience, I am very concerned about any 
effort that would combine appropriations and policy responsibilities 
and place them under the jurisdiction of a single committee.
  Collapsing appropriations and policy functions and housing them in 
the new Intelligence Committee would be a mistake.
  First, it ignores the history of the appropriations process and the 
lessons we have learned in both Houses of Congress.
  In 1865, the House created the Appropriations Committee. The Senate 
followed suit in 1867. Then, from 1867 to 1885 the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees were stripped of their control over 
appropriations as one authorization committee after another gained the 
authority to report appropriations. In 1885 both Houses realized that 
this ad hoc approach was detrimental, and by 1922, both the House and 
Senate had vested appropriations authority back in one committee.
  History has proven that moving appropriations to authorization 
committees creates a decentralized appropriations process. And that 
leads to greater spending and less accountability.
  In 1910, Congressman James Tawney, Chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee from 1905 to 1911, said the ``division of 
jurisdiction and responsibility in the matter of initiating 
appropriations has contributed more than any single cause to the 
enormous increase in appropriations during recent years.''
  Congressman Tawney's conclusions were backed up by a 1987 study that 
found that expenditures for rivers and harbors and agriculture between 
1877 and 1885 ``rose sharply after authorizing committees gained the 
right to appropriate.''
  A book published in 1989 by Charles H. Stewart III contained similar 
findings. Even after accounting for price changes; economic, 
population, and territorial growth; wars; and major programmatic 
changes sponsored by the authorizing committees, Mr. Stewart found that 
greater decentralization of the appropriations process between 1877 and 
1885 led to greater spending.
  Contrast those findings with a 1992 study conducted by John F. Cogan 
that found deficits are rare or nonexistent when spending jurisdiction 
lies within the Appropriations Committee, and I think you will agree, 
Mr. President, that we are better off with a centralized appropriations 
process.
  Of course, when you look at how the 9/11 Commission conducted its 
investigation, it's not surprising that their recommendations ignore 
this history. Not one of the 9/11 commissioners or 9/11 commission 
staff members interviewed Senator Inouye or me about intelligence 
oversight. Nor did they interview the Chairmen and Ranking Members of 
the House Appropriations Committee.
  So, I do not find it surprising that their recommendations ignore 
decades of ``lessons learned'' by the House and the Senate. But, I do 
find it difficult to understand how the Commission could recommend a 
major realignment of Congressional organization and attempt to change 
the process for conducting Congressional business without ever speaking 
to any of the Members of Congress responsible for the appropriations 
process.
  The 9/11 Commission's recommendations are not only ill-informed, they 
are also unfounded. Not one line in the Commission's report stated that 
the Senate and House Appropriations Committees were not performing 
effective intelligence oversight Not one line! And consolidating 
appropriations and authorization for intelligence matters would 
undermine nearly 140 years of Congressional tradition and would ignore 
our years of experience with such matters.
  I have heard some grumblings about how those of us who oppose 
provisions in this legislation are merely protecting their ``turf.'' 
I'm not interested in ``turf.'' I am intensively interested in function 
as well as effective oversight. You can't move the responsibilities for 
appropriations and authorizations around without having a real impact 
on function. And you certainly shouldn't make recommendations that aim 
to do that without even discussing those broad and sweeping changes 
with the members of Congress who are familiar with and part of the 
appropriations process.
  If the 9/11 Commission had asked me about these recommendations I 
would have told them that Congress has tried to place policy and 
appropriations functions under the jurisdiction of one committee 
before, with poor results. We have found that mixing policy legislation 
with appropriations legislation is inefficient and more importantly, 
not supportive of the individual processes. Those past experiences led 
to rules in the House and Senate that institutionalized the separation 
of policy and appropriations functions.
  Every year, Congress needs to fulfill its appropriations 
responsibilities in a timely manner; if we don't, the government can't 
keep operating. But the appropriations timetable is completely at odds 
with the complex and controversial deliberations that surround most 
policy legislation.
  History has shown that combining policy and appropriations functions 
leads us down one of two paths: either Congress rushes policy 
deliberations in order to meet fiscal year deadlines and risks adopting 
bad policy or we must delay the timely passage of appropriations bills 
in the interest of debating policy issues and we risk disrupting 
government operations.
  Whichever path we follow we short-change one goal in order to fulfill 
the other.
  The 9/11 Commission hopes that if we combine policy and budget 
oversight in one committee, policy deliberations will guide our 
efforts. But my years of experience tell me it will have the opposite 
effect. Budget decisions will rule the committee and policy oversight 
will take a back seat.
  Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre expressed concern about 
the dominance of budget issues in intelligence oversight when he 
testified before the Appropriations Committee a few weeks ago. He said:

       Frankly, the quality of congressional oversight is not 
     good. It is not as strong as it

[[Page 21338]]

     needs to be. I think we are confusing it by this issue of 
     consolidating authorizations and appropriations. I have said 
     to the Armed Service Committees--I used to work there, as you 
     know--that they have made a huge mistake thinking that they 
     are powerful only by trying to do what you do, shape the 
     dollars.
       There are reasons you have authorization committees. They 
     are to set the broad trends and directions for the policy 
     goals and to oversee the functioning of the Government. But 
     they spend far too much time wanting to shape the way you 
     appropriate little lines in the budget, and I think that is a 
     mistake.
       You play a crucial and indispensable role. They play a 
     crucial and indispensable role, but they are neglecting it, 
     in my view, by putting too much time and attention on budget 
     detail. I would like to see them spend far more time looking 
     at the large purposes, the large policy directions, and 
     overseeing the true functioning of these institutions. That 
     is what I think was intended by having separate authorization 
     and appropriations processes. They can be complementary, but 
     during the last 20 years, frankly, they have been in conflict 
     with each other. And I think that needs to change, and I will 
     be glad to amplify on that further at another time.

  But Dr. Hamre is not alone in his assessment that budget issues are 
overemphasized when policy and appropriations are jointly considered. 
Even the 9/11 Commission acknowledged this risk. On page 421 of their 
report they write:

       We also recommend that the intelligence Committee should 
     have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, 
     freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the 
     budget.

  If budget issues pose such an all-consuming risk to the entire 
oversight process, it is the view of this Senator that they should be 
housed within a separate committee that can fully address them, not 
delegated to subcommittee. This would encourage collaboration and 
coordination--hallmarks of our system of government.
  Those kinds of experiences suggest that the language included in this 
amendment is the wrong way to address the budget and policy issues 
facing our nation's intelligence community. Consolidating 
appropriations and authorization into one committee means fewer members 
of Congress and staff members will be looking at these complex issues--
how does that improve Congressional oversight? It seems to me we would 
have less oversight, not more.
  The legislative and appropriations process works best when there is 
friction between committees and bodies of Congress. That is what the 
Founding Fathers believed in--a system of check and balances. Our 
Constitution and the organization of our government are founded on that 
concept, and this amendment does not reflect that philosophy.
  The insights I am offering are not attempts to protect ``turf.'' They 
are the recommendations that I would have offered had the 9/11 
Commission interviewed me. Given my 36 years in the Senate 8 of which 
have been spent as chairman or ranking member of the Appropriations 
Committee--I think they are an important part of this debate.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Arizona. The Senator's amendment would have the effect of 
harming the Senate's oversight capabilities and making it ineffective.
  The Senator from Arizona argues that if we don't combine intelligence 
oversight and appropriations into a single committee we are wasting our 
time with reform efforts. I disagree. The resolution authored by the 
Senators from Kentucky and Nevada accomplishes all of the goals 
outlined by the 9/11 Commission and it does it in a way that maintains 
an established system of checks and balances we have had in the Senate 
since the Appropriations Committee was established in 1867. The 
appropriations and authorizing committees serve important but distinct 
and separate roles, and it would be unwise to combine them.
  Currently, intelligence funding is shared by five appropriations 
subcommittees, and intelligence oversight is divided among three 
committees. Supporters of the Senator's amendment say that if you 
combine intelligence appropriations and authorization into a single 
committee, you will centralize and have more powerful oversight.
  This is not the case. Not since the early 19th and 20th centuries did 
congressional committees originate both authorizing and appropriations 
bills. Programs back then were often authorized permanently. Oversight 
and appropriations functions were separated because it was determined 
that having joint authorizing and appropriations committees lead to 
greater spending and less accountability. We don't need to repeat that 
mistake of the past.
  Another reason for opposing this amendment is a matter of 
practicality. The Intelligence Committee meets several times a week. I 
have heard from my colleagues on the committee that it is the most 
demanding committee assignment they have. Under the resolution their 
workload and responsibility will significantly increase. We would be 
asking the Intelligence Committee to take on even more work by adding 
appropriations responsibility. It would make their workload enormous.
  For those who believe the Appropriations Committee divides 
responsibility for intelligence between too many subcommittees, this 
resolution addresses that complaint. The resolution would combine all 
intelligence appropriations into a new Intelligence Appropriations 
Subcommittee. While I would prefer we leave it to the Appropriations 
Committee to make the determination on whether this consolidation is 
warranted, I will support the resolution before us.
  We have passed already this year, and the President has signed into 
law, the Defense Appropriations bill. This bill contains most of 
funding this year for the intelligence agencies of our government. We 
have not, however, been able to approve this year an Intelligence 
Authorization bill for the next fiscal year. I do not believe the 
Senator's amendment serves us well if intelligence funding would now be 
held hostage to policy disputes in the Intelligence Committee that are 
holding up passage of an authorization bill.
  The resolution Senator McConnell and Reid have laid before the Senate 
is totally consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and we 
should approve it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Florida is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, I am honored to have served 10 
years on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including the 
opportunity to serve 18 months as its chairman. Today, I will make some 
comments on the general context of congressional reform in support of 
reform of the intelligence agencies, including some specific remarks 
relative to the amendment that is on the floor at this time.
  While some of us in Congress had recognized the problems within the 
Intelligence Community over the years--and we have been working on 
specific reforms--the tragedy of September 11, 2001, revealed systemic 
weaknesses that require sweeping changes. In the last few weeks, I have 
spoken about these issues in floor statements. We have now finished 
work on an excellent piece of legislation that will establish a strong 
national intelligence director and lay the groundwork for serious 
reform of our national intelligence community.
  It is my hope the House of Representatives will soon follow our lead, 
so that we may proceed to conference and turn this legislation into 
law. Now it is time to turn to one final, critical component of reform: 
Us.
  We in the Congress must be candid and admit that one of the targets 
of reform must be the current committee structure by which Congress has 
organized itself to provide oversight to the intelligence community. 
Our oversight has been proven to be haphazard at best. The 9/11 
Commission report states:

       Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional 
     oversight may be among the most difficult and the most 
     important. So long as oversight is governed by current 
     congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American 
     people will not get the security that they want and need. The 
     United States needs a strong, stable, capable congressional 
     committee structure to give America's national intelligence 
     agencies oversight, support, and leadership.


[[Page 21339]]


  The 9/11 Commission goes on:

       The future challenges of America's intelligence agencies 
     are daunting. They include the need to develop leading-edge 
     technologies that give our policymakers and our warfighters a 
     decisive edge in any conflict where the interests of the 
     United States are vital. Not only does good intelligence win 
     wars, but the best intelligence enables us to prevent them 
     from happening altogether.
       Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions, the 
     House and Senate Intelligence Committees lack the power, 
     influence, and sustained capability to meet this challenge. . 
     . .
       The other reforms we have suggested--for a National 
     counterterrorism Center and a National Intelligence 
     Director--will not work if congressional oversight does not 
     change, too. Unity of effort in executive management can be 
     lost if it is fractured by divided congressional oversight.

  To those remarks, I say amen.
  I am pleased that many of our colleagues have joined the chorus and 
cried amen as well. We now have many amendments before us that can 
accomplish the necessary changes to our Senate committee structure. I 
thank Senators Reid and McConnell, along with their staffs, for the 
work they have invested in this issue.
  The Reid-McConnell working group has come forward with a number of 
wise recommendations. I want to endorse a few of those recommendations 
in greater detail, while explaining my reasons for opposing the 
amendment that is now before us. I also want to make some 
recommendations that go beyond the resolution, but which I suggest 
would give the new structure enhanced oversight and direction on the 
intelligence community.
  The first recommendation I strongly support is the abolition of term 
limits for members of the Intelligence Committees. The terms of 
Intelligence Committee members should be made permanent so that the 
accumulated experience and expertise of the committee members can be 
retained.
  When a Member joins almost any other committee in the House or the 
Senate, he or she typically brings some base of knowledge to the task, 
such as a lawyer serving on the Judiciary Committee, or a military 
veteran serving on Armed Services, or someone with a financial services 
background joining the Banking Committee.
  It is a rare Member who has firsthand experience with the 
intelligence community. The complexity of the issues, the technologies 
involved in collection analysis, means that it is a very steep learning 
curve when someone joins the Intelligence Committee. It is not an 
exaggeration to suggest that it can take as much as half of the current 
8-year term before the Member feels confident in their knowledge of the 
intelligence community and can begin to make wise, informed judgments. 
That tutorial exhausts half of the time of Members currently serving.
  The justification for those term limits dates back to the creation of 
the Intelligence Committees in the 1970s, following Senator Frank 
Church's investigation of abuses by the CIA. It was feared that members 
of the Intelligence Committee would become captives of those they were 
overseeing, given the general lack of public scrutiny of the workings 
of the committee.
  However, in order to ensure that committee members have the expertise 
necessary to exercise effective oversight, we must give them adequate 
time to build up the experience they need. We must hope that their 
constituents will pay enough attention to their oversight of the 
intelligence agencies to ensure that the committee members remain 
independent. I expect this will be the case, given the increasing 
awareness of the importance of intelligence to our national security.
  There is another step that I believe should be taken, and that is an 
increased emphasis on training of Members who will join or who 
currently belong to the Intelligence Committee. This is, as our 
President has said, hard work, serving on the Intelligence Committees. 
The background, organizational history, financial matters affecting the 
community, as well as the emerging threats the community is responsible 
for understanding and assisting in our defense, are difficult. Members 
of the committee should devote greater time to their personal and 
collective training so they can better discharge these 
responsibilities.
  The second recommendation I would like to endorse is the distribution 
of the Intelligence Committee's responsibilities through the use of 
subcommittees, especially here a subcommittee on oversight that could 
examine adverse actions within the intelligence community which often 
require a detailed after-incident report.
  One of my principal concerns about the Intelligence Committee during 
my decade of service was the inordinate amount of time that was spent 
looking through the rearview mirror at the problems that had already 
come to fruition, including several significant cases of 
counterespionage, which left an inadequate amount of time to look 
through the front windshield at the threats that were coming at us.
  I believe the establishment of a subcommittee which had the specific 
responsibility for oversight, including these after-incident events, 
would contribute substantially to the committee's capability to look to 
the future.
  Another suggestion within the committee structure, since we will now 
be reorganizing the intelligence agencies around mission-based 
intelligence centers, should be the basis for establishing other 
subcommittees with oversight responsibilities within the Intelligence 
Committee itself. As an example, in the legislation we just passed, two 
intelligence centers are established by statute: one counterterrorism, 
the other counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, 
the Intelligence Committee should have subcommittees with specific 
responsibility to oversee the action of these two critical centers to 
assure that the threats are being properly identified, the resources 
are available to respond to those threats, that the centers are 
accomplishing their objective, and as other centers are created by 
action of the national intelligence director, they, too, deserve a 
special focus of a subcommittee within the Intelligence Committee.
  Next, I believe it is crucial that the appropriations for the 
intelligence community be detached from the budget of the Department of 
Defense so that intelligence funding can respond to intelligence needs 
and not simply fluctuate with the defense budget.
  The reality is that while the intelligence budget is inside the 
defense budget, that has resulted in, over time, a percentage 
relationship. And so as happened in the 1990s, when the overall size of 
the defense budget contracts because the Cold War was over and there 
was a feeling that we did not need to spend the resources we had when 
we were face to face with the Soviet Union, the consequence was we were 
also constricting the size of the intelligence budget at exactly the 
time the intelligence community needed to be expanding.
  We spent 40 years looking at the Soviet Union. We knew a lot about 
it. We had people who understood the language and the cultures of our 
adversary. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world did not 
suddenly declare peace. Rather, a new set of threats emerged from a 
different part of the world, largely the Middle East and central Asia, 
and we were grossly deficient, particularly in our human intelligence 
capability, to understand and react to those new threats.
  By divorcing the intelligence budget from the defense budget, we will 
have a greater opportunity to look specifically at the needs of both of 
those two important parts of our national security system, but to do so 
independently on their own merits.
  I am familiar with the proposal Senator McCain and others have put 
forward to give the Intelligence Committee both authorizing and 
appropriation authority. I respectfully disagree. Having two committees 
that pay attention to intelligence matters can be very helpful. I will 
admit that at one time, I was intrigued with the idea of permanently 
merging the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in the way the old 
Joint Atomic Energy Committee was merged and in a way for the last 
Congress the two committees merged for purposes of the 9/11 inquiry.
  I have now disabused myself of that suggestion. I believe it is 
important that, particularly with intelligence

[[Page 21340]]

where there are so few Americans who have the background to make proper 
judgments and so many of those do not have the information upon which 
to make precise judgment, and where there are few eyes outside of the 
Congress, the press, interest groups, citizens groups, and others who 
can effectively monitor the intelligence community, it is particularly 
important that we have a sufficient number of eyes within the Congress 
that are focused on intelligence issues.
  During the runup to the invasion of Iraq, for instance, there were 
four congressional committees that had some form of oversight over the 
administration's push for war. Only one of those four--and I see on the 
floor now the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee who, with 
his colleague Senator Rockefeller, was largely responsible for this--it 
was only the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which asked the 
tough questions which submitted the findings which have accelerated the 
pace of reform within the intelligence community.
  If there are four congressional committees with some oversight over 
intelligence funding--the two authorizing committees and the two 
appropriating subcommittees--there is less chance that all relevant 
congressional committees will be negligent in their oversight of 
administration action.
  I suggest two reforms which would enhance the establishment of a 
separate subcommittee of appropriations for intelligence. One of those 
is to increase the authority of the Intelligence Committee over the 
authorization process. As Senator Inouye mentioned in his remarks, 
there is currently law that says funds cannot be appropriated to the 
intelligence community which have not been authorized. The problem has 
been that there are sources of authorization other than the 
intelligence community. So if the Intelligence Committee, which is now 
invested with the particular responsibility, decides what it believes 
to be the appropriate priorities, those priorities could be disrupted 
by authorizations which come from other sources and which, in turn, 
validate appropriations.
  The second point I suggest is that the chair and vice chair of the 
Intelligence Committees serve on the appropriations subcommittee. There 
is precedent for this. As an example, in reverse order, the current 
chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee serves on the Armed 
Services Committee. The rationale is that Armed Services represents 
such a significant part of the total appropriations that it is 
desirable to have the person most responsible for those appropriations 
be a member of the Armed Services Committee.
  I would recommend that the same type of interlocking relationship 
should exist between the leadership of the Intelligence Committee and 
the new intelligence appropriations subcommittee.
  Finally, I recommend that the Intelligence Committee expand the use 
of advisory panels, such as the technical task force which has served 
the Senate Intelligence Committee extremely well over the last 5 years.
  I would like to recognize my colleague, Senator Shelby, who was very 
instrumental in the initial establishment of that technical committee. 
This advisory panel has reduced the tendency toward group think, which 
has afflicted the intelligence agencies themselves, as we witnessed so 
clearly in the report of Senator Roberts and the Intelligence Committee 
on the runup to the Iraq war.
  One possibility would be to have an advisory panel for each of the 
subcommittees, locking the Intelligence Committee into the pattern that 
mirrors and supports mission-based intelligence centers.
  There has been a term in the military referred to as incestuous 
amplification, which is a condition of warfare where one only listens 
to those who are already in lockstep agreement, reinforcing set 
beliefs, creating a situation ripe for miscalculation.
  Current events have offered powerful evidence that the intelligence 
community has been engaged in incestuous amplification. It is therefore 
especially important that the oversight committees of the Congress 
avoid that temptation.
  While I regret to say it, in many ways the Congress deserves the 
comments which have been made by the 9/11 Commission, but I believe the 
action we are considering today will go a long way toward assuring that 
the Congress will be a full partner in reforming the intelligence 
community of the United States, and the intelligence community in turn 
can be a fuller partner in assuring the safety of Americans.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.


                           Amendment No. 3999

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise to support Senator McCain and his 
amendment to the McConnell-Reid measure amending S. Res. 445.
  First, I pay tribute to the former chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Graham. I thank him for his service to our 
country. He is retiring, although that certainly does not describe the 
Senator, but I thank him for his leadership and his suggestions as we 
go through this very difficult task of reforming how we do our 
oversight responsibilities in reference to our intelligence 
obligations.
  Back to Senator McCain and his amendment, if we approve the McCain 
amendment, Senators will implement what is the most important 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission for improvement of congressional 
oversight of intelligence activities--most important by the 9/11 
Commission.
  Now, why is John McCain getting in the middle of what would have to 
be termed a sheep and cattle war, if one goes back to the history of 
Arizona, and taking on the challenge of suggesting that the 
Intelligence Committee, or any authorizing committee, have 
appropriations power? That is tough. I mean, that really is tough.
  I think everybody knows there is more than one way to skin a cat that 
is sticking his head in a bootjack than simply pulling on his tail. 
That is hard work. That is where nobody wants to reach their hand into, 
but there again that is John McCain.
  John is from Arizona. I used to reside in Arizona. There is a lot of 
cactus in Arizona. One does not have to sit on each and every one of 
them. Sometimes people think that Senator McCain does that. Why is he 
doing this? Why is he fighting this sometimes lonely battle? Well, on 
page 420 of the 9/11 report, the Commissioners wrote this:

       Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House 
     and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, influence 
     and sustained capability to meet this challenge.

  He is right. He is dead on. He is pulling that cat by the tail in the 
bootjack. And in terms of being right, there are times that one can 
take on tough measures and sort of let them go and slide or one can do 
the right thing. The truth of it is that I can tell my colleagues, as 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee and an 8-year veteran of that 
committee--and it has been a privilege--we are fractionalized when we 
talk to Lee Hamilton, Governor Kean, Bob Kerrey, the former Secretary 
of the Navy, John Lehman, and others. They came to visit before the 
Intelligence Committee with Senator Rockefeller and myself, Senator 
Rockefeller being the distinguished vice chairman and my bipartisan 
partner in trying to do what is right on behalf of our national 
security--and we think we have done a good job, by the way, backed up 
by 22 professional staffers, the most of any committee. So, 
consequently, what happens to us is that when we do our work as quoted 
by the 9/11 Commission--and after the visit by the 9/11 Commission to 
the Committee, they agreed with us that we are fractionalized, that our 
job is pretty tough, that in terms of being an authorizing committee we 
probably are expected to have the most obligation, independence, 
leadership, clout in regards to oversight in reference to intelligence 
and national security of any committee in the Congress, but we have the 
least.
  Why is that? It is because we are fractionalized in terms of 
sequential referral on demand. I am not going to get into that speech 
again because I think we are trying to work it out. I think we have a 
compromise, or I hope we have a compromise, and I thank

[[Page 21341]]

Senator Rockefeller for being a leader in this instance.
  Whatever we do, we know that we have to then first go to the Armed 
Services Committee and then, of course, we have to go to the 
Appropriations Committee.
  Now, that is not a bad thing because we have many fine people serving 
on the Appropriations Committee. I do not mean to perjure the 
Appropriations Committee. Far from it. They have many obligations. They 
have their constitutional authority to do this. But what happens? The 
intelligence community comes before us during the long session of 6 
months, 8 months, 9 months when we do our authorization and make 
priority changes and make recommended changes and make reform changes, 
some of which have been very dramatic. And I think they understand 
that, obviously, then we are going to have to go to the Armed Services 
Committee and then, obviously, we are going to have to go to the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Appropriations Committee where they have 
done, I might add, a splendid job of doing their very best in terms of 
their obligations to meet our national security obligations vis-a-vis 
the intelligence community.
  Now, what would someone do if they were a member of the intelligence 
community? They would appear before the authorizing committee, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee--and I am not saying it was wink them, 
blink them, and nod to a committee that has no authority, but one can 
sort of make that case--and I do not perjure anybody who has come 
before the committee because they are great people. They are laying 
their lives on the line. They are dedicated people. That is not my 
point.
  What they do, however, is go to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
and then they also go to two primary members of this Senate whom I 
personally call friends and admire and respect, and there have been no 
two people in the Congress of the United States, perhaps in the history 
of the United States, who have done more for the military and done more 
during those times where we were stretched thin and hollow and 
addressing the tremendous problems we have today. I am talking about 
the distinguished Senator from Alaska, who is chairman of the 
committee, Ted Stevens and his counterpart, the Senator from Hawaii, 
Dan Inouye. I do not know who has been the stagecoach driver and who 
has ridden shotgun. During these particular years, they both worked 
equally well.
  But what happens to them is that time demands come in and the 
intelligence community comes in and says: Wow, we have a problem. We 
have just had an ``Oh, my God'' hearing before the Intelligence 
Committee. Oh, my God, how did this happen? Khobar Towers, embassy 
bombings, USS Cole, the lack of really trying to figure out what 
happened when we missed the India nuclear explosion, 9/11, Somalia--do 
you know what. It was all tied together.
  So the Appropriations Committee is faced with this urgent need, and 
they respond. And the intelligence community pretty well gets what they 
want. That is not all bad, especially when we are facing some kind of 
emergency, but it basically cuts out the Intelligence Committee's 
authorization process to some degree. It cuts out what the Armed 
Services Committee does as well. It is time based.
  The 9/11 Commission took a look at this and said: Congressional 
oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now dysfunctional. 
Congress should address this problem. We have considered various 
alternatives. The primary suggestion: a single committee in each House 
of Congress combining authorizing and appropriating authorities. The 
McCain amendment will accomplish this alternative. The McCain amendment 
will accomplish this by giving appropriations authority to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee.
  The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, a man 
whom I admire, a man who has been a great friend, basically cited the 
example between 1865 and 1885 that when they took away powers from the 
Appropriations Committee, storm clouds arrived, lightning struck, and 
it was doom and gloom time until they restored that authority.
  Let me suggest another number. It is called 9/11. Let me suggest all 
the hearings we have held in the Intelligence Committee--I call them 
``Oh, my God'' hearings: Oh, my God, how did this happen?--indicated 
the systemic failure of the global intelligence community in regard to 
WMD and the situation in Iraq--not just the United States, everyone, 
including the United Nations.
  The chairman of the Appropriations Committee and his counterpart, the 
ranking member--when he says there is no turf battle, I believe him. I 
don't know of any two Members who would put turf over conscience and 
turf over performance and the obligations of what they have already 
done. I know the chairman has mentioned that he and the members and the 
qualified staff of the Appropriations Committee have gone the world 
over, and they have. I know. I have been with them on many occasions, 
looking at intelligence and looking to see how the money is spent on 
the ground, taking a hard look. I understand that.
  But we have 22 staffers, 22 professional staffers who have background 
and experience in regard to being an analyst at the DIA, being an 
analyst at the CIA with at least 10 years' experience. We have the 
staffers who put together the 521-page WMD report, where the chips fell 
where they may. Guess what happened. The intelligence was wrong. Some 
people try to put that at the foot of the President. He made very 
declarative and aggressive comments. Others in this Congress received 
the same intelligence and made the same statements. Now, of course, a 
lot of that has changed because it is an even-numbered year, and you 
know what kind of situation we are in.
  But I am trying to say your Intelligence Committee stands ready to do 
a professional job in regard to budget authority, should we be granted 
that privilege, with 22 professional staffers. We have done that. There 
have been occasions where we have been granted access. I don't mean 
that in a cynical way because the Appropriations Committee usually is 
in a big hurry with what they have to do, meeting obligations that are 
emergencies--where we have made our suggestions. Some of them, not all 
of them--as a matter of fact, not very many of them--were accepted by 
the Appropriations Committee or, for that matter, the Armed Services 
Committee. Some of them, a lot of them, ended up on the cutting-room 
floor.
  In some cases we were not granted access because of the time 
equation, and wouldn't you know that many of the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission and many of the problems we have experienced that 
nobody wants to see that we have had hearings on are the same kinds of 
things we have tried to fix in the Intelligence Committee and maybe 
could have had we not had this fractionalized process that the 9/11 
Commission has talked about.
  I have talked about what a hard job this is. I talked about the 
courage Senator McCain has had to approach this topic. It is a tough 
topic. Really, this is not hard. Members have a choice. They have a 
choice to make. A vote for the McCain amendment enhances the 
congressional oversight by addressing the findings of the 9/11 
Commission, period. The amendment will enhance the power, influence, 
and sustained capability of the Senate Intelligence Committee; that is, 
to conduct oversight of this Nation's intelligence activities. It 
couldn't be any more simple.
  Members, you should vote for the measure if you want to enhance the 
Senate Intelligence Committee's ability to conduct congressional 
oversight as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and, by the way, 
virtually every other commission that has studied this. So the McCain 
amendment is in harmony with the 9/11 Commission's major recommendation 
for improving congressional oversight and intelligence activities.
  I am not saying the appropriators or the Armed Services Committee has 
done anything wrong, egregious, dysfunctional, whatever. They have done 
a great job under the circumstances with

[[Page 21342]]

the setup of the Congress as it has been. But we stand ready with 22 
professional staffers to do the job. I believe we can do the job.
  I am voting for the McCain amendment. In behalf of our national 
security, I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Senator McCain has introduced an amendment 
to address the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for the creation of a 
committee on intelligence with appropriations powers.
  I have a great respect for the 9/11 Commission. They are dedicated 
members who have the Nation's best interests in heart and mind, and, 
for the most part, they have done an excellent job. Like the Commission 
members, I want our Government to take steps that will help ensure that 
our Nation will never again suffer a catastrophe like 9/11. But, I fail 
to comprehend how giving a legislative committee its own checkbook will 
help avoid another such disaster. Legislative committees have their 
plates quite full with evaluating policy. They should not take on the 
heavy lifting of appropriating public monies as well.
  The fact that the Commission made this recommendation left me 
wondering just how it came up with such a proposal.
  First, I looked at the Commission's report to see what evidence they 
cited for making this recommendation. I was startled to find that the 
Commission provides no specifics in its report to substantiate or 
justify this revolutionary proposal. The Commission offers no examples, 
no rationales, no justifications, no explanations. In short, the 
Commission provides no evidence that the appropriations process is 
flawed when it comes to intelligence matters. There simply is no 
substantive rationale for the need for this kind of drastic 
recommendation.
  According to the Commission, this recommendation was garnered from 
interviews with ``numerous members of Congress from both parties, as 
well as congressional staff members. . . . We found that 
dissatisfaction with congressional oversight remains widespread.'' But 
curiously the report never mentions any specific member or any staffer 
by name or position. Who are these phantom critics? Why were they 
especially qualified to comment? The point is, unspecified 
dissatisfaction from unidentified Members of Congress and unidentified 
congressional staff offers very little basis for embracing such a 
precedent-setting proposal.
  While I do not know who the Commission interviewed to reach this 
determination, I do know who they did not interview. They did not speak 
to Senator Stevens, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee 
and chairman of its Defense Subcommittee. I know they did not talk to 
Senator Inouye, the ranking member of the Defense Subcommittee. Both 
Senators Stevens and Inouye are long experienced legislators and 
appropriators in the field of intelligence. Why weren't they 
interviewed? Nor did they talk to me, and I am the ranking Democrat on 
the Appropriations Committee and the former chairman of the committee.
  Knowing just whom the Commission did and did not interview is 
important because of the makeup of the Commission. While undoubtedly 
sincere, well-meaning, and honorable, only 4 of the members of the 10 
individuals on the 
9/11 Commission had ever served in Congress, and only 2 of them had 
experience with the appropriations process. This recommendation, to 
grant both appropriation and authorization powers to a legislative 
committee, in my judgment reflects this lack of experience. Moreover, 
it belies a lack of familiarity with the history of the appropriations 
process.
  This particular recommendation would blur the existing oversight 
process which tends to ensure a more thorough examination of 
intelligence matters because of a focus on policy matters which is 
separate from the focus on budgetary matters. In other words, the 
commission wants to increase oversight of intelligence matters by 
paradoxically lessening and collapsing oversight on intelligence 
operations.
  The Commission's recommendation would limit the watchdog duties over 
secret intelligence functions to a tiny group of Senators, thereby 
fomenting an environment that would probably promote ``group think,'' 
and secrecy. In other words, the Commission wants to end, or, at the 
least, reduce ``group think'' and incestuous oversight in intelligence 
matters, but it is making a recommendation that would create an 
environment that would likely promote both.
  Most importantly, the historian in me marvels at the degree to which 
the Commission's recommendation flies in the face of history. The 
current Appropriations Committee just happens to be the carefully 
considered antidote to several past failures of the same sort of 
decentralized appropriation's fixes which the 9/11 Commission now 
incredibly recommends. There is nothing new or innovative in this 
Commission recommendation. It has been tried before, and it has failed 
miserably.
  In 1816 the Senate established the Committee on Finance and assigned 
it appropriations responsibilities in an effort to enhance 
congressional fiscal control. But as the country grew, the problems did 
too.
  The War with Mexico, 1846-1848, for example, caused Federal spending 
to nearly triple, and this dramatic explosion placed great pressures on 
Congress to revamp its appropriations process. In 1850, the Senate 
adopted its first rule governing appropriations. It banned amendments 
for additional appropriations not previously authorized by law.
  The Civil War, 1861-1865, as one might expect, vastly expanded and 
complicated Federal spending. Congress abruptly learned how the lack of 
centralized control in the Senate played to the strong advantage of the 
President. Congressional control of the power of the purse went out the 
window as President Lincoln spent millions of dollars without even 
bothering to secure formal congressional appropriations. He could be 
forgiven because he was trying to hold the union together, but the 
Constitution was circumvented and congressional power of the purse was, 
for a time, effectively seized.
  Following the Civil War on March 6, 1867, the Senate established a 
Committee on Appropriations in an effort to bring unity, authority, 
conformity, and order to the Federal spending process.
  As soon as the Appropriations Committee was established, however, 
authorizing committees began a vigorous struggle to regain their lost 
appropriations authority. Several House committees first grabbed 
appropriations authority. Soon, Senate committees were demanding the 
same. Everybody wanted a piece of the action. What kind of Pandora's 
box are we opening if we grant appropriations power to the Intelligence 
Committee? Why not also the Department of Homeland Security? Once the 
box is opened, the grabbing begins. In the late nineteenth century the 
grabbing gathered steam even amid stern warnings.
  Congressman Samuel Randall, D-Pa, the chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee at the time, warned that combining authorizing 
and appropriating authorities under one committee's jurisdiction would 
lead to greater Federal spending. ``Experience and observation,'' he 
pointed out, ``demonstrate such distribution leads to continually 
increasing appropriations, and renders it more difficult to keep 
expenditures within the limits of receipts.'' In other words, blending 
authority and appropriating leads to deficits.
  When the Senate debated granting the Committee on the District of 
Columbia the right to make appropriations in 1883, members of the 
Appropriations Committee argued against the move. Pointing out that the 
Appropriations Committee serves as a necessary, coordinating agent with 
the legislative committees, Senator Beck of Kentucky argued, ``it is 
not wise legislation to vest any committee with absolute power as to 
the amount of money necessary to carry those laws into effect. . . . We 
ought to have one committee as a check upon another, one guard placed 
upon another, so that no body of men sitting as a committee

[[Page 21343]]

of Congress should have absolute power over the money of the people.''
  Again, that is another important lesson for us today. The 
Appropriations Committee is a needed, important partner with Congress's 
legislative committees. When the 9/11 Commission argues for more 
supervision of intelligence matters, it is bogus to suggest that we 
start by decreasing oversight.
  But, in the late 19th century, these members of the Appropriations 
Committee were ignored. After the DC Committee had sought 
appropriations powers, more and more authorizing committees began 
seeking appropriations authority. Responding to pressure, the Senate 
returned appropriations authority to most Senate committees. The 
result, a repetition of all of the past problems. Without central 
authority, oversight and a central controlling mechanism, Federal 
finances again fell into disarray. Legislative committees were off 
pursuing their own individual agendas. Budget requests were submitted 
piecemeal. The practice known as ``coercive deficiencies,'' wherein 
executive agencies went through their year's appropriation within a 
matter of months, and then appealed to Congress for additional funds to 
get them through the year, again became common. Most importantly, the 
decentralized system of appropriations was simply not capable of 
managing the expenditures of a Federal Government that was growing 
large in size and in expense. No one was minding the fiscal store.
  I would urge any Senator who thinks that giving appropriation power 
to an authorizing committee will help restrain spending or increase 
discipline to study Congressional history. Congressman James Tawney, 
the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee from 1905 to 1911, 
concluded that ``division of jurisdiction and responsibility in the 
matter of initiating appropriations has contributed more than any other 
single cause to the enormous increase in appropriations during recent 
years.'' Everyone always wants to get an oar in the water.
  A number of scholarly studies support Congressman Tawney's 
observation, including the 1987 study by David Brady and Mark Morgan, 
Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process, and the 
book by Charles Stewart, Budget Reform Politics. These works document 
that without a central authority to impose overall budgetary discipline 
on the legislative committees, accountability all but vanished, and the 
public's money was spent with abandon.
  World War I, like both the Mexican and Civil Wars, forced the 
Congress to confront the financial mess that decentralized funding had 
created, and to establish a supervisory control over the appropriations 
process. In 1922, the Senate returned jurisdiction over all 
appropriations measures to the Appropriations Committee. Thus, they 
created the system that has now served us well for more than 80 years.
  Now, the 9/11 Commission proposes to return to the failed system of 
the past, and I adamantly oppose it. It is a formula for less 
accountability over public funds and for even larger deficits.
  The lessons of history must not be brushed aside.
  Most of us probably know the historical truism that those who do not 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it. History really does 
repeat itself because human nature does not change. In our desire to 
correct the reasons for our intelligence failures, let us avoid past 
mistakes. In our understandable desire to improve our intelligence 
system following 9/11, at least, we can try to avoid so-called 
solutions which have a proven track record of disaster.
  While it also endeavors to preserve its Constitutional purpose and 
traditions the U.S. Senate has an obligation to adapt to new 
challenges.
  I know that Senators Reid and McConnell examined the recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission with those thoughts in mind. I know that the 
Working Group they co-chaired has proposed changes that will implement 
many of the reforms of the 9/11 Commission, while respecting the rights 
of Senators and the institution of the Senate.
  I cannot say the same about this amendment.
  Authorization committees and appropriation committees have very 
different mandates, one to oversee policy, the other to oversee 
budgets. Different authorization and appropriations committees ensure 
checks and balances and better oversight.
  The amendment would result in fewer Senators looking into 
intelligence matters. It would eliminate the double punch of oversight 
with an authorization committee focused on policy matters and the 
Appropriations Committee focused on budget matters.
  The message of the 9/11 Commission was to increase, not decrease, the 
role of the Congress in intelligence matters. It asked the Congress to 
pursue more vigorous oversight and to ask tougher questions. This 
amendment would take us in the opposite direction.
  I urge the defeat of this amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I do not support the McCain amendment to 
grant appropriation powers, in addition to oversight powers, on 
intelligence matters to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  I am a member of the Intelligence Committee and I support the effort 
in this resolution to strengthen the oversight capabilities of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee. However, I cannot support this 
amendment. Because much of the work done by the Intelligence Committee 
is necessarily done in closed session, it is all the more important to 
have the checks and balances of additional committees involved in the 
review and funding decisions concerning intelligence activities. 
Intelligence matters, by their nature, require secrecy. However, 
democracy works best with active and open debate. For this reason, it 
is critical that this process, while secret, involve more than a small 
number of Senators.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, after conversation with the managers, I 
believe we have other issues to address. I think everybody is familiar 
with this issue. If it is agreeable to the managers, perhaps we could 
have an agreement.
  How much time does the Senator from Connecticut want?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Five minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Five minutes. The Senator from Pennsylvania wants 5 
minutes; the Senator from Missouri, 5 minutes; and I be allowed 5 
minutes.
  Mr. REID. I would like to be able to speak for a few minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Two minutes?
  Mr. REID. A few minutes. I will do it as quickly as I can.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Nevada, 5 minutes?
  Mr. REID. I may need 10.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Nevada, 10 minutes, and that followed by 
a rollcall vote?
  Mr. REID. The Senator from Arizona should be the last speaker?
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes. Part of that unanimous consent request is that I be 
the last speaker, for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, there would be no amendments in order prior 
to the vote up or down as the sponsor of the amendment wants.
  Mr. McCAIN. For the benefit of Members, Mr. President, would you 
repeat the terms of the unanimous consent agreement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the 
Senator from Connecticut will have 5 minutes, the Senator from 
Pennsylvania will have 5 minutes, the Senator from Missouri will have 5 
minutes, the Senator from Nevada will have 10 minutes, the Senator from 
Arizona will be the concluding speaker with 5 minutes, and there will 
be no amendments allowed before the final vote on this amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Followed by a rollcall vote?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be a rollcall vote.
  The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the McCain amendment. 
The McCain amendment is part of the

[[Page 21344]]

package of legislation Senator McCain and I and others introduced on 
September 7 to implement all of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. That is why I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the 
amendment.
  Governor Kean, Congressman Hamilton, members of the Commission made 
clear to Congress that they had three major and most urgent 
recommendations. The first was to create a national intelligence 
director, the second was to create a National Counterterrorism Center, 
and the third was to reform the way in which Congress oversees 
intelligence.
  The first two, the national intelligence director and 
counterterrorism center, we accomplished yesterday in passing the bill 
that came out of our Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Collins 
and I joked along the way that maybe we got the easier assignment than 
Senator Reid and Senator McConnell, who had to deal with Congress's own 
internal organization. I believe they have done well.
  I do want to say a few things, and I will have more to say about this 
in a bit.
  With regard to homeland security, the legislation Senator McCain and 
I introduced embracing the 9/11 Commission said that Congress should 
either establish a new committee with sole jurisdiction over homeland 
security or give that jurisdiction to another existing committee.
  Senator Reid and Senator McConnell and the working group chose to 
give that jurisdiction to the Governmental Affairs Committee on which I 
am privileged to serve. At the same time, it is significant to note 
that it is now going to be called the Committee on Homeland Security 
but at same time large chunks of the homeland security jurisdiction--
the Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration, now part of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service--have been taken back by the 
other committees. That is the kind of action that encourages those who 
are cynical about this Chamber, and I hope we can try to do better on 
that.
  With regard to the oversight of intelligence, the working group made 
a significant reform proposal which sponsors have described. But the 
McCain amendment embraces the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, 
which I still respectfully believe is the better course to follow, 
which is to combine the expertise of the intelligence community and 
their considerable staff in authorizing with the power to appropriate 
and in that sense to make sure that this most critical aspect of the 
war on terrorism, intelligence, has the most active and informed and 
aggressive oversight from Congress.
  The enormous achievement that the legislation we adopted yesterday 
represents in reforming our intelligence and homeland security 
apparatus will not fully be realized, or may go astray, unless there is 
the strongest possible congressional involvement in oversight. I 
believe this amendment will provide for that. That is why I rise to 
support it.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to speak in 
opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona for a 
number of reasons.
  First, the Intelligence Committee, with its current responsibilities, 
has a very heavy workload. I was on the Intelligence Committee for 8 
years and chaired the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress. It 
is a very time-consuming job. I think it would be unwise to give them 
the additional burden of deciding appropriations.
  As a member of the Appropriations Committee--and I do not make this 
argument on a turf basis--we spend a lot of time making the allocations 
among the 13 subcommittees which we have. We have a budget resolution. 
We have a specific amount of money and we have to make the allocations.
  If we have a committee such as the Intelligence Committee not a part 
of the appropriations process, to evaluate intelligence appropriations 
in contrast to the other appropriations functions, it simply does not 
give the full picture.
  We, obviously, never have as much money as the individual members 
would like to have for their respective subcommittees, but when the 
committee makes a decision as to allocations, it is keeping the entire 
budget in mind. That would be lost if you had the Intelligence 
Committee with the authority simply to carve out whatever amount of 
money they chose without regard to the other appropriations processes.
  In addition, the experience as detailed by the chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Alaska, has been that when 
authorization and appropriations were combined, there were enormous 
appropriations. At a time of deficits and at a time of large national 
debt, we ought not create another structure which would add to the 
burden of additional funding.
  The separateness of an intelligence appropriations subcommittee from 
the intelligence authorizing committee also lends for more 
congressional Senate oversight. With all of the work we have to do, 
there is insufficient time to give appropriate oversight to the 
intelligence functions. A separate appropriations subcommittee would 
have an opportunity to add to that oversight and would have an 
opportunity to add as a check and balance to what the authorizers may 
do.
  We are proposing some very far-reaching changes here. I believe the 
resolution is a sound one in that it strengthens the hand of the 
intelligence authorizing committee by taking away term limits so the 
members of that committee will develop real expertise. But we should 
not abandon the traditional division of responsibility between 
authorizers and appropriators.
  I have great respect for what the Senator from Arizona seeks to do. 
He has made very cogent critiques of the Appropriations Committee from 
time to time when the Appropriations Committee seeks to take on the 
authorizing role. There are not supposed to be authorizations on the 
appropriations bill.
  We know, as a practical matter, that happens on occasion. Really, it 
happens with excessive frequency. But just as the separateness ought to 
be maintained with appropriators not authorizing; so, too, the 
separators ought to be made with authorizers not appropriating.
  It is for these reasons that I oppose the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the McCain 
amendment.
  I joined the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence knowing full 
well that our system needed reform. Since that time, I have worked very 
hard with our distinguished chairman and members on both sides to try 
to bring about real reform that will enhance our Nation's ability to 
fight the war on terror by assuring we have the most accurate, 
actionable, and timely intelligence available.
  I applaud the provisions of the Collins-Lieberman bill, and commend 
my colleagues for coming together on that important piece of 
legislation. It is now time, however, for Congress to get into the 
really difficult battle; that is, reorganizing and reforming ourselves. 
That is necessary so long as such reform makes sense. The 9/11 
Commission concluded:
  The House and Senate intelligence committees lack the power, 
influence and sustained capability to meet the challenge of overseeing 
the United States intelligence community, and executive branch reform 
will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.
  That doesn't mean that a commission to investigate the facts and 
circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
should become the only basis for intelligence reform and we must adopt 
every recommendation. We have spent a good bit of time in this body--I 
have personally and I know my other members on the Intelligence 
Committee have worked on these issues far longer than the 9/11 
Commission worked on them. I know from my experience on the 
Appropriations Committee how important

[[Page 21345]]

that responsibility is, and I daresay that those of us on the 
Appropriations Committee have lots of experience on how the 
appropriations process works.
  I feel very strongly in the case of this amendment and the 
Commissions's recommendation to combine authorization and 
appropriations powers that we need to reject it.
  A longstanding lesson in the Congress that we have observed, I think 
wisely, is that it is inefficient and undesirable to mix policy 
legislation with appropriations legislation. Appropriations are 
required on a timely basis to keep the Government operating with as 
little disruption as possible, particularly funds for the intelligence 
community which are paramount to the day-to-day operations in 
continuity of our national security. It should not get stalled or held 
up as a result of potential policy disagreements.
  Every year on the appropriations bills which we process, we work hard 
to get the appropriations out on time and try to focus on those issues 
that need to be resolved in appropriating.
  Combining this legislation with appropriations can result in 
undesirable situations such as a rush job on policy deliberations in 
order to meet fiscal year deadlines, and thus potentially shortchanging 
the policy changes we need to make as a result of our oversight, or 
delays in appropriations, thus disrupting Government operations as we 
get involved in controversial policy debates.
  The longstanding lesson and separation has been institutionalized in 
rules for both the House and Senate. Over the years, various attempts 
have been made in history to mix policy and appropriations functions 
into a single committee. In the past, this has been judged as 
undesirable.
  If we want to get rid of the Appropriations Committees and spread 
appropriations throughout all the authorizing committees, that is a 
long and much more extended debate than we are having here. I do not 
think we can or should single out intelligence and say in intelligence 
alone they will have the appropriations functions along with the 
authorizing functions.
  Congress already has a mixed policy budget oversight model adopted in 
the 1980s for intelligence, the past legislation that provides the 
Intelligence Committees with powerful control over the budget. Section 
504 says no funds may be obligated unless authorized, and over time the 
Intelligence Committee began to authorize at the level of detail of 
appropriations.
  I was very happy to support our chairman's position in Collins-
Lieberman that protects our jurisdiction and enhances the power of the 
Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee as an authorizing 
committee ought to have greater powers. The need to authorize funding 
at the detailed budgetary levels would compel the Intelligence 
Committee to behave like an Appropriations Committee.
  I am familiar with how they work. It is better that the Intelligence 
Committee not get into this field. It is undesirable if our intent is 
to make our Intelligence Committee more effective. The Senate 
Intelligence Committee potentially becomes dominated and consumed by 
budget review and arguing over specific appropriations items.
  The question we have before the Senate is, should Congress 
reorganize. That would be a bad idea. We heard, as the Senator from 
Pennsylvania has discussed, objections to legislating on an 
appropriations bill. I object to appropriating on an authorizing bill. 
I hope my colleagues support that point of view.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Before my friend leaves, we have served together for many 
years. We do things in that committee that are so important for the 
State of Nevada. We authorize programs dealing with flood control, 
which Nevada has tremendous problems with, with the growth taking 
place. We do things there to help flood control in Las Vegas and the 
Appropriations Committee will not give us the money we feel we need.
  Superfund is a program I believe in, but we authorize things in that 
committee and the Appropriations Committee lets us down almost every 
time. We do it with the Corps of Engineers. We do it with the 
endangered species.
  I say, why shouldn't we have the Environment and Public Works 
Committee do their own appropriating? Then we would not have to worry 
about Las Vegas flooding. We would take care of it. I would go each 
year as quickly as I could to get the first bill passed and get all the 
money so there is none left for the rest of the committees.
  The fact is programs that are within that jurisdiction--FEMA is an 
example--these are programs that are essential. I get upset at the 
Appropriations Committee, even though I am a member, for not getting 
money to the things I support, as someone who has been chairman of that 
committee on two separate occasions.
  I know the good intentions of my friend from Arizona. He and I came 
to the House together. We came to the Senate together. I never like to 
get involved in a legislative battle with Senator McCain because of his 
passion with legislative battles and life in general. The fact is, even 
though I don't like to get involved, and I rarely do, he is wrong this 
time. He is wrong.
  What would happen if this amendment is passed? There would be more 
secrecy. There would be too much power consolidated, as the former 
chairman who served on the committee 10 years, Bob Graham, has said. He 
has served as chairman and wrote a book on the Intelligence Committee. 
He said it would be the wrong thing to do. It would reduce the number 
of people and staff looking at the critical matters.
  The appropriations and authorization process has been separate for 
170 years. Why? This is not by accident. It is because there has to be 
some control, ultimately, of money. That is why we do not allow Senator 
Reid of the Environment and Public Works Committee, Senator Reid and 
others who serve on authorizing committees to have a free hand in the 
money.
  Now, the authorizers look at matters of policy. That is the way it 
should be. The appropriators are spending the people's money the way 
the law states.
  The solution we have come up with is a better solution that 
strengthens the Intelligence Committee and creates a new intelligence 
appropriations subcommittee.
  Governor Kean, the cochair of the
9/11 Commission, said:

       I think [an intelligence appropriations subcommittee] would 
     be very much in my mind within the spirit of our 
     recommendations.

  I know my friend from Arizona wrote a letter saying this is fine, 
maybe, but what we want is better. I don't want to get in a nitpicking 
``he said, they said,'' but I am reading from page 421 of the 9/11 
Commission:

       We also recommend that the intelligence committee should 
     have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, 
     freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the 
     budget.

  I don't know if it was an oversight, but I wrote a book once and they 
sent it to an editor, someone who worked at the University of Texas. 
She was a professional editor. This is my book, a history book, and she 
came back with all of the contradictions that I had made myself right 
in my book. I was so stunned how good she was.
  Whoever was doing the editing of this report made a mistake, because 
you cannot have it both ways. You cannot have limited budget authority 
and have them do the appropriation and the authorizing all at one time.
  This is something that is very important. Senator McCain is wrong. It 
would not be hard, for example, to find someone to serve on the 
Intelligence Committee. He said we cannot find people to serve on the 
Intelligence Committee and this will make it worse.
  Walk through those doors and through another set of doors and you 
wind up in Senator Daschle's office. The most sought-after committee by 
Democrats in the Senate is the Intelligence Committee. There is a long 
line of people wanting to serve on that committee. Why? Because it 
deals with the most important aspects of what goes on in this country. 
It deals with the intelligence aspects of our Federal Government. They 
deal with what no one else deals with. Senator Roberts and

[[Page 21346]]

Senator Rockefeller have done a wonderful job with very few tools to do 
it with. What we did yesterday and what we are doing here today is 
creating an Intelligence Committee that has the tools to do work that 
they have done in a very difficult way. We are giving the Intelligence 
Committee superpower authority.
  I suggest to my friend Senator McCain, it is going to be easy to find 
people to serve on this committee. It has been easy in the past and it 
will be easier now because the committee is better than ever.
  He describes the lack of oversight in the current intelligence 
process, but his process is to give only a handful of Senators 
unprecedented power. We propose more checks and balances. That is what 
we need--more, not less.
  This amendment is an amendment that is offered in good faith. I know 
my friend from Arizona feels he is doing the right thing, but it is the 
wrong thing to do. It would be bad; it would consolidate power. This is 
exactly what we do not need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Nevada, and 
especially I thank Senator Roberts who brings great expertise to this 
issue, given his position as chairman of the Committee on Intelligence.
  I mention again the families and the Commission fully support this 
amendment. I have no doubt when we take this vote, my friends, that the 
Commission unanimously, and the families of September 11 support this 
amendment.
  I will quote from Jim Thompson, former Governor of Illinois, a member 
of the Commission, who says:

     . . . I urge the Senate to make the Commission's 
     recommendations for Congressional reform as high a priority 
     as it made our other recommendations. The congressional 
     reforms are important and necessary.

  That is why the Commission was unanimously strongly recommending a 
new committee structure combining authorizing and appropriating 
authority in a simplified and functional Homeland Security committee 
structure.
  Mr. Richard Ben-Veniste:

       I urge the Senate to make the Commission's recommendations 
     for Congressional reform as high a priority as it made our 
     other recommendations.

  The Commission strongly recommended new committee structure combining 
authorizing and appropriating authority in a simplified and functional 
Homeland Security committee structure.
  There is no doubt how the Commission stands or how the families 
stand. What this is all about is contained on page 419 of the 9/11 
Commission report, the bestselling report:

       Of all our recommendations--

  ``Of all our recommendations''--

     strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most 
     difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by 
     current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the 
     American people will not get the security they want and need.

  This is really what this amendment is all about.

     . . . the American people will not get the security they want 
     and need.

  So we are not talking about a turf battle here. We are not talking 
about who is going to do what and who is going to have the power of the 
purse. We are talking about the security that the American people want 
and need, according to the 9/11 Commission.
  Mr. President, I am a bit of a realist. I think it is going to be 
very difficult to win this vote. ``Intense pressure'' has been put on 
Members of the Senate as well as members of the Commission.
  I thank the members of the Commission who have stood up to that 
pressure, but I have no doubt that if this amendment goes down, we will 
perform two-thirds of our duties, and one-third, which, as the 
Commission pointed out, is the most difficult and most important, we 
will have failed that. And that is congressional oversight. That is 
really what this vote is all about.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and ask for the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the vote will now be 
held on the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. The question is on 
agreeing to the amendment.
  Mr. REID. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. 
Chambliss) is necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Edwards) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 23, nays 74, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 200 Leg.]

                                YEAS--23

     Alexander
     Bayh
     Biden
     Cantwell
     Collins
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Fitzgerald
     Graham (SC)
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Snowe
     Sununu
     Voinovich

                                NAYS--74

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Craig
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Shelby
     Smith
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thomas
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Chambliss
     Edwards
     Kerry
  The amendment (No. 3999) was rejected.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I think it may be important that we pause 
for a minute and figure out what we have done. I would like to have a 
colloquy with the Senator from Maine. We are now at a position where we 
are supposed to be consolidating authority in the homeland security 
committee. In fact, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky said last 
night:

       The most sweeping change we recommend is to consolidate 
     congressional jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland 
     Security. If you don't think this is major reform, ask the 
     roughly 25 Senate committee or subcommittee chairmen who 
     currently have jurisdiction over Homeland Security agencies 
     or programs.

  Truth in advertising: The homeland security committee has 38 percent 
of the Department's budget and 8 percent of the Department's employees. 
That is the great consolidation. Why don't we just stop, why don't we 
call it a night and say the heck with this farce. This is crazy. This 
is stupid.
  The amendment I am about to propose does, what? Something shocking. 
It takes the Transportation Security Administration, which is the heart 
and soul of homeland security, and moves it to, guess what. The 
homeland security committee from the committee on which I have been 
proud to serve for 18 years.
  Guess where the Coast Guard remains. The Coast Guard remains, guess 
where. In the Commerce Committee. This is a joke. This is a joke, I say 
to my dear friends.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a colloquy with 
the Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, can this Senator be part 
of that colloquy?

[[Page 21347]]


  Mr. McCAIN. Sure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if we are going to create jurisdiction in 
one committee for homeland security, let's do it. Let's not pretend 
that we are doing it. Let's not do it in name only. As a result of the 
proposal put before the Senate with its exclusions and the amendment 
adopted this morning, as the Senator from Arizona indicated, the 
homeland security committee would have exclusive jurisdiction over less 
than 38 percent of the Department's budget.
  It would have exclusive jurisdiction over fewer than 8 percent of the 
Department's employees. That is 13,000 employees out of 175,000 
employees. There are more amendments filed that would take still more 
agencies away from the committee's jurisdiction.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield for a question, it is my 
memory, if my memory serves me correctly, after 9/11, the first major 
step that we took was the creation of what agency? The Transportation 
Security Administration? Is that true?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. McCAIN. So what are we doing with the TSA, may I ask the Senator 
from Maine? Are we moving it into her committee so she has jurisdiction 
over it?
  Ms. COLLINS. No.
  Mr. McCAIN. Ah, I can hardly believe that. I mean, after all, that is 
what homeland security is really all about, I thought.
  Ms. COLLINS. The fact is that Congress has held 312 hearings over the 
past 2 years on homeland security. The Department has conducted 2,200 
briefings. There are 25 Senate committees and subcommittees with 
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. This is an 
intolerable situation for the Department. It is why the Department and 
the President are pleading with us to consolidate all of the Department 
under one authorizing committee.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield for a further question, if 
Secretary Ridge or Deputy Secretary Hutchinson had to testify before 
Congress as far as the activities of the TSA, to whom would they 
testify?
  Ms. COLLINS. They would testify all over. They testified before 88--
--
  Mr. McCAIN. But what about now?
  Ms. COLLINS. Well, that is a good question. I have had hearings. 
Other hearings have been held. Twenty-five Senate committees and 
subcommittees have a claim over DHS. It is why Secretary Ridge called 
up in desperation and said: Please give us some relief from this. This 
is intolerable. We are supposed to be running the Department. Instead, 
we are constantly testifying.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield to me on that?
  Mr. McCAIN. Sure.
  Mr. STEVENS. I have a chart of the Department of Homeland Security 
summary of appropriations, and it shows the total amount is 
$38,840,000,000. The two items that are not in that jurisdiction that 
would come out total $11 billion. The total amount the homeland 
security committee will have is $22,945,000,000.
  Now, Mr. Ridge appeared before the Commerce Committee under the 
chairmanship of the Senator from Arizona only twice.
  Mr. McCAIN. Secretary Ridge----
  Mr. STEVENS. I am reliably informed the reason it went to the 
Commerce Committee in the first place was the Senator from Arizona 
wrote a memorandum for the Parliamentarian saying that is where it 
should be, in the Commerce Committee, because we have jurisdiction over 
all the means of transportation and all of the entities TSA deals with.
  Now, the Senator's committee--I am a member of that committee--will 
not have jurisdiction over railroads, trains, buses, boats, all of the 
entities that TSA affects. TSA has moved into the facilities owned by 
those entities. They have not built their own buildings; they have 
moved into those occupied by the airlines, buses, wherever. The 
conflict we have to resolve is between TSA and entities that provide 
the transportation.
  Now, if we are going to have a consolidation of jurisdiction, that is 
why we have done this, that is why the Senator from Arizona wrote the 
memorandum in the first place, because we have the jurisdiction over 
the means of transportation.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Alaska is probably correct that I 
asserted jurisdiction over transportation at the time that TSA was 
created. That was before the 9/11 Commission was formed and made their 
recommendations and their decision was made. At least we told the 
American people that we would give those responsibilities to that 
committee.
  Now, maybe Ridge only testified before us twice; Hutchinson, many 
times. There were a multitude of hearings where we called upon TSA, 
exercising our oversight responsibilities, to provide us with 
information, briefings, and hearings.
  The TSA belongs under homeland security, I say to the Senator from 
Alaska, whether they go by bicycle, skateboard, or bus. The fact is 
that this is a joke when we leave the heart and soul of homeland 
security in the Commerce Committee, of which I am proud, and I know, 
according to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, must be 
consolidated.
  I do not know what budget the Senator is looking at, but the facts 
that the Senator from Maine and I have is that it is 38 percent of the 
homeland security budget and 8 percent of the Department's employees.
  My response is, fine, if the Senator from Alaska feels that it 
belongs in the Commerce Committee, he is entitled to that opinion. Let 
us just not tell people we are consolidating. Let us tell them the 
truth. Let us tell them it is business as usual in the Senate, as the 
last vote just proved. It is business as usual, and let us not waste 
the time of our colleagues and try to fool the American people that 
somehow we are making any significant changes when as it stands 8 
percent of the Department's employees fall under the committee on 
homeland security and 38 percent of the budget.
  Mr. STEVENS. I asked the Senator from Maine a question. I have not 
received a response. I am not a part of this dialog. I will make my 
statement later. I really take offense at the attitude of the Senator 
from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator usually does.
  Mr. STEVENS. Let's keep the personalties out of it.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Alaska asked to join in the colloquy and 
he was welcome to join the colloquy. If he chooses not to stay in the 
colloquy, then please do not remain in the colloquy.
  Mr. STEVENS. I do not shout as loud as the Senator from Arizona and 
then interrupt people.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator is welcome to join in the colloquy. I thought 
the colloquy was an exchange of views, ideas, and thoughts. I certainly 
would look forward to engaging in any colloquy with the Senator from 
Alaska. I have the greatest respect for him and the power and authority 
that we just saw exercised in the last vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I want to clarify the issue. It is not 
just TSA and the homeland security functions of the Coast Guard that 
are not transferred to the new homeland security committee. It is the 
immigration functions of the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Citizenship and 
Immigration Services stay now in the Judiciary Committee. Certain 
functions of the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement stay in Finance. So I think if we 
add in all of the exclusions, then we get to the percentages that I 
quoted.
  I say to my colleagues, my point is this: Are we going to do this or 
not? If we are not going to consolidate all of the functions of the 
Department of Homeland Security under one authorizing committee, as 
they are under one

[[Page 21348]]

appropriations subcommittee, appropriately so, then let us not pretend 
that we are.
  Mr. McCAIN. Would the Senator yield for a question?
  Ms. COLLINS. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. What is the view of the Senator as to the primary role of 
the U.S. Coast Guard today?
  Ms. COLLINS. The primary role of the Coast Guard today is port 
security. It has in some ways taken away from its many other important 
functions in fisheries enforcement and regulation, for example.
  Mr. McCAIN. Under this proposal that we are contemplating, where does 
the Coast Guard remain?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Coast Guard would remain in the Commerce Committee.
  The point is this: The administration has called for this 
consolidation. Let us either do it or not do it, but let us not pretend 
we are doing it by changing the name of a committee but only 
transferring to its exclusive jurisdiction 38 percent of the budget and 
8 percent of the people.
  If some of the pending amendments are approved, such as one to no 
longer have the Secret Service transferred, then we are just going to 
end up with jurisdiction over Tom Ridge's personal staff. That is about 
what is going to be left.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield for another question, I would 
like to mention as part of this colloquy a recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission: Congress should create a single principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are 
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over the 
Department's duties, but we believe that Congress does have the 
obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate.
  Now, is it true that under an amendment that has just been adopted by 
voice vote earlier, more responsibilities have been taken from the 
Senator's committee?
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. The underlying resolution as 
amended this morning now leaves the vast majority of the homeland 
security jurisdiction in committees other than in the new homeland 
security committee. I think that is a mistake. I think, if we are going 
to take that route, then we have not done the consolidation that the 
administration has called for.
  Perhaps that is the will of this body. I understand these issues are 
difficult, that committees think they have a special relationship with 
these agencies. But let's not pretend we are consolidating agencies to 
parallel the consolidation that we undertook when we created the 
Department of Homeland Security.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask the Senator from Maine, I am sure she is aware but 
I think our colleagues should know, that the legislation creating the 
Transportation Security Administration, under the title ``Functions,'' 
reads:

       The Under Secretary shall be responsible for security in 
     all modes of transportation including carrying out chapter 
     449 relating to civil aviation security, related research and 
     development activities, security responsibilities over other 
     modes of transportation, be responsible for day-to-day 
     Federal security screen operations, for passenger air 
     transportation, interstate transportation. . . .

  It goes on and on. It is all security. That is the job of the 
Transportation Security Administration. That is one of the reasons why 
it is so named.
  So rather than take the Transportation Security Administration and 
put it under the committee on homeland security and governmental 
affairs, we leave it in the Commerce Committee.
  Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. That is the effect of the 
underlying resolution.


                Amendment No. 4000 To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I perhaps foolishly have an amendment at 
the desk. I ask for its immediate consideration.
  Mr. STEVENS. I object. What was the request?
  Mr. McCAIN. No, I didn't make a request. I said I have an amendment 
at the desk. I ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection setting aside the pending 
amendment?
  Hearing none, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. I still don't understand. Is the Senator now calling up 
the amendment on Commerce?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. At the present time, yes.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4000 to amendment No. 3981.)

  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To ensure that the Committee has jurisdiction over the 
                Transportation Security Administration)

       On page 2, beginning in line 13, strike ``to the 
     Transportation Security Administration,''.
  Mr. McCAIN. I pretty well described this amendment just as we were 
discussing in this colloquy. Basically, it moves the Transportation 
Security Administration from the Commerce Committee to the new 
committee on homeland security and governmental affairs. I pretty well 
described it. I think it is clear, given the responsibilities of the 
Transportation Security Administration which I read a few minutes ago. 
They all have to do with transportation security. Obviously, homeland 
security is the appropriate place for it to be.
  I ask consideration of the amendment. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, this is an important amendment for the 
Senate. I hope Members will listen because the Transportation Security 
Agency is the one that manages basically the entities at the airports, 
the bus stations, wherever they may be where people enter into forms of 
transportation.
  All of those transportation means are under the jurisdiction of 
Commerce. I don't know about the rest of you, but I went to Nome one 
time and I found the Transportation Security Administration had moved 
into the Alaska Airlines terminal, owned by that airline, and said: 
Move out of the way. We have to put in these security devices. And they 
did that. They built a wall through that terminal and they proceeded to 
take it over.
  I have had more complaints about the Transportation Security 
Administration than I have any other entity since I have been in the 
Senate because of the way they impact the traveling public.
  I remind the Senate, there is a provision in the bill that authorized 
the Transportation Security Agency to transition to private enterprise 
when the time came that private enterprise could handle it. This is not 
a permanent Government entity. We sincerely believe that those involved 
in the transportation mechanisms should transition to the point where 
they, working with private enterprise, provide these functions. Right 
now these are temporary functions. We have provided Government 
employees to do it temporarily, not permanently. So this whole premise 
is that it should go over to the Governmental Affairs Committee--on 
which I am proud to serve and was once chairman--and they should 
oversee this entity, which we in Commerce want to see transition to 
become a part of the systems of transportation and not something 
maintained by Government forever.
  This is not something that really ought to be done this way at all. I 
do not disagree with the Senator from Maine. There are a substantial 
number of entities that are under the jurisdiction of various 
committees that should come to the governmental affairs and homeland 
security committee, as it is now to be renamed. But in terms of that 
transition, those things do not impact the overall commerce of the 
United States the way this one does.
  The Coast Guard, by the way--the Coast Guard's primary mission is not 
port security. It is to maintain the jurisdiction in the United States 
in

[[Page 21349]]

peacetime over the waters that are essential to our commerce and in 
wartime to become part of the Department of Defense.
  What sense does it make to split it up? By the way, a portion of the 
Coast Guard is already under Homeland Security. It is already there. We 
agreed to it in the bill that created the Homeland Security Department. 
This takes the rest of it, the part that deals with fishing, that deals 
with boat inspection, that deals with the various aspects of using the 
Coast Guard around the world as it did off Iraq when it had the job of 
handling interdicting shipping that violated the sanctions against Iraq 
importing certain goods. That was done by the Coast Guard. This isn't 
homeland security, either.
  Its primary function up my way is to patrol the fisheries, to 
maintain the maritime border. That has nothing to do with the security 
of the United States. It has to do with the protection of the basic 
resources of our oceans.
  If anyone has worked with the Coast Guard, they know they are part of 
the drug interdiction job. Maybe DEA ought to be transferred to 
homeland security. I am not sure. But it is certainly not the kind of 
thing we are talking about now.
  The Coast Guard has missions beyond ports. It has waterways, coastal 
security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, 
maritime safety, search and rescue. Search and rescue is absolutely 
essential to our State, to have the Coast Guard deal with those souls 
who are at sea, in danger. They do a marvelous job. They do 
environmental protection. What does environmental protection have to do 
with homeland security? That is a different matter--oil spills, 
contamination of the water, ice protections, and whether we can have 
transit of the vessels that are capable of going through ice. We now 
have a considerable number of icebreakers up our way. That is what they 
deal with.
  There is an enormous number of categories that have nothing to do 
with homeland security and those that deal with homeland security we 
already transferred to homeland security. The idea the Coast Guard is 
taking now, the rest of it--the amendment would say, take the rest of 
it and put it over there. I don't know if it is in this one, but that 
is the proposal, as I understand it.
  Admiral Collins, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, when asked about 
the future asset acquisition of the Commerce Committee this last April, 
stated:

       To enhanced mission performance, The Coast Guard must 
     optimize its unique authorities and capabilities, 
     accomplishing partnerships while gaining capacity it needs to 
     complete the full range of our missions. New assets will be 
     used to conduct fishery patrols, search and rescue cases, as 
     well as protecting the Nation against terrorist attacks.

  We have no problem putting the terrorist activities in. They are 
already in Homeland Security. You don't need this process to go through 
to split that jurisdiction up again.
  The problem right now is that Commerce Committee, having jurisdiction 
over all forms of transportation, would be faced with the problem of 
how to deal with this Transportation Security Agency. I think the 
committee under the chairmanship of the Senator from Arizona has a 
great record in dealing with this. As a matter of fact, they approved 
nine bills this year alone related to transportation security in this 
Congress and none of them dealt with security. One did--the Aviation 
Security Improvement Act was enhancement of security with regard to 
airlines themselves.
  I think if one examines the record of this Commerce Committee, it has 
conducted its jurisdiction under the Senator from Arizona. I look 
forward to continuing that as chairman in the next Congress.
  I want to give my friend from Hawaii time to speak on this.
  With regard to the nominations on the TSA and Coast Guard, they have 
been done in record time in Commerce. As compared to the rest of the 
Congress, nominations before our committee are expedited, and 
necessarily so. The impact of this matter obviously is that the 
confirmations of the Coast Guard will be taken over to homeland 
security. Those Coast Guard people do a lot more than just port 
security.
  I am getting redundant.
  But the difficulty with this is the transportation infrastructure 
itself should not be broken up. We should aim for the goal that this 
problem which is handled by TSA will be taken over by private 
enterprise. It should be. We envisioned that at the time we passed the 
original bill.
  We have jurisdiction, as I said, over aircraft, rail, and highways. 
There is no question when we look at it that putting those concepts 
that affect our livelihoods right now and dragging them down is the 
considerable impact of TSA on their operations--not only on this 
operation as passengers, but the whole spectrum of the relationship 
with TSA to the transportation entities, I think, needs to be 
considered.
  The McCain amendment would transfer jurisdiction over there to the 
homeland security and governmental affairs agency.
  We had a hearing this morning about the plight of the airline 
industry. There is no industry that has been affected as much by TSA as 
the airline industry. TSA is examining how to counter the threat posed 
by shoulder-launched missiles. The FAA has that jurisdiction.
  We have jurisdiction in Commerce over the FAA. Why should we transfer 
to Governmental Affairs the jurisdiction over an entity that is dealing 
with this type of equipment? They also have jurisdiction ultimately 
over some of the aspects of the transportation mechanisms themselves--
design of airplanes, design of buses, design of trucks, cars; the whole 
thing. I believe all of that ought to stay where it is, with Commerce.
  The FAA currently governs baggage weight and rules for lost and 
damaged baggage. TSA only deals with baggage security. We are going to 
take baggage security and put a whole entity over there when the 
problem is the problem of the industry which has the responsibility 
legally for the baggage no matter who handles it. I think this is 
absolutely wrong.
  Currently, the airline industry pays $14 billion in user fees, 
according to the air transportation testimony. Those fees have to be 
reduced. The only way to reduce them is to get TSA's function into the 
hands of private enterprise related to the entity they serve--not the 
whole transportation system but the system they are working with. TSA 
is designed almost as a ``one size fits all'' for everything. That 
should not be. We should have a security system that is related to the 
responsibility of those providing the transportation and let the users 
of that transportation pay for it and not the taxpayers. This is where 
in the long run we are going to go, and I believe it is the right thing 
to do.
  I cannot believe we should have two committees dealing with the 
airline industry. Governmental Affairs has no competence in this area 
in terms of the impact of entities like TSA on the airline industry. We 
do. We assert it in the committee under the chairmanship of the Senator 
from Arizona. It has been a good relationship. I believe it should be 
continued.
  I have talked a little bit about the Coast Guard. I don't think that 
is covered by this amendment. The current amendment covers only 
Commerce, as I understand it. Is that correct? I have not seen the 
amendment yet. Parliamentary inquiry: Does this amendment currently 
only apply to the Commerce Department? Is it under TSA and the Commerce 
Committee jurisdiction?
  Mr. McCAIN. It only applies to TSA.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator.
  Does the Senator from Hawaii wish to be recognized?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't want to take a lot of time. I 
wonder if we could get an agreement that perhaps Senator Inouye be 
recognized for--how much time would he need?
  Mr. INOUYE. Twenty minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Twenty minutes; followed by Senator Lieberman for 5 
minutes; Senator Lott for 5 minutes; whatever time Senator Stevens 
would need; and then 5 minutes for me to wrap up, followed by a 
rollcall vote.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I don't know whether I will use any time, 
but

[[Page 21350]]

I would like to be included to speak for up to 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent for that agreement.
  How much time does the Senator from Alaska need? Five minutes as 
well.
  Let me repeat: I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Hawaii 
be allowed 20 minutes; the Senator from Connecticut 5 minutes; the 
Senator from Mississippi 5 minutes; the Senator from Alaska 5 minutes; 
if needed, the Senator from Nevada 5 minutes; and the Senator from 
Arizona for 5 minutes, followed by a rollcall vote.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the request be 
modified: that there be no amendments in order prior to final passage 
on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I wish to join my colleague from Alaska in 
opposition to this amendment to transfer jurisdiction over the TSA to 
the soon-to-be renamed Governmental Affairs Committee.
  As noted by Senator Stevens, this amendment would effectively strip 
the Commerce Committee of its ability to oversee and coordinate the 
safety and security needs of our Nation's transportation system. To 
consider security in a vacuum, without understanding the impacts of 
security policy on the safety and operations of the mode of 
transportation, could give rise to unrealistic, contradictory, and 
counterproductive policies.
  The McCain amendment would sever issues and responsibilities that 
have enabled the Commerce Committee to craft and enact two of the most 
significant transportation security measures this body has adopted 
since the 9/11, 2001 attack on our Nation.
  The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the TSA, the 
Transportation Security Administration, mandated the Federal takeover 
of aviation security functions, and created a fee to pay for the new 
responsibilities.
  The Maritime Transportation Security Act created a new regime for 
maritime security within the TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard.
  The Commerce Committee also successfully completed a conference with 
the House earlier this year on a second port security bill, the Coast 
Guard and Maritime Security Act.
  These efforts were successful because of the Commerce Committee's 
understanding of the transportation industry, and the integral link 
between security, safety, and operations.
  The committee has worked for more than a decade to improve 
transportation security and has had to deal with the inertia of the 
Federal Government as well as fight entrenched interests to change the 
way we secure the transportation system.
  As far back as 1996, attempts were made to transfer security 
functions from the airlines to the Federal Government. Similarly, the 
port security act was initiated prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
The 9/11 attacks created sufficient public pressure to fundamentally 
change the way the Federal Government secured our aviation system and 
the ports.
  The problems we are having in improving security are not the result 
of an outdated committee system; they are the result of ``growing 
pains'' of a newly created department with insufficient resources to 
fulfill its responsibilities.
  The 9/11 Commission made many recommendations. However, the 
recommendations with respect to the transportation sector were very 
general, with no specifics. An effective approach would require taking 
operational needs of transportation systems, the funding streams for 
these systems, the economics of the industries, and the safety 
regulatory framework that is so crucial to protecting our citizens.
  In setting transportation security policy, all of these aspects come 
into play: safety regulations imposed by the Department of 
Transportation, safety regulations and recommendations by the National 
Transportation Safety Board, and the need to efficiently move 
passengers and cargo.
  For example, the Commerce Committee developed legislation to 
strengthen cockpit doors based on its jurisdictional aviation funding 
programs, the FAA's certification approval process, and aviation system 
safety. We had working knowledge of aircraft structure and the carrier 
maintenance schedules.
  The Commerce Committee was able to develop funding streams for the 
installation of another explosive detection system because of the 
committee's jurisdiction over airport funding programs and the use of 
the airport and airways trust fund.
  Similarly, the authorization for pilots to carry guns required an 
understanding of a wide variety of issues, including structural 
integrity of the aircraft, training programs, and the pilot licensing 
process.
  For example, if you left it up to a gun merchant or gun expert, he 
might say, give the pilots a .45. If you fired a .45 in one of those 
aircraft, it will blow the plane apart under the pressure of the 
atmosphere. So we have some sort of background and knowledge about 
aircraft structure. So the pilots would be carrying a smaller caliber 
pistol, something that will not put the aircraft into an explosive 
position.
  You cannot separate safety considerations, security considerations, 
and the operational theory. Keep in mind that when we passed the 
Airport Security Act, we initiated a user fee system, a system where 
the beneficiaries, if you want to call them that, the airlines, pay a 
fee for the metal detectors, pay a fee for the x-ray machines, pay a 
fee for the personnel. They have been paying $14 million per year.
  If you separate this function to another organization that will have 
no knowledge about the economics involved in the airlines, not 
realizing that the airlines are now on the verge of bankruptcy, who 
knows, we may really put them out of business. And the major mission of 
our airlines is to carry passengers, to carry on the mobility of the 
citizens of the United States.
  Transportation security decisions cannot be separated from the safety 
and operational concerns. The Senate leadership, tasked with the 
mission of developing a reorganization plan, recognized this vital 
link. That is why the leadership amendment keeps matters relating to 
the Coast Guard and the transportation security within the jurisdiction 
of the Commerce Committee.
  Even the Department of Homeland Security recognizes that security 
decisions can have safety and operational ramifications. This link is 
embodied in a recent memorandum of understanding between the Department 
of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation.
  Transportation security and safety are so intertwined that separating 
them, as the McCain amendment would do, could do harm rather than 
benefit our transportation system.
  After we created the Transportation Security Administration, long 
before we had a Department of Homeland Security, the President put in 
charge a tough law enforcement official who knew little about 
transportation. He did not last long because he knew only one side of 
the equation. He was succeeded by Admiral Loy who understood not only 
the balance between safety and security but the need to support 
policies and positions to maintain our safety needs while meeting our 
security challenges.
  Those tasked with the responsibilities of securing our transportation 
system must take into account the intricacy of the operations of the 
system, from safety standards to mock in place realities. The two 
cannot be separated. Without such context, security decisions will be 
made in a vacuum that at best might produce misguidance and extraneous 
efforts and at worst could triple the transportation modes that ensure 
the free flow of commerce and traffic upon which our Nation has been 
built.
  Competition, safety, and security are interrelated and inseparable 
aspects of interstate transportation, and each element significantly 
impacts a carrier's operation.

[[Page 21351]]

  I realize this amendment does not discuss the Coast Guard, so I will 
not discuss that matter at this moment.
  This is not a debate about protecting turf. It is a debate about the 
best way to do the job our Nation has entrusted to us. It is about our 
role in transportation safety and security and our ability to craft 
effective and timely solutions.
  Although the report said Congress should create a single board of 
review for homeland security, I feel certain the commission did not 
intend that such a consolidation would result in more harm than good. 
Each of us must look at what is in the best interest of our Nation. 
Senators Reid and McConnell have done that. Therefore, I urge my 
colleagues to vote against the McCain amendment.
  Finally, it has been said the homeland security proposal submitted by 
the leadership of the Senate did not change the status quo. It 
recommends, as this resolution will point out, that the new homeland 
security and governmental affairs committee have sole jurisdiction of 
three of the four directorates in the Department of Homeland Security: 
directorate of information analysis, science and technology programs 
under the under secretary, and emergency preparedness and response 
director.
  Yes, we have tried our best to make a change but not at the expense 
of a good, efficient, safe, and profitable transportation system.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, as we were listening to Senator McCain and 
the unanimous consent request for time, the cloakroom had a call from 
Senator Lautenberg. I ask unanimous consent that the order now before 
the Senate be amended to allow Senator Lautenberg 10 minutes. I am 
hopeful I will not have to use my 5 minutes, so it would not extend 
things for more than 5 minutes, 10 at the most. I ask Senator 
Lautenberg be allowed 10 minutes prior to Senator McCain speaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I rise to support this amendment. When the 9/11 
Commission Report came out--and the Commissioners said the top three 
priorities were the creation of a national intelligence director; 
second, national counterterrorism center; and, third, reform of 
congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security 
functions--a lot of cynics said none of this is going to be easy; maybe 
they will be able to reorganize the administrative branch of our 
Government, but they will never do the job themselves on themselves.
  I am afraid the Senate is in the process of proving the cynics right, 
and it is a shame. We are creating a shell here. This is like a shell 
game. We are calling a committee a homeland security committee, but if 
you pick up the shell, there is not much homeland security under it.
  I remember when the Department of Homeland Security legislation, in 
the aftermath of September 11, was brought before our committee and 
before the Congress. This was originally a recommendation of the Hart-
Rudman Commission which some of us picked up and advocated here in the 
Congress.
  During the legislative consideration of the Homeland Security 
Department, almost every agency that is now a part of the Department 
came to us and said: We can't go to this Department; it is too big; we 
can't work together. We appealed to them that they had to put their own 
interests aside, and in the aftermath of September 11, a national 
crisis which proved we were not organized to protect our homeland, they 
had to get together in one department and make it work for the public's 
benefit. We accomplished that in the Department, and they are now. It 
has not all been smooth, but I don't think there is anybody who would 
say we are not safer today than we were before the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security because they are all working together.
  That is why the 9/11 Commission said, if you want to do effective 
oversight of homeland security, if you want to make sure the Secretary 
of Homeland Security is not spending so much time jumping around from 
committee to committee up here in Congress but actually protecting the 
homeland, then create one homeland security committee of the Senate and 
the House.
  I have no particular argument to be made about which committee that 
should be. In the legislation Senator McCain and I put in, we mirrored 
the report of the 9/11 Commission: Either give one existing committee 
all of the homeland security oversight legislatively or create a whole 
new committee on homeland security. The Senate is on a path to do 
neither and, therefore, not meet the challenge of the 9/11 Commission 
and the challenge of our current circumstances in the war on terrorism 
to create such a committee.
  Here in this amendment, Senator McCain is trying to restore to the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, or being renamed the homeland security 
committee, the Transportation Security Administration. The total 
Department of Homeland Security has 175,000 employees. TSA has more 
than 51,000. Its functions are totally with regard to homeland 
security. Incidentally, the Coast Guard is totally within the Homeland 
Security Department. There may have been some misunderstanding about 
that here. Some of its functions are clearly not directed to homeland 
security. But TSA is totally homeland security. It belongs in the 
Department of Homeland Security, and it belongs in the committee 
designated here in the Senate to do oversight and authorization of 
homeland security.
  So I appeal to my colleagues, if you want to give this title to the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, fine. Senator Collins and I and members 
of our committee will do the best job we can. But if you are giving us 
the title, give us the responsibility to do the job right. If not, give 
it all to another committee or create a new committee. But right now, 
remembering the famous old saying about ``if it walks like a duck and 
quacks like a duck and looks like a duck, it must be a duck,'' we are 
creating a committee that does not have the budgetary authorization for 
most of the Department of Homeland Security, does not oversee most of 
the employees of the Department of Homeland Security, and we are 
calling it the committee on homeland security. It is not. And I do not 
see a good reason for doing it other than business as usual here in the 
Senate.
  So I appeal to my colleagues, let's do what is right for the country 
and put all of this in one committee. You can decide which one you want 
it to be. It does not have to be the one I happen to be ranking 
Democrat on. But let's do what is right and put it in one committee.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is the next 
Senator to be recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. When is the Senator from New Jersey to speak?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is to speak just 
before the Senator from Arizona is to close.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I be recognized before the Senator 
from Mississippi? I think it is appropriate for the Senator from Alaska 
to speak, as the main opponent of the amendment, before I speak, which 
would be after the Senator from New Jersey. I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senator from Alaska be allowed to speak prior to me speaking, 
which would then wrap it up, since the Senator from Alaska is the 
primary opponent of the amendment and I am the sponsor of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, I don't know what that 
does to the other order.
  Mr. McCAIN. It puts the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg, 
prior to you rather than after you.
  Mr. STEVENS. That is fine. I have no objection. Senator Lott precedes 
that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, there is not a quorum call in effect, is 
there?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is not.

[[Page 21352]]


  Mr. STEVENS. I am informed Senator Lautenberg will not be returning 
to the floor to speak. Next will be Senator Lott, right?
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes, Senator Lott.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, under the time agreement, is this the time 
that I will have to speak on the amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, first I want to speak on the broader 
subject, and with only 5 minutes, I don't have much time. But I am 
really worried that what we are doing here is not enough. I understand 
that the whips, who have been designated to carry out this task by our 
leaders, Senator McConnell and Senator Reid, have worked very hard to 
try to accommodate everybody's interests and concerns, but there is 
something bigger here than just individual interests and concerns or 
turf or jurisdiction, and I feel a lot of that is still at play.
  If we do not do anything more to this resolution than what is already 
in it, it is worth having. I do not want to complain about that. At 
least we are making the Intelligence Committee permanent.
  There are a number of things that are in this resolution that are 
worth having, but I am worried it is not enough. I don't like going 
against my friends and colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, 
Senator Stevens, Senator Cochran. I have faith in both of them. But I 
don't have faith in the way the system is set up now. The way things 
are spread out all over this institution, both on intelligence and 
homeland security, it is a prescription not to be able to do our job. 
That really does bother me. I didn't feel this way until I went on the 
Intelligence Committee.
  But I say to my colleagues, after a year and a half on the 
Intelligence Committee, I am really scared. I am worried that our 
intelligence community has not done its job and that it is not 
organized properly. We are trying to do something about that with the 
legislation we passed yesterday. I don't think we did enough. I still 
think there are a lot of people trying to protect the status quo. The 
Pentagon doesn't want to give up 80 percent of the budget. They want to 
make sure that everything is done the way it has been being done. The 
Pentagon wants to make sure the Secretary of Defense still controls 
certain nominations. Again, too many people are worried about trying to 
keep what they have now when what we ought to be worrying about is how 
do we do a better job of getting better intelligence, not only for the 
men and women in the military but across the board in intelligence.
  And this is the thing that really bothers me: part of it is our 
fault. We have not been doing our job. What is the proof? Look at 9/11. 
Look at the other things that we have found that the intelligence 
community did not know were about to happen or gave us information that 
was not accurate. If they failed, we failed.
  When these two pieces of legislation are finished, both the 
intelligence reform in the administration and the congressional reform, 
are we going to be better off? Are we going to have somebody we can 
hold accountable? Are we going to be able to make sure the Pentagon is 
doing its job, the CIA is doing its job? I don't believe so. The 
intelligence authorization committee is not set up to do the job. Even 
with this arrangement we are working on now, it is all going to be 
controlled by appropriations and the black budget.
  I want to emphasize, I trust Senator Stevens, and I know he wants the 
security of this country to be looked after. But if we are not going to 
have an Intelligence Committee with the authority to do the job and 
without the knowledge of what is happening on appropriations, I would 
recommend we all get off because we are going to be held responsible 
and we are not going to be able to do the oversight that is necessary.
  We are working at it. That is good. I commend everybody. On the 
homeland security, I debated on this particular point. I am on the 
Commerce Committee. I want all the jurisdiction we can possibly get. I 
am very concerned about the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard should be more 
than port security. The Coast Guard is about search and rescue. The 
Coast Guard should be about drug interdiction, which it is. It has a 
big agenda. I think you can make a strong case that it ought to stay in 
the Commerce Committee, and under the amendment, as I understand it, it 
would. That is a critical point.
  But if we are going to have a separate homeland security committee, 
or if we are going to put that issue under the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, we ought to do it in a way where we do cut down this 
duplication. I, again, am worried that we are talking about doing more 
than we are really doing.
  I have debated about whether we need a separate homeland security 
committee. But I think if we are going to do it, to only put 38 percent 
of the homeland security matters before the committee is not 
accomplishing the job, just like I am worried that on intelligence 
authorization, we still have not solved the problem with sequential 
referral to the Armed Services Committee. We still have not solved the 
problem about how do the authorizers know what the appropriators are 
doing, and how do the appropriators know what the authorizers are 
doing. We are not doing enough.
  I urge my colleagues, as we to go conference on the other bill, more 
work needs to be done. As we work toward completion on this 
legislation, I hope we will strengthen the hand of those who have 
negotiated on it and those who are going to be held responsible for 
what is the end result.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, under the order, Senator Lautenberg has 10 
minutes. He will not need that time so that can be stricken. What is 
the order of the speaking now?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada has 5 minutes, 
followed by the Senator from Alaska, followed by the Senator from 
Arizona, each for 5 minutes.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I don't have a dog in this fight other than 
the fact that I have worked for a month to the point where we are now. 
I don't want anyone here to think the new committee on homeland 
security-governmental affairs does not have a lot of work to do and a 
lot of jurisdiction. They are totally responsible for three 
directorates. The new homeland security-governmental affairs committee 
will have sole jurisdiction over three of the four primary directorates 
in the Department of Homeland Security: science and technology 
directorate, emergency preparedness and response directorate, 
information analysis and infrastructure protection, and share parts of 
the directorate of border and transportation security.
  For my good friend, the Senator from Maine, to stand and say, We 
don't have anything to do, basically, is simply not factual.
  I would also say we have transferred jurisdiction from 10 standing 
committees and given jurisdiction to this committee. This is not a 
numbers game as to how many employees are involved. It is the number of 
functions they have been asked to take a look at. And if it is any 
indication that we haven't given them anything, you should understand 
that every chairman of the 10 committees has been telling us we gave 
them too much. You can't have it both ways.
  I would also say, even though I don't have a dog in this fight, no 
one should ever suggest that Senator Inouye and Senator Stevens are not 
equipped to handle what has been left with them in Commerce. Remember, 
Senator Inouye is a Medal of Honor winner. Senator Stevens is a World 
War II veteran. That may not make them better Senators, but it 
certainly doesn't make them worse Senators.

[[Page 21353]]

  The only reason I am standing, people can vote however they believe 
they should, but they should not vote based on the fact that we have 
given this new homeland security subcommittee no jurisdiction. They 
have lots of work to do, including all the work they did before. It is 
not as if they don't have anything to do. They have all they had to do 
before plus all the other things they have been given as a result of 
this legislation that we hope will pass soon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I think the Senate should realize that 
when you are talking about the Transportation Security Agency, we are 
talking about 45,000 screeners in the current system. Passenger 
screening takes about $1.8 billion; baggage screening, $1.3 billion. 
Security and enforcement takes $703 million. The security part of TSA 
is very small compared to the manpower looking at passengers and 
baggage. That is their primary function now. And of this $2 billion, 
$70 million comes from aviation user fees, and $95 million comes from 
transfer from carryover for the fiscal year 2003.
  This is a function, in terms of this part of the homeland security 
agency, that is directly related to the transportation mechanisms. We 
urged and have continued to urge that the aviation industry pay the 
vast portion of this now because the major portion of TSA affects the 
airports and airways. We believe, and I sincerely believe, that we 
should find a way to have airlines collecting these user fees, have 
them provide the kind of screening that is necessary for the passengers 
and for their baggage.
  As a matter of fact, we have placed in this bill--this is the 
Homeland Security appropriations bill, of which I am a member of the 
conference, and they are meeting right now--a substantial amount of 
taxpayer money to continue this process of getting all of the baggage 
screening and all the passenger screening done. But the bulk of the 
money, two-thirds of the money each year is coming from the aviation 
industry itself, which is currently terribly hampered. They are hiring 
people still. In the small airports, it is very unique because they 
still have the people who are handling the passengers, but they have 
these people hired by TSA who are using a third or more of their 
buildings. That has to stop. That has to transition to a private 
enterprise.
  If we do this, and we put it in Governmental Affairs, that is not 
going to happen. They don't have the pressure from the entities that 
are carrying these passengers. We do in Commerce, and we have tried our 
best so far to meet the process and to be fair to both the Governmental 
agencies that have the temporary job and the transportation agencies 
that are paying the bulk of the cost of that job.
  But there has to be a transition. We cannot keep it up. In fact, very 
soon the airlines are going to be unable to pay those charges. They are 
going to have to be paid by the taxpayers. We heard this morning they 
are not even going to be able to make their contribution to the 
retirement funds. This must be changed.
  I will use the remainder of my time to say I agree with Senator Lott. 
We had a conversation at noon today about the whole system. It hasn't 
been since 1977 that we reorganized the Senate. We should do that. We 
should recognize the changes in the economy, changes in our people, 
changes in the whole global concept. But we have not done that. This is 
attempting now--because Homeland Security agencies have come upon us--
by the way, it has been on us for a while; we didn't need the 9/11 
Commission to tell us what to do. We created Homeland Security before 
they were created. They took it upon themselves to tell us how to do 
our own laundry. We can do this ourselves.
  By January, we will have to see what the House has done. We have the 
problem of dealing with 100 people, but they have 435 in the House. We 
are going to have to change to meet the reorganization they are going 
to bring about. They have a reorganization group going. We should have 
a reorganization group. With this group, the two whips have done a 
marvelous job trying to meet the demands of the 9/11 Commission, which 
is piecemeal as far as the Senate is concerned.
  We should have another reorganization. Whose job is that? That is the 
job of Rules and the Governmental Affairs Committees to reorganize and 
find a way to deal with the reorganization that is required for the 
Senate to meet current and future needs. This isn't the way to do it.
  The Senator keeps mentioning that two-thirds somehow or another is in 
Commerce. That is not so. We have one-third of this budget. We have 
one-third of the burden from the financing of Homeland Security, which 
is in TSA. I have the figures.
  I have table 3 from the Department of Homeland Security summary of 
appropriations for fiscal 2004 and 2005. This is prepared by the CRS. I 
ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                      TABLE 3.--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: SUMMARY OF APPROPRIATIONS
                                            [In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        FY 2004     FY 2005     FY 2005     FY 2005     FY 2005
                Operational component                   enacted     request      House      Senate       conf.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title I: Departmental Management and Operations:
                                                     ------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal: Title I...........................         453         713         584         562
Title II: Security, Enforcement, and Investigations:
    Office of the Undersecretary for Border and                8          10          10           9
     Transportation Security........................
    Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator project           328         340         340         340
     (US VISIT).....................................
    Customs and Border Protection...................       4,899       5,122       5,154       5,158
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement.............       3,407       3,307       3,363       3,760
    Transportation Security Administration..........       2,508       3,152       3,225       3,412
    U.S. Coast Guard................................       6,764       7,335       7,307       7,469
    U.S. Secret Service.............................       1,134       1,163       1,183       1,163
                                                     ------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal: Title II..........................      19,048      20,430      20,583      21,311
Title III: Preparedness and Recovery:
    Office of Domestic Preparedness/Office of State        4,013       3,561       4,115       4,034
     and Local Government Coordination and
     Preparedness...................................
    Counterterrorism fund...........................          10          20          10          10
    Emergency Preparedness and Response.............       9,351       5,625       5,425       5,648
                                                     ------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal: Title III (current year, net).....      13,374       9,206       9,550       9,692
Title IV: Research and Development, Training,
 Assessments, and Services:
    Citizenship and Immigration Services............         235         140         160         140
    Information analysis and infrastructure                  834         865         855         856
     protection.....................................
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.........         192         196         221         224
    Science and technology..........................         913       1,039       1,132       1,059
                                                     ------------------------------------------------
        Subtotal: Title IV..........................       2,173       2,240       2,368       2,279
Amount in this bill, for any year...................      35,048      32,590      33,085      33,085
Scorekeeping adjustments (rescissions; airline          (-4,786)
 relief) (net)......................................
                                                     ------------------------------------------------
          Total, Dept. of Homeland Security.........      30,262      32,590      33,085      33,844
                                                     ================================================
Discretionary (current year, this bill).............      29,242      31,504      32,000      32,000
Mandatory...........................................       1,020       1,085       1,085       1,085
Section 302(b) allocation...........................      29,242                  32,000      32,000

[[Page 21354]]

 
Difference, bill and allocation.....................           0                       0           0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: H.R. 4567 passed by the House June 18, 2004; S. 2537 introduced by the Senate June 17, 2004; and
  unofficial House Appropriations Committee tables, April 8, 2004.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is very clear. We are talking about 
one-third, not two-thirds.
  The other part of this is the other agencies spread throughout this 
maze of jurisdiction we have. When we reorganized in 1997, someone used 
a mixing bowl, and the committees spilled out first. It wasn't a good, 
sound reorganization. We need a good, sound reorganization. This is not 
the way to do it.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to quote from the 9/11 Commission 
report so we can put this into the perspective that I think this 
amendment deserves:
  Of all of the recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight 
may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is 
governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the 
American people will not get the security they want and need.
  The underlying resolution, as amended, leaves the vast majority of 
homeland security jurisdiction in committees other than the new 
homeland security committee. TSA and the Coast Guard stay in Commerce. 
By the way, the Coast Guard is under the Department of Homeland 
Security. The revenue functions of the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement stay in Finance. The 
revenue functions of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Citizenship and Immigration 
Services stay in Judiciary. It goes on and on.
  Screeners are responsible for security. The Coast Guard's primary 
responsibility is our Nation's security. I wish they could return 
primarily to their old line of work.
  So what do we end up with? We end up with a homeland security 
committee with jurisdiction over less than 38 percent of the 
Department's budget and fewer than 8 percent of the Department's 
employees. TSA employs 51,000 people. Those remain under the Commerce 
Committee. Not only that, but it is clear that what we have done here 
is essentially nothing. What we ought to do, perhaps, is just say we 
failed. I am not going to rant and rave anymore about how unfortunate 
it is that the Appropriations Committee is able to, as they have in the 
past, fund programs that the Intelligence Committee has thoroughly 
scrutinized and say should be canceled, at a cost of billions of 
dollars.
  I think we all know what the job of the Transportation Security 
Administration is. It is security. It is fighting the war on terrorism. 
Where should it be? It should, obviously, be under our new committee on 
homeland security and governmental affairs. So I won't bring up an 
amendment on the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard should be also under this 
committee because it is under the Department of Homeland Security. It 
is just logical.
  So as I say to my colleagues, if this amendment fails, why don't we 
just call it a day and say it is business as usual. We have had great 
success on executive reorganization and I am proud of the work the 
committee has done. Unfortunately, we have failed to act in any 
significant manner as far as the reorganization of the Senate is 
concerned, and that was recognized by the 9/11 Commission.
  I yield the remainder of my time, and I ask for the yeas and nays on 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Before the vote, Mr. President----
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, what is the regular order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is to proceed to a vote.
  Mr. McCAIN. I don't object, Mr. President. I wish the Senator from 
Kentucky had asked for time during the normal unanimous consent 
agreement. I don't object.
  Mr. REID. He is not going to speak on the amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I was going to say to our colleagues 
that it is the intention of Senator Reid and myself to continue to 
process amendments into the evening, with the goal of finishing 
tonight. We still have 30-some-odd amendments. There is certainly no 
requirement that they all be offered. We intend to keep plowing ahead 
and try to reach the finish line tonight.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the two leaders are emphatic that they want 
to move forward. We have a lot of stuff to do. Tomorrow is the 
scheduled day for departure. That will be difficult. I wish people 
would follow the example of the Senator from Arizona, and I say that 
seriously. He never takes a lot of time. He doesn't waste a lot of 
time. He sets a tone for how we should move forward. I appreciate his 
cooperation on these two very important amendments. These are the two 
most important amendments we will have on this bill now before the 
body. I appreciate his cooperation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Arizona.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. 
Chambliss) and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici) are 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Edwards) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham of South Carolina). Are there any 
other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 33, nays 63, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 201 Leg.]

                                YEAS--33

     Alexander
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Carper
     Chafee
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Hagel
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kyl
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Santorum
     Specter
     Sununu
     Talent
     Voinovich

                                NAYS--63

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Frist
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Chambliss
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Kerry

  The amendment (No. 4000) was rejected.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I 
move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I know Senator Hatch has an amendment. 
I do not see him on the floor at the moment.

[[Page 21355]]

  I do see him on the floor. I am hopeful that Senator Hatch will 
shortly be prepared to send his amendment to the desk.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator from Kentucky yield for a question?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask the Senator from Kentucky, I have a pending 
amendment which has been agreed to with a modification by Senator 
Roberts. I am prepared to offer it whenever appropriate so we can take 
care of it.
  Mr. McCONNELL. It appears as if Senator Hatch may not be quite ready, 
so why don't we have Senator Durbin go ahead and offer his amendment.


                Amendment No. 4036 to Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4036 to Amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To modify the provisions relating to the staffing and budget 
                        of the select Committee)

       In section 201, at the end of subsection (g), add the 
     following:
       ``(d) Of the funds made available to the select Committee 
     for personnel--
       ``(1) not more than 55 percent shall be under the control 
     of the Chairman; and
       ``(2) not less than 45 percent shall be under the control 
     of the Vice Chairman.''.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I have good news for the Chamber. I 
believe we have reached an agreement on this amendment which will help 
us move this important resolution along.
  I saw Senator Roberts on the floor a moment ago. I have had a 
conversation with Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller. The purpose 
of this amendment is to move us closer to the bipartisan model which we 
want to establish for this important intelligence committee. Yesterday, 
with an overwhelming vote of 96 to 2, the Members of this Chamber 
adopted the intelligence reform suggested by the 9/11 Commission, and 
it is a product of the fine bipartisan cooperation of Senator Susan 
Collins of Maine and Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut.
  I believe in the time I have been fortunate enough to represent 
Illinois in the Senate, it was one of our finer moments because we 
responded to a national crisis. We did it in a timely fashion. We did 
it in an orderly way. We brought together amendments which were 
substantive and numerous and voted in nonpartisan rollcalls. We came to 
the floor, and after a week and a half of debate brought this bill out 
with a vote of 96 to 2 to reform the executive branch. I think the 
message of the process and the message of the reform bill is that we 
want to take partisanship out of the intelligence operations of the 
executive branch.
  I believe by the joint effort of the Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid, 
and the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. McConnell, we are seeing that same 
thing today about the legislative branch.
  This amendment which I propose is an effort to move us closer to 
parity in staffing. I believe that establishing this by rule is a good 
thing for the future of the Intelligence Committee. What it says is 
that regardless of the partisan split of the committee, which is now a 
split of eight to seven, if I am not mistaken, we are going to divide 
staff by a 55-45 proportion, 55 percent to the chairman representing 
the majority of the committee, and 45 percent to the ranking member 
representing the minority on the committee.
  Along with Senator Roberts, who is on the majority side of this 
committee, and Senator Rockefeller, the ranking member, we had a 
conversation and we have agreed to a new number which I will present as 
a modification to this amendment shortly. It is a number of 60 percent 
for the chairman with the majority membership of the committee, 60 
percent of the staffing funds in control of the chairman, and 40 
percent of the funds in the control of the minority ranking member.
  I think this is a fair compromise. I believe it is offered by both 
sides in the spirit of moving us toward this bipartisanship on the 
Intelligence Committee. I believe it will have the net effect of 
improving the product of the committee.
  Let me quickly add that I don't believe there are necessarily 
Democratic or Republican answers to the tough issues we face on the 
Intelligence Committee. But I believe both sides should be adequately 
staffed so they can rise to the occasion when we face challenges for 
investigations and hearings that are held with witnesses being brought 
before us. By establishing 40 percent of the personnel funds to the 
ranking member and 60 percent to the chairman, I think we are moving 
closer to that model.
  For those who have been involved, Senator McConnell and Senator Reid, 
let me make it clear this would apply to the committee staff and not to 
individual member staffs. The effort in the preparation of this 
resolution was made so that every member of the Intelligence Committee 
who has personal staff would not be affected by this amendment. The 60-
40 would apply strictly to the other committee staff over and above the 
personal staff of the committee.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DURBIN. Yes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I believe the amendment at the desk is 55-45. Is the 
Senator going to modify the amendment?
  Mr. DURBIN. Yes. At this point I will be happy to yield for any other 
questions or comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I would like to verify what the 
Senator from Illinois has said.
  Senator Roberts can't be here at this particular time, but he 
authorized me to say he is in agreement with this. It is a sensible 
approach. It is bipartisan in nature. As far as we are concerned, there 
is agreement on both sides. What the managers decide is up to them.


                    Amendment No. 4036, As Modified

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if there are no further comments or 
questions, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment now pending 
before the Senate be modified on its face, and in paragraph (d), 
subparagraph (1), the number 55 be changed to 60; and in paragraph (d), 
subparagraph (2), the number 45 be changed to 40.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4036), as modified, is as follows:

       In section 201, at the end of subsection (g), add the 
     following:
       ``(d) Of the funds made available to the select Committee 
     for personnel--
       ``(1) not more than 60 percent shall be under the control 
     of the Chairman; and
       ``(2) not less than 40 percent shall be under the control 
     of the Vice Chairman.''.

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I believe we are prepared to move 
forward.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4036), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, Senator Hatch is here and ready to 
offer an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.


                Amendment No. 4037 to Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I call up my amendment which is at the 
desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], for himself, Mr. Leahy, 
     and Mr. Specter, proposes an amendment numbered 4037 to 
     amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.

[[Page 21356]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

    (Purpose: To retain jurisdiction over the Secret Service in the 
                      Committee on the Judiciary)

       In section 101(b)(1), after ``Service'' insert ``, and the 
     Secret Service''.

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to offer a Leahy-Specter-Hatch 
amendment that would preserve the Judiciary Committee's oversight 
jurisdiction over the U.S. Secret Service.
  The reason for the amendment is not simply the committee's 
longstanding relationship with the Secret Service, although that 
relationship is strong and healthy. It is a very good reason why we 
should retain the status. The Judiciary Committee has had jurisdiction 
over the Secret Service's title 18 authority since June 25, 1948. I was 
astonished to hear one of my colleagues say on the floor earlier today 
that the Judiciary Committee was trying to move jurisdiction to the 
Judiciary Committee. The committee has had jurisdiction over the Secret 
Service for the last 56 years.
  The more important reason is that a huge percentage of Secret Service 
operations are authorized by title 18 of the criminal code. That will 
obviously and appropriately remain under the Judiciary Committee's 
jurisdiction. If the point of this bill is to reform congressional 
oversight, then it would make no sense to reduce the Judiciary 
Committee's ability to examine how title 18 of the criminal code 
authority is used while continuing to rely upon the Judiciary Committee 
to make sure that title 18 provides appropriate authority to the Secret 
Service.
  A little bit of history may be helpful. The Secret Service was 
established as a law enforcement agency in 1865. While most people 
associate the Secret Service with Presidential protection, its original 
mandate was to investigate counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Today, the 
primary investigative mission of the Secret Service is to safeguard the 
payment and financial systems of the United States.
  The Secret Service has exclusive jurisdiction for investigations 
involving the counterfeiting of U.S. obligations and securities. That 
authority to investigate counterfeiting is derived from title 18 of the 
United States Code, section 3056. Some of the counterfeited U.S. 
obligations and securities commonly dealt with by the Secret Service 
include U.S. currency and coins, U.S. Treasury checks, Department of 
Agriculture food coupons, and U.S. postage stamps.
  The Secret Service combats counterfeiting by working closely with 
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as foreign 
law enforcement agencies, to aggressively pursue counterfeiters. Secret 
Service agents commonly work with Federal prosecutors--employees of the 
Department of Justice, over which the Judiciary Committee retains 
jurisdiction.
  It is important for Congress to keep up with the times when 
determining the scope of Title 18. Since 1984, the Secret Service's 
investigative responsibilities under Title 18 have expanded to include 
crimes that involve financial institution fraud, computer and 
telecommunications fraud, false identification documents, access device 
fraud, advance fee fraud, electronic funds transfers, and money 
laundering.
  People who counterfeit things are creative, and so are those who 
invent new products that are susceptible to being counterfeited. It is 
important that Title 18 provide the Secret Service with appropriately 
updated authority, and therefore it is crucial that the Judiciary 
Committee have the ability to require the Secret Service to report on 
its use of authority.
  Listen to some of the types of criminal investigations that the 
Financial Crimes Division of the Secret Service plans and coordinates:
  Financial Systems Crimes, including bank fraud; access device fraud; 
telemarketing; telecommunications fraud; computer fraud; the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and Farm Credit Administration 
violations.
  These are all traditional criminal investigations and they are all 
governed by Title 18. They are at the core of Judiciary Committee 
jurisdiction and expertise.
  Another division of the Secret Service, Forensic Services Division, 
FSD, is almost entirely focused on providing analysis for questioned 
documents, fingerprints, false identification, credit cards, and other 
related forensic science areas. A main purpose of this division is to 
investigate crimes and provide evidence for prosecutors to use in 
court. FSD also manages the Secret Service's polygraph program and 
coordinates photographic, graphic, video, and audio enhancement.
  Here's an example of how the Judiciary Committee's relationship with 
the Secret Service works: As part of the 1994 Crime Bill, Congress 
mandated the Secret Service to provide forensic/technical assistance in 
matters involving missing and sexually exploited children. The Forensic 
Service Division offers this assistance to Federal, State, and local 
law enforcement agencies, the Morgan P. Hardiman Task Force and the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. It is important for 
the Judiciary Committee to continue its relationship with the Secret 
Service to make sure that its capabilities are utilized in important 
areas of law enforcement such as these.
  For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote for keeping the 
jurisdiction where it belongs, with the people who have to deal with 
these criminal laws all the time. Frankly, it is a tough process. We 
should not move the Secret Service out of the Judiciary Committee 
jurisdiction because that is where this very tough anticrime approach 
has to occur and has to take place.
  I hope my colleagues will listen to me. I have no axes to grind here. 
I am not just trying to preserve jurisdiction; it doesn't make sense to 
take it out of the hands of the Judiciary Committee as much as some 
think it may. I don't think it can make a good case that it should be 
taken out of the Judiciary Committee.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record what looks like 
50 or more jurisdictional aspects of the Secret Service investigational 
approaches.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                           Title 18 USC 3056

       Secret Service has jurisdiction to investigate the 
     following:
       --213--Acceptance of loan or gratuity by financial 
     institution examiner
       --216--Punishments for 213
       --471--Counterfeiting US obligations
       --472--Uttering Counterfeiting securities
       --473--Dealing in Counterfeiting obligations or securities
       --474--Possession of device to counterfeit obligations
       --476--Theft of tools used to counterfeiting obligations
       --477--Selling of tools for counterfeiting obligations
       --478--Counterfeiting of foreign obligations
       --479--Uttering Counterfeit foreign obligations
       --480--Possessing counterfeit foreign obligations
       --481--Possession of electronic images for counterfeiting 
     foreign obligations
       --482--Forgery or Counterfeiting Bank Notes
       --483--Uttering counterfeit foreign bank notes
       --484--Fraudulently combining multiple United States 
     Instruments
       --485--Counterfeiting United States coins
       --486--Unauthorized passing of United States coins
       --487--Making or possessing counterfeit dies for coins
       --488--Making or possessing counterfeit dies for foreign 
     coins
       --489--Making or possessing likeness of United States or 
     foreign coins
       --492--Forfeiture of counterfeit paraphernalia
       --493--Bonds and obligations of certain lending agencies
       --508--Forging United States Transportation Documents
       --509--Unlawful Possession of Government transportation 
     plates
       --510--Forging Treasury Check endorsements
       --657--Misapplication of funds from a Credit Institution
       --709--False advertising or misuse of names of indicate 
     Federal agency
       --871--Threats against the President
       --879--Threats against former Presidents
       --912--Impersonation of Officer of the United States
       --981--Civil forfeitures
       --982--Criminal forfeitures

[[Page 21357]]

       --1001--False statements
       --1006--False statements to credit entries
       --1007--Forged/Counterfeit statements to influence the FDIC
       --1011--False statements to Federal Land Bank
       --1013--Use of forged securities or bonds to defraud 
     Federal Land Bank
       --1014--False Statement to influence Farm Credit 
     Administration
       --1028--Identity Theft
       --1029--credit card fraud
       --1030--Computer fraud
       --1344--Bank Fraud
       --1752--Entering the temporary offices of the President
       --1907--Disclosure of private information by a farm credit 
     examiner
       --1909--Conflicts of interest for National Bank Examiner
       --1956--Money Laundering
       --1957--Engaging in Monetary Transactions from specified 
     Unlawful Activities

  Mr. HATCH. When you look at these, you cannot conclude anything but 
this should stick with the Judiciary Committee. I don't have any ax to 
grind. Everyone knows that. The fact is, this is the right thing to do 
or I would not be standing here trying to do it. We have had a great 
relationship with the Secret Service and have done a great deal of work 
together over my 28 years on the Senate Judiciary Committee. I know 
this is right, and we have to do this.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I totally agree with the Senior Senator 
from Utah in this battle. Senator Hatch and I have worked very closely 
on this issue. This is an amendment cosponsored principally by Senator 
Hatch and myself and Senators Sessions, Specter, and Biden. It is not a 
partisan amendment by any means. It is not ideological. It just makes 
good sense.
  In the resolution before the Senate we look at the new committee, the 
homeland committee and governmental affairs committee, but we have four 
exceptions for good reasons. Section 101, we take the Coast Guard out 
of that. We take the Transportation Security Administration, we take 
the Federal law enforcement training sector, and we take the revenue 
functions of the Customs Service. But we have to make one other 
exception, and that exception is the U.S. Secret Service.
  The Secret Service operates under Title 18 of the United States Code, 
that title of the United States Code of criminal law. Every one of 
these yellow tabs in the criminal code is one more area under criminal 
law, criminal code, where the Secret Service operates. The 
distinguished Senator from Utah said it is not just the protection 
service by any means, even though that is what we see in the news. They 
enforce many of the criminal laws, many of the laws related to the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency and other financial instruments. They 
carry out criminal investigations. Criminal law enforcement function is 
the cornerstone of what the Secret Service does.
  I first got involved with the Secret Service when I was a State's 
attorney of Chittenden County in Vermont. That was over 38 years ago. 
We had a counterfeiting case we were prosecuting under State law. For 
the expertise, for help in the investigation, we called in the Secret 
Service. The Secret Service was involved immediately. Even though it 
was a State case, a State prosecutor, the Vermont State police, the 
Burlington City Police, the expertise came at a moment's notice from 
the U.S. Secret Service. They stayed throughout that case. They made 
sure we had the expertise. They made sure they gave us all their 
knowledge of how one of these cases would be tried. Incidentally, we 
won that case.
  Years later, when I was a new Member of the Senate, I was walking 
down the hall and I see the Secretary of State coming down the hall, 
people from the State Department, and also a couple of Secret Service 
agents. There was the Secret Service agent, David Lee--I remember his 
name--standing right there doing the dual things they do. His primary 
role had been in counterfeiting cases. We talked briefly about the 
number of counterfeiting cases he went to. I told him how much it meant 
to my little State of Vermont, which could not handle counterfeiting 
cases. A lot of crimes had been committed, and the Secret Service came 
in.
  Now, they enforce criminal law. They have full Federal arrest 
authority, full authority to carry any needed firearms, full authority 
to use deadly force. We should continue our oversight, and the 
Judiciary Committee should continue its role. Their dual criminal law 
enforcement of financial institution investigations and protective 
operations is inseparable from the proper jurisdictional oversight of 
the Judiciary Committee. Again, I point to the Federal criminal code 
rules.
  Now, the Coast Guard has been made exempt. It, like the Secret 
Service, is a distinct entity. Both should be exempted, not just the 
Coast Guard. The Secret Service has even more reason to be exempt. The 
success of the Secret Service mission depends on the criminal laws of 
the United States.
  An example of that is that all the criminal fraud law enforcement 
investigations which the Secret Service handles are within Title 18. 
Where do they handle it? Within the Department of Justice through the 
Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney--under, obviously, the 
jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee.
  I will give another example. The Secret Service is authorized at the 
request of any State or law enforcement agency or at the request of the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to provide forensic 
and investigative assistance in support of investigations involving 
missing or exploited children.
  Let me tell you right now, if you have a missing child, we want 
everybody involved. All the local authorities will tell you that, 
especially if they are anywhere near a State line. They want everybody. 
Again, it comes under our committee.
  So I agree, as I said, with the Senator from Utah. This is not a 
partisan issue. It is not a liberal issue. It is not a conservative 
issue. It is just good, plain sense.
  Mr. President, I would hope my colleagues would be willing to accept 
the amendment on behalf of myself, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Sessions, Mr. 
Specter, Mr. Biden, and others.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise, with a lot of respect for the 
Senator from Utah and the Senator from Vermont, to oppose this 
amendment. I do so because it continues the stripping away of 
jurisdiction from the newly designated committee on homeland security 
over more and more of what constitutes the Homeland Security 
Department.
  The recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional 
oversight of homeland security and to allow the leadership of the 
Homeland Security Department to spend more time protecting our homeland 
and less time running from committee to committee here in Congress was 
to create one committee on homeland security with jurisdiction over all 
aspects of the Homeland Security Department.
  The Homeland Security Department includes 175,807 employees. Now, 
employees are not the only measure of jurisdiction, but let's start 
with that number and then say that the bill brought before us by the 
working group immediately took out 45,000 from the Coast Guard, now 
under the Homeland Security Department, and 51,000 from the 
Transportation Security Administration. Add to that an amendment 
offered by my friends from the Judiciary Committee today which took 
back a good part of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration 
and Customs Service Enforcement, which will be shared in some part with 
Homeland Security and Customs & Border Protection, and you are at a 
point where jurisdiction over well over half--heading toward almost 
all--of the Department of Homeland Security employees is no longer 
under the committee we are establishing to oversee the Department of 
Homeland Security.
  I will repeat what I said earlier about the Transportation Security 
Agency authority. Our committee recommended the creation of a 
Department of Homeland Security after September 11. Why are we here? We 
are here because we were attacked on September 11, and we looked back 
and

[[Page 21358]]

said: We were not ready. We were not organized to defend our people. So 
we proposed the creation of the Homeland Security Department.
  Almost every agency we wanted to bring together in that Department 
protested: We want to be on our own turf. We want our own ground. But 
we pushed forward because there was a larger national interest. We 
prevailed, and we brought all these agencies together--one department. 
And it is working. We brought them together for the synergy of them 
working together to protect our national security in an age of 
terrorists who hate us more than they love their own lives and have 
shown that over and over again.
  So here comes another amendment to take the Secret Service, which is 
in the Department of Homeland Security, away from the oversight and 
jurisdiction of what we are calling the Homeland Security Department. 
We are beginning to make the homeland security committee look like a 
house without rooms in it or not as many rooms as are supposed to be 
there, or like a shell, when you pick it up and there is not much under 
it even though it says ``homeland security'' on the top. That is a 
shell game, and this adds only to that trend.
  Now, look, there are a lot of committees that could claim some 
relationship to different subparts of the Department of Homeland 
Security.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield on that point?
  The fact is, they are a distinct entity within homeland security. We 
have carved out that distinct entity for the Secret Service because of 
their law enforcement role. The distinguished Senator from Connecticut 
had no problem with carving out the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard--
--
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. There is a problem.
  Mr. LEAHY. But it has been done. It has been accepted.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Not done by me.
  Mr. LEAHY. It was not objected to by you, and it was accepted.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. It was indeed, and we are still working on an 
amendment to try to see if we can right that wrong. I say to the 
Senator from Vermont, with all respect, I understand your question. The 
point is, if we were doing this right, everything in the Homeland 
Security Department would be overseen by the homeland security 
committee. That is what the 9/11 Commission called for.
  Mr. LEAHY. If I might respond to that, if we were doing this right, 
we would not have brought out something put together behind closed 
doors. I am not accusing the Senator from Connecticut of doing that, 
but we suddenly have this thing plopped on our desks as people are 
leaving for the long-promised recess, and we are told: Here, we just 
have to put this all together right now. It is not the way to do it. We 
have not had hearings. We have not done anything like that. I think had 
we had those hearings, had we discussed it, you would have found a vast 
majority of Americans would assume the Secret Service carries out their 
law enforcement functions.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I may, here is the basic point. The 
Secret Service is now part of homeland security. The Homeland Security 
Department should be overseen by the homeland security committee. I was 
not behind those closed doors, if they existed. My understanding is the 
working group leadership spoke to the ranking members on each of the 
committees. I may be wrong. I did not do that. That is what I heard.
  But let me explain. The Senator from Vermont and the Senator from 
Utah have cited context between the Judiciary Committee and the Secret 
Service. As I say, there are so many committees that can cite context 
in one way or another with different components of the Homeland 
Security Department. But let me tell you why the Secret Service was put 
into the Homeland Security Department.
  Obviously, the Secret Service is best known for its mission in 
protecting the Nation's highest elected leaders as well as visiting 
heads of state. It is entirely appropriate that the department 
responsible for safeguarding the security of this Nation includes an 
agency which is responsible for protecting its top leaders who, 
tragically, in this age may be targets of terrorism.
  Since 1998, when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision 
Directive 62, the Secret Service has assumed responsibility for 
planning, coordinating, and implementing security operations at all 
national special security events. And what is the great fear at such 
events? Terrorism. These national events, like the Olympics or the 
political party conventions, are important to our country and, 
unfortunately, enticing targets to terrorists if they are not defended. 
It is the Secret Service that is responsible for planning, 
coordinating, and implementing those security operations--another 
obvious reason why it should be in the Homeland Security Department.
  What has being there allowed the Secret Service to do? To draw on the 
expertise and resources of the different agencies within the Department 
of Homeland Security to support the Secret Service's protective 
missions as well, of course, as to share the Service's own expertise 
and experience with the other agencies in the Department to help them 
do their job better.
  Some of the unique responsibilities of the Secret Service are 
particularly relevant to terrorism. The Secret Service has 
responsibility for identity theft in various forms and methods. This is 
one of the terrorists' primary tools, assuming identities not their own 
to break through the defenses our country sets up. The ability to 
identify and prevent the proliferation of false identifications is 
critically important to the Department's mission of identifying 
terrorists and stopping them before they strike us, and that is the 
Secret Service's responsibility.
  The Secret Service also has responsibility for the protection of 
important national buildings, including the White House, the Vice 
President's residence, foreign missions, and other important buildings 
in the Nation's Capital which, tragically, sadly, in our age, are also 
prime targets for terrorists. Those are the reasons why the Secret 
Service has been placed in the Department of Homeland Security.
  But again, I come back to the main point. Are we going to do what we 
say we are going to do or are we going to false advertise? We say we 
are going to respond to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for a 
committee on homeland security. I have said before and I will say it 
again, the Governmental Affairs Committee has had some experience in 
homeland security so we are a natural place to put it. But I haven't 
sought it.
  What I seek is the willingness to reorganize ourselves to the same 
extent that we have been willing to reorganize the executive branch, by 
creating the Department of Homeland Security and now a national 
intelligence director. With all respect to my friends on Judiciary, 
this is just another step to stopping us from achieving that mission, 
from meeting the challenge that the 9/11 Commission has set before us--
and the request of the families of 9/11--to organize ourselves in a way 
that we can perform the kind of oversight that will mean we are doing 
everything humanly possible to prevent anything such as September 11 
from happening again.
  I hope we will draw the line on what is sucking out the insides of 
what we are calling a committee on homeland security.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the issue before us is really very 
straightforward. Do we want to reorganize the Senate to consolidate 
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security within one 
committee or don't we? What we should not do is to pretend we are 
consolidating jurisdiction in one committee, as recommended by the 9/11 
Commission, and as strongly endorsed by the administration and 
Secretary Ridge. If we are going to consolidate authority, then let's 
do it. If we are going to try to address the problem of 25 different 
Senate committees and subcommittees having a claim on the new 
Department, requiring testimony from officials in the Department, if we

[[Page 21359]]

want to continue on that route, then let us not pretend we are 
undergoing significant reform.
  Moreover, the Secret Service has responsibilities ranging from 
investigations of Presidential threats to protection at major events 
that go to the heart of the Department of Homeland Security's mission. 
The Secret Service is a vital part of the mission of securing the 
homeland. That is why it was moved into the Department of Homeland 
Security, and that is why if we are going to mirror the Department, it 
should be under the jurisdiction of whatever committee is given 
responsibility for homeland security.
  There are functions of the Secret Service that clearly fit with the 
core mission of the Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, at a 
hearing shortly before passage of the legislation setting up the new 
Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service 
testified, explaining why it was important to include the Secret 
Service in the new Department. He stated:

       Our core philosophy mirrors that of the new Department of 
     Homeland Security. Like our agency, the new department will 
     be prepared to respond to incidents and infiltration. Our 
     common goal is to anticipate and prepare through robust 
     threat assessments and analyses of intelligence information 
     that is made available to us.

  He also stated:

       Beyond our protective responsibilities, the Secret Service 
     is a major contributor to other aspects of our homeland 
     security.

  He concluded his testimony by stating:

       It is clear the Department of Homeland Security will be 
     built on the pillars of prevention and protection. These are 
     the very words found throughout our strategic plan. They 
     define the mission and the culture of the United States 
     Secret Service.

  I know that the Secret Service enforces certain criminal laws, and it 
has a good relationship with the Judiciary Committee. However, the fact 
is, it is part of the Department of Homeland Security. If we are going 
to have a committee responsible for the Department of Homeland 
Security, we should do that. We should not exclude key agencies. 
Otherwise, we are defeating the whole purpose of creating new 
jurisdiction and trying to consolidate oversight and responsibility for 
the Department of Homeland Security.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. I wonder if the distinguished Senator from Maine would 
yield for a question?
  Ms. COLLINS. I have yielded the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask the distinguished Senator from Maine, we have the 
Secret Service in Homeland Security, but carved out is a separate 
entity, partly because of their criminal jurisdiction and the fact that 
their oversight is in the Judiciary Committee. I would ask if by the 
same logic that because they are there, they must suddenly come under 
this new committee, do we also bring the Attorney General's office 
under this new committee for oversight because they prosecute the cases 
brought by the Secret Service? Do we bring the U.S. attorneys? Maybe 
the Attorney General and the U.S. attorney should be brought into this 
new homeland security committee for confirmation, for oversight, or 
budget and everything else because, after all, they have criminal 
jurisdiction and the Secret Service goes to them.
  Or do we have a bifurcated thing where the Secret Service criminal 
jurisdiction, which does come under the Department of Justice and the 
U.S. attorneys for prosecution, suddenly say: Well, we can watch what 
they are doing in the Judiciary Committee, but maybe we shouldn't be 
watching because maybe it should be somewhere else where there is none 
of the 56 years of experience watching over it?
  It seems to me what we are doing is trying to set up an 
organizational chart for the sake of organizational charts. I might 
say, maybe this is one of the problems with putting this thing together 
behind closed doors, without the input of the people most directly 
involved, without any hearings. And suddenly as the airplanes are 
revving up and the smell of jet fuel is in the air, we are saying: 
Quick, we have to do it, forget the 56 years, forget what has worked. 
Forget the fact that it is working. Forget the fact that it works 
extremely well. Forget all those criminal cases that they handle. We 
have an idea to fill out some new chart and, therefore, go forward with 
it. Forget the proud tradition of the Secret Service. Forget all the 
experience, all the things they have done. Forget the prosecutors they 
have to go to. But, by golly, we are going to have a nice new chart.
  There is more I could say but I shan't. I think maybe we ought to 
vote and see where we stand.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the Senator from Vermont raised a 
rhetorical question, or at least I think it was a rhetorical question. 
He said, Should we put the Office of the Attorney General under the 
jurisdiction of the Governmental Affairs Committee? Of course, the 
answer to that is obviously no, because the Office of the Attorney 
General is not part of the Department of Homeland Security.
  The issue before us is really straightforward and simple. Do we want 
to follow the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Secretary 
Ridge and the rest of the administration and have a single authorizing 
committee in the House and the Senate with responsibility for the 
Department of Homeland Security, not responsibility for 38 percent of 
the Department of Homeland Security, not responsibility for 8 percent 
of the employees of the Department of Homeland Security? No, there 
isn't a recommendation to have agencies that are not part of the 
Department added to the jurisdiction.
  The idea is to have a single authorizing committee in the House and 
the Senate to mirror the agencies that are in the Department of 
Homeland Security, to consolidate jurisdiction between the House and 
Senate, which is spread over 88 committees and subcommittees; so that 
the officials of the Department don't have to answer to so many 
congressional overseers that they are prevented from devoting as much 
attention as they need to to do their duties. That is what this debate 
is about.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Senator from Maine, in asking the 
question actually gives my answer, because if the issue is simply where 
are they sitting, that determines jurisdiction. The Secret Service, for 
years and years, would have been under the jurisdiction of the Finance 
Committee because they are in the Treasury Department. They have been 
in the Treasury Department forever. But the jurisdiction has been under 
the Judiciary Committee because of their unique law enforcement 
aspects.
  Now, the Senator from Maine says, quite properly, we should not put 
the Attorney General under this committee, even though these various 
groups, various entities for criminal prosecution have to go to the 
U.S. attorney but because the Attorney General is under the Department 
of Homeland Security.
  By the same token, when the Secret Service was in Treasury, everybody 
knew, because of the criminal jurisdiction and involvement, they would 
be under the jurisdiction of a committee that deals all the time with 
criminal law, with the courts, and with title 18. This is title 18 in 
my hand, the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. Taking up the whole 
middle part of this is Secret Service jurisdiction.
  Do we want to make them better? Do we want proper oversight? Do we 
want to say, by golly, look at this, we came out with this closed door 
item and put it out here and immediately the Senate has saved the 
world--no hearings, nothing? Here it is.
  I am far more interested in having the Secret Service be the best it 
can be. I am far more interested in making sure we are giving them the 
proper criminal codes they need. I am far more interested in making 
sure, when they are investigating crime, they can do their best.
  I think what Senator Hatch and I are trying to save the Senate from 
doing is making a very serious mistake with the Secret Service, just to 
fill out an organizational chart.

[[Page 21360]]

  I see the distinguished senior Senator from Utah in the Chamber. I 
will yield in a moment.
  But I point out, in talking about the number of places Secretary 
Ridge may have to appear, he has only come to the Judiciary Committee 
once in each of the last 2 years. It is not like he is coming often.
  But the point is, the Secret Service has 56 years of experience of 
making sure it works right. We are going to throw that overboard 
because we got this brand-new color-coded organizational chart for the 
Senate. My goodness, ladies and gentlemen, you can rest easy tonight, 
there will be no more terrorism because the Senate has a new 
organizational chart. Whoop-de-do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I don't think there is anybody on this 
floor who respects the chairlady of the appropriate committee and the 
ranking member more than I do. I think the world of both of them. I 
think they deserve a commendation for what they have done. I just 
cannot pay enough tribute to them. I know they are sincere.
  I want everybody here to know that I don't have an ax to grind. I 
have a reputation for trying to do what is right. I am very sincere 
about this. It is not a question of trying to retain jurisdiction for 
retention's sake. This is really important. I believe we should have a 
committee on homeland security. I believe it should have jurisdiction 
over much of the area that applies to terrorism. But I also sincerely 
believe--and I think the case is overwhelming--that most of what the 
Secret Service does is pursuant to the Criminal Code.
  The Judiciary Committee is specifically and especially geared to 
handle oversight of those problems. You don't have to completely 
develop a whole new system of oversight. It has worked marvelously well 
for 56 years.
  At the end of the day, the Secret Service is a criminal investigative 
agency. Sure, they may have some peripheral and even very important 
interests in terrorism, but their interests go way beyond that. Almost 
everything they do comes because of what the Criminal Code tells them 
to do.
  The Secret Service's criminal authority is much broader than homeland 
security and counterterrorism. Let me review some of the longstanding 
criminal laws. I will just review some of them. These are criminal 
statutes and they are important, and the Secret Service works pursuant 
to these statutes.
  It has jurisdiction to investigate acceptance of loan or gratuity by 
financial institution examiners; punishment for section 213, the prior 
section I mentioned; section 471, counterfeiting U.S. obligations; 
section 472, uttering counterfeit securities; section 473, dealing in 
counterfeiting obligations of securities; section 474, possession of 
device to counterfeit obligations; section 476, theft of tools used in 
counterfeiting obligations; section 477, selling of tools for 
counterfeiting obligations; section 478, counterfeiting of foreign 
obligations; section 479, uttering counterfeit foreign obligations; 
section 480, possessing counterfeit foreign obligations. This is all 
pursuant to title 18 USC. Section 481, possession of electronic images 
for counterfeiting foreign obligations; section 482, forgery or 
counterfeiting bank notes; section 483, uttering counterfeit foreign 
bank notes; section 484, fraudulently combining multiple U.S. 
instruments; section 485, counterfeiting U.S. coins; section 486, 
unauthorized passing of U.S. coins; section 487, making or possessing 
counterfeit dyes for coins; section 488, making or possessing 
counterfeit dyes for foreign coins; section 489, making or possessing a 
likeness of U.S. or foreign coins.
  I will not read the rest. But it goes right down the Criminal Code 
where they spend almost all their time. If you ask virtually anybody in 
the Secret Service, they believe the jurisdiction ought to be kept with 
the Judiciary Committee.
  I do not think there is any question. I know the head of the Secret 
Service does. There is no question they have overlapping jurisdiction 
in some areas where they can help with terrorism, but that is a modest 
amount of what they do.
  Most all of what they do involves technical Criminal Code laws, and 
that is judiciary, and the Judiciary Committee is especially equipped 
to handle those type of activities.
  The Judiciary Committee has a long history of balancing civil 
liberties with law enforcement obligations. The Secret Service carries 
out a host of law enforcement activities.
  Let's face it, the Judiciary Committee is uniquely qualified and 
uniquely structured to vigorously oversee and monitor this balance. My 
office received a letter from organizations from the ACLU to the 
American Conservative Union expressing civil liberties concerns with 
this reorganization.
  Look, I understand my two colleagues and their desire to try to bring 
everything together, but if you use this as an excuse to do that--in 
fact, one agency or another might have something to do with terrorism, 
but that is not its major obligation--my gosh, you might as well take 
over the whole Government.
  I think this works well. If it ``ain't'' broke, why are we trying to 
fix it? I believe very sincerely that my two esteemed colleagues, as 
much as I love and respect them, are wrong on this. I can live with 
anything the Senate decides to do, but I think it would be tragic if 
the Secret Service is moved over to this Department and this committee 
that is not particularly the committee that should have jurisdiction 
over it and over the work that the Secret Service does.
  I do not want to keep the Senate any longer. All I can say is, I 
would feel badly if this amendment is not agreed to by the Senate. It 
should be agreed to by the Senate. I am prepared to vote on it.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, earlier we discussed Judiciary Committee 
jurisdiction.
  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                  October 7, 2004.
     Hon. Bill Frist,
     Capitol Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Tom Daschle,
     Capitol Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     Capitol Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Harry Reid,
     Capitol Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators: We write to raise serious concerns about a 
     provision of S. Res. 445, the McConnell-Reid Senate 
     Intelligence and Homeland Security Oversight Reform Proposal, 
     that would create a new Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs Committee.
       While we commend the Senate for taking strong actions to 
     revamp congressional oversight of the Executive Branch's 
     intelligence and homeland security functions, we strongly 
     oppose any action to remove from the Judiciary Committee its 
     jurisdiction over criminal law, law enforcement, domestic 
     intelligence activities, domestic surveillance authorities, 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of 
     Justice, and investigative guidelines issued by the Attorney 
     General. As organizations with longstanding expertise and 
     experience in these areas, we believe it is essential at this 
     critical time in our Nation's history that the Judiciary 
     Committee retain its jurisdiction over these issues and 
     ensure continuity of congressional oversight. Its members and 
     staff have developed years of experience in these complex 
     legal issues, which have serious implications not only for 
     safety and security but also for civil liberties and civil 
     rights. In particular, the Judiciary Committee's deep 
     substantive expertise and historical role in civil liberties 
     issues is increasingly important as government powers expand 
     to fight terrorism.
       We urge you to clarify that jurisdiction over these law 
     enforcement and domestic intelligence issues, including 
     oversight of the FBI and Justice Department, remain with the 
     Senate Judiciary Committee.
           Sincerely,
       American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression.
       American Civil Liberties Union.
       American Conservative Union.
       American Immigration Lawyers Association.
       American Library Association.
       Bill of Rights Defense Committee.
       Center for American Progress.
       Center for Democracy and Technology.
       Center for National Security Studies.

[[Page 21361]]

       Citizens for Health.
       Cyber Privacy Project.
       Free Congress Foundation.
       Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quaker).
       Human Rights Watch.
       National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
       National Coalition of Mental Health Professionals and 
     Consumers, Inc.
       Peoople for the American Way.
       Private Citizen, Inc.
       The Rutherford Institute.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, let me sum up. This amendment poses the 
question, Are we really going to do what the 9/11 Commission asked us 
to do, which is to create a committee to oversee the Department of 
Homeland Security? That is what it is all about.
  We reorganized the Federal Government executive branch to better 
protect our homeland security. The Commission says we have to 
reorganize our oversight to be able to protect our homeland security. 
That is what the proposal of the Commission is all about.
  We are getting to a point, as we begin to take all these pieces out, 
where it is a sham, as I have said before. What we are calling a 
homeland security committee is not really. It is as if you had a cat, 
and you put a little necklace around its neck with a sign that said, 
``I am a horse,'' and expected people to think the cat was a horse.
  We are at a point now where we are calling this committee the 
homeland security committee, and it is not.
  Let me go to the numbers in closing. There are 175,000 employees in 
the Department. The McConnell-Reid proposal takes out the Coast Guard 
and TSA. That is 97,000 of those 175,000 employees gone. Earlier today, 
my friends from the Judiciary Committee took back Immigration, Customs 
enforcement, Customs, and border protection, another almost 19,000 
employees gone from what is supposed to be the oversight committee of 
homeland security.
  It was said earlier that what is left is a lot in our committee--
three of the four directorates. OK, I know the number of employees does 
not say everything, but it does say a lot. Three directorates left in 
the oversight responsibility of the committee we are calling the 
homeland security committee, three directorates from DHS: emergency 
preparedness, 4,800 employees; intelligence analysis and infrastructure 
protection, 700 employees; science and technology, about 200 employees. 
We have about 5,700 employees left in the three directorates that come 
under the new committee on homeland security from the Homeland Security 
Department. That is 5,700 out of a total of 175,000 in the Department.
  Let me give this stunning statistic, Mr. President. Are you ready? 
The Secret Service itself has 6,381 employees. That is about 500 more 
employees than in the three directorates that are left clearly within 
the jurisdiction of the committee being called the homeland security 
committee.
  As I have said, if you want to give the responsibility for oversight 
of homeland security to another committee, do it. If you want to create 
a new committee on homeland security, do it. But if you are going to 
call it a committee on homeland security, then give it jurisdiction 
over homeland security.
  A lot of the reality of the promise has already been taken away. I 
hope my colleagues will draw a line here and say that the Secret 
Service, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security for very 
good reasons that I enumerated earlier, should remain under the 
jurisdiction for oversight of what we will call the Department of 
Homeland Security.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on 
the Hatch amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4037. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. 
Chambliss), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), and the Senator 
from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Edwards and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 54, nays 41, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 202 Leg.]

                                YEAS--54

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Leahy
     Lott
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Reed
     Roberts
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--41

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Bayh
     Bond
     Breaux
     Burns
     Carper
     Chafee
     Coleman
     Collins
     Daschle
     Dayton
     Dole
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Hollings
     Inhofe
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Snowe
     Sununu
     Talent
     Voinovich

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Chambliss
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Gregg
     Kerry
  The amendment (No. 4037) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. BENNETT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Talent). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, Senator Roberts has a couple of 
amendments that he believes have been cleared with everyone interested 
in them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. President. The two leaders have indicated 
they want to press forward on this resolution tonight. We still have a 
number of amendments. They are completing in the House, as we speak, 
the FSC conference report, the conference dealing with the drought aid 
and the hurricane assistance, and we have to deal with those in the 
next few days, so we need to finish this bill tonight if at all 
possible. The two leaders have instructed their two loyal assistants to 
move forward on this resolution, and that is what we are going to do. 
So everyone who has amendments should bring them forward. If there is a 
time when no one is offering amendments, we will move to third reading 
on the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I have two amendments to offer. I wish to 
offer them in sequence, taking 2 minutes at most for each one. I 
propose to only give a very brief description of each amendment.


                Amendment No. 4019 To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be 
set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4019.

[[Page 21362]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Roberts] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4019 to amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

                 (Purpose: To clarify staff provisions)

       In section 201, strike subsection (g) insert the following:
       (g) Staff.--Section 15 of S. Res. 400 is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``Sec. 15. (a) In addition to other committee staff 
     selected by the select Committee, the select Committee shall 
     hire or appoint one employee for each member of the select 
     Committee to serve as such Member's designated representative 
     on the select Committee. The select Committee shall only hire 
     or appoint an employee chosen by the respective Member of the 
     select Committee for whom the employee will serve as the 
     designated representative on the select Committee.
       ``(b) The select Committee shall be afforded a supplement 
     to its budget, to be determined by the Committee on Rules and 
     Administration, to allow for the hire of each employee who 
     fills the position of designated representative to the select 
     Committee. The designated representative shall have office 
     space and appropriate office equipment in the select 
     Committee spaces. Designated personal representatives shall 
     have the same access to Committee staff, information, 
     records, and databases as select Committee staff, as 
     determined by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
       ``(c) The designated employee shall meet all the 
     requirements of relevant statutes, Senate rules, and 
     committee security clearance requirements for employment by 
     the select Committee.''.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment simply clarifies language 
in the McConnell-Reid amendment regarding the staffing of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  The amendment ensures that the professional staff of the Intelligence 
Committee and the personal staff now designated by Members to serve on 
the committee will be provided similar access to committee resources 
and information as determined by the chairman and vice chairman.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I thank Senator Kyl 
for his assistance. It provides modest but important clarity to the 
proposals of Senator McConnell and Senator Reid.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Kansas.
  The amendment (No. 4019) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 4018 To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4018.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kansas [Mr. Roberts] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4018 to amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the clerk and ask unanimous 
consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

         (Purpose: To clarify the nominee referral provisions)

       In section 201, strike subsection (h) and insert the 
     following:
       (h) Nominees.--S. Res. 400 is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``Sec. 17. (a) The select Committee shall have final 
     responsibility for reviewing, holding hearings, and reporting 
     the nominations of civilian persons nominated by the 
     President to fill all positions within the intelligence 
     community requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) Other committees with jurisdiction over the nominees' 
     executive branch department may hold hearings and interviews 
     with such persons, but only the select Committee shall report 
     such nominations.''.


                    Amendment No. 4018, As Modified

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment makes explicit what is 
already implicit in the McConnell-Reid substitute amendment; namely, 
that the Intelligence Committee will have explicit jurisdiction for the 
consideration and reporting of nominees for civilian intelligence 
community positions.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and hope the managers 
will agree to incorporate the modification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       In section 201, strike subsection (h) and insert the 
     following:
       (h) Nominees.--S. Res. 400 is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``Sec. 17. (a) The select Committee shall have jurisdiction 
     reviewing, holding hearings, and reporting the nominations of 
     civilian persons nominated by the President to fill all 
     positions within the intelligence community requiring the 
     advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) Other committees with jurisdiction over the nominees' 
     executive branch department may hold hearings and interviews 
     with such persons, but only the select Committee shall report 
     such nominations.''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the pending 
amendment, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 4018), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I also understand that we are close to 
an agreement between the interested parties on the Intelligence 
Committee and the Armed Services Committee on the important sequential 
referral issue that has been under discussion all day long with the 
principals of those two committees. We are hoping to be able to deal 
with that amendment shortly.
  If anyone else has an amendment they want to offer, now is the time. 
The majority leader and the minority leader have indicated we are going 
to press into the evening and finish this proposal. If you have an 
amendment, we urge you to come over and offer it.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am told by Senator Rockefeller that 
the sequential referral issue that has been under discussion all day 
has now been worked out, and he is prepared to offer it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.


         Amendment No. 4030, As Modified, To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendment No. 4030 at the 
desk and send a modification to the desk and ask that it be considered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
pending amendment is set aside. The clerk will report the amendment, as 
modified.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] proposes 
     an amendment numbered 4030, as modified, to amendment No. 
     3981.

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

   (Purpose: To clarify the jurisdiction of the select Committee on 
                             Intelligence)

       At the end of section 201, insert the following:
       (i) Jurisdiction.--Section 3(b) of S. Res. 400 is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(b)(1) Any proposed legislation reported by the select 
     Committee except any legislation involving matters specified 
     in clause (1)

[[Page 21363]]

     or (4)(A) of subsection (a), containing any matter otherwise 
     within the jurisdiction of any standing committee shall, at 
     the request of the chairman of such standing committee, be 
     referred to such standing committee for its consideration of 
     such matter and be reported to the Senate by such standing 
     committee within 10 days after the day on which such proposed 
     legislation, in its entirety and including annexes, is 
     referred to such standing committee; and any proposed 
     legislation reported by any committee, other than the select 
     Committee, which contains any matter within the jurisdiction 
     of the select Committee shall, at the request of the chairman 
     of the select Committee, be referred to the select Committee 
     for its consideration of such matter and be reported to the 
     Senate by the select Committee within 10 days after the day 
     on which such proposed legislation, in its entirety and 
     including annexes, is referred to such committee.
       ``(2) In any case in which a committee fails to report any 
     proposed legislation referred to it within the time limit 
     prescribed in this subsection, such Committee shall be 
     automatically discharged from further consideration of such 
     proposed legislation on the 10th day following the day on 
     which such proposed legislation is referred to such committee 
     unless the Senate provides otherwise, or the Majority Leader 
     or Minority Leader request, prior to that date, an additional 
     five days on behalf of the Committee to which the proposed 
     legislation was sequentially referred. At the end of that 
     additional five day period, if the Committee fails to report 
     the proposed legislation within that five day period, the 
     Committee shall be automatically discharged from further 
     consideration of such proposed legislation unless the Senate 
     provides otherwise.
       ``(3) In computing any 10 or 5-day period under this 
     subsection there shall be excluded from such computation any 
     days on which the Senate is not the session.
       ``(4) The reporting and referral processes outlined in this 
     subsection shall be conducted in strict accordance with the 
     Standing Rules of the Senate. In accordance with such rules, 
     committees to which legislation is referred are not permitted 
     to make changes or alterations to the text of the referred 
     bill and its annexes, but may propose changes or alterations 
     to the same in the form of amendments.''.

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, strengthening the two congressional 
Intelligence Committees was a fundamental part of the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations for improving congressional oversight. This is more of 
that. They made many recommendations, most of which were included in 
whole or in part in our resolution.
  One area where the Commission did not make a specific recommendation 
but which is very important was the question of shared jurisdiction 
between the Intelligence Committee and other committees, specifically 
the Armed Services Committee. Under the current structure, other 
committees have the automatic right to receive sequential referral of 
any legislation reported by the Intelligence Committee if it touches on 
their jurisdiction. And the Intelligence Committee enjoys a reciprocal 
right of referral. In practice, this authority has been exercised 
hardly at all--very rarely, infrequently--at least by the Intelligence 
Committee, but it has become a bit of an annual routine for the Armed 
Services Committee to seek sequential referral of the intelligence 
authorization bill. This practice is based upon legitimate interests on 
the part of the Armed Services Committee. But the system has worked to 
the detriment of the Intelligence Committee and effective oversight. I 
will try to explain why.
  Every year the intelligence authorization bill is referred to the 
Armed Services Committee for a period of not more than 30 days of 
legislative session. The Armed Services Committee almost always holds 
the bill for a full 30 days which can, in fact, work out to 2 calendar 
months, when you really carry that math out. This allows them to review 
the bill, which is important and proper, but it puts the Intelligence 
Committee far behind in the annual legislative process. By which I mean 
by the time the bill is reported, after a sequential referral by the 
Armed Services Committee, acted on by the Senate, and negotiated with 
the House, the annual appropriations bill often is already enacted into 
law.
  For example, this year our authorization bill has not been dealt 
with. The appropriations bill has been passed in the Senate. This is an 
awkward way to do business. So we too often have been unable to provide 
the appropriators with the benefit of the work of the intelligence 
oversight committees. Timely passage of the intelligence authorization 
bill would become even more critical with the creation of a new 
appropriations subcommittee on intelligence.
  In order for this new system to work, the Intelligence Committee has 
to be integral to the whole process. That is the whole point. We have 
to make changes in the way the sequential referral authority works. So 
Senator Evan Bayh offered an amendment to completely strike the 
language that provides for automatic sequential referral, and that is 
certainly one way to approach it. It has some downsides.
  The Armed Services Committee and other committees have legitimate 
interests that need to be protected. Doing away with the provision also 
would remove the Intelligence Committee's ability to request the 
referral of legislation reported by other committees when that 
legislation relates to intelligence matters.
  Finally, completely removing the referral authority would have the 
inevitable result--and this is sort of the soul of this institution--of 
alienating the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees. This is 
something we cannot afford and must not do. The committees have to work 
together constantly on a wide range of issues.
  To achieve what Senator Bayh and myself and others want, all of us 
seeking more effective intelligence oversight, we have worked out a 
compromise, I am very happy to report. The amendment I have offered 
significantly reduces the amount of time that another committee has 
available to review legislation reported by the Intelligence Committee 
and vice versa. That time goes from 30 days of legislative session down 
to 10.
  But hold on. The amendment also makes clear that the clock does not 
begin until the committee receiving our bill has all the relevant 
classified annexes available for review which could be thousands of 
pages.
  According to our compromise, an additional 5 days of sequential 
referral can be added if requested by the majority or the minority 
leaders. That struck people as wise and useful. So when there is a 
legitimate need to have more scrutiny by the Armed Services Committee, 
they would make that request, and it would, of course, be granted.
  This is made easier under the new structure because the chairman and 
the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee are now ex officio 
members of the new Intelligence Committee. We welcome their 
participation. I don't think it will do anything but strengthen our 
committee more. In fact, I think we will end up with five members of 
the Armed Services Committee on our Intelligence Committee, and that is 
good.
  So I thank Senator Bayh for bringing this issue to the attention of 
the Senate. I thank Senators Levin and Warner for their willingness and 
insistence on finding a middle ground. I really mean I thank them. I 
thank both the majority and minority leaders who were instrumental in 
reaching this agreement because we were back and forth all day long.
  Finally, I thank, of course, my chairman, Senator Roberts, for his 
help in crafting this compromise. I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. The amendment has been modified?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding of the Chair.
  Mr. REID. I have spoken to the comanager of this bill. We have no 
objection. We appreciate very much the time and effort of so many 
involved to get us to this point.
  I urge that the amendment be accepted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does any Senator seek recognition on the 
amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4030), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay 
that motion on the table.

[[Page 21364]]

  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have tried to be silent tonight. If anyone 
wants to come and offer an amendment, I will sit down.
  People have made statements asking: What is this committee going to 
have; you have taken everything from them. I am going to read a few of 
the most important things they have to do. This committee should not be 
concerned only with the number of employees. They should be concerned 
with responsibilities.
  The first directorate, the Directorate for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection: the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. In general: There 
shall be in the Department a Directorate for Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection.
  Responsibilities: The Under Secretary shall assist the Secretary in 
discharging this responsibility. The Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis is under the control of this committee.
  The Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis: There shall be in 
the Department an Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis who 
shall be appointed by the President.
  The Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and the Assistant 
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection shall assist the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in 
discharging the responsibilities of the Under Secretary.
  The Secretary shall ensure that the responsibilities of the 
Department regarding information analysis and infrastructure protection 
are carried out through the Under Secretary for Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection.
  Responsibilities of the Under Secretary: To access, receive, and 
analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and 
other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and 
local government agencies, including law enforcement agencies, and 
private sector entities, and to integrate such information in order 
to--A, identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to 
the homeland; B, detect and identify threats of terrorism against the 
United States; C, understand such threats in light of actual and 
potential vul-
nerabilities to the homeland.
  That sounds to me like it is more than nothing. This is the policy of 
our country over which they have jurisdiction.
  No. 2. To carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities 
of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, 
including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks 
posed by particular types of terrorist attacks within the United 
States, including an assessment of the probability of success of such 
attacks and the feasibility and potential efficacy of various 
countermeasures to such attacks.
  No. 3. To integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability 
assessments, whether such information, analyses, or assessments are 
provided or produced by the Department or others, in order to identify 
priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other 
agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies 
and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
       No. 4. To ensure, pursuant to section 202, the timely and 
     efficient access by the Department to all information 
     necessary to discharge the responsibilities under this 
     section, including obtaining such information from other 
     agencies of the Federal Government.
       No. 5. To develop a comprehensive national plan for 
     securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the 
     United States, including power production, generation, and 
     distribution systems, information technology and 
     telecommunications systems (including satellites), electronic 
     financial and property record storage and transmission 
     systems, emergency preparedness communications systems, and 
     the physical and technological assets that support such 
     systems.
       No. 6. To recommend measures necessary to protect the key 
     resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in 
     coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government 
     and in cooperation with State and local government agencies 
     and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
       No. 7. To administer the Homeland Security Advisory System, 
     including--
       A. exercising primary responsibility for public advisories 
     related to threats to homeland security; and
       B. in coordination with other agencies of the Federal 
     Government, providing specific warning information, and 
     advice about appropriate protective measures and counter-
     measures, to State and local government agencies and 
     authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the 
     public.
       No. 8. To review, analyze, and make recommendations for 
     improvements in the policies and procedures governing the 
     sharing of law enforcement information, intelligence 
     information, intelligence-related information, and other 
     information relating to homeland security within the Federal 
     Government and between the Federal Government and State and 
     local government agencies and authorities.
       No. 9. To disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed 
     by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of 
     the Federal Government with responsibilities relating to 
     homeland security, and to agencies of State and local 
     governments and private sector entities with such 
     responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, 
     prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks 
     against the United States.
       No. 10. To consult with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and other appropriate intelligence, law 
     enforcement, or other elements of the Federal Government to 
     establish collection priorities and strategies for 
     information, including law enforcement-related information, 
     relating to threats of terrorism against the United States 
     through such means as the representation of the Department in 
     discussions regarding requirements and priorities in the 
     collection of such information.
       No. 11. To consult with State and local governments and 
     private sector entities to ensure appropriate exchanges of 
     information, including law enforcement-related information, 
     relating to the threats of terrorism against the United 
     States.
       No. 12. To ensure that--
       A. any material received pursuant to this Act is protected 
     from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for 
     the performance of official duties; and
       B. any intelligence information under this Act is shared, 
     retained, and disseminated consistent with the authority of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related procedures and, as 
     appropriate, similar authorities of the Attorney General 
     concerning sensitive law enforcement information.
       No. 13. To request additional information from other 
     agencies of the Federal Government, State and local 
     government agencies, and the private sector relating to 
     threats of terrorism in the United States, or relating to 
     other areas of responsibility assigned by the Secretary, 
     including the entry into cooperative agreements through the 
     Secretary to obtain such information.
       No. 14. To establish and utilize, in conjunction with the 
     chief information officer of the Department, a secure 
     communications and information technology infrastructure, 
     including data-mining and other advanced analytical tools, in 
     order to access, receive, and analyze data and information in 
     furtherance of the responsibilities under this section, and 
     to disseminate information acquired and analyzed by the 
     Department, as appropriate.
       No. 15. To ensure, in conjunction with the chief 
     information officer of the Department, that any information 
     databases and analytical tools developed or utilized by the 
     Department--
       A. are compatible with one another and with relevant 
     information databases of other agencies of the Federal 
     Government; and
       B. treat information in such databases in a manner that 
     complies with applicable Federal law on privacy.
       No. 16. To coordinate training and other support to the 
     elements and personnel of the Department, other agencies of 
     the Federal Government, and State and local governments that 
     provide information to the Department, or are consumers of 
     information provided by the Department, in order to 
     facilitate the identification and sharing of information 
     revealed in their ordinary duties and the optimal utilization 
     of information received from the Department.
       No. 17. To coordinate with elements of the intelligence 
     community and with Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
     agencies, and the private sector, as appropriate.
       No. 18. To provide intelligence and information analysis 
     and support to other elements of the Department.
       No. 19. To perform such other duties relating to such 
     responsibilities as the Secretary may provide.

  Mr. President, this is a big-time focus on the administration of this 
new committee. This is only part of it. For someone to come to the 
floor and say they have not given us anything, I have

[[Page 21365]]

read some of the most important aspects of setting the policy of this 
country as it relates to defeating terrorism. They may not have the 
right number of employees, but their responsibilities for setting the 
policy of this country are in that committee. Anyone who thinks not, 
let them see what we have done. This is only the first directorate. 
There are others. I have not completed reading what is in this 
directorate.
  Here are the agencies covered: The Department of State, the CIA, the 
FBI, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  I have only read a few things of the first directorate. If they had 
nothing else to do during the legislative year than deal with what I 
have completed reading, it would be a massive undertaking. In addition 
to that, you see, we have not taken any of the responsibilities away 
from the Governmental Affairs Committee. They had huge responsibilities 
before we gave them this. For people to come on this floor and whine 
and cry about they don't have anything to do, it is not in keeping with 
what we have done with this committee.
  I will go to one other directorate. I have only read a few pages from 
this directorate. I have read three pages. I have about 15 or 20 more 
here. I don't feel that I want to spend my time reading that, other 
than to say they have tremendous responsibilities.
  Under the Office of Science and Technology, they have another big 
job. This is to ``carry out programs that, through the provision of 
equipment, training, and technical assistance, improve the safety and 
effectiveness of law enforcement technology and improve access by 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.''
  That is another huge responsibility they have been given.

       In carrying out its mission, the Office shall have the 
     following duties:
       No. 1. To provide recommendations and advice to the 
     Attorney General.
       No. 2. To establish and maintain advisory groups (which 
     shall be exempt from the provisions of the Federal Advisory 
     Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)) to assess the law enforcement 
     technology needs of Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
     agencies.
       No. 3. To establish and maintain performance standards in 
     accordance with the National Technology Transfer and 
     Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 14-113) for, and test and 
     evaluate law enforcement technologies that may be used by 
     Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.
       No. 4. To establish and maintain a program to certify, 
     validate, and mark or otherwise recognize law enforcement 
     technology products that conform to standards established and 
     maintained by the Office in accordance with the National 
     Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 
     104-113). The program may, at the discretion of the Office, 
     allow for supplier's declaration of conformity with such 
     standards.
       No. 5. To work with other entities within the Department of 
     Justice, other Federal agencies, and the executive office of 
     the President to establish a coordinated Federal approach on 
     issues related to law enforcement technology.
       No. 6. To carry out research, development, testing, 
     evaluation, and cost-benefit analyses in fields that would 
     improve the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of law 
     enforcement technologies used by Federal, State, and local 
     law enforcement agencies, including, but not limited to--
       A. weapons capable of preventing use by unauthorized 
     persons, including personalized guns;
       B. protective apparel;
       C. bullet-resistant and explosion-resistant glass;
       D. monitoring systems and alarm systems capable of 
     providing precise location information;
       E. wire and wireless interoperable communication 
     technologies;
       F. tools and techniques that facilitate investigative and 
     forensic work, including computer forensics;
       G. equipment for particular use in counterterrorism, 
     including devices and technologies to disable terrorist 
     devices;
       H. guides to assist State and local law enforcement 
     agencies;
       I. DNA identification technologies; and
       J. tools and techniques that facilitate investigations of 
     computer crime.
       No. 7. To administer a program of research, development, 
     testing, and demonstration to improve the interoperability of 
     voice and data public safety communications.
       No. 8. To serve on the Technical Support Working Group of 
     the Department of Defense, and on other relevant interagency 
     panels as requested.
       No. 9. To develop, and disseminate to State and local law 
     enforcement agencies, technical assistance and training 
     materials for law enforcement personnel, including 
     prosecutors.
       No. 10. To operate the regional National Law Enforcement 
     and Corrections Technology Centers and, to the extent 
     necessary, establish additional centers through a competitive 
     process.
       No. 11. To administer a program of acquisition, research, 
     development, and dissemination of advanced investigative 
     analysis and forensic tools to assist State and local law 
     enforcement agencies in combating cybercrime.
       No. 12. To support research fellowships in support of its 
     mission.
       No. 13. To serve as a clearinghouse for information on law 
     enforcement technologies.
       No. 14. To represent the United States and State and local 
     law enforcement agencies, as requested, in international 
     activities concerning law enforcement technology.
       No. 15. To enter into contracts and cooperative agreements 
     and provide grants, which may require in-kind or cash matches 
     from the recipient, as necessary to carry out its mission.
       No. 16. To carry out other duties assigned by the Attorney 
     General to accomplish the mission of the Office.

  Mr. President, that is a pretty heavy load. I would say if they think 
they have more time than this, then they have a lot of time. This is 
what we believe we have given them, partially. And for anyone to come 
here and say that these three directorates, plus the fourth--this 
doesn't give them anything to do, it may not be the number of 
employees, but there is a large number of employees in the TSA.
  They have so much. Committees are there to set policy. That is the 
whole purpose of it, and I have laid out policy directions that they 
have on which it would take forever for this body to hold hearings.
  It is very unfair to Senator McConnell and me and the task force 
generally to say we did not give them anything. We gave them so much 
you need a semitruck and trailer to haul the responsibilities alone. I 
have read only part of them.
  Senator McConnell will be on the floor shortly. If there are no other 
amendments, we will go to final passage. Everybody should know it is 
8:30 at night, and we waited all day. We want to be patient. As I 
indicated, we are going to do our very best to finish this legislation 
as soon as we can.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                Amendment No. 3986 to Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is an amendment at the desk by 
Senator Byrd, No. 3986. I ask that it be considered. It has been 
cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendments are 
laid aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for Mr. Byrd, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3986 to amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:


                           amendment no. 3986

       At the appropriate place in Sec. 402(b) after the word 
     ``matters,'' insert the following:
       ``, as determined by the Senate Committee on 
     Appropriations''
  Mr. HARKIN. I didn't hear the request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There was a request to dispense with further 
reading of the amendment.
  Mr. HARKIN. What amendment?
  Mr. McCONNELL. An amendment by Senator Byrd relating to the 
resolution we are working.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3986) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. REID. I move to lay that motion on the table.

[[Page 21366]]

  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 4038 to Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is an unnumbered amendment at the 
desk by Senator Shelby regarding the National Flood Insurance Act.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
laid aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for Mr. Shelby 
     and Mr. Sarbanes, proposes an amendment numbered 4038 to 
     Amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To retain jurisdiction over the National Flood Insurance Act 
  of 1968, with the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following: ``Provided, 
     That the jurisdiction provided under section 101(b)(1) shall 
     not include the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, or 
     functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency related 
     thereto.''.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I am aware of no opposition to the Shelby amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4038) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. SARBANES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Delaware has 
an amendment to offer. He has indicated he would be willing to enter 
into a time agreement which, as far as I am concerned, is fine. He has 
indicated he would take--
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, unless someone else wishes to speak on 
this, 15 minutes. I think I can do it in 10, but let's say 15 minutes 
to protect myself.
  Mr. REID. And whoever wishes to speak against him have 15 minutes, 
and Senator Biden have 5 minutes to close if somebody speaks following 
that.
  Would that be appropriate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Could we be informed as to the topic?
  Mr. REID. The topic of it is Senator Biden and Senator Lugar wish to 
add the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
as ex officio members of the Intelligence Committee, having no voting 
rights or the ability to help establish a quorum.
  Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator for the explanation.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Biden 
have 15 minutes, that someone opposing his amendment have 15 minutes, 
and Senator Biden have 5 minutes to close the debate prior to a vote on 
the amendment, and that no amendments to the amendment be in order 
prior to a vote on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Delaware.


                Amendment No. 4021 To Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendments are 
laid aside. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN], for himself and Mr. 
     Lugar, proposes an amendment numbered 4021 to amendment No. 
     3981.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 5, after line 3, insert the following:
       ``(C) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations (if not already a member of the select 
     Committee) shall be ex officio members of the select 
     Committee but shall have no vote in the Committee and shall 
     not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum.''.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is very straightforward. Right now, 
the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee are ex 
officio members of the Intelligence Committee, with no voting rights, 
no requirement that they be there to make a quorum. Quite frankly, they 
are there to be able to listen when they seek to do that.
  Senator Lugar and I are proposing the same exact status be made 
available for the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee. I know the argument will be, why don't we make everybody, 
every chairman, every ranking member, ex officio members? But the 
Foreign Relations Committee does need access to this information.
  I know it will come as a shock, but because of the necessary 
requirement of focusing on certain subject matters, which hopefully we 
gain some expertise on, the Foreign Relations Committee and its 
chairman and ranking member, hopefully, have some insights occasionally 
which other Members may not have because they do not spend the time on 
that issue. Just as in the Armed Services Committee, the ranking member 
and the chairman may have access to information that is not 
intelligence information but is information that would shed light upon 
judgments being made by the Intelligence Committee as a consequence of 
information made available by the CIA and other intelligence 
operations. Because, as we all know, intelligence operations can have 
major impacts for good or for ill on American foreign policy.
  I am necessarily, as we all are, restrained from giving contemporary 
examples of that, but I have been here a long time and go back to the 
period of the Cold War. I sat on the Intelligence Committee at the 
time, but I was not a ranking member. I was on the Intelligence 
Committee for 10 years, I think as long as anybody who served in this 
body. There may be somebody who served longer than me on that 
committee. But one of the things I learned is occasionally the 
Intelligence Committee would come up with initiatives made available 
under our special rules, which are necessary, special rules that are 
applicable only to the Intelligence Committee, and access and brief 
only the Intelligence Committee, and many members on the committee 
would not be aware that there were totally different operations going 
on on a diplomatic front or on an arms control front or on a matter 
relating to national security that were not explicitly--explicitly--
intelligence matters.
  Let me give you a few examples without giving, obviously, the 
details, but generic examples. Intelligence collection and analysis are 
essential to the verification of compliance with arms control and 
nonproliferation agreements. A few years ago, we on the Foreign 
Relations Committee heard that a particular intelligence system that is 
important to that function--that is, collecting intelligence for 
compliance on nonproliferation treaties and arms control--we heard that 
function was in danger of being lost.
  We took the initiative. We raised it with the Intelligence Committee 
because we had heard this. We let them know what we had heard to make 
sure the executive branch retained this particular system that we 
believed, in the

[[Page 21367]]

Foreign Relations Committee, was essential to a matter relating to 
nonproliferation, something that most of the members on the 
Intelligence Committee, understandably, serving on many committees 
other than Foreign Relations or Armed Services, did not see the 
particular relevance of. So when briefed by the Intelligence Committee, 
it seemed all right. It didn't seem like this particular system was 
critical for a foreign policy initiative that was underway and a treaty 
that existed. And by the way, we only heard about it from someone in 
the executive branch who had made it known to a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee.
  Intelligence is also needed to give warning of new dangers and 
opportunities around the world. That may require different capabilities 
from those of us who serve on the Armed Services Committee or who 
served in the Armed Services. The Armed Services Committee rightly 
worries about intelligence support for military operations. Why is that 
unrelated to major diplomatic operations? That can have as much 
consequence on American security as tactical military operations.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has a concern to ensure that there is 
a balance, that U.S. intelligence resources are not devoted primarily 
or overwhelmingly to tactical targets. My friend, the chairman of the 
committee, may disagree with me, but if I translate that, we only have 
so many assets that can be brought to bear. If I can make an analogy to 
the FBI, there are only 11,600 FBI agents, I think maybe 11,800. By the 
way, I might note, before 9/11 there were only 11,300. So we haven't 
done much there.
  But let's assume we say what is going on right now. There is a 
decision being made that those agents should focus on counterterror. 
That is a legitimate issue. But what about the Mafia? What about 
organized crime units that deal in drugs that are not involved in 
terror? It is a legitimate issue to debate as to where the resources 
should be placed. Of that 11,800, you have about 4,000 people to be 
made available. You only have so many satellites. You only have so many 
agents. You only have so many resources. And, understandably, the Armed 
Services Committee wants to make sure those resources are focused on 
those tactical issues that are critically important.
  I am not suggesting they should not. But there should be a voice 
there that is fully informed on the foreign policy side and has access 
that other members of the Foreign Relations Committee do not have 
because, as we all know, there are certain things that are made 
available to the Foreign Relations Committee, under our rules, only to 
the ranking member and only to the chairman and not the whole 
membership. And so absent having the fact that we have a member who may 
be brighter than and more informed than the chairman or the ranking 
member, they don't have the same access. They don't have the same 
access to all the diplomatic initiatives that are underway.
  So if it makes sense to have Armed Services have tactical input here, 
it seems to me that this false separation of our foreign policy and our 
defense policy is one of the reasons we got ourselves in trouble to 
begin with. What are we doing now? We are agreeing to change the rules. 
We are about to change the rules, I hope, when we get into reorganizing 
this body. And we are going to say no longer is a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee not able to serve on Armed Services, and no longer 
is a member of Armed Services not able to serve on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. Why? We are going around making sure that there 
are not stovepipes in the Intelligence Committee. We finally figured 
out there should not be stovepipes in terms of information and access 
and expertise as it relates to strategic doctrine, foreign policy, and 
tactical military operations. It is necessary.
  I know of one matter on which we were kept in the dark for some 
months, then briefed earlier this year. And we have gotten no 
information since. We go back, the chairman and I, and say: We want 
more information.
  They say: We already told the Intelligence Committee.
  Then the Intelligence Committee tells us, which is literally true: We 
can come and read whatever it is that is there.
  We all know how this place works. If you are not there in the middle 
of a hearing, if you are not there in that closed session, if you are 
not able to probe what is being said and have a perspective that may be 
different than the members of the committee, you are not likely to get 
the information.
  That is especially true because if we gained information as ex 
officio members of the Intelligence Committee, we would be bound by the 
same nondisclosure rules that apply to other members of the 
Intelligence Committee. I found in my 10 years on the Intelligence 
Committee--I think that is longer served time than anybody who 
presently sits on the Intelligence Committee, or as long; I could be 
wrong about that--I found, as one of my friends said early on when I 
got put on that committee originally: I don't want to go on because it 
is like Pac-Man. They will tell you information that you otherwise 
could learn, but once they have told you, you can't disclose it because 
if you do, even though it appears in the New York Times, you have 
violated the law.
  One of the things that is useful, I find that people are much more 
open with me as a junior member of the Intelligence Committee rather 
than a 31-year member of the Foreign Relations Committee. So we would 
be bound by the same rules. The Foreign Relations Committee also has a 
major concern for the safety and security of overseas embassies. We 
have shared that concern in this regard with the Intelligence 
Committee, which doesn't want to see intelligence personnel or 
information put at risk by ineffective security in our embassies. We 
will be able to pursue that shared interest more effectively if our 
chairman and ranking member have ready access to the information on 
this security and security around the world.
  And lastly, because I am getting pretty close here, the idea of being 
able to completely separate the functioning of our State Department and 
the functioning of the intelligence community in little neat boxes does 
not comport with reality. That is not how it works.
  Other than the present chairman of the committee maybe not wanting 
the Government expense of adding two more chairs at the table, I quite 
frankly don't understand what the problem is.
  I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time in opposition?
  The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, Senator Biden, in his usual flare, has 
offered an amendment to add the chairman and ranking member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee as ex officio members of the 
Intelligence Committee. Under S. Res. 400, the organizing resolution 
for the Senate Intelligence Committee, eight members are already 
crossovers from other committees: two from the Judiciary Committee, two 
from Armed Services, two from Appropriations, and two from foreign 
Relations. This is on purpose, because we believe these four committees 
should have crossover representation on the committee as it now stands. 
That is under S. Res. 400.
  With all due respect, I think the members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee--Senator Hagel, Senator Rockefeller--do an excellent job in 
representing the Foreign Relations Committee on the Intelligence 
Committee. These crossover members do perform an invaluable service for 
the Intelligence Committee.
  First, they ensure that the insights and perspectives of the other 
Senate committees are considered in the oversight of the intelligence 
activities of the United States. And second, they do already provide 
the Armed Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee and the 
Appropriations Committee and, yes, the esteemed members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, with a view of the Intelligence Committee on 
issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries.

[[Page 21368]]

  Now, under the McConnell-Reid reform proposal, the Intelligence 
Committee would grow by two ex-officio members already. The chairman 
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the majority and 
minority leaders, already serve as ex-officio members of the committee. 
So following reform, the Intelligence Committee will be composed of 
eight crossover members. If Senator Biden's amendment is successful, 
there will be six nonvoting ex-officio members.
  Now, any chairman or any ranking member who has crossover 
jurisdiction with any other committee, under this logic, should be an 
ex-officio member of the committee. After all, we need to keep an eye 
on one another. I have every trust in thee and me, but I wonder about 
thee. This is like Bob Barker: Come on down, be an ex-officio member of 
the Intelligence Committee. This is empowerment? This is further 
dissolution in terms of the responsibilities and cohesion and 
pertinence in regard to the Intelligence Committee.
  Well, does the Intelligence Committee need that much oversight? Do 
the guaranteed crossover memberships not really protect sufficiently 
the equities of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees?
  As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I said on the Senate floor 
earlier today that I often have concerns with the actions of the Armed 
Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Appropriations 
Committee, and the Judiciary Committee--not necessarily in that order.
  Given this logic, as such, given the proliferation of ex-officio 
memberships, perhaps the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee should have ex-officio membership on other committees with 
jurisdiction that overlap the intelligence issues. What is good for the 
goose is good for the gander. I will leave Members to decide who is the 
goose and who is the gander. I focus on four primary committees: Armed 
Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Judiciary. I was going 
to have a second-degree amendment to say, why can't Senator Rockefeller 
and I be ex-officio on these committees if they want to be ex-officio 
on our committee? I am not sure exactly what they would do other than 
monitor. We can certainly find something for them to do as they follow 
the work of the Intelligence Committee. I could go on. We could have 
ex-officio status for Senator Rockefeller and myself for the new 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Banking, Finance, and 
Agriculture Committees. They all have cross-jurisdictional interests 
that touch on intelligence issues.
  With only limited exceptions, all Senators have access to the 
information and activity of the Intelligence Committee. As chairman, I 
and the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller, have invited 
all Senators to come down and take a look at the classified portions of 
the Iraq review or any other Intelligence Committee product or holding. 
You are welcome. Just ask. Come on in.
  The committee assists in the arrangement of classified briefings for 
all Senators by our intelligence agencies. Ex-officio membership is an 
unnecessary requirement and maintains the status of the Intelligence 
Committee as a weak child of the Senate.
  Let's not have any further diminution of the Intelligence Committee. 
I urge colleagues to oppose the Biden amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, you know, one of the problems of being 
around here a while is that you get in this body and you take things in 
a personal context. This has nothing to do with overseeing the 
Intelligence Committee. This is about expanding the capability of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Let me give my friend an example. I think he totally misses the 
point. He views this as an assault on the committee, a weakening. We 
are looking at them. I wonder if the Senator is aware that on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, there are numerous occasions when the 
ranking member and chairman are made aware by the Secretary of State 
and/or the President himself of a diplomatic initiative that they have 
no idea is about to be undertaken. I wonder if he knows that. It is not 
about the collection of intelligence, it is about a diplomatic 
initiative.
  Let me make something up. Assume we were having great difficulty with 
Canada and they are our enemy. The President and Secretary of State 
call the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
down to get our judgment on whether, if we made the following entree 
diplomatically to a particular group in Canada--say, Quebec--we might 
be able to move the ball, and, at the same time, the Intelligence 
Committee is hearing information that is meat and potatoes, critically 
important, that there is an initiative underway in the Intelligence 
Committee to eavesdrop upon the undertakings of the very people who are 
about to make this initiative. It might be a useful thing, not an 
assault on the chairman or a diminution of his authority but another 
access and avenue of, hopefully, an informed person with a different 
perspective on something that is not banking, or it is not agriculture; 
it is serious stuff.
  We tend, when we think about intelligence, to think only in terms of 
covert operations and the military. The fact is, that is part of our 
problem. This false separation of the conduct of American foreign 
policy and the policy of our strategic doctrine and our tactical 
doctrine is part of our problem. So this is not about sitting down and 
babysitting, or whatever the phrase used by my friend was; this is 
about being collaborative and letting them maybe know a perspective 
they didn't know.
  Lastly, we all have access to all kinds of information. The problem 
is, unless we are essentially tasked with the responsibility and 
obligation, there is so much we have to do, we don't get to do it. I 
know what the chairman is worried about: this guy sitting next to me. I 
hired him in the Intelligence Committee 20 years ago. He sat there for 
10 years. Now he works for me on the Foreign Relations Committee. There 
is a worry--not about my particular colleague on my left--but we will 
have staff there that will do what they do in every committee if they 
attend a hearing: Mr. Chairman, this is about to happen, and it is a 
small thing and it totally conflicts with what you have been told by 
the Secretary of State and it may be useful.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's opening time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. Do I have any time beyond that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes to close.
  Mr. BIDEN. The bottom line is, I wish we would get together in this 
place and stop viewing everything as sort of an assault on somebody 
else's jurisdiction. This is not about that. I got off of the 
Intelligence Committee. I was on the Intelligence Committee, the Budget 
Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Judiciary 
Committee. I concluded that I could not do all four of those, so I got 
off. I gave up the chairmanship of the Budget Committee because I 
didn't think I could do that and my job on the Foreign Relations 
Committee and the Judiciary Committee.
  The strength of this institution lies in our willingness to recognize 
the contribution that each of us can make, the perspective we bring to 
the table, and, occasionally, just maybe a degree of expertise that 
maybe another colleague doesn't have. I clearly do not have the 
expertise of my colleague on the Intelligence Committee on intelligence 
matters now. He is fully, contemporaneously, totally informed. I don't 
have the competence on matters relating to the Banking Committee and 
the international banking system as the chairman and ranking member do 
because that is their obligation. I don't have the competence my friend 
from Alaska has on the Appropriations Committee and how all these 
pieces fit together, but I respectfully suggest that I might be able to 
contribute.
  Whoever succeeds me--the Senator from Connecticut, I think, is next 
in line to be chairman or ranking member of the Foreign Relations--I 
respectfully suggest he has a perspective that might be useful.

[[Page 21369]]

  Why do we view this in terms of competition? If you hang around this 
place long enough, you kind of go through a couple phases, one of which 
is you end up sometimes not recognizing the potential strength that 
lies here.
  Senator Hagel and Senator Rockefeller are brilliant members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Rockefeller, because he is the 
cochairman, has not been able to attend one-fifth of our hearings, and 
he should not be at our hearings. He should be doing the work of the 
Intelligence Committee because that is his primary responsibility. 
Senator Hagel is the same way. They are both incredibly well-informed 
people. They both serve on the committee, but they do not have the full 
access Senator Lugar has to every diplomatic initiative that Senator 
Lugar may be aware of or the particular concerns or the sensitivity of 
a particular initiative and at a particular time.
  I conclude by saying, I go back to my days on the Intelligence 
Committee. I happened to be aware, only because Senator Pell made me 
aware, of an initiative that was underway in a particular Eastern 
European country. At the time, Mr. Casey and Ugell were running 
operations there. Only because I was made aware by the chairman of the 
committee of what he had been briefed on and was allowed to communicate 
was I able to say in a hearing and I think--I don't know this for a 
fact. I know I asked for two hearings, as a member of the Intelligence 
Committee of the entire Senate. I demanded there be a secret hearing, 
that we close the doors, only Senators, no staff. It does not often 
happen because you only have one of two choices when you are informed 
about what you think is a dangerous initiative that is underway in the 
intelligence community. You go forward and you blow it and you suffer 
the consequences, you have broken the law, or under the laws, you can 
ask for a secret meeting of the Senate.
  There was an operation that was proposed. This is years ago in the 
early days of the Reagan administration, relating to the very country 
in which there was a serious diplomatic initiative being made, in a 
sense covertly, not by the intelligence community, but by the State 
Department and the White House.
  When I made the Congress aware of that, it was concluded that maybe 
it was not a good operation, and I signed on that piece of paper. You 
still have to sign off: I oppose this action. Whether it is because I 
did that or not, I cannot say, but the action was jettisoned. It was 
ill-conceived and totally at odds with the initiative the Reagan 
administration had going over in another piece of it. I do not know if 
that was a positive contribution or not, but I can tell you it was a 
different perspective.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I believe I have approximately 9 minutes 
remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator from Delaware, 
whom I admire for his expertise on foreign policy, I think all of us 
have an obligation to learn from, to ask, to seek guidance, to seek 
expertise from other Members, and I hope it is in that spirit that we 
are able to do this.
  As Chairman of the Emerging Threats Capabilities Subcommittee on 
Armed Services, I work very closely with Senator Lugar on the 
Counterthreat Reduction Program. I do not think I can do the job 
without talking to Senator Lugar. Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar put 
that together, the Nunn-Lugar program. I talk with Senator Lugar a lot 
in regard to his perspectives on foreign policy.
  I have not taken the opportunity that I probably should have to talk 
with the Senator from Delaware at great length--we talk about some 
things but certainly not enough. I welcome the Senator to come to the 
Intelligence Committee in regard to any desire he might have to go over 
or to review any of the intelligence material that pertains to foreign 
policy. All of that does, as a matter of fact. It was the State 
Department that pretty much got it right in the WMD review in regard to 
possible WMD in Iraq, and we know that and we respect that. We made a 
special effort to invite the State Department in, and we will be happy 
to visit with the Senator from Delaware about that.
  I yield the remaining time I have to a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee who is always telling me about the need to tie in 
the relationship with regard to foreign relations and intelligence. He 
is the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. We 
work together in a bipartisan way. We have gone through pretty tough 
times. We achieved a 17-to-0 vote in regard to the WMD inquiry.
  We are not trying to deny information to anybody. We want to share 
it. We want to learn, especially from people such as Senator Biden.
  I yield my remaining time to Senator Rockefeller.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman, 
the Senator from Kansas. I say to the Chair, I was downstairs and I had 
a wonderful opportunity to spend some time talking with Senator Byrd. 
We do not have that much opportunity to talk with each other--all of 
us--and I enjoyed it. Then I began to listen to the conversation. I 
began to think, I don't know of any committee in the Congress which is 
more specifically and more logically set up with respect to 
representation from other committees.
  We have the Foreign Relations Committee. We have the Judiciary 
Committee. We have the Appropriations Committee. We have the Armed 
Services Committee. We have general members. We are actually going to 
grow somewhat smaller probably as a result of this intelligence reform. 
So everybody is represented.
  One of the things I have also noticed is that there are a number of 
Senators--unfortunately not the majority of them, but a number of 
them--who will come in early in the morning, and they will get with my 
staff or Senator Roberts' staff and they will say: I want to read stuff 
that I can only read inside these closed facilities. It may be a 
National Intelligence Estimate. It may be parts of a report. But we 
operate openly within a very discreet and necessarily secreted space.
  It does not occur to me that Foreign Relations is denied access. 
Everybody, by definition of being a Senator, belongs to the 
Intelligence Committee by way of information. It would be perfectly 
honest to say sometimes taking the 3 or 4 hours, as a number of 
Senators do, they come in and read and sometimes those are much more 
productive than even some of the hearings that we might have where 
everybody gets 5-minute questioning rounds, and Senators will take 
that.
  Is it true we have a special relationship with the Armed Services 
Committee? Yes, it is true because a great deal of the Armed Services 
budget interacts and relates to what is going on in intelligence. This 
evening, we passed a very carefully crafted compromise between 
sequential referral because the relationship between Armed Services and 
Intelligence is necessarily complex and can have tension or less 
tension, and we want to try and keep it having less tension.
  We have a very small space. Our hearing room is the smallest hearing 
room I have ever been in, in either the State legislature or the 
Senate. It seems to me the particular committees that have jurisdiction 
are represented. They are represented under S. Res. 400. It is very 
formal, it is very exacting, and just as Senator Lugar--I am so 
distressed to see Senator Lugar leave the committee because he was so 
good at it, but that was the 8-year limit, which is now hopefully going 
to disappear.
  There is representation, I say very honestly to my friend from 
Delaware. There is representation. The Senator is always welcome. The 
Senator has as much right and access--equal and not one-quarter of 1 
percent less--to what

[[Page 21370]]

goes on in terms of the intelligence that is available to us, Chairman 
Roberts or myself and other members of our committee--now 17, soon to 
be 15--have.
  I would just hope that that particular relationship of armed services 
would be understood. The chairman is on the Armed Services Committee 
and that is a conflict. It tears at him because he is chairman of one 
and very senior on the other, but we work it out. We simply work it out 
because we stay with it.
  Again, I say that being on Intelligence is sort of like 100 percent 
of your time, and I think the quickest way to achieve that is to come 
in and do the reading. I am thinking of a lot of Senators, whose names 
are going through my head as I speak, who do that. They come in at 7 in 
the morning. My staff and the chairman's staff are there. They 
accommodate them. They say: What do you want to read? And they make it 
available. They sit down and read and they walk away and they have 
gotten an enormous amount of information.
  So I think the system works pretty well.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I think the committees are accommodating, and I 
would hope that the Senator would be understanding of that.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question? I will be very 
brief.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I used to have a friend who used to say: You have to know 
how to know.
  The Senator has been on the Intelligence Committee long enough to 
know that unless one is there and they know what has been said, reading 
the report is not particularly relevant half the time. My question is 
this: What is the problem? The committee does not have enough seats? 
The committee does not have enough chairs if we walk in? What is the 
deal? What is the concern? That we would release the information more 
than anyone else on the committee might?
  I mean, I am a little confused. Like from that line in the movie: 
What is the story, Richie? What is the problem? What is the downside? 
Do we breathe too much of the oxygen in the room? Are we going to take 
up more time? I do not quite get it.
  I understand what the Senator says about how we are covering it. What 
I do not understand is, no one has said to me what is the downside of 
Senator Lugar being able to, when he feels like it, show up, sit there 
and ask questions just like the Senator asks questions because he has a 
perspective. I am a little curious about that.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I would be happy to do my best to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the chairman have 2 minutes 
to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I say to the distinguished ranking member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, that, in fact, to get into the room space 
is a problem. We do not have a single place to put a single person 
except in the back of the room. Now, that embarrasses me to say that, 
but it is a fact.
  Secondly, I differ with the ranking member when he says that reading 
does not count that much. Reading and knowing the material, whether it 
is WMD or whether it is predictions, or whatever it is, is the greatest 
part of it.
  The hearings are tremendously important and they are the democratic 
part of it so everybody has a chance to ask questions, but I know of 
nothing which precludes the ranking member being able to do that. For 
example, to staff, it is a matter of just saying, I want to know the 
answers.
  The Senator has the same privileges on Intelligence that this Senator 
does, I would say through the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. I do not believe that is accurate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Before going to the vote, I will say that I am aware 
of only two, possibly three, amendments remaining. We are still hoping 
to push forward. I know Senator Craig is here, and I believe he is 
prepared to offer an amendment. It is still our hope that we can press 
through to final passage tonight.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
4021.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. 
Campbell), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the Senator from 
New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), 
and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Lott) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Edwards), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the Senator from South 
Carolina (Mr. Hollings), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), 
and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 36, nays 54, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 203 Leg.]

                                YEAS--36

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Sarbanes
     Stabenow

                                NAYS--54

     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dole
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Campbell
     Chambliss
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Graham (FL)
     Gregg
     Hollings
     Kerry
     Lieberman
     Lott
  The amendment (No. 4021) was rejected.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, there will be no more rollcall votes 
tonight. We will continue to be here for a while. The plan will be to 
have a cloture vote on this bill tomorrow morning. We will have to 
start fairly early tomorrow morning. That vote should occur around 
9:15. We will come in at 9 and do a little bit of business and have the 
first rollcall vote tomorrow around 9 o'clock.
  We do appreciate everyone's patience and especially appreciate the 
bill's managers, Senators McConnell and Reid. This has been a very long 
day. I know people are exhausted. We have a lot more work to do. We 
will continue for a while. Again, no more rollcall votes tonight.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Our two managers have done a wonderful job in getting us 
to this point. It is very important now to know what amendments are 
left. If they can be submitted tonight, we will work on a finite list 
and try to get that finite list locked in tonight or first thing 
tomorrow to work through what amendments remain.
  Our two managers are to be congratulated for a job well done today. 
We will try to finish tomorrow.
  Mr. FRIST. For planning purposes, because people are asking how long 
we will be around, we are really having to take this an hour at a time. 
The plans remain, as the Democratic leader and I have said all week, we 
will complete this bill. We are going to deal with

[[Page 21371]]

FSC/ETI, the jobs manufacturing bill, and we will complete Homeland 
Security appropriations before we leave.
  We have been fairly clear about the schedule, and everyone has worked 
very hard, but it means we will stay here until we finish. So we will 
be here tonight, tomorrow, Saturday, Sunday, or whenever we complete 
our work. I don't know how long that will take. Everyone knows what the 
bills are. We have again and again asked for people to focus on the 
bills. Members have done a very good job. People are very tired.
  Rather than break and spend all next week or even the week after 
that, we have decided to go straight through. We know what the business 
is. The objectives are as I said. And we will again--it is late 
tonight--we will start early tomorrow morning, and we will complete 
business before we leave.
  No more rollcall votes tonight.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ensign). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                Amendment No. 4040 to Amendment No. 3981

  Mr. BINGAMAN. On behalf of Senator Domenici and myself, I send an 
amendment to the desk. I understand it has been agreed to by both 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendments are 
set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for Mr. 
     Domenici, for himself and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4040 to amendment No. 3981.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
reading be dispensed with.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To transfer jurisdiction over organization and management of 
  United States nuclear export policy to the Committee on Energy and 
                           Natural Resources)

       Section 101(b) is amended by--
       (1) striking paragraph (10); and
       (2) adding at the end the following:
     ``Matters relating to organization and management of United 
     States nuclear export policy (except programs in the 
     Department of Homeland Security) shall be referred to the 
     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.''.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. CRAIG. We support the amendment. It is an excellent, necessary 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4040) was agreed to.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. SARBANES. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Vitiation Of Vote

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I am sure that everyone in good faith 
offered the amendment, but the action that was taken by the Senate has 
to be rescinded. The managers of the bill were not aware of what was 
going on. Anyone interested in this had no knowledge of what was going 
on. It is simply not the right thing to do.
  I ask unanimous consent that the action taken by the Senate on 
amendment No. 4040 be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. HARKIN. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I certainly have no objection. I thought 
this had been agreed to by both managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, both managers of the bill were engaged 
in conversation here. There was a misunderstanding about whether the 
Domenici amendment had been approved. Senator Reid correctly asked that 
the vote be vitiated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Is there objection to the 
request?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I understand there is no quorum call in 
progress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.


                              Overtime Pay

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, America is stuck in a jobless recovery. 
This jobless recovery is not an accident. It is in large measure the 
result of failed economic policies, policies that the Bush 
administration stubbornly clings to. Despite the loss of millions of 
private sector jobs over the last 3 and a half years, this 
administration has embraced offshore outsourcing. It has been against 
extending unemployment insurance for the long-term unemployed. It is 
adamant against raising the minimum wage. And it has been determined to 
eliminate time-and-a-half overtime pay for millions of American 
workers.
  It is time, I believe, for us to chart a new course. It is time for 
Washington to listen to ordinary working Americans. They are telling us 
loudly and clearly that their No. 1 issue is economic security. They 
are telling us that they fear losing their jobs, their health care, and 
their retirement.
  Now they also fear losing their right to time-and-a-half compensation 
for overtime. They fear, with good reason, that under the Department of 
Labor's new rules, they will be obliged to work a 50- or 60-hour week 
with zero additional compensation. For millions of working Americans 
this is unacceptable, and it is the last straw.
  Accordingly, we have repeatedly offered an amendment to stop the Bush 
administration's new rules to eliminate overtime pay protections for 
millions of American workers. That amendment was voted on numerous 
times in the Senate and passed both by strong bipartisan majorities. It 
also has the overwhelming support of the American public. Yet despite 
this clear expression of the will of Congress and the public, my 
overtime amendment was stripped earlier in the year from the Omnibus 
appropriations bill in conference and again this week in the conference 
on the FSC-ETI bill.
  But my overtime amendment will be back, and it will be back by 
popular demand. It amazes me, wherever I travel in the United States, 
people come up to me to talk about this overtime issue. They know what 
the administration is doing. They are angry. They want action to stop 
these new overtime rules.
  Frankly, at this point, the administration has zero credibility on 
this issue. The Department of Labor claims that it simply wants to give 
employers a clearer guide as to who is eligible for overtime pay. But 
ordinary Americans are not buying this happy talk. They know the 
administration has put into effect a radical rewrite of the Nation's 
overtime rules. They know these new rules strip millions of workers 
from the right to fair compensation.
  The American people are right. Plain and simple, the new overtime 
rules are a frontal attack on the 40-hour workweek, proposed initially 
by the administration without a single public hearing.
  The new rules could effectively end overtime pay in dozens of 
occupations, including nurses, police officers, clerical workers, air 
traffic controllers, social workers, even journalists. Indeed, the new 
criteria for excluding employees from overtime are deliberately vague 
and elastic, so as to stretch across vast swaths of the workforce.
  Listen to Mary Schlichte, a nurse in Cedar Rapids, IA. Here is what 
she said:

       Many nurses just like me work long hours in a field with 
     very stressful working conditions and little compensation. . 
     . . Our patients rely on us, and our families depend on

[[Page 21372]]

     us. We need overtime pay so we can stay in the profession we 
     love and still make ends meet.

  Ms. Schlichte told me about her nurse colleagues in Cedar Rapids who 
also rely on overtime pay. One nurse is married to a struggling farmer, 
and she relies on overtime pay to cover their insurance premiums. They 
already fear losing their farm, she says, and now they fear losing 
their health care, too.
  Dixie Harms is a longtime trainer of nurses in Des Moines. Ms. Harms 
told me:

       If overtime is changed for hospital nurses, we will see a 
     mass exodus of registered nurses from the hospital setting 
     because they will get fed up and refuse to ``volunteer'' so 
     many hours doing what they love doing.

  Three years ago, after the terrible September 11 attacks, many here 
in Washington spoke eloquently about the heroism of our firefighters, 
police officers, first responders, and public safety workers. Ever 
since, America's first responders have worked long hours to protect us 
from terrorist threats. But the administration even wanted to deny 
these workers time-and-a-half compensation for those longer hours. This 
is wrong.
  Since passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, overtime 
rights and the 40-hour workweek have been sacrosanct, respected by 
Presidents of both parties. But alas, it is not sacred to this 
administration. For 65 years, the 40-hour workweek has allowed workers 
to spend time with their families instead of toiling past dark and on 
weekends. At a time when family dinner is becoming an oxymoron, this 
standard is more important than ever.
  These radical revisions are antiworker and antifamily. And given the 
fact that we are stuck in a jobless recovery, the timing of this attack 
on overtime could not be worse. It is yet another instance of this 
administration's economic malpractice. Bear in mind that time-and-a-
half pay accounts for some 25 percent of the total income of Americans 
who work overtime. With average U.S. incomes declining, the proposed 
changes would slash the paychecks of millions of white-collar workers.
  Moreover, the new rules are all but guaranteed to hurt job creation 
in the United States. Isn't this just basic logic? If employers can 
more easily deny overtime pay, they will push their current employees 
to work longer hours without compensation. With millions of Americans 
currently out of work, why would we give employers yet another 
disincentive to hire new workers?
  It is bad enough to deny 6 million workers their overtime rights, but 
what is striking is the mean-spiritedness of the Department of Labor. 
The Department offered employers what amounts to a cheat sheet. It 
offered employers helpful tips on how to avoid paying overtime to the 
lowest paid workers, the same workers who are supposedly helped by the 
new overtime rules.
  For example, the Department suggested cutting a worker's hourly wage 
so that any new overtime payments will not result in a net gain to the 
employee. It also recommended raising a worker's salary slightly to 
meet the threshold at which eligibility for time-and-a-half pay ends. 
This is just disgraceful. But it gets worse. The administration's 
scheme specifically targeted veterans, categorizing many as 
professionals even if they do not hold a professional degree or receive 
the same salary as degreed professionals.
  Think about it: The administration opted to deny overtime pay to 
first responders, police officers, and firefighters who put their lives 
on the line protecting us here at home. It also aimed to take away 
overtime from veterans who put their lives on the line overseas. This 
may seem outrageous to most Americans, but some major employers are 
very pleased.
  Here is a portion of the Boeing Corporation's comments on the 
Department's rules:

       Many of [Boeing's] most skilled technical workers received 
     a significant portion of their knowledge and training outside 
     the university classroom, typically any branch of the 
     military service . . . Boeing thus supports the department's 
     focus on the knowledge used by the employee performing her 
     job rather than the source of the knowledge or skill . . .

  The National Association of Manufacturers made similar comments. Let 
me quote:

       NAM applauds the department for including this alternative 
     means of establishing that an employee has the knowledge 
     required for the exemption to apply. This addition is 
     entirely consistent with the realities of the current 
     workplace and the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
     For example, many people who come out of the military have 
     significant knowledge based on work experience but have not 
     had ``a prolonged course of specialized intellectual 
     instruction.''

  Understandably, veterans were deeply disturbed by the 
administration's proposed new rules. For example, Vietnam Veterans of 
America wrote to the Secretary of Labor and said:

       [Veterans] who have received military training equivalent 
     to a specialized degree could now be classified as a 
     professional employee and lose their right to overtime. This 
     will be true even if the veterans in question do not earn the 
     higher pay afforded to those with an advanced degree or with 
     supervisory/management positions.

  The organization further complained that this legitimizes the already 
extensive problems of discrimination against veterans.
  And this is from the national president of the Vietnam Veterans of 
America, Thomas Corey:

       Therefore, we would like to make you aware that the 
     proposed modification of the rules would give employers the 
     ability to prohibit veterans from receiving overtime pay 
     based on the training they received in the military . . . The 
     proposed rule changes will make these veterans and their 
     families unfairly economically vulnerable in comparison with 
     their non-veteran peers. We hope you will agree that the men 
     and women who have served our Nation so well in military 
     service should not be penalized for having served.

  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to express my sadness with the 
actions of the Senate these last 2 days and express why I will oppose 
the resolution to reorganize the Senate. I will vote against the 
resolution because it was supposed to improve the manner in which this 
Chamber overseas the intelligence and homeland security issues. As of 
now, it will do no such thing. In fact, it is a step backward because 
we have claimed to have taken action when in reality little has 
changed.
  Make no mistake, the status quo rules the day and underscores the 
observation that the Senate has failed to change the way it conducts 
oversight of intelligence and homeland security issues as recommended 
by the 9/11 Commission.
  First, the 9/11 Commission recommended we establish a single 
committee, each House of Congress, combining authorizing and 
appropriating authorities. However, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected 
the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona, which I supported, 
that would have given the Select Committee on Intelligence 
appropriating power that would substantially reform the manner in which 
this body conducts oversight of intelligence. The actions of the Senate 
fly in the face of the 9/11 Commission recommendations.
  Without this power, I anticipate that the problems that have been 
described by Senator McCain and Senator Roberts during this debate will 
continue. In many instances, the executive branch agencies will pay 
their authorizing committees lip service and go behind their backs to 
the Appropriations Committee to get what they want. All you have to do 
is talk to members of the Intelligence Committee and you will 
understand why it is so important that they have the appropriations 
power.
  If we are going to be asking people to serve on a Select Intelligence 
Committee and we don't give them the appropriations, then why serve on 
the committee, because it will be more of

[[Page 21373]]

the same that we have had around here for the last several years?
  I have seen it time and again in my first term. We do a poor job of 
oversight because authorizing committees lack the power of the purse. 
The defeat of the McCain amendment will only continue to make oversight 
of intelligence more difficult than necessary.
  Second, the Senate took up this resolution to fulfill the 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that there should be a single 
authorizing committee in each House of Congress for the Department of 
Homeland Security, just as we have for the Department of Defense, 
Department of State, and Department of Justice.
  Again, what we did flies in the face of the recommendation. We have 
seen amendment after amendment offered and accepted by this body, which 
guts the authorizing jurisdiction of the committee on homeland security 
and governmental affairs. Instead of having a single authorizing 
committee, the Department of Homeland Security will have at least four. 
Many of my colleagues took the floor and insisted the exceptions they 
were carving out of the jurisdiction of the homeland security committee 
had nothing to do with turf. Baloney. It had everything to do with 
turf.
  At a time when our national security is in jeopardy, the American 
people should be upset and concerned with what we have seen on the 
floor of the Senate when we should be concerned about our homeland 
security. All of us in the Senate understand that we are in jeopardy 
from what we are doing in our respective offices to make sure our 
people are being taken care of here.
  As a result of the turn of events, it is a farce to rename the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs the committee on homeland security 
and governmental affairs. It is no such thing. It has jurisdiction over 
a small percentage of the employees of the Department and less than 40 
percent of the budget.
  Let me repeat that we didn't even give the proposed homeland security 
committee the jurisdiction over either the majority of the budget or 
the personnel of the Department.
  When we return in November--maybe in January--I will seek to offer an 
amendment to restore the name of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
If we are not going to create a homeland security committee, let's not 
pretend that we are. Let's not pretend. Things have not really changed 
at all, in my opinion. I hope that what the Senate has done is reported 
across America, so that our constituents can see what we have done and 
tell us what a lousy job we did. Then maybe we can come back during the 
lameduck session in November and pass a reorganizing resolution that 
actually makes a difference and is guided solely by what is in the best 
interest of our country and not the best interest of each individual 
Senator.
  A few years ago, the Committee on Governmental Affairs held a hearing 
at which the Comptroller General testified on the preparedness of the 
executive branch to meet the 21st century challenges facing America. I 
am reminded of that hearing and I ask, Is the Senate prepared to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century? Are we capable of making the 
changes necessary to meet both the great dangers and wonderful 
opportunities we have before us? These last few days would indicate 
that we are not.
  Shame on the Senate, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I support the proposed reform to 
strengthen our oversight of the intelligence community.
  We just passed sweeping, historic legislation to reform America's 
entire intelligence community. It was a very good bill that will 
greatly strengthen our ability to develop good intelligence and fight 
terrorism.
  The National Intelligence Reform Act fulfills what I consider the 
priorities for intelligence reform, including many reforms I have been 
fighting for: A strong National Intelligence Director to lead and 
manage the intelligence community. A National Counter Terrorism Center 
so we have unity of effort to combat terrorism. Information sharing so 
analysts can connect the dots. An Inspector General for the entire 
intelligence community. Strong alternative analysis or red-teaming. An 
ombudsman so our intelligence professionals can speak truth to power. 
And protection for civil liberties and privacy.
  But reform of our intelligence community is only half the job. We 
must also reform our oversight of the intelligence community. As the 9/
11 Commissioners said, reforming intelligence without reforming 
oversight is like one hand clapping.
  The 9/11 Commission report says that, ``Of all our recommendations, 
strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult 
and important.'' Our leaders gave this ``most difficult and important'' 
task to two of our most esteemed colleagues: Senator Reid and Senator 
McConnell. I thank them for their leadership. And thank the entire 
bipartisan working group. I thank them for their creativity, 
cooperation and consideration to develop the substance of the proposal 
now before the Senate.
  I support all three key recommendations of the bipartisan working 
group: to create an appropriations subcommittee for Intelligence; to 
strengthen the Select Committee on Intelligence; and to create a 
Homeland Security Committee. Let me talk about each of these 
recommendations.
  The bipartisan working group proposal, and the rule we are now 
considering, will create an appropriations subcommittee for 
Intelligence. I believe this is one of the most important reforms we 
can make to strengthen Congressional oversight of the intelligence 
budget. That's why I wrote to Senator McConnell and Senator Reid urging 
them to do this.
  Some of my colleagues point out that the 9/11 Commission recommended 
creating a combined authorization and appropriations committee for 
intelligence. But that was just one option mentioned in the 9/11 
Commission Report.
  The 9/11 Commission Report also included two provisions supporting an 
Intelligence Appropriations subcommittee:
  The 9/11 Commission, on page 410 of its report, criticized the 
intelligence appropriations process, noting that ``the final budget 
review is handled in the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations 
Committees. Those committees have no subcommittees just for 
intelligence, and only a few members and staff review the requests.''
  The 9/11 Commission included the following recommendation on page 416 
of its report: ``Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for 
intelligence. . . .''
  Governor Tom Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, supports creating 
an Intelligence Appropriations subcommittee. In the September 7, 2004 
Intelligence Committee hearing, I asked him directly what he thought of 
my idea of an Intelligence Appropriations subcommittee. Chairman Kean 
said, ``I think that would be very much in my mind within the spirit of 
our recommendations.''
  Creating an Intelligence Appropriations subcommittee is the best way 
to strengthen oversight of the intelligence budget. Appropriations 
subcommittees conduct rigorous oversight of the agencies they fund. 
Senator Bond and I certainly do for the agencies funded by our VA/HUD 
bill. An Intelligence subcommittee will make the Appropriations 
Committee's oversight stronger: intelligence will have the attention of 
a full subcommittee, and that subcommittee will have sufficient staff 
for real oversight of intelligence funding. I hope my colleagues will 
join me in strong support of the proposal to create an Intelligence 
Appropriations subcommittee.
  The working group also recommends strengthening the existing Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I am proud to serve on the Intelligence 
Committee. I take that responsibility very seriously. Senator Daschle 
appointed me to the Committee in 2001, before the September 11th 
attacks. I have always used my role to push for reform and 
modernization so that we have the best possible intelligence for our 
decisionmakers and our troops.
  The bipartisan working group proposal maintains many of the good

[[Page 21374]]

things about the way the Intelligence Committee is organized: Including 
members of the Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations and 
Judiciary Committees. Ensuring the majority has only a 1-vote 
advantage. Having subpoena authority. Having a core nonpartisan 
professional staff.
  The rule would also strengthen the committee: Elevating it to an 
``A'' Committee. Creating at least one subcommittee to strengthen 
oversight. Giving the committee a stronger role in reviewing civilian 
intelligence nominees. Creating designated staff positions for each 
member of the committee.
  So I really think this resolution will help the Intelligence 
Committee to be more effective.
  The third reform proposed by the bipartisan working group is to 
create a Homeland Security Committee. We know that our colleagues on 
the Government Affairs Committee did a good job with the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security, so it's only logical that the 
current Governmental Affairs Committee would take on responsibility for 
homeland security. I believe it's important to make sure that other 
functions within the jurisdiction of Governmental Affairs do not lose 
out in this reform. I am thinking in particular of the Committee's work 
on government management and the Federal workforce, to ensure that we 
support our federal employees who serve the American people in so many 
ways.
  Having an authorizing committee for homeland security should be a 
real help in the unfinished business of making the Department of 
Homeland Security an effective agency, to work with our States, 
counties, cities and towns, as well as other Federal agencies, to 
protect the American people.
  The three reforms proposed by the McConnell-Reid working group, and 
codified as changes to the Senate Rules in this resolution, meet the 
challenge of the 9/11 Commission and our obligation to the American 
people to strengthen congressional oversight. That's why I intend to 
support the Resolution, and urge my colleagues to support it as well.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senate agreed, 
by unanimous consent, to an amendment that Senator Grassley and I 
offered to S. Res. 445, the Senate intelligence reform resolution. Our 
amendment will preserve the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee over 
the commercial operations of what has historically been known as the 
United States Customs Service.
  The United States Customs Service is one of the oldest agencies in 
the U.S. Government. It was created in 1789 to collect tariffs which, 
at that time, were the principal source of revenue funding the Federal 
Government.
  Until 1816, the Senate had no standing committees. Senators 
established ad-hoc committees to consider specific bills. In his 1815 
message to Congress, President Madison recommended a series of 
controversial economic measures, including tariff revisions and the 
creation of a second national bank. The Senate responded by creating 
the Select Committee on Finance and Uniform National Currency.
  In his 1816 message, President Madison recommended a further series 
of economic measures. This time, the Senate responded by creating the 
Committee on Finance as a standing committee on December 10, 1816. 
Under the leadership of Chairman George Campbell, Democrat of 
Tennessee, the committee's very first task was to consider the Tariff 
Act of 1816. Other original members of the Finance Committee included 
Senators Chace of Vermont, Bibb of Georgia, King of New York, and Mason 
of New Hampshire.
  Over the ensuing 188 years, the Finance Committee's jurisdiction has 
come to include not just tariff legislation, but all legislation 
related to international trade. Up until 1930, trade policy had been 
set primarily through Congressional establishment of tariffs, under the 
jurisdiction of the Finance Committee. When, however, the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff of 1930 became associated with the Depression, Congress shifted 
its approach. As the new Roosevelt administration considered proposals 
to reduce tariffs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested that, 
instead of reducing tariffs unilaterally, Congress authorize the 
President to negotiate reciprocal reductions.
  When, in 1934, President Roosevelt endorsed this approach and sent it 
to Congress, the bill was referred to the Finance Committee. The bill 
was enacted into law as the Trade Act of 1934, establishing the basic 
model for trade policy ever since. As a result, the committee acquired 
jurisdiction not only over tariffs, but over a broad range of issues 
implicated by U.S. trade policy.
  Throughout those 188 years, the Finance Committee has retained 
jurisdiction over the Customs Service. And, like that of the Committee, 
the mission of Customs has expanded to cover a range of trade issues.
  Today, Customs continues to serve a revenue collection function. This 
year, it will collect nearly $25 billion in import duties, making it 
the second largest source of government revenue after the income tax.
  In today's globalized world, however, Customs has also come to serve 
a vital role in facilitating trade and, through trade, the nation's 
economic well-being. For example, in fiscal year 2004, Customs will 
process approximately 28 million entry summaries, covering imports 
worth $1.36 trillion. That is more than 56,000 separate merchandise 
entries every day.
  In fiscal year 2003, Customs made 6,500 seizures of goods, worth 
nearly $1 billion, that were imported in violation of the intellectual 
property rights of U.S. businesses and individuals.
  Customs enforces the U.S. trade remedy laws, collecting $1.5 billion 
in antidumping and countervailing duties in fiscal year 2004.
  In addition, Customs enforces country-of-origin labeling rules, 
blocks trade in endangered species and conflict diamonds, collects 
trade data widely relied upon in the government and private sector, 
fights child pornography, and issues hundreds of classification and 
valuation rulings every year. Thousands of American businesses and jobs 
depend on Customs to process imported inputs efficiently, so they can 
reduce production costs through just-in-time inventory systems.
  Over time, Customs has also come to have a national security mission. 
Customs agents are often the first line of defense at the border. For 
example, it was a Customs agent who apprehended the so-called 
``millennium bomber'' crossing the border from Canada into Washington 
State in December 1999.
  Until recently, Customs was housed within the Department of the 
Treasury. Treasury was well-suited to oversee both the revenue 
collection and commercial facilitation functions of Customs, and to 
ensure that those functions were carried out in a manner calculated to 
advance the economic growth and well-being of the United States.
  After September 11, 2001, however, things changed. We learned that 
day how important it is to ensure the strongest possible coordination 
among the many Federal Agencies charged with our domestic security.
  In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress moved the Customs 
Service from the umbrella of the Treasury Department into the new 
Department of Homeland Security.
  The Customs Service, as such, no longer exists as a single entity. 
Rather, its many functions were divided among two parts of the Border 
and Transportation Security Directorate of the Department of Homeland 
Security--Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.
  When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, there was 
widespread concern in the business community that moving Customs from 
Treasury--an agency whose principal mission is the health of the U.S. 
economy to a new agency principally concerned with national security 
would lead to a shift in Customs' focus away from trade facilitation--
with adverse consequences for those businesses and for the economy as a 
whole.
  For some agencies, this problem was solved by splitting the agency 
apart and moving to DHS only the people directly working on security 
issues. For

[[Page 21375]]

example, this is what happened at APHIS. That solution did not work for 
Customs, because many Customs employees perform both commercial and 
security functions as part of their jobs.
  Instead, Congress made Customs serve two masters. The employees of 
Customs were physically moved into the Department of Homeland Security. 
But the commercial functions of Customs remain under the policy control 
of the Treasury Department. Section 412 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 expressly provides that ``authority related to Customs revenue 
functions'' that was previously vested in the Secretary of the Treasury 
``shall not be transferred'' to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
  There was some flexibility built into the law. That way, over time, 
the Secretary of Treasury could delegate some responsibilities to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security if experience demonstrated that a 
particular Customs function was more closely related to security than 
to trade facilitation.
  As a practical matter, the result has been shared authority over 
Customs by Treasury and Homeland Security. Similarly, in the Senate, 
the result has been shared oversight by the Finance Committee and the 
Committee on Government Affairs. One committee focuses on homeland 
security issues and the other on commercial issues.
  In response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Senate 
is now engaged in a debate over how to reorganize our committee 
structure to provide stronger, more coherent oversight over issues 
related to homeland security.
  In my view, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission do not justify 
any changes in committee oversight jurisdiction of Customs. The 
Commission has recommended centralizing oversight over homeland 
security issues in one committee in each House. The clear purpose of 
that recommendation is to centralize oversight over homeland security 
functions, not over other functions that happen to be performed by 
individuals employed by the Department of Homeland Security.
  The Grassley-Baucus amendment to S. Res. 445 ensures that the Finance 
Committee will retain the jurisdiction over the commercial facilitation 
functions of the Customs Service that the committee has held for nearly 
200 years.
  Everyone understands that in the post-9/11 world, the United States 
must vigilantly protect our borders. But while we do so, we must ensure 
that we do not overburden commerce with other Nations. We must strike a 
delicate balance between protecting the Nation's borders and promoting 
the nation's economic health. If we lose that balance, American 
businesses will suffer. So will our ports, because shippers will find 
it faster and less expensive to send their cargo through Canadian or 
Mexican ports.
  I believe that granting jurisdiction over the business facilitation 
functions of the Customs Service to the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Government Affairs would inevitably lead to commercial 
considerations being discounted heavily in the name of security. That 
would hurt the U.S. economy in the long run.
  On the other hand, retaining jurisdiction over the revenue and 
commercial functions of Customs in the Finance Committee in no way 
detracts from the ability of the new Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee to oversee those functions of Customs that pertain to 
border security. Separating oversight of these two functions will 
guarantee that commercial concerns receive a full and fair airing in 
any debate involving both commerce and security.
  So what are the functions over which the Finance Committee would 
retain jurisdiction under this amendment? Clearly, all the ``revenue 
functions'' defined in section 415 of the Homeland Security Act are 
included. These are generally functions that have virtually no security 
aspects to them--such as collecting tariffs, regulating country of 
origin labeling, or enforcing antidumping duty orders.
  The amendment also preserves Finance Committee jurisdiction over 
``any commercial function'' of CBP or ICE, ``including matters related 
to trade facilitation and trade regulation.''
  For example, the Finance Committee would retain jurisdiction over all 
commercial aspects of the implementation of Customs' new computer 
system, the Automated Commercial Environment or ACE. ACE was conceived 
many years ago long before 9/11--as a way to create a paperless 
environment that reduces paperwork and delays for goods clearing 
Customs and enhances the efficiency of American businesses that depend 
on those goods.
  ACE has security applications. It can be used to flag entries with 
suspicious documentation. And the Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee can certainly look into those issues. But it is not, 
and never has been, primarily a security-focused project.
  A second example is the issue of container security. Customs is 
engaged in a program of public-private cooperation with shippers to try 
to balance security concerns with incoming cargo containers and the 
economic concerns of shippers. Under this amendment, the Finance 
Committee would retain jurisdiction over the trade facilitation aspects 
of Customs' inspection and clearance of cargo containers.
  Trade is critical to the health of the America economy. Exports alone 
accounted for 25 percent of U.S. economic growth between 1990 and 2000. 
Exports support an estimated 12 million jobs. Imports allow businesses 
and consumers more choice of goods and inputs and foster America's 
competitiveness in the global economy.
  For these reasons, Congress has a responsibility to ensure that 
Customs continues to serve the needs of the business and trade 
community. That can only be achieved by safeguarding a balance between 
Customs' trade facilitation and homeland security functions. The 
Grassley-Baucus amendment promotes that balance.


                     Amendment No. 3995, Withdrawn

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, earlier today there was a long deliberation 
and finally adoption of an amendment that had been earlier filed by 
Senator Bayh. It is my understanding that another amendment superseded 
that. That amendment is pending. It is No. 3995.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be 
withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, other 
than conforming and technical managers amendments, the only remaining 
first-degree amendments be the following, which are filed at the desk: 
Collins, Nickles, Hutchison, Frist, Bingaman-Domenici, and Rockefeller.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that it 
be in order to file timely second-degree amendments up until 9:15 
tomorrow morning.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement that was 
adopted by the Senate a few minutes ago, we want to make sure the 
Record is clear that when we talk about Collins, Nickles, Hutchison, 
Frist, Bingaman, and Rockefeller, we are talking about one amendment 
per member, and I want the Record to reflect that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Record will so reflect.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________