[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 20946-20978]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004--Continued

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate has voted overwhelmingly to 
invoke cloture on the national intelligence reform bill. I voted 
against cloture on the bill. The Senate leadership, in supporting 
cloture on this bill--I speak most respectfully--argued that this 
debate has gone on long enough. In essence, that is what has been 
stated.
  I will soon begin my 47th year in this body. I never thought I would 
see the demise of the Senate as a debating institution. I am very sorry 
about that. I have seen the demise of the Senate as a debating 
institution. I have been here when debate on a bill went over 100 days.
  Today's situation is eerily reminiscent of the autumn of 2002. A few 
years ago, the hue and cry went up for all Senators to support a 
massive bureaucratic reshuffling of our homeland security agencies and 
a war resolution--I will refer to in that way--against Iraq just weeks 
before election day.
  Like a whipped dog fearing his master, the Senate obediently complied 
with the demands of the White House, to which our leadership said: let 
us get this matter behind us; let us get it behind us.
  I know many of the Members who come to this body in this day and time 
are from the other body, and I speak most respectfully of the other 
body. I came from the other body likewise. But I can remember when I 
was in the other body I often said, Thank God for the Senate of the 
United States. That is when I was still in the other body. Thank God 
for the Senate of the United States. They take their time over there to 
debate. In this day and time, we do not take time to debate.
  Hindsight reveals the mistakes that the Senate made 2 years ago. 
Today, the Department of Homeland Security finds itself bogged down by 
bureaucratic infighting, unresolved turf wars, and insufficient 
funding. The central argument for the war resolution against Iraq, the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction, has disintegrated into a mess of 
lies and hot air. The calls for Congress to act quickly were revealed 
to be ill-advised, misguided, misinformed.
  The 108th Congress has an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of 
the 107th Congress. Yet the repeated calls by Senators for immediate 
action on this bill suggests we have learned very little.
  Most of the hundreds of amendments offered to this bill, or certainly 
scores of amendments, have focused on trying to speed up reforms that 
we already do not understand. Apparently, few Senators have dared to 
speak about the need for caution in arranging a massive, secretive 
bureaucracy. It would be the most secretive around.
  The risk that this bill will grow into a hydra-headed monster 
increases exponentially as election day nears. Many believe the House 
bill will include a number of provisions unrelated to intelligence 
reform, all the way from amendments on immigration to reauthorization 
of the PATRIOT Act. I hear lately the House has no intention of adding 
that last mentioned measure. In the rush to pass this bill on a 
political timetable, what type of Faustian bargains will be struck to 
jam this bill through the Congress? We have had it happen before. We 
have been jammed on these important bills. We have had our backs 
against the wall because of some nearing date, perhaps of a recess, and 
so forth. What kind of deals with the devil will be made in order to 
get this bill done in time for election day? That is the big rush--get 
this bill through in time for election day.
  Even one Republican Member of the House of Representatives is 
concerned that a slam-dunk conference would open the door to 
politically motivated poison pills. Why is there such a clamor to vote 
on a bill that is increasingly viewed as a way to make political hay in 
the hours before a Presidential election? Will Senators even get to 
read the conference report on this bill before we are expected to vote 
on it? If we pass this bill, who knows what may be lurking in the walls 
surrounding that conference between the two Houses unless the House 
should decide to accept the Senate-passed bill, making it all the more 
important for the Senate to take our time and thoroughly debate the 
bill.
  The mistake of how the Senate is choosing to consider this bill is 
not the

[[Page 20947]]

fault of the 9/11 Commission. That panel is a group of experienced and 
dedicated public servants. Their research went straight to the heart of 
the question that has burned in the minds of millions of Americans for 
3 years: Namely, how did such a powerful Nation fail to defend itself 
from those attacks?
  In chilling detail, the panel's report lays out the facts about how 
the U.S. Government failed to stop 19 hijackers--not from Iraq--19 
hijackers armed with box cutters; 19 hijackers, not from Iraq, not a 
one. Not even one of those 19 hijackers came from Iraq. Yet some have 
attempted to tie the hijackers with Iraq.
  ``The document is an improbable literary triumph,'' declared U.S. 
Circuit Judge Richard Posner in the New York Times Book Review. 
``However, the commission's analysis and recommendations are 
unimpressive,'' he said, ``not sustained by the report's narrative,'' 
he said, ``come to very little . . . [and more] of the same.''
  That is pretty harsh criticism. And contrary to what some believe 
about the critics of intelligence reform, Judge Posner is not 
protecting his turf, and he does not have an ax to grind.
  The Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings 2 weeks ago on the 
September 11 recommendations. A bipartisan array of national security 
experts pleaded with the Congress as they gave testimony to the 
Appropriations Committee, pleaded with the Congress not to rush these 
reforms.
  My, what an impressive list of names: The former chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren; former Senator Bill 
Bradley; former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci; former Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen--we all remember him. He has been an 
outstanding Secretary of Defense. He was a Republican--former CIA 
Director Robert Gates; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre; 
former Senator Gary Hart; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--he 
indicated we ought to take several months on this bill--former chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn--there is a good one 
for you. I served in the Senate with Sam Nunn. I served on the Armed 
Services Committee when he was chairman. Here is a man who is a 
careful, careful legislator--former Senator Warren Rudman, Republican 
from New Hampshire; former Secretary of State George Shultz, another 
Republican.
  Among them they have decades of knowledge and experience, and the 
Congress stands ready to dismiss their concerns out of hand.
  I pointed out that several of these distinguished persons are 
Republicans just to emphasize there are several preeminent Republicans 
who have had great experience in government who say: Wait, take your 
time. What is the hurry here? Why the big hurry?
  This group of 11 experienced public servants who urged the Congress 
to stop, look, and listen, they have no turf to protect. They have long 
since left the service of the executive and legislative branches. Why 
does the Senate not take their advice? Why does the Senate not pause to 
listen to their sage advice?
  Let us remember that 2 years ago Members of Congress fell all over 
themselves in a mad frenzy to adopt the advice of Senator Hart and 
Senator Rudman to create a Department of Homeland Security. Anyone who 
did not agree with the Hart-Rudman report was viewed as being 
obstructionist or out of touch. But today, the Senate sloughs off the 
counsel of those same two men to slow down--slow down. That is what the 
Senate is all about.
  The Senate is not a second House of Representatives with a 6-year 
term. Thank God for that. As I said many years ago when I was a Member 
of the other body, the body that is closest to the people, I said thank 
God for the Senate. So I did not come to this body with any idea of 
changing the rules to make it a second House of Representatives with a 
6-year term. I never thought that about it. I have thought that it is 
meant to be a place where men and women could argue as long as their 
feet would hold them erect. I have said time and again that as long as 
we have a forum in which elected representatives of the people can 
speak out, speak out without fear and speak out as long as they want to 
speak on a matter they feel very deeply about, thank God, the people's 
liberties will be secure.
  But today, as I say, the Senate sloughs off the counsel of these 
eminent luminaries to slow down. How quickly we turn on the advice of 
our friends.
  I fear the Senate wants change, in some instances, merely for the 
sake of change, and that we do not yet possess an adequate 
understanding of why we are doing what we are doing. It is not even 
clear why or how the 9/11 Commissioners arrived at all of their 
recommendations. The Commission's report does not explain it. What 
recommendations did the Commission consider and reject, and why did 
they reject the recommendations? Did the 9/11 panel receive any 
independent assessments of their ideas before they were published? Will 
the Commission's proposals prevent intelligence failures in other 
areas, such as stopping a repeat of the Iraq weapons of mass 
destruction fiasco? Even as the Senate rushes to pass this intelligence 
reform bill, with one eye on the public opinion polls, of course, and 
the other on the adjournment date, we do not know the answer to these 
questions.
  Given the Senate's failure to ask more questions about the creation 
of a Department of Homeland Security and the need for war in Iraq, I 
would hope this Chamber would be more circumspect about rushing to 
restructure our intelligence agencies on the eve of a Presidential 
election.
  These agencies are very secretive--very secretive. And look at the 
power Congress is about to give the national intelligence director. 
Look at the power. He is not an elected individual. I would hope that 
the Senate would pause to consider the powers that may be shifted to 
the executive branch in this legislation. I also hope that Senators 
will consider if such a timid Congress could possibly exercise proper 
oversight over a powerful and secretive bureaucracy.
  We are being naive about these intelligence reforms. It may be 
comforting to embrace the 9/11 report, and I hold in the highest regard 
the members, as I say, of that Commission and for its work. It may be 
comforting to embrace the 9/11 report, but its reforms ignore more 
fundamental intelligence problems.
  At the Appropriations Committee hearing on September 21, 2004, I 
asked Henry Kissinger: If the 9/11 Commission's recommendations had 
been implemented in 2002, would our intelligence agencies have come to 
a different conclusion about Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass 
destruction? His answer was no, nothing would have been different. 
There still would have been false claims of huge stockpiles of WMD in 
Iraq.
  Mr. President, we are all too focused just on the failings of 9/11. 
The Senate has not focused enough attention on the intelligence 
failures leading to war in Iraq, in which, as of the last reading of 
the news reports, we have lost 1,061 men and women. For what? For what 
did they give their lives? I would wonder, if I had a grandchild who 
had gone and lost his life in this war, for what did he give his life? 
Was it worth it? Was it worth it to invade a country under the new 
doctrine of preemption, which flies right into the face of the 
Constitution of the United States?
  I did not hear the Constitution mentioned last night in the debate. I 
am not sure, maybe I had my back turned at the moment. I have a sick 
wife and maybe, perhaps, I did not hear it. But I certainly did not 
hear it in the first debate between Mr. Bush and Mr. Kerry; not one 
time did I hear the Constitution mentioned. And I did not hear it 
mentioned last night. Yet it is mentioned every day throughout this 
country in the courtrooms of this Nation, the Constitution of the 
United States. Here we have these Presidential debates and nobody--if I 
find I am mistaken about last night's debate, I will certainly amend my 
words in this respect, but I do not believe I missed something there.
  The Senate has not focused enough attention on the intelligence 
failures

[[Page 20948]]

leading to the war in Iraq. We have not focused enough attention on the 
nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea. We have not focused 
enough attention on China. We have not focused enough attention on the 
proliferation of deadly germs and gases.
  Any of these challenges could be responsible for the next 
catastrophic attack on our country or our interests, and they are 
conspicuously ignored by this bill. Congress is showing myopic vision 
in failing to see the universe of threats to this country. Terrorism 
may be the most immediate threat to our country, but it is not the only 
threat.
  As a Member of the Senate and as the then-chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee in the Senate, I and my committee responded 
quickly to the attack of 9/11. Within 3 days, Congress passed an 
appropriations bill, appropriating $40 billion--within 3 days, $40 
billion. Congress, both Houses, passed an appropriations bill 
appropriating $40 billion. In other words, $40 for every minute since 
Jesus Christ was born, $40 for every minute since Jesus Christ was 
born--$40 billion. So Congress acted quickly.
  We all are concerned. There is no monopoly of concern on either side 
of the aisle here. I support the effort to reform our intelligence 
agencies. I support the creation of a national intelligence director. 
But I do not support this hurry in which we are engaged. We need to 
stop, look, and listen, debate, offer amendments, answer questions, 
hold more hearings, like Ted Stevens and I holding hearings in the 
Appropriations Committee.
  I have been one of the harshest critics of the status quo. 
Intelligence agencies are expected to uncover terrorists plots against 
our country and produce unbiased, accurate intelligence, free from 
political interference. The CIA and other agencies have fallen 
tragically short on both marks. However, I am not convinced that the 
Congress fully understands the implications of the reforms proposed by 
the 9/11 Commission, and the rush to vote on these issues before the 
Presidential elections means it will not have that opportunity. Henry 
Kissinger called attention to that fact.
  We are legislating in an atmosphere, just before a Presidential 
election, that is not conducive to thoughtful reform of these 
intelligence agencies. But the greatest contribution the Senate can 
make to the cause of the 9/11 families is to take the time to get those 
reforms right. Prematurely cutting off debate on this bill only 
succeeds in further politicizing a process that is more mindful of 
election day than it is the result of this debate.
  Like 2 years ago, the Senate is being stampeded into voting on major, 
far-reaching legislation. The result of this ill-considered course is 
easily seen: Any reforms the Congress enacts will be the product of 
rush and haste rather than thoughtful deliberation. We owe more to the 
memories of those who lost their lives on September 11.
  Mr. President, a little earlier I made the statement to the effect 
that I heard no one in last night's debate on either side mention the 
Constitution of the United States. My press has since called me and 
told me I was wrong. That, indeed, one of the candidates--and he said 
Senator Edwards--did mention the Constitution of the United States. 
Thank God for that.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the 
remarks of the Senator from Virginia and I be recognized to offer a 
Warner-Levin amendment which which has now been worked out and cleared. 
I think Senator Warner is somewhere nearby. If there is no objection, I 
ask unanimous consent to put us next in line with that amendment, which 
is a modified amendment and has been agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania.


                              HEALTH CARE

  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I rise to talk about an issue that is 
getting quite a bit of play in the press, other than the security issue 
having to do with our intelligence community and homeland security. 
This is a different kind of security issue. It is an issue having to do 
with health care. I wanted to discuss with Members today the two 
approaches that the candidates for President have about health care and 
what the consequences are to the consumer, to the patient, as well as 
to the taxpayer and to our health care system in general.
  This is a very important debate we are having about health care 
because there is an acute problem. It is a problem that, candidly, this 
Congress has not dealt with. We saw in the debates last night and other 
conversations about the importance of a Patients' Bill of Rights, which 
would have done nothing but add more cost to the health care system. It 
would have caused more uninsured, and that is the term I want to focus 
on today, ``the uninsured.''
  As I travel around Pennsylvania--and I am sure this is true for my 
colleagues as they travel in their States-- what we hear repeatedly is 
the problem of the spiraling cost of health care. A Patients' Bill of 
Rights would have done nothing but add more cost to that system and add 
more to the uninsured problem. What we don't hear are answers from 
Congress on how to deal with the problem of the uninsured.
  We have two Presidential candidates who have laid out a plan to deal 
with this very complex problem. I will say that Senator Judd Gregg 
chaired a task force on our side of the aisle that put forth a variety 
of different proposals to deal with the uninsured because it is a very 
complicated group of people in the sense that there isn't one reason 
people are uninsured. Senator Gregg has given eloquent talks about the 
approach we have offered. But, candidly, we have not moved forward on 
this on either side of the aisle to try to bring it to fruition.
  The Presidential candidates have put forward some ideas. I wanted to 
talk about both of those plans.
  Let me first talk about Senator Kerry's plan. Senator Kerry has 
proposed a plan which, according to the revenue estimates, runs in the 
area of about $1.5 trillion over the next 10 years, $1.5 trillion in 
new spending for tax breaks to provide for the uninsured. What the 
Senator from Massachusetts has suggested is that this $1.5 trillion 
will cover roughly 27 million people who are currently uninsured, which 
would make up a little over half of the uninsured in America. But at a 
cost of $1.5 trillion over 10 years to get someone insured in America, 
one person under his proposal is $5,500 per insured per year--not per 
family, per insured per year, $5,500 in Government subsidies to provide 
for insurance per year. That is a very high-cost way of trying to 
provide insurance.
  On top of that, not only is it a high-cost way, but as you will see 
in a moment, it is a very bureaucratic way. It is a very inefficient 
way, and it is a further Government takeover of the private health care 
system. It federalizes under Medicaid a dramatic expansion of Medicaid 
for a lot of the people who currently are either uninsured or in many 
cases insured by private sector employers.
  I want to talk about the fiscal voodoo that is going on as to how 
this program is going to be paid for, which is one of the many 
proposals that Senator Kerry has put forth in the election. But this is 
by far the most expensive, $1.5 trillion. He says he is going to pay 
for it by repealing the Bush tax cuts.
  As you can see from this chart, the Bush tax cuts, scored over the 
next 10 years, will cost the Treasury $1 trillion. So there is still an 
unaccounted for half a trillion dollars, if we repeal all of them.
  Now, what he has said is he only wants to repeal the ones that are on 
those who make over $200,000. Well, if we go down here and look at what 
is the tax cut for those who make $200,000, it is roughly $612 billion 
over the next 10 years, which is less than half of this $1.5 trillion. 
There is still almost $900 billion in unaccounted-for new spending or 
tax incentives in the Kerry plan that are not paid for. He could add an 
additional $400 billion, roughly, in getting rid of the 10-percent 
bracket and the marriage penalty, the child credit, and the middle-
class rate reductions. We can do that, too. We are still half a 
trillion dollars short.

[[Page 20949]]

  The plan doesn't add up. It adds up to a fiscal disaster. As many 
know, the biggest group of people, as far as percentage, who pay in 
this bracket for which the Senator from Massachusetts wants to 
eliminate this tax reduction is small businesses. These are the job 
creators. He wants to eliminate tax incentives for people in small 
business who are the job creators. He wants to get rid of, I assume, or 
add other taxes on to pay for the additional $900 billion it is going 
to take to pay for this new proposal which spends $5,500 per person to 
provide insurance for them. I would just suggest that that is a very 
costly way.
  Let me contrast that with the President's approach, which does not, 
as Senator Kerry's plan does through his program, displace private 
insurance. What do I mean by that? The reason this costs so much is 
because he is going to be insuring more people than the 27 million in 
his new program, but a lot of those people he is insuring are already 
insured.
  He is going to take them from the private sector and move them to the 
public sector. That is why it costs so much. It is a new publicly borne 
cost that is now a privately borne cost. The taxpayers are going to pay 
for this, as opposed to employers and employees.
  What the President has done is a much smarter, more targeted 
approach. He put together a plan that does not cost $1.5 trillion but 
$129 billion. It spends $1,900 to attract someone who is currently 
uninsured into the new insurance pool that will be created, and it does 
so in a way that doesn't take someone who has insurance and displaces 
them into a public pool, which is what the Kerry plan does. So this is 
a much more commonsense approach, leaving the private insurance market, 
which has served our country so well, in place and not replacing it 
with a public sector plan, but creating incentives through low-income 
tax credits, small employer tax credits, above-the-line deductions, 
some private market reforms, like AHPs and other things, to broaden the 
pool for people to be able to purchase health insurance.
  This will add almost 7 million people to the ranks of the insured 
from the ranks of the uninsured. It does so at a responsible cost, 
something we can likely afford over the next 10 years, as opposed to 
blowing a hole through the deficit. I find it remarkable that we hear 
over and over again from the Senator from Massachusetts about how this 
President has very high deficits, yet we look at a plan here that, 
under the current scenario he proposes, is a $600 billion repeal of 
taxes to pay for a $1.5 trillion program. If you are talking about 
blowing a hole in the deficit, this will do so, and then some; it will 
add about $100 billion in new deficits every year as a result of this 
proposal.
  This is only part of the problem. The other part of the problem is 
how the Kerry plan works. Unlike the Bush plan which, again, doesn't 
displace people from the private sector to the public sector, does not 
cost $5,500 per person to get them into the insured category, Senator 
Kerry's plan is incredibly complicated and promises things he cannot 
deliver. For example, he talks about how he is going to provide the 
same health plan that Members of Congress have, by participating in the 
Federal Employees Health Benefit system. He said that, and then the 
Federal Employees Union got to him and said, whoa, whoa, whoa, you are 
not going to do that; you are not going to put everybody into our 
insurance pools. That is going to drive up the cost of our health care 
dramatically. You can say you are going to give everybody what Members 
of Congress have, but we are going to set up a separate pool.
  So he sets up a separate insurance pool. It is not what Members of 
Congress have. It is something completely different. It sets up this 
insurance pool that people can participate in, but the cost of that 
pool is going to be based on who enrolls in it. So I don't understand 
how that will save any money, because all insurance pools are based on 
who is enrolled in the plan. So there is this idea that somehow or 
other we are going to give you a congressional health care benefit--
which, by the way, is the same as every other Federal employee--for 
nothing, when in fact they are going to get something like a 
congressional health care plan. Let me assure you, it won't be for 
nothing; it will be for a lot of money, in a very complicated way.
  This is a chart that tries to describe how the Kerry plan works from 
the standpoint of the Medicare portion over here, including schools, by 
the way. Schools are going to be responsible for being a social service 
agency and signing up people for Medicaid. Now we talk so much about 
how schools are being asked to do so much more when it comes to 
education. Senator Kerry has another idea for them. They are going to 
take the responsibility for enrolling children into Medicaid as part of 
their responsibilities.
  Over here, you have sort of how we interact with the doctors and the 
hospitals. You have this new agency, the premium rebate pool agency--
not a particularly creative acronym. We have this agency that is going 
to determine what is covered, how much we pay. So you are going to 
have, in a sense, the Federal Government making these decisions as to 
what doctors you see, how much they are going to pay these doctors, 
what is going to be covered by these plans.
  Again, it is not just an expansion of Medicaid, which is very costly, 
and bringing a lot of new people into the Medicaid Program, many of 
whom already have insurance, not only setting up this other plan to 
deal with how we are going to handle the ``private market reforms'' 
Senator Kerry wants to impose to help, in this case, those who are 
high-cost patients in the health care system. So here is the 
congressional health plan, and you have all these different 
organizations, or different functions with new organizations, and some 
are going to be organizations that will have increased responsibility 
to offer this new congressional health plan, which isn't a 
congressional health care plan.
  You have a tax credit idea. It is not simple. In fact, Senator Kerry 
has not been particularly clear about how these tax credits will work. 
He has several of them, not just one. There are four different tax 
credits Senator Kerry is going to put in place here. Here they are. 
This is a very complicated system, and it is an extremely costly 
system, and one that puts more people into Government, less in the 
private sector, and when private sector reforms happen, puts more 
oversight into the Government over the private sector--all at the cost 
of $1.7 trillion.
  This is not the direction we want to take in health care. We don't 
want more Government oversight of the private sector to drive up costs 
in the private sector. We don't want more people from the private 
markets going into the Government pools, and we don't want to create 
the shell game that Senator Kerry is in the area of the new 
congressional health plan, which isn't a congressional health plan.
  The idea of tax credits has some appeal to me. The President's 
proposal is to try to provide tax credits. But this is a very 
complicated plan, and it has not been well spelled out. We worked very 
hard to try to understand it. It is not a very well thought out, 
planned out approach. I suggest this is bad policy. This is complicated 
policy. It is very costly policy. It doesn't deliver to people what has 
been promised. What it does deliver is a big tax bill, or very big 
deficits in the future, neither of which is something we should be 
desirous of here in the Senate.
  With that, I think we have done a pretty good comparison of where the 
President wants to go, which is responsible reform and the 
encouragement of people who do not have insurance to be insured, 
without disrupting the private markets, without increasing the size of 
the Government-run health care plans, and doing so at a responsible 
cost, as opposed to Senator Kerry, who wants to dramatically increase 
Government's role in health care, increase the Government's role in 
overseeing private health care, and play a shell game because it sounds 
good that you are getting congressional health care for nothing, when 
in fact you are not, and for a lot. Again, I will give Senator Kerry 
credit for the tax credit idea,

[[Page 20950]]

but it is very foggy and not particularly well thought out, in my 
opinion. So I think it is a failure on all fronts. It is very 
complicated and will not serve the best interests of the patients in 
America and will not serve the interests of taxpayers in America.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am joined by my colleague, the ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Michigan. This 
is an amendment which we have jointly worked out together.


                    Amendment No. 3875, As Modified

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, from a parliamentary standpoint, I now 
send a modification to amendment No. 3875 to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The amendment (No. 3875), as modified, is as follows:

       On page 210, strike line 23 and insert the following:

     SEC. 336. COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, the National Intelligence Program shall consist of 
     all programs, projects, and activities that are part of the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the effective 
     date of this section.
       (b) Joint Review of Certain Programs.--(1) The National 
     Intelligence Director and the Secretary of Defense shall 
     jointly review the programs, projects, and activities as 
     follows:
       (A) The programs, projects, and activities within the Joint 
     Military Intelligence Program as of the effective date of 
     this section.
       (B) The programs, projects, and activities within the 
     Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program as of 
     the effective date of this section.
       (C) The programs, projects, and activities of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency as of the effective date of this section 
     that support the intelligence staff of the Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence staffs of the unified 
     combatant commands, and the portions of the sensitive 
     compartmented communications systems that support components 
     of the Department of Defense.
       (2) As part of the review under paragraph (1), the Director 
     shall consult with the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (3)(A) The review under paragraph (1) with respect to the 
     programs, projects, and activities referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(C) shall be completed not later than 60 days after the 
     date on which the first individual nominated as National 
     Intelligence Director after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act is confirmed by the Senate.
       (B) Upon completion of the review under paragraph (1) of 
     the programs, projects, and activities referred to in 
     paragraph (1)(C), the Director shall submit to the President 
     recommendations regarding the programs, projects, or 
     activities, if any, referred to in paragraph (1)(C) to be 
     included in the National Intelligence Program, together with 
     any comments that the Secretary of Defense considers 
     appropriate.
       (C) During the period of the review under paragraph (1) of 
     the programs, projects, and activities referred to in 
     paragraph (1)(C), no action shall be taken that would have 
     the effect of prejudicing the outcome of such review.
       (4)(A) The review under paragraph (1) with respect to the 
     programs, projects, and activities referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) shall be completed 
     not later than one year after the effective date of this 
     section.
       (B) Upon completion of the review under paragraph (1) of 
     the programs, projects, and activities referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1), the Director 
     shall submit to the President recommendations regarding the 
     programs, projects, or activities, if any, referred to in 
     such subparagraphs to be included in the National 
     Intelligence Program, together with any comments that the 
     Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

     SEC. 337. GENERAL REFERENCES.

  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I shall be very brief on 
this matter.
  The distinguished manager and comanager have worked with my staff and 
Senator Levin and myself, and we have come to an agreement on this 
issue.
  Again, it is an amendment by myself, Mr. Levin, Mr. Stevens, Mr. 
Inouye, Mr. Allard, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Cornyn, and Mr. Chambliss.
  I start by referring to the 9/11 report. This is a very important 
report which has been a roadmap for so many of the provisions and it is 
a roadmap I have used for this provision.
  I read from page 412:

       The Defense Department's military intelligence programs--
     the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the 
     tactical intelligence and related activities programs 
     (TIARA)--would remain part of that department's 
     responsibility.

  That is the purpose of this amendment. It is to clarify. I think it 
was the intent of the managers all along. They made statements 
comparable to what is in the 9/11 report from which I just quoted and, 
therefore, this amendment would leave in place those programs being 
performed by what we call the combat agencies, largely under a 
contractual relationship, and they would remain in place, but with the 
understanding that upon completion of a review, to be conducted by the 
national intelligence director and the Secretary of Defense, if they 
reach, as is specified under the bill, a joint opinion as to the 
desirability to move them into the national intelligence program, in 
all likelihood that can be achieved.
  I thank the managers. I yield the floor to my distinguished colleague 
from Michigan. I thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Levin, for 
his work on this very important amendment, an aspect of which is 
tailored to meet a concern that the Senator from Michigan has.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my concern about the definition of 
intelligence programs that the budget execution authority would be 
transferred to relates to the definition in the bill that, in turn, 
relates to the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  There are a number of Defense Intelligence Agency programs which, in 
my judgment, should not have their budget execution authority 
transferred to the new national intelligence program. Specifically, 
there are three programs. These are a small set of DIA programs but, 
nonetheless, there are three in particular to which I refer.
  First is the intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second 
is the intelligence staff of the combatant commanders. Third is certain 
sensitive communications systems which support the Department of 
Defense command structure.
  The principal purpose of those programs is to support joint or 
tactical military operations, and I think it would be a mistake to 
transfer the budget execution authority for those three programs to the 
national intelligence director. They are just simply too deeply 
embedded in supporting joint or tactical military operations for that 
to make sense.
  However, rather than trying to resolve that debate here and rather 
than having the bill transfer the budget execution to the national 
intelligence program, what we have arrived at is a compromise which 
does the same thing relative to these programs, as Senator Warner just 
outlined, relative to a number of other programs; that is, we assign 
and task the new national intelligence director and the Secretary of 
Defense to review these DIA programs, then to make a recommendation as 
to where the budget execution ought to rest, whether it should be in 
the national intelligence program or in the Department of Defense, and 
then to make a recommendation to the Office of Management and Budget 
and then to the President who would make the decision on this issue.
  The review would be an expedited review. It would not take more than 
60 days. But it would make it possible to have this decision in review 
based on the facts relating to this program rather than to make an 
abstract judgment about all programs in the Defense Intelligence Agency 
in this bill.
  During this period of review, we have agreed that nothing would be 
done to prejudice the outcome of this review. With the adoption of this 
amendment, assuming it is adopted, then my amendment No. 3810 will be 
withdrawn because that is the purpose of this amendment.
  Again, as I did with another amendment earlier today, I thank the 
managers of the bill for working with us to make this possible. It is a 
very rational approach, as well as a good compromise

[[Page 20951]]

to a very complicated situation. We want to avoid--we want lines to be 
clear, but we do not want them to be arbitrary in a way which will 
force budget execution of programs to be where they logically should 
not be.
  I also thank Senator Warner for his leadership on a very related 
issue. The way in which we have addressed these two issues is similar 
but not exactly the same. It just makes a lot of sense.
  I thank the managers for their willingness to work with us on this 
matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sununu). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague and 
ranking member. Given that the two of us are about to start a hearing 
in 10 minutes, I guess it is best we go to the adoption of the 
amendment, but I yield for any comments the distinguished chairman may 
like to make.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chairman 
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee for working so 
closely with Mr. Lieberman and me on this very important issue to set 
forth a process for determining what intelligence assets belong in the 
NIP, the national intelligence program, versus the joint military 
intelligence program and the tactical program.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director 
strong budgetary authority over the national intelligence program. 
Senator Lieberman and I envision that his program will be composed of 
the intelligence assets that serve national purposes, meaning those 
that pertain to the interests of more than one department.
  In the long run, I strongly believe the budgets for the National 
Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the 
National Reconnaissance Office should be wholly within the national 
intelligence program.
  Currently, these agencies have split budgets, and the heads of these 
agencies tell us that leads to a great deal of administrative 
inefficiency. Now, it is possible that some intelligence assets from 
the Department of Defense's Joint Military Intelligence Program may 
ultimately be moved to the national intelligence program, but, of 
course, military intelligence assets that principally serve joint or 
tactical military needs should stay within the Department of Defense, 
and I think the language is very clear on this point.
  Through this amendment, we have tried to address concerns that both 
Senators have raised. I think the compromise language does address and 
alleviate those concerns. The reviews that are underway will help us 
better define the parts of the intelligence budget that will be 
completed within 1 year after the effective date, in one case 60 days, 
in the case that Senator Levin is concerned with the three activities 
in the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  The reviews mandated in this compromise amendment will provide a 
rational process for determining which assets belong in the national 
intelligence program and which do not. I very much appreciate the 
cooperation of our colleagues, and I do urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment as 
modified. In fact, I know that the chairman and ranking member of the 
Armed Services Committee have to go to a hearing, so that may only 
shorten the praise that I want to offer to them.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator can take his time.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Take my time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I truly thank them for their extraordinary service on 
behalf of our national security generally but also for their work on 
this amendment. We had some very good discussions about this, and I 
never had a moment where I felt they were doing this just to protect 
turf. I know they were pursuing these questions with a genuine interest 
in what would work best for our national security, both the 
intelligence and the military sides of it.
  This is not an uncomplicated problem. We are setting up a national 
intelligence director. We want that person to coordinate the 
intelligence community, and budget authority is a critical part of 
that. Senator Warner is quite right, obviously, in the section that he 
read from the 9/11 Commission Report.
  Interestingly, as my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee 
may remember, when Dr. Zelikow, the chief of staff of the Commission, 
came before our committee, he said they had changed their mind a bit on 
putting the Joint Military Intelligence Program into the Department of 
Defense budget control because of the Commissioners' concern that the 
national intelligence assets--the National Security Agency, Geospatial 
Agency, and Reconnaissance--all have a single budgetary accountability, 
in this case to the national intelligence budget. I believe in the long 
run that is the way it ought to go.
  I must say in my own mind, perhaps simplistically, I always believed 
that what we wanted to do was to say that the national intelligence 
director should have control over the national intelligence budget; 
that the Secretary of Defense should have clear control over TIARA, the 
tactical intelligence budget; and that the Joint Military Intelligence 
Program was somewhere in between. We had to find a rational way to 
decide where authority went.
  I think in some sense what we are saying in this legislation is we 
are not quite ready to make those decisions. So this amendment that we 
agreed to essentially freezes the status quo with regard to the JMIP 
and the particular programs that we discussed in the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, subjects them to review, consideration of all of 
the factors--effectiveness, budgetary authority, all the rest, military 
effectiveness--and then has a decision made ultimately by the Office of 
Management and Budget on recommendation from the national intelligence 
director.
  It is a very strong, balanced, reasonable conclusion which does no 
damage to the basic purpose of this legislation and provides for, 
ultimately, a rational allocation of budget authority in the shared 
interest of our national security, which is, after all, what this is 
all about.
  So this is really what legislating is supposed to be about. I thank 
my colleagues for all the work they and our staffs have done, and I 
move adoption of the modified amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the yeas and nays had been ordered. I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays on this 
amendment be vitiated and that we have a voice vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3875), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I want to thank our colleagues and managers of the bill 
and, as always, thank Senator Warner. The managers have worked so well 
with us, and I want to thank them for that, and also thank them for the 
way they worked with each other.


                     Amendment No. 3810, Withdrawn

  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3810 now be 
withdrawn since that was covered in the amendment which was just 
adopted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alaska.


                    Amendment No. 3827, As Modified

  Mr. STEVENS. I call up amendment No. 3827, and I send to the desk a 
modified version of that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  Mr. STEVENS. I think it is already before the Senate.

[[Page 20952]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has now been modified.
  The amendment (No. 3827), as modified, is as follows:

   (Purpose: To strike section 206, relating to information sharing)

       On page 126, strike lines 23 through 25.
       On page 127, line 1, strike ``(2)'' and insert ``(1)''.
       On page 127, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(2)''.
       On page 128, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the 
     following:
       (3) Environment.--The term ``Environment'' means the 
     Information Sharing Environment as described under subsection 
     (c).
       On page 130, strike line 10 and insert the following:
       (c) Information Sharing Environment.--
       On page 130, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 133, lines 5 and 6, delete ``Director of the Office 
     of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal officer as 
     designated in subsection 206(g)''.
       On page 133, line 10, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 134, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 134, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 135, beginning on line 16, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget shall submit to the President and'' and 
     insert ``the President shall submit''.
       On page 135 strike lines 19 through 22 and insert 
     ``Environment. The enterprise architecture and implementation 
     plan shall be prepared by the principal officer in 
     consultation with the Executive Council and shall include--
     ''.
       On page 135, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 136, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 16, strike ``Network;'' and insert 
     ``Environment; and''.
       On page 137, line 18, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 137, line 21, strike ``that the Director of 
     Management and Budget determines'' and insert ``determined'' 
     and insert a period.
       On page 138, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the 
     following:
       (g) Responsibilities of Executive Council for Information 
     Sharing Environment.--
       On page 138, beginning on line 4, insert ``(1) Not later 
     than 120 days after the date of enactment, with notification 
     to Congress, the President shall designate an individual as 
     the principal officer responsible for information sharing 
     across the Federal government. That individual shall have and 
     exercise governmentwide authority and have management 
     expertise in enterprise architecture, information sharing, 
     and interoperability.''
       On page 138, beginning on line 6, strike ``The Director of 
     Management and Budget'' and insert ``The principal officer 
     designated under this subsection''.
       On page 138, beginning on line 9, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 138, line 21, strike ``to the President and''.
       On page 139, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 140, strike lines 5 through 17.
       On page 140, strike lines 18 and 19 and insert the 
     following:
       (h) Establishment of Executive Council.--
       On page 140, strike line 20 through line 24 and insert 
     ``There is established an Executive Council on information 
     sharing that shall assist the principal officer as designated 
     under subsection 206(g) in the execution of the duties under 
     this Act concerning information sharing.''.
       On page 141, line 1, insert ``The Executive Council shall 
     be chaired by the principal officer as designated in 
     subsection 206(g).''
       On page 141, beginning on line 4, strike ``, who shall 
     serve as the Chairman of the Executive Council''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 2, strike ``assist the 
     Director of Management and Budget in--'' and insert ``assist 
     the President in--''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 4, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, line 12, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 142, beginning on line 15, strike ``Network;'' and 
     insert ``Environment; and''.
       On page 142, strike lines 22 through 24, and insert ``(F) 
     considering input provided by persons from outside the 
     federal government with significant experience and expertise 
     in policy, technical, and operational matters, including 
     issues of security, privacy, or civil liberties.
       On page 143, beginning on line 7, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the 
     Executive Council,'' and insert ``the principal officer as 
     designated in section 206(g)''.
       On page 144, strike line 3 and all that follows through 
     page 145, line 10.
       On page 145 line 11, strike ``(j)'' and insert ``(i)''.
       On page 145, beginning on line 14, strike ``through the 
     Director of Management and Budget'' and insert ``principal 
     officer as designated in section 206(g)''.
       On page 145, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 145, line 21, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 145, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 4, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 146, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 17, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 147, line 22, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 6, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 8, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 17, strike ``(k)'' and insert ``(j)''.
       On page 148, line 20, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 148, line 24, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 5, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 10, strike ``(l)'' and insert ``(k)''.
       On page 149, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, line 14, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 149, beginning on line 14, strike ``the Director of 
     Management and Budget'' and insert ``the principal officer as 
     designated in section 206(g)''.
       On page 149, line 19, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 9, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 13, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 16, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 150, line 18, strike ``(m)'' and insert ``(l)''.
       On page 150, beginning on line 23, strike ``Network'' and 
     insert ``Environment''.
       On page 151, line 2, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 151, line 3, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 7, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 11, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.
       On page 152, line 19, strike ``(n)'' and insert ``(m)''.
       On page 152, beginning on line 21, strike ``to the Director 
     of Management and Budget''.
       On page 153, line 1, strike ``Network'' and insert 
     ``Environment''.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I again thank the managers of the bill, 
Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman and their staffs, for working 
with us on this amendment. That amendment has now been modified, and I 
think it meets the objections or the reservations that were set forth 
by the administration Statement of Position, the so-called SAP, that we 
received on this bill.
  It has been modified to make certain that the President will have the 
authority to designate an entity. We all agree, we hope, that he will 
not delegate this matter to the national intelligence director. I think 
it is a function that is essential to carry out the purposes of this 
bill. Therefore, I am offering the modified amendment.
  I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, as modified, be 
considered and adopted, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the 
table.

[[Page 20953]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered. The amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3827), as modified, was agreed to.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                     Amendment No. 3839, Withdrawn

  Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3839 be 
withdrawn from consideration. I am still sad about the vote that was 
against the position I supported with regard to disclosing the 
aggregated top line of intelligence. I hope before we are through with 
this bill that we will find some way to accommodate some of the 
reservations I have about that process, but in any event I withdraw the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I say to the two Senators, it is my 
intention now to support this bill. I congratulate them for listening 
to us. Sometimes I have raised my voice. One newspaper said I shouted 
at the distinguished Senator from Maine. That is just my trial lawyer 
voice, and I apologize for it.
  I do thank the Senator for her courtesy and apologize if I have been 
mistaken in terms of the tone of my voice, but that is my voice. I 
cannot do much about it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Alaska 
for his cooperation and his many helpful suggestions for improving this 
bill. I have great affection and respect for the senior Senator. I very 
much appreciate the fact that he is going to support this bill on final 
passage. That means a great deal to me and will certainly assist us. I 
look forward to continuing to consult with him as we move through the 
conference process, and I will tell the senior Senator from Alaska that 
I am very relieved today to see that he is not wearing his ``Incredible 
Hulk'' tie but, rather, a very restrained tie from some national 
museum, I believe. I know that bodes well for the day ending well. 
Again, I thank the Senator. I very much enjoy working with him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am delighted that we have reached a 
meeting of the minds on the information-sharing part of the bill, which 
preserves intact the considerable reforms that are called for which 
will protect our national security, as advanced by Senator Durbin, but 
also quite appropriately embrace the concerns that Senator Stevens and 
the administration had as to who would be in charge of this 
transformation.
  Second, I grew up in a family where if you were not passionate and 
didn't raise your voice about things that mattered to you, it was 
thought that something was wrong. I also want to make clear that when 
you raised your voice the other day, I did not think you were only 
shouting at the Senator from Maine, I thought that I was also included 
as a recipient.
  Look, it reminds me of the old Teddy Roosevelt line about being in 
the arena, not standing on the side reading a newspaper but getting 
into the arena and fighting with all your heart for what you believe 
in. I admire the Senator greatly for doing that. I would much rather 
have him on my side rather than against me, and that is why I am 
particularly thrilled to hear the announcement of the Senator from 
Alaska that he will support this measure as amended.
  I thank him and I yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have spoken just now with the two managers 
of the bill. There is not going to be a vote in the immediate future. 
As the record indicates, this legislation has to be completed by 4:30, 
so final passage certainly will take place at 4:30. There may be an 
amendment or two before that time, but there is nothing right now. If 
people are on their way over, they should turn around and go back. 
There probably won't be anything, probably within the next hour.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, of all the testimony presented to the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs during our eight hearings on the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission perhaps none was more powerful 
than that of Mary Fetchet. Her son, Brad, died in the World Trade 
Center on September 11. Here are a few of her words.
  She said:

       When American lives are at stake, indifference or inertia 
     is unacceptable. When critical reforms are implemented to 
     make our country safer, I will know that neither Brad's life 
     nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on 
     September 11 were lost in vain.

  Throughout this debate it has been the families of the victims of 9/
11 who have reminded us of why we are here and why these reforms are so 
important.
  In passing the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004--as I believe 
we will later this afternoon--the Senate will reject indifference and 
inertia. We will endure critical reforms to make our country safer. We 
will declare that the lives lost to terrorism were not lost in vain. 
The action we take in their memory will benefit people of good will in 
this country and throughout the world today and for many years to come.
  This legislation will make the most sweeping changes in our 
intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It is the result of 
enormous effort. The issues are complex and many. The timetable was 
tight, but the stakes were so high and the times so dangerous that we 
simply could not delay this urgent task. Now we are on the threshold of 
getting the job done and getting it done right.
  I am deeply grateful to my good friend Senator Lieberman. This 
legislation would not have been possible without his tireless effort 
and his bipartisan spirit. From the moment we were first assigned the 
task of developing this legislation on July 22nd, our fellow members of 
the Governmental Affairs Committee dug in with energy and intellect. I 
am grateful to the Presiding Officer as one of the committee members 
for his contributions. It was an August recess we will never forget.
  We are very grateful to the leaders of the Senate. Senator Frist and 
Senator Daschle had the confidence in our committee that they felt they 
could charge us with this enormous and critical undertaking.
  Our whips, Senator Reid and Senator McConnell, have also been very 
helpful. Senator Reid has been a constant presence in the Chamber 
throughout this debate.
  We could not have accomplished all that we did without our dedicated 
staff, led by Michael Bopp and Joyce Rechtschaffen. We have worked so 
closely with them. We have worked arm in arm. They have literally 
worked day and night to produce this bill. I am so proud of their 
extraordinary efforts.
  Our staffs were supplemented by hard-working detailees from the CIA, 
the DIA, and other agencies, as well as by members of the Commission 
staff who, rather than going back to their previous jobs and lives, 
worked with us on the committee to help give the benefit of their 
expertise. Without the efforts of all these staff members we never 
could have gotten the job done. I am very grateful to all of them.
  This legislation, however, is not merely the result of months of 
extraordinary effort by our committee or of the expert and insightful 
testimony we heard from more than two dozen witnesses at eight 
hearings. Rather, it builds upon a rock-solid foundation

[[Page 20954]]

laid by the 9/11 Commission and the investigation that it conducted 
over 20 months, including 19 days of hearings with 160 witnesses. I 
thank all Commission members for all of their extraordinary effort.
  The need for reform in our intelligence system was not, however, 
suddenly revealed in hearings spurred by one catastrophic failure 3 
years ago. The failures that led to that day are numerous and reach 
back many years. They were overlooked in terrorist attack after 
terrorist attack for more than a decade. The call for reform was made 
in studies, commission reports, and legislation going back half a 
century. It is a call we can no longer ignore.
  Our committee was guided by clear principles. An intelligence 
community designed for the Cold War must be transformed into one 
designed to win the war against global terrorism and future national 
security threats. The new structure must build upon the strengths of 
the old and recognize the considerable improvements made since 
September 11.
  The unique experience, expertise, and viewpoints of the 15 agencies 
that comprise our intelligence community are assets that must be 
preserved. The barriers to information sharing, cooperation, and 
coordination within the community, what the 9/11 Commission calls 
stovepipes, must be demolished. In their place must come a structure 
with the agility the times and the threats demand--not another layer of 
bureaucracy.
  We were determined, in crafting this new structure, that we not 
infringe upon the freedoms that define us as Americans. The legislation 
that came out of our committee by a unanimous vote adhered to these 
important principles and it has been strengthened by the vigorous 
debate we have had in the Senate during the past week. The debate has 
not merely been vigorous but also highly informed. Throughout these 
proceedings, it has been clear the commitment that drove our committee 
to act is shared by the full Senate. From the authorities of the 
national intelligence director to the structure of our transformed 
intelligence community to the protection of civil liberties, many 
critical issues have been raised, debated, and resolved. I particularly 
thank the members of the Committee on Armed Services, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and the Appropriations Committee, 
particularly their chairs and ranking members. Their knowledge and 
their input have been invaluable.
  Many important issues have been raised and will be resolved as this 
transformation continues. One of the most remarkable aspects of this 
debate has been the widespread recognition that intelligence reform is 
not a single act but an ongoing process.
  The fundamental obligation of government is to protect its citizens 
and those protections must evolve to meet new threats. This legislation 
brings about much-needed reforms and it creates an environment in which 
this ongoing process can continue.
  I began these remarks with a quote from a mother who has suffered the 
worst loss any parent can endure. She turned her loss into positive 
advocacy. It is Senator Byrd, however, who inspires me to end these 
remarks with a quote from the Constitution.

       To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
     domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote 
     the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
     ourselves and our Posterity . . .

  The opening lines of our Constitution provide, in some ways, a job 
description of America's Government that is a miracle of clarity as 
well as an awesome challenge. Rarely does one piece of legislation 
encompass all of its elements or do we have the opportunity to do so in 
a way that clearly demonstrates the spirit that animates it. This is 
one of those rare times. Let us do what the times demand. Let us act to 
approve this legislation this afternoon and by doing so make our 
country safer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Has the Senator from Maine completed her statement?
  Ms. COLLINS. Yes.


                    Amendment No. 3915, As Modified

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, after 9/11, there was broad agreement that 
the absence of an accurate, reliable, and comprehensive terrorist watch 
list was a serious deficiency. Unfortunately, 3 years later, we still 
have not accomplished this important task.
  My amendment, which has been modified to reach an agreement with 
Senators Collins and Lieberman, addresses this deficiency. It requires 
a report to Congress on the watch list, specifically on the standards 
in place to ensure we have a list that is reliable and accurate, and 
that we have procedures for determining threat levels and the 
consequences to listed individuals. It also mandates a process for 
individuals erroneously listed on the ``Automatic Selectee'' and ``No-
Fly'' lists to have their names removed. Finally, it would require an 
assessment of the privacy and civil liberty implications of using these 
lists. It is critical that we have a complete, accurate and 
consolidated watch list, but we also need to be mindful of our 
liberties in the process.
  We know that one of the most senior and respected Members of this 
Senate who for decades has taken the same flight was told he could not 
board because he was, apparently, on some kind of terrorist list. They 
said: Of course, it is an obvious error, and we will get it cleared up. 
But repeatedly when he tried to get on the same plane, he was 
continually stopped.
  Now, as a Member of the Senate, after six or seven times of this 
happening, and after calls from the White House, the head of Homeland 
Security and others, the problem was finally corrected. Can you imagine 
what it is like if you are Jane Smith or John Jones from a small town 
somewhere in this country, but you have to travel on business and your 
name is there, and you lose important clients, you lose important 
business, or you are unable to get home to visit a friend or a family 
member, and you probably cannot pick up the phone and call the White 
House and say, ``Look, this is the sixth or seventh time I have been 
mistakenly barred from traveling. Please fix it''?
  Now, there are other concerns I would like to have addressed, but 
this modified version reflects the agreement with Senators Collins and 
Lieberman.
  Mr. President, I believe the modified amendment is at the desk, and I 
ask unanimous consent it be in order to call up my amendment No. 3915 
and that it be so modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The amendment, (No. 3915) as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. TERRORIST WATCH LISTS

       (a) Criteria for Watch List.--The National Intelligence 
     Director of the United States, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and 
     the Attorney General, shall report to Congress on the 
     criteria for placing individuals on the Terrorist Screening 
     Center consolidated screening watch list, including minimum 
     standards for reliability and accuracy of identifying 
     information, the degree of information certainty and the 
     range of threat levels that the individual poses, and the 
     range of applicable consequences that apply to the person if 
     located. To the greatest extent consistent with the 
     protection of law enforcement sensitive information, 
     classified information, and applicable law, the report shall 
     be in unclassified form and available to the public, with a 
     classified annex where necessary.
       (b) Safeguards Against Erroneous Listings.--The Secretary 
     of Homeland Security shall establish a process for 
     individuals to challenge ``Automatic Selectee'' or ``No Fly'' 
     designations on the applicable lists as maintained by the 
     Transportation Security Administration and have their names 
     removed from such lists, if erroneously present.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Department of Homeland Security 
     Privacy Officer shall submit a report assessing the impact of 
     the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' lists on privacy 
     and civil liberties to the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
     Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on 
     Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Government 
     Reform, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
     and the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives. The report shall include any recommendations 
     for practices, procedures, regulations, or legislation

[[Page 20955]]

     to eliminate or minimize adverse effects of such lists on 
     privacy, discrimination, due process and other civil 
     liberties, as well as the implications of applying those 
     lists to other modes of transportation. In its analysis, the 
     report shall also consider the effect these recommendations 
     would have on the ability of such lists to protect the United 
     States against terrorist attacks. To the greatest extent 
     consistent with the protection of law enforcement sensitive 
     information, classified information, and applicable law, the 
     report shall be in unclassified form and available to the 
     public, with a classified annex where necessary.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall become 
     effective on the date of enactment of this Act.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Leahy for working with 
Senator Lieberman and me on his amendment. It requires two reports 
related to watch lists: one on the criteria for listing a name on the 
Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list, and another on 
the effect of the ``automatic selectee'' and ``no-fly'' lists on 
privacy and civil liberties.
  We worked with him to incorporate some modifications that make the 
amendment acceptable to the two managers and incorporate some 
recommendations from the administration.
  I am well aware of some of the problems with the watch list. A 
constituent of mine from Camden, ME, a retired physician, has the 
misfortune to have a name that is identical to a name that is on the 
watch list. Every time he flies, he encounters great difficulties. I 
believe the Senator's amendment will help to address that.
  It is important to ensure we are safe and that those who want to do 
us harm do not have access to aircraft. But at the same time we want to 
make sure that law-abiding travelers are not impeded from conducting 
their travels simply because they have the misfortune to share a name 
with someone on the watch list.
  The process required by the Senator, I think, will be helpful. I urge 
adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 3915), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, first, I thank the distinguished chair of 
the committee for her cooperation and help, and also commend her and 
her distinguished ranking member for moving this far along.


                    Amendment No. 3916, As Modified

  Mr. President, a major weakness uncovered after 9/11 was the failure 
of Government agencies to share information with one another. The 9/11 
Commission recommended a government-wide information system to ensure 
that we connect the dots. The Commission also recommended that the 
``[p]rotection of privacy rights should be one key element'' of 
implementing the system. Given the sweeping powers that Congress is 
about to grant for building an information sharing system, we have to 
protect the privacy and civil liberties of the American people.
  After all, we fought a Revolution to guarantee our privacy. The 
distinguished Presiding Officer and the distinguished chair know, 
because they come from New England, that the Revolution was fought on 
our soil.
  We all agree we must maximize this information, but we must also 
maximize the protection of personal information. And we need assurances 
that private information will be protected before we build the system, 
not after. We certainly do not want to repeat what happened with CAPPS 
II, when $100 million of taxpayer money was spent on deploying a system 
that then subsequently collapsed because we failed to adequately 
account for civil liberties and privacy concerns.
  My amendment, which has been modified to reach an agreement with 
Senators Collins and Lieberman, would require that we take advantage of 
available privacy-enhancing technology that would prevent unauthorized 
dissemination of information. It also requires the Administration to 
fulfill its obligations to report to Congress on plans for the network 
before spending funds to build it. This oversight is critical to 
ensuring the network maximizes security while balancing civil liberties 
and privacy.
  Senators Collins and Lieberman have agreed to accept this important 
amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up 
amendment No. 3916, and that it be modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
  Without objection, the amendment is so modified.
  The amendment, No. 3916, as modified, is as follows:

       On page 132, line 23, strike ``and''.
       On page 133, line 3, strike the period and insert ``; 
     and''.
       On page 133, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
       (L) utilizing privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize 
     the inappropriate dissemination and disclosure of personally 
     identifiable information.
       On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
       (o) Limitation on Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section, none of the funds provided 
     pursuant to subsection (n) may be obligated for deployment or 
     implementation of the Network unless the guidelines and 
     requirements under subsection (e) are submitted to Congress.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand there is no objection to this 
amendment from the managers of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, again, I thank Senator Leahy for 
modifying his amendment to address concerns that the manager raised. I 
have no objection to the modified amendment, and I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified.
  The amendment (No. 3916), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                      Amendment No. 3913 Withdrawn

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I have an amendment No. 3913, which I will 
soon withdraw. It is on the subpoena powers of the civil liberties 
board created in this bill.
  We have worked hard to strengthen the powers of the board both at the 
committee level and then here on the floor, and I believe we have made 
great progress. We added teeth to this oversight body and fought 
against efforts to weaken it.
  I think the goal of this amendment, which is to give the board 
enforcement power for its subpoena authority, is an important one. 
However, in order to expedite the passage of this bill, I will withdraw 
the amendment now. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this 
important issue next year. But I also understand the need to expedite 
the passage of this bill. There may be another time to bring this up. I 
will withdraw the amendment now, though I look forward to working with 
my colleagues on the issue next year.
  I withdraw the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont for his 
cooperation on that last issue. As I have explained to my colleagues, 
the bill strikes a very delicate balance on the civil liberties board's 
power, and there were amendments to strengthen it as well as amendments 
to weaken it. I appreciate my colleagues' cooperation on both sides of 
the aisle. I am sure there will be more discussion of this issue as we 
go along.

[[Page 20956]]

  I thank the Senator from Vermont and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                      Consolidation of Amendments

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in 
order for previously agreed upon amendments, which I will list, to be 
consolidated into one title under the heading: ``9/11 Commission Report 
Implementation Act,'' with a short title section (a), short title: This 
act may be cited as the ``9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 
2004.''
  The amendments should be included in this order: No. 3942, No. 3807, 
No. 3702, No. 3774, No. 3705, No. 3766, No. 3806.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for up to 30 minutes and have that time allotted 
against my 1 hour postcloture.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, will the 
Senator from Michigan inform me whether her statement is going to be 
germane to the bill as is required in the postcloture situation?
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I will ask to speak as in morning 
business using this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will not object because I am aware that 
the Senator could speak for up to an hour under the cloture rules, 
although I remind the Senator that she could not speak on the subject 
about which she appears to be ready to speak. But in the interest of 
moving forward, and since there have been others today who have also 
spoken as in morning business, I will not object. I do think it is 
unfortunate, however.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Stabenow are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to commend my colleagues on 
the adoption of amendment No. 3765 to S. 2845, the National 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which will create an Office of 
Geospatial Management within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS.
  This amendment originated as a stand alone bill, S. 1230, which was 
introduced by Senator Allard and amended by Senators Collins, 
Lieberman, and myself in a Governmental Affairs Committee business 
meeting. I thank Senator Allard, who shares my interest in geospatial 
information sharing, for offering this amendment, as well as Senators 
Collins and Lieberman for their continued support on this issue.
  Much of the discussion that has grown from the 9/11 Commission report 
has centered around the institutional stovepipes that impede 
information sharing within the Government, which is why this amendment 
is so important. While the term ``geospatial'' is foreign to many, the 
tools it describes are relied upon by all. The 9/11 Commission 
recommended that the President ``lead a government-wide effort to bring 
major national security institutions into the information revolution.'' 
Geospatial coordination is a critical component of that effort.
  Geospatial technologies, such as satellite imagery and aerial 
photography, provide data that create the maps and charts that can help 
prevent a disaster from occurring or lessen the impact of an 
unforeseeable event by equipping first responders with up-to-date 
information. In the event of a terrorist chemical attack, knowing which 
way a contaminated plume will travel can save lives. Similarly, the 
damage of a natural disaster, such as a wildfire, can be lessened by 
maps that help predict which areas will be in the path of the blaze.
  All levels of government are more effective and efficient when 
employing geospatial technology, especially in the area of homeland 
security. According to DHS, geospatial information is used for 
intelligence, law enforcement, first response, disaster recovery, and 
agency management--virtually every function of the Department.
  When the Department was created in 2003, it brought together 
components from 22 separate agencies, each of which managed its 
geospatial needs independently. In the past year, the Department has 
encountered significant difficulties integrating personnel, financial 
systems, and computer systems from the legacy agencies. Geospatial 
information has been no different.
  A September 2004 Government Accountability Office, GAO, report 
entitled ``Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure 
Effective Port Security Assessment Program,'' found that the 
development of a geographic information system, GIS--GIS is often used 
as a synonym for geospatial to map the Nation's most strategic ports 
would greatly benefit the Coast Guard as it implements the Port 
Security Assessment Program. A GIS would integrate all security 
information pertaining to one port into a single database so that it is 
easily accessible and can be frequently updated. In addition, it would 
give the Coast Guard the ability to visually map a port so that it can 
quickly identify the location and surrounding environment of an at-risk 
container before deploying a response team, for example.
  However, GAO also found that:

       The Coast Guard lacks a strategy that clearly defines how 
     the (GIS) program will be managed, how much it will cost, or 
     what activities will continue over the long term.

  The legacy agencies that make up DHS had traditionally managed their 
own geospatial procurement. But many of the homeland and non-homeland 
security missions of DHS complement each other. Sharing maps and data 
reduces redundancy, provides savings, and ensures better information 
for disaster response.
  Currently, the DHS Chief Information Officer, CIO, is working to 
break down this geospatial stovepiping within the Department by naming 
a Geospatial Information Officer. However, there is no single office in 
DHS officially responsible for geospatial management and, therefore, no 
corresponding budget. In the present structure, the Geospatial 
Information Officer does not have the authority to compel the five DHS 
directorates to cooperate with his efforts. The entire agency should 
make geospatial coordination a priority.
  A geospatial management office needs to be created and codified 
within DHS. A congressionally mandated office would give the Geospatial 
Information Officer more authority with which to do this job.
  The Office of Geospatial Management has the potential to 
significantly increase the quality of the resources homeland security 
officials rely on by reducing redundancy and improving the quality of 
geospatial procurement. But in order to do this it needs authority and 
funding.
  This office would also serve as a mechanism for coordinating with 
State and local authorities. Much of the geospatial information 
available today is created at the State and local levels. Centralizing 
this information will make it more widely available to first responders 
and other homeland security officials.

[[Page 20957]]

  In order to facilitate this process, it is also important that local 
governments initiate their own coordination efforts. In June 2003, the 
city of Honolulu conducted a pilot program to foster geospatial 
coordination and collaboration among public and private stakeholders in 
critical infrastructure protection. Representatives from local and 
State government, utility companies, and other private organizations 
came together to identify potential impediments to geospatial 
information sharing in Honolulu and to develop a plan to circumvent 
those impediments. I commend the government of the City and County of 
Honolulu for hosting such an exemplary event. This sort of commitment 
at a local level is crucial to breaking down the geospatial stovepipes 
that exist at all levels of government. I hope other cities will follow 
suit.
  This amendment will help DHS to better coordinate its activities, and 
will ultimately make our Nation safer and prevent duplicative spending. 
I appreciate my colleagues' endorsement of this important issue, and 
urge that this language be maintained in the final version of the 
intelligence reorganization bill that is sent to the President.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I strongly support the intelligence 
reform bill now before the Senate, and I will vote for it.
  The 9/11 Commission worked incredibly hard in a bipartisan manner to 
identify how to better protect our country from terrorism. They have 
given us a roadmap to protect our people, and we should move forward 
with it promptly.
  In their report, the commissioners said we need clear direction for 
our country's intelligence community. They stressed better coordination 
as a key area where we can make the greatest difference. The bill on 
the floor does that, it has bipartisan support, and we should move it 
forward.
  As a member of both the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee 
and the Senate's 9/11 Working Group, I have looked closely at these 
challenges. And over the past few years, I have worked closely with the 
Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, FBI, TSA, 
Border Patrol, as well as the National Guard and local law enforcement 
throughout Washington State. Through our work together, I have learned 
first hand the difficulties they face every day in defending our 
country.
  I especially want to commend the September 11 families who bravely 
stood up and spoke out. They forced our government to fully examine the 
terrorist attacks and to find ways to make our people safer. Their 
brave advocacy has made a difference.
  Mr. President, this is an important step toward achieving a truly 
integrated national effort in the global war on terror. I am proud to 
support it.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S.2845, the 
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. The bill before us today is 
the result of tireless work by the Government Affairs Committee and its 
able chair and ranking member. It also reflects intensive consideration 
by other committees with jurisdiction over issues addressed in the 
bill, including the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees of which I 
am a member. The bill makes some important changes in the way our 
intelligence community is managed. It is a bipartisan bill which 
strikes a balance between ensuring that we have a strong national 
intelligence director, on the one hand, and that we meet the 
intelligence needs of the agencies which house our intelligence 
collection systems, on the other.
  The 9/11 Commission threw down the gauntlet when it released its 
final report, calling on Congress and the President to enact meaningful 
reforms that will help prevent future catastrophic terrorist acts. In 
painstaking detail, the commission made clear how the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, took place and how our government struggled to 
respond. They then made 41 distinct recommendations across a wide range 
of policy areas creating a framework for our efforts. We have a 
responsibility to enact as many of these recommendations as feasible. 
With the threat of terrorism still high, we must have the best 
intelligence at our fingertips, a robust law enforcement effort, and an 
effective homeland defense if we are to foil future catastrophic terror 
attacks.
  S. 2845 is an important first step. I believe the reforms in this 
bill fully implement the commission's recommendations on the need for a 
more unified intelligence effort. They address the lack of intelligence 
sharing among the 15 agencies which make up our intelligence community. 
Recognizing the limitations of the Director of Central Intelligence, 
who technically has the authority to manage all our intelligence 
resources, the bill centralizes the management and coordination of 
intelligence agencies by creating a national intelligence director or 
NID who has strong budgetary and personnel powers. The NID will also 
have the authority to create uniform classification standards and to 
set collection priorities. Yet the bill leaves the intelligence 
resources of each agency within their existing organizations so those 
agencies can effectively and efficiently meet their intelligence 
collection needs, so military operations and readiness are not 
compromised, and so we can maintain the diversity of views critical to 
sound intelligence analysis.
  Beyond a more unified approach to intelligence collection and 
analysis, the Commission called for a more integrated response to our 
enemies. As the Commission noted, our bulky national security 
institutions are still structured to respond to the Cold War. In 
retrospect, it is no surprise that they were unable to respond to a 
non-state terrorist network. By unifying the intelligence resources 
dispersed across the government, we are striving to create a more 
nimble intelligence apparatus that can lead our response to these non-
traditional threats. To that end, this bill enacts the Commission's 
recommendation to establish a civilian-led joint command for 
counterterrorism--a National counterterrorism Center--to act on joint 
intelligence by integrating civilian and military counterterrorism 
efforts across the government and to serve as the President's principal 
advisor on joint operations. The NCTC will help address many of the 
operational shortcomings identified in the 9/11 Commission report.
  Intelligence reform is an important bulwark in the war on terror but 
it is not our only line of defense. Even if the intelligence reforms in 
this bill were in place before 9/11, they would not guarantee that the 
events of that fateful day could have been averted. That is why I 
supported the McCain transportation security and the Hutchison cargo 
security amendments. These amendments direct TSA to produce a national 
transportation strategy, to implement a system for comparing names of 
air passengers against the consolidated terrorist watch lists, to 
screen all air passengers and their carry-on bags for explosives, and 
to set up a system to screen air cargo. And I am pleased that we have 
accepted amendments that address the role of diplomacy, foreign aid, 
and the military in the war on terrorism. The 9/11 Commission 
recommendations in these areas have not received nearly as much 
attention as the recommendations relating to intelligence reform. I 
hope that we address these recommendations more fully in the next 
Congress. We must act broadly and on many fronts to put an end to the 
threat posed by al-Qaida and those who subscribe to its ideology.
  As we work to bolster our national preparedness in areas of border 
security and emergency preparedness, we must balance the privacy and 
civil liberties of individuals against our national security 
requirements. While some have suggested otherwise, these principles are 
not mutually exclusive, and I strongly believe that we can preserve 
both. S.2485 recognizes the importance of individual rights by creating 
a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. By providing the Civil 
Liberties Board with appropriate authority, the legislation ensures 
that its members will have access to the information they need to 
provide informed advice to the Executive Branch, Congress, and the 
American public as to how we can best protect privacy without 
compromising security.

[[Page 20958]]

  As we complete action on this bill, we are reminded of the deep sense 
of urgency that pervades our work. I appreciate that there are some in 
this body who wish we had taken a slower approach. Last month, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee held hearings on the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations with a particular focus on intelligence reform. 
Witnesses, including Dr. Henry Kissinger, raised concerns, some of 
which have been addressed in amendments. The general sentiment of those 
hearings, however, was that we should approach intelligence reform much 
more gingerly. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time. Many 
of the reforms we enact today are based on recommendations that were 
made by previous commissions. These are not new ideas that require more 
study. The 9/11 Commission did us a tremendous service by creating a 
framework for action and by galvanizing the political will to enact 
these needed reforms.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to hail the bipartisan spirit in which 
this bill was crafted. For too long, Congress has ignored the views of 
the minority at its peril. We have budget resolutions that represent 
the priorities of just one party and conference committees that do the 
same. It is impossible to address the problems of the day unless we put 
our differences aside to work on real solutions that have broad 
support. This intelligence reform bill is an important reminder of how 
much more we could accomplish if we would just work together. I want to 
urge my colleagues who will serve on the conference committee to 
maintain the bipartisan spirit in which this bill has been considered 
in the Senate. When the final version of this bill comes before the 
Senate, it should not go beyond the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission in its scope, and it should not include partisan provisions 
that jeopardize passing meaningful reform in this Congress.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss this body's efforts 
to reform the U.S. intelligence community.
  My distinguished colleagues from Maine and Connecticut have worked 
hard to develop legislation to address some of the executive branch 
structural reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission. To be sure, 
there is a need to change, the way we do business if we are to 
effectively battle terrorist organizations, like al-Qaida, and protect 
the American people from another devastating terrorist attack. But I 
believe that many provisions of the bill before us are tackling the 
problem from the wrong angle.
  I think it is important that we move forward with deliberate speed. 
Past efforts, like the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, should set an 
example. That overhaul of the Defense Department took several years 
from start to finish. It was a huge undertaking, as is our current 
effort to reform the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission did a 
good job of cataloguing and critiquing the failures of 9/11--I believe 
it spent some 18 months on that effort. But it spent far less time 
developing the recommendations to solve the problems. We are now acting 
on those recommendations over a period of less than 2 weeks on the 
Senate floor. It is important to ask whether, in the middle of a war, 
it is wise to attempt such a fundamental reorganization with a deadline 
of October 8 for Senate consideration, a conference and then adoption 
of a conference report.
  Nevertheless, I will support moving this legislation forward, as the 
President has strongly urged us to do, so that we may try to resolve 
outstanding issues in the Senate-House conference committee. As 
Congress prepares its final intelligence reform bill to be sent to the 
President, we must be especially careful to do no harm. I will continue 
to press the issues about which I am concerned during the conference.
  Today I plan to discuss: No. 1, how the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations fail to thoroughly address the problems it identified; 
No. 2, deficiencies in the Governmental Affairs Committee proposal; and 
No. 3, what I think we should be doing instead--focusing on 
intelligence community reform, instead of just reorganization. I will 
also touch very briefly on two additional areas in which I had proposed 
amendments: visa reform, and tools and resources for fighting terror.
  Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger identified one of the 
key problems with the 9/11 Commission recommendations:

       [The Commission] has . . . proposed a substantial 
     reorganization of the intelligence community--changes that do 
     not logically flow from the problems that the Commission 
     identified in its narrative.

  The Commission identified four categories of failures by the U.S. 
Government that ultimately led to the attacks of September 11, 2001: 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. After reviewing the 
9/11 Commission's narrative of these failures and studying its 41 
recommendations to prevent future such failures, I am hard pressed to 
see what most of the recommendations have to do with the problems 
identified.
  I will briefly touch on each of these broad problems identified by 
the Commission and assess how they will be addressed by both the 
Commission and later the Senate's legislation.
  First, lack of imagination. I agree that this problem was a 
significant contributor not only to the failure of intelligence 
community to predict the 9/11 attacks, but also the vast majority of 
the intelligence failures that have plagued our intelligence community 
over the past 20 years. A lack of imagination is simply an extension of 
the much broader and more pervasive cultural problems such as risk 
aversion, group think and a lack of competitive analysis that continue 
to hamper our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. I will deal 
with these problems in more detail later; but it is clear that none of 
the Commission's recommendations or this bill's provisions begin to 
address this culture problem; and, in fact, one recommendation could 
substantially increase risk aversion, a problem exacerbated by the 
bill's redundant provisions piling on layers of civil liberties and 
privacy review.
  The Commission itself notes that ``Imagination is not a gift usually 
associated with bureaucracies,'' and so it is ironic that Commission 
proposes to create an even more bureaucratic intelligence structure. 
Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton contend that an empowered NID 
will foster competitive analysis and quash group think because that 
individual will draw on the perspectives of all the intelligence 
agencies, rather than just the CIA, as the DCI is now more likely to 
do.
  But a convincing case can be made that the creation of national 
intelligence director with budgetary authority over most of the 
intelligence community could actually exacerbate the community's lack 
of imagination. Under such a centralized system, it is far more likely 
that agencies, like DHS's Information Analysis office, will be inclined 
to provide a commonly accepted view because the NID will control their 
budgets. As such, they will lack the protection that their previous 
patron--the Department of Homeland Security, in this case--provided 
them. Risk aversion and group think are, therefore, likely to become 
even more widespread problems.
  The second failure identified by the Commission is one of policy. 
Here the report faults not the intelligence community, but political 
leaders, including Members of Congress, for failing to act even when 
there was a clear threat. Terrorists had demonstrated time and time 
again that they were at war with us: in 1993 at the World Trade Center; 
in 1995 at a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia; in 1998 at the 
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and in 2000 with the bombing of 
the USS Cole. Almost a decade of attacks resulted in little more than a 
single cruise missile strike that destroyed a pharmaceutical plant.
  This failure of decisionmaking really calls for a fix that can't be 
legislated--good leadership.
  The Commission makes a number of related recommendations on how to 
fight the war on terror, with the goal of making another attack less 
likely. These range from the obvious, ``make a long-term commitment to 
Afghanistan,'' to the irrelevant and unwise, declassifying the overall 
intelligence

[[Page 20959]]

 budget. On the whole, however, most of recommendations are already 
being implemented in some fashion, and have been underway since shortly 
after the attacks. I commend to my colleagues a fact sheet prepared by 
the White House detailing its implementation of the majority of the 9/
11 Commission's recommendation.
  On a more specific level, one area where not enough work has been 
done is that of terrorists' travel. The Commission correctly identifies 
the importance of the problem arguing, ``[f]or terrorists, travel 
documents are as important as weapons,'' and I am, therefore, surprised 
that the Commission and the committee have decided to put that issue on 
the backburner. I will return to this issue in more detail shortly, but 
it is one area where Congress can make an important contribution to 
U.S. security and we should not abdicate that responsibility.
  The third failure is one of capabilities. It is here that the 9/11 
Commission highlights numerous glaring weaknesses in how the 
intelligence community shared information, prepared for potential 
attacks and planned for U.S. responses. The Commission recommends 
improvements in information sharing and the parts of this legislation 
that seek to implement these are important.
  Regardless of how we ultimately decide to organize the intelligence 
community, it is important that we improve and streamline information 
sharing. Congress has already taken some important steps toward that 
objective. For example, the PATRIOT Act, enacted shortly after the 
September 11 attacks, improved information sharing by breaking down 
legal barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, but it is 
clear we will not be able to make the Patriot Act provisions permanent 
in this bill.
  Unfortunately, the 9/11 Commission overlooks the fact that solving 
the capabilities problem requires far more than just improving the 
sharing of information. The problem extends beyond what intelligence is 
available to an analyst at any given time. The 9/11 Commission, the 
Joint House-Senate Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, and the recently 
completed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation into 
pre-war intelligence on Iraq all point to far deeper deficiencies. They 
identify core cultural problems. Indeed, too often the right 
information is not collected due to, among other things, excessive risk 
aversion, and analysis of the information is not adequately questioned 
to ensure that group think has not replaced sound judgment.
  The Commission focused on only one recommendation for fixing a 
laundry list of problems with the CIA's collection and analysis, and 
only one recommendation on improvements to the FBI's intelligence 
capabilities. On the other hand, the Commission devoted three 
recommendations to protecting civil liberties, though none is designed 
to prevent a future attack.
  The last failure identified by the Commission is one of management. 
It is this failure that leads the Commission to recommend the creation 
of the National Intelligence Director. The report highlights the 
inability of then-DCI George Tenet to mobilize the entire intelligence 
community after he issued a memo stating, ``We are at war'' with 
terrorists. However, the 9/11 Commission's report states that the DCI's 
memo had ``little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA.'' If even the 
CIA, where the Director has complete budgetary and line control, did 
not respond to the DCI's memo, we should not be confident that simply 
putting someone at the top of a new organizational chart is the panacea 
that some claim.
  It warrants noting that the 9/11 Commission details an example, from 
before 9/11 and the changes that followed, where the intelligence and 
law enforcement communities were able to mobilize, break down 
stovepipes and information was shared ``widely and abundantly.'' This 
example--termed the ``Millennium Exception'' by the Commission--focuses 
on the last weeks of December 1999, when the government ``acted in 
concert to deal with terrorism.'' The Government's approach to this 
threat, demonstrate the power of strong leadership and commitment, 
despite what some call a disjointed intelligence organization.
  Too often problems of management have less to do with organizational 
structure, and more to do with the managers themselves. I fear that we 
are rushing to implement sweeping organizational changes because it is 
the easy thing to do, not because it is necessarily the right thing to 
do. In the meantime, the hard work of changing the culture of the 
community seems to have been pushed to the side.
  The Senate is currently considering a reorganization package that 
contains a number of the 9/11 Commission's 41 recommendations. Among 
the most significant, the bill establishes a Senate-confirmed national 
intelligence director with strong budget, personnel, security, and 
other authorities; creates a national counterterrorism center, NCTC, to 
integrate intelligence capabilities and develop joint counterter-
rorism plans; redefines the National Foreign Intelligence Program as 
the National Intelligence Program--which includes the national 
collection agencies within the Defense Department, NSA, NGA, and NRO; 
and contains provisions that require the establishment of an 
information sharing network.
  The bill is called the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. But 
it does not reform the intelligence community; it reorganizes it. It 
does not get at the fundamental problems in the intelligence community 
identified by the 9/11 Commission and the other intelligence 
investigations and inquiries over the last several years. And, 
unfortunately, in at least one glaring respect, it violates the first 
rule of medicine and legislating in that it does do harm. Moreover, 
even if the reshuffling of bureaucracy can ultimately be made to work, 
doing so now, while our country is at war, makes it very hard to supply 
our strategists, planners, and warfighters the information they need, 
when they need it.
  I have taken under careful advisement the cautious tone of many 
former and current officials. For example, in his testimony to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on August 17, 2004, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated:

       In pursuit of strengthening our nation's intelligence 
     capabilities, I would offer a cautionary note. It is 
     important that we move with all deliberate speed; however, 
     moving too quickly risks enormous error . . . And we are 
     considering these important matters while waging a war.

  The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, recently 
released a statement, signed by an experienced group of former 
officials, urging similar caution. The statement was endorsed by: 
former Senators David Boren, Bill Bradley, Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and 
Warren Rudman; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci and William 
Cohen; former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre; former Director 
of Central Intelligence Robert Gates; former Secretary of State and 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger; and former Secretary of 
State George Shultz. It said:

       Rushing in with solutions before we understand all of the 
     problems is a recipe for failure.

  In his testimony, Secretary Rumsfeld discussed in detail his concerns 
about how intelligence community reorganization could potentially 
adversely affect the Defense Department. He expressed his strong 
reservations about the national collection agencies--the NSA, NGA, and 
NRO--being removed from the Defense Department, where they are now 
located, and aligned under the direct leadership of the national 
intelligence director. He stated:

       ``We wouldn't want to place new barriers or filters between 
     the military Combatant Commanders and those agencies when 
     they perform as combat support agencies. It would be a major 
     step to separate these key agencies from the military 
     Combatant Commanders, which are the major users of such 
     capabilities.

  The Defense Department worked tirelessly in the decade after the 
first gulf war to ensure that the speed and scope of intelligence 
support to military operations would be improved for future conflicts. 
It was General Schwartz
kopf's view that the national intelligence support during Desert Storm

[[Page 20960]]

was not adequate. Now, as we have seen from the success of our military 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader War on Terror, ``gaps 
and seams,'' as Secretary Rumsfeld refers to them, have been 
drastically reduced.
  General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also expressed 
his concerns on the subject during his testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, stating:

     . . . for the warfighter, from the combatant commander down 
     to the private on patrol, timely, accurate intelligence is 
     literally a life and death matter every day. . . . As we move 
     forward, we cannot create any institutional barriers between 
     intelligence agencies--and of course that would include the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospacial-
     Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance office 
     and the rest of the warfighting team.

  I am concerned that the reorganization package before the Senate 
places this effective system in jeopardy.
  In S. 2485, the NSA, NGA, and NRO remain within DOD; but this is 
somewhat deceiving. These national collection agencies will also be 
within the newly defined National Intelligence Program. The Committee-
reported bill would essentially remove the Secretary of Defense from 
any meaningful management role over these agencies.
  First, the national intelligence director would have the authority to 
appoint the heads of these agencies, albeit with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of Defense. What makes this unusual and potentially 
problematic? Well, consider the fact that the Director of the National 
Security Agency, a general officer, is dual-hatted as the Deputy 
Commander for Network Attack, Planning, and Integration at Strategic 
Command, or that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 
also serves as an Under Secretary of the Air Force. These positions 
truly support the mission of the Defense Department
  Second, the national intelligence director would have the authority 
to execute the budgets of these agencies. It is one thing to say that 
the NID should manage the entire budget for the National Intelligence 
Program, and, therefore, to help develop agencies' budgets and even 
receive their appropriation. It is quite another to altogether remove 
the Secretary of Defense from the loop by requiring that the NID 
suballocate funding directly back to the agencies. This effectively 
removes the Secretary from the management loop.
  I have studied the Defense Secretary's testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, as well as the testimony of other experts. I am 
also aware that there were some good amendments in the committee markup 
to help preserve the Defense Department's equities. But I am still not 
convinced that we are doing no harm. As General Myers commented during 
the course of the Senate Armed Services Committee's discussion on the 
subject, ``[T]he devil's in the details.''
  I recognize that during the course of the Senate's debate on this 
bill, several of my colleagues have offered amendments to ensure that 
the equities of the Defense Department are protected, and I applaud 
them for their efforts.
  So, while I am not convinced we are doing no harm--particularly with 
respect to ensuring our warfighters have the intelligence support they 
need--I am also not convinced that we are necessarily doing much good. 
Again, the solutions of the 9/11 Commission, and, in turn, the Senate 
bill, don't seem to match the problems.
  I would like to discuss an example of what I believe we could do to 
help minimize our chances of another catastrophic terrorist attack--by 
addressing cultural problems in the intelligence community, including 
risk aversion, group think, and a failure of leadership.
  I was a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee for 8 years and 
participated in the first of the post-9/11 evaluations--the joint 
Senate-House inquiry, formally named the Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001. Along with the current Intelligence 
Committee chairman, I offered additional views to that report which, 
had I been part of the 9/11 Commission, I would similarly have 
submitted. Those additional views describe the core cultural problems 
in the intelligence community that can't simply be solved by 
reorganizing agencies. On this, the Commission report and the bill 
before us missed the mark in many respects.
  First, let's consider risk aversion, which plays out not only in the 
intelligence community, but also in foreign policy decisionmaking, 
economics, business investments, and so on. There are many potential 
reasons for risk aversion--a particular action might have adverse, 
unintended consequences, might get one into trouble with one's 
superiors, or might simply draw unwanted attention, just to name a few. 
When an individual or a government acts, there is always a calculation 
of risk; but some governments and some individuals are more willing to 
take chances than others. This is a product of both leadership and 
environment.
  An aversion to taking risks--even when they should be taken--plagues 
our intelligence community. Indeed, in the course of our congressional 
inquiry on the 9/11 attacks no intelligence or law-enforcement agency 
escaped being described by its own officials as hampered by an aversion 
to thinking critically, exposing their views to others, and being 
willing to boldly take risks. Time and time again, this has contributed 
to intelligence failures--most recently, of course, 9/11 and the 
intelligence communities' claims about Saddam's stockpiles of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  The 9/11 Commission also addressed the issue of risk aversion within 
the CIA, noting the net result for that agency pre-9/11: 

       . . . an organization capable of attracting extraordinarily 
     motivated people but institutionally averse to risk, with its 
     capacity for covert action atrophied, predisposed to restrict 
     the distribution of information, having difficulty 
     assimilating new types of personnel, and accustomed to 
     presenting descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence.

  One of the most well known examples of the problem of risk aversion 
in the context of the 9/11 attacks was the FBI's failure to respond to 
the ``Phoenix Memorandum,'' written by a Phoenix special agent who 
wanted to alert his superiors about suspicious individuals seeking 
pilot training. The now-famous electronic communication to FBI 
headquarters recommended that the FBI consider seeking authority to 
obtain visa information from the State Department on individuals who 
obtained visas to attend flight school.
  The intelligence operations specialists at headquarters who reviewed 
the memo told the staff of the congressional joint inquiry that they 
had decided among themselves that seeking that authority raised 
profiling concerns. These concerns stemmed at least in part from 
previous public allegations of racial profiling against FBI agents who 
had questioned two Middle Eastern men acting suspiciously on a flight 
from Phoenix to Washington, DC, in 1999.
  On a broader--not case-specific--level, the intelligence community's 
clandestine service has been seriously hampered by an aversion to 
taking risks. According to the 9/11 Commission's report, James Pavitt, 
the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, recalled that covert 
action had gotten the clandestine service into trouble in the past, and 
he had no desire to see it happen again.
  It is likely that this ``trouble'' was at least in part a result of 
congressional actions, for example the 1976 Church Committee 
investigation, which was set up in the wake of revelations about 
assassination plots organized by the CIA. The investigation resulted in 
some 183 recommendations, and subsequent legislative proposals and 
debate that consumed considerable attention over a number of years. In 
part, that debate focused on specific, clearly defined limitations and 
prohibitions on intelligence activities.
  Obviously, as we move forward with reforming congressional oversight 
of the intelligence community, there will be a need to balance strong 
and effective oversight with not hamstringing the community and 
creating an even more risk averse environment.

[[Page 20961]]

  The culture of risk aversion in the clandestine service was also 
accentuated by executive branch actions during the Clinton 
administration. For example, risk aversion in the clandestine service 
was compounded by the 1995 Deutch Guidelines, CIA guidelines 
promulgated by then-Director of the CIA, John Deutch, which severely 
limited the ability of CIA case officers to meet with and recruit 
foreign nationals who may have been involved in dubious activities or 
have blood on their hands. Incidentally, during his tenure, Mr. Deutch 
also conducted a CIA-wide ``asset scrub,'' which applied an inflexible 
reporting standard to all CIA spies that, if not met, resulted in their 
automatic firing. How can you effectively penetrate an organization or 
adversarial regime without dealing with unsavory characters? 
Thankfully, the Deutch Guidelines were finally repealed by the DCI in 
July 2002; but, their repercussions had a lasting effect on the culture 
of the Directorate of Operations.
  So, here we have a clandestine service unwilling to take the risks 
that are, by nature, part of the job. Compound that with the fact that 
the DO had few resources. Between 1992 and 1998, the Central 
Intelligence Agency closed one-third of its overseas field stations, 
lost one-quarter of its clandestine service case officers, lost 40 
percent of its recruited spies, and CIA intelligence reports declined 
by nearly one-half.
  The result of this deterioration of a key part of our intelligence 
community was that, before 9/11, we had not one human source inside al-
Qaida's command structure. What did the 9/11 Commission recommend to 
transform the clandestine service into a unit more effectively able to 
penetrate al-Qaida.

       The CIA Director should emphasize . . . ``(b) transforming 
     the clandestine service by building its human intelligence 
     capabilities; (c) developing a stronger language program, 
     with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d) 
     renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations 
     officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) 
     ensuring a seamless relationship between human source 
     collection and signals collection at the operational level; 
     and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and 
     liaison operations.

  As Reuel Gerecht, American Enterprise Institute scholar, commented in 
a recent article in the Weekly Standard, ``That's it. In a 447-page 
report on the intelligence failings of 9/11, the clandestine service 
gets nine lines. The important bit--`transforming the clandestine 
service . . .' is a 10-word platitude.'' The intelligence reform bill 
we are considering this week similarly fails to delve into this central 
problem. Even if we put the resources back in, we have not figured out 
how to deal with the mentality now ingrained in our covert officers.
  Finally, as I previously noted, I believe the bill currently before 
the Senate will exacerbate the risk aversion problem in at least one 
respect: its creation of an excessive, redundant bureaucracy to oversee 
the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Should there be 
protections and oversight? Yes. But should there be so many layers of 
such oversight that intelligence officers are more worried about 
getting into trouble than about adequately performing their missions? 
Certainly not.
  The provisions in this bill dealing with privacy and civil liberties 
are quite extensive. In summary, the bill establishes: two officers 
within the National Intelligence Authority, one responsible for 
privacy, the other for civil rights and civil liberties; an Inspector 
General within the National Intelligence Authority, who, in part, 
monitors and informs the National Intelligence Director of any 
violations of civil liberties and privacy; an Ombudsman within the 
National Intelligence Authority to protect against so-called 
politicization of intelligence; an independent Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board with extensive investigative authorities; and 
privacy and civil liberties officers within the Departments of Justice, 
Defense, State, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and Homeland 
Security, the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and any other department, agency, or element of the Executive 
Branch designated by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to 
be appropriate for coverage.
  These provisions reach far beyond what the 9/11 Commission 
recommended--an executive branch board to oversee the protection 
privacy and civil liberties. The President already created such a board 
through executive order on August 27.
  Under the construct offered in the Governmental Affairs Committee 
bill there will simply be too many people performing the same task. It 
will be inefficient; it will be counterproductive; and it will add yet 
another legal hurdle for our intelligence officers to overcome. Our 
goal should be to make it easier for them to do their jobs--to detect 
and prevent future catastrophic terrorist attacks--not more difficult. 
Let's not forget why we are reforming the intelligence community. It is 
to prevent another 9/11. The problem is not that we invaded suspects' 
privacy, but that we didn't know enough about them to prevent the 
attack.
  I offered an amendment to S. 2845, which I discussed several times on 
the floor of the Senate, to eliminate some of this redundant oversight. 
I withdrew that amendment reluctantly, but with the understanding that 
the issue would be resolved in conference. I plan to continue to press 
my case on this matter because I believe it is central to ensuring that 
we do not make worse the already existing problem of risk aversion 
within the intelligence community.
  Second, group think. This problem is not unrelated to the problem of 
risk aversion. The result of analysts' fears of taking risks is often 
that they are unable to think outside the box, to break free of the 
generally-accepted assumptions held by their agency or by the rest of 
the intelligence community.
  In his August 16 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger discussed the problem at 
length, stating:

       Different organizations will drift gravitate towards 
     different ways of organizing reality--based upon their range 
     of responsibilities and, also, their interests in a narrower 
     sense. Most individuals make themselves comfortable in their 
     own organizations by not challenging a prevailing consensus.

  Another cause of group think is simply a lack of imagination. In a 
recent op-ed in the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger raises some 
important questions about the reforms currently being pursued. He 
states that the basic premise of the ``current emphasis on 
centralization'' through the creation of a director of national 
intelligence ``seems to be that the cause of most intelligence failures 
is inadequate collection and coordination.'' Kissinger believes, 
however, that ``the breakdown usually occurs in the assessment stage.'' 
He attributes that breakdown to a failure of imagination to connect the 
dots of available knowledge. His op-ed describes in detail how a lack 
of imagination led to the major intelligence failures of the last 4 
decades: the 1973 Middle East War, the Indian nuclear test of 1998, the 
September 11 attacks, and the failure to find WMD stockpiles in Iraq.
  How do we solve this problem? Well, let's take the issue of Iraq's 
weapons. The Senate concluded in its bipartisan report on the 
intelligence community's assessment:

       The presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs was so 
     strong that formalized IC mechanisms to challenge assumptions 
     and ``group think,'' such as ``red teams,'' ``devil 
     advocacy,'' and other types of alternative, or competitive 
     analysis, were not utilized.

  Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger recommends precisely what 
the bipartisan report said was lacking. In his testimony, SASC, August 
16, he stated:

       The only solution within an organization is to establish a 
     Devil's Advocacy organization to challenge the prevailing 
     beliefs.

  This is an imperfect solution, as Secretary Schlesinger further 
notes, but, still, if we had had such mechanisms, we would have had a 
far greater chance of reaching the truth. Yet, neither the Commission 
nor the Committee recommends such a ``red team'' or ``devil's 
advocacy'' entity or process. We will have to do it by amendment.

[[Page 20962]]

  This is one place where we can learn from our past successes and 
failures. Historically speaking, ``red teams,'' have been helpful 
inside and outside of the intelligence community. In the 1970s, for 
example, the intelligence community persisted in underestimating the 
size and scale of the Soviet arms build-up. In response, Congress 
created a ``red team'' called Team B to review the IC's analysis. Team 
B's report, which documented how far off the intelligence community 
was, laid the foundation for President Reagan to rebuild the U.S. 
military in the 1980s.
  More recently, the Rumsfeld Commission on the ballistic missile 
threat was created to play devil's advocate with the findings of the 
intelligence community. Not surprisingly, the Commission found the 
estimates far off, dramatically underestimating the time it would take 
for a country to procure or produce a ballistic missile.
  The chairmen of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, 
recognize the group think problem in their September 8 Washington Post 
op-ed, and offer that their proposed reforms ``institutionalize 
information-sharing, thus guaranteeing a competitive airing of views.'' 
They further state:

       We don't want dissent quashed by group-think; we want 
     competing analyses to be shared broadly . . .

  But as key experts, like Henry Kissinger and Jim Schlesinger, point 
out, it is valid to question whether cen-
tralized intelligence--which we are now pursuing--encourages 
conformity, making the problem of group think worse. At best, that 
structural change will do nothing to affect the problem.
  Last, but certainly not least, leadership is a problem that simply 
cannot be solved legislatively. Conversely, good leadership can 
potentially solve the other cultural issues I have identified.
  Al-Qaida's attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long 
period of poor leadership at the highest levels of the U.S. Government 
regarding terrorism. Despite repeated assaults on the United States and 
its interests, the U.S. Government was still unwilling to treat 
terrorism as a true national security issue until after 9/11.
  This was, of course, partly a failure of political leadership. But 
the intelligence community is not absolved, either. The problem of 
inadequate allocation of resources in the intelligence community, for 
example, was at least partly a result of confused leadership in the 
community. In spite of a 1998 declaration of war on al-Qaida by the 
Director of Central Intelligence, two key organizations--namely, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration--
were not allowed, though they offered, to throw their support behind 
the antiterror effort.
  Counterterrorism analytic centers were fragmented across the 
administration at the Pentagon, the CIA, and various FBI locations. 
Only after 9/11 did various intelligence and law enforcement entities 
begin to put aside their parochialism and work together in a more 
productive manner. And certainly reorganization was a partial fix for 
the problem--in particular, the new Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center, TTIC, which merges and analyzes all threat information in a 
single location under the direction of the DCI, has been beneficial. 
But, with better leadership of the intelligence community, the 
condition would not have been so prevalent in the first place. It would 
not have taken a monumental disaster for these entities to cooperate 
more effectively with one another.
  I would now like to briefly discuss visa reform. I am pleased that 
the Collins-Lieberman bill, with the addition of Kyl amendment No. 
3926, will at least tighten up immigration law to require, in statute, 
that most temporary visa applicants be personally interviewed by State 
Department consular officers during the application process, and that 
all such applicants be required to actually complete their visa 
applications to get a visa. Past misuse of immigration law allowed 15 
of the 19 September 11 hijackers to enter the United States without 
completing their applications or being interviewed.
  Some might question why such State Department regulations need to be 
included as statutory language in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Section 214(b) of the INA governs the admission of nonimmigrants to the 
United States. It presumes that an alien who applies for a temporary 
visa actually intends to stay in the United States permanently ``until 
he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular office'' that he 
intends to stay temporarily. This means that the burden of proof is on 
the alien to show that he is eligible to receive a visa and that he 
will not overstay or otherwise violate the terms of the visa. Had the 
State Department required its consular affairs officers to implement 
section 214(b) correctly, and thus to conduct in-person interviews and 
require that visa applications be completely and accurately filled out, 
to meet the burden of proof requirement, the tragedy of 9/11 could have 
been prevented.
  The intent of Section 214(b) was not carried out by the State 
Department consular affairs officers who issued visas to the 9/11 
hijackers. Fifteen of the 19 men who flew hijacked airplanes into the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside were 
Saudi nationals who should have been denied admission to the United 
States under section 214(b) because their visa applications contained 
inaccuracies or omissions. These were not trivial mistakes in spelling 
or punctuation. The applications omitted such fundamental information 
as: means of financial support, home address, and destination or 
address while in the United States. According to an October 28, 2002 
National Review article by Joel Mowbray under the title and subtitle 
``Visas for Terrorists: They were ill-prepared. They were laughable. 
They were approved,'' only one of the 15 applicants listed an actual 
destination address for inside the United States. The rest listed 
locations such as ``California,'' ``New York,'' or simply ``Hotel.''
  Section 214(b) should also have been used to require face-to-face 
interviews of those applying for nonimmigrant visas. Only two of the 15 
Saudi hijackers were interviewed by State Department officials. Such 
laxity by consular officers, however, occurred under guidelines and 
practices put in place by senior State Department officials. According 
to cables and other written notices sent over time by Mary Ryan, who 
was Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs on September 11, 2001, 
shortening the visa application process wherever possible was a ``very 
worthy goal.''
  Such top-down guidelines were explored in an October 2002 GAO report, 
``Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as Antiterrorism 
Tool.'' The report says the State Department's written guidelines and 
resulting practices for visa issuance allowed for ``widespread 
discretionary adherence among consular officers in adhering to the 
burden of proof requirements included in section 214(b).'' The GAO 
report also says the State Department's ``Consular Best Practices 
Handbook'' gave consular managers and staff the discretion to ``waive 
personal appearance and interviews for certain nonimmigrant visa 
applicants.''
  The 9/11 Commission was provided detailed information about the State 
Department's use of section 214(b) and its contribution, in my opinion, 
to the tragedy of 9/11. In a letter to the 9/11 Commission on April 23, 
2004, I said how important it was that the 9/11 Commission focus on the 
State Department's contribution to the dysfunction of the visa-issuance 
system prior to September 11. In a followup letter on May 13, 2004 to 
the Commission, I stated that correct use of the statutory law 
governing nonimmigrant visa issuance could have kept several, if not 
all, of the 9/11 hijackers from entering the country.
  The amendment that the bill managers have accepted is based on the 
regulations promulgated by the State Department in the Foreign Affairs 
Manual it issued after September 11. It requires that all aliens who 
apply for a nonimmigrant visa submit to an in-person interview with a 
consular affairs officer. Although the primary purpose of the in-person 
interview is to determine whether an applicant will

[[Page 20963]]

overstay his or her visa, it is also a prime opportunity for a consular 
affairs officer to gauge the intent of the applicant to try to make 
sure that the applicant does not intend to harm the United States. I 
recognize that not every person may have to be interviewed, so my 
amendment allows applicants under the age of 12, individuals over the 
age of 65, diplomats, and certain other individuals to be exempt from 
the in-person interview requirement if the consular affairs officer 
deems it appropriate.
  My amendment also requires that, even if the nonimmigrant visa 
applicant falls into a category for which an interview is not 
necessarily required, one will be required if he is not a national of 
the country in which he is applying for a visa; if he was previously 
refused a visa; or if he is listed in the Consular Lookout and Support 
System. CLASS is the State Department's database that lists all 
applicants about whom the Department has security concerns. Finally, my 
amendment requires that all applicants for nonimmigrant visas provide 
complete and accurate information in response to every question on the 
nonimmigrant visa application. This is to ensure that the application 
is completely filled out and that the applicant has provided enough 
information to meet the burden of proof required by section 214(b) of 
the INA.
  The codification of these few provisions will help ensure that 
terrorists are not able to enter the country using legally issued 
visas. Provisions to that effect ought to be in any piece of 
legislation aimed at preventing additional terrorist attacks on this 
country. I appreciate the willingness of Senators Collins and Lieberman 
to work with me to modify the amendment to make it acceptable.
  Before I close, I want to note that I have separately discussed 
another related area in serious need of attention: making sure we have 
the legal authorities and resources we need to effectively fight 
terror. I had prepared several amendments on this topic, which I 
intended to introduce to this bill, but because some Members 
erroneously believed that these amendments were highly controversial, I 
chose not to pursue them.
  These amendments, one of which was my Tools for Terrorism, TFTA, bill 
in its entirety, others of which were parts of that bill, should not 
have been considered controversial. TFTA is not new--it is composed of 
bills that have been pending, have been approved by the Justice 
Department, and have been the subject of nine separate hearings. TFTA 
consists of all or part of 11 bills currently pending in the House and 
Senate. Every provision of the bill previously has either been 
introduced as a bill in the House or Senate or had a committee hearing. 
Every provision of the bill has the full support of the Justice 
Department. Collectively, the provisions of this bill have been the 
subject of nine separate hearings before House and Senate committees 
and have been the subject of four separate committee reports. 
Furthermore, collectively, the bills included in TFTA have been pending 
before Congress for 13 years.
  That said, in the interest of allowing the Senate to move forward 
quickly, and noting that some of the provisions of my TFTA bill are 
included in the House version of the Intelligence Reform bill, I have 
decided to continue to try to press my case during the House-Senate 
conference.
  My intention today was not to create a sense of futility in this 
body's efforts, but rather to express reservations about the proposed 
solutions and highlight those areas I know need to be resolved if we 
are to effectively wage the war on terror. A careful reading of the 
congressional joint inquiry report, the Senate's Iraq intelligence 
investigation, and the 9/11 Commission's narrative of the failures that 
led to 9/11 all point to far deeper deficiencies than can be solved by 
bureaucratic reorganization.
  I plan to vote for this bill, but I do so recognizing that it is 
imperfect, and also with the clear intention of continuing to press my 
case for various modifications in conference.
  Finally, while it is true that, if we do reform right, we will be 
able to improve our intelligence, it will never be the case that our 
intelligence is perfect. It is next to impossible to imagine every 
possibly means by which we might be attacked. As Judge Richard Posner 
points out in his New York Times Book review:

       The [9/11 Commission] narrative points to something 
     different, banal and deeply disturbing; that it is almost 
     impossible to take effective action to prevent something that 
     hasn't occurred previously.

  This does not mean we should not try; it does mean that we have to be 
realistic about the limitations of intelligence.
  Those limitations make solid political leadership all the more 
important. Intelligence, diplomacy, military, law enforcement--these 
are all tools in our arsenal to fight the war on terror and whatever 
other threats may come our way. Decisionmakers must be willing to use 
them effectively. That is what will offer our greatest protection 
against another devastating attack.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, Congress has no more solemn obligation 
than to ensure our Government can effectively defend the American 
people. We must put America's security first.
  The attacks of September 11 exposed serious weaknesses at every level 
of our Government's response to terrorism.
  Since that awful day, many of us in Congress have resolved to do 
everything possible to understand how a handful of terrorists could 
defeat the entire U.S. Government's defenses and then adapt those 
defenses in order to prevent future attacks and make America safer.
  The bill we are about vote on reflects the lessons of our inquiries.
  It is thorough, thoughtful, bipartisan, and most important, rooted 
firmly in the facts behind the greatest failure of American 
intelligence in our lifetime.
  When enacted, this legislation will improve our Government's ability 
to disrupt and prevent the kind of devastating attacks we witnessed 
that fateful day 3 years ago. In short, it will make America and 
Americans more secure.
  I can think of no more important action this Senate can take in the 
remaining days of this session than to pass this legislation and move 
it to a conference with the House.
  Immediately following the attack of the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon, Congress began a thorough investigation to uncover precisely 
what went wrong in the days leading up to September 11.
  The House and Senate Intelligence Committees conducted a bipartisan 
inquiry.
  They received thousands of pages of documents, conducted hundreds of 
hours of hearings, and heard from scores of Government and 
nongovernment witnesses who offered meaningful insights into what 
happened and how.
  The unanimous, bipartisan recommendations of that report were 
available in December 2002.
  Independent of this effort, President Bush had asked GEN Brent 
Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to former President Bush, to 
examine our intelligence community and suggest reforms that could make 
it function more effectively.
  According to press accounts, the recommendations of that 
investigation were available in March 2002.
  In addition, despite opposition from the White House, a strong 
bipartisan coalition was forged in the Congress to establish an 
independent, blue ribbon commission to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the 9/11 attacks and provide us with a roadmap for how to 
improve our defenses, specifically those of our intelligence community.
  The White House eventually gave the Commission its support and its 
cooperation. The unanimous, bipartisan recommendations of that 
commission were released in July 2004.
  That is three separate investigations in less than 3 years--three 
separate investigations that originated in either the Congress or the 
Bush administration. Each investigation represented different points of 
view and perspectives. Yet each investigation reached

[[Page 20964]]

the same conclusion: If our intelligence community is to respond 
quickly and effectively to terrorism, there must be a single person in 
charge with the authority to allocate resources and direct personnel. 
There must be a single person responsible for setting the direction of 
our intelligence operations.
  And there must be a single person accountable for the success or 
failure of those operations.
  The legislation before us reflects the lessons learned from these 
investigations and it is particularly faithful to the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations.
  Not only does this legislation establish a national intelligence 
director with real power, it goes on to make a series of fundamental 
changes in the intelligence community and related Government agencies.
  Just as important as what it does, is what it does not do. It does 
not stray from the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. It avoids 
extraneous issues that would have only brought divisiveness and delay 
to this debate. Time is of the essence.
  As Governor Kean said when releasing his commission's report:

       Every day that passes is a day of increased risk if we do 
     not make changes.

  America could not wait and the Senate wisely focused on the most 
urgent challenges at hand.
  I am especially grateful to Senators Collins and Lieberman, the 
managers of this important legislation.
  Shortly after the 9/11 Commission issued its report, Senator Frist 
and I assigned them the difficult task of taking the Commission's 
recommendations on the executive branch and producing a bill that 
converts these proposals into legislative language.
  They have not only done that, they have managed to grasp the details 
of this complicated bill and produce strong bipartisan support for 
their bill.
  As I noted above, Senate passage will get this bill to a conference 
with the House and their version of this legislation. Unfortunately, it 
appears that some in the other body do not share this goal of swiftly 
enacting the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. They do not believe we 
should limit our work to the 9/11 Commission's work. Nor do they 
believe our top goal should be to defeat terrorists rather than push 
partisan political agendas.
  Many of the people who are apparently willing to pursue this course 
have fought real reform efforts from the start. They opposed forming 
the 9/11 Commission. They opposed cooperating with the 9/11 Commission. 
They opposed giving the Commission the time and funding it needed to do 
its job. It is not surprising to learn now that they are now opposed to 
giving the Commission's recommendations a fair hearing.
  We can't afford to keep kicking this can down the road. It may seem 
obvious, but there are some who seem not to understand that American 
lives are at stake.
  This is the best--and perhaps last--opportunity to enact meaningful 
comprehensive reform legislation to make Americans more secure.
  With today's strong bipartisan vote, the Senate can make a clear 
statement that we are ready to seize this opportunity to protect 
America and more effectively fight terrorism.
  I hope our colleagues in the House who have opposed the Commission's 
work to this point will be able at long last to set aside their 
partisan agenda and follow the bipartisan example of the Senate.
  The families of the victims of 9/11 and, indeed, all Americans should 
expect no less from their elected representatives.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I want to voice my strong support for S. 
2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, and to commend my 
colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee for their careful work 
in drafting this important legislation. In producing this bill, 
Senators Collins and Lieberman have managed to combine urgent action 
with careful deliberation. I hope that this difficult balance can be 
maintained in conference.
  While the authors of this bill deserve our thanks, the fact is that 
we would not be debating desperately needed intelligence reforms today 
had it not been for the work of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States--and for the work of the many concerned 
Americans, including families of 9/11 victims, who fought to establish 
the Commission and to protect its independence and authority. The 9/11 
Commission worked hard to produce a thorough account of the facts 
concerning what the various elements of the U.S. Government knew, what 
action was taken to address the terrorist threat, and where 
communication and coordination broke down. All Americans deserve 
answers to these questions. And we have a duty to act on the 
Commission's recommendations and to put this country on a firmer, 
smarter footing to fight the terrorist forces that have attacked this 
country and wish to attack us again.
  At the same time, we know that reorganization for its own sake is 
simply disruptive and distracting--a smokescreen of busy work and 
changing flow charts that can obscure serious flaws rather than remedy 
them. And needlessly trampling on the civil liberties, protected by our 
Constitution and guarded by generations of Americans, in the name of 
reform would be a horrible mistake. Hundreds of thousands of brave men 
and women have died defending our freedoms throughout our history. We 
cannot fail to guard those precious freedoms now.
  The Senate bill creates a civil liberties board to evaluate new 
policies and ensure that civil liberties concerns are considered as the 
President and executive agencies propose and implement policies to 
protect the Nation against terrorism. The Commission specifically 
recommended the creation of such a board within the executive branch 
that would have as its primary mission the protection of our citizens' 
civil liberties. I am pleased that Senator Kyl agreed to withdraw an 
amendment that would have undermined this provision. The supporters of 
this amendment suggested that efforts to protect our privacy and civil 
liberties will undermine the work of the intelligence and law 
enforcement community. I respectfully disagree. Americans reasonably 
expect their Federal Government to protect them from terrorism while 
respecting their privacy and civil liberties. We can, and must, do 
both.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill is the right approach. It is important 
that the privacy and civil liberties oversight provisions in this bill 
be included in the final legislation that goes to the President's desk.
  Similarly, it would be a grave mistake for the conference to add 
extraneous provisions increasing the power of the Government, such as 
those contained in another amendment offered by Senator Kyl that derive 
from the so-called PATRIOT II proposal. We have not had the kind of 
full and informed debate on these proposals that the 9/11 Commission 
called for. For this bill to remain true to the Commission's 
recommendations, it cannot be used as a way to bypass the very 
deliberation that the Commission said is essential.
  Even after we finish work on this bill, our work will be far from 
complete. The Commission's intelligence reform proposals have been the 
focus of most of the media attention surrounding the 9/11 report, and 
they are at the heart of the legislative efforts in which we are 
currently engaged. But the Commission's call for more focused, 
effective ways to attack the terrorists and their organizations, and, 
critically, to prevent the continued growth of terrorism, deserve 
equally intense examination and action.
  We need to make a long-term commitment to denying terrorists 
sanctuaries, and to cultivating new generations of partners, not 
enemies, overseas. As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs, I know that we do not have the intelligence resources or the 
diplomatic resources that we should around the world. We do not really 
have any policy at all to deal with Somalia, a failed state in which 
terrorists have operated and found sanctuary. And there is a great deal 
of work to be done to help countries in which we know terrorists have 
operated to improve the basic capacities of border patrols who could 
stop wanted individuals, and customs

[[Page 20965]]

agents who could help stop weapons proliferation and auditors who could 
freeze terrorist assets. And we can do more to help root out the 
corruption that undermines these safeguards at every turn.
  I am pleased that the Senate accepted an amendment that I offered to 
this bill, which arises from my experience with African affairs. I know 
many Africanists are concerned about terrorist activity in the Sahel, 
and the U.S. Government is working with partners in that region to 
address this issue. Some of these same terrorists are based in north 
Africa, above the Sahel, which various parts of the U.S. Government and 
our own congressional committees consider to be a different region of 
the world, one usually lumped together with the Middle East rather than 
sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, getting counter-terrorism right in 
Mali really requires understanding a number of things about Algeria, 
and getting it right in the Horn of Africa requires an understanding of 
Yemen as well as Kenya. But the policymakers who specialize in these 
places don't necessarily work together.
  These geographic stovepipes hamper good policy, and cap fragment the 
picture that our intelligence community is able to piece together. And 
it is not just Africa, and it is not just terrorism. Where National 
Intelligence Centers are established with a specific regional focus, 
the National Intelligence Director needs to ensure that regular contact 
and cooperation among linked centers is institutionalized, not ad hoc. 
My amendment strengthens information sharing, and signals Congress's 
intent to ensure that the centers that are eventually established are 
as effective as possible.
  There is also much more to getting our policies right when it comes 
to homeland security and emergency preparedness, and that work will 
continue long after we complete work on this bill. We still lack a 
comprehensive homeland security plan with clear priorities, deadlines, 
and accountability. Without such plans, it is not possible to properly 
target our homeland security dollars to meet our most pressing needs. 
We are getting on the right track, however. The Commission recommended 
that future transportation security budgets be based on a thorough 
assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, and I am pleased that the 
Senate adopted my amendment to the fiscal year 2005 Department of 
Homeland Security bill to require just that. Senator McCain also 
included a provision to require a national transportation security 
strategy, and I was pleased to support it. These steps will help, but 
there is more we must do.
  I was also pleased to support the amendment offered by Senator 
Collins to coordinate and simplify the homeland security grant process, 
which is based on a bill I cosponsored. This important amendment will 
make it much easier for local first responders to get funding by 
reducing the many, and often redundant, grant application steps. The 
amendment also gives local officials far more flexibility in spending 
homeland security dollars, including paying for overtime costs 
associated with homeland security tasks and training. Successful 
programs, such as FIRE Act grants, the COPS program, and the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant program, are protected in this 
legislation. The amendment allocates funding based on threat, as 
recommended by the Commission, but also maintains baseline funding so 
that States and local officials can have a predictable stream of 
funding to meet the homeland security needs faced by all jurisdictions. 
This amendment will help simplify and rationalize the current homeland 
security grant system. However, I agree with Senator Lieberman that 
more resources must be allocated to meet our homeland security needs.
  I hope that the conference is able to quickly agree upon a final 
version of this bill that follows the Senate's approach and does not 
contain extraneous and controversial provisions. And I look forward to 
continuing to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to 
ensure that what we have learned from the 9/11 Commission becomes a 
part of how we do business every day. This intelligence reform bill is 
a very good start, not the end, of the efforts we must make to bring 
about real changes that will enhance our security and the security of 
our children.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, first, let me again thank my colleagues 
from Maine and Connecticut for their hard work preparing and bringing 
an intelligence reform bill to the Senate floor. Reforming the 
intelligence community is serious business, and I appreciate the 
professional and thoughtful approach taken by the Government Affairs 
Committee, especially the chairman and ranking member.
  I rise today to express some of my concerns on S. 2845, the National 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
  First, it is important to fully understand exactly why we are 
debating the reformation of our intelligence community in the first 
place. Our enemy has attacked us in new ways that no one ever thought 
about or occurred before in the entire history of mankind. The attacks 
on 9/11 were made on predominately civilian targets, using commercial 
civilian airlines, loaded with totally innocent, ordinary citizens. No 
one really planned for an attack of this nature because as a God-
fearing nation, it was hard to imagine that some human beings could be 
so evil, so warped in their interpretation of their own religion that 
they believe the slaughter of innocent people by the thousands is 
somehow condoned or even approved by their God. Well, we now know the 
nature of our enemy, and it is dangerous beyond anything we have known 
in the past. And we are reminded of our enemy's evil nature every time 
we see a video of an innocent person pleading for their life or being 
beheaded in Iraq. These Islamic terrorists have in effect ``hijacked'' 
the Muslim faith, distorted it to meet their own twisted philosophy of 
life, and we must stop them.
  Let me be absolutely clear on this point: the Islamic terrorists want 
to frighten us, they want to disrupt our economy and our way of life, 
and they want to kill us; they will stop at nothing, including suicide 
attacks to achieve their evil goals. I have said in this chamber many 
times that effective intelligence is our first line of defense against 
this enemy and only good intelligence will prevent them from ever again 
attacking us on our own homeland.
  That is why we are here today to put more ``teeth'' into our 
intelligence community. We are here to debate and vote on legislation 
that should provide more security for our citizens.
  The Collins-Lieberman legislation that we are considering is a good 
bill in many ways, but it only marks the beginning of a process to 
rebuild our intelligence capabilities, not the end.
  The bill establishes a National Intelligence Director; a position 
that I view as the ``foundation'' upon which all other intelligence 
reform measures will be built. However, there are some other measures 
relative to intelligence reform that will require our attention as soon 
as possible.
  This bill leaves the intelligence community at fifteen members, eight 
of which are in the Department of Defense. As you know, I had a 
bipartisan amendment that was co-sponsored by my colleague from 
Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson, that would create a unified command for 
military intelligence giving the new National Intelligence Director a 
single point of contact for military-related intelligence requirements 
and collection capabilities instead of eight. This is a major issue 
that must be addressed soon; otherwise the National Intelligence 
Director will have an unrealistically large span of control.
  Collectively, the eight members of the intelligence community that 
this bill leaves in the Department of Defense are huge, with tens of 
thousands of people and multi-billion dollar budgets. How someone 
outside of the Department of Defense, like the national intelligence 
director, could adequately and efficiently manage these vast 
intelligence capabilities by dealing with eight separate military 
members is beyond me. Senator Nelson and I are committed to fix this 
shortcoming by introducing a bill to create a unified

[[Page 20966]]

combatant command for military intelligence this coming January.
  The Central Intelligence Agency is left intact in this bill, which is 
the right decision. But the bill does not adequately address the 
importance of human intelligence, HUMINT, or emphasize rebuilding this 
critical capability. HUMINT is a dirty and dangerous occupation, and 
it, more than any other intelligence discipline, will be the key to 
eliminating al-Qaida and all other terrorist organizations. We really 
owe our HUMINT case officers in the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and other agencies all our thanks, 
support, and the resources necessary to get the job done.
  The portion of this bill that creates a civil liberties board with 
broad subpoena power is particularly troubling to me. We need to take 
more risks in HUMINT and we need to rebuild the morale of our HUMINT 
collectors. What kind of message are we sending to our intelligence 
agents in the field who are risking their lives to protect us by 
creating a board designed to look over their shoulders and, which is 
redundant to the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil 
Liberties? We could create a morale problem throughout our intelligence 
community that might take years to repair and, I hasten to add, at a 
time when we need HUMINT more than ever to protect our citizens.
  I am voting for S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004, because it does establish the national intelligence director and 
gives statutory authority for the newly created National 
Counterterrorism Center. However, I will continually seek ways to 
address my concerns with this bill, some of which I have mentioned 
above. I want to reiterate again, that this bill marks only the 
beginning of the process to reform our intelligence community, not the 
end.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the recommendations of 
the
9/11 Commission Report that deal with the integrity of our borders and 
visitor access to America.
  In the decade before 9/11, al-Qaida studied how to exploit gaps and 
weaknesses in the passport, visa, and entry systems of the United 
States and other countries. Al-Qaida actually set up its own passport 
office in Kandahar and developed working relationships with travel 
facilitators--travel agents, document forgers, and corrupt government 
officials.
  Since 9/11, some important steps have been taken to strengthen our 
homeland security. While these efforts have made us safer, we are not 
safe enough. A real world example was reported this past Saturday by 
the Washington Post. Peru and the U.S. intercepted a criminal network 
with possible al-Qaida links that smuggled Arabs into America after 
receiving false papers in Lima. Keeping Americans secure means being 
diligent on all fronts, at home and abroad.
  The amendment that I am offering ties directly to two important 
recommendations of the Commission Report prohibiting terrorist travel 
to our country.
  The first is the Commission recommendation that ``Targeting travel is 
at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their 
money. . . Better technology and training to detect terrorist travel 
documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's 
vulnerability to clandestine entry.''
  Americans need to know that every reasonable step is being taken to 
ensure that those who would harm our country and our citizens do not 
travel freely and easily into the United States. This is a task that 
deserves our full attention when the vast number of travel documents 
handled in our embassies, consulates, and border stations is 
considered. Specialists must be developed and deployed in consulates 
and at the border to detect terrorists through their travel practices, 
including their documents.
  Last year there were about seven hundred consular officers stationed 
overseas in 211 posts. In addition to processing six million non-
immigrant visa applications and nearly 600,000 immigrant visa 
applications, they provided a full range of services to American 
citizens. Chronic understaffing has led to an over-reliance on foreign 
workers to screen and review visa applications, jobs that normally 
would be handled by American officers. This process leaves too many 
gray areas; one mistake or intentional oversight in a foreign nationals 
review of an application could mean the lives of thousands of 
innocents. My amendment goes a long way to bolster the visa application 
process by mandating that American consular officials review and 
approve each and every immigrant and nonimmigrant visa application.
  Over the last 2 years the State Department has hired an average of 65 
new consular officials. That number has not proven enough. My amendment 
provides the State Department the authority to increase the number of 
consular officials by 150 each year for 4 years, ensuring that trusted 
American resources are responsible for reviewing all visa applications.
  Currently, consular officers only receive an overview in fraudulent 
document training. My amendment mandates that these consular officers 
are suitably trained in detecting fraudulent documents and document 
forensics, prior to beginning their service.
  Our due diligence cannot stop here.
  The second Commission recommendation that relates to my amendment 
states that we should ``. . . raise U.S. and border security standards 
for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term . . .'' 
The Commission goes on to say that ``It is elemental to border security 
to know who is coming into the country. Today more than 9 million 
people are in the United States outside the legal immigration system.''
  Pre-9/11 the INS had only about 2,000 agents for interior enforcement 
and only 9,800 border patrol agents. With the priorities of the agency 
concentrated on immigration and narcotics, our northern border was 
often neglected and no major counterter-
rorism effort was underway. These gaps in our security created a 
weakness that allowed the loss of over 3,000 innocent citizens. More 
robust enforcement of routine immigration laws could have made a 
difference.
  We must have the resources to be able to detect and, if need be, 
detain terrorists who seek entry through our borders. My amendment 
makes providing the necessary personnel for border security and 
immigration enforcement a top priority. It provides authority to 
increase the number of border patrol agents by 1,000 each year for a 5-
year period. It also increases the number Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement investigators by 800 per year for a period of 5 years.
  The Commission found that many of the 19 9/11 hijackers, including 
known operatives, could have been watch-
listed and were vulnerable to detection by border authorities; however, 
without adequate staff and coordinated efforts, the evildoers were 
allowed unhampered entry.
  The world has changed dramatically since 9/11 when the evil doers 
used our open and trusting society against us. We can not allow a 
repeat of that tragedy. This amendment will allow those who guard our 
frontiers the tools they need to ensure the safety of the citizens of 
the United States of America.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr President, I rise to address a very specific but 
invaluable component of the intelligence reform package before us 
today.
  As many may know, before the release of the 9/11 Commission report 
earlier this year, I introduced stand-alone legislation--cosponsored by 
Senator Mikulski--creating an Inspector General for Intelligence. The 
``Intelligence Community Accountability Act of 2004'' proposed an 
independent inspector general for the entire intelligence community--
all fifteen agencies and department members. I introduced this 
legislation largely as a result of my experience as a member of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee which undertook a year-long investigation 
on the pre-war intelligence of Iraq.
  I commend the efforts and tremendous work of the authors of the 
underlying bill--they have embraced the

[[Page 20967]]

concept and spirit of my earlier bill and have included language in 
their legislation creating an Inspector General for the National 
Intelligence Director. I would also like to thank Senators Roberts, 
Mikulski and Feinstein for their support in being original cosponsors 
of an amendment I was prepared to offer on this subject. I will not 
offer that amendment but I want to make clear my intentions to continue 
working for better and more comprehensive accountability in our 
intelligence community.
  In that vein, I want to express my strong opposition to any amendment 
or proposal that would weaken the language on the authorities and 
powers of the NID's inspector general. Any such amendment, if accepted 
or approved, would be a grave step backward in an area that is in 
critical need of a step forward. . . . I am of course talking about 
accountability in the intelligence community.
  Any amendment to scale back the IG provisions of the bill would fly 
in the face of the 521-page report that followed the committee's 
investigation on Iraq pre-war intelligence and would ignore vital 
problems of information sharing that have been found throughout the 
community.
  Any inspector general who is to serve the National Intelligence 
Director must have the power and authority to access employees and 
information in the agencies that lie in the national intelligence 
program. How can an IG be effective if his hands are tied because of 
turf battles and arguments over jurisdiction?
  My preference would be to enhance some of the authorities of the 
NID's inspector general as proposed by the underlying bill, but I would 
rather work to preserve the bill's language as it exists now than to 
gut it through the passage of any proposal that rescinds the abilities 
of the IG to delve into the coordination and communication between and 
among the various entities of the intelligence community.
  Issues of accountability have often been central to the work we as 
Senators do in seeking to bring better government to our constituents--
particularly when matters of national security are at stake.
  I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in 
accountability during my 12 years as a member of the House Foreign 
Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and as Chair of the 
International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. During the 99th Congress, I worked to bring the State 
Department Accountability Review Board into fruition as part of the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.
  Among other issues, it was a lack of accountability that permitted 
the radical Egyptian Sheik Rahman, the mastermind of the first World 
Trade Center bombing in 1993, to enter and exit the U.S. five times 
totally unimpeded even after he was put on the State Department's 
Lookout List in 1987, and allowed him to get permanent residence status 
by the INS even after the State Department issued a certification of 
visa revocation. In 1995 and again after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
I introduced legislation establishing Terrorist Lookout Committees in 
our embassies and consulates abroad--all in an effort to create more 
accountability in the protection of our homeland.
  In this same vein, my membership on the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence has allowed me to realize that the need for greater levels 
of accountability in our intelligence community is and must be a 
priority. It is all too evident that in addressing the key concerns and 
problems seen in the management of our intelligence agencies, 
accountability is an area unquestionably in need of dramatic 
improvement.
  I am pleased that as intelligence community reform has gained 
momentum, the concept of an inspector general has been very much a part 
of the debate. Indeed, an inspector general is included in the broad 
and comprehensive intelligence reform legislation authored by Senator 
Feinstein--legislation that I was proud to co-sponsor earlier this 
year.
  An inspector general for the whole intelligence community was also 
included in reform legislation offered by Senator Graham, the former 
chairman of the Senate intelligence community. Language creating a 
community-wide inspector general was contained in the proposal by 
current Intelligence Committee Chairman Roberts as well as the recent 
bill offered by Senators McCain and Lieberman.
  And as I indicated, an inspector general is included in the 
underlying bill crafted by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. I 
commend and, once again, thank all of my colleagues for including this 
key component in their proposals. This bill takes a step forward in 
addressing the key issue of intelligence community accountability and 
it should not be weakened by any additional amendments or 
modifications.
  The belief that any new Director of National Intelligence should have 
an independent inspector general is one that few seriously dispute. In 
testimony before the intelligence committee in July, former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense John Hamre stated that an inspector general ``will 
help far more in driving and shaping the quality of outputs from this 
community.'' And Secretary of State Colin Powell called an inspector 
general a ``good idea'' while speaking before the Governmental Affairs 
Committee.
  When I first drafted and then introduced my stand-alone legislation 
in early June, I had certainly envisioned that the inspector general 
the bill would establish would reside within a newly re-organized 
intelligence community. When I introduced my bill, I stated then that 
it was intended to be part of a larger initiative to overhaul the 
entire intelligence community's organizational structure. We have 
reached that point, and I am here today to continue my efforts to 
ensure that the final product the Senate approves contains the best 
possible mechanisms to bring accountability to the community.
  As I indicated earlier, I have participated in this national debate 
on bettering our diplomatic, intelligence and national security 
services on many fronts and for many years. But it was as a member of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, which spent a year reviewing the 
pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, 
the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam Hussein's human rights abuses 
and his regime's impact on regional stability that I realized the real 
and dire need for intelligence community change.
  In looking at the intelligence community, we must remember that it is 
an amorphous entity made of up fifteen agencies, parts of departments, 
and independent bodies all spread out within our Federal Government. 
They each have their own mission, chain of command, procedures, history 
and institutional paradigms. The necessity for a stronger, independent 
head of the intelligence community became obvious to me and that 
measures must be legislated and instituted to hold the community and 
its amalgamation of agencies more accountable for the failures and 
shortcomings we had discovered.
  The committee's report on the pre-war intelligence on Iraq revealed 
systemic flaws in the intelligence community, perhaps, most notably in 
many instances, a stunning lack of accountability and sound, ``hands-
on'' management practices. These poor management practices contributed 
to the mis-characterization of intelligence reporting on Iraq's WMD 
programs.
  I recognize that intelligence analysis is an imprecise art, with 
rarely--if ever--any absolutes; however, our report revealed that many 
judgements regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and 
capabilities were based on old assumptions allowed to be carried over 
year after year, virtually unchecked and unchallenged, without any 
critical re-examination of the issue.
  In short, there was a lack of analytic rigor performed on one of the 
most critical and defining issues spanning more than a decade--that of 
the preponderance of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq and the 
looming threat they posed to Iraq's neighbors and to the U.S.
  Intelligence community managers, collectors and analysts believed 
that

[[Page 20968]]

Iraq had WMDs, a notion that dates back to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to 
retain, build and hide those programs. In many cases, the committee's 
report showed that the intelligence community made intelligence 
information fit into its preconceived notions about Iraq's WMD 
programs.
  From our review, we know the intelligence community relied on sources 
that supported its predetermined ideas, and we also know that there was 
no alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' performed on such a critical 
issue, allowing assessments to go unchallenged. This loss of 
objectivity or unbiased approach to intelligence collection and 
analysis led to erroneous assumptions about Iraq's WMD program.
  For example, the committee's review showed that analysts minimized 
reporting from a biological weapons source because the source reported 
information that did not fit with their beliefs about the existence of 
mobile biological weapons facilities.
  We also know that the key judgment in the National Intelligence 
Estimate that Iraq was developing an unmanned aerial vehicle ``probably 
intended to deliver biological warfare agents'' overstated what was in 
the intelligence reporting. This review revealed that some intelligence 
community UAV analysts failed to objectively assess significant 
evidence that clearly indicated that non-biological weapons delivery 
missions were more likely.
  In addition, the committee's report revealed that, despite 
overwhelming evidence suggesting that the aluminum tubes Iraq was 
trying to procure were for artillery rockets, some intelligence 
community analysts rejected information and analysis from experts, 
including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of 
Energy, who refuted the claim that the tubes were being procured for 
use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. This information was rejected 
because it did not fit into some analysts' notion that Iraq was 
procuring these tubes as part of its nuclear reconstitution effort.
  Clearly stated, the intelligence community failed to ``think outside 
the box,'' a phrase often used by the community's analytic cadre to 
describe more innovative approaches to examining a problem set.
  Critical thinking and objectivity are crucial elements in both the 
collection and analytic trade crafts and ought to be ingrained, by 
appropriate training and effective oversight by management, in every 
collector and analyst entering the ranks of the intelligence community. 
Management has the responsibility to ensure analysts are trained to 
produce--and actually produce--the best, most objective, unvarnished 
assessments, and both management and the analysts and collectors have 
the responsibility to ensure that their trade-craft is practiced 
properly.
  Along this same line of accountability, our report revealed how poor 
leadership and management resulted in the intelligence community's 
failure to convey the uncertainties in many of the assessments in the 
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
  For example, the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had mobile 
transportable facilities for producing biological warfare agents but 
failed to alert intelligence consumers that this assessment was based 
primarily on reporting from a single human intelligence source to whom 
the intelligence community never had direct access and with whom there 
were credibility problems.
  In the analysis on Iraq's chemical weapons activities, the 
intelligence community failed to explain that several assessments were 
based on layers of analysis of a single stream of intelligence 
reporting regarding the presence of a tanker truck that was assessed to 
be involved in the possible transshipment of chemical munitions.
  Finally, during coordination sessions with Secretary Powell in 
preparation for his speech before the United Nations in February 2003, 
the intelligence community was instructed to include in the 
presentation only corroborated, solid intelligence.
  In fact, from our review we learned that the DCI told a national 
intelligence officer who was also working on the speech to ``back up 
the material and make sure we had good stuff to support everything.'' 
When Secretary Powell spoke before the UN, he said that every statement 
he was about to make would be ``backed up by sources, solid sources . . 
. based on solid intelligence.''
  Incredibly, from our review, we know that much of the intelligence 
provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell's 
speech was incorrect and uncorroborated. For example, the IC never 
alerted Secretary Powell that most of the intelligence regarding Iraq's 
mobile biological warfare program came from one source with 
questionable credibility nor did anyone alert Secretary Powell to the 
fact one of the sources cited in his speech was deemed to be a 
fabricator--something known by IC analysts since the May 2002 issuance 
of a ``fabrication notice.''
  An independent, over-arching community-level inspector general who 
can delve into the communication between and among agencies, or the 
lack thereof, can assist in bridging the disconnects that lead to such 
failures. This IG should be properly empowered to reach into and across 
the bureaucratic and organization lines that separate each community 
agency so that next time, if the Department of Energy's assessments 
about the intended use of aluminum tubes by a dangerous regime are 
ignored or cast aside, someone can be held accountable.
  There is no question that the intelligence community requires 
systemic changes. We are here today to do just that. Americans have a 
right to know that their intelligence services are doing the best job 
possible in protecting their security. I say this even while I must 
recognize the dedication and professionalism of the thousands of 
Americans who make up our intelligence community.
  Each day across this country and around the world, they labor, mostly 
without recognition, to keep this country safe from harm. Our 
intelligence employees work under very demanding conditions and in 
environments that are extremely dangerous and can often shift without 
notice.
  It is their vigilance upon which we rely to give us the forewarning 
necessary to counter the many dangers present in our world. Although it 
is impossible to directly express our deep appreciation for their 
efforts, we have an obligation to express our eternal gratitude to 
those who serve America so well.
  Yet, however appreciative we are of the service done by those who 
work in the fifteen agencies that make up our nation's intelligence 
community, we as a Congress have a responsibility to continue to work 
to find ways to help them do an even better job, and more importantly, 
to ensure that any failures are not repeated and that we learn from 
past mistakes. At the same time, we have an obligation to the people of 
this country to ensure that both pride and comfort in our intelligence 
services exist. The people of this Nation, and those of us elected to 
represent them, have a right to know that when mistakes are made, 
corrections soon follow. That is what brings us here today.
  I ask unanimous consent that a chart entitled ``Decades of 
Terrorism'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          Decades of Terrorism

       Oct. 23, 1983--Beirut Barracks bombing; Dec. 12, 1983--US 
     Embassy bombing, Kuwait; Sept. 20, 1984--East Beirut bombing; 
     Dec. 3, 1984--Kuwait Airways hijacking; April 12, 1985--
     Madrid restaurant bombing.
       June 14, 1985--TWA flight 847 hijacking; Oct. 7, 1985--
     Achille Lauro attack; Dec. 18, 1985--Rome and Vienna 
     bombings; April 2, 1986--TWA flight 840 bombing; April 5, 
     1986--Germany disco bombing.
       Dec. 21, 1988--Pan-Am Flight 103 bombing; Feb. 26, 1993--
     World Trade Center bombing; Nov. 13, 1995--US Military HQ 
     attack, Saudi Arabia; June 5, 1996--Khobar Towers bombing; 
     Aug. 7, 1998--US Embassy bombings in Africa.
       Oct. 12, 2000--USS Cole attack; Sept. 11, 2001--9/11; May 
     12, 2003--Housing compound bombing in Saudi Arabia; May 29-
     31, 2004--Saudi oil company attacks; June 11-19, 2004--Paul 
     Johnson kidnaping/execution.

[[Page 20969]]




                         9/11 Commission Report

       ``The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in 
     the great struggles of the twentieth century must work 
     together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national 
     power can be combined.''

  Ms. SNOWE. This chart beside me illustrates in the starkest of terms, 
what we are dealing with. . . ..and what this legislation is all about. 
I call the contents of this chart to the attention of my colleagues to 
serve as a reminder of ``the big picture.'' The goal of this reform 
movement is and has always been to make sure our intelligence agencies 
are better equipped, organized and managed so that we are in a greater 
position to detect threats and stop attacks. We want an intelligence 
community that is better prepared to ensure we don't keep adding to 
this list.
  I also refer my colleagues to a quote from the preface of the 9/11 
Commission Report: ``The massive departments and agencies that 
prevailed in the greatest struggles of the twentieth century mush work 
together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can 
be combined.'' This bill we are debating today speaks directly to this 
charge. And it is my view that a strong Inspector general is a vital 
component of that effort.
  An inspector general will help to enhance the authorities of the 
National Intelligence Director that we will shortly create, assisting 
this person in instituting better management accountability, and 
helping him/her to resolve problems within the intelligence community 
systematically.
  Ideally, the inspector general for intelligence should have the 
ability to investigate current issues within the intelligence 
community, not just conduct ``lessons learned'' studies. The IG should 
have the abilities to seek to identify problem areas and identify the 
most efficient and effective business practices required to ensure that 
critical deficiencies can be addressed before it is too late, before we 
have another intelligence failure, before lives are lost.
  In short, an inspector general for intelligence that can look across 
the entire intelligence community will help improve management, 
coordination, cooperation and information sharing among the 
intelligence agencies. A strong, effective IG will help break down the 
barriers that have perpetuated the parochial, stove-pipe approaches to 
intelligence community management and operations.
  As I stated earlier, I was prepared to offer an amendment that would 
have expanded on the language already included in the underlying bill--
but let me be clear, there are many positive aspects of the inspector 
general as contained in this bill.
  I am pleased, for example, that the bill ensures independence of the 
IG by including a separate budget account for his office. I also 
welcome the language pertaining to staffing, reports, subpoena powers 
and complaint procedures.
  I have no doubt that the authors of the underlying bill and I share 
the same goal--an independent IG with proper authorities to assist in 
preventing some of the failures I've detailed here today.
  As the Chairman of the intelligence committee stated last week on the 
Senate floor, members of the committee received a frightening briefing 
last week in closed session where we were told that despite the current 
terrorist threat we face, and the high state of alert we live under, 
information sharing between the intelligence agencies is still not 
taking place and no one is holding anyone accountable for their failure 
to do so.
  Too many incidents of failure to prevent attacks, failure to properly 
collect the needed intelligence, failure to adequately analyze that 
intelligence and failure to share information within the community beg 
for better accountability in the entirety of the community. Who better 
to do this than a single IG, who can reach across the community, work 
with the existing individual agency IG's, and confront any problem with 
a macro, overarching view? It is my hope that the new inspector general 
for the NID, as authorized in this bill, will take great strides to 
guarantee that information sharing and accountability are woven into 
the fabric of the intelligence community. Mr. President, this is the 
whole reason we are here today.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thought I would take this moment of 
quiet on the floor--we are just about a half hour away from voting 
final passage of this bill--to thank my staff and the staff of Senator 
Collins, which is led by Michael Bopp. My staff is led by Joyce 
Rechtschaffen and Kevin Landy, who has been a team leader on this 
effort. It has been a mighty team. They worked very hard to help 
Senator Collins and me put the hearings together on the 9/11 Commission 
Report; to work, many of them, over August in addition to working on 
the hearings, to draft the legislation I introduced with Senator McCain 
to adopt the nonintelligence parts of the Commission report, and then 
to work in the week and a half--this being the eighth day of 
consideration on the floor--to see this bill at the point it is now.
  I am very proud that the committee, in the first instance, and now 
the Senate itself, has responded to the challenge of the 9/11 
Commission Report. But, more to the point, it has responded to the 
deficiencies in our current systems of intelligence and homeland 
security generally and brought forth a bill that I am convinced, if we 
can hold it through conference, which we certainly intend to do, will 
make the American people a lot safer in an age of terrorism.
  I want to list the names of all the members of my staff who have 
worked so hard to bring this legislation to the edge of adoption: Mike 
Alexander, David Barton, Rajesh De, Christine Healey, Larry Novey, 
Holly Idelson, Beth Grossman, Mary Beth Schultz, Andrew Weinschenk, 
Fred Downey, Kathy Seddon, Donny Williams, Jason Yanussi, Dave Berick, 
Adam Sedgewick, Megan Finlayson, Rachel Sotsky, Tim Profeta, William 
Bonvillian, Sarah Wachtel, Scott Campbell, Wendy Wang, Laurie 
Rubenstein, Leslie Phillips, Chuck Ludlam, and Janet Burrell.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, while the distinguished comanager of the 
bill is on the floor--I am sorry Senator Collins is not on the floor--
on behalf of the whole Senate, we need to extend to you our 
congratulations. We all applaud and commend the great work done. This 
has been a very difficult job. While those of us who were home in 
August, doing the things we do--having townhall meetings and doing 
campaign events--you and Susan were here doing work to get us in a 
position so when we came back here there would be an instrument that 
you could recommend to the other members of your committee who worked 
with you during this downtime in August--most of it down. This vehicle 
is now about to be completed. It is a sea change. It is the first part 
of what the 9/11 Commission recommended, and it is good work. The 
Senator from Connecticut and Senator Collins should feel very good 
about their accomplishment. I think it is not only a significant 
improvement from what we had, it is a sea change in what we had before. 
The American people are going to be safer as a result of this. Congress 
is going to be more responsible as a result.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Nevada for his 
kind words. I thank him for his characteristic presence and support on 
the floor.
  This has been an extraordinary chapter in my own legislative career 
here and one that I am very grateful to have had. It has been a real 
honor to work with Senator Collins. I think from the beginning she and 
I went into this process having had a good relationship working on the 
committee as Chair and ranking member. This was a moment where we 
should be working together without any regard to party liabilities or 
party caucuses; this was an urgent matter of national security.
  America was attacked on 9/11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission report was an 
indictment of various parts of our intelligence and security systems--
border security, for instance--and an appeal for urgent action to close 
those gaps, to strengthen where we are vulnerable; again, an enemy to 
cause us harm and

[[Page 20970]]

death, the likes of which we have never faced before; as someone else 
wrote, ``an enemy who hates us more than they love their own lives.''
  Senator Collins and I from the beginning went forward on not only a 
bipartisan basis but on a nonpartisan basis--which turned out to be the 
case in our committee as well--and with the strong support of the 
bipartisan leadership of Senator Frist and Senator Daschle. That has 
been the case on the floor of the Senate.
  I am proud to say that I believe the proposal came from the 
Governmental Affairs Committee as a strong proposal. I feel that within 
a half hour of moving to final passage it has grown stronger as a 
result of action taken by the full Senate on the floor.
  There is work yet to be done. Obviously, passing the Senate doesn't 
make it law; we have to go to conference and present something to the 
President which he can sign. But I think everyone here has caught the 
moment of urgency and responded to it in the national interest. This is 
a great way for us to end this session. I am speaking now apart from 
the national security implications--just what service in the Senate is 
all about and what message we send to the American people.
  The message here is not just in the content of this law proposal but 
in the way we have done it, which is we are capable still in an 
increasingly political or partisan time, particularly prior to a 
national election, to put all that aside and do what is best for the 
American people.
  I note the presence on the floor of my friend and colleague from 
Arizona. He and I have worked very hard together.
  We thank our colleagues on both sides. In addition to the core parts 
of the Governmental Affairs Committee bill which adopted the critical 
intelligence recommendations of the 9/11 Commission establishing a 
national intelligence director, a national counterterrorism center, 
Senator McCain and I offered amendments which accomplish and respond to 
all of the other major recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with 
regard to border security, for instance, and foreign policy; outreach 
to the Muslim world so that this bill, as we are ready to vote on it, 
really meets the challenges of the 9/11 Commission and responds to the 
pleas of the families who lost loved ones on 9/11 to do whatever we 
humanly could to make sure nothing like 9/11 ever happens again in the 
United States of America. I believe the product we are about to vote on 
does exactly that.
  I thank the Chair and note the presence of other colleagues on the 
floor. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. President, I rise at this time as we head toward a 
vote on final passage to voice my strong support for this legislation. 
But equally important, I wish to pay tribute to the work of Senator 
Lieberman and Senator Collins in fashioning this legislation in a 
bipartisan way. I am pleased to serve on the Governmental Affairs 
Committee with both of them.
  This has been put together in a way that reflects the core 
recommendations of the September 11 Commission. It takes our 
intelligence-gathering system and creates a strong intelligence 
director but gives that director the kind of budget and personnel 
responsibility that will enable him to be effective as we continue to 
fight a long war on terrorism--a global fight the length of which we 
can't determine right now but whose priority and importance is 
undisputed. It takes all of the assets of our intelligence-gathering 
network--the assets that serve our national intelligence operation but 
puts them under the national intelligence director--and gives that 
director the authority and the flexibility that is going to be 
necessary to be effective.
  It deals with important issues such as border security and 
transportation today under the responsibility of the Commerce 
Committee. It creates a counterterrorism center--something that has 
already been done. But it is important that we authorize the 
counterterrorism center which is going to be responsible for putting 
together all of our efforts in dealing with terrorist threats, 
collecting and distributing that to law enforcement officials, and 
making sure that our objective of identifying threats to this country, 
whether it is through financing or the movement of personnel and 
materials, is done effectively.
  While this legislation responds to the September 11 Commission 
recommendations, I think it is also important to recognize that the 
September 11 Commission report dealt with the weaknesses that led to 
the attacks in New York City and Washington and the downing of the 
plane in Pennsylvania. In order for this legislation to be effective, 
we need to continue to make sure all of our intelligence assets are 
focused on the future. There are going to be new threats and new 
challenges in what will be an evolving fight. The counterterrorism 
center is going to have to evolve over time to deal with new threats 
from different parts of the world.
  We are going to have to improve our techniques for information 
sharing. We are going to have to develop new technologies for 
information gathering around the world. We will have to continue to 
improve our human intelligence system--something that was, 
unfortunately, lacking in the years which led up to September 11. This 
is going to be a continuing process of change.
  I think it is most important that this legislation creates the 
infrastructure and a culture and a leadership structure that can 
respond to these changes which can evolve with the times and that can 
deal with the unexpected.
  If there is one thing we can be sure of, it is that the fighting of 
terrorism around the world will include many unexpected, unpredictable 
events. But if we are to succeed, we want to make sure our 
intelligence-gathering operation has all the tools and the support that 
is necessary.
  This is a very strong piece of legislation. It was put together in a 
bipartisan way, but it is not strong because it is bipartisan. I think 
it is receiving the bipartisan support because it is a strong, 
thoughtful piece of legislation.
  We have a lot of work left to do. We are going to go to a conference 
with the House, and that in and of itself will be a long process to 
overcome any differences in the legislation. But I hope in the end and 
I believe in the end this will be a bill that makes our intelligence-
gathering capability and our ability to fight terrorism around the 
world stronger and which will meet with the core and the thrust of the 
September 11 Commission report.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, later this afternoon the Senate is 
expected to adopt an amendment by the majority leader that establishes 
a national counterproliferation center. Establishing such a center now 
is premature and prejudges the ongoing work of the WMD Commission on 
which I have the honor of serving.
  I am one who said we have to get this done, and have done everything 
under my power to be of some small assistance to the managers of the 
bill to complete our work on the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. So 
I find myself in kind of an interesting position saying that we ought 
to slow down on this one, but I am saying it because this issue was not 
addressed by the 9/11 Commission.
  The President asked the WMD Commission to examine whether the U.S. 
Government should establish a national counterproliferation center and 
to offer our recommendation. If I may quote from the President's 
remarks on the day that he announced the establishment of the WMD 
Commission:

       Given the growing threat of weapons and missile 
     proliferation in our world, it may also be necessary to 
     create a similar center in our government to bring together 
     our intelligence analysis planning and operations to track 
     and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I 
     asked the committee commission headed by Judge Laurence 
     Silberman and Senator Chuck Robb to determine the merits of 
     creating such a center.

  In other words, the WMD Commission has been chartered to determine 
the creation of such a center. I have to tell my colleagues, as a 
member of that

[[Page 20971]]

Commission, we have not yet reached a point where we could either 
recommend or not recommend. The Commission and its staff have held a 
number of discussions on the desirability of establishing a 
counterproliferation center, and we will soon examine the structure and 
responsibilities that such a center might entail, if it should be 
established at all. In response to the President's specific request, we 
will issue a formal recommendation in our final report in March.
  This amendment could seriously undermine the work of the WMD 
Commission. The amendment would establish a national 
counterproliferation center before the Commission has even had a chance 
to fully study the issue. Rather than waiting for an in-depth review of 
the pros and cons of moving ahead with such a center--a review that 
will be fully completed in March--this amendment goes ahead and does it 
anyway. The proponents of this amendment, and I understand that, have 
argued that the center would not be established for a year after 
enactment of the underlying bill and the structures and 
responsibilities could be changed later. But if we are planning to 
delay establishing the center for a year and if we are open to changes 
which would presumably require changes in law, then why are we passing 
this amendment? Why interrupt the work of the WMD Commission when we 
could have the benefit of their assessment in a few months?
  If the WMD Commission concludes no center is needed, or something 
different is more appropriate, then it would be very hard to find an 
opportunity to take this recommendation into account, short of passing 
legislation that will rescind this amendment if it is enacted.
  I don't believe we should interfere with the WMD Commission's work. 
What we should do is allow all of the facts to be considered and 
debated, and then we can take the appropriate actions at that time.
  Let's make no mistake, establishing this center would be a very 
significant action by the Congress. It cuts to the heart of the 
security issues that we all agree are critical to our Nation. We need 
to make sure that if we are going to do this, we do it right. We should 
await the WMD Commission's report, hear a variety of opinions, and 
structure the center, if it is needed, in a way that makes the most 
sense of the task at hand. We should not take the shortcuts on an issue 
of such importance, but I am afraid we are on the verge of doing just 
that.
  We owe it to the American people to fully assess the implications of 
building a national counterproliferation center. This will be far 
reaching. I don't believe any Members have had a chance to examine this 
in any detail. The amendment puts the cart before the horse and I 
strongly oppose it.
  I repeat again, the 9/11 Commission did not address the issue of 
counterproliferation. They addressed a broad variety of issues but 
counterproliferation was not one of them. And weapons of mass 
destruction, in the sense of the charter of the WMD Commission, was not 
part of their deliberations.
  I have strongly supported the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I am 
proud of the work Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have done in 
addressing every single one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations with 
the exception of two that have to do with the congressional 
reorganization.
  Having said that, this amendment is out of the purview of the 
September 11 Commission and, frankly, out of the purview of this 
pending legislation.
  The majority leader has assured me there will be language, certain 
caveats about how it could be changed, et cetera, and I appreciate 
that. We have had a significant dialog on the issue. But the difference 
I have with the amendment and the majority leader is basically that we 
have said we are going to establish this national counterproliferation 
center, period.
  This is not an issue of national emergency. I think it does a 
disservice to the WMD Commission on which I serve, which would report 
out in March their recommendations and conclusions, and we would be 
acting, then, on far firmer ground.
  Maybe we can talk about it more after this bill is passed. I know the 
White House has severe reservations about this amendment. Maybe we 
could continue a dialog on it and at least make this amendment 
significantly more palatable so that the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission recommendations that come out in March can be fully and 
completely considered.
  I thank the majority leader for his commitment to maintaining a 
dialog on this issue. I may not be able to speak again in the Senate, 
but I again express my profound and deep appreciation to Senator 
Collins and Senator Lieberman who have displayed adequately for all 
Americans as well as Members of this body that if there is a cause 
great enough and people good enough that we will act in a bipartisan 
fashion for the good of this Nation.
  I have been in this body for only 18 years, but this is one of my 
prouder moments because of the way this entire body has acted in the 
national interest.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                Amendment No. 3895, as Further Modified

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to comment on the amendment we will 
be voting on in a bit. It does center on the establishment of a 
counterproliferation center.
  I appreciate the comments of my distinguished colleague from Arizona. 
We have had the opportunity to talk over the course of today about this 
amendment and we have a modification. I have talked to the White House 
and, based on that conversation, made further modifications.
  The reason we should vote on this amendment and it should be a part 
of this package that we can all be very proud of passing here in 10, 
15, or 20 minutes is that the greatest threat facing our country is not 
a terrorist. We all know it is not just the terrorists. The greatest 
threat is a terrorist armed with some sort of weapon of mass 
destruction.
  In debate the other night before 60 million people, President Bush 
and Senator Kerry cited the nexus between proliferation and terrorism 
being their single greatest concern and the most significant challenge 
our country faces. This whole concept of counterproliferation--talk 
about a counterproliferation center is not a new idea, but it is a new 
component of U.S. policy and has been looking at the safety and 
security of the American people and an overhaul of our intelligence 
gathering and intelligence system. The counterproliferation is an 
important component to be addressed.
  Counterproliferation is a broad topic and it includes everything the 
United States and its allies do to halt, to deter, to stop, to roll 
back the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery 
systems and related materials.
  It means interdicting these dangerous materials before they get into 
the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists. It means stopping 
these items before terrorist groups can assemble them into weapons and 
deliver them to our homeland.
  Again, we are talking about counterproliferation, not just 
counterterrorism. But counterproliferation also means unraveling those 
proliferation networks that supply, sustain, finance, and enable 
proliferation suppliers and customers. They are the linkages and supply 
chains between countries that proliferate, firms that proliferate, 
middlemen, and their customers around the globe.
  The most famous network unraveled by the U.S. and its partners was 
the AQ Khan network. It was this network that supplied Libya, Iran, and 
possibly others, with nuclear equipment, materials, and know-how. 
Counterprolif-
eration works, but it takes close cooperation, it takes close 
coordination, and it takes teamwork within the United States, and with 
our friends and allies around the world.
  The most famous interdiction of recent times was the stopping of the 
BBC China, a ship that was delivering nuclear parts and components to 
Libya before being interdicted at a friendly port by some of our 
European allies. This interdiction had a major effect on

[[Page 20972]]

prompting Colonel Qadhafi to come clean and to give up his programs.
  With more and more countries possibly pursuing weapons of mass 
destruction programs, and with those same proliferators skirting 
international laws, treaties, and export control regimes, 
counterproliferation can help fill the gap and slow or stop this 
dangerous trade.
  The President's Proliferation Security Initiative was a positive step 
in this direction, but there is more that we can do and we should do. 
This amendment directs what we can and should do.
  The President's Proliferation Security Initiative is supported by 
over 60 countries, and nearly two dozen are active participants. As we 
expand globally, however, we, at the same time, need to develop 
internally. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission called for strengthening the 
Proliferation Security Initiative in its report and its 
recommendations.
  Establishing a National Counterterrorism Center is necessary. We are 
doing that. But the National Counterterrorism Center will be focusing 
on terrorists and terrorist groups. The Nation needs a similar center 
that, working closely with the National counterterrorism Center, will 
focus, clarify, and coordinate our country's counter-
proliferation efforts.
  In other words, as the counterterrorism center focuses on the 
customers, the end users of these dangerous weapons--the terrorists--
the national counterproliferation center will be focusing on the 
suppliers and brokers and distributors of these weapons. This separate 
center will endeavor to stop these activities before they ever reach 
the terrorists, before they ever reach the bad guys.
  That is what my amendment does. Establishing a national counterpro-
liferation center not only promotes this critical function called 
counter-
proliferation that is so necessary to defend our country, it also 
breaks down the stovepipes that currently exist within the executive 
branch.
  This amendment tracks very closely to the structure, authorities, and 
roles established for the National Counterterrorism Center. Further, we 
have made changes to this amendment as amendments to the National 
Counterterrorism Center have been offered on the floor.
  This amendment has also been modified to make clear that counterpro-
liferation does not include programs such as the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program and other threat reduction programs; that our 
traditional nonproliferation efforts as they pertain to treaties and 
regimes are not included; and that it does not apply to programs that 
provide protective gear, clothing, and other items that protect our 
troops on the battlefield from weapons of mass destruction attacks.
  Finally, as my distinguished colleague from Arizona said, I am well 
aware--we all are--that the President has a Commission studying this 
issue. That is why this amendment sets the parameters for a national 
counterpro-
liferation center without getting into the explicit detail. It also 
does not call for any existing agencies or efforts to be 
disestablished.
  The amendment is also consistent with the framework and authorities 
for the NID that have been established in the underlying bill.
  I have also modified the implementation date so that this center does 
not have to be established until late next year.
  All of this gives the President the flexibility to fine-tune the 
center based on the findings of his Commission. It also gives him time 
to establish the center, particularly since the administration will be 
busy in the coming months setting up the counterterrorism center.
  The bottom line is this: Just as we take the offensive in the global 
war on terrorism, we must similarly take the offensive in stopping the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our nonproliferation 
efforts are a good defense, but they are not sufficient. We need a good 
offense, and counterpro-
liferation is just the answer.
  The role of the national counterpro-
liferation center, therefore, is to coordinate, plan, and manage those 
efforts. It is to break down the stovepipes that exist in this nascent 
effort. It is to deny the terrorists and others access to weapons of 
mass destruction and their materials while the National 
Counterterrorism Center works to dismantle terrorist groups and bring 
terrorists to justice.
  Mr. President, establishing a national counterproliferation center is 
not only the smart thing to do, it is something we must do. I encourage 
my colleagues to give this amendment their full support. Doing so will 
make the country and the American people much safer.
  Let me also add, in response to the Senator from Arizona, we have 
received input from the White House on how to improve this amendment. 
We have incorporated their ideas. The White House, at this point, does 
not oppose this amendment.
  I am confident this amendment does strike the proper balance between 
establishing the national counterprolif-
eration center and, at the same time, leaving the President more than 
sufficient time--a year--and flexibility to modify it as he sees fit or 
as the Commission recommends.
  This amendment is crafted in a manner so as to leave the whole range 
of details for the President and the Commission to flush out as they 
see fit.
  Finally, the modified amendment also includes a provision we worked 
on with a number of Senators, including Senator McCain's staff, that 
makes clear that the intent of this amendment is not to undermine or 
override the Commission.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and do appreciate the consideration 
of my colleagues in supporting this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic whip.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on the 
leader's amendment. The modification has been sent to the desk. Mr. 
President, this is the Frist amendment No. 3895, as further modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is further modified.
  The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:

       On page 94, strike line 5 and insert the following:

     SEC. 144. NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER.

       (a) National Counterproliferation Center.--(1) Within one 
     year of enactment of this Act there shall be established 
     within the National Intelligence Authority a National 
     Counterproliferation Center.
       (2) The purpose of the Center is to develop, direct, and 
     coordinate the efforts and activities of the United States 
     Government to interdict the trafficking of weapons of mass 
     destruction, related materials and technologies, and their 
     delivery systems to terrorists, terrorist organizations, 
     other non-state actors of concern, and state actors of 
     concern.
       (b) Director of National Counterproliferation Center.--(1) 
     There is a Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center, who shall be the head of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center, and who shall be appointed by 
     the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
     Senate.
       (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center shall 
     have significant expertise in matters relating to the 
     national security of the United States and matters relating 
     to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their 
     delivery systems, and related materials and technologies that 
     threaten the national security of the United States, its 
     interests, and allies.
       (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center may not, while so serving, serve 
     in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence 
     community, except to the extent that the individual serving 
     as Director of the National Counterproliferation Center is 
     doing so in an acting capacity.
       (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center shall report to the National 
     Intelligence Director on the budget, personnel, activities, 
     and programs of the National Counterproliferation Center.

[[Page 20973]]

       (2) The Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on 
     the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center under subsection (g).
       (3) The Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center shall report to the President and the National 
     Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of 
     counterproliferation operations.
       (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center shall be as follows:
       (1) To develop and unify strategy for the 
     Counterproliferation efforts of the United States Government.
       (2) To make recommendations to the National Intelligence 
     Director with regard to the collection and analysis 
     requirements and priorities of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center.
       (3) To integrate counterproliferation intelligence 
     activities of the United States Government, both inside and 
     outside the United States, and with other governments.
       (4) To conduct stgrategic planning and develop recommended 
     courses of action for multilateral and United States 
     Government counterproliferation activities, which--
       (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the 
     President) of the United States Government; and
       (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses 
     of action, parameters for such courses of action, 
     coordination of agency operational activities, 
     recommendations for operational activities, and assignment of 
     national, departmental, or agency responsibilities.
       (5) To ensure that the collection, analysis, and 
     utilization of counterproliferation intelligence, and the 
     conduct of counterproliferation operations, by the United 
     States Government are informed by the analysis of all-source 
     intelligence.
       (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National 
     Counterproliferation Center.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, at the direction of the President and the 
     National Intelligence Director, the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center shall--
       (1) serve as a principal adviser to the President and the 
     National Intelligence Director on operations relating to 
     interagency counterproliferation planning and activities;
       (2) provide unified strategic direction for the 
     counterproliferation efforts of the United States Government 
     and for the effective integration and deconfliction of 
     counterproliferation intelligence and operations across 
     agency boundaries, both inside and outside the United States, 
     and with foreign governments;
       (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the extent to which the counterproliferation 
     program recommendations and budget proposals of the 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government conform to the policies and priorities established 
     by the President and the National Security Council;
       (4) advise the President on, the selections of personnel to 
     head the nonmilitary operating entities of the United States 
     Government with principal missions relating to 
     Counterproliferation;
       (5) advise the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the science and technology research and 
     development requirements and priorities of the 
     counterproliferation programs and activities of the United 
     States Government; and
       (6) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence 
     Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law;
       (f) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and 
     maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a 
     Directorate of Intelligence.
       (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility 
     within the United States Government for the analysis of 
     information regarding proliferators (including individuals, 
     entities, organizations, companies, and states) and their 
     networks, from all sources of intelligence, whether collected 
     inside or outside the United States.
       (3) The Directorate shall--
       (A) be the principal repository within the United States 
     Government for all-source information on suspected 
     proliferators, their networks, their activities, and their 
     capabilities;
       (B) propose intelligence collection and analysis 
     requirements and priorities for action by elements of the 
     intelligence community inside and outside the United States;
       (C) have primary responsibility within the United States 
     Government for net assessments and warnings about weapons of 
     mass destruction proliferation threats, which assessments and 
     warnings shall be based on a comparison of the intentions and 
     capabilities of proliferators with assessed national 
     vulnerabilities and countermeasures;
       (D) conduct through a separate office independent analyses 
     (commonly referred to as ``red teaming'') of intelligence 
     collected and analyzed with respect to proliferation; and
       (E) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
       (g) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and 
     maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a 
     Directorate of Planning.
       (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for 
     conducting strategic planning and developing courses of 
     action for counterproliferation activities, as described in 
     subsection (d)(4).
       (3) The Directorate shall--
       (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency 
     plans, to counter proliferation activities based on policy 
     objectives and priorities established by the National 
     Security Council;
       (B) develop plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input 
     from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements 
     of the United States Government who have expertise in the 
     priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and 
     operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with 
     respect to counterproliferation;
       (C) assign responsibilities and propose courses of action 
     for counterproliferation operations to the departments and 
     agencies of the United States Government (including the 
     Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
     Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and 
     agencies of the United States Government), consistent with 
     the authorities of such departments and agencies;
       (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under 
     subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such 
     operations as necessary;
       (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the performance of the departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the United States with regard to the plans 
     developed under subparagraph (A); and
       (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
       (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of 
     operations assigned under paragraph (3).
       (h) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may 
     appoint deputy directors of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the 
     Center as the National Intelligence Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (2) To assist the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center in fulfilling the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under this section, the National 
     Intelligence Director shall employ in the National 
     Counterproliferation Center a professional staff having an 
     expertise in matters relating to such duties and 
     responsibilities.
       (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under paragraph (2), the National 
     Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the 
     excepted service such positions in the Center as the National 
     Intelligence Director considers appropriate.
       (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the analytical staff of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the 
     intelligence community and from such other personnel in the 
     United States Government as the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate.
       (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), 
     the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time--
       (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of 
     personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to 
     the National Counterproliferation Center from any element of 
     the intelligence community that the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate; and
       (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or 
     element of the United States Government and not funded within 
     the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, 
     agency, or other element concerned.
       (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of 
     personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director 
     under subparagraph (A)(i).
       (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government receiving a request for transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
       (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the 
     National Counterproliferation Center under this subsection 
     shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center on all 
     matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility 
     and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the 
     missions of the Center.
       (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or 
     detailed to the National Counterproliferation Center under 
     this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of 
     such personnel at the Center.
       (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center may,

[[Page 20974]]

     with the approval of the National Intelligence Director, 
     reward the staff of the Center for meritorious performance by 
     the provision of such performance awards as the National 
     Intelligence Director shall prescribe.
       (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center any 
     responsibility, power, or authority of the National 
     Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8).
       (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the staff of the National Counterproliferation Center has 
     access to all databases and information maintained by the 
     elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to 
     the duties of the Center.
       (i) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The 
     elements of the intelligence community and the other 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the 
     National Counterproliferation Center in carrying out its 
     missions under this section.
       (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government under this subsection shall include, but not be 
     limited to--
       (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, 
     whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the 
     National Counterproliferation Center in a manner consistent 
     with the laws and regulations of the United States and 
     consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4);
       (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center to ensure that ongoing operations 
     of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with 
     operations planned by the Center;
       (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center on the performance of such 
     department, agency, or element in implementing 
     responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or 
     element through joint operations plans; and
       (D) the provision to the analysts of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center electronic access in real time to 
     information and intelligence collected by such department, 
     agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the 
     Center.
       (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National 
     Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, 
     or element of the United States Government on a plan 
     developed or responsibility assigned by the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under this subsection, the 
     National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head 
     of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the 
     President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement.
       (j) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``counterproliferation'' means--
       (A) activities, programs and measures for interdicting 
     (including deterring, preventing, halting, and rolling back) 
     the transfer or transport (whether by air, land or sea) of 
     weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and 
     related materials and technologies to and from states and 
     non-state actors (especially terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations) of proliferation concern;
       (B) enhanced law enforcement activities and cooperation to 
     deter, prevent, halt, and rollback proliferation-related 
     networks, activities, organizations, and individuals, and 
     bring those involved to justice; and
       (C) activities, programs, and measures for identifying, 
     collecting, and analyzing information and intelligence 
     related to the transfer or transport of weapons, systems, 
     materials, and technologies as described in subparagraph (A).
       (2) ``Counterproliferation'' does not include--
       (A) the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other threat 
     reduction programs run or administered by the Department of 
     Defense, Department of Energy and Department of State;
       (B) the nonproliferation efforts and activities of the 
     United States Government as they apply to the implementation 
     and management of nonproliferation treaties, conventions, and 
     regimes; or,
       (C) programs designated to protect members of the Armed 
     Forces from the employment of weapons of mass destruction by 
     developing and fielding protective equipment, gear and 
     clothing, and other means to enhance the survivability of 
     Armed Forces personnel on the battlefield.
       (3) The term ``states and non-state actors of proliferation 
     concern'' refers to countries or entities (including 
     individuals, entities, organizations, companies, and 
     networks) that should be subject to counterproliferation 
     activities because of their actions or intent to engage in 
     proliferation through--
       (A) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or 
     nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or
       (B) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) 
     of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or 
     related materials.
       (k) Reports on Eestablishment.--(1)(A) The President shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the plans of the President to 
     establish the National Counterproliferation Center as 
     required by this section.
       (B) The report shall be submitted not later than six months 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later 
     than 30 days before the date of the establishment of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center.
       (2) The President shall submit to Congress from time to 
     time such updates of the plans under paragraph (1)(a) as the 
     President considers appropriate. Each update shall include 
     such recommendations for legislative or administrative action 
     as the President considers appropriate to improve the 
     effectiveness of the National Counterproliferation Center 
     consistent with its mission.
       (m) Construction With Certain Conditions.--Nothing in this 
     section shall override recommendations contained in the 
     forthcoming final report of the President's Commission on 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction, established by Executive Order 
     in February 2004, that will improve the effectiveness of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center: Provided further, That 
     in the case of a conflict between the WMD Commission's final 
     report and the National Counterproliferation Center as 
     established in this section, the Congress and the President 
     shall consider the Commission's recommendations and act as 
     soon as practicable thereafter to make such modifications to 
     statute as deemed necessary.

     SEC. 145. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as further modified.
  The amendment (No. 3895), as further modified, was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. REID. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have a series of cleared amendments at 
the desk. Some of them are modifications of previously submitted 
amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be 
considered en bloc, modified as necessary, agreed to en bloc, with the 
motions to reconsider laid upon the table.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3896

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Frist 
amendment No. 3896 be considered at this point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is now 
pending.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3896) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendment No. 3876, Withdrawn

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have worked with the distinguished 
managers. Like so many things in the course of our legislative process, 
we have worked out a very large number of items, and they have been 
accepted. One remains and, in my judgment, the various good-faith 
proposals simply do not meet the criteria that I feel has to be 
established. So I have two courses of action. One, which I intend to 
follow, is to withdraw the amendment. The second, of course, would be 
to press this on with a vote. Frankly, given the structure of the 
vote--I don't say this as criticism--it does not allow the time in 
which to get sufficient information and viewpoints to my colleagues to 
prevail on such a vote. So I think the better course of action for this 
Senator is to continue to press my concerns in the course of the 
conference.
  At this time, I call up amendment No. 3876.

[[Page 20975]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. For a little expression of the explanation of the 
amendment, I go back to two very important documents. The first is a 
letter dated September 28, 2004, Statement of Administration Policy. I 
ask unanimous consent that the following paragraph be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not 
     include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and 
     Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal; the 
     Administration supports inclusion of this provision in the 
     Senate bill. The legislation should also recognize that its 
     provisions would be executed to the extent consistent with 
     the constitutional authority of the President: to conduct the 
     foreign affairs of the United States; to withhold information 
     the disclosure of which could impair the foreign relations, 
     the national security, deliberative processes of the 
     Executive, or the performanceof the Executive's 
     constitutional duties; to recommend for congressional 
     consideration such measures as the President may judge 
     necessary or expedient; and to supervise the unitary 
     executive.

  Mr. WARNER. That paragraph states that:

       The Administration opposes the Committee's attempt to 
     define in statute programs that should be included in the 
     National Intelligence Program.

  I believe we have to work this out in a clearer fashion. It is also 
more clear than what is in the amendment structure today, so I will put 
that aside and then go to the subject of this amendment.
  The last paragraph of the September 28 letter reads:

       The Administration notes that the Committee did not include 
     Section 6, (``Preservation of Authority and Accountability'') 
     of the Administration's proposal; the Administration supports 
     the inclusion of this provision in the Senate bill.

  That was the basic intent of my amendment; therefore, I will take the 
opportunity to work on that during the course of conference in the 
hopes of achieving that goal.
  I thank the managers for their effort to work on it, and we will 
hopefully work on it further to achieve this administration goal.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the cooperation of 
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. We have incorporated many 
of his suggestions into the bill. I appreciate his advice.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                        Modification to No. 3807

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify 
amendment No. 3807, with the changes at the desk, notwithstanding its 
prior adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The modification is as follows:

     hold driver's licenses and personal identification cards.
       (4) Negotiated rulemaking.--
       (A) In general.--Before publishing the proposed regulations 
     required by paragraph (2) to carry out this title, the 
     Secretary of Transportation shall establish a negotiated 
     rulemaking process pursuant to subchapter IV of chapter 5 of 
     title 5, United States Code (5 U.S.C. 561 et seq.).
       (B) Representation on negotiated rulemaking committee.--Any 
     negotiated rulemaking committee established by the Secretary 
     of Transportation pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include 
     representatives from--
       (i) among State offices that issue driver's licenses or 
     personal identification cards;
       (ii) among State elected officials;
       (iii) the Department of Homeland Security; and
       (iv) among interested parties, including organizations with 
     technological and operational expertise in document security 
     and organizations that represent the interests of applicants 
     for such licenses or identification cards.
       (C) Time requirement.--The process described in 
     subparagraph (A) shall be conducted in a timely manner to 
     ensure that--
       (i) any recommendation for a proposed rule or report is 
     provided to the Secretary of Transportation not later than 9 
     months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (ii) a final rule is promulgated not later than 18 months 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.
       (c) Grants to States.--
       (1) Assistance in meeting federal standards.--Beginning on 
     the date a final regulation is promulgated under subsection 
     (b)(2), the Secretary of Transportation shall award grants to 
     States to assist them in conforming to the minimum standards 
     for driver's licenses and personal identification cards set 
     forth in the regulation.
       (2) Allocation of grants.--The Secretary of Transportation 
     shall award grants to States under this subsection based on 
     the proportion that the estimated average annual number of 
     driver's licenses and personal identification cards issued by 
     a State applying for a grant bears to the average annual 
     number of such documents issued by all States.
       (3) Minimum allocation.--Notwithstanding paragraph (2), 
     each State shall receive not less than 0.5 percent of the 
     grant funds made available under this subsection.
       (d) Extension of Effective Date.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation may extend the date specified under subsection 
     (b)(1)(A) for up to 2 years for driver's licenses issued by a 
     State if the Secretary determines that the State made 
     reasonable efforts to comply with the date under such 
     subsection but was unable to do so.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for 
     each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2009, such sums as may 
     be necessary to carry out this section.

     SEC. __08. SOCIAL SECURITY CARDS.

       (a) Security Enhancements.--The Commissioner of Social 
     Security shall--
       (1) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
     this section, issue regulations to restrict the issuance of 
     multiple replacement social security cards to any individual 
     to minimize fraud;
       (2) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     section, require verification of records provided by an 
     applicant for an original social security card, other than 
     for purposes of enumeration at birth; and
       (3) within 18 months after the date of enactment of this 
     section, add death, fraud, and work authorization indicators 
     to the social security number verification system.
       (b) Interagency Security Task Force.--The Commissioner of 
     Social Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security, shall form an interagency task force for 
     the purpose of further improving the security of social 
     security cards and numbers. Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of enactment of this section, the task force shall 
     establish security requirements, including--
       (1) standards for safeguarding social security cards from 
     counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft;
       (2) requirements for verifying documents submitted for the 
     issuance of replacement cards; and
       (3) actions to increase enforcement against the fraudulent 
     use or issuance of social security numbers and cards.


 Amendments Nos. 3733, As Modified, 3760, 3837, As Modified, 3861, As 
 Modified, 3880, As Modified, 3924, As Modified, 3977, 3978, 3979, and 
                                  3980

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Senator Lieberman and I have a series of 
cleared amendments at the desk. Some of these are modifications of 
previously submitted amendments. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendments be considered en bloc, modified as necessary, 
agreed to en bloc, with the motions to reconsider laid upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                    amendment no. 3733, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON USE OF DATABASES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Data-mining.--The term ``data-mining'' means a query or 
     search or other analysis of 1 or more electronic databases, 
     where--
       (A) at least 1 of the databases was obtained from or 
     remains under the control of a non-Federal entity, or the 
     information was acquired initially by another department or 
     agency of the Federal Government;
       (B) the search does not use a specific individual's 
     personal identifiers to acquire information concerning that 
     individual; and
       (C) a department or agency of the Federal Government or a 
     non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal Government 
     is conducting the query or search or other analysis to find a 
     pattern indicating terrorist, criminal, or other law 
     enforcement related activity.
       (2) Database.--The term ``database'' does not include 
     telephone directories, information publicly available via the 
     Internet or

[[Page 20976]]

     available by any other means to any member of the public 
     without payment of a fee, or databases of judicial and 
     administrative opinions.
       (b) Reports on Data-Mining Activities.--
       (1) Requirement for report.--Beginning one year after the 
     effective date of this section the National Intelligence 
     Director shall submit a report, public to the extent possible 
     with a classified annex, to Congress on all activities of the 
     intelligence community to use or develop data-mining 
     technology.
       (2) Content of report.--A report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall include, for each activity to use or develop data-
     mining technology that is required to be covered by the 
     report, the following information:
       (A) A thorough description of the data-mining technology, 
     the plans for the use of such technology, the data that will 
     be used, and the target dates for the deployment of the data-
     mining technology.
       (B) An assessment of the likely impact of the 
     implementation of the data-mining technology on privacy and 
     civil liberties.
       (C) A thorough discussion of the policies, procedures, and 
     guidelines that are to be developed and applied in the use of 
     such technology for data-mining in order to--
       (i) protect the privacy and due process rights of 
     individuals; and
       (ii) ensure that only accurate information is collected and 
     used.
       (D) Any necessary classified information in an annex that 
     shall be available to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
     the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence and Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (3) Time for report.--The report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted not later than September 30th of each 
     year.
       (4) Expiration.--The requirements of this subsection shall 
     expire 4 years after the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3760

  (Purpose: To provide that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
 Board include in certain reports, any proposal that the Board advised 
             against, but actions were taken to implement)

       On page 158, line 5, strike ``and''.
       On page 158, line 9, strike the period and insert ``; 
     and''.
       On page 158, insert between lines 9 and 10, the following:
       (C) each proposal reviewed by the Board under subsection 
     (d)(1) that--
       (i) the Board advised against implementation; and
       (ii) notwithstanding such advice, actions were taken to 
     implement.


                    amendment no. 3837, as modified

       At the end, add the following:

  TITLE IV--ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY PILOT PROGRAM

     SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT.

       The Secretary of Homeland Security may carry out a pilot 
     program to test various advanced technologies that will 
     improve border security between ports of entry along the 
     northern border of the United States.

     SEC. 402. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Required Features.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall design the pilot program under this title to have the 
     following features:
       (1) Use of advanced technological systems, including 
     sensors, video, and unmanned aerial vehicles, for border 
     surveillance.
       (2) Use of advanced computing and decision integration 
     software for--
       (A) evaluation of data indicating border incursions;
       (B) assessment of threat potential; and
       (C) rapid real-time communication, monitoring, intelligence 
     gathering, deployment, and response.
       (3) Testing of advanced technology systems and software to 
     determine best and most cost-effective uses of advanced 
     technology to improve border security.
       (4) Operation of the program in remote stretches of border 
     lands with long distances between 24-hour ports of entry with 
     a relatively small presence of United States border patrol 
     officers.
       (5) Capability to expand the program upon a determination 
     by the Secretary that expansion would be an appropriate and 
     cost-effective means of improving border security.
       (b) Coordination With Other Agencies.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall ensure that the operation of the 
     pilot program under this title--
       (1) is coordinated among United States, State and local, 
     and Canadian law enforcement and border security agencies; 
     and
       (2) includes ongoing communication among such agencies.

     SEC. 403. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.

       (a) Procurement of Advanced Technology.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security may enter into contracts for the 
     procurement or use of such advanced technologies as the 
     Secretary determines appropriate for the pilot program under 
     this title.
       (b) Program Partnerships.--In carrying out the pilot 
     program, the Secretary of Homeland Security may provide for 
     the establishment of cooperative arrangements for 
     participation in the pilot program by such participants as 
     law enforcement and border security agencies referred to in 
     section 402(b), institutions of higher education, and private 
     sector entities.

     SEC. 404. REPORT.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     pilot program under this title.
       (b) Content.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
     the following matters:
       (1) A discussion of the implementation of the pilot 
     program, including the experience under the pilot program.
       (2) A recommendation regarding whether to expand the pilot 
     program along the entire northern border of the United States 
     and a timeline for the implementation of the expansion.

     SEC. 405. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out the pilot program under this title.


                    amendment no. 3861, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. BORDER SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall submit to the President and the appropriate committees 
     of Congress a comprehensive plan for the systematic 
     surveillance of the Southwest border of the United States by 
     remotely piloted aircraft.
       (b) Contents.--The plan submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall include--
       (1) recommendations for establishing command and control 
     centers, operations sites, infrastructure, maintenance, and 
     procurement;
       (2) cost estimates for the implementation of the plan and 
     ongoing operations;
       (3) recommendations for the appropriate agent within the 
     Department of Homeland Security to be the executive agency 
     for remotely piloted aircraft operations;
       (4) the number of remotely piloted aircraft required for 
     the plan;
       (5) the types of missions the plan would undertake, 
     including--
       (A) protecting the lives of people seeking illegal entry 
     into the United States;
       (B) interdicting illegal movement of people, weapons, and 
     other contraband across the border;
       (C) providing investigative support to assist in the 
     dismantling of smuggling and criminal networks along the 
     border;
       (D) using remotely piloted aircraft to serve as platforms 
     for the collection of intelligence against smugglers and 
     criminal networks along the border; and
       (E) further validating and testing of remotely piloted 
     aircraft for airspace security missions; and
       (6) the equipment necessary to carry out the plan.
       (7) A recommendation regarding whether to expand the pilot 
     program along the entire southwestern border.
       (c) Implementation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall implement the plan submitted under subsection (a) as a 
     pilot program as soon as sufficient funds are appropriated 
     and available for this purpose.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
     the provisions of this section.


                    amendment no. 3880, as modified

       On page 19, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
       (c) Consistency of Personnel Policies and Programs With 
     Certain Other Personnel Policies and Standards.--(1) The 
     personnel policies and programs developed and implemented 
     under subsection (a)(8) with respect to members of the 
     uniformed services shall be consistent with any other 
     personnel policies and standards applicable to the members of 
     the uniformed services.
       (2) It is the sense of the Senate that the NID shall seek 
     input from the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the 
     military departments, and, as appropriate, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security in developing and implementing such 
     policies and programs.
       On page 19, line 15, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(d)''.
       On page 20, line 4, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(e)''.


                    amendment nno. 3924, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) Definition of Enterprise Architecture.--In this 
     section, the term ``enterprise architecture'' means a 
     detailed outline or blueprint of the information technology 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that will satisfy the 
     ongoing mission and goals of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and that sets forth specific and identifiable 
     benchmarks.
       (b) Enterprise Architecture.--The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall--
       (1) continually maintain and update an enterprise 
     architecture; and
       (2) maintain a state of the art and up to date information 
     technology infrastructure that is in compliance with the 
     enterprise architecture of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.

[[Page 20977]]

       (c) Report.--Subject to subsection (d), the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall report to the House and 
     Senate Judiciary Committees, on an annual basis, on whether 
     the major information technology investments of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation are in compliance with the enterprise 
     architecture of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     identify any inability or expectation of inability to meet 
     the terms set forth in the enterprise architecture.
       (d) Failure to meet terms.--If the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation identifies any inability or 
     expectation of inability to meet the terms set forth in the 
     enterprise architecture in a report under subsection (c), the 
     report under subsection (c) shall--
       (1) be twice a year until the inability is corrected;
       (2) include a statement as to whether the inability or 
     expectation of inability to meet the terms set forth in the 
     enterprise architecture is substantially related to 
     resources; and
       (3) if the inability or expectation of inability is 
     substantially related to resources, include a request for 
     additional funding that would resolve the problem or a 
     request to reprogram funds that would resolve the problem.
       (e) Federal Bureau of Investigation's Enterprise 
     Architecture, Agency Plans and Reports--This section shall be 
     carried out in compliance with the requirements set forth in 
     Sec. 206(f) and (1).


                           amendment no. 3977

       On page 4, beginning on line 10, strike ``information 
     gathered, and activities'' and inserting ``foreign 
     intelligence gathered, and information gathering and other 
     activities''.
       On page 4, line 16, insert before the period the following: 
     ``, but does not include personnel, physical, document, or 
     communications security programs''.
       On page 23, line 8, strike the period and insert ``as it 
     pertains to those programs, projects, and activities within 
     the National Intelligence Program''.
       On page 24, line 10, insert ``transactional deposit'' after 
     ``establish''.
       On page 181, line 9, insert ``or involving intelligence 
     acquired through clandestine means'' before the period.


                           amendment no. 3978

(Purpose: to authorize the Secretary of State to increase the number of 
   consular officers, clarify the responsibilities and functions of 
 consular officers, and require the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
  increase the number of border patrol agents and customs enforcement 
                             investigators)

       At the end, add the following:

                        TITLE IV--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 401. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSULAR 
                   OFFICERS.

       (a) Increased Number of Consular Officers.--The Secretary 
     of State, in each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009, may 
     increase by 150 the number of positions for consular officers 
     above the number of such positions for which funds were 
     allotted for the preceding fiscal year.
       (b) Limitation on Use of Foreign Nationals for Visa 
     Screening.--
       (1) Immigrant visas.--Subsection (b) of section 222 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following: ``All immigrant visa 
     applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular 
     officer.''.
       (2) Nonimmigrant visas.--Subsection (d) of such section is 
     amended by adding at the end the following: ``All 
     nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and 
     adjudicated by a consular officer.''.
       (c) Training for Consular Officers in Detection of 
     Fraudulent Documents.--Section 305(a) of the Enhanced Border 
     Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1734(a)) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following: ``As part of 
     the consular training provided to such officers by the 
     Secretary of State, such officers shall also receive training 
     in detecting fraudulent documents and general document 
     forensics and shall be required as part of such training to 
     work with immigration officers conducting inspections of 
     applicants for admission into the United States at ports of 
     entry.''.
       (d) Assignment of Anti-Fraud Specialists.--
       (1) Survey regarding document fraud.--The Secretary of 
     State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, shall conduct a survey of each diplomatic and 
     consular post at which visas are issued to assess the extent 
     to which fraudulent documents are presented by visa 
     applicants to consular officers at such posts.
       (2) Requirement for specialist.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than July 31, 2005, the 
     Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security, identify the diplomatic and consular 
     posts at which visas are issued that experience the greatest 
     frequency of presentation of fraudulent documents by visa 
     applicants. The Secretary of State shall assign or designate 
     at each such post at least one full-time anti-fraud 
     specialist employed by the Department of State to assist the 
     consular officers at each such post in the detection of such 
     fraud.
       (B) Exceptions.--The Secretary of State is not required to 
     assign or designate a specialist as described in subparagraph 
     (A) at a diplomatic and consular post if an employee of the 
     Department of Homeland Security is assigned on a full-time 
     basis to such post under the authority in section 428 of the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236).

     SEC. 402. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME BORDER PATROL AGENTS.

       In each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall, subject to the availability of 
     appropriations for such purpose, increase by not less than 
     1,000 the number of positions for full-time active duty 
     border patrol agents within the Department of Homeland 
     Security above the number of such positions for which funds 
     were made available during the preceding fiscal year. Of the 
     additional border patrol agents, in each fiscal year not less 
     than 20 percent of such agents shall be assigned to duty 
     stations along the northern border of the United States.

     SEC. 403. INCREASE IN FULL-TIME IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
                   ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATORS.

       In each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall, subject to the availability of 
     appropriations for such purpose, increase by not less than 
     800 the number of positions for full-time active duty 
     investigators within the Department of Homeland Security 
     investigating violations of immigration laws (as defined in 
     section 101(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) above the number of such positions for 
     which funds were made available during the preceding fiscal 
     year.


                           amendment no. 3979

 (Purpose: To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to ensure that 
 nonimmigrant visas are not issued to individuals with connections to 
terrorism or who intend to carry out terrorist activities in the United 
                                States)

       At the end, add the following new title:

                      TITLE IV--VISA REQUIREMENTS

     SEC. 401. IN PERSON INTERVIEWS OF VISA APPLICANTS.

       (a) Requirement for Interviews.--Section 222 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the 
     Secretary of State shall require every alien applying for a 
     nonimmigrant visa--
       ``(1) who is at least 12 years of age and not more than 65 
     years of age to submit to an in person interview with a 
     consular officer unless the requirement for such interview is 
     waived--
       ``(A) by a consular official and such alien is within that 
     class of nonimmigrants enumerated in section 101(a)(15)(A) or 
     101(a)(15)(G) or is granted a diplomatic visa on a diplomatic 
     passport or on the equivalent thereof;
       ``(B) by a consular official and such alien is applying for 
     a visa--
       ``(i) not more than 12 months after the date on which the 
     alien's prior visa expired;
       ``(ii) for the classification under section 101(a)(15) for 
     which such prior visa was issued;
       ``(iii) from the consular post located in the country in 
     which the alien is a national; and
       ``(iv) the consular officer has no indication that the 
     alien has not complied with the immigration laws and 
     regulations of the United States; or
       ``(C) by the Secretary of State if the Secretary determines 
     that such waiver is--
       ``(i) in the national interest of the United States; or
       ``(ii) necessary as a result of unusual circumstances; and
       ``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), to submit to an in 
     person interview with a consular officer if such alien--
       ``(A) is not a national of the country in which the alien 
     is applying for a visa;
       ``(B) was previously refused a visa, unless such refusal 
     was overcome or a waiver of ineligibility has been obtained;
       ``(C) is listed in the Consular Lookout and Support System 
     (or successor system at the Department of State);
       ``(D) may not obtain a visa until a security advisory 
     opinion or other Department of State clearance is issued 
     unless such alien is--
       ``(i) within that class of nonimmigrants enumerated in 
     section 101(a)(15)(A) or 101(a)(15)(G); and
       ``(ii) not a national of a country that is officially 
     designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of 
     terrorism; or
       ``(E) is identified as a member of a group or sector that 
     the Secretary of State determines--
       ``(i) poses a substantial risk of submitting inaccurate 
     information in order to obtain a visa;
       ``(ii) has historically had visa applications denied at a 
     rate that is higher than the average rate of such denials; or
       ``(iii) poses a security threat to the United States.''.

     SEC. 402. VISA APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.

       Section 222(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1202(c)) is amended by

[[Page 20978]]

     inserting ``The alien shall provide complete and accurate 
     information in response to any request for information 
     contained in the application.'' after the second sentence.

     SEC. 403. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Notwithstanding section 341 or any other provision of this 
     Act, this title shall take effect 90 days after date of the 
     enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3980

 (Purpose: To require the establishment of pilot projects relating to 
 the coordination of information among emergency first responders, and 
                          for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. REGIONAL MODEL STRATEGIC PLAN PILOT PROJECTS.

       (a) Pilot Projects.--Consistent with sections 302 and 430 
     of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 182, 238), not 
     later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 
     Executive Director of the Office of State and Local 
     Government Coordination and Preparedness and the 
     Undersecretary for Science and Technology, shall establish 
     not fewer than 2 pilot projects in high threat urban areas or 
     regions that are likely to implement a national model 
     strategic plan.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of the pilot projects required 
     by this section shall be to develop a regional strategic plan 
     to foster interagency communication in the area in which it 
     is established and coordinate the gathering of all Federal, 
     State, and local first responders in that area, consistent 
     with the national strategic plan developed by the Department 
     of Homeland Security.
       (c) Selection Criteria.--In selecting urban areas for the 
     location of pilot projects under this section, the Secretary 
     shall consider--
       (1) the level of threat risk to the area, as determined by 
     the Department of Homeland Security;
       (2) the number of Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
     agencies located in the area;
       (3) the number of potential victims from a large scale 
     terrorist attack in the area; and
       (4) such other criteria reflecting a community's risk and 
     vulnerability as the Secretary determines is appropriate.
       (d) Interagency Assistance.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     provide assistance to the Secretary of Homeland Security, as 
     necessary for the development of the pilot projects required 
     by this section, including examining relevant standards, 
     equipment, and protocols in order to improve interagency 
     communication among first responders.
       (e) Reports to Congress.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall submit to Congress--
       (1) an interim report regarding the progress of the 
     interagency communications pilot projects required by this 
     section 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act; and
       (2) a final report 18 months after that date of enactment.
       (f) Funding.--There are authorized to be made available to 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this section.

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank everyone who has worked so hard 
on this bill, particularly my colleague and partner, Senator Lieberman.
  I believe we are ready to move to third reading.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall the bill, as amended, pass?
  Ms. COLLINS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Edwards) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 2, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 199 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (FL)
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Sununu
     Talent
     Thomas
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--2

     Byrd
     Hollings
       

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Edwards
     Kerry
       
  The bill (S. 2845), as amended, was passed.
  (The bill will be printed in a future edition of the Record.)
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________