[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 20477-20541]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and 
     the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     United States Government, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Collins Amendment No. 3705, to provide for homeland 
     security grant coordination and simplification.
       Lautenberg Amendment No. 3767, to specify that the National 
     Intelligence Director shall serve for one or more terms of up 
     to 5 years each.
       Kyl Amendment No. 3801, to modify the privacy and civil 
     liberties oversight.
       Feinstein Amendment No. 3718, to improve the intelligence 
     functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
       Stevens Amendment No. 3839, to strike section 201, relating 
     to public disclosure of intelligence funding.
       Ensign Amendment No. 3819, to require the Secretary of 
     State to increase the number of consular officers, clarify 
     the responsibilities and functions of consular officers, and 
     require the Secretary of Homeland Security to increase the 
     number of border patrol agents and customs enforcement 
     investigators.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3887, to amend the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to cover individuals, 
     other than United States persons, who engage in international 
     terrorism without affiliation with an international terrorist 
     group.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3888, to establish the 
     United States Homeland Security Signal Corps to ensure proper 
     communications between law enforcement agencies.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3889, to establish a 
     National Commission on the United States-Saudi Arabia 
     Relationship.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3890, to improve the 
     security of hazardous materials transported by truck.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3891, to improve rail 
     security.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3892, to strengthen border 
     security.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3893, to require 
     inspection of cargo at ports in the United States.
       Reid (for Schumer) Amendment No. 3894, to amend the 
     Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance cybersecurity.
       Allard Amendment No. 3778, to improve the management of the 
     personnel of the National Intelligence Authority.
       Byrd Amendment No. 3845, to enhance the role of Congress in 
     the oversight of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government.
       Warner Modified Amendment No. 3877, to modify the role of 
     the National Intelligence Director in the appointment of 
     intelligence officials of the United States Government.
       Leahy/Grassley Amendment No. 3945, to require Congressional 
     oversight of translators employed and contracted for by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       Reed Amendment No. 3908, to authorize the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security to award grants to public transportation 
     agencies to improve security.
       Reid (for Corzine/Lautenberg) Amendment No. 3849, to 
     protect human health and the environment from the release of 
     hazardous substances by acts of terrorism.
       Reid (for Lautenberg) Amendment No. 3782, to require that 
     any Federal funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland 
     Security for grants or other assistance be allocated based 
     strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.
       Reid (for Lautenberg) Amendment No. 3905, to provide for 
     maritime transportation security.
       Reid (for Harkin) Amendment No. 3821, to modify the 
     functions of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3748, to clarify the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Ombudsman of the National 
     Intelligence Authority and of the Analytic Review Unit within 
     the Office of the Ombudsman.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3739, to ensure the sharing of 
     intelligence information in a manner that promotes all-
     sources analysis and to assign responsibility for competitive 
     analysis.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3750, to clarify the responsibilities 
     of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National 
     Counterterrorism Center for information-sharing and 
     intelligence analysis.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3747, to provide the National 
     Intelligence Director with flexible administrative authority 
     with respect to the National Intelligence Authority.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3742, to clarify the continuing 
     applicability of section 504 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 to the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated 
     for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
     the United States.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3740, to include among the primary 
     missions of the National Intelligence Director the 
     elimination of barriers to the coordination of intelligence 
     activities.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3741, to permit the National 
     Intelligence Director to modify National Intelligence Program 
     budgets before their approval and submittal to the President.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3744, to clarify the limitation on 
     the transfer of funds and personnel and to preserve and 
     enhance congressional oversight of intelligence activities.
       Roberts Amendment No. 3751, to clarify the responsibilities 
     of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to the National 
     Intelligence Program.
       Kyl Amendment No. 3926, to amend the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act to ensure that nonimmigrant visas are not 
     issued to individuals with connections to terrorism or who 
     intend to carry out terrorist activities in the United 
     States.
       Kyl Amendment No. 3881, to protect crime victims' rights.
       Kyl Amendment No. 3724, to strengthen anti-terrorism 
     investigative tools, promote information sharing, punish 
     terrorist offenses.
       Stevens Amendment No. 3826, to modify the duties of the 
     Director of the National Counterterrorism Center as the 
     principal advisor to the President on counterterrorism 
     matters.
       Stevens Amendment No. 3827, to strike section 206, relating 
     to information sharing.
       Stevens Amendment No. 3829, to amend the effective date 
     provision.
       Stevens Amendment No. 3840, to strike the fiscal and 
     acquisition authorities of the National Intelligence 
     Authority.
       Stevens Amendment No. 3882, to propose an alternative 
     section 141, relating to the Inspector General of the 
     National Intelligence Authority.
       Collins (for Inhofe) Amendment No. 3946 (to Amendment No. 
     3849), in the nature of a substitute.
       Sessions Amendment No. 3928, to require aliens to make an 
     oath prior to receiving a nonimmigrant visa.
       Sessions Amendment No. 3873, to protect railroad carriers 
     and mass transportation from terrorism.
       Sessions Amendment No. 3871, to provide for enhanced 
     Federal, State, and local enforcement of the immigration 
     laws.
       Sessions Amendment No. 3870, to make information sharing 
     permanent under the USA PATRIOT ACT.
       Warner Amendment No. 3876, to preserve certain authorities 
     and accountability in the implementation of intelligence 
     reform.
       Collins (for Cornyn) Amendment No. 3803, to provide for 
     enhanced criminal penalties for crimes related to alien 
     smuggling.
       Collins (for Baucus/Roberts) Modified Amendment No. 3768, 
     to require an annual report on the allocation of funding 
     within the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department 
     of the Treasury.
       Collins (for Stevens) Amendment No. 3903, to strike section 
     201, relating to public disclosure of intelligence funding.
       Frist (for McConnell) Amendment No. 3930, to clarify that a 
     volunteer for a federally-created citizen volunteer program 
     and for the program's State and local affiliates is protected 
     by the Volunteer Protection Act.
       Frist (for McConnell) Amendment No. 3931, to remove civil 
     liability barriers that discourage the donation of equipment 
     to volunteer fire companies.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President. The bill is now officially 
before the Senate. It is open for amendment. We have great deal of work 
to do on this legislation, as the Presiding Officer is well aware. I do 
anticipate many votes later today, starting at 4:15. I do anticipate a 
late session tonight in order to make considerable progress on the 
bill.
  In addition, I want to alert my colleagues to the fact that the 
majority leader, with the consent of the Democratic leader, did file a 
cloture motion last week that will ripen tomorrow morning. So we are 
determined to make good progress on this bill. We made a great deal of 
progress last week. Negotiations continued over the weekend. But we 
have to finish this highly significant bill. That is the leader's 
intention. It is the floor managers' intention. And we will be working 
long and hard to do so both tonight and tomorrow night.

[[Page 20478]]

  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, in a helpful way, wishes to inform 
the Senate that under the previous order, at the hour of 4:15 today, 
the Senate will proceed to a series of votes on the pending amendments 
with 2 minutes equally divided for debate prior to each vote.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, first, I congratulate Senator Collins and 
Senator Lieberman for their very fine work on this bill. Anyone who has 
watched this debate has to be very impressed by the work they have done 
in, frankly, a relatively short period of time. They have held a number 
of hearings. They have diligently worked on this bill and brought the 
bill to the floor.
  I came to the floor last week and asked my colleague from Maine some 
questions. I thought she had some very good answers. As I expressed at 
that time--and I have made no secret of this--I have always been 
concerned that any bill we produce, in fact, give the head of our 
intelligence enough authority, enough power to actually get the job 
done. And that was my concern. Frankly, that was the nature of my 
questions to my colleague from Maine last week.
  I come to the floor this morning to express my concerns about the 
Byrd amendment. My reading of the Byrd amendment is, frankly, that it 
would strike at the heart of the Collins-Lieberman bill. I believe if 
the Byrd amendment were to be adopted, all my worst fears would be 
realized, and we would end up with a bill that would look like it was 
giving power to this new head of intelligence in this country, but, in 
fact, that person would not really have the requisite power they 
needed.
  I wonder if I may ask my friend and colleague from Maine several 
questions about her interpretation of the Byrd amendment.
  My understanding is that the Byrd amendment begins, on the copy I 
have, on page 27 of the bill and strikes the title ``Transfer or 
Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of Personnel within NIP.''
  I wonder if my colleague shares my concerns about the danger of this 
amendment. I think, frankly, this is a gutting amendment. I wonder what 
her reaction to that is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Ohio will yield, I 
will be happy to respond to his question. The Senator from Ohio is 
exactly right. The amendment offered by the Senator from West Virginia 
would greatly weaken the authority of the national intelligence 
director to move funding and people. That is one of the most important 
reforms made by this legislation. That is one reason I am strongly 
opposed to the amendment offered by the Senator from West Virginia.
  I believe the Senator from Ohio is exactly right, that were the 
amendment to pass, it would severely undermine the reforms called for 
by the 9/11 Commission to create a NID with real authority. That means 
the authority over the budget, over the people in the national 
intelligence program, the authority to set priorities, and certainly 
the Byrd amendment would greatly weaken that authority.
  Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate very much my colleague's response. That is 
the way I read this. As I expressed when I was on the floor last week, 
really what we need to do is to empower this person, this new position 
with the authority to get the job done. Never again do we want to be in 
a position where the head of intelligence of this country can come 
before the committee and say: I do not have enough power; I do not have 
the authority to get the job done; I could not move people around; I 
did not have the budget authority.
  That, I think, is what my two colleagues who are on the floor right 
now have tried to craft with this bill. If you look at this particular 
section, it talks about the transfer of people and the transfer of 
money, and the ability of that person to be able to do that and to be 
the prime mover, the prime person who could do that.
  Never again should the head of intelligence in this country really be 
subservient to anybody else. Yes, they should consult. Yes, they should 
involve other people. But they certainly should be the prime person.
  I wonder if I may ask my colleague--I see Senator Lieberman on the 
floor--I know some people do have concerns with the way the Senator has 
written the bill, that other agencies would not be consulted. With the 
way the Senator has written the bill, would the new head of 
intelligence consult other agencies and be involved with other agencies 
with regard to these very essential decisions?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, through you, I am pleased to respond to 
the Senator from Ohio. I thank him for his questions. The direct answer 
is that in the proposal Senator Collins and I have put down, the 
national intelligence director, in formulating the national 
intelligence budget, as distinguished from the military tactical 
intelligence joint budget, would be required to consult with the heads 
of the relevant intelligence agencies in formulating his budget, but we 
make very clear that the budget authority for the national intelligence 
budget ought to go to the national intelligence director, both in terms 
of final recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget and the 
President, but then that the money must come to the national 
intelligence director before it goes to those constituent agencies. 
That is a critical element of the authority that we want to establish 
in the national intelligence director where there is none.
  We had repeated testimony before our committee from Secretary Powell, 
from former Directors of Central Intelligence that without budget 
authority, they are ineffective, they have no clout.
  In addition to constricting, as the Senator from Ohio has made clear, 
the authority of the national intelligence director under the Collins-
Lieberman proposal to transfer both personnel and funds, the Byrd 
amendment does dramatically undercut that budget authority by, if I can 
state this to the best of my ability in lay people's language, removing 
the authority of the new national intelligence director to have budget 
accounts at the Treasury Department, which would mean that the only way 
Treasury could transfer money to the national intelligence director was 
back through the Department of Defense. That is exactly what we are 
trying to change.
  Mr. DeWINE. If I may ask an additional question for Senators who are 
watching today, maybe the answer is obvious, but what is the importance 
of that distinction, the inability to do that, having that money go 
through the Defense Department as opposed to the national intelligence 
director?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. It is just such a strange circumstance with which I 
believe many members of our committee were surprised to find, that the 
intelligence budget, including the CIA budget, the Central Intelligence 
Agency right now, goes through the Department of Defense before it gets 
there. Obviously, the Defense Department is an important user of 
intelligence, perhaps the most important, so is the State Department, 
the President, and the Homeland Security Department.
  The current situation is a little bit--let me see if I can think of 
an analogy, and I know this is farfetched--where the budget of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission went through the Department of 
Health and Human Services. It may be a little farfetched. Maybe it went 
through one of the other Departments that is slightly more related. It 
makes no sense.
  Again, we are trying to create authority here, and authority in this 
town, as we kept hearing over and over, is built on money, budget 
authority, and this amendment would remove that authority from the 
national intelligence director and, therefore, weaken that position. I 
fear it would get us back to where we are now, where we do not have 
that authority with anyone in the intelligence community and no one is 
in charge.

[[Page 20479]]


  Mr. DeWINE. I wonder if I may ask my colleague another question. As 
one looks at the language throughout the bill that Senator Collins and 
Senator Lieberman have crafted, they have made a distinction between 
the national intelligence programs and the nonnational intelligence 
programs, given certainly the authority over the national intelligence 
programs and what they described as far as the budget authority, 
execution authority over those to the national intelligence director.
  The other programs that are not national intelligence programs 
continue to remain, then, with other departments--for example, the 
Defense Department--is that correct?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I am sorry? I missed the question.
  Mr. DeWINE. The other programs that are not national intelligence 
programs would not come under, then, the national intelligence 
director?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is correct. We tried to draw some lines. They are 
not always clear because there are a lot of programs that overlap, but 
to say that anything in the national intelligence budget should go to 
the national intelligence director, that is his or her job. There are 
other programs that are uniquely the work of the Defense Department--I 
am going to put it another way: that are totally used by the Defense 
Department for tactical intelligence to support the work of one service 
of the military or a joint military action. But those assets are not 
used for anything else in our intelligence community nonmilitary and, 
of course, they should go for budget control to the Secretary of 
Defense.
  Mr. DeWINE. That is the way the Senator's bill is written?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. We preserve that. There are one or two 
amendments that are seeking still to clarify that break that we will 
debate and vote on I would guess before this bill is finally 
considered, but that is exactly what we have done in the underlying 
bill.
  Mr. DeWINE. When I came to the Senate floor last week, I was asking 
questions of both the Senator from Connecticut and my colleague from 
Maine, and I was happy to hear some of the answers about the Senator's 
understanding of this bill that has been drafted, but I am concerned 
that under the amendment from our colleague from West Virginia, these 
powers would be gone. For example, I asked about the ability to move 
personnel around, and the Senator assured me under his bill the 
national intelligence director would be able to move personnel around 
from one department to another as long as it was a national 
intelligence program. Is it the Senator's understanding under the 
amendment from our colleague from West Virginia that power would be 
gone?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I say through the Chair, that power would be seriously 
limited, which is to say the personnel transfers under the amendment 
would have to be done in accordance with procedures to be developed by 
the national intelligence director with the concerned department head 
and only for periods up to 1 year, and that is a constriction that says 
to the national intelligence director: You do not have the latitude to 
do what you think is necessary to protect the national security 
interests. This is a little bit like saying to a general: You can only 
make a decision for a short period of time in moving your troops around 
to better confront the enemy and achieve victory. It makes no sense. It 
is a critical part of the overall proposal of our bill and the 9/11 
Commission.
  If the Senator from Ohio would give me a moment, this morning, the 
Family Steering Committee composed of families of victims of 9/11 sent 
a letter to every Senator commenting on some of these amendments. With 
regard to this amendment introduced by the Senator from West Virginia, 
No. 3845, they say that the 9/11 Commission has stated repeatedly that 
the power of the purse is critical for the national intelligence 
director position. S. 2845, the underlying bill, provides for the 
national intelligence director to be empowered with budget execution 
and transfer authorities. The NID also needs to be able to transfer 
personnel in response to threats, which is what the Senator's question 
goes to. So the families conclude: In summary, we oppose amendment No. 
3845 introduced by the Senator from West Virginia and others because it 
reduces the authority of the national intelligence director.
  I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Ohio would yield on 
that point.
  Mr. DeWINE. I sure will.
  Ms. COLLINS. The amendment offered by our colleague from West 
Virginia would actually give the national intelligence director less 
authority than the DCI has under current law to move people and money 
around to address urgent needs. It not only would undo the reforms in 
our bill, it is a step back from current law.
  Under the Byrd amendment, aggregate transfers from a department or 
agency would be limited to $100 million or 5 percent of the funds 
available to the department or the agency. There is no such limitation 
in current law. The amendment offered by the Senator from West Virginia 
not only undermines the reforms in this bill and significantly would 
weaken the authority of the NID to move people and money to meet urgent 
compelling needs, but it actually is weaker than the authority that the 
Director of the CIA now has. I just wanted to make that point. I know 
the Senator from Ohio is aware of that as well.
  Mr. DeWINE. I thank my colleague for her answer, and that is 
something that should alarm all the Members of the Senate. I believe 
there is a general consensus--certainly there is in the intelligence 
community, a general consensus at least, and I think there is among 
Members of the Senate--that the power of the DCI today is not enough, 
and to think that we would be thinking about passing a bill that would 
pass with this amendment possibly that would weaken the head of our 
intelligence agencies and give that person less power to me is a 
shocking thought.
  I believe our whole goal should, in a very responsible, rational way, 
create a new system, which this bill has done, to empower one person to 
have the authority to run the intelligence in this country. I am 
afraid, as this discussion has pointed out between my colleagues and 
myself, that the Byrd amendment will take us actually in the wrong 
direction. It is a weakening amendment. At least for this Member, it is 
a gutting amendment. It, frankly, would make it impossible for me to 
vote for this bill. It would destroy the power of the head of 
intelligence, this new position, and it would be the wrong thing to do. 
It is very well intended, but it would be a very serious mistake. This 
discussion we just had certainly brings that out.
  Again, I want to congratulate my colleagues. They have done a very 
good job in trying to deal with all of the diverse needs we have in the 
intelligence community, the Defense Department, and all the other 
agencies. It has been a very tough job, and I congratulate them for 
their work.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to thank our friend and 
colleague from Ohio for both his thoughtful consideration of this 
legislation and his very relevant questions this morning, which I do 
believe help to illuminate the consequences on one of the amendments we 
are going to vote on today.
  Last week, the Senator was here in a less friendly posture. It is 
always better to have him on our side, and I thank him very much for 
caring enough about this critically important legislation to come over 
and be part of this debate.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

[[Page 20480]]

  The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3845

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in a few hours the Senate will vote on the 
Byrd-Stevens-Inouye-Warner amendment. That amendment's purpose is to 
ensure that the new national intelligence authority is held accountable 
to the people's representatives in the Congress. Let me say again, the 
amendment which I have offered on behalf of myself and Mr. Stevens, Mr. 
Inouye, and Mr. Warner has a purpose, that purpose being to ensure that 
the new national intelligence authority, the NID, is held accountable 
to the people's representatives in the Congress.
  Last Friday, I spoke about the Englishmen who spilled their blood to 
wrest the power of the purse away from monarchs, over many centuries, 
in England. Their struggle was enshrined in Article I, section 9 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which I hold in my hand, the Constitution of the 
United States--the struggle of Englishmen across many centuries, even 
prior to 1215 when the barons yielded, the great Magna Carta was agreed 
to by King John, a mighty monarch. And what does that section 9 of 
Article I say?

       No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
     Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular 
     Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
     public Money shall be published from time to time.

  Not just some of the moneys, all of the moneys. How then, I ask 
Senators, can a regular account of public money be kept if the Congress 
empowers a new intelligence director to spend money without regard to 
appropriations law and without regard to this Constitution?
  This is a debate about power. Make no mistake about it. It is a 
debate about power and who should wield it--the elected representatives 
of the people or an unelected, unaccountable bureaucrat nestled deep 
inside our Nation's intelligence agencies.
  It goes to the heart of the balance of power between the executive 
and the legislative branches of Government. I took an oath to support 
and defend that Constitution, and I have tried to do that now, I will 
soon be in my 59th year in government, in politics, in the legislative 
branches of Government--at the State level and at the national level.
  Under the pending bill, the Treasury Secretary is authorized to 
create appropriations accounts to which the national intelligence 
director can transfer funds. Get that. We are talking about an 
unelected bureaucrat who will be able to transfer funds. The Collins-
Lieberman bill includes no limits on how those funds can be used.
  Let me say, I don't see either of the two managers on the floor but 
they are listening. I saw Senator Lieberman just a few minutes ago. I 
am sure he is in the premises here. One of the distinguished persons 
who is aiding the Governmental Affairs Committee in this connection has 
nodded in the affirmative. So I am not talking behind Senator 
Lieberman's back. He is here. He knows very well what I am saying, and 
I am sure he will be very ready to counter my arguments. I respect him 
for that.
  Let me say again, under the pending bill, the Treasury Secretary is 
authorized to create appropriations accounts to which the national 
intelligence director can transfer funds. The Collins-Lieberman bill 
includes no limits on how those funds can be used once they are 
transferred. Under current law, the intelligence director would be 
authorized to transfer up to $3.5 billion from the defense budget, 
giving this director enormous transfer authority never contemplated by 
the Congress.
  That places the Congress on the defensive. The Congress would have to 
act retroactively to transfers made by the national intelligence 
director, allowing the intelligence director to spend funds without 
adequate oversight by the Congress.
  I remind Senators that in 1996, the National Reconnaissance Office--
the Government's spy satellite agency--was discovered to have stashed 
away billions of dollars into a reserve that was not reported to the 
Congress. While the proponents of the bill before the Senate argue that 
the national intelligence director needs strong budget authority to 
fight the war on terror, Senators should understand that the 
intelligence director can use that authority for activities that have 
nothing to do with the war on terror. The intelligence director could 
use this sweeping transfer authority to circumvent the limitations 
imposed by the Congress, the elected representatives of the American 
people. It has happened before, and it will happen again. It can happen 
again and very likely it will happen again.
  Senators Collins and Lieberman have argued that our mandate here 
today is to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations and that 
those recommendations include an intelligence director with strong 
budget authority. I respectfully submit that our mandate as Senators--
my mandate, at least, as a Senator--first and foremost is to protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.
  We took an oath to do so, and that mandate supersedes any 
recommendations put forward by any commission, including the 9/11 
Commission. To provide virtually unchecked flexibility to an 
intelligence director to transfer funds from one account to another 
would nullify and make meaningless the legislative process of reviewing 
budget requests from the intelligence agencies. It would nullify and 
make meaningless congressional decisions about how funds are allocated.
  Congressional judgment by elected lawmakers--I am elected; I am one 
of the elected lawmakers. From time to time I have to go back before 
the people and see if they want me to continue in this work. 
Congressional judgment by elected lawmakers would be made subordinate 
to executive judgments by unelected bureaucrats.
  The power of the purse for which our English ancestors spilled their 
blood and which has protected our democratic institutions and 
individual rights for centuries would, in a very large measure, pass to 
the executive branch.
  I am saying, in essence, that we need more time to discuss this 
amendment and to discuss this bill. I don't know what is in the bill. I 
have read parts of the bill, but I have many other duties to perform, 
and I think we need more time. This is a major bill. This is the very 
same thing we ran into when we created the Department of Homeland 
Security--the very same thing. We are backed up against the wall. The 
idea is you have to pass this. You have to do it. You have to get 
behind it. And we find we have a lot of problems with that.
  I sought to have the leadership take a little more time on that bill, 
discuss it, debate it, but the leadership didn't choose to take more 
time.
  It was the very same way with the nefarious resolution that was 
passed by this Senate on October 11 of 2002 to shift the constitutional 
power to declare war to a single individual; namely, the President of 
the United States. I pleaded that we have more time. I pleaded on that 
same occasion--I think it was with Mr. Lieberman and with the other 
managers on both sides--please take more time.
  Here we are shifting the power. Congress says in article I, section 
8, that the Congress shall have the power to declare war. So the 
Framers of the Constitution did not intend for one man to be able to 
declare war. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend for one 
body to put this Nation into a war. It required both bodies. The 
Constitution says Congress--not just the Senate, not just the House--
Congress, which is a combination of both, Congress shall have power to 
declare war. So the Framers meant for that very great question to be 
decided by a huge body of men. It was men in those days, only men in 
the Congress of the United States; but, of course, we know what 
``Congress'' meant--for anybody who serves. It is Congress made up of 
the elected representatives of the American people. So I have a mandate 
to listen to the American people. I have a mandate to exercise whatever 
judgment I have and can bring to bear in my own way to look at these 
things and to ask questions.

[[Page 20481]]

  So there we were. We passed it in a big hurry. The leadership on both 
sides said: Let's get this behind us. I am talking about the resolution 
that was passed by the U.S. Senate on October 11, 2002, shifting the 
power, shifting the decision to put this country at war, shifting that 
decision away from the Congress and handing it over lock, stock, and 
barrel to one man--the President of the United States. It does not make 
any difference if he is a Democrat or a Republican, that power is his 
and will be in the next President's hand. He will have that power, and 
the next one, if he or she decides to use it. It will be there for them 
because there is no sunset provision in that resolution terminating 
that power.
  I sought even to have the Congress adopt an amendment which would 
have provided for a sunset provision in that power so that within a 
year or at most 2 years--and the circumstances were set forth in my 
amendment calling for a sunset provision, a termination of handing this 
power over to any President, Republican or Democrat. Do you know how 
many votes I got? Well, I got 31 votes, including my own.
  I yet am astonished to this very day as to why the Members of the 
Senate of the United States sought not only to give that power to a 
President, one man--whether he is Democrat or Republican, that is not 
the point--shift that power to a President. I said: If we are going to 
be foolish enough to do that, let's at least have a sunset provision so 
we can terminate that power. But no, I got 31 votes, including my own--
31 votes. What a shame that this Senate and the House would give that 
power to an individual and say: It's yours, take it, keep it until we 
in the Congress decide to repeal that provision and take it back. How 
about that. So the sunset provision was turned down.
  I asked for more time. Oh, the leadership said: Let's get this behind 
us. The President said: Get it behind you; we have an election coming. 
That was the manipulation that was wrought to have that key vote occur 
just a few days before the national elections in the year 2002.
  Why, those Members who were up for reelection, as they voted on that 
resolution, they certainly thought: If I vote against this, what is it 
going to do to me and my reelection? People might think I am 
unpatriotic; I better vote for this; man, I have to be reelected; I 
have to be reelected; I am going to vote for it; I have some questions 
about it, but I am going to put all questions aside because we have an 
election coming here. The leadership said: Put it behind us; let's vote 
on it, get it behind us.
  I said at the time: You will not get this behind you because this 
President is not going to let you get it behind you. It is in his favor 
to make you vote before the election. You might vote differently after 
the election. No, you have to vote before the election. There we were. 
We did not have time. I pleaded for time, time, wait until after the 
election, let's wait to hear what the people have to say.
  Here again, we are pressed for time. We are going to go out on I 
believe it is October 8 presumably for the elections, at least until 
they are over, so we are in a hurry. Let's not wait until after the 
election; no, let's get this behind us. We have to do what the 
Commission says. What about the Constitution? We are legislating in a 
tremendous hurry, and that is not good.
  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his appearance before 
the Appropriations Committee said that ought to be put off. You need, I 
believe he said, 6 or 8 months. I am not sure I am quoting him 
precisely. In essence, that was his message: Put it off; don't do it in 
a time before an election; don't do it under the heat that is 
generated; take your time; this is a measured, measured decision, don't 
rush it through. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger showed the 
committee the names of several other very important dignitaries who, by 
their experience, see the reasoning all joined in the suggestion that 
we take our time. But no, we are brushing that aside, and that was the 
decision on the part of former Secretaries of Defense--for example, Mr. 
Cohen. It included both Republicans and Democrats urging that we take 
more time. I think we should take more time here because we are doing 
some dangerous things in this bill.
  My amendment will keep the power of the purse where it belongs, not 
in the hands of the intelligence community but here in the hands of the 
people's elected representatives in the Congress. My amendment retains 
for the Congress the responsibility for deciding how budget accounts 
for the intelligence director should be structured while allowing the 
flexibility the Governmental Affairs Committee seeks for the transfer 
of personnel and funding within the intelligence community. My 
amendment is an oversight amendment. It guarantees better oversight 
over the way these funds are going to be spent.
  Normally, when we pass an appropriation, we say to Mr. A, who is head 
of one agency: Here, you take this and you do this, and you do this, 
and you do this, and you do this, and then come back in a year and tell 
us what you did; come back in here tell us what you did with our 
limitations to do this, do this, but don't do this, don't do this. 
Under those limitations the agency assures Congress he will live up to 
the mandate, he will do this, he will do this, and he will not do this 
that Congress said don't do.
  Well, that is not going to be the case. This national intelligence 
director will do whatever he wants to do, and then there will not be 
those limitations, either, on him or her. He is not going to be 
elected. He is going to be another bureaucrat--and I do not mean to 
speak in any derogatory manner concerning bureaucrats because we have 
to have them--but they are not elected by the people.
  All these seats--these chairs, as I call them--were here many years 
before I came, and they are filled with Members who are elected by the 
people of their respective States. We have to answer to those people.
  This amendment limits the transfer of funds to $100 million or to 5 
percent of the Department or Agency budget, whichever is the lesser. 
Senators should realize that even with the limitations included in this 
amendment, the intelligence director is granted significant authority 
to transfer funds. He would still have significant authority. Given the 
history, though, of abuses of power and the violation of civil 
liberties that have taken place within our intelligence community, I 
cannot imagine Senators condoning such sweeping budget transfer 
authority.
  Hear me, Senators. We should take time. We are talking about rushing 
through a massive change, one which will have some bearing upon this 
Constitution which we are sworn to support and defend, and yet we are 
going to do it with our ears closed, our eyes closed, and our voices 
unheard.
  We are being pressured to act fast before we go home on October 8. I 
cannot imagine Senators condoning such sweeping budget transfer 
authority. Common sense and history suggest that if one man is given 
control of our intelligence agencies and one man is given control over 
funds appropriated to those agencies, abuses can occur, may occur, and 
in all probability will occur at some point in time. Those abuses may 
manifest themselves in the violations of civil liberties, your 
liberties. They may manifest themselves in scandals such as those at 
Abu Ghraib prison, or they may manifest themselves as they did in the 
lead-up to the war in Iraq through politicized intelligence. Therein 
lies a great danger.
  The New York Times, on Sunday, wrote a very lengthy article--read 
it--entitled, ``How the White House Embraced Disputed Arms 
Intelligence.''
  I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times be 
reprinted in the Record at the close of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cochran). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the article explores how senior 
administration officials, including President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney, ``repeatedly failed to fully disclose the contrary

[[Page 20482]]

views of America's leading nuclear scientists'' when asserting in 2002 
that Saddam Hussein was rebuilding his nuclear weapons program. The 
article reads:

       They sometimes overstated even the most dire intelligence 
     assessments . . .

  It goes on to say:

     yet minimized or rejected strong doubts of nuclear experts.

  The article goes on:

       Today, 18 months after the invasion of Iraq, investigators 
     there have found no evidence of . . . a revived nuclear 
     weapons program.

  Secretary of State Colin Powell said last Friday he regretted the 
administration's claims that Iraq had stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction in making its case for war.
  So the gut-wrenching question for the Senator from Maine is--hear 
me--if we do this intelligence reorganization hurriedly, are we willing 
to launch our next preemptive war based on the presumption that our 
handiwork has corrected our intelligence problems? That is a very 
serious question.
  I will say it again: The gut-wrenching question for you, Robert C. 
Byrd, and for every other Member of the Senate, remains: if we do this 
intelligence reorganization hurriedly, as we are doing, are we willing 
to launch our next preemptive war based on the presumption that our 
handiwork has corrected our intelligence problems?
  Think about it. That should sober one up. The question remains, and 
we are going to be held to it by the American people and by that 
Constitution: If we do this intelligence reorganization hurriedly, are 
we willing to launch our next preemptive war based on the presumption 
that our handiwork has corrected our intelligence problems?
  I say to Senators, again, preemptive attack is the official policy of 
this Government. Preemptive attack today, under the Bush 
administration, is the official policy of this Government.
  Remember also that preemption is totally antithetical to the U.S. 
Constitution because it clearly cuts the Congress out of decisions to 
go to war. Preemption by its very nature precludes congressional 
debates or approval of resolutions before commencing to shed the blood 
of our sons and our daughters. Preemption stands on its face 
antithetical, opposite, 180 degrees, to this Constitution, which says 
that the Congress shall have power to declare war; the Congress, 
meaning a group of people, two bodies, made up of men and women 
representing all of the States of this Union. Congress shall declare 
war, not one man. But the doctrine of preemption tells us the 
President--the President, not the Congress--the President shall have 
power to declare war. That is the preemptive doctrine. That great power 
may send your son, your daughter, your grandson, your granddaughter to 
war. Who says so? One man, the President of the United States.
  So on its face it is unconstitutional. How can a President declare 
war without doing it clandestinely, secretly? If he wants to bomb a 
certain country, he is not going to take it up with the Congress. He 
wants to be secret about this because that strike has to be preemptive. 
How can it be preemptive if it is going to be debated by the Members of 
the United States Senate? It can't be preemptive.
  Let us remember that intelligence--remember, this is not just Robert 
Byrd saying this--let us remember that the intelligence was manipulated 
to get us into the Iraq war. Will it not be more easily manipulated in 
the hands of one intelligence chief, a partisan chief more free than 
ever to tweak intelligence to please a President? It may be a 
Democratic President. Does that make it any better? No. That makes no 
difference.
  It is comforting to believe that our intelligence agencies will not 
be manipulated for political gain, but it is also naive to believe 
that. To turn over to a greater degree the power of the purse to 
shadowy figures in the intelligence community is to invite abuses like 
those that lead to scandal and to the disgrace of the United States in 
the eyes of the international community.
  Think of what we are doing here. It is just like it was when we had 
that resolution before the Senate on which the Senate voted on October 
11, 2002. There is not another Senator on this floor, except the 
distinguished Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran, who is presently 
presiding over this body, and myself, two Senators. A major question is 
before the Senate. We are talking about your oversight duties as a 
Member of the Senate, as you chair or as you serve on a committee--your 
oversight; the oversight powers of the Congress, provided for in the 
Constitution of the United States. Yet we are saying, Well, forget it.
  The Congress must preserve its power to rein in--not just because it 
can but because the people expect it of the Congress--our Nation's 
intelligence agencies and to rein in the executive branch when abuses 
like these occur.
  Further, we must do all we can to ensure that the new intelligence 
positions created by the Collins-Lieberman bill are held accountable to 
the Congress; in other words, to the people. This Constitution, in its 
first three words, says, ``We the people . . . .'' So we have a 
responsibility. We have a duty to the people we represent to see that 
these people are held accountable to the Congress.
  On page 47, the pending bill creates four deputy national 
intelligence director positions as executive level 2 appointments, the 
equivalent of a Deputy Secretary of Defense or State. Yet none of these 
new positions is subject to Senate confirmation. How about that? The 
Congressional Research Service informs me that these deputy 
intelligence directors would be--listen to this--the only executive 
level 2 appointments in our Government not subject to confirmation by 
the Senate. There you have it. These people are going to have 
tremendous responsibilities, but I am informed that these deputy 
intelligence directors would be the only executive level 2 appointments 
in our Government not subject to Senate confirmation.
  So it is clear that more needs to be done to ensure accountability to 
the Congress. How much thought was given to this in the distinguished 
committee? How much thought was given to this in the Commission that 
recommends to the Congress these reforms? These clearly mean that more 
needs to be done to ensure accountability to the Congress. The 
intelligence failures of 9/11 and the intelligence failures in Iraq are 
in part a testament to the dire consequences of the Congress abdicating 
its constitutional duties. The Congress was rushed, as it oftentimes 
is--rushed, pressured--could be pressured by circumstances only, but 
that is not quite the case. Congress was rushed into creating a 
homeland security department, and, in the process, it ceded authorities 
to the executive branch over organization and personnel matters. The 
result has been an underfunded homeland security agency whose 
effectiveness has been compromised, to some extent, by turf wars and 
bureaucratic resistance.
  So we rushed consideration of the war resolution with Iraq, and in 
the process ceded the constitutional authority to declare war to the 
White House. The result has been a rush to war marked by foreign policy 
failures and scandals, with the death toll rising daily and with no end 
in sight to the chaos in Iraq.
  What a pickle. What a pickle we have put ourselves in. Now the 
Congress is confronted with an intelligence reform bill, proposing to 
create a national intelligence director who will command 15 
intelligence agencies and a $40 billion budget. Rather than learn from 
our mistakes, rather than take the time to thoughtfully consider this 
matter outside of Presidential politics, we are being pushed to finish 
this bill within a handful of days, finish this bill within a shirt-
tail full of days, and to cede control over the allocation of the 
resources to the intelligence community.
  Think about it. Think what you are doing. Think what you are about to 
do, Senators. National security experts are pleading with the Congress 
to stop for a minute. Hold on, here. Hold on, they say. Stop for a 
minute to think about what it is doing.
  The Appropriations Committee heard from a bipartisan array of 
witnesses urging the Congress to slow down.

[[Page 20483]]

  What is the hurry? What is the hurry?
  The list is impressive. These men are not Members of the Congress. 
Listen to them, though. They are saying, slow down. David Boren, former 
Senator from the State of Oklahoma, former chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee in the Senate.
  Here is another former Senator, Bill Bradley, saying let's slow down 
here. Slow down. Where is the hurry? Frank Carlucci, former Secretary 
of Defense under President Reagan. Here is a more recent Secretary of 
Defense, former Member of this body, a Republican, William Cohen. 
Robert Gates, Gary Hart, former U.S. Senator; Henry Kissinger, former 
Secretary of State; John Hamre.
  In the case of some of these, their titles have momentarily escaped 
me.
  Sam Nunn, former Senator from the State of Georgia and chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee;
  Warren Rudman, Republican, former Senator from New Hampshire; George 
Shultz, former Secretary of State, Republican--there you have it, an 
impressive roster of Republicans and Democrats who rendered great 
service to this country in one form or another. They are saying slow 
down. What is the hurry? What is the hurry? They are former Senators, 
former Department of Defense Secretaries, former Secretaries of State, 
Republicans and Democrats, all making the same plea: ``Racing to 
implement reforms on an election timetable is precisely the wrong thing 
to do.''
  That is not Robert Byrd saying that. Robert Byrd is quoting these 
luminaries, and Robert Byrd feels the same way they do.
  ``Racing to implement reforms on an election timetable is precisely 
the wrong thing to do. Intelligence reform is too complex and too 
important to undertake at a campaign breakneck speed.''
  They are saying this subject matter deserves a thoughtful, 
comprehensive approach. Why in Heaven's name are we in all of this big 
hurry? Why is there all of this hurry? I am not saying there shouldn't 
be reform. I am not saying that at all. I am saying this is a major 
undertaking and we ought to have the time and we ought to take time to 
debate and ask questions and to try to remove the gremlins that may 
come to light if we take more time.
  The Wall Street Journal concluded in August that:

       The larger point here is that there is no need to rush to 
     any quick political fix.

  We may have a different President after the election. He may 
appoint--and probably would--a national intelligence director who will 
be a different person from that whom the current President may appoint, 
should he be reelected. We ought not to do this in such a big hurry.
  The Wall Street Journal continues:

       We are contemplating the biggest change to our intelligence 
     services since 1947, while we are fighting a war against a 
     lethal enemy . . .

a war that in large measure has resulted from faulty intelligence.
  Are we fixing that fault in this bill? Are we dealing with 9/11 in 
this bill without casting a watchful eye to the future, to Iraq? How 
about it?

       That work should take some time--and beltway forbid, maybe 
     even a little thought.

  That is a quotation from the Wall Street Journal of the month of 
August.
  The case for stopping and thinking for a moment grows even stronger 
when one reads U.S. Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner's critique of 
the 9/11 Commission's report in the New York Times Book Review. Judge 
Posner writes:

       The enormous public relations effort that the commission 
     orchestrated to win support for the report before it could be 
     digested . . . invites criticism . . . [as does] the 
     commissioners' misplaced, though successful, quest for 
     unanimity. . . . The Commission's contention that our 
     intelligence structure is unsound predisposed it to blame the 
     structure for the failure of the 9/11 attacks, whether it did 
     or not. And pressure for unanimity encourages just the kind 
     of herd thinking now being blamed for that other recent 
     intelligence failure--the belief that Saddam Hussein 
     possessed weapons of mass destruction. . . . For all one 
     knows, the price of unanimity was adopting recommendations 
     that were the second choice [or maybe even the third or 
     fourth choice] of many of the commission's members. . . .

  The larger concern is not only that the Congress, in its rush to act, 
may botch the implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendation, 
but that those recommendations may not be as well-thought-out as the 
public relations campaign would have us believe.
  We are so threatened by the politics surrounding the 9/11 
Commission's report and the release of its recommendations prior to the 
Presidential election that we stand ready--stand, salute--to abdicate 
our constitutional responsibilities rather than to question or probe 
deeper into the potential flaws of the Commission's recommendations.
  I say again it is the same kind of thinking that occurred prior to 
the vote on the war resolution with Iraq, the same mentality that led 
to the much regretted passage of the PATRIOT Act with only a single 
dissenting vote in this Chamber, and that led to the creation of a 
Homeland Security Department that now struggles with its mission to 
make Americans safer from terrorism.
  I urge Senators, I plead with Senators, I beg Senators to consider 
carefully their vote on this amendment.
  I am sure there are many Senators who have regretted and will regret 
to their dying day their decision to vote for the Iraq resolution that 
was passed by this body on October 11, 2002. I am sure many Senators 
have lived to regret that vote because we were being pressured: Hurry, 
hurry, hurry, get this vote behind us. We don't want to talk more about 
this. We want to talk about the economy. They will regret it. I have 
had Senators tell me they regret it.
  I urge Senators to consider carefully their vote on this amendment. 
Also, consider this Constitution and the oath I have taken this many 
times to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. This 
Constitution provides for adequate oversight. It gives the Congress the 
power, the oversight.
  This bill will, to a considerable extent, take away that power. I am 
not seeking to undermine the intelligence reforms proposed by the 
Governmental Affairs Committee. I seek only to ensure that the Congress 
retain its oversight functions in intelligence and national security 
matters. We owe it to the people who had faith and confidence in us and 
who sent us here.
  We are not elected here, sent here, by any President of the United 
States. No President tapped me on the shoulder and said, go get him, 
boy, I am going to see that you get it. No President can do that. No 
President can tap me on the shoulder and say: Boy, you are gone; you 
won't be back after this election. No, no President can say that, thank 
God. No President is king in this country. Not here, no. We did not 
swear an oath to adopt any particular commission's report.
  We should use our own best judgment in this case, and in doing that 
we will arrive at different signals, of course, but that is our 
responsibility. We owe it to the victims of the September 11 attack and 
their families to get these reforms straight and to take time to study 
and debate them. Why not take more time? It would be a sad legacy if 
the suffering of these victims of the September 11 attack, it would be 
a sad legacy if their suffering and loss resulted not in the 
strengthening but in the weakening of our national security and 
intelligence service, leaving more Americans vulnerable to a terrorist 
attack.
  In summary, it is a critical mistake to hand to an unelected 
intelligence chief nearly unfettered budget transfer authority. We are 
handing off the ability to exercise oversight. When we do that, we 
cannot determine whether congressional intent for the people's tax 
dollars has been met. We will not know about transfers until some time, 
perhaps, after the fact. Millions of dollars--nay, billions of 
dollars--could be moved around at the discretion of one man, an 
unelected figure, with no one the wiser. Resources could be switched 
from one area of the world to another area of the globe at the 
discretion of one man. Secret operations could be funded without the 
prior knowledge of

[[Page 20484]]

any Member of Congress at the discretion of one man. This is one-man 
rule. Intelligence could be manipulated by one man, with discretion 
concerning where to take away secret resources and where to add them.
  Absolute power, Senators just heard, corrupts absolutely, and the 
United States is about to aid and abet that truism.
  Senators, Republicans and Democrats, we will rue the day when, 
because of rushing and posturing and hurrying, we created a spy chief 
with such awesome power.
  I ask unanimous consent to add the names of Senator Leahy, Senator 
Dorgan, and Senator Burns as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. May the record show that John Hamre is a former Deputy 
Defense Secretary and Robert Gates is a former CIA Director.

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 3, 2004]

        How the White House Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence

          (By David Barstow, William J. Broad and Jeff Gerth)

       In 2002, at a crucial juncture on the path to war, senior 
     members of the Bush administration gave a series of speeches 
     and interviews in which they asserted that Saddam Hussein was 
     rebuilding his nuclear weapons program. Speaking to a group 
     of Wyoming Republicans in September, Vice President Dick 
     Cheney said the United States now had ``irrefutable 
     evidence''--thousands of tubes made of high-strength 
     aluminum, tubes that the Bush administration said were 
     destined for clandestine Iraqi uranium centrifuges, before 
     some were seized at the behest of the United States.
       Those tubes became a critical exhibit in the 
     administration's brief against Iraq. As the only physical 
     evidence the United States could brandish of Mr. Hussein's 
     revived nuclear ambitions, they gave credibility to the 
     apocalyptic imagery invoked by President Bush and his 
     advisers. The tubes were ``only really suited for nuclear 
     weapons programs,'' Condoleezza Rice, the president's 
     national security adviser, explained on CNN on Sept. 8, 2002. 
     ``We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.''
       But almost a year before, Ms. Rice's staff had been told 
     that the government's foremost nuclear experts seriously 
     doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons, according to 
     four officials at the Central Intelligence Agency and two 
     senior administration officials, all of whom spoke on 
     condition of anonymity. The experts, at the Energy 
     Department, believed the tubes were likely intended for small 
     artillery rockets.
       The White House, though, embraced the disputed theory that 
     the tubes were for nuclear centrifuges, an idea first 
     championed in April 2001 by a junior analyst at the C.I.A. 
     Senior nuclear scientists considered that notion implausible, 
     yet in the months after
     9/11, as the administration built a case for confronting 
     Iraq, the centrifuge theory gained currency as it rose to the 
     top of the government.
       Senior administration officials repeatedly failed to fully 
     disclose the contrary views of America's leading nuclear 
     scientists, an examination by The New York Times has found. 
     They sometimes overstated even the most dire intelligence 
     assessments of the tubes, yet minimized or rejected the 
     strong doubts of nuclear experts. They worried privately that 
     the nuclear case was weak, but expressed sober certitude in 
     public.
       One result was a largely one-sided presentation to the 
     public that did not convey the depth of evidence and argument 
     against the administration's most tangible proof of a revived 
     nuclear weapons program in Iraq.
       Today, 18 months after invasion of Iraq, investigators 
     there have found no evidence of hidden centrifuges or a 
     revived nuclear weapons program. The absence of 
     unconventional weapons in Iraq is now widely seen as evidence 
     of a profound intelligence failure, of an intelligence 
     community blinded by ``group think,'' false assumptions and 
     unreliable human sources.
       Yet the tale of the tubes, pieced together through records 
     and interviews with senior intelligence officers, nuclear 
     experts, administration officials and Congressional 
     investigators, reveals a different failure.
       Far from ``group think,'' American nuclear and intelligence 
     experts argued bitterly over the tubes. A ``holy war'' is how 
     one Congressional investigator described it. But if the 
     opinions of the nuclear experts were seemingly disregarded at 
     every turn, an overwhelming momentum gathered behind the 
     C.I.A. assessment. It was a momentum built on a pattern of 
     haste, secrecy, ambiguity, bureaucratic maneuver and a 
     persistent failure in the Bush administration and among both 
     Republicans and Democrats in Congress to ask hard questions.
       Precisely how knowledge of the intelligence dispute 
     traveled through the upper reaches of the administration is 
     unclear. Ms. Rice knew about the debate before her Sept. 2002 
     CNN appearance, but only learned of the alternative rocket 
     theory of the tubes soon afterward, according to two senior 
     administration officials. President Bush learned of the 
     debate at roughly the same time, a senior administration 
     official said.
       Last week, when asked about the tubes, administration 
     officials said they relied on repeated assurances by George 
     J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence, that the 
     tubes were in fact for centrifuges. They also noted that the 
     intelligence community, including the Energy Department, 
     largely agreed that Mr. Hussein has revived his nuclear 
     program.
       ``These judgments sometimes require members of the 
     intelligence community to make tough assessments about 
     competing interpretations of facts,'' said Sean McCormack, a 
     spokesman for the president.
       Mr. Tenet declined to be interviewed. But in a statement, 
     he said he ``made it clear'' to the White House ``that the 
     case for a possible nuclear program in Iraq was weaker than 
     that for chemical and biological weapons.'' Regarding the 
     tubes, Mr. Tenet said ``alternative views were shared'' with 
     the administration after the intelligence community drafted a 
     new National Intelligence Estimate in late September 2002.
       The tubes episode is a case study of the intersection 
     between the politics of pre-emption and the inherent 
     ambiguity of intelligence. The tubes represented a scientific 
     puzzle and rival camps of experts clashed over the tiniest 
     technical details in secure rooms in Washington, London and 
     Vienna. The stakes were high, and they knew it.
       So did a powerful vice president who saw in 9/11 horrifying 
     confirmation of his long-held belief that the United States 
     too often naively underestimates the cunning and ruthlessness 
     of its foes.
       ``We have a tendency--I don't know if it's part of the 
     American character--to say, `Well sit down and we'll evaluate 
     the evidence, we'll draw a conclusion,''' Mr. Cheney said as 
     he discussed the tubes in September 2002 on the NBC News 
     program ``Meet the Press.''
       ``But we always think in terms that we've got all the 
     evidence,'' he said. ``Here, we don't have all the evidence. 
     We have 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent. We don't know how 
     much. We know we have a part of the picture. And that part of 
     the picture tells us that he is, in fact, actively and 
     aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.''


                       joe raises the tube issue

       Throughout the 1990's, United States intelligence agencies 
     were deeply preoccupied with the status of Iraq's nuclear 
     weapons program, and with good reason.
       After the Persian Gulf war in 1991, arms inspectors 
     discovered that Iraq had been far closer to building an 
     atomic bomb than even the worst-case estimates had 
     envisioned. And no one believed that Saddam Hussein had 
     abandoned his nuclear ambitions. To the contrary, in one 
     secret assessment after another, the agencies concluded that 
     Iraq was conducting low-level theoretical research and 
     quietly plotting to resume work on nuclear weapons.
       But at the start of the Bush administration, the 
     intelligence agencies also agreed that Iraq had not in fact 
     resumed its nuclear weapons program. Iraq's nuclear 
     infrastructure, they concluded, had been dismantled by 
     sanctions and inspections. In short, Mr. Hussein's nuclear 
     ambitions appeared to have been contained.
       Then Iraq started shopping for tubes.
       According to a 511-page report on flawed prewar 
     intelligence by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 
     agencies learned in early 2001 of a plan by Iraq to buy 
     60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes from Hong Kong.
       The tubes were made from 7075-T6 aluminum, an extremely 
     hard alloy that made them potentially suitable as rotors in a 
     uranium centrifuge. Properly designed, such tubes are strong 
     enough to spin at the terrific speeds needed to convert 
     uranium gas into enriched uranium, an essential ingredient of 
     an atomic bomb. For this reason, international rules 
     prohibited Iraq from importing certain sizes of 7075-T6 
     aluminum tubes; it was also why a new C.I.A. analyst named 
     Joe quickly sounded the alarm.
       At the C.I.A.'s request, The Times agreed to use only Joe's 
     first name; the agency said publishing his full name could 
     hinder his ability to operate overseas.
       Joe graduated from the University of Kentucky in the late 
     1970's with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, 
     then joined the Goodyear Atomic Corporation, which dispatched 
     him to Oak Ridge, Tenn., a federal complex that specializes 
     in uranium and national security research.
       Joe went to work on a new generation of centrifuges. Many 
     European models stood no more than 10 feet tall. The American 
     centrifuges loomed 40 feet high, and Joe's job was to learn 
     how to test and operate them. But when the project was 
     canceled in 1985, Joe spent the next decade performing hazard 
     analyses for nuclear reactors, gaseous diffusion plants and 
     oil refineries.
       In 1997, Joe transferred to a national security complex at 
     Oak Ridge known as Y-12, his entry into intelligence work. 
     His assignment was to track global sales of material used in 
     nuclear arms. He retired after two years, taking a buyout 
     with hundreds of others at Oak Ridge, and moved to the C.I.A.

[[Page 20485]]

       The agency's ability to assess nuclear intelligence had 
     markedly declined after the cold war, and Joe's appointment 
     was part of an effort to regain lost expertise. He was 
     assigned to a division eventually known as Winpac, for 
     Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control. 
     Winpac had hundreds of employees, but only a dozen or so with 
     a technical background in nuclear arms and fuel production. 
     None had Joe's hands-on experience operating centrifuges.
       Suddenly, Joe's work was ending up in classified 
     intelligence reports being read in the White House. Indeed, 
     his analysis was the primary basis for one of the agency's 
     first reports on the tubes, which went to senior members of 
     the Bush administration on April 10, 2001. The tubes, the 
     report asserted, ``have little use other than for a uranium 
     enrichment program.''
       This alarming assessment was immediately challenged by the 
     Energy Department, which builds centrifuges and runs the 
     government's nuclear weapons complex.
       The next day, Energy Department officials ticked off a long 
     list of reasons why the tubes did not appear well suited for 
     centrifuges. Simply put, the analysis concluded that the 
     tubes were the wrong size--too narrow, too heavy, too long--
     to be of much practical use in a centrifuge.
       What was more, the analysis reasoned, if the tubes were 
     part of a secret, high-risk venture to build a nuclear bomb, 
     why were the Iraqis haggling over prices with suppliers all 
     around the world? And why weren't they shopping for all the 
     other sensitive equipment needed for centrifuges?
       All fine questions. But if the tubes were not for a 
     centrifuge, what were they for?
       Within weeks, the Energy Department experts had an answer.
       It turned out, they reported, that Iraq had for years used 
     high-strength aluminum tubes to make combustion chambers for 
     slim rockets fired from launcher pods. Back in 1996, 
     inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency had 
     even examined some of those tubes, also made of 7075-T6 
     aluminum, at a military complex, the Nasser metal fabrication 
     plant in Baghdad, where the Iraqis acknowledged making 
     rockets. According to the international agency, the rocket 
     tubes, some 66,000 of them, were 900 millimeters in length, 
     with a diameter of 81 millimeters and walls 3.3 millimeters 
     thick.
       The tubes now sought by Iraq had precisely the same 
     dimensions--a perfect match.
       That finding was published May 9, 2001, in the Daily 
     Intelligence Highlight, a secret Energy Department newsletter 
     published on Intelink, a Web site for the intelligence 
     community and the White House.
       Joe and his Winpac colleagues at the C.I.A. were not 
     persuaded. Yes, they conceded, the tubes could be used as 
     rocket casings. But that made no sense, they argued in a new 
     report, because Iraq wanted tubes made at tolerances that 
     ``far exceed any known conventional weapons.'' In other 
     words, Iraq was demanding a level of precision craftsmanship 
     unnecessary for ordinary mass-produced rockets.
       More to the point, those analysts had hit on a competing 
     theory; that the tubes' dimensions matched those used in an 
     early uranium centrifuge developed in the 1950's by a German 
     scientist, Gernot Zippe. Most centrifuge designs are highly 
     classified; this one, though, was readily available in 
     science reports.
       Thus, well before Sept. 11, 2001, the debate within the 
     intelligence community was already neatly framed: Were the 
     tubes for rockets or centrifuges?


                       Experts Attack Joe's Case

       It was a simple question with enormous implications. If Mr. 
     Hussein acquired nuclear weapons, American officials feared, 
     he would wield them to menace the Middle East. So the tube 
     question was critical, yet none too easy to answer. The 
     United States had few spies in Iraq, and certainly none who 
     knew Mr. Hussein's plans for the tubes.
       But the tubes themselves could yield many secrets. A 
     centrifuge is an intricate device. Not any old tube would do. 
     Carefully inquiry might answer the question.
       The intelligence community embarked on an ambitious 
     international operation to intercept the tubes before they 
     could get to Iraq. The big break came in June 2001; a 
     shipment was seized in Jordan.
       At the Energy Department, those examining the tubes 
     included scientists who had spent decades designing and 
     working on centrifuges, and intelligence officers steeped in 
     the tricky business of tracking the nuclear ambitions of 
     America's enemies. They included Dr. Jon A. Kreykes, head of 
     Oak Ridge's national security advanced technology group; Dr. 
     Duane F. Starr, an expert on nuclear proliferation threats; 
     and Dr. Edward Von Halle, a retired Oak Ridge nuclear expert, 
     Dr. Houston G. Wood III, a professor of engineering at the 
     University of Virginia who had helped design the 40-foot 
     American centrifuge, advised the team and consulted with Dr. 
     Zippe.
       On questions about nuclear centrifuges, this was 
     unambiguously the A-Team of the intelligence community, many 
     experts say.
       On Aug. 17, 2001, weeks before the twin towers fell, the 
     team published a secret Technical Intelligence Note, a 
     detailed analysis that laid out its doubts about the tubes' 
     suitability for centrifuges.
       First, in size and material, the tubes were very different 
     from those Iraq had used in its centrifuge prototypes before 
     the first gulf war. Those models used tubes that were nearly 
     twice as wide and made of exotic materials that performed far 
     better than aluminum. ``Aluminum was a huge step backwards,'' 
     Dr. Wood recalled.
       In fact, the team could find no centrifuge machines 
     ``deployed in a production environment'' that used such 
     narrow tubes. Their walls were three times too thick for 
     ``favorable use'' in a centrifuge, the team wrote. They were 
     also anodized, meaning they had a special coating to protect 
     them from weather. Anodized tubes, the team pointed out, are 
     ``not consistent'' with a uranium centrifuge because the 
     coating can produce bad reactions with uranium gas.
       In other words, if Joe and his Winpac colleagues were 
     right, it meant that Iraq had chosen to forsake years of 
     promising centrifuge work and instead start from scratch, 
     with inferior material built to less-than-optimal dimensions.
       The Energy Department experts did not think that made much 
     sense. They concluded that using the tubes in centrifuges 
     ``is credible but unlikely, and a rocket production is the 
     much more likely end use for these tubes.'' Similar 
     conclusions were being reached by Britain's intelligence 
     service and experts at the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency, a United Nations body.
       Unlike Joe, experts at the international agency had worked 
     with Zippe centrifuges, and they spent hours with him 
     explaining why they believed his analysis was flawed. They 
     pointed out errors in his calculations. They noted design 
     discrepancies. They also sent reports challenging the 
     centrifuge claim to American government experts through the 
     embassy in Vienna, a senior official said.
       Likewise, Britain's experts believe the tubes would need 
     ``substantial re-engineering'' to work in centrifuges, 
     according to Britain's review of its prewar intelligence. 
     Their experts found it ``paradoxical'' that Iraq would order 
     such finely crafted tubes only to radically rebuild each one 
     for a centrifuge. Yes, it was theoretically possible, but an 
     Energy Department analyst later told Senate investigators, it 
     was also theoretically possible to ``turn your new Yugo into 
     a Cadillac.''
       In late 2001, intelligence analysts at the State Department 
     also took issue with Joe's work in reports prepared for 
     Secretary of State Colin Powell. Joe was ``very convinced, 
     but not very convincing,'' recalled Greg Thielmann, then 
     director of strategic, proliferation and military affairs in 
     the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
       By year's end, Energy Department analysts published a 
     classified report that even more firmly rejected the theory 
     that the tubes could work as rotors in a 1950's Zippe 
     centrifuge. These particular Zippe centrifuges, they noted, 
     were especially ill suited for bomb making. The machines were 
     a prototype designed for laboratory experiments and mean to 
     be operated as single units. To produce enough enriched 
     uranium to make just one bomb a year, Iraq would need up to 
     16,000 of them working in concert, a challenge for even the 
     most sophisticated centrifuge plants.
       Iraq had never made more than dozen centrifuge prototypes. 
     Half failed when rotors broke. Of the rest, one actually 
     worked to enrich uranium, Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who once ran 
     Iraq's centrifuge program, said in an interview last week.
       The Energy Department team concluded it was ``unlikely that 
     anyone'' could build a centrifuge site capable of producing 
     significant amounts of enriched uranium ``based on these 
     tubes.'' One analyst summed it up this way: the tubes were so 
     poorly suited for centrifuges, he told Senate investigators, 
     that if Iraq truly wanted to use them this way, ``we should 
     just give them the tubes.''


                              enter cheney

       In the months after Sept. 11, 2001, as the Bush 
     administration devised a strategy to fight Al Qaeda, Vice 
     President Cheney immersed himself in the world of top-secret 
     threat assessments. Bob Woodward, in his book `` Plan of 
     Attack,'' described Mr. Cheney as the administration's new 
     ``self-appointed special examiner of worst-case scenarios,'' 
     and it was a role that fit.
       Mr. Cheney had grappled with national security threats for 
     three decades, first as President Gerald R. Ford's chief of 
     staff, later as secretary of defense for the first President 
     Bush. He was on intimate terms with the intelligence 
     community, 15 spy agencies that frequently feuded over the 
     significance of raw intelligence. He knew well their record 
     of getting it wrong (the Bay of Pigs) and underestimating 
     threats (Mr. Hussein's pre-1991 nuclear program) and failing 
     to connect the dots (Sept. 11).
       As a result, the vice president was not simply a passive 
     recipient of intelligence analysis. He was known as a man who 
     asked hard, skeptical questions, a man who paid attention to 
     detail. ``In my office I have a picture of John Adams, the 
     first vice president,'' Mr Cheney said in one of his first 
     speeches as vice president. ``Adams like to say, `The facts 
     are stubborn things.' Whatever the issue, we are going to 
     deal with facts and show a decent regard for other points of 
     view.''
       With the Taliban routed in Afghanistan after Sept. 11, Mr. 
     Cheney and his aides

[[Page 20486]]

     began to focus on intelligence assessments of Saddam Hussein. 
     Mr. Cheney had long argued for more forceful action to topple 
     Mr. Hussein. But in January 2002, according to Mr. Woodward's 
     book, the C.I.A. told Mr. Cheney that Mr. Hussein could not 
     be removed with covert action alone. His ouster, the agency 
     said, would take an invasion, which would require persuading 
     the public that Iraq posted a threat to the United States.
       The evidence for that case was buried in classified 
     intelligence files. Mr. Cheney and his aides began to meet 
     repeatedly with analysts who specialized in Iraq and 
     unconventional weapons. They wanted to know about any Iraqi 
     ties to Al Qaeda and Baghdad's ability to make unconventional 
     weapons.
       ``There's no question they had a point of view, but there 
     was no attempt to get us to hew to a particular point of view 
     ourselves, or to come to a certain conclusion,'' the deputy 
     director of analysis at Winpac told the Senate Intelligence 
     Committee. ``It was trying to figure out, why do we come to 
     this conclusion, what was the evidence. A lot of questions 
     were asked, probing questions.''
       Of all the worst-case possibilities, the most terrifying 
     was the idea that Mr. Hussein might slip a nuclear weapon to 
     terrorists, and Mr. Cheney and his staff zeroed in on Mr. 
     Hussein's nuclear ambitions.
       Mr. Cheney, for example, read a Feb. 12, 2002, report from 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency about Iraq's reported 
     attempts to buy 500 tons of yellowcake, a uranium 
     concentrate, from Niger, according to the Senate Intelligence 
     Committee report. Many American intelligence analysts did not 
     put much stock in the Niger report. Mr. Cheney pressed for 
     more information.
       At the same time, a senor intelligence official said, the 
     agency was fielding repeated requests from Mr. Cheney's 
     office for intelligence about the tubes, including updates on 
     Iraq's continuing efforts to procure thousands more after the 
     seizure in Jordan.
       ``Remember,'' Dr. David A. Kay, the chief American arms 
     inspector after the war, said in an interview, ``the tubes 
     were the only piece of physical evidence about the Iraqi 
     weapons programs that they had.''
       In March 2002, Mr. Cheney traveled to Europe and the Middle 
     East to build support for a confrontation with Iraq. It is 
     not known whether he mentioned Niger or the tubes in his 
     meetings. But on his return, he made it clear that he had 
     repeatedly discussed Mr. Hussein and the nuclear threat.
       ``He is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time,'' 
     Mr. Cheney asserted on CNN.
       At the time, the C.I.A. had not reached so firm a 
     conclusion. But on March 12, the day Mr. Cheney landed in the 
     Middle East, he and other senior administration officials had 
     been sent two C.I.A. reports about the tubes. Each cited the 
     tubes as evidence that ``Iraq currently may be trying to 
     reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.''
       Neither report, however, mentioned that leading centrifuge 
     experts at the Energy Department strongly disagreed, 
     according to Congressional officials who have read the 
     reports.


                        what white house is told

       As the Senate Intelligence Committee report made clear, the 
     American intelligence community ``is not a level playing 
     field when it comes to the competition of ideas in 
     intelligence analysis.''
       The C.I.A. has a distinct edge: ``unique access to policy 
     makers and unique control of intelligence reporting,'' the 
     report found. The Presidential Daily Briefs, for example, are 
     prepared and presented by agency analysts; the agency's 
     director is the president's principal intelligence adviser. 
     This allows agency analysts to control the presentation of 
     information to policy makers ``without having to explain 
     dissenting views or defend their analysis from potential 
     challenges,'' the committee's report said.
       This problem, the report said, was ``particularly evident'' 
     with the C.I.A.'s analysis of the tubes, when agency analysts 
     ``lost objectivity and in several cases took action that 
     improperly excluded useful expertise from the intelligence 
     debate.'' In interviews, Senate investigators said the 
     agency's written assessments did a poor job of describing the 
     debate over the intelligence.
       From April 2001 to September 2002, the agency wrote at 
     least 15 reports on the tubes. Many were sent only to high-
     level policy makers, including President Bush, and did not 
     circulate to other intelligence agencies. None have been 
     released, though some were described in the Senate's report.
       Several senior C.I.A. officials insisted that those reports 
     did describe at least in general terms the intelligence 
     debate. ``You don't go into all that detail but you do try to 
     evince it when you write your current product,'' one agency 
     official said.
       But several Congressional and intelligence officials with 
     access to the 15 assessments said not one of them informed 
     senior policy makers of the Energy Department's dissent. They 
     described a series of reports, some with ominous titles, that 
     failed to convey either the existence or the substance of the 
     intensifying debate.
       Over and over, the reports restated Joe's main conclusions 
     for the C.I.A.--that the tubes matched the 1950's Zippe 
     centrifuge design and were built to specifications that 
     ``exceeded any known conventional weapons application.'' They 
     did not state what Energy Department experts had noted--that 
     many common industrial items, even aluminum cans, were made 
     to specifications as good or better than the tubes sought by 
     Iraq. Nor did the reports acknowledge a significant error in 
     Joe's claim--that the tubes ``matched'' those used in a Zippe 
     centrifuge.
       The tubes sought by Iraq had a wall thickness of 3.3 
     millimeters. When Energy Department experts checked with Dr. 
     Zippe, a step Joe did not take, they learned that the walls 
     of Zippe tubes did not exceed 1.1 millimeters, a substantial 
     difference.
       ``They never lay out the other case,'' one Congressional 
     official said of those C.I.A. assessments.
       The Senate report provides only a partial picture of the 
     agency's communications with the White House. In an 
     arrangement endorsed by both parties, the Intelligence 
     Committee agreed to delay an examination of whether White 
     House descriptions of Iraq's military capabilities were 
     ``substantiated by intelligence information.'' As a result, 
     Senate investigators were not permitted to interview White 
     House officials about what they knew of the tubes debate and 
     when they knew it.
       But in interviews, C.I.A. and administration officials 
     disclosed that the dissenting views were repeatedly discussed 
     in meetings and telephone calls.
       One senior official at the agency said its ``fundamental 
     approach'' was to tell policy makers about dissenting views. 
     Another senior official acknowledged that some of their 
     agency's reports ``weren't as well caveated as, in 
     retrospect, they should have been.'' But he added, ``There 
     was certainly nothing that was hidden.''
       Four agency officials insisted that Winpac analysts 
     repeatedly explained the contrasting assessments during 
     briefings with senior National Security Council officials who 
     dealt with nuclear proliferation issues. ``We think we were 
     reasonably clear about this,'' a senior C.I.A. official said.
       A senior administration official confirmed that Winpac was 
     indeed candid about the differing views. The official, who 
     recalled at least a half dozen C.I.A. briefings on tubes, 
     said he knew by late 2001 that there were differing views on 
     the tubes. ``To the best of my knowledge, he never hid 
     anything from me,'' the official said of his counterpart at 
     Winpac.
       This official said he also spoke to senior officials at the 
     Department of Energy about the tubes, and a spokeswoman for 
     the department said in a written statement that the agency 
     ``strongly conveyed its viewpoint to senior policy makers.''
       But if senior White House officials understood the 
     department's main arguments against the tubes, they also took 
     into account its caveats. ``As for as I know,'' the senior 
     administration official said, ``D.O.E. never concluded that 
     these tubes could not be used for centrifuges.''


                          a referee is ignored

       Over the summer of 2002, the White House secretly refined 
     plans to invade Iraq and debated whether to seek more United 
     Nations inspections. At the same time, in response to a White 
     House request in May, C.I.A. officials were quietly working 
     on a report that would lay out for the public declassified 
     evidence of Iraq's reported unconventional weapons and ties 
     to terror groups.
       That same summer the tubes debate continued to rage. The 
     primary antagonists were the C.I.A. and the Energy 
     Department, with other intelligence agencies drawn in on 
     either side.
       Much of the strife centered on Joe. At first glance, he 
     seem an unlikely target. He held a relatively junior 
     position, and according to the C.I.A. he did not write the 
     vast majority of the agency's reports on the tubes. He has 
     never met Mr. Cheney. His one trip to the White House was to 
     take his family on the public tour.
       But he was, as one staff member on the Senate Intelligence 
     Committee put it, ``the ringleader'' of a small group of 
     Winpac analysts who were convinced that the tubes were 
     destined for centrifuges. His views carried special force 
     within the agency because he was the only Winpac analyst with 
     experience operating uranium centrifuges. In meetings with 
     other intelligence agencies, he often took the lead in 
     arguing the technical basis for the agency's conclusions.
       ``Very few people have the technical knowledge to 
     independently arrive at the conclusion he did,'' said Dr. 
     Kay, the weapons inspector, when asked to explain Joe's 
     influence.
       Without identifying him, the Senate Intelligence 
     Committee's report repeatedly questioned Joe's competence and 
     integrity. It portrayed him so determined to prove his theory 
     that he twisted test results, ignored factual discrepancies 
     and excluded dissenting views.
       The Senate report, for example, challenged his decision not 
     to consult the Energy Department on tests designed to see if 
     the tubes were strong enough for centrifuges. Asked why he 
     did not seek their help, Joe told the committee: ``Because we 
     funded it. It was our testing. We were trying to prove some 
     things that we wanted to prove with the testing.'' The Senate 
     report singled out

[[Page 20487]]

     that comment for special criticism, saying, ``The committee 
     believes that such an effort should never have been intended 
     to prove what the C.I.A. wanted to prove.''
       Joe's superiors strongly defend his work and say his words 
     were taken out of context. They describe him as diligent and 
     professional, an open-minded analyst willing to go the extra 
     mile to test his theories. ``Part of the job of being an 
     analyst is to evaluate alternative hypotheses and 
     possibilities, to build a case, think of alternatives,'' a 
     senior agency official said. ``That's what Joe did in this 
     case. If he turned out to be wrong, that's not an offense. He 
     was expected to be wrong occasionally.''
       Still, the bureaucratic infighting was by then so widely 
     known that even the Australian government was aware of it. 
     ``U.S. agencies differ on whether aluminum tubes, a dual-use 
     item sought by Iraq, were meant for gas centrifuges,'' 
     Australia's intelligence services wrote in a July 2002 
     assessment. The same report said the tubes evidence was 
     ``patchy and inconclusive.''
       There was a mechanism, however, to resolve the dispute. It 
     was called the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a 
     secret body of experts drawn from across the federal 
     government. For a half century, Jaeic (pronounced jake) has 
     been called on to resolve disputes and give authoritative 
     assessments about nuclear intelligence. The committee had 
     specifically assessed the Iraqi nuclear threat in 1989, 1997 
     and 1999. An Energy Department expert was the committee's 
     chairman in 2002, and some department officials say the 
     C.I.A. opposed calling in Jaeic to mediate the tubes fight.
       Not so, agency officials said. In July 2002, they insist, 
     they were the first intelligence agency to seek Jaeic's 
     intervention. ``I personally was concerned about the extent 
     of the community's disagreement on this and the fact that we 
     weren't getting very far,'' a senior agency official 
     recalled.
       The committee held a formal session in early August to 
     discuss the debate, with more than a dozen experts on both 
     sides in attendance. A second meeting was scheduled for later 
     in August but was postponed. A third meeting was set for 
     early September; it never happened either.
       ``We were O.B.E.--overcome by events,'' an official 
     involved in the proceedings recalled.


                        white house makes a move

       ``The case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of our country, 
     requires a candid appraisal of the facts,'' Mr. Cheney said 
     on Aug. 26, 2002, at the outset of an address to the Veterans 
     of Foreign Wars national convention in Nashville.
       Warning against ``wishful thinking or willful blindness,'' 
     Mr. Cheney used the speech to lay out a rationale for pre-
     emptive action against Iraq. Simply resuming United Nations 
     inspections, he argued, could give ``false comfort'' that Mr. 
     Hussein was contained.
       ``We now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire 
     nuclear weapons,'' he declared, words that quickly made 
     headlines worldwide. ``Many of us are convinced that Saddam 
     will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon, we 
     cannot really gauge. Intelligence is an uncertain business, 
     even in the best of circumstances.''
       But the world, Mr. Cheney warned, could ill afford to once 
     again underestimate Iraq's progress.
       ``Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and 
     seated atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam 
     Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the 
     entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the 
     world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends 
     throughout the region, and subject the United States or any 
     other nation to nuclear blackmail.''
       A week later President Bush announced that he would ask 
     Congress for authorization to oust Mr. Hussein. He also met 
     that day with senior members of the House and Senate, some of 
     whom expressed concern that the administration had yet to 
     show the American people tangible evidence of an imminent 
     threat. The fact that Mr. Hussein gassed his own people in 
     the 1980's, they argued, was not sufficient evidence of a 
     threat to the United States in 2002.
       President Bush got the message. He directed Mr. Cheney to 
     give the public and Congress a more complete picture of the 
     latest intelligence on Iraq.
       In his Nashville speech, Mr. Cheney had not mentioned the 
     aluminum tubes or any other fresh intelligence when he said, 
     ``We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire 
     nuclear weapons.'' The one specific source he did cite was 
     Hussein Kamel al-Majid, a son-in-law of Mr. Hussein's who 
     defected in 1994 after running Iraq's chemical, biological 
     and nuclear weapons programs. But Mr. Majid told American 
     intelligence officials in 1995 that Iraq's nuclear program 
     had been dismantled. What's more, Mr. Majid could not have 
     had any insight into Mr. Hussein's current nuclear 
     activities: he was assassinated in 1996 on his return to 
     Iraq.
       The day after President Bush announced he was seeking 
     Congressional authorization, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Tenet, the 
     director of central intelligence, traveled to Capitol Hill to 
     brief the four top Congressional leaders. After the 90-minute 
     session, J. Dennis Hastert, the House speaker, told Fox News 
     that Mr. Cheney had provided new information about 
     unconventional weapons, and Fox went on to report that one 
     source said the new intelligence described ``just how 
     dangerously close Saddam Hussein has come to developing a 
     nuclear bomb.''
       Tom Daschle, the South Dakota Democrat and Senate majority 
     leader, was more cautious. ``What has changed over the course 
     of the last 10 years, that brings this country to the belief 
     that it has to act in a pre-emptive fashion in invading 
     Iraq?'' he asked.
       A few days later, on Sept. 8., the lead article on Page 1 
     of The New York Times gave the first detailed account of the 
     aluminum tubes. The article cited unidentified senior 
     administration officials who insisted that the dimensions, 
     specifications and numbers of tubes sought showed that they 
     were intended for a nuclear weapons program.
       ``The closer he gets to a nuclear capability, the more 
     credible is his threat to use chemical and biological 
     weapons,'' a senior administration official was quoted as 
     saying. ``Nuclear weapons are his hole card.''
       The article gave no hint of a debate over the tubes.
       The White House did much to increase the impact of The 
     Times' article. The morning it was published, Mr. Cheney went 
     on the NBC News program ``Meet the Press'' and confirmed when 
     asked that the tubes were the most alarming evidence behind 
     the administration's view that Iraq had resumed its nuclear 
     weapons program. The tubes, he said, had ``raised our level 
     of concern.'' Ms. Rice, the national security adviser, went 
     on CNN and said the tubes ``are only really suited for 
     nuclear weapons programs.''
       Neither official mentioned that the nation's top nuclear 
     design experts believed overwhelmingly that the tubes were 
     poorly suited for centrifuges.
       Mr. Cheney, who has a history of criticizing officials who 
     disclose sensitive information, typically refuses to comment 
     when asked about secret intelligence. Yet on this day, with a 
     Gallup poll showing that 58 percent of Americans did not 
     believe President Bush had done enough to explain why the 
     United States should act against Iraq, Mr. Cheney spoke 
     openly about one of the closest held secrets regarding Iraq. 
     Not only did Mr. Cheney draw attention to the tubes; he did 
     so with a certitude that could not be found in even the 
     C.I.A.'s assessments. On ``Meet the Press,'' Mr. Cheney said 
     he knew ``for sure'' and ``in fact'' and ``with absolute 
     certainty'' that Mr. Hussein was buying equipment to build a 
     nuclear weapon.
       ``He has reconstituted his nuclear program,'' Mr. Cheney 
     said flatly.
       But in the C.I.A. reports, evidence ``suggested'' or 
     ``could mean'' or ``indicates''--a word used in a report 
     issued just weeks earlier. Little if anything was asserted 
     with absolute certainty. The intelligence community had not 
     yet concluded that Iraq had indeed reconstituted its nuclear 
     program.
       ``The vice president's public statements have reflected the 
     evolving judgment of the intelligence community,'' Kevin 
     Kellems, Mr. Cheney's spokesman, said in a written statement.
       The C.I.A. routinely checks presidential speeches that draw 
     on intelligence reports. This is how intelligence 
     professionals pull politicians back from factual errors. One 
     such opportunity came soon after Mr. Cheney's appearance on 
     ``Meet the Press.'' On Sept. 11, 2002, the White House asked 
     the agency to clear for possible presidential use a passage 
     on Iraq's nuclear program. The passage included this 
     sentence: ``Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-
     strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to enrich uranium 
     for nuclear weapons.''
       The agency did not ask speechwriters to make clear that 
     centrifuges were but one possible use, that intelligence 
     experts were divided and that the tubes also matched those 
     used in Iraqi rockets. In fact, according to the Senate's 
     investigation, the agency suggested no changes at all.
       The next day President Bush used virtually identical 
     language when he cited the aluminum tubes in an address to 
     the United Nations General Assembly.


                     dissent, but to little effect

       The administration's talk of clandestine centrifuges, 
     nuclear blackmail and mushroom clouds had a powerful 
     political effect, particularly on senators who were facing 
     fall election campaigns. ``When you hear about nuclear 
     weapons, this is the national security knock-out punch,'' 
     said Senator Ron Wyden, a Democrat from Oregon who sits on 
     the Intelligence Committee and ultimately voted against 
     authorizing war.
       Even so, it did not take long for questions to surface over 
     the administration's claims about Mr. Hussein's nuclear 
     capabilities. As it happened, Senator Dianne Feinstein, 
     another Democratic member of the Intelligence Committee, had 
     visited the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in 
     August 2002. Officials there, she later recalled, told her 
     they saw no signs of a revived nuclear weapons program in 
     Iraq.
       At that point, the tubes debate was in its 16th month. Yet 
     Mr. Tenet, of the C.I.A., the man most responsible for 
     briefing President Bush on intelligence, told the committee 
     that he was unaware until that September of the profound 
     disagreement over critical evidence that Mr. Bush was citing 
     to world leaders as justification for war.

[[Page 20488]]

       Even now, committee members from both parties express 
     baffled anger at this possibility. How could he not know? ``I 
     don't even understand it,'' Olympia Snowe, a Republican 
     senator from Maine, said in an interview. ``I cannot 
     comprehend the failures in judgment or breakdowns in 
     communication.''
       Mr. Tenet told Senate investigators that he did not expect 
     to learn of dissenting opinions ``until the issue gets 
     joined'' at the highest levels of the intelligence community. 
     But if Mr. Tenet's lack of knowledge meant the president was 
     given incomplete information about the tubes, there was still 
     plenty of time for the White House to become fully informed.
       Yet so far, Senate investigators say, they have found 
     little evidence the White House tried to find out why so many 
     experts disputed the C.I.A. tubes theory. If anything, 
     administration officials minimized the divide.
       On Sept. 13, The Times made the first public mention of the 
     tubes debate in the sixth paragraph of an article on Page 
     A13. In it an unidentified senior administration official 
     dismissed the debate as a ``footnote, not a split.'' Citing 
     another unidentified administration official, the story 
     reported that the ``best technical experts and nuclear 
     scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the 
     C.I.A. assessments.''
       As a senior Oak Ridge official pointed out to the 
     Intelligence Committee, ``the vast majority of scientists and 
     nuclear experts'' in the Energy Department's laboratories in 
     fact disagreed with the agency. But on Sept. 13, the day the 
     article appeared, the Energy Department sent a directive 
     forbidding employees from discussing the subject with 
     reporters.
       The Energy Department, in a written statement, said that it 
     was ``completely appropriate'' to remind employees of the 
     need to protect nuclear secrets and that it had made no 
     effort ``to quash dissent.''
       It closed hearings that month, Congress began to hear 
     testimony about the debate. Several Democrats said in 
     interviews that secrecy rules had prevented them from 
     speaking out about the gap between the administration's view 
     of the tubes and the more benign explanations described in 
     classified testimony.
       One senior C.I.A. official recalled cautioning members of 
     Congress in a closed session not to speak publicly about the 
     possibility that the tubes were for rockets. ``If people 
     start talking about that and the Iraqis see that people are 
     saying rocket bodies, that will automatically become their 
     explanation whenever anyone goes to Iraq,'' the official said 
     in an interview.
       So while administration officials spoke freely about the 
     agency's theory, the evidence that best challenged this view 
     remained almost entirely off limits for public debate.
       In late September, the C.I.A. sent policymakers its most 
     detailed report on the tubes. For the first time, an agency 
     report acknowledged that ``some in the intelligence 
     community'' believed rocket were ``more likely end uses'' for 
     the tubes, according to officials who have seen the report.
       Meanwhile, at the Energy Department, scientists were 
     startled to find senior White House officials embracing a 
     view of the tubes they considered thoroughly discredited. ``I 
     was really shocked in 2002 when I saw it was still there,'' 
     Dr. Wood, the Oak Ridge adviser, said of the centrifuge 
     claim. ``I thought it had been put to bed.''
       Members of the Energy Department team took a highly unusual 
     step: They began working quietly with a Washington arms-
     control group, the Institute for Science and International 
     Security, to help the group inform the public about the 
     debate, said one team member and the group's president, David 
     Albright.
       On Sept. 23, the institute issued the first in series of 
     lengthy reports that repeated some of the Energy Department's 
     arguments against the C.I.A. analysis, though no classified 
     ones. Still, after more than 16 months of secret debate, it 
     was the first public airing of facts that undermined the most 
     alarming suggestions about Iraq's nuclear threat.
       The reports got little attention, partly because reporters 
     did not realize they had been done with the cooperation of 
     top Energy Department experts. The Washington Post ran a 
     brief article about the findings on Page A18. Many major 
     newspapers, including The Times, ran nothing at all.


                     scrambling for an ``estimate''

       Soon after Mr. Cheney's appearance on ``Meet Press,'' 
     Democratic senators began pressing for a new National 
     Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, terrorism and unconventional 
     weapons. A National Intelligence Estimate is a classified 
     document that is supposed to reflect the combined judgment of 
     the entire intelligence community. The last such estimate had 
     been done in 2000.
       Most estimates take months to complete. But this one had to 
     be done in days, in time for an October vote on a war 
     resolution. There was little time for review or reflection, 
     and no time for Jaeic, the joint committee, to reconcile deep 
     analytical differences.
       This was a potentially thorny obstacle for those writing 
     the nuclear section: What do you do when the nation's nuclear 
     experts strongly doubt the linchpin evidence behind the 
     C.I.A.'s claims that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons 
     program?
       The Energy Department helped solve the problem. In meetings 
     on the estimate, senior department intelligence officials 
     said that while they still did not believe the tubes were for 
     centrifuges, they nonetheless could agree that Iraq was 
     reconstituting its nuclear weapons capability.
       Several senior scientists inside the department said they 
     were stunned by that stance; they saw no compelling evidence 
     of a revived nuclear program.
       Some laboratory officials blamed time pressure and 
     inexperience. Thomas S. Ryder, the department's 
     representative at the meetings, had been acting director of 
     the department's intelligence unit for only five months. ``A 
     heck of a nice guy but not savvy on technical issues,'' is 
     the way one senior nuclear official described Mr. Ryder, who 
     declined comment.
       Mr. Ryder's position was more alarming than prior 
     assessments from the Energy Department. In an August 2001 
     intelligence paper, department analysts warned of suspicious 
     activities in Iraq that ``could be preliminary steps'' toward 
     reviving a centrifuge program. In July 2002 an Energy 
     Department report, ``Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts 
     Underway?'', noted that several developments, including 
     Iraq's suspected bid to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger, 
     suggested Baghdad was ``seeking to reconstitute'' a nuclear 
     weapons program.
       According to intelligence officials who took part in the 
     meetings, Mr. Ryder justified his department's now firm 
     position on nuclear reconstitution in large part by citing 
     the Niger reports. Many C.I.A. analysts considered that 
     intelligence suspect, as did analysts at the State 
     Department.
       Nevertheless, the estimate's authors seized on the Energy 
     Department's position to avoid the entire tubes debate, with 
     written dissents relegated to a 10-page annex. The estimate 
     would instead emphasize that the C.I.A. and the Energy 
     Department both agreed that Mr. Hussein was rebuilding his 
     nuclear weapons program. Only the closest reader would see 
     that each agency was basing its assessment in large measure 
     on evidence the other considered suspect.
       On Oct. 2, nine days before the Senate vote on the war 
     resolution, the new National Intelligence Estimate was 
     delivered to the Intelligence Committee. The most significant 
     change from past estimates dealt with nuclear weapons; the 
     new one agreed with Mr. Cheney that Iraq was in aggressive 
     pursuit of the atomic bomb.
       Asked when Mr. Cheney became aware of the disagreements 
     over the tubes, Mr. Kellems, his spokesman, said, ``The vice 
     president knew about the debate at about the time of the 
     National Intelligence Estimated.''
       Today, the Intelligence Committee's report makes clear, 
     that 93-page estimate stands as one of the most flawed 
     documents in the history of American intelligence. The 
     committee concluded unanimously that most of the major 
     findings in the estimate were wrong, unfounded or overblown.
       This was especially true of the nuclear section.
       Estimates express their most important findings with high, 
     moderate or low confidence levels. This one claimed 
     ``moderate confidence'' on how fast Iraq could have a bomb, 
     but ``high confidence'' that Baghdad was rebuilding its 
     nuclear program. And the tubes were the leading and most 
     detailed evidence cited in the body of the report.
       According to the committee, the passages on the tubes, 
     which adopted much of the C.I.A. analysis, were misleading 
     and riddled with factual errors.
       The estimate, for example, included a chart intended to 
     show that the dimensions of the tubes closely matched a Zippe 
     centrifuge. Yet the chart omitted the dimensions of Iraq's 
     81-millimeter rocket, which precisely matched the tubes.
       The estimate cited Iraq's alleged willingness to pay top 
     dollar for the tubes, up to $17.50 each, as evidence they 
     were for secret centrifuges. But Defense Department rocket 
     engineers told Senate investigators that 7075-T6 aluminum is 
     ``the material of choice for low-cost rocket systems.''
       The estimate also asserted that 7075-T6 tubes were ``poor 
     choices'' for rockets. In fact, similar tubes were used in 
     rockets from several countries, including the United States, 
     and in an Italian rocket, the Medusa, which Iraq had copied.
       Beyond tubes, the estimate cited several other ``key 
     judgments'' that supported its assessment. The committee 
     found that intelligence just as flawed.
       The estimate, for example, pointed to Iraq's purchases of 
     magnets, balancing machines and machine tools, all of which 
     could be used in a nuclear program. But each item also had 
     legitimate non-nuclear uses, and there was no credible 
     intelligence whatsoever showing they were for a nuclear 
     program.
       The estimate said Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission was 
     building new production facilities for nuclear weapons. The 
     Senate found that claim was based on a single operative's 
     report, which described how the

[[Page 20489]]

     commission had constructed one headquarters building and 
     planned `` a new high-level polytechnic school.''
       Finally, the estimate stated that many nuclear scientists 
     had been reassigned to the A.E.C. The Senate found nothing to 
     back that conclusion. It did, though, discover a 2001 report 
     in which a commission employee complained that Iraq's nuclear 
     program ``had been stalled since the gulf war.''
       Such ``key judgments'' are supposed to reflect the very 
     best American intelligence. (The Niger intelligence, for 
     example, was considered too shaky to be included as a key 
     judgment.) Yet as they studied raw intelligence reports, 
     those involved in the Senate investigation came to a 
     sickening realization. ``We kept looking at the intelligence 
     and saying, `My God, there's nothing here,''' one official 
     recalled.


                            The Vote for War

       Soon after the National Intelligence Estimate was 
     completed, Mr. Bush delivered a speech in Cincinnati in which 
     he described the ``grave threat'' that Iraq and its ``arsenal 
     of terror'' posed to the United States. He dwelled longest on 
     nuclear weapons, reviewing much of the evidence outlined in 
     the estimate. The C.I.A. had warned him away from mentioning 
     Niger.
       ``Facing clear evidence of peril,'' the president 
     concluded, ``we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking 
     gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''
       Four days later, on Oct. 11, the Senate voted 77-23 to give 
     Mr. Bush broad authority to invade Iraq. The resolution 
     stated that Iraq posed ``a continuing threat'' to the United 
     States by, among other things, ``actively seeking a nuclear 
     weapons capability.''
       Many Senators who voted for the resolution emphasized the 
     nuclear threat.
       ``The great danger is a nuclear one,'' Senator Feinstein, 
     the California Democrat, said on the Senate floor.
       But Senator Bob Graham, then chairman of the Intelligence 
     Committee, said he voted against the resolution in part 
     because of doubts about the tubes. ``It reinforced in my mind 
     pre-existing questions I had about the unreliability of the 
     intelligence community, especially the C.I.A.,'' Mr. Graham, 
     a Florida Democrat, said in an interview.
       At the Democratic convention in Boston this summer, Senator 
     John Kerry pledged that should he be elected president, ``I 
     will ask hard questions and demand hard evidence.'' But in 
     October 2002, when the Senate voted on Iraq, Mr. Kerry had 
     not read the National Intelligence Estimate, but instead had 
     relied on briefing from Mr. Tenet, a spokeswoman said. 
     ``According to the C.I.A.'s report, all U.S. intelligence 
     experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons,'' Mr. 
     Kerry said then, explaining his vote. ``There is little 
     question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear 
     weapons.''
       The report cited by Mr. Kerry, an unclassified white paper, 
     said nothing about the tubes debate except that ``some'' 
     analysts believed the tubes were ``probably intended'' for 
     conventional arms.
       ``It is common knowledge that Congress does not have the 
     same access as the executive branch,'' Brooke Anderson, a 
     Kerry spokeswoman, said yesterday.
       Mr. Kerry's running mate, Senator John Edwards, served on 
     the Intelligence Committee, which gave him ample opportunity 
     to ask hard questions. But in voting to authorize war, Mr. 
     Edwards expressed no uncertainty about the principal evidence 
     of Mr. Hussein's alleged nuclear program.
       ``We know that he is doing everything he can to build 
     nuclear weapons,'' Mr. Edwards said then.
       On Dec. 7, 2002, Iraq submitted a 12,200-page declaration 
     about unconventional arms to the United Nations that made no 
     mention of the tubes. Soon after, Winpac analysts at the 
     C.I.A. assessed the declaration for President Bush. The 
     analysts criticized Iraq for failing to acknowledge or 
     explain why it sought tubes ``we believe suitable for use in 
     a gas centrifuge uranium effort.'' Nor, they said, did it 
     ``acknowledge efforts to procure uranium from Niger.''
       Neither Energy Department nor State Department intelligence 
     experts were given a chance to review the Winpac assessment, 
     prompting complaints that dissenting views were being 
     withheld from policy makers.
       ``It is most disturbing that Winpac is essentially 
     directing foreign policy in this matter,'' one Energy 
     Department official wrote in an e-mail message. ``There are 
     some very strong points to be made in respect to Iraq's 
     arrogant noncompliance with U.N. sanctions. However, when 
     individuals attempt to convert those `strong statements' into 
     the `knock-out' punch, the administration will ultimately 
     look foolish--i.e., the tubes and Niger!''


                       The U.N. Inspectors Return

       For nearly two years Western intelligence analysts had been 
     trying to divine from afar Iraq's plans for the tubes. At the 
     end of 2002, with the resumption of United Nations arms 
     inspectors, it became possible to seek answers inside Iraq. 
     Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     immediately zeroed in on the tubes.
       The team quickly arranged a field trip to the Nasser metal 
     fabrication factory, where they found 13,000 completed 
     rockets, all produced from 7075-T6 aluminum tubes. The Iraqi 
     rocket engineers explained that they had been shopping for 
     more tubes because their supply was running low.
       Why order tubes with such tight tolerances? An Iraqi 
     engineer said they wanted to improve the rocket's accuracy 
     without making major design changes. Design documents and 
     procurement records confirmed his account.
       The inspectors solved another mystery. The tubes 
     intercepted in Jordan had been anodized, given a protective 
     coating. The Iraqis had a simple explanation: they wanted the 
     new tubes protected from the elements. Sure enough, the 
     inspectors found that many thousands of the older tubes, 
     which had no special coating, were corroded because they had 
     been stored outside.
       The inspectors found no trace of a clandestine centrifuge 
     program. On Jan. 10, 2003, The Times reported that the 
     international agency was challenging ``the key piece of 
     evidence'' behind ``the primary rationale for going to war.'' 
     The article, on Page A10, also reported that officials at the 
     Energy Department and State Department had suggested the 
     tubes might be for rockets.
       The C.I.A. theory was in trouble, and senior members of the 
     Bush administration seemed to know it.
       Also that January, White House officials who were helping 
     to draft what would become Secretary Powell's speech to the 
     Security Council sent word to the intelligence community that 
     they believed ``the nuclear case was weak,'' the Senate 
     report said. In an interview, a senior administration 
     official said it was widely understood all along at the White 
     House that the evidence of a nuclear threat was piecemeal and 
     weaker than that for other unconventional arms.
       But rather than withdraw the nuclear card--a step that 
     could have undermined United States credibility just as tens 
     of thousands of troops were being airlifted to the region--
     the White House cast about for new arguments and evidence to 
     support it.
       Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, asked the intelligence agencies for more evidence 
     beyond the tubes to bolster the nuclear case. Winpac analysts 
     redoubled efforts to prove that Iraq was trying to acquire 
     uranium from Africa. When rocket engineers at the Defense 
     Department were approached by the C.I.A. and asked to compare 
     the Iraqi tubes with American ones, the engineers said the 
     tubes ``were perfectly usable for rockets.'' The agency 
     analysts did not appear pleased. One rocket engineer 
     complained to Senate investigators that the analysts had ``an 
     agenda'' and were trying ``to bias us'' into agreeing that 
     the Iraqi tubes were not fit for rockets. In interviews, 
     agency officials denied any such effort.
       According to the Intelligence Committee report, the agency 
     also sought to undermine the I.A.E.A.'s work with secret 
     intelligence assessments distributed only to senior policy 
     makers. Nonetheless, on Jan. 22, in a meeting first reported 
     by The Washington Post, the ubiquitous Joe flew to Vienna in 
     a last-ditch attempt to bring the international experts 
     around to his point of view.
       The session was a disaster.
       ``Everybody was embarrassed when he came and made this 
     presentation, embarrassed and disgusted,'' one participant 
     said. ``We were going insane, thinking, `Where is he coming 
     from?'''
       On Jan. 27, the international agency rendered its judgment: 
     it told the Security Council that it had found no evidence of 
     a revived nuclear weapons program in Iraq. ``From our 
     analysis to date,'' the agency reported, ``it appears that 
     the aluminum tubes would be consistent with the purpose 
     stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable 
     for manufacturing centrifuges.''


                        The Powell Presentation

       The next night, during his State of the Union address, 
     President Bush cited I.A.E.A. findings from years past that 
     confirmed that Mr. Hussein had had an ``advanced'' nuclear 
     weapons program in the 1990's. He did not mention the 
     agency's finding from the day before.
       He did, though, repeat the claim that Mr. Hussein was 
     trying to buy tubes ``suitable for nuclear weapons 
     production.'' Mr. Bush also cited British intelligence that 
     Mr. Hussein had recently sought ``significant quantities'' of 
     uranium from Africa--a reference in 16 words that the White 
     House later said should have been stricken, though the 
     British government now insists the information was credible.
       ``Saddam Hussein,'' Mr. Bush said that night, ``has not 
     credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to 
     hide. The dictator of Iraq is not disarming.''
       A senior administration official involved in vetting the 
     address said Mr. Bush did not cite the I.A.E.A. conclusion of 
     Jan. 27 because the White House believed the agency was 
     analyzing old Iraqi tubes, not the newer ones seized in 
     Jordan. But senior officials in Vienna and Washington said 
     the international group's analysis covered both types of 
     tubes.
       The senior administration official also said the 
     President's words were carefully chosen to reflect the doubts 
     at the Energy Department. The crucial phrase was ``suitable 
     for nuclear weapons production.'' The phrase stopped short of 
     asserting that the tubes

[[Page 20490]]

     were actually being used in centrifuges. And it was accurate 
     in the sense that Energy Department officials always left 
     open the possibility that the tubes could be modified for use 
     in a centrifuge.
       ``There were differences,'' the official said, ``and we had 
     to address those differences.''
       In his address, the President announced that Mr. Powell 
     would go before the Security Council on Feb. 5 and lay out 
     the intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs. The purpose was 
     to win international backing for an invasion, and so the 
     administration spent weeks drafting and redrafting the 
     presentation, with heavy input from the C.I.A., the National 
     Security Council and I. Lewis Libby, Mr. Cheney's chief of 
     staff.
       The Intelligence Committee said some drafts prepared for 
     Mr. Powell contained language on the tubes that was patently 
     incorrect. The C.I.A.wanted Mr. Powell to say, for example, 
     that Iraq's specifications for roundness were so exacting 
     ``that the tubes would be rejected as defective if I rolled 
     one under my hand on this table, because the mere pressure of 
     my hand would deform it.''
       Initelligence analyst at the State Department waged a quiet 
     battle against much of the proposed language on tubes. A year 
     before, they had sent Mr. Powell a report explaining why they 
     believed the tubes were more likely for rockets. The National 
     Intelligence Estimate included their dissent--that they saw 
     no compelling evidence of a comprehensive effort to revive a 
     nuclear weapons program. Now, in the days before the Security 
     Council speech, they sent the secretary detailed memos 
     warning him away from a long list of assertions in the 
     drafts, the intelligence committee found. The language on the 
     tubes, they said, contained ``egregious errors'' and ``highly 
     misleading'' claims. Changes were made, language softened. 
     The line about ``the mere pressure of my hand'' was removed.
       ``My colleagues,'' Mr. Powell assured the Security Council, 
     ``every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid 
     sources. These are not assertions.''
       He made his way to the subject of Mr. Hussein's current 
     nuclear capabilities.
       ``By now,'' he said, ``just about everyone has heard of 
     these tubes, and we all know there are differences of 
     opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. 
     Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors 
     in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts and the 
     Iraqis themselves argue that they are really to produce the 
     rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket 
     launcher.''
       But Mr. Powell did not acknowledge that those ``other 
     experts'' included many of the nation's most authoritative 
     nuclear experts, some of whom said in interviews that they 
     were offended to find themselves now lumped in with a reviled 
     government.
       In making the case that the tubes were for centrifuges, Mr. 
     Powell made claims that his own intelligence experts had told 
     him were not accurate. Mr. Powell, for example, asserted to 
     the Security Council that the tubes were manufactured to a 
     tolerance ``that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable 
     rockets.''
       Yet in a memo written two days earlier, Mr. Powell's 
     intelligence experts had specifically cautioned him about 
     those very same words. ``In fact,'' they explained, ``the 
     most comparable U.S. system is a tactical rocket--the U.S. 
     Mark 66 air-launched 70-millimeter rocket--that uses the 
     same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has 
     specifications with similar tolerances,''
       In the end, Mr. Powell put his personal prestige and 
     reputation behind the C.I.A.'s tube theory.
       ``When we came to the aluminum tubes,'' Richard A. Boucher, 
     the State Department spokesman, said in an interview, ``the 
     secretary listened to the discussion of the various views 
     among intelligence agencies, and reflected those issues in 
     his presentation. Since his task at the U.N. was to present 
     the views of the United States, he went with the overall 
     judgment of the intelligence community as reflected by the 
     director of central intelligence.''
       As Mr. Powell summed it up for the United Nations, ``People 
     will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in 
     my mind these illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam 
     Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key 
     missing piece from his nuclear weapons program: the ability 
     to produce fissile material.''
       Six weeks later, the war began.

  Mr. BYRD. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator 
from West Virginia, for his years of experience and his dedication to 
the Constitution and his ability to protect the rightful prerogatives 
of this body. I do, however, disagree with him, respectfully, on the 
contents of his amendment.
  I note, as I said this morning, the limitations in Senator Byrd's 
amendment would inhibit the ability of the national intelligence 
director to move people and money around to counter the threats facing 
our country. That is a major reform that has been recommended not only 
by the 9/11 Commission but by the witnesses before our committee and is 
a major reform supported by the administration.
  Senator Byrd argues that the transfer authorities in the underlying 
bill cede too much power to the executive branch. But, in fact, the DCI 
currently has transfer authorities.
  This is not a novel concept. We give the NID more transfer authority 
than the DCI currently has, but we are not taking power from Congress 
in any way because our bill does not change the existing process 
through which transfers must be approved by the appropriate 
congressional committees.
  Mr. President, I will have more to say on Senator Byrd's amendment 
later.


                Amendment No. 3950 To Amendment No. 3705

  Mr. President, at this point, I would like to take the opportunity to 
clear a pending amendment, so I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside, and I send to the desk a second-degree 
amendment to the Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman amendment No. 3705.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the Senator's request?
  Without objection, it is so ordered. The pending amendment is set 
aside.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Ms. Collins], for herself and Mr. 
     Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 3950 to amendment 
     No. 3705.

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

            (Purpose: To make certain technical amendments)

       On page 5, after line 2, insert the following:
       (7) Grant programs under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
     Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121-5206).
       On page 10, line 17, strike the semicolon and all that 
     follows through page 11, line 7, and insert a period.
       On page 12, line 5, strike ``(5)'' and insert ``(6)''.
       On page 12, lines 17 through 20, strike ``technical 
     assistance provided by any Federal agency to States and local 
     governments to conduct threat analyses and vulnerability 
     assessments'' and insert ``technical assistance provided by 
     any Federal agency to States and local governments regarding 
     homeland security matters''.
       On page 18, line 9, insert ``secure'' after ``for''.
       On page 23, line 18, insert ``on the basis of terrorist 
     threat'' after ``grant''.
       On page 25, line 24, insert ``on the basis of terrorist 
     threat'' after ``distribute''.

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this second-degree amendment addresses 
several relatively minor concerns raised by some of the Members of this 
body and the Department of Homeland Security about the underlying 
amendment. I know of no objection to the second-degree amendment. The 
changes it would make do not in any way affect the funding formula of 
the underlying amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise in support of this 
amendment. It builds on some extraordinary work done by the bipartisan 
membership of the Governmental Affairs Committee on a separate bill 
before we were assigned responsibility for this intelligence reform 
months ago in which the chairman and Senator Carper played leading 
roles. I give them both great credit.
  There is nothing more difficult than funding formulas around this 
place, for understandable reasons. I think this amendment strikes the 
right balance in the distribution of homeland security grant funds. The 
balance is to make certain we apply the dollars across our country in a 
way that protects us against the enemy we face, the terrorist enemy we 
face that is ruthless and unpredictable. To some extent, we think we 
understand them. The probabilities are they will strike more at large 
cities and visible and symbolic targets, but the reality is we cannot 
have our focus on what this enemy will do to us or aspire to do to us, 
be limited to the dreadful and tragic experience of September 11 in 
which they hit

[[Page 20491]]

visible symbols of America's greatness because this same terrorist ilk 
has struck throughout the world at other kinds of targets that are not 
so visible, at buses with innocents on them, and other means of 
transportation, at gatherings of people in Iraq adjacent to places 
where Iraqis are lining up to apply to become security officers.
  So that is the balance we are trying to strike which is to give 
special attention to the larger cities that are more likely to be 
targets but to understand that in a way that we have never experienced 
in our history before, all of America is potentially a target because 
these people do not ever play by anybody's rules of warfare. They 
strike at the most vulnerable targets. That means they could strike 
anywhere.
  The Governmental Affairs Committee spent many months working on this 
compromise legislation. The amendment incorporates the text of that 
Governmental Affairs legislation, unanimously approved, to help 
streamline our funding for first responders around America. It ensures 
that a very significant part of the homeland security funding will be 
determined on the basis of the risks and threats that particular 
communities face, which moves us substantially in the direction that 
the 9/11 Commission recommended.
  At the same time, this amendment will guarantee that each State, and 
therefore the localities under the State, continues to receive a 
minimum amount of funding to build up essential capabilities to both 
prevent and respond to a potential terrorist attack.
  So I am pleased this amendment appears to be acceptable on both 
sides. I join in urging its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, as the Senator from Connecticut has 
indicated, the underlying amendment would implement the Homeland 
Security Grant Enhancement Act. This legislation is the product of 
three hearings and 2 years of negotiation on the Governmental Affairs 
Committee. It was approved by a unanimous vote, and it currently has 29 
cosponsors.
  It is supported by Senators from big States, such as Michigan and 
Ohio, and small States, such as Maine and Delaware. The widespread 
support in the Senate demonstrates that the amendment takes a balanced 
approach to homeland security funding. It recognizes that a threat-
based funding formula is a critical aspect, but it also preserves and 
recognizes the fact that first responders in every State stand on the 
front lines of securing the homeland.
  I am constantly reminded that two of the hijackers on 9/11 began 
their journey of death and destruction from Portland, ME. So small 
States are not immune from being used as staging grounds for terrorist 
attacks.
  I think we have come up with a carefully balanced formula that will 
help make our Nation safer. Secretary Ridge frequently reminds us that 
homeland security starts with hometown security. Our legislation 
recognizes that as well.
  I note that the legislation is supported by a wide variety of 
organizations, including the National Governors Association, the 
National Council of State Legislatures, the Council of State 
Governments, the National Association of Counties, the National League 
of Cities, Advocates for EMS, the International City/County Management 
Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, and the Fire Chiefs 
Association.
  I know the Presiding Officer is very familiar with this issue in his 
capacity as the distinguished chairman of the Homeland Security 
Appropriations Subcommittee, and we have enjoyed working closely with 
him and his staff as well.
  I want to mention one aspect of the underlying bill; that is, it 
would provide greater flexibility in the use of homeland security funds 
so we can ensure that if a State needs to have more training as opposed 
to buying more equipment, there is more flexibility for the use of 
those funds in a flexible manner via a waiver from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security.
  This was a particular concern to the Senator from Missouri, Mr. 
Talent. I know having that flexibility will enable our first 
responders, whether they live in Maine, Missouri, or Mississippi, to be 
better prepared.
  Mr. President, I know of no further requests for debate on the 
second-degree amendment nor on the underlying amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the second-degree amendment 
No. 3950.
  The amendment (No. 3950) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that 
motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate today will 
accept a bipartisan amendment, No. 3705, to the National Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004, S. 2845, offered by Senator Collins, for myself and 
eight other cosponsors, that will revise the formula for the allocation 
of State and local homeland security grant funding.
  Homeland security is a national responsibility shared by all States, 
regardless of size. Each State has basic terrorism preparedness needs 
and, therefore, a minimum amount of domestic terrorism preparedness 
funds is necessary for each State. Our first responders in each and 
every State are on the front lines in defending against and preparing 
for terrorist attacks. We need to ensure that they receive the funding 
they need to prepare for and respond to such attacks.
  Recognizing that every State and community should have helped to meet 
those needs, I authored a minimum formula for State and local basic 
formula grants to emergency responders that are distributed to States 
by the Department of Homeland Security Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness. That formula guarantees that 
each State--regardless of size--receives at least 0.75 percent of the 
national allotment to help meet their national domestic security needs.
  Congress continues to recognize that every State and community--rural 
or urban, small or large--has basic domestic security needs and merits 
the Federal help to meet those needs. Both the Senate and House 
Homeland Security appropriations bills for Fiscal Year 2005 keep the 
all-State minimum formula for first responder grants that are 
distributed to the States.
  Representatives and officials from urban States and cities have 
argued that Federal money to fight terrorism is sent to areas that do 
not need it and it is ``wasted'' in small towns. However, Congress has 
shown that it recognizes these highly populated, highly threatened and 
highly vulnerable areas have terrorism preparedness needs beyond those 
basic needs for each State. That is why we in the Senate last month 
included $1.2 billion for discretionary grants to high-threat urban 
areas for the coming fiscal year. The House-passed Homeland Security 
appropriations bill included $1 billion for the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative.
  Not all those who are leaders in urban areas believe that every cent 
of State and local homeland security funding should go solely to first 
responders in our cities. I recall this past August, former New York 
City Mayor Rudy Giuliani brought a warning to emergency first 
responders in my home State of Vermont that should serve as a notice to 
all Americans. He said there was no doubt in his mind that another 
serious attack on the United States would be attempted, and he said it 
could just as easily be small town America rather than another large 
city.
  ``The risk of another attack is a very great one. . . . The biggest 
city and the smallest towns, both had to be prepared,'' he was quoted 
by The Rutland Herald. While in Vermont, Mr. Giuliani publicly lauded 
the value of the work that first responders in small local communities 
do day after day. I join him in that praise.
  I remind my colleagues that the town of Shanksville, PA, where the 
fourth hijacked airliner, United flight 93, crashed on September 11, 
2001, is a tiny town of 245 residents with only one fire truck in a 
small fire station. On that

[[Page 20492]]

day, Shanksville's police officers, fire fighters, and EMS officers who 
raced to the crash site of flight 93 were on the front lines of 
terrorism response. It is a threat we cannot always predict but one 
that we must always try to be prepared to meet.
  Officials in the current administration hold the same view. In an 
interview published in the 2004 edition of The Year in Homeland 
Security, the Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness, Sue 
Mencer, stated the following: . . . `` there should be some base level 
funding to each state and territory regardless of size or population 
density. There are infrastructures everywhere, although they may not be 
so dramatic as a Brooklyn Bridge or Golden Gate. There are critical 
underground pipelines, highways, bridges that we don't think of 
automatically but still need to be protected.''
  Critics of the all-State minimum seem to forget that since the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, we have asked all-State and 
local first responders to defend us as never before on the front lines 
in the war against terrorism. Emergency responders in a rural State 
have the same responsibilities as those in any urban State to provide 
enhanced protection, preparedness and response against terrorists.
  Fostering divisions between States ignores the real problem: We 
should be looking to increase the funds to our Nation's first 
responders. The Hart-Rudman report on domestic preparedness argues that 
the U.S. will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting 
critical emergency responder needs over the next 5 years if current 
funding levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds 
available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for, and 
respond to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
  I am proud to join Senator Collins and my eight colleagues in 
cosponsoring her bipartisan amendment to revise the formula for the 
allocation of State and local homeland security grant funding. This 
amendment maintains the 0.75 percent minimum that each State currently 
receives under the USA PATRIOT Act to help ensure that every State can 
respond to its preparedness needs, but it also clarifies and recognizes 
the fact that some States indeed have high-threat areas. I will 
continue to oppose any efforts to reduce adequate support and resources 
for our police, fire, and EMS services in each State and community as 
they continue to protect us from terrorists or respond to terrorist 
attacks, as well as carry out their other preparedness 
responsibilities. We should adequately meet the needs of all of our 
dedicated first responders and resist efforts that would pit them 
against each other.
  We must continue our efforts to ensure the readiness of our States 
and communities. Should the United States experience terrorist attacks 
like those we endured over 3 years ago, I want to make sure that each 
police officer, firefighter, or rescue worker who responds to those 
attacks has the best training and equipment available to get the job 
done. I applaud all the hard work of all our State and local emergency 
first responders who not only continue to carry out the day-to-day 
responsibilities they have always had, but also find themselves serving 
on the front lines in the war on terrorism.


                     Amendment No. 3705, As Amended

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know of no further debate on the 
underlying amendment, the Collins-Carper-Lieberman-Coleman amendment 
No. 3705.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
No. 3705, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 3705), as amended, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the motion to table 
is laid on the table.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I note the Senator from North Dakota is 
on his feet. I wonder if the Senator could inform us whether he is 
seeking recognition to talk about the bill or offer an amendment or 
morning business.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I seek recognition to speak about the bill 
and about Senator Byrd's amendment and generally about the subject the 
Senate is considering.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from North Dakota.


                           Amendment No. 3845

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me say that the Senator from West 
Virginia has done a great service today by pointing out that there is a 
substantial difference between flexibility and accountability. I 
cosponsored the amendment offered by Senator Byrd, not because I want 
less flexibility but because I demand and expect that we should have 
accountability in terms of how money is spent by the Federal 
Government, especially in these areas.
  I don't think there is one instance in which the administration would 
argue they have not been given the flexibility to move funding from one 
account to another in order to accomplish their specific goals and 
purposes in defeating terrorism. The Congress has been extraordinarily 
generous in working with the administration in every conceivable way to 
move money around to areas where they need that money with which to 
fight terrorism.
  Senator Byrd, in his amendment, indicates that he thinks we should 
continue to have some accountability. Under the pending bill, the 
Treasury Secretary is authorized to create appropriations accounts, to 
which the national intelligence director then can transfer funds, and 
there are really no limits on how those funds would be used at this 
point.
  Let me give a short description of some of the angst I have about 
this when you just provide funding and say: Katey, bar the door, do 
what you want, and don't worry about how we feel about it.
  This is a tiny little issue, but there is a small area down in the 
Treasury Department called the Office of Foreign Asset Control, OFAC. 
Its purpose is to track money that goes to fund and support terrorist 
organizations so we can shut down that funding. That is the purpose of 
OFAC. I found that OFAC has 21 people tracking American tourists 
traveling to Cuba. These are American citizens who are suspected of 
trying to take a vacation in Cuba. We have 21 people in an agency 
designed to try to interrupt the flow of money to terrorists who are 
now spending their time trying to shut down travel by the American 
people to Cuba.
  I will give you an example. A young woman named Joni Scott went to 
Cuba. She didn't have a license to go there. She went there to 
distribute free Bibles on the streets of Havana and other Cuban cities. 
She is a devoutly religious young woman. I have met with her. She went 
to Cuba to distribute free Bibles. OFAC tracked her down and slapped 
her with a $10,000 fine because she didn't have a general license to go 
to Cuba.
  And there is Joan Slote, a 76-year-old grandmother who likes to ride 
bicycles, who signed up with a Canadian company for a bicycle tour of 
Cuba. She happens to be a senior Olympian who rides bicycles in the 
Senior Olympics. They tracked her down and slapped a $10,000 fine on 
her. It was later reduced, but they decided they were going to try to 
attach her Social Security check because she did not pay her fine on 
time. That was because she had been in Europe. She rushed back home 
when her son had a brain tumor and was dying, went to her son's 
bedside, and was not at home to get her mail. What was her 
transgression? She was an American who decided to ride a bike in Cuba.
  My point is this: This is a rather small agency, OFAC. And when Paul 
O'Neill was the Secretary of the Treasury, I asked him at a hearing, 
because I was the chair of the appropriations subcommittee--I said: Mr. 
Secretary, wouldn't you really prefer to use all of those assets at 
OFAC to track terrorists? He didn't answer for three or four times. 
Finally, about the fifth time, he said: Of course.
  If I had my choice, that would be the most productive thing. We now 
discover that more and more of those people at OFAC are being used to 
track Americans who travel to Cuba. I don't understand that. But it 
goes to the

[[Page 20493]]

point that Senator Byrd has made. Should we have some accountability? 
When we decide to take the taxpayers' money and appropriate that money, 
should we have some accountability with respect to how the money is 
spent? This isn't about Republicans or Democrats, conservatives or 
liberals; it is about accountability.
  My colleague from West Virginia, a unique, extraordinary Senator, 
often pulls from his pocket that well-worn and underlined copy of the 
Constitution and he asks whether the Senate is carrying out its 
responsibility. Because after all, this is a Government with several 
branches. We want to work together. We certainly all want to fight 
terrorism. There is no question about that. We are willing to 
appropriate the funds with which to combat terrorism, but we are not 
all willing to say: By the way, here is the check, spend it the way you 
want. Congress needs to be involved.
  This is not about turf. This amendment described today by Senator 
Byrd is a bipartisan amendment. But it is not about turf. It is about 
Republicans and Democrats together who have joined to take a look at 
this issue and say: In this circumstance, we believe there ought to be 
some fundamental accountability.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, would the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DORGAN. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I appreciate what the Senator said. I must say that 
Senator Collins and I in crafting the underlying bill were very careful 
to make sure we did not diminish the accountability the national 
intelligence director will have to the internal executive branch budget 
procedures or to Congress. There is a movement of authority here. The 
movement of authority is from the Department of Defense to the national 
intelligence director. The Byrd amendment would eliminate that, would 
force the money to go back to the Department of Defense.
  I want to assure the Senator that internally the limits of transfer 
authority in our bill are quite clear. The national intelligence 
director has to get approval from the Office of Management and Budget.
  More to the point, on congressional oversight, our legislation 
doesn't alter today's balance between the executive and legislative 
branch at all. For example, on page 28, paragraph (4) of the bill:

       Any transfer of funds under this subsection shall be 
     carried out in accordance with existing procedures applicable 
     to reprogramming notifications for appropriate congressional 
     committees.

  Page 29, paragraph (5)(A):

       The National Intelligence Director shall promptly submit to 
     appropriate committees of Congress a report on any transfer 
     of personnel . . .

  And finally: ``Any transfer of funds or personnel cannot exceed 
applicable ceilings established in law for such transfer'' by that 
Congress.
  So my question is why my friend from North Dakota thinks in any way 
this proposal, which does move budget authority from the Defense 
Department to the national intelligence director, alters the authority 
of Congress to hold these people accountable?
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I cosponsored the amendment not because of 
what I think but because of what I know. Let me describe for the 
Senator from Connecticut a circumstance that I believe means less 
accountability for the Congress and a circumstance that puts the 
Congress in a position of having to act retroactively with respect to 
an action that is already taken which dramatically changes the 
prerogatives of Congress.
  As I understand it, under the bill, the Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorized to create appropriations accounts to which the national 
intelligence director then can transfer funds. As I further understand 
it, the underlying bill includes no limits on how those funds can be 
used once they are transferred.
  As I understand it, the intelligence director would be authorized to 
transfer about $3.5 billion from the defense budget, and that gives the 
director a substantial amount of transfer authority never contemplated 
by Congress. The circumstance is that Congress would have to take 
action only retroactively to transfers that are made by the national 
intelligence director, which means that director begins and works to 
expend funds by their own volition.
  My colleague from Connecticut indicates that they must get approval 
from the Office of Management and Budget. I would point out, that is 
just the administration giving itself approval to do what it wants. 
That is not a check and balance of any type.
  My point is this: Once these transfers are made into this account and 
from the account, the only action that would then be available to 
Congress is some retro-action to say that is not what we intended. That 
puts Congress in a circumstance that, in my judgment, is 
disadvantageous for the body in this Government that has the power of 
the purse.
  I go back to this point, and this is a small point, but it is one 
that is instructive to me: If we do not tell those for whom we 
appropriate money how we want those funds to be spent, then, Katey, bar 
the door. Then you have a circumstance of the type I just described to 
my colleagues. I bet there is not one colleague in this Chamber who 
would stand up and say this young woman named Joni Scott should have 
been fined for going to Cuba to distribute free Bibles. I bet there is 
not one person in this Chamber who would stand up and say: I think we 
ought to fine a good Christian, a young woman who goes to Cuba and 
distributes free Bibles.
  That is what the people in OFAC are doing. They are tracking people 
down, such as Joni Scott. That is not the intent, in my judgment. When 
we appropriate funding--and we are going to appropriate a lot of it--we 
are in every circumstance accommodating to the administration when it 
needs to move money for a good purpose, to combat terrorism. When we 
appropriate that money, we demand accountability. We expect and demand 
accountability. That is what the Byrd amendment provides.
  It is not a radical amendment. First of all, it is bipartisan, and, 
second, it is just the most fundamental step that, in my judgment, we 
ought to take as a Congress because we, after all, are the ones who 
decide how much the American people pay in taxes, what do they have to 
provide for Government, and then we are the stewards of how that money 
is spent.
  Without this amendment, we have lost control over the stream of this 
funding. That is why I was a cosponsor of the Byrd amendment, again a 
bipartisan amendment.
  I think it is the right thing for us to do.
  I must say to my colleague from Connecticut, I honestly do not think 
this amendment in any way undermines the Collins-Lieberman bill. I 
think, frankly, it will strengthen that bill and say to every Member of 
the House and Senate, Republicans and Democrats: We are going to do 
this in a way that requires accountability. What better message, in my 
judgment, than that message? So I actually think it strengthens the 
underlying bill.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I may respond.
  Mr. DORGAN. I will be happy to yield for a question.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Then I will be happy to yield back.
  There is a misunderstanding, and I want to see if I can clarify it. 
There are three parts of the amendment offered by the Senator from West 
Virginia and others. Two have to do with transfers of personnel and 
money and whether they can be limited in any way.
  We believe it is not right for Congress to limit the authority--here 
I mean amounts of money or personnel of the nature of how long the 
national intelligence director, whom I have been calling the general we 
do not have now of our intelligence forces, can transfer personnel or 
money to fight the war on terrorism, to plug a gap that he sees 
existing in his ranks, to respond to a crisis that occurs somewhere in 
the world. That is the kind of flexibility we want to give him. That is 
subject to oversight, but that is a limitation on the power the 
national intelligence director has in our bill, recommended by the 9/11 
Commission, supported by the families of those who died on 9/11.

[[Page 20494]]

  That is one part. We can argue about that. But it is definitely a cut 
in the authority of the national intelligence director to help us wage 
war on terrorism.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I can reclaim my time for a moment on 
that point because I think this is a fruitful discussion, the authority 
in the underlying bill given to the national intelligence director is 
extraordinary and above that which we provide in most other 
circumstances with respect to appropriations. The two Senators may well 
intend that. I expect they do intend that. Our only point is there has 
never been a circumstance, to my knowledge, where someone has come to 
us on an urgent basis saying, We need to plug this hole, we need to 
move funds, there has never been a circumstance in which the Congress 
says: No, you cannot do that. We have always said: Absolutely, let us 
work with you.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to make clear again, there is an 
alteration of authority and accountability here but not between the 
executive branch and Congress. The alteration of authority and 
accountability is between agencies of the executive branch, between the 
Defense Department and the national intelligence director because, as 
has been said over and over--and talk about accountability, we are 
spending, by most estimates--and I cannot say the exact number because 
it is classified--we spend over $40 billion a year on our intelligence 
agencies, and the 9/11 Commission and Members of this Congress know it 
and tell us there is no one in charge. What kind of accountability is 
that?
  One of the main purposes of this bill is to put someone in charge, 
the national intelligence director, and to hold him accountable.
  I want to repeat, there is nothing in this bill--there may be some 
alteration of authority that comes through in the congressional 
oversight reforms that are coming from Senator McConnell and Senator 
Harry Reid among different committees of the Congress, but all the 
review and approvals that Congress has for appropriations now will 
exist when this bill passes. But the national intelligence director 
will have more authority than the Director of Central Intelligence has 
today. It is true the Department of Defense, which currently, 
strangely, receives more than 80 percent of the intelligence budget and 
then funnels it out to the intelligence community, will lose some of 
that authority.
  There is nothing in this bill--if you see it, bring it to us. Senator 
Collins and I will review it and see if we can alter it. That is not 
our intention. I want to say what bothers me about the amendment, apart 
from the transfer, is that it strikes a section in our bill which we 
thought was process, was routine, which simply says: If we are to give 
this national intelligence director some authority for the budget, we 
have to give the Treasury the authority to set up accounts for that 
person in the Treasury so he can spend it, but he has to spend it 
according to the appropriations of Congress. He has to spend subject to 
all the oversight, notification, and accountability of Congress.
  I remain puzzled, and I do feel very strongly that this amendment 
will do serious damage to our proposal, unanimously adopted by the 
committee based on recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and strongly 
supported by the families of the victims of 9/11.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me just say, first of all, you can 
delegate authority, but you cannot delegate responsibility. No one can 
delegate responsibility. We have certain responsibilities for the 
taxpayers' money. I must say the amendment that has been offered, in my 
judgment, conforms to the Constitution's understanding of what our 
responsibilities are.
  We have a disagreement. I don't want that disagreement to undermine 
my comments about the work that Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman 
have done. They have done a lot of work on this bill, perhaps more than 
anyone else in the Congress, with hearing after hearing after hearing. 
Very few of us not on that committee understand the hours and the work 
they put in on this product. I don't mean by cosponsoring this 
amendment to denigrate or undermine their work, I mean to improve on 
that work.
  And let me just make this point: We have a very fundamental 
disagreement, the Senator from Connecticut and I, because he believes 
there is no new authority given to the national intelligence director. 
As I understand this, what happens is, the Treasury Secretary creates 
appropriations accounts, and he creates appropriations accounts to 
which the national intelligence director can then transfer funding.
  I also understand under current circumstances, several billion 
dollars would be transferred to those accounts, and then at some point 
later, if the Congress determines the expenditures for which that sum 
of several billion dollars has been committed is not appropriate to 
what the Congress intended, Congress can then retroactively evaluate 
how to deal with that. I am saying I believe it puts us in a position, 
historically, that we are not in with respect to our role as 
appropriators.
  I think the circumstances have always been that money is appropriated 
through an appropriations process, not through an authorization. The 
bill we have today is an authorization. I happen to believe this 
authorization bill should give some additional authority to a new 
person--in this case the national intelligence director--but I am going 
to speak for a moment, when we finish this discussion, about the 
stovepipes and my concerns about what is going on in intelligence 
generally and why we are in a position, I think, of some vulnerability 
based on what is not being done.
  So I happen to think that it is useful to put someone in charge, but 
putting someone in charge does not mean that we ought to say to them, 
oh, by the way, here is a pot of money, move it around as you wish, let 
us know how you used it, and then we will take a look at it and see 
whether we evaluate that to have been appropriate use. That is not the 
way we do things in Congress.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a moment?
  Mr. DORGAN. Of course, I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I could not disagree more with the Senator's 
understanding of the language in the bill. If there is any basis to the 
Senator's understanding, we ought to sit together and see if we can 
fashion a change, because the intention, as I understand it--and 
perhaps the Senator from Maine may want to speak to this section--was 
to simply make clear that as we are giving budget authority, and we are 
giving authority to the NID, but we are holding him or her 
accountable--as we give that authority to the NID, an account has to be 
created in the Treasury where he can receive that money, which now goes 
to the Defense Department.
  Our reading of this part of this amendment was that if the formation 
of these accounts for the national intelligence director at the 
Treasury is prohibited, then the money is going to go back to Defense 
again and they are going to undercut the new national intelligence 
director and go back to the stovepipes.
  We have no intention to create pots of money that the NID will do 
whatever he wants with. Incidentally, any transfer of funds from within 
the intelligence community--and the budget of this agency itself is not 
going to be large; it is going to oversee a budget for agencies that is 
going to be large--will have to be made according to the normal 
procedures with notification to Congress. We have not altered that at 
all.
  We have even said explicitly that the power--we want to create as 
much strength in this office as possible. The power in the 
Appropriations Committee each year to set certain ceilings on transfers 
remains untouched. We reaffirm it in our proposal.
  So we have very different views of this part of the Byrd amendment, 
and if there is any basis for what the Senator from North Dakota is 
saying, we ought to sit down and figure out how to correct it because 
we just want to help

[[Page 20495]]

this office to work. We do not want to give them any authority to hold 
billions of dollars of money without holding them accountable.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. I would be happy to yield to the Senator from West 
Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Why not take more time? What is all the rush? Why not take 
time? That is all I am asking for is take time. The distinguished 
Senator has offered to sit down with the distinguished Senator from 
North Dakota. Why do we not take time and try to work this out? There 
are many other questions. That is what I am asking. Let us have more 
time. We are being forced to operate under the gun here and that does 
not lend itself to very wise legislation. That is what I am asking: How 
about more time? We might resolve several of these problems then.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I say to the Senator from West Virginia----
  Mr. DORGAN. I would be happy to yield for a response.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator, and I will give it right back.
  I say to the Senator from West Virginia most respectfully, we are 
here. We have been working on this bill in our committee since the end 
of July. We have listened to a lot of people in the committee. We have 
altered parts of it. Just last week in 5 days of consideration, several 
of our colleagues introduced amendments. We thought they would do 
damage to the bill but they had some merit. We reasoned with them. We 
came up with clarifications. Sometimes we accepted whole amendments.
  Perhaps there is some lack of clarity in this particular part that we 
can resolve together, but on the overall question, I say to Senator 
Byrd, we do not have time. It is 3 years plus since these terrorists 
struck America and killed 3,000 of our innocents, men, women, children. 
Every form of citizen and noncitizen happened to be in the wrong place 
at the wrong time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota has the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me reclaim my time.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Well, I did not finish but he can take it over. I just 
want to say, we are under threat. This Capitol----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yielded for the purpose of 
answering questions not for a debate.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. DORGAN. In my judgment, the discussion we have just had is easily 
resolved. Either the Senator is providing much greater authority and 
therefore more flexibility at the expense of less accountability to the 
Congress or he is not. As I read this, I believe the amendment that has 
been offered by Senator Byrd, Senator Stevens, Senator Inouye, Senator 
Warner, myself and others, a bipartisan amendment, does not in any way 
weaken the bill that came to the Senate floor on which the Senator has 
spent a lot of time. I think it, in fact, strengthens it. It 
strengthens the role of Congress and I think makes this a better bill.
  So I understand the Senator believes that the way the Senator has 
created this underlying Collins-Lieberman bill does not provide less 
accountability for Congress. The Senator has described it as much 
better flexibility, and that flexibility, as I read this, comes at the 
expense of accountability for the Congress.
  My only point is, all of us want exactly the same thing. We want this 
to work. If there is anybody in here who does not want this to work, 
they do not belong in this Chamber. We want this to work. Why do we 
want it to work? Because we know people want to murder innocent 
Americans. They want to commit acts of terror in this country and we 
need to stop them.
  Now, how do we stop them? With good intelligence.
  I cannot say how profoundly disappointed I am at the poor 
intelligence we have been given as a Congress in recent years. Somebody 
needs to answer to that. Somebody needs to be accountable for that. In 
part, that is what Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins are trying to 
do with this legislation. That is why I commend them for their work.
  Let me describe a continuing problem that we have with our law 
enforcement and intelligence communities in their efforts to prevent 
another terrorist attack.
  On September 10, 2001, the day before 9/11, two messages apparently 
related to the 9/11 hijackings were intercepted by our Government, by 
the National Security Agency. The Arabic language messages said, ``The 
match is about to begin'' and ``tomorrow is zero hour.''
  Those messages were not translated until the day after 9/11.
  You would think that the FBI's translation capabilities would have 
been vastly improved in the intervening three years. Yet last week we 
learned that the Inspector General of the Department of Justice had 
issued a report, which found that three years later, the FBI has 
neglected to translate hundreds of thousands of hours of intercepted 
communications among suspected terrorists.
  This is not about politics at all. There is no partisanship in this. 
The question is, Do the FBI, CIA, the NSA, and others do an effective 
job or do they not? Can we prevent acts of terrorism or can we not?
  Let me read this, from the Inspector General's report: Three years 
after September 11, more than 120,000 hours of potentially valuable 
terrorism-related recordings have not yet been translated by the 
linguists at the FBI.
  In fact, some recordings have been deleted from audio computer files, 
and FBI officials speaking on condition of anonymity said officials 
have had to go back to original al-Qaida recordings on some occasions 
to try to restore them, after realizing that copies had been deleted 
because of capacity problems.
  The inspector general's report said the linguists might not have 
realized that material was deleted unless a case officer simply 
happened to notice it missing from the final transactions. The FBI had 
failed to institute necessary controls to prevent critical audio 
material from being automatically deleted.
  After September 11, 2001, the FBI director said this:

       The FBI needed to change from an agency primarily focused 
     on investigating crime to one whose primary focus is the 
     prevention of future terrorist attacks.

  The Inspector General says:

       Yet necessary system controls have not been established to 
     prevent critical audio materials from being automatically 
     deleted, such as protecting sessions of the highest priority 
     on digital collection systems, active on-line storage until 
     linguists review them.

  This is the Inspector General, again. He says:

       The results of our tests showed that three of our FBI 
     offices tested had al-Qaida sessions that potentially were 
     deleted by the system before linguists had a chance to review 
     them.

  There is something wrong here. How can you have 120,000 hours of 
intercepted phone messages and all kinds of audio recordings--
terrorists, al-Qaida recordings--that have never been listened to? Is 
there a recording in that 120,000 hours that sounds like the recording 
on September 10, 2001, a recording that says: ``Tomorrow is the zero 
hour,'' and no one has listened to it? I don't know.
  The American people understand, I think, that the capability of our 
intelligence system, the CIA, the FBI, and others, will determine 
whether we are successful in preventing another terrorist attack.
  So it is disheartening when you see the same failures cited over and 
over, with little improvement.
  Let's go back to August 2000, before this administration took over. 
In that month, we had a report of the National Commission on 
Terrorism--a report authorized by this Congress, issued by a commission 
chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer. This was the same Paul Bremer who 
later went on to head the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.
  The Bremer commission, 4 years ago--this is before 9/11--had this to 
say:

       The FBI's ability to exploit the increasing volume of 
     terrorism information has been hampered by aging technology.
       All U.S. Government agencies faced a chronic shortage of 
     linguists to translate raw data into useful information. This 
     shortage has a direct impact on our counterter-
     rorism efforts.


[[Page 20496]]


  Mr. Bremer said then, over 4 years ago, that what we need are 
additional linguists, we need to interpret the raw data, we need to be 
able to understand it, determine what it means for this country's 
safety.
  Here we are 4 years later and we get an Inspector General's report 
that says there are 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-
related recordings not even translated.
  Indeed, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice concluded 
that one-third of terrorism-related audio recordings were not 
translated within 12 hours as mandated by the FBI rules. There are 
123,000 hours in languages primarily related to counterterror-
ism--Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Pashtun--that have not been translated; 
370,000 hours of recordings in languages connecting to 
counterintelligence probes had not been deciphered by that time. That 
is nearly one-half million hours potential leads to terrorist plots, 
sitting there, uninterpreted.
  We can pass legislation. We can have a debate about all these issues. 
But if agencies can't get their act together, can't do the job, don't 
even interpret the al-Qaida recordings to understand what is there, how 
on Earth are we going to protect this country?
  The 9/11 Commission, incidentally, the Commission which has prompted 
this bill coming to the floor of the Senate, says the following:
  The analysts for the 9/11 Commission

       . . . had difficulty getting access to the FBI and 
     intelligence community information they were expected to 
     analyze. The poor state of the FBI's information systems 
     meant that such access depended in large part on an analyst's 
     personal relationships with the individual in the operational 
     units or squads where the information resided. For all of 
     these reasons, prior to 9/11 relatively few strategic 
     analytic reports about counterterrorism had been completed. 
     Indeed, the FBI had never completed an assessment of the 
     overall terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland.

  And I continue to quote:

       The FBI did not have an effective intelligence collection 
     effort. The FBI did not dedicate sufficient resources to the 
     surveillance and translation needs of counterter-
     rorism agents. It lacked sufficient translators proficient in 
     Arabic and other key languages, resulting in a significant 
     backlog of untranslated intercepts.

  This from the 9/11 Commission. Following the release of this 
information from the 9/11 Commission, we now have the release of the 
Inspector General's report, which is absolutely stunning. It is 
astonishing to receive a report that, nearly 4 years after a 
recommendation was made by the Bremmer-Sonnenberg Commission, 3 years 
after we were attacked on 9/11, that we have 120,000 hours of 
recordings of intercepted information, a portion of which is from al-
Qaida, and it has not yet been interpreted or translated. This is 
unbelievable.
  I talked for a few moments about accountability. Where is the 
accountability here? Who is accountable for that? Who is responsible 
for that?
  I want to make one other point, if I might. Again, I know I had a 
discussion with my colleague from Connecticut. My colleague from Maine 
is on the floor. I don't know whether she heard me, but I said I 
appreciated the work the two have done to bring this to the floor. Much 
of it has great merit, in my judgment. Much will be very protective of 
this country's interests and advances our interests in combating 
terrorism. I do support the amendment because I think that amendment 
will strengthen the bill. But let me say one other thing. The 9/11 
report is a roadmap and we are using that roadmap in an attempt to 
construct some legislation here. Other roadmaps, for example, include 
this Inspector General's report of which we have just become aware. 
That ought to tell us something about where we are headed here. It is 
not good.
  Let me mention one additional point. As we evaluate what yet needs to 
be done to protect this country, and discuss issues of transparency, 
there remain 28 pages of information up in the Intelligence Committee 
that should still be released. They are classified ``top secret.'' Some 
in the Senate have read this material; all have the opportunity to read 
it. It comes from the December 2002 report of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee of the House and Senate that was sent to the White House and 
then was published. That report was on 9/11, what happened, and how it 
happened. That report was published in the December 2002 with 28 pages 
missing, and the 28 pages deal with Saudi Arabia. That is what has been 
said publicly, disclosed publicly, but yet they are deemed top secret 
and the American public is not able to see them. Then, the chairman of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Richard Shelby, indicated that he 
thought 95 percent of it could be easily declassified. The Foreign 
Minister of Saudi Arabia thought it should be declassified. Yet it has 
been classified by the White House, which refuses to share this 
information with Congress and the American people.
  I believe, once again, that all of us should continue to ask the 
White House to declassify those 28 pages. That, too, is a contribution 
to understanding what happened and what we do about it.
  Those 28 pages, in my judgment, should be released. They cannot as 
long as they are classified ``top secret.'' In my judgment, they should 
be declassified. Again, Senator Shelby indicated that he thought 95 
percent of it could easily be declassified, and, as I indicated, the 
Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia called for its declassification. 
Considering that fifteen of the 19 terrorists who struck this country 
were Saudis, I think our country deserves to get to the bottom of this.
  I believe, once again, as we finish discussing these issues on 
intelligence, 9/11, and how to strengthen this country, how to prevent 
future acts of terrorism, that these 28 pages ought to be made 
available to the American people.
  I came to the floor today to talk about this inspector general's 
report and to weigh in briefly on an amendment offered by my colleague, 
Senator Byrd.
  Let me conclude as I started by saying that I believe Senator Byrd 
has done a great service to the Senate by once again saying there is 
merit in many of these proposals and that he doesn't come to the floor 
to denigrate these proposals. He comes to the floor to strengthen these 
proposals. I agree with him that we have a government in which we have 
separating powers with respect to the ability and the fight to try to 
prevent further acts of terrorism from occurring in this country.
  All of us need to work together. But we need to work smart. Working 
hard and working smart sometimes can be two different things. I hope we 
will work smart working together to have accountability in Congress to 
provide the flexibility while still retaining accountability so we can 
create this new agency, get rid of these stovepipes, and have agencies 
that are forward working, that will share information which will 
protect this country from future acts of terrorism. All of us share 
that goal.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I note that the Senator from North Dakota 
gave a very troubling and compelling example of the fact that the FBI 
is so far behind in translating critical messages and documents. I am 
troubled by that, also.
  Where we may differ is, I believe, that the authority given to the 
national intelligence director by the bill will allow us to address 
that problem. Now we will have one person in Government who is 
accountable and responsible and who will be able to--unless the Byrd 
amendment is agreed to--transfer the people and the funds necessary to 
tackle that backlog. That can't happen because of a very cumbersome 
process. I see our legislation and the authority it gives the new NID 
to be critical in allowing us to address just those kinds of problems.
  We know there is a shortage of linguists throughout the Federal 
Government, but we also know there are thousands of linguists. Some of 
them are in the FBI, some of them are in the CIA, and some are in 
various other agencies. If we had a national intelligence director who 
was able to marshal those resources, then we could get rid of those 
backlogs. I think that would be very helpful.

[[Page 20497]]

  I have other comments I want to make in response to the Senator's 
comments on the Byrd amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one point?
  Ms. COLLINS. If I could complete my sentence, I would be happy to 
yield briefly for a question.
  The Senator from Missouri has been waiting for some time to speak on 
the amendment that was just cleared on homeland security grants. I will 
yield briefly for a question.
  Mr. DORGAN. I thank the Senator.
  I only make the point that I don't think any of us disagree with the 
point of having sufficient flexibility so the agencies will make 
decisions to hire people to translate the tapes. Somebody must be 
accountable today--not just tomorrow--for 120,000 pages not being 
translated.
  My point is, whether Senator Byrd or myself or any other Senator, we 
all want sufficient resources to be devoted to the task at hand--
especially the urgent task at hand. With or without the kind of 
flexibility you provide in this bill, I believe the evidence is that in 
every circumstance in the last 3 years when the administration asked 
for flexibility in moving funding, it has been granted by this 
Congress, and it has done so immediately. I know that because I am an 
appropriator and I see what comes to us. We move it immediately.
  I wanted to make the point that I don't think there is any 
disagreement at all about our interest in seeing critical issues 
funded. We all want that to happen.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reclaiming my right to the floor, let us 
look at what happens under the current system when funds are 
reprogrammed. I would like to quote from the acting CIA Director John 
McLaughlin testimony that he gave before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee which parallels conversations that Senator Lieberman and I 
had with him privately. It goes directly to this point of the need for 
a more agile system.
  Yes, the DCI has some reprogramming authority now. But let us look at 
the way it works. Listen to what John McLaughlin says:

       Typically you require the approval of the agency that is 
     surrendering the funds. Then you require the approval of the 
     department head who overseas the agency. Usually that is the 
     Secretary of Defense. Then you require the approval of OMB. 
     Then you require the approval of six congressional 
     committees. Typically that takes 5 months.

  I want to repeat that. That reprogramming takes 5 months, on average.
  John McLaughlin goes on to say:

       So you can see that is not very agile to meet the needs of 
     today. My view is that the national intelligence director 
     ought to have the authority to move those funds.

  We are facing an agile enemy, and what are we putting up against him? 
A system where it takes 5 months to move funds from one category to 
another.
  I wish to address the issue of the accounts under the bill, which 
both Senator Byrd and Senator Dorgan have addressed. These are simply 
accounts that allow the NID to receive the appropriations. That is all 
they are. The accounts set up under our bill do not give the NID any 
additional authority. These are just regular Treasury accounts.
  Why are they needed? They are needed because the money now is 
funneled through the Department of Defense.
  If you are going to allow the NID to receive the appropriations from 
Congress from a mechanics standpoint, you have to have a mechanism 
whereby the Treasury Department sets up the accounts for him. That is 
all this is. In fact, I refer to page 24, line 12, of our legislation. 
These accounts are set up explicitly ``for the purpose of carrying out 
the responsibilities and authorities of the director under this act.''
  The accounts themselves do not allow or authorize the NID to transfer 
funds. There is transfer authority. It is on page 27 of the bill. These 
authorities include a number of important safeguards.
  First of all, transfers will still require congressional approval 
just as they do now. We are not changing the balance of power between 
this new position and the Congress. The transfers are subject to the 
applicable ceilings established in law to the appropriation ceilings. 
The transfers cannot be made unilaterally by the NID. They require the 
approval of the Director of Management and Budget.
  Finally, the NID must consult with the affected agency heads, but no 
longer will he have to get the approval of the agency head and then the 
department head and then Office of Management and Budget and then 
Congress--that whole intricate system. We would allow consultation. 
Then the NID can move the money with the approval of OMB and subject to 
the same congressional review we have now. This is not a radical new 
concept. It is an essential authority. We cannot afford to have a 
process that takes 5 months for money to be moved from one account to 
another.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.


                           Amendment No. 3705

  Mr. TALENT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine for her 
comments. I am going to make a couple of comments about an amendment 
the Senate adopted an hour or two ago that I am strongly supportive of 
and was pleased to cosponsor. I want a little more on the record about 
what that amendment does.
  As I travel around Missouri and talk with first responders about 
homeland security, there is a consistent theme I hear. This goes back 
several years ago when I was not even in the Senate and was just 
campaigning. Over and over again, what I heard from fire chiefs, local 
public health authorities, police chiefs, and sheriffs was this: Look, 
we thank the Federal Government for sending money to help be prepared, 
but do not tell us in a detailed way what to do with the money.
  I had one fire chief from Missouri say his big fear is: They will 
send the money and I will need the dollars to buy a better 
communication system so that in the event there is a terrorist-related 
disaster, I can find out where my guys and gals are and tell them where 
to go. My big fear is they will tell me I have to buy HAZMAT suits when 
I don't need HAZMAT suits, because we already have in Missouri a 
tremendous HAZMAT regional team that I would call if we ever had that 
problem.
  This concern resonated with me. I said to myself, that is what the 
Federal Government will do. It will send them the money but then tell 
them what to do with it. Accountability is fine. It is fine maybe to 
have certain standards in certain areas that are off limits--maybe you 
do not want them to spend the money on routine personnel costs. But I 
am a big believer that our first responders are best prepared to handle 
disaster-related emergencies when they prepare themselves better just 
to handle emergencies. The kind of problems or threats associated with 
terrorist disasters are 80 percent the same as with any other 
disaster--fire, people being crushed or trapped in buildings. The 
better they are prepared to do their job on a day-to-day basis, the 
better they will be prepared to protect, help, cure, or get us loose 
from some terrorist-related disaster.
  After I came to the Senate, I found out in large part we have, 
unfortunately, done exactly what they were afraid we were going to do, 
which is send them the money with so many strings attached that they do 
not have the flexibility to use it the way they want.
  We had an example of this in Missouri last year when Senator Bond and 
I were contacted by the local Jewish community in St. Louis which was 
hosting the Maccabi Games--like the international youth Olympics for 
Jewish youth from around the world. Those games drew over 5,000 young 
Jewish people from around the world. The Maccabi Games were an obvious 
target for a terrorist threat--that is just a matter of common sense--
and there were a lot of extra costs associated with protecting the 
games.
  The local hosts wanted some of those costs reimbursed. We certainly 
understand that. We tried to get money that had already been assigned 
to the State of Missouri reprogrammed or changed so they could use it 
for this obviously

[[Page 20498]]

necessary purpose, and we could not. The statute was too closed to let 
the money be reprogrammed, despite the best efforts of Senator Bond and 
I.
  It turned out that the Maccabi Games went on without incident, and we 
are all very grateful. But the problems remain for the discretion on 
the part of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination to at least have the 
authority to entertain a waiver application by States to reprogram 
dollars where, at least, some unexpected need arises.
  I joined with Senator Collins in cosponsoring legislation to that 
effect. I offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution on the Homeland 
Security appropriation which did get adopted by the Senate and had a 
colloquy with Senator Cochran at the time about the need to follow up 
on this issue. I was very pleased to cosponsor with Senator Collins, an 
amendment that, among other things, does create that kind of waiver 
authority for the Secretary of Homeland Security and for the Director 
to help out in instances such as that.
  I congratulate the Senator from Maine for her interest. She has heard 
the same things I have heard. She knows the need to do something about 
it. I am very pleased that with the adoption of that amendment, we have 
taken a step in that direction. It is not as far as we need to go, in 
my judgment. We can trust our first responders more than we will trust 
them even with this amendment becoming law--and I hope it does become 
law--but it is a step in the right direction. I will keep working in 
that direction. The people of Missouri and the people of the country 
will be better off as we make progress toward that end.
  To reiterate, as I have traveled across the State of Missouri 
discussing homeland security, nearly every police chief and every first 
responder has told me the same thing: Don't tie our hands on how we are 
going to use money you give us. Leave us some discretion on how to use 
those funds. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security 
asserts it must tightly control how every dollar is spent. I appreciate 
the need for accountability given the department's mission. I also 
appreciate that in many instances our first responders know best how to 
allocate these funds and that sometimes very legitimate concerns fall 
outside the narrow spending guidelines of the department.
  For example, in St. Louis last year, our local Jewish community 
hosted the Maccabi Games, an international Jewish Youth Olympics, which 
drew over 5,000 Jewish youth from around the world. Given the security 
environment, Missouri's Homeland Security Office threat assessment team 
stressed the need for greater security but lacked the latitude to 
reallocate even a modest sum from the monies awarded to the State. 
Despite all of our efforts here, they were unable to free up dollars to 
provide for the necessary security.
  Thankfully, the event ended without incident, but it still 
illustrates the need for discretion on the part of the Secretary and 
the director of the Office for State and Local government Coordination 
to approve waiver applications on the part of the State to reprogram 
some of their Federal grant homeland money when some new kind of 
security issue arises that was unforeseen when they originally applied 
for those grants.
  Last year, I engaged in a colloquy on this floor with Chairman 
Cochran on this issue and have been working since arriving in the 
Senate with Chairman Collins to craft language that would provide State 
and local governments with flexibility in the reallocate a portion of 
homeland security grant funds based upon the changing threat 
environment. Last week I successfully offered an amendment to the 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill that addressed this 
issue.
  I am pleased that Senator Collins has included in her amendment 
language that we worked on together over the past year to provide the 
discretionary authority needed by the State homeland security 
officials.
  Ms. COLLINS. I appreciate the leadership of the distinguished Senator 
from Missouri to allow greater flexibility for State and local 
officials in spending homeland security grant funds. I agree that 
greater flexibility is needed to use homeland security funds to meet 
special security needs. I am pleased to include in my amendment 
language Senator Talent and I have crafted over the past 18-months 
which last week he made the subject of a sense of the senate resolution 
granting authority to the Director of the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness to approve the reallocation of funds available to State 
homeland security officials in unspent homeland security funds. I am 
confident that this language would allow State and local officials to 
reallocate homeland security grant funds to provide greater safety for 
special security events like the Maccabi Games. Senator Talent has been 
tireless in his efforts to pass his measure and achieve this 
flexibility to help local first responders and I am proud that we could 
include it in this amendment. I look forward to continuing to work with 
the Senator from Missouri on this important issue.
  Mr. TALENT. Mr. President, I will make a comment or two on the bill 
as a whole. I will not hold the Senate up a long time. We are trying to 
get this bill done, and I fully support that.
  There is an area of the bill I would like to register, for the 
record, concern on the part of this Senator. Probably the bill's 
managers will recognize the legitimacy of that concern.
  First, I want to say how much I have appreciated the work by the 
Senator from Maine and the Senator from Connecticut on this bill. I 
have enjoyed this debate and enjoyed the part that I played in it--not 
that it has been significant but just attending the briefings, visiting 
with the Senators on and off the Senate floor. In my work on the Armed 
Services Committee, we have had hearings on this subject.
  This has been handled in the way the American people like to see the 
Senate handle things. It has been bipartisan in the best sense of that 
word--not that we have tried to conceal legitimate differences of 
opinion that sometimes separate the two parties, but because we have 
understood that the right way to deal with those differences is to 
reconcile them where we can, to have them out without being personal or 
political about it, and understand we are all working for the good of 
the American people and the security of the country.
  We can all agree, having been here now through almost this entire 
Congress, that unfortunately, the Senate does not always operate in 
that ideal fashion. I believe it has operated in that way on this bill, 
and the leadership of the two Senators is the reason. It is clear from 
listening to this debate and watching it on TV in my office that both 
of these Senators have done their due diligence. They know their 
subject. There has not been a point raised that they were unfamiliar 
with. That has been very impressive to me and has led me to decide that 
I am going to give them the benefit of the doubt on amendments that are 
offered because clearly they have studied this. It is not a case where 
they are refusing to consider any concern or looking down on a Senator 
who is raising it.
  It is important for the public to know that personal factors like 
that can play a part in legislation. The trust and regard in which 
these two Senators are held by the rest of the body is making a 
difference.
  I also agree with them that it is time to do something; that 3 years 
is long enough. Some people say 40 years, because there have been a 
number of recommendations for changing how we do intelligence over the 
decades. I think it is time to get something done. I agree with that.
  I also like the creation of a national intelligence director. I do 
wish we could have come up with a different name than NID. Imagine how 
often that name is going to be used and what it may come to represent 
in Washington, but it may be too late to do anything about that.
  For some reason, I do not think people have aired on the floor--and I 
want to; it is a practical reason--there are

[[Page 20499]]

times in our history when foreign policy and national defense are 
bigger issues than at other times. The American people in the United 
States of America are a people who are concerned with their day-to-day 
lives. That is as it should be. We would rather, if we could, avoid 
having to engage extensively in these tremendous efforts abroad and in 
all the foreign policy discussions and reconstructions that go with 
that.
  In our elections, sometimes we elect Presidents in a context where 
foreign policy does not seem to be all that important. I think it is 
another way of saying some Presidents are more interested than other 
Presidents in intelligence on a day-to-day basis. I do not say that to 
be critical. I do not think there has been a President who has ever 
served in that high office who has not cared about the security of the 
country. But I think people here understand what I mean.
  Now that we are fighting this terrorist war, we all read stories 
about intelligence. We know how important it is. We are all following 
it on a day-to-day basis. Everybody wants to serve on the Intelligence 
Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee, and that is fine. But in 
other times, attention and interest wanes.
  I think by having a national intelligence director, what we will help 
ensure is that even in those times when interest is waning on the part 
of other high-level political actors, maybe even the President, we will 
have somebody in Washington whose job it is to look at all this in a 
comprehensive way, and try to make sure the agencies under him or her 
are working together on behalf of the interests of the American people, 
in a way rather like we have done with the Federal Reserve, where we 
have created an agency and we have vested a lot of authority in a 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve. We know that person is watching 
monetary policy and other policy.
  Over time, what has happened is Presidents of both parties and under 
all circumstances realize that appointments to that kind of job are 
very highly scrutinized, and you put in people who have prestige and 
gravitas and the regard of people of both parties and the regard of the 
country.
  It is my hope that will happen with the national intelligence 
director. Presidents, whether foreign policy is the No. 1 concern for 
them or not, will know this is an important appointment and they need 
to put somebody in this position, from administration to 
administration, who has the regard of everybody in the country, who 
watches and knows about foreign policy and about intelligence. That 
will help create a stability over time and a continuity in our 
intelligence policy.
  Now, I am not downgrading the concerns people have expressed. There 
is always a tension in this kind of thing. You cannot create and set up 
a higher authority such as this without increasing the risk that if you 
get a person in there who is very autocratic, it may tend to create a 
certain kind of group-think among the agencies even more than we now 
have, that people could be acting in way that is designed to please 
only this national intelligence director rather than trying to have 
their own opinions regarding intelligence. But there are safeguards in 
the bill designed to deal with that. I certainly have had some concerns 
along those lines, but I am going to exercise the benefit of the doubt 
in favor of supporting the creation of a national intelligence 
director.
  There is an area, though--and the Senators have addressed it; I think 
perhaps they could again in response to my remarks--I am concerned 
about the flow of intelligence to the troops in the field. Here is the 
kind of classic situation I am concerned about. We have, of course, an 
extensive satellite system in place. We get intelligence all the time 
from those satellites. Particularly since the first Gulf War, the 
Department of Defense has become pretty good at getting that 
intelligence off the set satellites and getting it out to the field in 
real time. That means virtually instantaneously, so that it can be used 
by our special operations troops, by commanders in the field to check 
and select targets. This kind of mapping and satellite intelligence can 
be used even to move troops around during some kind of an engagement. 
It works pretty well. I know that for a fact.
  I think one of the reasons it does work is these agencies--the 
National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Agency--are in the Department of Defense 
and the customers they are serving with that intelligence are in the 
Department of Defense. It is very reasonable to believe that if the 
provider of the intelligence and the customer of the intelligence are 
in the same Department, the same bureaucratic structure, they will 
share intelligence better.
  If that were not true, then why are we doing this bill? Because the 
whole point of the bill is to get all these intelligence agencies under 
some kind of joint authority so they will share better. In most cases, 
I think it is very clear how the bill is doing that, that the bill is 
breaking down existing bureaucratic barriers.
  But I do think we all ought to be honest enough to admit with respect 
to this particular kind of sharing, we are setting up a bureaucratic 
barrier that does not exist now, because we are going to pull those 
agencies out of the control of the Department of Defense and put them 
under the national intelligence director, at least partially. So there 
is at least a risk we will put up a stovepipe in the name of taking 
down stovepipes, that we will put up a stovepipe in an area where the 
sharing is working. It would be ironic if one of the effects of the 
bill were to interrupt the sharing of the intelligence in the one area 
where we have confidence now that it is being shared.
  Now, I feel a lot better about this concern than I did when I first 
heard about this bill. I know the Senator from Maine and the Senator 
from Connecticut have put measures in the bill designed to ensure that 
flow of intelligence continues. I am glad they have done that. I am 
glad they recognized the importance of this concern, because it is 
going to grow as time goes on.
  Let me give you an example. We are trying, on the Armed Services 
Committee--and both Senators serve on that Committee, so they know this 
as well as I--to make all the various what we call weapons platforms 
for the Army network-centric. What this means is they will all be 
networked in, so that we hope in the near future intelligence from a 
satellite will not even have to go through a middleman at the NGA or 
the NSA, it will go directly from the satellite down to the commander 
in the field. It is very important that we procure weapons systems and 
platforms and communications systems and signal intelligence systems 
that are all linked together.
  This bill, for example, gives procurement authority to the NID over 
the satellite end of those systems. So we are going to have the NID 
procuring the satellites, the platforms that are getting the 
intelligence. We are going to have the Department of Defense procuring 
its end of the platform that is going to be receiving the intelligence, 
and there is a danger we will end up with a stovepipe we do not want.
  I am not saying this is a reason to oppose the bill. I am not saying 
it is a reason to change the bill. I am saying it is a concern. I guess 
what I would say to my friends from Connecticut and Maine is, if they 
could give us their assurance that not only in the passage of the bill 
but in the implementation of it, and in the months and years after 
that, they will remain conscious of these concerns and try to ensure a 
free flow of intelligence from these various intelligence organizations 
out to the troops in the field, even though they will no longer be in 
the same bureaucratic organizations.
  Maybe the Senator from Maine would yield for a question from me or 
have a brief colloquy, if I can ask consent to do that.
  I have been airing the point you and I have talked about privately, 
and you have addressed on the floor as well, about the importance of 
making sure that tactical military intelligence continues to flow from 
the NGA and the

[[Page 20500]]

NRO and the others out to troops in the field.
  I was telling the Presiding Officer you all have done a lot to allay 
my concern in that regard. What I was hopeful of, and I wanted to put 
on the record, is to get assurance from you and the Senator from 
Connecticut that in implementing this bill you will continue to oversee 
this aspect of it and try to make certain the NID understands the 
importance of acting jointly with the DOD in ensuring that this 
intelligence continues to flow. Because no matter what protocols you 
put in the bill, this is a fruitful area for oversight to make certain 
that this intelligence is not interrupted. Would the Senator from Maine 
care to comment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am pleased to give the assurances the 
Senator from Missouri is seeking. He and I, as he mentioned, along with 
my friend from Connecticut, serve on the Armed Services Committee and 
have a deep commitment to making sure that our men and women in the 
military receive the real-time, actionable intelligence they need to be 
effective. Nothing in this bill would in any way hinder the flow of 
intelligence from NSA to the combatant commanders to the troops on the 
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan--nothing.
  In fact, as the Senator from Missouri knows, we opposed an amendment 
last week which would have undermined the relationship between those 
defense agencies and the Secretary of Defense by essentially moving 
them out of the Pentagon--not physically but from an authority 
standpoint--and having them only report to the national intelligence 
director. We recognized that we need a dual reporting, that these 
agencies are providing critical intelligence to our troops and to 
Pentagon officials as well as to the rest of the intelligence 
community.
  I agree with the Senator that vigilant oversight is going to be 
necessary to make sure this is implemented in the manner we intend. But 
I must say, given the clear language of the bill, given the fact that 
tactical intelligence assets are completely exempted from the NID's 
control, and given the fact that any NID is going to be committed to 
providing excellent intelligence to our troops, I can't imagine the 
bill having the negative impact that he might feel.
  Mr. TALENT. I have been much reassured by the debate, by your 
comments, and by my further thinking on the subject. I do think it is 
unlikely that any national intelligence director would not be sensitive 
to this. And given the congressional concern that has been expressed, 
if he or she were insensitive, we certainly could do something about 
it.
  To give an example--and I shared this with the Senate--on 
procurement, you know the extent to which we are trying to procure 
network-centric type platforms for the Army. And since now the various 
satellite agencies would be under the procurement authority of the NID, 
it would be important early in this process to get some kind of 
memorandum of understanding or protocol so there would be a joint type 
procurement process to make certain that what the Army was doing to get 
network-centric receivers was compatible with whatever the NID was 
procuring for satellite.
  I expect there will be a number of instances in practice where it 
will be useful for all of us to be aware on a continuing basis of this 
concern and trying to make certain that they work together, as we did 
with Goldwater-Nichols. There is an example of a congressional 
enactment and oversight that has increased the joint process.
  I don't offer these remarks in hostility to the bill but to put on 
the record again the importance of this, to make clear your intent and 
the intent of the Senator from Connecticut in this regard. I would be 
happy to have the Senator comment further.
  Ms. COLLINS. Let me indicate to the Senator from Missouri that I very 
much appreciate his concern in this area. There is no greater advocate 
for our troops than he. I join with him in an assurance that we are 
going to watch this very carefully. The language of the bill is very 
tightly and carefully drafted. The commitment to our troops is there. 
There is nothing in this bill that would in any way hinder military 
operations, readiness, or the flow of real-time, actionable 
intelligence to our troops. That is essential. The Senator has my 
commitment to continue to monitor this very closely.
  Mr. TALENT. I am grateful. I don't know if the Senator from 
Connecticut wanted to say something now or later. I am not inviting you 
to admit a concern that you don't think is in the language of the bill, 
that would suggest a weakness in the bill that you don't believe is 
there. It is just that any change in structure like this has the 
potential, if we are not careful, to interrupt that flow. I am pleased 
about your reassurances. I won't make you say it for the 15th time. I 
will just reclaim my time and close briefly. It has been a pleasure to 
participate in this debate and to watch how my friends from Connecticut 
and Maine have handled it. I do think it is time to do something. I had 
concerns. I had concerns about the speed with which we were acting. I 
think we can all concede the honesty of those concerns. I do believe, 
however, for the reasons I have indicated, that we ought to move 
forward. I think we can, while guarding against the dangers that are 
present whenever you have a major change like this. There is a lot 
about our intelligence system that is working. We do want to be careful 
that in trying to fix the parts that aren't, we don't cause problems 
for the parts that are working.
  The Senators from Maine and Connecticut have done a good job in 
guarding against that. I congratulate them on their work. Again, I am 
pleased the Senate has adopted an amendment which finally takes a first 
step toward allowing our first responders, our State and local 
officials on whom we depend, to have discretion in where they are going 
to use these homeland security grants the country is giving them.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Dole). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, before the Senator from Missouri 
leaves the floor, I thank him for his statement. I thank him for his 
kind words about Senator Collins and me, which she certainly deserves 
and I am glad to be along with her on that ride.
  I thank him for the specific question and assure the Senator on my 
behalf, one, that Senator Collins and our committee were focused 
throughout the deliberations on making sure this substantial 
reorganization of our intelligence assets not in any way diminish the 
availability of intelligence to the warfighter. In fact, in the best of 
all situations, we believe the recommendations that we have made will 
improve intelligence to the warfighter.
  By way of reassurance, I want to quote from GEN Michael Hayden, 
Director of the National Security Agency, who said in testimony before 
the other body:

       An empowered national intelligence director who would 
     direct authority over the national agencies should not be 
     viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to fulfill 
     our responsibilities as combat support agencies.

  He was speaking on behalf of the three.
  It was quite illuminating, in talking to General Hayden and others. 
They are in direct daily contact, particularly with the combatant 
commanders. They have people out in the field right now with those 
combatant commanders, particularly in the most active areas of the 
world, such as the central command, which includes Iraq and Pakistan. 
After having described that close integration of national intelligence 
assets with the warfighters, General Hayden concluded:

       It is inconceivable to me that any future leader of the 
     National Security Agency could or would ever act any 
     differently.

  GEN James Clapper, head of the NGA, National Geospatial Agency, 
expressed exactly the same sentiments to us.
  I want to reassure the Senator from Missouri, more to the point of 
his question, that to the extent we are able--and I am sure if we are 
not, the Armed Services Committee will--we will definitely keep a close 
eye as this new system is implemented to make sure our

[[Page 20501]]

intention, which is that this reform improves intelligence for our 
warfighters, in fact is being realized.
  Mr. TALENT. I can see how that would happen, and we should not accept 
something that is working fairly well if we think we can make it 
better. It may be possible by moving these agencies into the NID for 
budgetary purposes that they will get a higher priority than they get 
now with the DOD which does not see itself primarily as an intelligence 
department. I can see potential pluses to this. I just thought it was 
very important that the record show the concern about this is not only 
deep with you two as the managers but also all throughout the Senate 
and the Congress, that there are many of us who are familiar with this 
and who know this current system is working, certainly working much 
better than it used to.
  I hope whoever is going to be the national intelligence director--I 
certainly will bring this up in the confirmation process, and I hope 
you two do as well--knows we want his cooperation and will continue to 
want this to be a priority.
  I thank the Senator for his comments.
  I yield back my time.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I am very pleased to see the Senator 
from Minnesota is on the floor. Senator Coleman has been one of the 
most diligent members of the Governmental Affairs Committee on this 
issue. He came to virtually every hearing we had throughout the August 
recess, starting on the very first hearing on July 30. He is a 
cosponsor of the bill. He helped to write many of its provisions. I am 
very grateful for his leadership and support, and I look forward to 
hearing his comments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Madam President, I express my deep gratitude for the 
kind words of the Senator from Maine and my gratitude for the 
incredible work she and the Senator from Connecticut did in pulling us 
together in doing a series of hearings--I believe eight--with countless 
hours of testimony, a very thorough review of the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission, and then an analysis of how do we take those 
recommendations and somehow move forward in a way that improves, 
increases the level of safety and security in this great country of 
ours. That was the challenge and it certainly is a challenge.
  I think the chairman has been challenged with drafting a bill that 
represents a kind of balance here between ambitious reform of our 
intelligence services and the continuity of the existing intelligence 
assets we rely upon to keep our country safe. There was discussion 
during the hearings about the nature of change and some of the 
challenges of concern--a concern that if we are to make changes, is 
that going to make us more vulnerable during that period of time.
  There was great thought that went into the balance we see in this 
bill: The balance between the creation of a powerful national 
intelligence director, on the one hand, and this concept of 
departmental autonomy on the other; and the right balance between 
centralization of the information sharing and the balance of civil 
liberties we cherish as Americans. How do you provide those protections 
without undermining the ability to do the hard work that has to be done 
in intelligence, and that keeps up the morale of those on the front 
lines every day making us safer--folks who, in many ways, are simply 
unknown; we will never know who they are. At one of our hearings, which 
was classified, even the name of the witness was classified. I sat 
there as a relatively new Member of the Senate listening to the 
incredible work that is going on day to day to keep our country safe. I 
was struck by that, and I am deeply committed to making sure as we move 
forward in reform that we keep the morale up and the appreciation up, 
that we strike the right kind of balance.
  After hours of hearings and countless study, I believe the bill 
drafted by the chair and ranking member represents the kind of balance 
we need. Today and tomorrow, we are going to vote on a number of 
amendments that would unravel this carefully constructed balance by 
weakening the national intelligence director. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose any such efforts to undermine this balance.
  I agree with the sponsors of these amendments that it is vitally 
important soldiers in combat get timely, accurate information that is 
relevant to their immediate needs. I also agree the military chain of 
command needs to be respected. However, I disagree on their 
interpretation of how the Collins-Lieberman bill would affect the armed 
services.
  Last week, we debated and voted on an amendment that would have 
effectively removed several intelligence agencies from the Defense 
Department. We defeated the amendment because a strong majority of the 
body thought, as I do, that the Department of Defense needs to retain 
its combat support relationship with such agencies as the National 
Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office. I think that vote 
reflects the importance we attach to the Department's role in 
intelligence.
  The central finding of the 9/11 Commission was that prior to 2001, 
the safety of Americans was substantially weakened by the absence of a 
strong entity to make sure that the use of intelligence assets 
reflected national priorities and that the intelligence gathered was 
shared with officials who needed it, even if those officials were 
located in different agencies. I note that the Chair, on a number of 
occasions, talked about a George Tenet memo in 1998, where he declared 
war on al-Qaida and nobody knew about it. There were agencies 
throughout Government that never got this declaration of war from the 
head of the CIA. As the Commission put it, no one was in charge.
  As I say that, I do want to say, having listened to the testimony, 
today we have a new level of cooperation and collaboration between 
those involved in intelligence gathering. And because of that new level 
of cooperation and collaboration, we are moving forward and this 
country is safer today than it was on 9/11. But the reality of the case 
is that with no one in charge, institutional silos arose to prevent 
important pieces of information from being collected into an overall 
threat assessment that might have alerted officials to the danger we 
faced.
  So it is clear to me, and as recommended in this bill, we need a 
strong national intelligence director, strong enough to enforce common 
policies throughout the intelligence community whenever and wherever 
intelligence collected by one agency might be useful to another. We do 
not need a mere coordinator. That is what we have now; we have a 
coordinator. We need someone who can focus resources and attention on 
the most vital threats, national priorities. That person can only 
succeed if we give him or her the strong powers they need over the 
budget and personnel.
  I have heard members point out that the 9/11 Commission did not point 
to any institutional policy that prevented the sharing of information. 
The argument is, if we can do all this today, why do we have to make 
institutional change? They argue the problem is due to individuals who 
failed to perform their jobs by failing to convey information they were 
supposed to share. It is true that the commission's report discusses 
several specific instances of this type of bureaucratic behavior, and 
in the end things that should have been done were not done, none of 
which seem to have led to disciplinary action. Nevertheless, there were 
policies such as the wall between domestic and foreign intelligence 
that inhibited the full sharing of information.
  But even that is not quite the full story. It is my belief such 
insular behavior will always exist, unless and until we have a strong 
national intelligence director who can effectively enforce common 
information policies. That is what the Collins-Lieberman bill creates. 
That is why keeping these powers is so important.
  In the committee markup, the Senator from Michigan pointed out 
instances where language could have

[[Page 20502]]

been made clearer. I agree with him that clearer lines of authority are 
important. But I fear that the amendments being offered today are not 
mere clarifications but, rather, represent a fundamental tip in the 
balance and will result in erosion of the power of the NID.
  I believe the Department of Defense will have a strong role in the 
new intelligence constructs that the Collins-Lieberman bill creates. 
The DOD will retain full authority over tactical intelligence. It will 
have a seat at both the National Counterterrorism Center and the Joint 
Intelligence Community Council to argue for institutional interests and 
ensure that its needs are met.
  The bill also leaves direct, day-to-day command of the Department of 
Defense intelligence agencies with the DOD. Most of the staff of the 
intelligence agencies will remain uniformed service men and women. The 
Department will remain the intelligence community's largest consumer of 
information. The Secretary of Defense will remain one of the most 
senior members of the Cabinet, with close communication with the 
President.
  If we are going to create a NID with actual clout when it comes to 
enforcing common intelligence standards, the NID must have the ability 
to transfer funds and personnel within the intelligence community. 
Witness after witness came before us and said: With budget authority, 
there is power. Whoever controls the purse has power. We understand 
that in this body. He or she must be able to move assets where they are 
needed most and ensure full compliance with communitywide requirements. 
The chairman of the 9/11 Commission has admonished Congress, saying, 
``If you are not going to create a NID who has the powers of budget and 
appointment, don't do it.'' These powers are necessary to ensure that 
intelligence gathered by intelligence agencies reflects national 
priorities and is shared among all parts of the Government that need 
it.
  The Collins-Lieberman bill gives the national intelligence director a 
number of important powers. He is supposed to develop common policies 
of personnel, budget practices, information networks, security 
classifications, and communication systems. If we want him to succeed 
in these tasks, we must also give him or her the powers to accomplish 
them.
  This body voted last week to retain day-to-day control of the Defense 
intelligence services with the DOD, and I supported that sentiment. But 
since the NID will not have direct day-to-day control, it is even more 
important that he have the ability to transfer money and personnel.
  We all know that bureaucracies have a natural tendency to resist 
change. So the question is, Will the national intelligence director be 
able to enforce his policies in the face of the inertia that normally 
characterizes existing agencies? Not unless everybody knows he is in 
charge of the resources and has the power to shift them according to 
agency performance and his evaluation of needs.
  The bill contains numerous provisions to ensure that this power is 
used responsibly. We make it clear that only the national intelligence 
director can make these transfers of resources and personnel. We also 
retain Congress's authority to approve transfers before they occur. 
That way, it will be clear who is responsible for them and who will 
have to justify them. We create the joint intelligence community 
council made up of the users of intelligence, including the Secretary 
of Defense, to advise and evaluate the national intelligence director.
  We require the NID to notify Congress, including the Committee on 
Armed Services, whenever there are transfers of personnel to or from 
the Department of Defense. In light of these protections, it is 
extremely unlikely that the intelligence community will fail to support 
our armed services. In fact, it is stronger than that. It simply is not 
going to happen. We have set in place the kind of measures, the kind of 
safeguards, the kind of oversight, the kind coordination that will 
ensure the needs of the armed services are met. The intelligence needs 
of the armed services will be met.
  Another amendment would remove the section of the bill that would 
disclose the total funding for intelligence. I must respectfully 
disagree with those who believe this disclosure will harm our national 
security.
  Again, this was an issue in which we had very clear testimony before 
the committee. By the way, after all, reliable estimates of this number 
already appear in the trade press. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission 
recommended going further. They wanted to disclose the totals for each 
agency. But here we have a balance.
  In our history as a nation, we have found the benefits of disclosure 
usually outweigh the costs. What we have in the way of disclosure makes 
policymakers accountable to their actions. But again, we have struck a 
balance.
  I note in his testimony before the committee last month, then-acting 
CIA Director John McLaughlin agreed that declassification of the top 
line figure would make sense. He testified:

       It reinforces responsibility and accountability on those 
     receiving the money, because you can see whether it's going 
     up, down, or so forth. . . . It also does the same thing for 
     Congress. . . . I don't think declassifying the top line 
     would be a major security threat.

  Given all this, it is difficult for me to believe that disclosure 
would weaken our safety in any meaningful way. It would, however, lead 
to more open debate about how much we need to spend to keep America 
safe, and I think that is a good thing.
  There are also proposals to exempt military personnel from the 
national intelligence director's transfer, detail, and assignment 
authority. I can understand the desire to maintain the military chain 
of command, but if we want the national intelligence director to 
develop and enforce common intelligence policies even in the face of 
agency silos, then he or she is going to need to draft his or her own 
players and make sure they are playing on the same team. When the 
national intelligence director transfers a soldier out of an 
intelligence agency, that soldier returns to the Armed Forces where he 
or she will be, once again, safely in the chain of command. But as long 
as they remain in the intelligence community, they are responsible for 
meeting the needs of the entire community, not just the Department of 
Defense, and that is why that individual must have the confidence of 
the national intelligence director.
  There is a second reason for keeping personnel authority in the 
national intelligence director. We all agree on the creation of a 
National Counterter-rorism Center--there has not been a lot of debate 
over that--and intelligence centers that represent other national 
priorities. We mean for these centers to contain the best people from 
each agency. Assuming, for example, that the National Counterterrorism 
Center consists of the best terrorism experts from each element of the 
intelligence community, it makes sense for it to be the forum for 
negotiating common policies and planning joint operations. But in order 
to prevent each agency from creating its own counterterrorism unit and 
sending the NCTC only junior workers or workers sitting out their final 
years until retirement, the national intelligence director must have 
the power to bring the best and the brightest to the National Counter-
terrorism Center.
  I note that the Chair talked about her visit to the current TTIC, the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the forerunner of the NCTC. She 
noticed how young some of the personnel there were. At this stage in 
time, it is not seen as the best place to be, but with a strong 
national intelligence director and a clear National Counterterrorism 
Center, we want the best and the brightest, and the national 
intelligence director should have the right to bring those people to 
the table to work with him or her.
  Finally, we will vote on amendments that would take one agency or 
another out of the definition of ``national intelligence program'' and 
thereby move their budgets away from the national intelligence 
director's authority and back under the Defense Secretary's authority. 
This might be wise if we make

[[Page 20503]]

the Secretary of Defense responsible for enforcing common intelligence 
policies and meeting the intelligence needs of the entire Government, 
but in that case we would not need a national intelligence director. In 
that case, we ought to also transfer the CIA into Defense.
  On the other hand, if we want a strong coordinator of intelligence 
and we do not want that person to be the Secretary of Defense, then the 
national intelligence director must have the budget power over all 
parts of the intelligence community that service common needs. It 
simply would not make sense to break agencies, such as the NSA or NRO, 
up into pieces depending on whether this program or that fell into the 
national intelligence program. They should either be part of a 
coordinated approach to intelligence or they should be totally 
separate. I submit they are too important not to be brought into the 
national intelligence policy.
  I note that even under the Collins-Lieberman bill, these agencies 
would remain under the day-to-day control of the Department of Defense. 
Most of their personnel will still consist of uniformed military 
officers. The relevant congressional committees will remain actively 
involved in ensuring the needs of the military are met, and the 
Secretary of Defense will remain a senior Cabinet member with a direct 
line to the President. With all this, it is difficult for me to believe 
that the intelligence our combat forces receive will diminish in any 
material way. It seems more probable that through better coordination 
and sharing, the Armed Forces will have access to better intelligence 
under the Collins-Lieberman bill than they would have in a watered-down 
version, and I think that is the key here.
  In this post-9/11 world in which we live, where we understand the 
nature of the importance of intelligence, we must understand the 
importance of breaking down the silos that in the past prohibited folks 
from working together. It is clear we all will benefit. The Department 
of Defense benefits and the intelligence agencies benefit, but most 
importantly, the people of this great country benefit. When we have and 
will have a strong national intelligence director, a clear sense of 
somebody in charge with accountability and credibility, with the 
support and confidence of the President, we will all be able to sleep 
easier at night.
  I urge my colleagues to resist the natural hesitation in the face of 
major change. Everybody likes change until it happens to them. The 
events of 9/11 changed the world, and we must change our mindsets in 
response. I believe the Collins-Lieberman bill represents the right 
balance and will make America safe.
  I urge my colleagues to reject those amendments that would weaken the 
balance, that would weaken the strength of the national intelligence 
director.
  Let's move America forward. Let's make the change. Let's support this 
bill.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota for 
his comments. As I indicated, he has been a key member in drafting this 
bill. I very much appreciate his many contributions and support.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I join in thanking the Senator from 
Minnesota. Senator Coleman really hung in there with us and did the 
hard work in July, August, and September, both in attending the 
hearings and in helping to draft a bill over a 2-day markup.
  His statement today means a lot to us personally, but I hope and 
believe it will mean a lot to the other Members of the Senate because 
it is a strong explanation of why this bill is urgently necessary. 
People asked earlier: What is the rush? People today asked: What is the 
rush? The rush is, we were attacked on September 11. It is more than 3 
years later, and Congress has not acted to adequately reorganize our 
intelligence assets community, which the 9/11 Commission told us, and 
everybody agrees, does not have a leader in charge.
  Right now--what is his name?--Zawahiri, the second to bin Laden in 
al-Qaida, last week put out another tape urging Islamist terrorists 
around the world to attack America and Americans. So we are at war, and 
we are not properly defending ourselves. That is the urgency.
  The Senator from Minnesota has spoken very eloquently today, both for 
the bill and against weakening amendments. That is really going to be 
the test over the next couple of days as we move to cloture and 
adoption of the bill. The bill is in good shape now. We have listened, 
we have negotiated with some people, accepted some amendments that we 
thought would not hurt the bill and would strengthen or clarify it. As 
the Senator from Minnesota knows, a line has to be drawn and some of 
these amendments take too much out of the bill and would hurt the 
purpose, which is to better protect the American people.
  So I thank the Senator very much for what he has said, and I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I yield to the Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


           Amendments Nos. 3825, 3809, as modified, and 3810

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I have a unanimous consent request, and I 
think I am following a pattern, at least I hope so. If not, I will 
withdraw. I ask unanimous consent that three amendments be called up 
and then be set aside so that they are in advance of cloture. I ask 
unanimous consent that amendment No. 3825 be called up and set aside. I 
also send to the desk a modified version of amendment No. 3809, which 
has been approved by the Democratic leader, which I understand the 
process is the modification and then that modified amendment will be 
set aside. Also, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 3810 be 
called up and set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3825

   (Purpose: To permit reviews of criminal records of applicants for 
                  private security officer employment)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 
                   ACT OF 2004.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 
     2004''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) employment of private security officers in the United 
     States is growing rapidly;
       (2) private security officers function as an adjunct to, 
     but not a replacement for, public law enforcement by, among 
     other things, helping to protect critical infrastructure, 
     including hospitals, manufacturing facilities, defense and 
     aerospace contractors, nuclear power plants, chemical 
     companies, oil and gas refineries, airports, communication 
     facilities and operations, and others;
       (3) the 9-11 Commission Report says that ``Private sector 
     preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business 
     in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous 
     potential cost in lives, money, and national security'' and 
     endorsed adoption of the American National Standards 
     Institute's standard for private preparedness;
       (4) part of improving private sector preparedness is 
     mitigating the risks of terrorist attack on critical 
     infrastructure by ensuring that private security officers who 
     protect those facilities are properly screened to determine 
     their suitability;
       (5) the American public deserves the employment of 
     qualified, well-trained private security personnel as an 
     adjunct to sworn law enforcement officers; and
       (6) private security officers and applicants for private 
     security officer positions should be thoroughly screened and 
     trained.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a 
     current employee and an applicant for employment as a private 
     security officer.
       (2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer'' 
     means any person that--
       (A) employs private security officers; and
       (B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the 
     Attorney General to request a criminal history record 
     information search of an employee through a State 
     identification bureau pursuant to this section.

[[Page 20504]]

       (3) Private security officer.-- The term ``private security 
     officer''--
       (A) means an individual other than an employee of a 
     Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty is to 
     perform security services, full- or part-time, for 
     consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in uniform or 
     plain clothes (except for services excluded from coverage 
     under this section if the Attorney General determines by 
     regulation that such exclusion would serve the public 
     interest); but
       (B) does not include--
       (i) employees whose duties are primarily internal audit or 
     credit functions;
       (ii) employees of electronic security system companies 
     acting as technicians or monitors; or
       (iii) employees whose duties primarily involve the secure 
     movement of prisoners.
       (4) Security services.--The term ``security services'' 
     means acts to protect people or property as defined by 
     regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
       (5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State 
     identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by 
     the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of 
     criminal history record information.
       (d) Criminal History Record Information Search.--
       (1) In general.--
       (A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized employer may 
     submit to the State identification bureau of a participating 
     State, fingerprints or other means of positive 
     identification, as determined by the Attorney General, of an 
     employee of such employer for purposes of a criminal history 
     record information search pursuant to this section.
       (B) Employee rights.--
       (i) Permission.--An authorized employer shall obtain 
     written consent from an employee to submit to the State 
     identification bureau of a participating State the request to 
     search the criminal history record information of the 
     employee under this section.
       (ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall provide to the 
     employee confidential access to any information relating to 
     the employee received by the authorized employer pursuant to 
     this section.
       (C) Providing information to the state identification 
     bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history 
     record information search from an authorized employer 
     pursuant to this section, submitted through the State 
     identification bureau of a participating State, the Attorney 
     General shall--
       (i) search the appropriate records of the Criminal Justice 
     Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation; and
       (ii) promptly provide any resulting identification and 
     criminal history record information to the submitting State 
     identification bureau requesting the information.
       (D) Use of information.--
       (i) In general.--Upon receipt of the criminal history 
     record information from the Attorney General by the State 
     identification bureau, the information shall be used only as 
     provided in clause (ii).
       (ii) Terms.--In the case of--

       (I) a participating State that has no State standards for 
     qualification to be a private security officer, the State 
     shall notify an authorized employer as to the fact of whether 
     an employee has been--

       (aa) convicted of a felony, an offense involving dishonesty 
     or a false statement if the conviction occurred during the 
     previous 10 years, or an offense involving the use or 
     attempted use of physical force against the person of another 
     if the conviction occurred during the previous 10 years; or
       (bb) charged with a criminal felony for which there has 
     been no resolution during the preceding 365 days; or

       (II) a participating State that has State standards for 
     qualification to be a private security officer, the State 
     shall use the information received pursuant to this section 
     in applying the State standards and shall only notify the 
     employer of the results of the application of the State 
     standards.

       (E) Frequency of requests.--An authorized employer may 
     request a criminal history record information search for an 
     employee only once every 12 months of continuous employment 
     by that employee unless the authorized employer has good 
     cause to submit additional requests.
       (2) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue such 
     final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to 
     carry out this section, including--
       (A) measures relating to the security, confidentiality, 
     accuracy, use, submission, dissemination, destruction of 
     information and audits, and recordkeeping;
       (B) standards for qualification as an authorized employer; 
     and
       (C) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for 
     conducting the background checks.
       (3) Criminal penalties for use of information.--Whoever 
     knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained 
     pursuant to this section other than for the purpose of 
     determining the suitability of an individual for employment 
     as a private security officer shall be fined under title 18, 
     United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, 
     or both.
       (4) User fees.--
       (A) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may--
       (i) collect fees to process background checks provided for 
     by this section; and
       (ii) establish such fees at a level to include an 
     additional amount to defray expenses for the automation of 
     fingerprint identification and criminal justice information 
     services and associated costs.
       (B) Limitations.--Any fee collected under this subsection--
       (i) shall, consistent with Public Law 101-515 and Public 
     Law 104-99, be credited to the appropriation to be used for 
     salaries and other expenses incurred through providing the 
     services described in such Public Laws and in subparagraph 
     (A);
       (ii) shall be available for expenditure only to pay the 
     costs of such activities and services; and
       (iii) shall remain available until expended.
       (C) State costs.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed as restricting the right of a State to assess a 
     reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the costs to the 
     State of administering this section.
       (5) State opt out.--A State may decline to participate in 
     the background check system authorized by this section by 
     enacting a law or issuing an order by the Governor (if 
     consistent with State law) providing that the State is 
     declining to participate pursuant to this paragraph.


                    amendment no. 3809, as modified

       On page 28, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:
       (D) the personnel involved are not military personnel and 
     the funds were not appropriated to military personnel 
     appropriations, except that the Director may make a transfer 
     of such personnel or funds if the Secretary of Defense does 
     not object to such transfer; and
       (E) nothing in section 143(i) or 144(f) shall be construed 
     to authorize the National Intelligence Director to specify, 
     or require the head of a department, agency, or element of 
     the United States Government to approve a request for, the 
     transfer, assignment, or detail of military personnel, except 
     that the Director may take such action with regard to 
     military personnel if the Secretary of Defense does not 
     object to such action.


                           amendment no. 3810

 (Purpose: To clarify the definition of National Intelligence Program)

       On page 7, beginning on line 20, strike ``that is not part 
     of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date 
     of the enactment of this Act''.

  Mr. LEVIN. I very much thank my dear friend from West Virginia, and I 
thank the managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I rise today to not offer but to 
talk about an amendment because things are in the works. Therefore, I 
can only talk, not offer.
  The amendment, were it to take place, would be amendment No. 3712. Of 
course, it is to No. 2845, which is our basic bill. I think it is 
widely agreed that Congress has an obligation to ensure that the 
efforts of the 9/11 Commission to improve our system of homeland 
security is accurately captured by any legislation that we pass out of 
this body.
  Last week, Senators McCain and Hutchison offered constructive 
amendments on aviation security, but I believe my talking points offer 
the most comprehensive approach to improving aviation security, so I 
put them forward to my colleagues. I am pleased that Senator McCain was 
an original cosponsor of my Aviation Security Amendment Act, which I am 
talking about today as if it were an amendment, which it is not, for 
the moment anyway.
  My idea would be to take needed steps to make certain that Commission 
transportation security recommendations are reflected in the pending 
legislation faithfully.
  The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are wide ranging. They 
build on the work we did in the House-Senate joint inquiry in 2002. I 
strongly believe that we must reform our Government, our Congress, and 
our intelligence agencies to meet the threat of terrorism as has been 
eloquently discussed by the two floor managers on many occasions.
  Although the recommendations for transportation security are a small 
part of the overall report, their importance cannot be understated. 
They are sort of the most visible parts of security. I agree with the 
Commission's report when it states that targeting terrorists' ability 
to travel is a potent

[[Page 20505]]

weapon against our efforts to protect against future terrorist attack.
  In my position as chairman and now ranking member on the Senate 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on 
Aviation, I have worked on many of these issues that face Congress 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
  I should point out that the Commerce Committee has looked at these 
issues and developed other recommendations in the years preceding 
9/11. I also want to note that while we need to incorporate legislation 
consistent with the 9/11 recommendations, the report contains specific 
criticisms of the FAA prior to 9/11 that I do not believe are 
justified.
  For example, the report criticizes the Administrator of the FAA for 
being more focused on the delays than on security prior to 9/11, but we 
all were. We addressed those needs collectively with a new process to 
expedite airport construction.
  Unfortunately, I found it to be one area of the report that failed to 
put into context the actions of the FAA prior to 9/11 and what the 
congressional role was during that period.
  Additionally, after TWA 800 went down in July 1996, we all know that 
we spent countless hours trying to develop measures for aviation 
security. That was well before 9/11 by 5 years. Ultimately, we mandated 
that more equipment and canine teams be dispatched as quickly as 
possible, but clearly the events of 9/11 have required an even more 
comprehensive approach.
  I have worked closely with Senators McCain, Hollings, Lott, and many 
others over this period to take action to help ensure that the events 
of 9/11 are not repeated. Congress has passed a number of landmark 
bills to address critical needs in filling gaps in our aviation 
security. While the legislation that passed in the days immediately 
following the terrorist attacks was responsive to the crisis our 
aviation system faced, these laws primarily addressed the immediate 
needs we had regarding commercial passenger airline security, including 
aircraft passenger and baggage screening. I believe we have a much 
improved aviation security network because of the laws that were 
adopted. Improving aviation security is a continuous process, an 
expensive process, and we must continue to make improvements to our 
aviation security network. I think we all know much more needs to be 
done.
  Over the last 3 years, TSA, the Transportation Security 
Administration, has had an appropriate opportunity to get up and 
running. It was awkward at first. They are much better at it now. I, 
along with my colleagues on the Commerce Committee, have conducted 
numerous oversight hearings on TSA and aviation security, a number of 
them in closed session. Because of this oversight and our understanding 
of the transportation system, we were better able to understand where 
we had made progress and identify what more work needed to be done 
about aviation security.
  To further address these needs, Senators McCain, Hollings, and myself 
introduced S. 2393, the Aviation Security Advancement Act, which 
included measures to tighten air cargo security and bolster other 
existing programs.
  As we know, after the 9/11 Commission was established, they began a 
complete review of the events surrounding 9/11 and the requirements 
that would be necessary for a comprehensive strengthening of all of our 
homeland defense. When this report was released in July, it contained 
specific recommendations regarding transportation security, along with 
express concern about cargo and general aviation security. Both cargo 
and general aviation security have been subjects considered at hearings 
before the Senate Commerce Committee this year, and I introduced S. 
2393 in an effort to make these issues a focus of Congress.
  Last week, there was the amendment that I am talking about--not 
offering but talking about--which would do the following: Standardize 
the Federal screener workforce to properly address staffing needs and 
promote more efficient and effective screening at airports; require DHS 
to consider coordinating aviation-security-related functions to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of passenger screening; increase funding 
for all-cargo aviation security to establish an improved security 
program and to promote the use of improved technology for cargo 
screening; provides an additional $450 million to fund priority capital 
security projects at airports; develops a streamlined baggage screening 
system by requiring a schedule for the in-line placement of explosive 
detection systems; it bolsters the Federal Air Marshal Program; 
advances the development of biometric technology for precise 
identification of workers and travelers; and improves perimeter 
security at airports by authorizing more than $20 million for TSA to 
develop biometric technology and fund a biometric center of excellence.
  I believe these changes significantly improved the underlying 
legislation and have left us with a product that speaks to many of the 
problems that the 9/11 Commission found and which continue to exist in 
our airport transportation security network.
  As I indicated, this is all in some flux now. It is being worked out 
with the floor managers. I simply thank my colleagues and the Presiding 
Officer and the two floor managers for allowing me to speak on what I 
think would be potentially quite a helpful amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia, 
Mr. Rockefeller, for talking about this amendment at this point. I know 
he has not officially offered it yet.
  We are talking to him about it. I think this amendment responds to 
many of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission to strengthen 
aviation security. I very much appreciate the provisions of this 
amendment. We are trying to work out the authorization level that is 
included in the bill, but my overall reaction to his proposal is very 
favorable.
  I know it has been reported by the Commerce Committee and cleared by 
the chairman and the ranking member of that committee. As usual, it 
reflects the Senator's thoughtful consideration of homeland security 
issues.
  I very much have appreciated his advice throughout this debate, and I 
am hopeful that shortly we will be able to have him officially offer 
his amendment, perhaps with a modification, and we would be able to 
accept it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Senator Collins has spoken exactly for me as well. I 
look forward to working with the Senator. It is a good amendment. There 
is one part that doesn't go to the heart of it, and we hope to look 
over it for a bit more and then I hope before along we can accept the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I rise first to congratulate the 
committee on the hard work they have put into this bill, in particular 
Senator Susan Collins, who I think has done a wonderful job. This was a 
very difficult situation. She and Senator Lieberman have led the 
committee in an admirable way. What I have to say is just what I hope 
will be seriously considered as the bill moves its way through to final 
completion by the House and Senate, ultimately to be in a form that can 
be signed by the President.
  I rise to discuss one aspect of the bill concerning privacy and civil 
liberties. The bill before us has many appropriate suggestions for 
reforming our intelligence activities. Part of this reform includes the 
transformation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the enhancement 
of the human intelligence capability. We have heard over and over again 
that we must increase our human intelligence. Almost every time we get 
in a situation where we wonder what is happening in some country--even 
sometimes when we are engaged in war--we ask, Do we know this? Do we 
know that? The answers are we should, but we don't because we don't 
have anyone there. We don't have anyone on the ground. That wasn't 
always the case, but it has become a growing difficulty.

[[Page 20506]]

  Actually, I think we should be getting better and better at it. What 
concerns me is that part of this reform in this bill includes the 
transformation of the Central Intelligence Agency and its enhancement 
of human intelligence, as I said, but this reform in human intelligence 
is very critical because we must get better at it. But, simultaneously, 
we must not inhibit it with overreaching privacy and civil liberties 
provisions that may have a chilling effect on such activities.
  Simply put, I believe these provisions send a wrong message to our 
professional intelligence officers. Clearly, the 9/11 Commission report 
includes recommendations highlighting the need for adequate supervision 
of executive branch powers in order to protect civil liberties. As a 
modern democracy, we cherish individual rights and understand the 
importance of creating institutions with a clear mandate for protecting 
those civil rights. However, this bill establishes two officers in the 
National Intelligence Authority to oversee compliance of privacy 
policies and civil rights and civil liberties policies.
  It also creates no fewer than eight similar officers for each of the 
executive branch departments and agencies concerned with national 
security. These officers would be required to recommend privacy and 
civil liberties policies and to:

     periodically investigate and review department, agency, or 
     element actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and 
     related laws and their implementation to ensure that [they 
     are] adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in 
     [their] actions.

  These officers are created in addition to an inspector general of the 
National Intelligence Authority. Clearly, insisting on all of these 
goes well beyond what is necessary and may well hurt our attempt to 
improve our human intelligence.
  Our history of intelligence reform has many examples of sending wrong 
messages to our intelligence officers. The restrictions and 
bureaucratic oversight instituted in the past have often hampered the 
aggressiveness of operations and left our policymakers with less than a 
complete picture about critical intelligence matters.
  The chilling effect that began with the Church hearings in the 1970s, 
while it did some things that were good--the chilling effect is long 
remembered. It has had a long, long effect.
  The 1995 directive issued by former CIA Director John Deutch, which 
limited officers from including unsavory individuals, was also 
something that had enormous chilling effects and caused some difficulty 
in obtaining the kind of people we needed as the human resources we 
have been describing.
  My concern is that excessive oversight established by this current 
bill will do the same thing, if not more. It will leave case officers 
who do human intelligence missions concerned that they cannot do their 
jobs to the best of their ability without worrying about being 
disciplined or somebody kind of looking over their shoulder.
  Some people have called this reluctance by operations officers, by 
these officers, ``risk aversion.'' I don't know if that is the right 
characterization, but certainly we have had difficulties accomplishing 
certain missions because we could not get enough trained people on the 
ground in critical places throughout the world.
  I am concerned that the oversight provisions of sections 126, 127, 
and 212 in this bill will continue to hurt us in this area.
  Having said that, I believe removing these provisions would create a 
much better balance between the Government authority needed to protect 
America and the civil liberties we hold so dear. Removing these 
sections that create too many oversight positions would remove 
redundancy while maintaining the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board that was recommended by the national commission.
  Once again, I believe this bill does a very good job of enhancing our 
intelligence system, but let us not undermine these positive steps 
before they have had a chance to work.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3903

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I rise today in opposition to 
amendment No. 3903, offered by Senator Ted Stevens. This amendment 
strikes the provision in the bill that calls for the disclosure of the 
aggregate amount of funding requested, authorized, and appropriated for 
the national intelligence program.
  There is one of the fundamental reforms recommended by the 9/11 
Commission and one that I have long supported.
  The proponents of this amendment have made two central arguments. 
First, they suggest we are rushing into this decision without fully 
understanding the implications.
  Second, they suggest that revealing the amount of overall spending 
could somehow damage our national security.
  Let us address the first argument, that we are rushing into this 
decision. I must point out this is not a new debate. The Congress has 
been considering this particular question for at least a decade. In 
1993, the Senate adopted an amendment calling for the disclosure of the 
aggregate amount of intelligence spending.
  Let me repeat that the Senate endorsed the idea 11 years ago.
  That effort and a subsequent attempt to make the top line public, 
which is what we are talking about--the total amount of the 
intelligence budget--in 1997 had the support of Senators Specter, 
Boren, and DeConcini, all of whom served as chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee. We had a full and complete debate in 1993, and 
this issue has been reviewed, debated, and discussed numerous times in 
the intervening years. The argument that we are being rushed into this 
decision is an excuse being used to stop this important change.
  Regarding the second argument, that disclosing the overall budget 
will damage our national security, I cannot cite a better source than 
the Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin who testified last month 
that this important step would reinforce responsibility and 
accountability, not only for those receiving the money but for the 
Congress as well. In addition, Robert Gates and John Deutch, former 
Directors of Central Intelligence, have said that releasing the number 
would not damage national security.
  Arguing that disclosure of the total spending for national 
intelligence would compromise our security and provide enemies with 
useful information about our intelligence programs ignores the reality 
of the current situation. While the number is in fact classified, it is 
widely reported in the press. It also was officially declassified for 
fiscal years 1997 and 1998 by former DCI Tenet.
  Some have argued that the total amount is not the problem; it is the 
budget trends that need to be protected. Again, current practice 
undermines this argument. Every year when we do the intelligence 
authorization bill, the chairmen and vice chairmen in both Houses come 
to the floor and talk about whether we have increased or decreased the 
budget that year. Often those statements include specific percentage 
increases. These discussions and trends disclose nothing about the 
specific intelligence programs being funded.
  The idea that our enemies can somehow determine something about our 
intelligence capability by knowing the total of what we spend is simply 
not accurate. Year-to-year changes in any specific program will not 
move the overall total number enough to give an adversary any 
indication of how that money is being spent.
  In other sensitive national security areas, we disclose much more 
information without doing damage. We currently disclose an enormous 
amount of detail about our defense budget and

[[Page 20507]]

military capabilities. The amount of money we spend on personnel, 
acquisition, and research and development is unclassified. Also 
available are the amounts for specific weapons systems, such as tanks, 
aircraft, and missile defense.
  Even much of the spending in the defense budget for specific tactical 
intelligence programs is unclassified currently.
  The disclosure of the total of the national intelligence budget is 
simply not an academic debate. This step is critical to many of the 
other reforms in this bill which our floor managers are trying so hard 
to get done, and to some of the proposed congressional reforms we will 
be discussing later this week. Without a separate unclassified budget 
number, the fund for the National Intelligence Program will still need 
to be included in the Defense Department budget. This arrangement will 
hinder effective control by the national intelligence director and will 
restrict our ability to organize in a way to streamline congressional 
oversight, which is what the 9/11 Commission and our floor managers are 
seeking in their legislation.
  To conclude, it will be virtually impossible to have a separate 
appropriations for intelligence without the declassified intelligence 
budget. If we do not take this step and make this number public, we are 
seriously undermining the reforms in this bill.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose the Stevens amendment and support this 
key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia 
for his very eloquent presentation.
  As the Senator indicated, the intelligence budget's aggregate number 
has been made public twice by the DCI. So this is not unprecedented. 
But if the amendment offered by the Senator from Alaska were adopted, 
let there be no mistake of what the effect would be. The effect would 
be that the funding for the National Intelligence Program would still 
be funded through Department of Defense.
  The whole purpose of this bill is to create a national intelligence 
director with significant authority, and the first and perhaps most 
significant of those authorities is the control of the budget. The only 
way you can give the NID true control over the budget is if you have a 
separate account that the NID controls. And we need to do that by 
declassifying the top level number.
  We did not go as far as the 9/11 Commission recommended. The 9/11 
Commission recommended declassifying the top lines of all the agencies' 
budgets within the National Intelligence Program. We did not adopt that 
approach. Instead, we are only declassifying the aggregate number for 
the entire national intelligence budget, a number I note is often 
estimated and reported in the newspapers today.
  But the point I want to make to supplement the remarks of the Senator 
from West Virginia is if we do not do this, if we adopt the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Alaska, we will undermine a key reform in 
the bill because the intelligence budget is so big that if it is not 
going to be declassified, it has to go through the Department of 
Defense. There is no other agency or department that is big enough to 
conceal the total amount of the budget.
  This is going to be an important vote which is coming up this 
afternoon.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, when I delivered my short remarks in 
reference to the privacy and civil liberties provision, I failed to 
mention the other provisions in the bill that attempt to provide 
similar or corresponding type relationships. One is called the privacy 
and civil liberties oversight board. That is a very different thing 
within the purview of intelligence activities. It is almost political 
in nature. It is appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate, three members of one party and two of the other.
  It seems to me a very significant intrusion, perhaps, if one of those 
institutions will have a very chilling effect.
  In addition to all of those I have mentioned, four, that is five; I 
mentioned six, that is seven; and now we have an eighth, which is an 
ombudsman, which seems, at least to me, to be a bit of piling on in 
this bill. You get one, and you think it is OK; someone has another; 
and someone has another. There is no criticism in that, but that is 
what it appears to me. We used to call that piling on when we went into 
conference where somebody seemed to be piling on because they have so 
many provisions affecting the same thing. But in this case, if that is 
what it is, it will have serious potential for repercussions that we 
don't want.
  I thank you, Madam President, and the Senate for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I apologize for not being here earlier. 
I thank the managers of the bill, Senator Collins and Senator 
Lieberman, and their staffs for the work that has been done over the 
weekend, which we will be hearing about soon, trying to meet us halfway 
in terms of some of the objections we have raised to the bill.
  We will soon vote on amendment No. 3903, which the Senator from Maine 
has just discussed, declassification responsibility. This is an 
enormous step to take mainly because of the absolute lobbying and 
pressure from two people from the 9/11 Commission. I have talked to 
other members on the Commission who were not so keen about 
declassification of the entire intelligence budget other than Mr. 
Hamilton and Mr. Kean.
  Clearly, it is a massive step. From President Truman to President 
Bush, every President of the United States has said do not declassify 
the top line of our budget. We have voted in the Senate many times 
since I have been in the Senate as Members have tried to do this, and 
we have uniformly turned down such a proposal.
  Now it is in a bill for the first time. We must take it out. It 
requires 51 votes to take out. In the past, it took 51 votes to pass. 
We are in a different position now than we were before. Very clearly, 
because of the scope of this bill, we are doing something even more 
expansive than amendments that came before the Senate before.
  Again, I call the attention of the Senators who will vote to the 
scope of the definition of national intelligence under this bill. It is 
a sweeping definition.
  I ask that page 6, beginning on line 19, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       (6) The term ``National Intelligence Program''--
       (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, 
     projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community;
       (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities 
     (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the 
     National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the National Security Agency, the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance 
     Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Office of Information analysis of the 
     Department of Homeland Security; and
       (ii) includes any other program, project, or activity of a 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government relating to national intelligence unless the 
     National Intelligence Director and the head of the 
     department, agency, or element concerned determine otherwise; 
     but
       (B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii), does not 
     refer to any program, project, or activity of the military 
     departments, including any program, project, or activity of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency that is not part of the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, to acquire intelligence principally 
     for the planning and conduct of joint or tactical military 
     operations by the United States Armed Forces.

  Mr. STEVENS. My point is this: Included in intelligence are the top 
secret plans of this country. They are the planning for future devices 
and concepts that deal with interception of information. They deal with 
the ability to identify individuals. They deal with so many classified 
areas that I may be violating some rules by mentioning the two I 
mentioned.
  All the money we put in this bill, hide in the intelligence bill, to 
stop anyone from knowing about it, has to

[[Page 20508]]

be disclosed under this direction, to include everything, any program, 
project, or activity of any one of these agencies.
  I plead with Members to think about classification. This is not 
routine classification of who is an employee of the CIA. That is bad 
enough, come to think of it. These activities are so far reaching, and 
with so many agencies, including the defense agency that deals with 
research activities. It has projects it is working on, which are so far 
out that may prove to be viable. They are part of the intelligence 
budget. They are classified. They are down in the black portion of the 
bill and are kept classified because we do not want anyone to know what 
we are researching and what we are developing. It would be included in 
this.
  No amendment we ever looked at before would have done that, but 
because of the definition of intelligence in this bill it becomes all 
inclusive and there is no alternative.
  Sometimes I think maybe I am just not able to communicate totally 
what I am thinking about this bill. It is far reaching to the point of 
having the ability to destroy intelligence capability to plan for the 
future.
  There is no question about the right to know everything--except the 
secrets of the country. Aren't we allowed to have some secrets? Do we 
have to disclose a number that encompasses the financing of secret 
activities, some so classified they are not even top secret; they are 
code word? You have to be cleared for the word. You have to be totally 
cleared. And there are very few people cleared for these activities. I 
don't think there are many people in the Senate who are cleared for 
code word activities.
  Should we tell them what we are spending for code word activities? We 
do not even tell them the word--but we will have to print in the Record 
now, disclose in the top line of the intelligence budget, all of those 
activities.
  I will speak later about it. Again, I implore the managers of the 
bill to think twice about this precedent we would be setting, reversing 
the votes in the Senate--reversing because now it requires 51 votes to 
take it out. In the past, it was 51 votes to get it passed.
  This has shifted the burden from the intelligence people who want to 
protect the Intelligence Committee to the people who do not understand 
it, do not wish to really understand it. I am not being accusatory of 
my two friends. They have worked hard and are trying to understand, but 
some of us have lived a lifetime in trying to understand it. This 
amendment has to pass.
  If we want to disclose the budget to the extent that it is not 
classified in terms of top secret or above, that is another matter. We 
can disclose a portion of the budget that is in the secret category, 
but when we get to top secret and above--no. If we include that, count 
me out. I cannot believe we would do that. I hope the Senator will 
listen to us later.
  Mr. BURNS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. STEVENS. I am delighted to yield.
  Mr. BURNS. As I looked at this amendment and thought of making 
available the information of how much we spend on intelligence--not 
only are there operations we have to take into consideration, lives of 
people are on the line. We make them more vulnerable every day in their 
work, gathering intelligence.
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is absolutely right.
  Mr. BURNS. And I ask the Senator, has anyone determined what it does 
to the human assets, the people? They are the best we have. Are they 
willing to work for this agency to get the best intelligence we need?
  Mr. STEVENS. The problem is, once we make available this top line 
they wish to disclose and then start through the budget on what you can 
find easily, pretty soon you come down to the portion of the budget 
that is in the classified sector, and then you start to pick it apart. 
You know what will happen. It will keep getting question after question 
after question.
  But the people who risk their lives, who are foreign nationals, are 
paid from this budget. We are really going to put in there how much we 
are paying people around the world to spy for us? Are we naive enough 
to think we are not paying people? It would be in there. Unless the 
Senator disagrees with me, there is one little exception: unless 
someone decides otherwise. I am not sure what that means because it 
only refers to that one section. It is related to national 
intelligence.
  Now, national intelligence is intelligence that is covered by section 
5. It does not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement 
activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It does 
not say it does not cover counterintelligence or activities of the CIA 
or the DIA, but it does for the FBI.
  I think the problem is, the definitions of these programs are so 
specific now to this bill. But this one covers the disclosure of the 
total amount. That is what I object to.
  Mr. BURNS. Madam President, I have drawn the conclusion that 
basically this destroys the network. And we wonder why we do not have 
human resources on the ground in some areas in the world and, yes, even 
in our own country. I will tell you, if this is disclosed, this will be 
one of the main reasons that we will have.
  Mr. STEVENS. Let me tell the Senator one thing before I quit. I 
remember one morning I woke up and the New York Times had a picture of 
the Predator on the front page, and it disclosed that it was capable of 
carrying the Hellfire missile. If there was anything that was totally 
classified at that time, that was it, and there it was out there on the 
front page. Do you know what. About a week later, we missed several 
people in Afghanistan on whom we were trying to use the Hellfire 
missile. They knew it was already there. They knew it was armed by that 
time. Before that, it had not been armed and before that no one had the 
capability to arm it. But we developed a way to arm it, and there it 
was on the front page of the New York Times.
  Now, this concept of leakage of the intelligence community's 
activities starts from the top line. I do not understand why we should 
reverse the history of this Senate. The Senate has never voted to 
disclose the intelligence budget--never.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I have great respect for the Senator 
from Alaska. He has always contributed to our country in so many 
different ways. I have great respect for his long experience in matters 
of defense and intelligence. I assure him of this.
  He raised the question about whether the Senator from Maine and I 
understand what we are doing. Let me assure him, we understand. We have 
spent a lot of time studying this issue. The 9/11 Commission has spent 
a lot of time studying this issue. We disagree with the amendment of 
the Senator from Alaska. We have a difference of conclusion about 
policy, but we understand exactly what we are doing.
  What we are doing is saying that the billions of dollars that are 
spent every year on intelligence is the people's money. Unless there is 
a national security reason not to tell them what the bottom line is we 
are spending, they have a right to know. One of the consequences of 
that is that there will be more accountability.
  Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin said to our 
committee:

       I think it would make some sense to declassify the overall 
     number of the foreign intelligence program. It would 
     reenforce responsibility and accountability.

  This is nobody who was pulled in out of nowhere to run the CIA. He 
spent his entire career, more than 30 years, in intelligence.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. No. I would like to----
  Mr. STEVENS. But you are using foreign intelligence. This is national 
intelligence. He talked about foreign intelligence.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Excuse me, he talked about national intelligence 
before our committee. It is the bottom line, a gross number.
  The colloquy between the Senator from Montana and the Senator from

[[Page 20509]]

Alaska was interesting but bore no relevance whatsoever to the proposal 
in our bill. Do you think we would make this recommendation if we 
thought it would compromise the security of anybody in our intelligence 
community?
  Let me ask you this: How would it? It is the bottom line. It is not 
even the 15 constituent agencies of the intelligence community. This 
does not compromise anybody's security any more than the Defense 
Department budget compromises the security of our soldiers, or the DEA 
budget, which is public, Drug Enforcement Agency, compromises the 
security of any of our drug enforcement agents, or the FBI budget. 
People in DEA and FBI are involved in very dangerous work.
  Anyway, it is only the bottom line.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 4:15 
having arrived, the Senate will proceed to a series of votes on pending 
amendments, with 2 minutes equally divided for debate prior to each 
vote. The first amendment is Senator Byrd's amendment, amendment No. 
3845.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I want to explain to our colleagues 
what is going to happen before we proceed. There will be a motion to 
table the Byrd amendment. There will be 2 minutes equally divided and 
then a motion to table the Byrd amendment.
  We have been able to work out an agreement on Senator Warner's 
amendment. That will be the second matter we deal with. He will send a 
modification to the desk, and it is my hope to be able to adopt that 
amendment by a voice vote and vitiate the rollcall request.
  Then there will be consideration of an amendment from Senator Stevens 
having to do with the effective date. Again, we have worked out a 
compromise on that, working very hard throughout the weekend. I expect 
Senator Stevens will propose a modification to his amendment, and that 
will allow us to clear that amendment by a voice vote.
  We then will proceed to the Stevens amendment dealing with 
classification, which has been debated extensively. That will require a 
rollcall vote, and I will be moving to table it.
  We then will move to another Stevens amendment where, again, I am 
pleased to report there is another compromise. It has to do with the 
interagency counterterrorism plans. Again, an amendment will be sent to 
the desk incorporating the compromise. I believe Senator Stevens will 
be offering that. I anticipate being able to accept that on a voice 
vote.
  So I want my colleagues to know that we have made considerable 
progress in accommodating concerns expressed by the Senator from 
Virginia and the Senator from Alaska. As a result, I see the need for 
two rollcall votes out of the five that were ordered. I hope that is 
how it will unfold.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time with regard to the amendment?
  Mr. BURNS. Madam President, I say to the managers of the bill, I 
would like to respond to the ranking member's assessment of why the 
funds should be disclosed. I ask permission to do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield time?
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I am wondering if perhaps that could be 
done in the 2 minutes on the Stevens amendment, since we have an awful 
lot of amendments to get through. I am very hesitant to cut off the 
Senator from Montana, but would that be acceptable?
  Mr. BURNS. That will be fine. We might ask for a little more time.
  Ms. COLLINS. OK. Madam President, we would now proceed to 2 minutes 
of debate equally divided on Senator Byrd's amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, seeing the absence of Senator Byrd, I 
ask the Senator, would you like to proceed to my amendment to take a 
little time while he comes to the floor?
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I think that would be a good idea. I 
ask unanimous consent that we proceed to Senator Warner's amendment 
first while we are waiting for Senator Byrd.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I now observe the presence of the 
Senator from West Virginia.


                Amendment No. 3877, As Further Modified

  Madam President, I send to the desk a modification to amendment No. 
3877.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is further 
modified.
  The amendment, as further modified, is as follows:

       On page 40, strike line 18 and all that follows through 
     page 42, line 9, and insert the following:
       (b) NID Recommendation or Concurrence in Certain 
     Appointments.--With respect to any position as head of an 
     agency, organization, or element within the intelligence 
     community (other than the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency)--
       (1) if the appointment to such position is made by the 
     President, any recommendation to the President to nominate or 
     appoint an individual to such position shall be accompanied 
     by the recommendation of the National Intelligence Director 
     with respect to the nomination or appointment of such 
     individual to such position; and
       (2) if the appointment to such position is made by the head 
     of the department containing such agency, organization, or 
     element, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or 
     a subordinate official of such department or of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, no individual may be appointed to such 
     position without the concurrence of the National Intelligence 
     Director.
       (c) Presidential Authority.--This section, and the 
     amendments made by this section, shall apply to the fullest 
     extent consistent with the authority of the President under 
     the Constitution relating to nomination, appointment, and 
     supervision of the unitary executive branch.
       On page 42, after line 25, add the following:
       (e) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 201 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking subsection (a);
       (B) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (a) and (b), respectively;
       (C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``National Intelligence 
     Director'';
       (D) in subsection (a), as so redesignated--
       (i) in paragraph (1)--
       (I) by striking ``seek'' and inserting ``obtain''; and
       (II) by striking the second sentence; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2)--
       (I) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as 
     subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and
       (II) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph (B):
       ``(B) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.''; 
     and
       (E) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), as so 
     redesignated--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as 
     subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and
       (ii) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph (B):
       ``(B) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.''.
       (2)(A) The heading of such section is amended by striking 
     ``consultation and''.
       (B) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II 
     of chapter 8 of such title is amended in the item relating to 
     section 201 by striking ``consultation and''.

  Mr. WARNER. This is an amendment which strikes a balance between the 
respective authorities of the newly to be created NID together with the 
Secretary of Defense and others as it relates to the recommendations to 
the President for the appointment of Presidential appointees. It has 
the support of the distinguished managers on both sides. I worked in 
cooperation with the White House staff in its preparation, and they 
have expressed strong concurrence.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee for working with Senator Lieberman and me 
on the appointment authority. This is a very important issue. We have 
struck the right balance in the modification. I urge acceptance of the 
modification which embodies the compromise we worked on over the 
weekend.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank Senator Warner for the 
initiative and for the reasoning that we have

[[Page 20510]]

done. We have come up with a result that is a wise and solid balance. 
We are creating a new position--national intelligence director--but we 
want that position to work particularly closely with the Secretary of 
Defense. This compromise says that on the critical national 
intelligence agencies--NSA, NGA, and NRO--that are now in the Defense 
Department, whereas the initiative to head that department was 
previously in the national intelligence director, we are giving it back 
to the Secretary of Defense but asking for concurrence from the 
national intelligence director before it goes to the President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the managers has expired.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. In fact, this amendment broadens the involvement of 
the national intelligence director in these important nominations.
  I thank the Senator for his cooperation. It shows that Senator 
Collins and I are willing to hear and accept a good idea.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I note the long hours and hard work of 
the two managers. We started on this on Thursday, when I first 
introduced it, and we worked it again on Friday. Those were productive 
days. Even though we did not have rollcall votes on Friday, much was 
accomplished, including the resolution of this amendment.
  I ask now that the amendment be agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
3877, as further modified.
  The amendment (No. 3877) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3845

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the amendment of 
the Senator from West Virginia.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, the amendment of the Senator from West 
Virginia would considerably limit the authority of the national 
intelligence director to move money and people. It would undermine a 
key reform that is included in this bill, a reform that the 9/11 
Commission says is absolutely necessary to empower the NID. Otherwise 
we are just creating another layer of bureaucracy. We need to make sure 
that the NID has the authority to marshal the resources, the people, 
and the funding to counter the biggest threats we face.
  The Byrd amendment would actually give the new national intelligence 
director less authority than the DCI has under current law to move 
around money and personnel to address urgent needs. Under the Byrd 
amendment, aggregate transfers from a department or an agency would be 
limited by a dollar and a percentage amount. There is no such 
limitation in current law. This amendment represents a step backward 
from current law. It would severely undermine the reforms. I am going 
to move that it be tabled. I urge my colleagues to oppose the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has 1 minute.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes. I 
would like to yield to the distinguished Senator, chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee and President pro tempore of the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent for an 
additional minute on our side, then, as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I believe this is another amendment 
that is sort of misunderstood. The powers of the national intelligence 
director under this bill are much broader than the CIA Director's. 
Under this bill he has the right to move money from any part of the 
intelligence community to another part without consent of the agency to 
whom we appropriated money and, really, without regard to the program 
activities or even the specifications Congress has put on that money.
  Take, for instance, reserve funds. Reserve funds are there in the 
event of emergencies for the specific agency involved. He can go in to 
take the reserve funds from one agency and move them entirely to 
another agency without any consent of the agency or the consent of the 
committees that appropriated the money for that reserve contingency.
  The Senator's amendment makes a lot of sense. Those of us who are 
cosponsors are very serious about our support.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support much of what is contained in 
amendment No. 3845, offered by Senator Byrd. However, I will vote 
against the amendment because it strikes from the underlying bill 
section 224(b)(3), a provision included in an amendment I offered 
during markup of the bill in the Government Affairs Committee. Section 
224 requires that the NID, the Director of the NCTC, and the Director 
of any other intelligence center make intelligence information 
available upon the request of committees of Congress with jurisdiction 
over the subject matter to which the information relates, or upon the 
request of the chairman or ranking member of the House or Senate 
Intelligence Committees. Too much information and too many documents 
have been withheld from congressional committees by the CIA. If we are 
going to prevent a stronger national intelligence direction from 
becoming a stronger ``yes man'' and stronger political arm of a White 
House, there must be strong oversight from Congress.
  The intention of section 224(b)(3) is to limit the amount of 
intelligence information that the executive branch can legally withhold 
from the Congress. The requirement to provide information to Congress 
exists unless the President asserts a Constitutionally-based privilege. 
Senator Byrd and I both agree that the Congress should have broad 
access to intelligence information. I disagree, however, with that part 
of the Byrd amendment which strikes section 224(b)(3).
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, while I agree with the 
provisions of Senator Byrd's amendment, No. 3845, that seeks to provide 
greater congressional oversight of the national intelligence authority, 
my objections to provisions in the amendment that would require the 
National Intelligence Director to relinquish budget authority make it 
necessary for me to oppose the amendment and vote in favor of the 
motion to table the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, we must not take control of public moneys 
from the elected representatives of the people and give it to an 
unelected bureaucrat. The Byrd-Stevens-Inouye-Warner amendment gives 
the director the flexibility to transfer personnel and appropriations 
to protect against terrorist attacks but provides a leash with which to 
rein him in should abuses occur. They may occur. They probably will in 
time. This is a safeguard.
  I say listen to the Constitution of the United States. I am very 
interested in reform, and I admire the work the committee has done. But 
we are acting too hastily. We are not given enough time, and we are 
going to rue the day that we turned this amendment down and failed to 
leash this unelected bureaucrat. We, the people, stand by the 
Constitution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, testimony from former DCIs as well as 
other experts confirmed the need for stronger authority to transfer and 
reprogram funds and told us this is key to reform of the intelligence 
community. The Acting Director of the CIA said it best. He talked about 
how cumbersome the current system is. He told us you first have to 
acquire the approval of the agency head, then you have to go to the 
department secretary, then you have to go to OMB, and then you have to 
go to Congress. We are keeping the OMB and congressional steps. I want 
to make that clear. But that process, he told us, typically

[[Page 20511]]

takes 5 months, and, as he said--and I quote John McLaughlin:

       So you can see that's not very agile to meet the needs of 
     today. My view is that the national intelligence director 
     ought to have the authority to move those funds.

  I would also note that other provisions in the bill are opposed by 
the White House, and the amendment is opposed by the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mr. Cornyn) 
and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from 
Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Corzine), the Senator from North Carolina 
(Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the Senator from 
South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Kennedy), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coleman). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 62, nays 29, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 195 Leg.]

                                YEAS--62

     Alexander
     Allard
     Allen
     Bayh
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chambliss
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Conrad
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dole
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Pryor
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Sununu
     Talent
     Voinovich
     Wyden

                                NAYS--29

     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Burns
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Murkowski
     Reed
     Reid
     Sarbanes
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Akaka
     Cornyn
     Corzine
     Edwards
     Graham (FL)
     Hollings
     Inhofe
     Kennedy
     Kerry
  The motion was agreed to.


                    Amendment No. 3829, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided on the Stevens amendment No. 3829.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to inform our 
colleagues that, after working very closely with Senator Stevens, 
Senator Lieberman and I have agreed to a modification of his amendment 
that is acceptable to us.
  The bill originally called for an effective date after enactment of 
180 days. The amendment of Senator Stevens would retain that date but 
give the President the ability to extend for another 6 months for 
certain provisions of the bill. That is an acceptable compromise.
  I thank the Senator from Alaska for working with the Senator from 
Connecticut and myself to reach this agreement. I want my colleagues to 
take note that we have accommodated the Senator's concern in this 
regard.
  Mr. STEVENS. I send a modification of my amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment (No. 3829), as modified, is as follows:


                    amendment no. 3829 (as modified)

       On page 133, line 4, strike ``90 days'' and insert ``180 
     days''.
       On page 134, line 4, strike ``180 days'' and insert ``270 
     days''.
       On page 135, line 15, strike ``270 days'' and insert ``1 
     year''.
       On page 140, line 6, strike ``30 days'' and insert ``90 
     days''.
       On page 145, line 12, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 149, line 16, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 150, line 20, strike ``1 year'' and insert ``15 
     months''.
       On page 212, beginning on line 3, strike ``subsection (b), 
     this Act, and the amendments made by this Act,'' and insert 
     ``subsections (b), (c), and (d), titles I through III of this 
     Act, and the amendments made by such titles,''
       On page 212, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
       (b) Specified Effective Dates.--(1) The provisions of 
     section 206 shall take effect as provided in such provisions.
       (2) The provisions of sections 211 and 212 shall take 
     effect 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       On page 212, line 7, strike ``(b)'' and all that follows 
     through ``United States'' on line 10 and insert ``(c) Earlier 
     Effective Date.--In order to safeguard the national security 
     of the United States through rapid implementation of titles I 
     through III of this Act while also ensuring a smooth 
     transition in the implementation of such titles,''.
       On page 212, beginning on line 11, strike ``Act (including 
     the amendments made by this Act), or one or more particular 
     provisions of this Act'' and insert ``titles I through III of 
     this Act (including the amendments made by such titles), or 
     one or more particular provisions of such titles''.
       On page 212, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (d) Delayed Effective Date.--(1) Except with respect to a 
     provision specified in subsection (b), the President may 
     extend the effective date of a provision of titles I through 
     III of this Act (including the amendments made by such 
     provision) for any period up to 180 days after the effective 
     date otherwise provided by this section for such provision.
       (2) The President may extend the effective date of a 
     provision under paragraph (1) only if the President 
     determines that the extension is necessary to safeguard the 
     national security of the United States and after balancing 
     the need for a smooth transition in the implementation of 
     titles I through III of this Act against the need for a rapid 
     implementation of such titles.
       On page 212, line 17, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(e)''.
       On page 212, line 18, strike ``(b)'' and insert ``(c) or 
     (d)''.

       On page 212, line 23, strike ``earlier'' and insert 
     ``earlier or delayed''.
       On page 212, line 25, strike ``earlier'' and insert 
     ``earlier or delayed''.

  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senators from Maine and Connecticut for 
working with us on this amendment. It does stretch out the timeframe 
and makes much more sense.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alaska. We 
have improved this. We have said 180 days for the effective date. If 
the President decides it is in the national security interest to extend 
that, he can do that. If he decides he wants to implement it earlier 
than 180 days in the national security interest, he can do that as 
well. It is a good compromise. I support it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3829), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                    Amendment No. 3903, as modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided on the Stevens amendment No. 3903.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, could we have order?
  Determining classification is the responsibility and duty of the 
chief executive of the United States, the President, who is also 
Commander in Chief. Presidents Truman through Bush has determined that 
the overall intelligence budget top-line figure is, and shall remain, 
classified, and I believe we should not overrule that judgment.
  The foundation of an effective intelligence capability, is secrecy. 
Secrecy protects not only the information that we collect, but also the 
brave people that put themselves at risk to do the collection of it. We 
are an open and a free society that generally abhors secret dealings by 
our Government. But in the case of intelligence collection and 
analysis, secrecy, is absolutely necessary.

[[Page 20512]]

  Some of my colleagues argue that the American people have a right to 
know how much of their money is being spent to defend their Nation's 
security through intelligence-gathering operations. I assert today 
that, through its elected officials, the public interests are being 
effectively served.
  Some argue that disclosing the total budget amount will instill 
public confidence and enable the American people to know what portion 
of the Federal budget is dedicated to intelligence activities. This 
bill recommends that the overall intelligence budget should no longer 
remain classified. I believe that the total budget figure is of no use 
to anyone but to those who wish to do us harm.
  For example, what do the numbers tell our adversaries or potential 
adversaries in the world? In any given year, perhaps, not a great deal. 
But while watching the changes in the budget over time, and using 
information gathered by their own intelligence activities, 
sophisticated analysts can indeed learn a great deal.
  Trend analysis, as you know, is a technique that our own analysts use 
to make predictions and to reach conclusions. There are hostile foreign 
intelligence agencies all over the world that are focused solely on 
gathering every bit of information that they can about our own 
intelligence-gathering operations and our capabilities. Their ultimate 
goal is to exploit weaknesses and to deny access and to deceive our own 
intelligence collectors. Denial and deception is already a serious 
concern for the intelligence community, and providing our enemies or 
potential enemies with any insight as to what we spend on intelligence 
will only make it worse, not better.
  No other nation, friend, or ally, reveals the amount that it spends 
on intelligence. It would set a terrible, dangerous precedent, because 
right after the aggregate budget was revealed, that number doesn't say 
much and so the calls would be quickly for more information.
  This is a slippery slope. Reveal the first number and it will be just 
a matter of minutes before there will be a call to reveal more 
information.
  I want to remind my colleagues that we voted on a similar measure in 
1997--the amendment failed by a vote of 56-43. There have also been 
five votes in the House--all of which have failed. Let us not change 
our records now.
  The President of the United States and every President since Harry 
Truman has requested that the Senate not declassify the amount our 
country spends on intelligence. I believe we should listen to what he 
tells us. I have amended my original amendment to request that only a 
study be done on this important issue. That the national intelligence 
director have the time to investigate this important topic and let him, 
with the President, decide what the safety needs of our Nation are to 
be.
  Based on the recommendations of our colleagues here in the past, I 
hope you will accept this change and support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I rise respectfully to oppose the amendment of the 
Senator from Alaska. The 9/11 Commission recommended that we disclose 
not only the bottom line of what we spend on intelligence but the 
budgets of each of the 15 constituent agencies.
  The Governmental Affairs Committee decided that we could respond and 
respect the public's right to know by putting out the bottom line 
number. That means X billion dollars. No details about what goes to 
what agency or certainly not what goes to what program or what 
personnel. But we were not ready to order the disclosure of the 
intelligence agency budget specifically, and we asked the national 
intelligence director to come back to us with a study.
  That is a good balance. The Senator from Alaska would prohibit public 
disclosures of the bottom line. The public has a right to know at least 
that. One thing they might conclude from that is that we are not 
spending enough on intelligence in the war on terrorism as compared to 
other things we are spending on.
  We worked hard on this. It is balanced. It respects the right to 
know. The families of people lost on 9/11 oppose this amendment, as I 
do.
  I move to table and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would also point out that if we do not 
disclose the top line, the result is the intelligence budget is still 
funded through the Department of Defense. So if we are trying to give 
the national intelligence director real budget authority, we have to 
disclose that top line. We are not disclosing the top line of the CIA, 
the DIA, the NSA; it is only the aggregate figure for the entire 
national intelligence budget. Otherwise we are not reforming the 
process. The funding will have to go through the Department of Defense.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send a modification to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified.
  The amendment (No. 3903), as modified, is as follows:


                     amendment no. 3903 as modified

       On page 115, strike lines 15 through 25 and insert the 
     following:
       (a) Study on Disclosure of Aggregate Amount of 
     Appropriations Requested.--The National Intelligence Director 
     shall conduct a study to assess the advisability of 
     disclosing to the public the aggregate amount of 
     appropriations requested in the budget of the President for 
     each fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program.
       On page 116, line 1, strike ``(c)'' and insert ``(b)''.
       On page 116, strike lines 21 through 23, and insert the 
     following:
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the effective 
     date of this section, the National Intelligence Director 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the 
     studies carried out under subsections (a) and (b).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) 
is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from 
Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) would vote ``aye.''
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka), the 
Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Corzine), the Senator from North Carolina 
(Mr. Edwards), the Senator from Florida (Mr. Graham), the Senator from 
South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Kennedy), and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) are 
necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 55, nays 37, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 196 Leg.]

                                YEAS--55

     Alexander
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Chafee
     Clinton
     Coleman
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Ensign
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham (SC)
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     McCain
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Sununu
     Voinovich
     Wyden

                                NAYS--37

     Allard
     Allen
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Craig
     Crapo
     Dole
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Kyl
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith
     Stevens
     Talent
     Thomas
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Akaka
     Corzine
     Edwards
     Graham (FL)
     Hollings
     Inhofe
     Kennedy
     Kerry
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 20513]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cornyn). The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. If I give notice of reconsideration of that vote, what 
happens under the cloture vote as set for tomorrow?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the vote is reconsidered, the amendment 
will be pending.
  Mr. STEVENS. I give notice of reconsideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I regret seriously I was unable to make 
my statement in full. I was not notified of this time limit when I left 
on Friday. I came back and found it. The statement of my amendment 
there was not a statement of my amendment. It was a statement in 
opposition to my amendment. I was unable to tell the Senate that the 
statement of policy of the President of the United States supports this 
amendment. I think the Senate should reconsider tomorrow and think 
again about this amendment.
  Is there a time limit on me right now?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have the floor. Is there a time limit?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that he cannot 
move to reconsider as he did not vote on the prevailing side.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to reconsider the vote. I was on the prevailing 
side.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question then is on agreeing to the motion 
to table.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is that debatable?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not debatable.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion to table.
  The motion is agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to reconsider is laid upon the 
table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3830.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. STEVENS. I still have the floor, do I not, Mr. President?


                    Amendment No. 3826, As Modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 2 minutes of debate equally 
divided on the Stevens amendment No. 3826, according to the previous 
order.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I believe we have worked out an agreement 
on Senator Stevens' amendment No. 3826, as modified, that is acceptable 
to both sides. I am pleased we have been able to reach a compromise. 
This amendment would clarify the NCTC Director's role in advising the 
President and the national intelligence director. It uses language that 
we worked out carefully during the committee markup with Senator Levin 
and others.
  Specifically, the NCTC Director would advise the President and the 
NID on interagency counterterrorism planning and activities which is 
consistent with the NCTC Director's responsibility to conduct 
interagency counterterrorism planning.
  I urge adoption of the amendment, as modified.
  Mr. STEVENS. Has the amendment been modified, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       On page 84, beginning on line 8, strike ``joint operations 
     relating to counterterrorism'' and insert ``interagency 
     counterterrorism planning and activities''.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I will say for the record the Senator 
from Maine is correct. We have modified this as requested by the 
committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
3826, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 3826) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3827

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I call up amendment No. 3830.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the next vote is on 
amendment No. 3827. There will be two minutes of debate evenly divided.
  The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that 
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. STEVENS. Now what is the regular order, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order before the Senate.
  The Senator from Alaska.


                           Amendment No. 3830

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3830.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. STEVENS. There is an objection to calling up the amendment?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. STEVENS. I just want to call it up and set it aside and qualify 
it for a vote later.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It takes unanimous consent to set aside the 
pending amendment.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I repeat my objection, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have had a conversation with the 
Senator from Alaska. I remove my objection to his calling up the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I renew my request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
set aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, and Mr. Inouye, proposes an amendment numbered 3830.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

    (Purpose: To modify certain provisions relating to the Central 
                          Intelligence Agency)

       On page 28, beginning on line 16, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 1, strike ``OF THE NATIONAL 
     INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 5, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director'' and insert ``for the National 
     Intelligence Director and the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency''.
       On page 43, beginning on line 17, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.
       On page 141, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
       (H) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or his 
     designee;
       On page 141, line 16, strike ``(H)'' and insert ``(I)''.
       On page 141, line 18, strike ``(I)'' and insert ``(J)''.
       On page 141, line 21, strike ``(J)'' and insert ``(K)''.
       On page 179, beginning on line 21, strike ``and 
     coordination of'' and all that follows through ``elements 
     of'' beginning on line 23 and insert ``, and coordinate 
     outside the United States, the collection of national 
     intelligence through human sources by agencies and 
     organizations within''.
       On page 194, beginning on line 23, strike ``of the National 
     Intelligence Director''.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the pending amendment that was 
set aside?

[[Page 20514]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment was No. 3810 by Senator 
Levin which has been set aside.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, am I interfering with a time agreement 
now by continuing on the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am constrained to say that I am 
disturbed at the process that has just been used. I was out of town. I 
left town saying I was willing to work. I come back and find a series 
of my amendments have a 2-minute time limit. I was not consulted on 
that at all. I think in view of the haste with which this bill is 
moving forward, it is very sad. It is going to change this Senator's 
vote on cloture tomorrow because I am tired of having this bill being 
pushed so hard.
  It is being pushed by a group of people who were part of a commission 
that went out of existence. They went out and raised a million and a 
half dollars, and they are lobbying this Senate. They are lobbying 
hard, principally the two leaders. They are no longer leaders of that 
Commission, and they are demanding that we act. Are they registered 
lobbyists? Are they? What right have they to push this Senate so hard?
  I think we should take some time and consider what we are doing. If 
we are not careful, we will destroy the intelligence system we are 
trying to reorganize. I am in favor of reorganizing it. I said that in 
the beginning. But this is going too fast, when I am prevented from 
even reading, perhaps just 1 minute to read a 3-minute statement, and 
nothing in front of the Senators on our side indicated the President of 
the United States was in favor of this amendment. I offered it because 
the statement came from the administration.
  I think we should slow down. If we don't slow down, we are going to 
be around a long time because I remember Senator Allen who stretched 
out a cloture vote once for 3 weeks. I really believe there should be 
some senatorial courtesy involved when a Senator is trying to oppose a 
pressure group like this. It is not easy to do. I know that. But I am 
up to it, I tell you. I am up to it. And people better understand that.
  I ask that that amendment be set aside for the purpose of further 
consideration tomorrow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is set aside.
  The Senator from Kansas.


                    Amendment No. 3740, As Modified

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the 
pending amendment, and I call up amendment No. 3740 with a modification 
which I send to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is already pending.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member 
for crafting an amendment with me that embodies several technical and 
clarifying modifications to their bill. If, in fact, the distinguished 
Senator and the distinguished ranking member at this time would accept 
the amendment, it would be highly desirable on the part of this 
Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee for working very closely with us in proposing 
this amendment which combines portions of several other amendments that 
he has introduced. It clarifies that the mission of the national 
intelligence authority includes eliminating barriers to the 
coordination of all intelligence activities, including but not limited 
to counterterrorism. It appropriately ensures that the congressional 
intelligence committees will receive reports relating to the 
acquisition authorities of NSA and NGA. It provides that the NID may 
directly modify budget proposals made by agencies as part of the 
national intelligence program. I appreciate how closely the chairman 
has worked with Senator Lieberman and me. I am pleased to support the 
amendment, and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the Senators for their assistance.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       On page 9, line 13, strike ``counterter-
     rorism'' and insert ``intelligence, including 
     counterterrorism,''.
       On page 23, line 1, strike ``may require modifications'' 
     and insert ``may modify, or may require modifications,''.
       On page 28, line 17, strike ``or'' and insert ``and''.
       On page 112, beginning on line 12, strike ``Committee on 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives'' and 
     insert ``Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Government Reform of the House of Representatives''.
       On page 200, strike lines 5 through 11 and insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 307. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
                   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERTAINING TO NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Section 105(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-5(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``ensure'' and inserting 
     ``assist the Director in ensuring''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``appropriate''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 3740) was agreed to.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay 
that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


            Amendments Nos. 3741, 3744, and 3751, Withdrawn

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw from 
consideration amendment Nos. 3741, 3744, and 3751.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendments are 
withdrawn.


                    Amendment No. 3748, As Modified

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the 
pending amendment, and call up amendment No. 3748, as modified, which I 
send to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:
       On page 78, line 19, insert ``regular and detailed'' before 
     ``reviews''.
       On page 79, strike lines 1 and 2 and insert the following:

     political considerations, based upon all sources available to 
     the intelligence community, and performed in a manner 
     consistent with sound analytic methods and tradecraft, 
     including reviews for purposes of determining whether or 
     not--
       (A) such product or products state separately, and 
     distinguish between, the intelligence underlying such product 
     or products and the assumptions and judgments of analysts 
     with respect to the intelligence and such product or 
     products;
       (B) such product or products describe the quality and 
     reliability of the intelligence underlying such product or 
     products;
       (C) such product or products present and explain 
     alternative conclusions, if any, with respect to the 
     intelligence underlying such product or products;
       (D) such product or products characterizes the 
     uncertainties, if any, and the confidence in such product or 
     products; and
       (E) the analyst or analysts responsible for such product or 
     products had appropriate access to intelligence information 
     from all sources, regardless of the source of the 
     information, the method of collection of the information, the 
     elements of the intelligence community that collected the 
     information, or the location of such collection.
       On page 80, line 1, insert ``(A)'' after ``(5)''.
       On page 80, line 3, strike ``, upon request,''.
       On page 80, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following:
       (B) The results of the evaluations under paragraph (4) 
     shall also be distributed as appropriate throughout the 
     intelligence community as a method for training intelligence 
     community analysts and promoting the development of sound 
     analytic methods and tradecraft. To ensure the widest 
     possible distribution of the evaluations, the Analytic Review 
     Unit shall, when appropriate, produce evaluations at multiple 
     classification levels.
       (6) Upon completion of the evaluations under paragraph (4), 
     the Analytic Review Unit may make such recommendations to

[[Page 20515]]

     the National Intelligence Director and to appropriate heads 
     of the elements of the intelligence community for awards, 
     commendations, additional training, or disciplinary or other 
     actions concerning personnel as the Analytic Review Unit 
     considers appropriate in light of such evaluations. Any 
     recommendation of the Analytic Review Unit under this 
     paragraph shall not be considered binding on the official 
     receiving such recommendation.
       On page 80, line 6, strike ``Information.--'' and insert 
     ``Information and Personnel.--(1)''.
       On page 80, line 8, insert ``, the Analytic Review Unit, 
     and other staff of the Office of the Ombudsman of the 
     National Intelligence Authority'' after ``Authority''.
       On page 80 line 10, insert ``operational and'' before 
     ``field reports''.
       On page 80, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
       (2) The Ombudsman, the Analytic Review Unit, and other 
     staff of the Office shall have access to any employee, or any 
     employee of a contractor, of the intelligence community whose 
     testimony is needed for the performance of the duties of the 
     Ombudsman.

  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, this amendment ensures that the analytic 
review unit will be able to perform an important quality control and 
accountability mechanism for the analytic product of the intelligence 
community. This is an important function that has not been performed by 
the intelligence community as well as it should have. I thank the 
chairman and ranking member for working with me to ensure that this 
important amendment is adopted.
  I yield to the distinguished chairman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I again thank the distinguished chairman 
for working very closely with the floor managers on this amendment.
  It provides thoughtful clarifications to the establishment of an 
analytic review unit under the Collins-Lieberman bill. I believe the 
changes made by this amendment would strengthen the bill. I urge its 
adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I, too, rise to support the amendment 
the Senator from Kansas offered. It clarifies and strengthens the bill. 
I thank him for it and I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified.
  The amendment (No. 3748), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like at this time to address the 
Senate and the managers with regard to two amendments. I want to be 
cooperative in the procedures that they may have in mind for further 
amendments. If it is convenient, I would like to move forward. If not, 
I would like to know at what time would be more convenient for the 
managers. I think we are making considerable progress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the courtesy of 
the Senator from Virginia. I would like to suggest that we have a brief 
quorum call so we can try to have some order. We have several requests 
on both sides of the aisle to proceed on amendments. I need to compare 
notes with the Democratic manager of the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly want to be cooperative. I hope 
the Senator will take into consideration that I now have the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. I certainly will. If the Senator wants to proceed--
  Mr. WARNER. No. I want to be cooperative. I am perfectly willing to 
yield the floor for the purpose of a quorum. It is my hope that I will 
be recognized at such time as the quorum call is to be withdrawn at the 
discretion of the managers.
  Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President. That is my intent.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to proceed as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Chambliss are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is considering the Intelligence 
Reform Act.
  Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be 
permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                               IRAQ'S WMD

  Mr. DAYTON. Over the weekend, there was a very alarming report in the 
New York Times that stated that senior administration officials 
repeatedly failed to disclose the contrary views of America's leading 
nuclear scientists about tubes that could be used for either a nuclear 
weapons program in Iraq or for alternative purposes, such as short-
range rockets.
  I understand the article is printed in today's Record in Senator 
Byrd's remarks.
  The investigative article found:

       Senior administration officials . . . sometimes overstated 
     even the most dire intelligence assessments of the tubes, yet 
     minimized or rejected the strong doubts of nuclear experts.

  That they had alternative uses.

       They worried privately that the nuclear case was weak, but 
     expressed sober certitude in public.

  The article goes on to say:

       The absence of unconventional weapons in Iraq is now widely 
     seen as evidence of a profound intelligence failure, of an 
     intelligence community blinded by ``group think,'' false 
     assumptions and unreliable human sources.
       Yet the tale of the tubes, pieced together through records 
     and interviews with senior intelligence officers, nuclear 
     experts, administration officials and Congressional 
     investigators, reveals a different failure.
       Far from ``group think,'' American nuclear and intelligence 
     experts argued bitterly over the tubes. . . .
       Precisely how knowledge of the intelligence dispute 
     traveled through the upper reaches of the administration is 
     unclear. Ms. Rice--

  The National Security Adviser--

     knew about the debate before her Sept. 2002 CNN appearance. . 
     . . President Bush learned of the debate at roughly the same 
     time, a senior administration official said.

  The report goes on to document how, even though the 15 different 
agencies of the Federal Government with responsibility for intelligence 
gathering and assessment differed on this analysis, according to 
congressional and intelligence officials, none of them informed senior 
policymakers in the Congress about the Energy Department's dissent, and 
the Energy Department contained the nuclear experts most knowledgeable 
about the probable use of these tubes for another purpose.
  Despite this disagreement, despite the uncertainty, Vice President 
Cheney in the fall of 2002, in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
on August 26 of that year, stated:

       We now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire 
     nuclear weapons. . . .Many of us are convinced that Saddam 
     will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon we 
     cannot really gauge. Intelligence is an uncertain business, 
     even in the best of circumstances.

  The Vice President went on to say:

       Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and 
     seated atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam 
     Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the 
     entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the 
     world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends 
     throughout the region, and subject the United States or any 
     other nation to nuclear blackmail.

  Yet the article goes on to say that neither the Vice President nor 
Ms. Rice mentioned that the Nation's top nuclear design experts 
believed overwhelmingly that the tubes were poorly suited for the 
centrifuges that would be used for nuclear warheads.

[[Page 20516]]

  The article goes on:

       Mr. Cheney, who has a history of criticizing officials who 
     disclose sensitive information, typically refuses to comment 
     when asked about secret intelligence. Yet on this day, with a 
     Gallup poll showing that 58 percent of Americans did not 
     believe President Bush had done enough to explain why the 
     United States should act against Iraq, Mr. Cheney spoke 
     openly about one of the closest held secrets regarding Iraq. 
     Not only did Mr. Cheney draw attention to the tubes; he did 
     so with a certitude that could not be found in even the CIA's 
     assessments. On ``Meet the Press,'' Mr. Cheney said he knew 
     ``for sure'' and ``in fact'' and ``with absolute certainty'' 
     that Mr. Hussein was buying equipment to build a nuclear 
     weapon. ``He has reconstituted his nuclear program,'' Mr. 
     Cheney said flatly.

  Ms. Rice said in a New York Times article today, referencing 
yesterday's investigative report, that she was aware of the dispute in 
September 2002 among the different intelligence agencies when she 
stated in a television interview that the tubes ``are only really 
suited for nuclear weapons programs.''
  I have my own experience of being shown one of those tubes in a 
briefing conducted by Ms. Rice and CIA Director George Tenet in the 
White House situation room on December 23, 2002. We were told 
unequivocally that the tube was intended for Iraq's reconstituted 
nuclear weapons program. We were given no indication that there was 
another possible purpose for that tube. We were given no indication 
that there was serious disagreement among the nuclear experts in the 
Federal Government about the use of those tubes. We were not given all 
the facts. We were given one set of facts, the one that supported the 
position of the President and the Vice President and the one they 
wanted us to take when we voted on the administration's war resolution 
just a few days later.
  It turns out the information we were given was wrong. One and a half 
years of subsequent inspections by over 1,400 U.S. weapons inspectors 
has uncovered no evidence of a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program under Saddam Hussein. Some 1,300 of those tubes were found to 
be part of a short-range rocket program which did not represent a 
threat to our own national security.
  The nuclear threat of Iraq was President Bush and Vice President 
Cheney's trump card, and they played it to the hilt. They betrayed the 
trust of the Members of Congress to persuade us to vote for their war 
resolution. They withheld information we should have had rightfully as 
Members of this body before making that fateful decision.
  We have 138,000 American troops committing their lives, risking their 
lives, bleeding, fighting, some of them dying, on a daily basis, and we 
are now told that the administration has any other number of plausible 
explanations for why they conducted this operation. But the truth is 
that for many of us, the overwhelming argument being made back in the 
fall of 2002 when that war resolution was being debated was the 
supposed nuclear threat of Iraq. And for us to not have been told the 
truth and all the truth about the facts the administration had before 
it at the time to me is shameful, disgraceful, and a fundamental 
violation of the public trust.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, are we in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are not.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I rise to speak to an amendment that 
was accepted on Friday.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.
  The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Tennessee will yield 
for a moment to make a unanimous consent request to follow the Senator 
from Tennessee.
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, the Senator was not on the 
floor. I had the floor and yielded to the managers for the purpose of 
going into the cloakroom. So I think I have a right to be recognized 
when the managers seek recognition, at which time I want to go ahead 
with my amendments. May I inquire as to the amount of time my 
distinguished colleagues desire?
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I would like to have about 5 minutes, but it does not 
need to be now.
  Mr. WARNER. I am trying to be accommodating.
  Mr. DURBIN. Speaking through the Chair, I am happy to follow the 
Senator from Virginia if the Senator will give some indication of the 
time sequence. We can propound a unanimous consent request that I 
follow the Senator from Virginia after he has spoken, if he can give me 
some indication of how long he will speak.
  Mr. WARNER. If it is agreeable to the distinguished Senator, I will 
follow him and the Senator from Illinois can follow me.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator from Virginia give me a rough indication 
of how long he might speak?
  Mr. WARNER. I will not take an undue period. It is largely in the 
hands of the managers as to their desire to probe some of the aspects 
of the amendments. I hope it can be a reasonable period of time, and I 
hope we will not prolong the Senator's schedule.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent that I follow the Senator from 
Virginia, after he has spoken to his amendments, to speak in morning 
business.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague for his usual courtesy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Virginia, if 
his amendments are ready to be adopted, he can offer them.
  Mr. WARNER. No, they are not ready to be adopted.


                           Amendment No. 3807

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I rise to speak briefly to an amendment 
that was accepted on Friday. I thank the managers of the bill, the 
Senator from Maine and the Senator from Connecticut, for doing this and 
the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, for his work in making it 
possible.
  This has to do with the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that 
the Federal Government set standards for the security of personal 
identification documents such as drivers' licenses to prevent them from 
being counterfeited and used as identification for terrorists.
  As a former Governor, I have always been skeptical of Federal rules 
that require States to take action that cost States money. As someone 
who respects civil liberties, I have been reluctant to unnecessarily 
identify Americans. In fact, as Governor, I vetoed the bill requiring a 
picture on a driver's license three times because I thought it was an 
unnecessary imposition on civil liberties. But times have changed. I 
believe the Senator from Arizona and others did an excellent job of 
implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that drivers' 
licenses and other personal identification documents be upgraded so we 
can prevent terrorists from using them.
  My one concern and the concern that the Senator from Arizona 
recognized was that I do not want to see the Federal Government come up 
with this good idea, pass it into law, require the States to do it, and 
then send the bill to the States. We call that an unfunded Federal 
mandate, and most of us in this body have said we will not do that 
anymore.
  Senators McCain, Collins, and Lieberman have worked out an acceptable 
way, I believe, to deal with that problem. Basically, the amendment 
that was adopted on Friday will give the Secretary of Transportation 18 
months from the passage of the bill to work with State and local 
officials to come up with a set of minimum standards for driver's 
licenses. During that negotiation, States will include estimates of the 
cost of implementing the proposed standards.
  After this 18-month period, the rules will be made final. At that 
point, we will have before us the new requirements for States for these 
upgraded drivers' licenses and other personal identification documents 
as well as the costs that we are imposing on the States. At that time, 
it will be up to us, if we are true to our word about no more unfunded 
Federal mandates, to

[[Page 20517]]

appropriate the appropriate amount of money that it would take 
Tennessee, Montana, New York, and all the other States to pay for this 
new requirement that we have imposed on the States. That will be 
something we can debate and discuss at that time.
  The State governments will have 2 years from the issuance of the 
final regulation to implement these standards, but it is our 
responsibility then, if it is our good idea, if we impose it on the 
States, to pay for it. I, and I am sure many others in this body, will 
be here to argue strenuously that we do, and we should.
  This is an excellent amendment. I am glad it was accepted on Friday. 
I appreciate the work of the National Governors Association and the 
Senators who were involved. This will give the States the time and 
resources that States need to make the necessary changes to drivers' 
licenses and other personal identification documents.
  I call on my colleagues to keep this moment in mind because 18 months 
to 2 years from now the bill will come due and the bill should be paid 
by us, those who impose the rule, and not sent to State governments. 
Sending the States the bill would be an unfunded Federal mandate, which 
we have said we will not do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Presiding 
Officer.
  I wish to inquire of the manager, is this an appropriate time to move 
forward?
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest that the Senator from Virginia 
go ahead and present his amendments.


                 Amendments Nos. 3874 and 3875, en bloc

  Mr. WARNER. I send to the desk two amendments which I will address. 
They are companion amendments, but I felt it was necessary to do it in 
two different amendments. One is 3874 and one is 3875. Copies are at 
the desk, but for the convenience of the clerk I will send up 
additional copies.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3874

   (Purpose: To provide for the treatment of programs, projects, and 
activities within the Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical 
  Intelligence and Related Activities programs as of the date of the 
                         enactment of the Act)

       On page 211, after line 22, add the following:

     SEC. 337. RETENTION OF CURRENT PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, AND 
                   ACTIVITIES WITHIN JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
                   PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED 
                   ACTIVITIES PROGRAMS PENDING REVIEW.

       (a) Retention Within Current Programs.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, all programs, projects, and 
     activities contained within the Joint Military Intelligence 
     Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
     program as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain within such programs until a thorough review of such 
     programs is completed.
       (b) Removal From Current Programs.--A program, project, or 
     activity referred to in subsection (a) may be removed from 
     the Joint Military Intelligence Program or the Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities programs only if agreed 
     to by the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary of 
     Defense.


                           amendment no. 3875

 (Purpose: To clarify the definition of National Intelligence Program)

       On page 6, strike line 24 and all that follows through page 
     7, line 2, and insert the following:
       (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities of the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, including the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, the

  Mr. WARNER. I have heard reference made to the fact that this bill 
leaves intact the manner in which we deal with the TIARA programs and 
the JMIP; that is, the Joint Military Intelligence Program. I would 
like to read from page 412 of the 9/11 Commission. The Commission 
states as follows:

       The Defense Departments's military intelligence programs--
     the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the 
     tactical intelligence and related activities program 
     (TIARA)--would remain part of that department's 
     responsibility.

  My question to the distinguished managers, if they desire to reply, 
is, Is it their position--and I believe they have so stated, but I wish 
to give them this opportunity--that the recommendation of the 
Commission that they remain at the Department of Defense, is it the 
understanding of Senators in their bill that is now before the Senate 
that that comports with that objective?
  May I read it again?
  Ms. COLLINS. Yes, please do.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, I thank the Senator. Page 412 of the Commission 
report:

       The Defense Department's military intelligence program--the 
     joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the tactical 
     intelligence and related activities program (TIARA)--would 
     remain part of that department's responsibility.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I could respond through the Chair to 
the inquiry of the Senator from Virginia, the bill makes very clear 
that any intelligence assets that are principally for joint military 
operations or for tactical intelligence stay within the Department of 
Defense.
  Now, there may be national intelligence assets that are now included 
within the Joint Military Intelligence Program that could be 
transferred to the national intelligence program. The tactical assets 
are clearly just under the control of the Secretary of Defense, but 
some of the JMIP assets are national, so that is why the bill is worded 
as it is with the word ``principally.''
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
  I would like to now go to the bill and specifically draw the 
managers' attention to pages 6 and 7. The bill reads:

       The term ``National Intelligence Program''--

  And that is what the distinguished manager was addressing--

       (A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, 
     projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence 
     community; (ii) includes all programs, projects, and 
     activities (whether or not pertaining to national 
     intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the 
     Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
     the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
     Reconnaissance Office . . .

  Now, therein is the problem that the Senator from Virginia has. What 
is the meaning of ``whether or not pertaining to national 
intelligence''? Because the title says this is the definition of 
national intelligence. (A)(i) basically gives that, and then (ii) seems 
to extend the definition to include programs that are not now part of 
the national intelligence program; that is, ``whether or not 
pertaining.'' I find that of considerable concern.
  The purpose of the amendment is to clarify that form because having 
had considerable experience when I worked in the Department and the 
years that I have been privileged to be on the Armed Services 
Committee--and I have to be very careful as I speak because these are 
so highly classified, but I will just give generally a picture of my 
concern.
  Right now, the JMIP literally contracts extensively with the 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NGA, as it is referred to. For 
example, the Department of Defense puts in the JMIP budget, through the 
budgeting process, a block of money. It can then go and contract with 
these several what we call combat agencies, because they have all the 
assets--the technical people to do the work. So they sign the contract 
for a program and that program is absolutely essential to the 
functioning of, in many instances, the TIARA program, but in many 
instances the JMIP. And it is essential. The JMIP cannot function 
unless that particular program for which it has contracted with the NGA 
is fulfilled.
  As I read this amendment--let's call it program X--program X could be 
transferred under the language ``whether or not pertaining to National 
intelligence,'' and it goes into the NGA, and then, frankly, the NID 
might make a decision that, wait a minute, we have to get a very 
expensive overhead system and we have to go down into the various 
budgets of the different combat agencies and scrape up some money.
  So they come down and they say JMIP says they need the money, but I

[[Page 20518]]

think we have to prioritize. We are going to take the money and we are 
going to put it toward the overhead system and it will not be used--for 
example, this is one of the main functions of the National Geospatial 
Agency--to make maps. As a matter of fact, when I first came to the 
Senate it was the old mapping agency. Now it has been combined several 
times through a number of job descriptions.
  But that could be lost. Suddenly we are controverting the 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, that everything in the TIARA and 
the JMIP is going to be left untouched.
  That is the problem I see. I think we have to take a good look at 
this amendment because my amendment eliminates that language--that is 
one of the two amendments--it eliminates it in such a way that we 
redefine that paragraph 1. On page 6, the one I read from, strike so-
and-so and put this language in, that is:

       The term ``National Intelligence Program''--
       (ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities of the 
     National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the date of 
     enactment of this Act, including the Central Intelligence 
     Agency--

  And then it goes on to read:

     the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial. . . .

  All I have done is keep in place the recommendation of the 
Commission. The very words I have heard the distinguished managers say 
on the floor a number of times--and I have it back in the previous 
Records, in which she has represented to this body in the course of the 
four or five days we have been debating that we are not touching TIARA 
and we are not touching the JMIP.
  There is my problem. I believe this fixes it.


                           Amendment No. 3874

  The next amendment addresses what the distinguished managers said a 
few minutes ago. There could come a time where it is the judgment of 
the NID that some of these programs should no longer be under the 
jurisdiction of the JMIP, and therefore my other amendment kicks in. It 
reads as follows:

       Removal From Current Programs. A program, project, or 
     activity referred to in subsection (a) may be removed from 
     the Joint Military Intelligence Program or the Tactical 
     Intelligence and Related Activities programs only if agreed 
     to by the National Intelligence Director and the Secretary of 
     Defense.

  So the two of them could make adjustments in the future. But right 
now, we have a number of programs in JMIP which are being performed by 
the combat agencies and I think it would not be in our best interests 
to dislodge those programs now. In the future, if the two heads agree, 
this is the statutory authority to do it.
  I feel very strongly about these amendments. So much so I will ask 
for votes on them if we are not able to--I don't say that in the way of 
anything other than expressing my sincerity in these amendments, but I 
hope you could possibly accept them. If you cannot, I feel obligated to 
ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would point out that the amendment of 
the distinguished Senator would require that the Secretary of Defense 
agree to the movement of any asset from the JMIP or TIARA budget to the 
National Intelligence Program budget.
  I want to make sure my colleagues realize that the White House 
opposes giving the Secretary of Defense a veto over what can be moved 
from JMIP or TIARA to the new National Intelligence Program. I 
apologize for talking in acronyms in describing this.
  As you know, the tactical intelligence programs are the TIARA 
programs that are run by the various services within the Department of 
Defense. The JMIP is the Joint Military Intelligence Programs.
  I note we have tried to strike a delicate balance in this bill. We 
decided, and so I joined the Senator from Virginia, to defeat an 
amendment that would have moved the NSA, the NGA, the NRO out of the 
purview and daily supervision of the Secretary of Defense. We were 
cognizant that the NSA and the NGA provide direct support to the 
warfighter.
  The underlying legislation, however, does strike a delicate balance. 
We give the national intelligence director control over the budgets, 
the tasking of national assets, and certain personnel authorities, 
while leaving those agencies under the day-to-day supervision of the 
Secretary of Defense. I think that is the right balance.
  Keep in mind, when we talked to the head of the NSA, the three-star 
General who runs that agency, he told us that he has more contact with 
the CIA than he does the Secretary of Defense; that he is providing 
national intelligence everyday beyond the needs of the Pentagon. That 
is not in any way to lessen the important role he is providing to our 
warfighters, to the combat commanders, to the Secretary of Defense. But 
these are national assets. Indeed, while I can't disclose the amounts 
of the budgets or the exact percentages because they are classified, 
the majority of the budgets for these agencies are already in the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.
  I understand the point of the Senator from Virginia. As always, I am 
happy to try to work with him. I know Senator Levin has some amendments 
in this area that may bring further clarity. But I am concerned about 
the scope of his amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, replying to my distinguished colleague, 
let's use the example of maps. They are absolutely essential to the 
troops. They can't operate without maps.
  The only existing entity of the Federal Government that can make maps 
is the NGA. Right now, the JMIP, which is the Joint Military 
Intelligence Program, is acting on behalf of all the services--the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. They all desperately need 
maps. They have this contract which they pay for out of this budget to 
have the maps made. But the way your bill is drawn, it seems to me that 
they could stop making the maps for the military because they think 
that the dollars are better needed for overhead systems. There sits the 
Secretary almost powerless unless he runs right up to the President and 
says: Wait a minute. And you can't have him going to the President on 
all of the dozens of contracts that the JMIP has with the various 
contract agencies.
  I ask a question. The 9/11 Commission explicitly said don't do this. 
I thought I understood the manager to say: Well, we are not doing it. I 
have about four or five references where on the floor the manager said 
we are not touching TIARA or JMIP; those programs remain under the 
budget of the Secretary of Defense.
  With no intention to do other than what is right, we have a vague 
situation that we cannot let remain and jeopardize the maps. It is the 
clearest thing I know that is understandable by everybody in this 
Chamber--the need for those maps for our soldiers, our naval personnel 
on the high seas, those flying the aircraft. You cannot limit the 
ability of the Secretary of Defense to adequately provide those maps.
  I say to my distinguished colleague, my colleague has a statute which 
puts in question the ability to control the very thing my colleague 
said time and time again she was not going to touch.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first let me clarify that we did what the 
9/11 Commission recommended with regard to these agencies. We did not 
sever their connection to the Secretary of Defense. The Senator from 
Virginia is well aware of that. He is well aware that I opposed 
attempts to sever the connection with the Secretary of Defense. The 
Senator from Virginia is well aware that the Secretary of Defense would 
continue to have day-to-day line authority supervision over these 
agencies.
  The second point I make is there is nothing in this bill that would 
in any way hinder the ability of the NGA to provide much needed maps 
for our troops. That is just not going to happen. The satellites that 
are used to produce these maps for the military are also used for 
surveillance of international terrorism or compliance with 
proliferation treaties. They are used to

[[Page 20519]]

look at camps in Afghanistan. These are national assets that are used 
by multiple agencies, and the bill reflects that.
  That is why the majority of the budgets for these agencies are 
already part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program--what we 
would rename as the National Intelligence Program. The majority of the 
budget finances are already part of not JMIP, not TIARA, but what is 
known as NFIP. That would not in any way hinder the ability of these 
agencies to meet their obligations to the Department of Defense and to 
our warfighters.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in response to my colleague, I am not 
touching the satellites. I agree. Everything she said is absolutely 
correct. We are not touching the satellites. But we are concerned about 
things such as the mundane maps which are about 80 percent used by the 
tactical forces, maybe 20 percent distributed elsewhere in the 
Government for other purposes. But that is the heart and soul of 
tactical intelligence. It is desperately needed. You simply have to let 
those moneys that the Secretary of Defense allocates by contract to the 
NGA to do the maps be untouched. They cannot be seized in a sweep-up or 
a reprioritization.
  We just had an amendment which was rejected about the reprogramming 
authority. You have extensive reprogramming authority. But time and 
time again, I have heard the Senator from Connecticut say we are not 
going to touch TIARA, we are not going to touch the JMIP. Yet, if I 
could draw the attention of my colleague from Connecticut to page 6 of 
the bill, the language is very clear. It says:

       The term ``national intelligence program'' includes all 
     programs, projects and activities whether or not pertaining 
     to national intelligence.

  So you are going beyond national intelligence. You are grabbing the 
responsibilities of the TIARA Program and the JMIP. There is the 
language.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, responding to my friend from Virginia, 
the intention here is to give the national intelligence director 
budgetary authority over the national intelligence programs. That would 
not include TIARA. It might include, as has been illuminated in a 
colloquy between the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Maine, 
some programs that are currently in JMIP, the Joint Military 
Intelligence Program.
  For the sake of reasonable organization, we wanted to take the full 
budgets of those national intelligence agencies--NSA, National 
Geospatial, and NRO. But what I want to say is that there is some 
indication that, for instance, a substantial percentage of one of those 
agency budgets is currently in JMIP. We expect that they will continue 
to work for the military and its joint programs. But for the sake of 
decent organization and clear lines of authority, the judgment made by 
our committee was to say that all of the budgets of those three 
national intelligence agencies within the national intelligence program 
will go on budget under the national intelligence director and to leave 
it. There is going to be some overlap on what is now JMIP. The bill 
encourages the Secretary of Defense and the national intelligence 
director to work out those areas of overlap.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. He precisely came to 
my point.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. That was not my intention.
  Mr. WARNER. Roughly about 30 percent of the NGA budget is derivative 
of the JMIP budget. One of the pending amendments of the Senator has 
this provision in it. He said the programs may be moved. My language 
does that. It says: A program, project, or activity referred to in 
subsection (a) may be removed from the JMIP or the tactical 
intelligence but only if agreed to by the national intelligence 
director and the Secretary of Defense.
  So they have the concurrence of the two principals, and then move it 
but leave in place now those programs such that the budgets remain 
until they make a joint decision to move them.
  I used the example of maps. You cannot cut off the flow of maps back 
to the troops, the sailors, and the airmen. Yet those maps are made by 
the NGA.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is right. He is correct, obviously. It is 
clearly not the intention of the bill to do that. The fact is the work 
of the National Geospatial Agency which we are describing here that 
produces image intelligence which is so critical to the military is 
also, as the Senator knows, increasingly critical to the Department of 
Homeland Security, even the Department of State.
  Mr. WARNER. I concur.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is why we want to put the budget of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in the national intelligence program. 
These are national intelligence assets.
  Clearly, the call of the military for the services of those assets 
will be a priority of the agency wherever that budget authority is.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for that reassurance. 
But the language now transfers that program, if we look at the 
parenthetical on page 6, and includes all programs, projects, and 
activities, whether pertaining to national intelligence or not, which 
means you grabbed it all and moved it.
  That may be to the advantage of our national intelligence system, our 
tactical system, some date in the future, but do not do it now until we 
have had some measure of experience.
  The Senator from Virginia has provided for the removal of those 
programs with the concurrence of the two principals. You cannot take 
away from the Secretary of Defense. He is, under title 10, required to 
provide for the men and women of the Armed Forces their basic needs. 
Nothing is more basic than the simple maps, and 80 percent of that cost 
of producing those maps comes out of JMIP.
  I plead with the Senator, leave it for the moment. As we go through 
the progression and implementation of this, it seems to me the NID and 
Department of Defense can work it out if for some reason there is 
concurrence of viewpoints. This is crippling the Secretary of Defense 
in fulfilling his missions under title 10 where he is required by law, 
enacted by this Senate over a period of many years, to keep those 
troops supplied with what they need.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, of course, we do not intend nor do I 
think we do in any sense cripple the Secretary of Defense. We make a 
judgment that some of these programs are national intelligence 
programs. They ought to be in the budget control of the national 
intelligence director. We enumerate which programs--TIARA, the so-
called tactical military programs--off the table. That is with the 
Secretary of Defense. That provides intelligence to single services or 
some of the joint programs.
  This is a difference of opinion. It is true that because we want to 
give some credibility to this national intelligence director with these 
national assets as he serves the entire community, including, most of 
all, the President of the United States, we are recommending those 
budgets of those three agencies go to the national intelligence 
director. Then the negotiation begins with the Secretary of Defense. 
That is a change.
  I assure the Senator there is no intention in any way to contravene 
or to diminish the capacity of the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his 
title 10 statutory requirements. He will work it out with the national 
intelligence director.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I understood my colleague, all the 
TIARA and JMIP budgets are off the table. Did the Senator just say 
that?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Not quite.
  Mr. WARNER. It is the ``not quite.''
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. If I confused the Senator, I apologize.
  Mr. WARNER. You did not confuse this old fox; he is listening. But 
the others may not be able to follow these nuances.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The TIARA budget is totally within the control of the 
Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. WARNER. Splendid. Leave it there.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. With the Joint Military Intelligence Program, it is 
not so clear. That is where there will

[[Page 20520]]

be, if it is part of a national intelligence program, the budget 
authority will be with the national intelligence director. But the No. 
1 customer is going to be the Department of Defense.
  We are talking almost as if these are people in different 
governments. They are going to work this out as they do every day.
  I will read testimony from General Hayden, the head of the National 
Security Agency, before the House, August 18. He says:

       An empowered national intelligence director with direct 
     authority over the national intelligence agencies should not 
     be viewed as diminishing our ability or willingness to 
     fulfill our responsibilities as a combat support agency.

  General Hayden is a very respected head of one of those agencies--
speaking, in fact, for all of them later on--saying to have a national 
intelligence director with budget authority is not going to diminish 
our ability or commitment to the combat support agencies.
  Then he goes on to talk about how he has forward deployed hundreds of 
people with our U.S. military command, and there is no way that the 
creation of a national intelligence director, he says, will alter that 
commitment to the military.
  We are trying to create some budgetary clear lines to the national 
intelligence director, not contravening the title 10 responsibilities 
of the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, would the Senator look at page 412 of the 
9/11 Report, please.
  Let me read it:

       The Defense Department's military intelligence programs--
     the joint military intelligence program (JMIP) and the 
     tactical and related activities program (TIARA)--would remain 
     part of that department's responsibility.

  In testimony before your committee, the 9/11 Commissioners have 
repeatedly stated that some portions, as the Senator said, of JMIP, 
might ultimately need to be moved to the national intelligence program 
but only after a thorough review.
  The humble Senator from Virginia is just trying to keep the programs 
in place until as that wise old Commission said, ``ultimately'' you may 
review them and consider moving them.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I respond to my friend who may be humble but is a very 
distinguished, nonetheless, expert on these matters, and I appreciate 
the Senator is so informed about the contents of the Commission report.
  Interestingly, we communicated with the 9/11 Commission about this 
particular part of our bill, and they changed their position. Their 
position developed. I represent that as my best understanding, but I 
urge the Senator overnight to check with the staff and members of the 
Commission. I represent that they support our proposal for budgetary 
authority for the national intelligence director as contained in the 
bill Senator Collins and I have put before the Senate that the 
Senator's amendment would alter.
  Mr. WARNER. I bring to the attention of the managers something they 
are already aware of, but I think it is important it be incorporated in 
the debate. I draw the Senators' attention to the September 28, 2004, 
Statement of Administration Policy, which is in the Record in many 
places, the guidance that was sent to you and your distinguished 
colleague, the chairman, Senator Collins. It says in the fourth 
paragraph:

       The administration opposes the Committee's attempt to 
     define in statute the programs that should be included in the 
     National Intelligence Program; the Administration believes 
     that further review is required. The Administration also 
     believes that the Committee's bill provisions relating to the 
     NID's role in the acquisition in major systems needs further 
     study.

  There is a clear statement of policy by the White House on the 
precise point that is in these two amendments.
  I say to my colleague, if the Senator has a reply to this, I am happy 
to hear it; otherwise, I ask for the yeas and nays and then I will 
fight on.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, indeed. I respectfully disagree. I will share 
something because we have been talking about the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
  GEN James Clapper spoke before us and gave some very strong views 
that support to military programs would not be compromised in any way 
by creation of a strong national intelligence director with budget and 
other authorities over his agency.
  So this is a gentleman, a very distinguished general, who is in 
charge of the exact agency we are talking about, who said to us 
directly that he was confident the support of his agency to the 
military would not be compromised in any way by a national intelligence 
director with budget authority over his agency.
  It was quite interesting. He described in some detail, as the Senator 
has spoken to, the direct support the National Geospatial Agency is 
giving to military operations in the nine combatant commands and 
increasingly to levels far below the traditional boundaries of those 
commands to their subordinate units.
  In fact, as he said, national agencies--this where it is hard to draw 
real hard lines--national agencies are more and more providing what 
might on another occasion be called tactical support. When our 
warfighters need imagery support, General Clapper said they get it from 
the NGA employees who are often right out there with them on the ground 
alongside their commanders. What struck me is he said to us that is the 
way things work now in the real world, and that nothing in the 
legislation we have put before the Senate, Senator Collins and I, would 
change that. I think that is a very strong statement from the head of 
the agency that I know the Senator is concerned about.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might reply, I was privileged to know 
General Clapper very well. I think you will find he was not with the 
NGA, but he was Director of the DIA, when he used to come before the 
Armed Services Committee. He is with the NGA now.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. He is now.
  Mr. WARNER. I just point out to you, I will have to go back and look 
at his testimony, but I know he fully understands the need to keep 
intact the Secretary of Defense's absolute authority to control those 
matters which are essential to the fulfillment of his title 10 
responsibilities.
  I say to you most respectfully, this, in my judgment, is sufficiently 
vague as to put that in jeopardy. But I have taken generously of the 
time of the managers, so at this time I ask for the yeas and nays on 
both amendments that are pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection to it being in order to 
order the yeas and nays with one show of hands?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will do it singularly if there is a 
technical problem. Why don't I do it singularly. First I ask for the 
yeas and nays on amendment No. 3875.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right to seek the yeas and 
nays on amendment No. 3874, which is the currently pending amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. I ask for the yeas and 
nays on amendment No. 3874.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
amendment be laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3875 and ask for 
the yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer and thank the managers of 
the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the managers 
will allow the setting aside of the pending amendments and allow me to 
call up three amendments that are at the desk that Senator Leahy has 
asked me to offer on his behalf.
  Ms. COLLINS. Reserving the right to object, I am unaware of what 
these

[[Page 20521]]

three amendments are. We have a lot of requests for other amendments to 
be brought up. I wonder if the Senator would withhold so that I could 
talk with him about what the three amendments are. Senator Durbin was 
actually next in line.
  Mr. REID. Well, that is fine. But I thought we were going to allow 
amendments to be offered. If we are going to pick and choose what 
amendments are going to be offered, I will object to all of them, 
because Senator Leahy has the right to offer his amendments if anybody 
else does. I will be happy to withhold for a short time. I withdraw my 
request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, it is my understanding I have a unanimous 
consent agreement to speak next as in morning business, but since the 
chairman of this committee and ranking member have been on the floor 
all day on this bill, I would withhold my opportunity to speak if they 
have any pending business on this bill that they want to take care of 
at this point.
  I say to the Senators, I know you want to stay for my speech, but I 
am sure you would like to take care of the bill before us and pending 
amendments, and I do not want to stand in your way.
  So at this point, Mr. President, if I can speak through you and ask 
the chairman of the committee if she has any pending business at this 
point related directly to the bill. If the Senator from Maine could 
inform me.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I do not yet know the answer to the 
question raised by the Senator from Illinois. It is very thoughtful of 
him. I offer to withhold. I was going to debate a little bit further 
with Senator Warner, but perhaps we have covered that to death and 
should wait until tomorrow to conclude our comments.
  I ask through the Chair, could the Senator tell me how long he wishes 
to speak?
  Mr. DURBIN. In the neighborhood of 15 to 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, during the time in the quorum, we have been 
able to speak with the managers of the bill. I now ask unanimous 
consent that the pending amendments be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


              Amendments Nos. 3913, 3915, and 3916 En Bloc

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I call up en bloc amendments Nos. 3913, 
3915, and 3916 on behalf of Senator Leahy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments are considered pending.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3913

         (Purpose: To address enforcement of certain subpoenas)

       On page 159, strike lines 19 through 25 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(2) Enforcement of subpoena.--In the case of contumacy or 
     failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(D), 
     either the Board or the Attorney General of the United States 
     may seek an order to require such person to produce the 
     evidence required by such subpoena from the United States 
     district court for the judicial district in which the 
     subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found.''.


                           amendment no. 3915

    (Purpose: To establish criteria for placing individuals on the 
 consolidated screening watch list of the Terrorist Screening Center, 
                        and for other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER.

       (a) Criteria for Watch List.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall report to Congress the criteria for placing 
     individuals on the Terrorist Screening Center consolidated 
     screening watch list, including minimum standards for 
     reliability and accuracy of identifying information, the 
     certainty and level of threat that the individual poses, and 
     the consequences that apply to the person if located. To the 
     greatest extent consistent with the protection of classified 
     information and applicable law, the report shall be in 
     unclassified form and available to the public, with a 
     classified annex where necessary.
       (b) Safeguards Against Erroneous Listings.--The Secretary 
     of Homeland Security shall establish a process for 
     individuals to challenge ``Automatic Selectee'' or ``No Fly'' 
     designations on the consolidated screening watch list and 
     have their names removed from such lists, if erroneously 
     present.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board shall submit a report assessing the impact of 
     the ``No Fly'' and ``Automatic Selectee'' lists on privacy 
     and civil liberties to the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
     Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on 
     Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Government 
     Reform, and the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure of the House of Representatives. The report 
     shall include any recommendations for practices, procedures, 
     regulations, or legislation to eliminate or minimize adverse 
     effects of such lists on privacy, discrimination, due process 
     and other civil liberties, as well as the implications of 
     applying those lists to other modes of transportation. The 
     Comptroller General of the United States shall cooperate with 
     the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board in the preparation of 
     the report. To the greatest extent consistent with the 
     protection of classified information and applicable law, the 
     report shall be in unclassified form and available to the 
     public, with a classified annex where necessary.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341 or any 
     other provision of this Act, this section shall become 
     effective on the date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3916

  (Purpose: To strengthen civil liberties protections, and for other 
                               purposes)

       On page 132, line 23, strike ``and''.
       On page 133, line 3, strike the period and insert ``; 
     and''.
       On page 133, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
       (L) utilizing privacy-enhancing technologies that minimize 
     the dissemination and disclosure of personally identifiable 
     information.
       On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
       (o) Limitation on Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this section, none of the funds provided 
     pursuant to subsection (n) may be obligated for deployment or 
     implementation of the Network under subsection (f) unless--
       (1) the guidelines and requirements under subsection (e) 
     are submitted to Congress; and
       (2) the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board submits 
     to Congress an assessment of whether those guidelines and 
     requirements incorporate the necessary architectural, 
     operational, technological, and procedural safeguards to 
     protect privacy and civil liberties.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, it is my understanding that, pursuant to 
the unanimous consent agreement, I am to be recognized to speak in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.


                              War in Iraq

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I understand that an article printed in 
the New York Times yesterday, October 3, relative to the war in Iraq 
and the intelligence leading up to it, was printed in the Record 
earlier today in Senator Byrd's remarks.
  Mr. President, it was about 2 years ago that we faced a critical 
decision on the floor of the Senate. It was a vote that most Members of 
the Senate, certainly Members of the House, will never forget. It is 
rare in your legislative career that you are asked to vote to go to 
war, and that is exactly what occurred in this Chamber in October of 
2002. It has happened two or three times in my congressional career.
  Each time it has been a matter of grave concern. Each Member of the 
Senate and the House want to make certain that they use their best 
judgment, that they get it right. Because if we embark on a war, it 
goes without saying that some of the bravest and best Americans we 
serve are going to risk their lives and some will lose their lives. 
That was what faced us in October of 2002.
  The final vote was 77 Members in favor of the use of force resolution 
to go to war in Iraq and 23 in opposition. Of the 23 Senators voting in 
opposition--1 Republican, Senator Chafee of Rhode Island--22 were 
Democrats. I was included in that number of 22 Democrats.

[[Page 20522]]

  I remember the vote. It was late at night. When we finally adjourned 
and left, each of us felt a heavy weight on our shoulders. We knew that 
decision in this room by 100 Americans would lead to a war and others 
would die, many others would be injured as a result. Each Member of the 
Senate, I am certain, tried to make the right choice and the right 
decision based on the information they had and their conscience.
  Now today, some 2 years later, we step back from that moment and 
reflect on it, because it was a critical moment in the history of our 
democracy.
  When we vote to go to war, a war in this case which President Bush 
asked us to support, we have to do it based on facts and evidence given 
to us. It is rare that any one of us has any personal knowledge of the 
circumstances that lead up to the possibility of war. We rely on people 
who serve our Government--our military leaders, our intelligence 
experts, people in the field of diplomacy. We ask them to give us 
information so we can make the right decision, and that is the position 
we found ourselves in in October of 2002.
  Today we reflect on the information given to the Congress and the 
American people before this historic and momentous decision to go to 
war in Iraq. As we view this information, we cannot help but believe 
that we were deceived. We were misled. We were given the wrong 
information before that invasion. Many of the things said to us on the 
floor of the Senate, much of the information given to us by the 
administration that led to that decision to go to war in Iraq today, 2 
years later, we know was wrong. It was just wrong.
  Think back about that debate and what led up to it. In the few short 
weeks when it became abundantly clear that we would face that decision, 
we had heard about Iraq for years. We remembered their invasion of 
Kuwait, the Persian Gulf War where, under General Schwarzkopf, our Army 
liberated the people of Kuwait, driving the Iraqis back into their 
homeland.
  We knew who Saddam Hussein was. We knew the kind of thug, brutal 
dictator that he had been in his own country. We remembered that 
wasting war that he had with Iran where thousands of innocent people 
were killed. We knew exactly what we were dealing with in Saddam 
Hussein. He was not a new character for me in my congressional career, 
nor for most Americans.
  But prior to the invasion of Iraq we were told that it had more to do 
with other issues. It wasn't just the fact that he was an evil 
dictator; it was the fact that he was a threat to the people of his own 
nation, to the region, and to the United States. That is what we heard 
from the Bush administration in support of the invasion of Iraq.
  You will remember the debate very well. How often we heard from the 
President and others that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass 
destruction that would be used to harm America, that he had unmanned 
aerial vehicles which he could launch against other nations in the 
Middle East, against Israel, even against the United States.
  We were told that he was somehow linked with al-Qaida and Osama bin 
Laden, the perpetrators of the disgraceful and barbaric acts of 
September 11, 2001. Those were the facts given to us.
  We know in those cases and in so many others that those facts were 
wrong--just plain wrong. The American people were misled. They were 
told there was a threat against this country that did not exist. The 
question which faces us today and one which goes to the heart of our 
democracy is whether the people who made those statements knew they 
were misleading the American people.
  That is a very serious charge. It may be the most serious charge in a 
democracy--that any leader in Congress or in the executive branch of 
the Government deliberately misled the American people into believing 
there was a threat, into believing that a war was necessary, and into 
making a decision that was based on wrong information. That debate has 
raged ever since.
  When we invaded Iraq and found no weapons of mass destruction, when 
we found no evidence of these chemical and biological stockpiles, these 
arsenals of weapons, poised and ready to strike us, the American people 
and many Members of Congress had to stop and think: if that key element 
in the war against Iraq was wrong, if we were misled about that fact, 
what other facts were we misled about?
  This New York Times article, which has been put into the Record for 
all to read, addresses one particular element. Most everyone who 
remembers that debate--I remember so many parts of it--will recall how 
much time we spent asking ourselves whether Iraq was in a position 
where it had nuclear weapons or the capacity to build them. Time and 
again, this debate focused on one piece of tangible evidence: aluminum 
tubes, aluminum tubes which might or could have been used in the 
production of nuclear weapons.
  You will remember the references to them. They were made by virtually 
every member of the Bush administration--the President, the Vice 
President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Each one of them made some 
reference to these aluminum tubes and the fact that they were proof-
positive evidence of the nuclear weapons that could threaten us from 
Iraq. This New York Times piece has taken the time to go through the 
history of these aluminum tubes. What they have found is indeed 
troubling. What they found is abundantly clear, that the administration 
deliberately disregarded the facts and findings of the Department of 
Energy and other key intelligence agencies and, as a result, misled the 
American people about Iraq's nuclear program--the single most important 
justification for the war.
  Now, a President--any President--must always take whatever actions 
are necessary to protect America. But the true test of leadership is 
telling the truth to the American people about the world, tell them of 
our threats based on reality, based on truth, based on facts. That is 
the hard work of the Presidency.
  In this case, the President did not do that. In his State of the 
Union Address, and in many other statements, we were told things that 
were, frankly, not true. Even today, after we have investigated Iraq, 
after we have sent thousands of inspectors to look for the evidence 
that we were told would be there, after we have come up empty-handed 
for a year and a half, even today, when National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice was asked on public television whether she would 
concede that the statements of the administration misled the American 
public, she would not do so.
  I say this: If Dr. Condoleezza Rice knows of any credible evidence to 
support the argument that Iraq was using those aluminum tubes to build 
nuclear weapons, she owes it to the American people and to her 
President to step forward and say so. The New York Times, in its 
lengthy investigation, produced evidence to the contrary. Yet Dr. Rice 
refuses to even acknowledge it.
  We should never give any country veto power over America's security. 
But we have to be honest with the American people about what we need to 
be safe. This New York Times article details how the administration 
spoke with such great certainty to the American people about Saddam's 
nuclear program, at a time when they knew privately that the evidence 
was highly questionable. In fact, this article shows that top members 
of the administration repeatedly made statements that any fair analysis 
of the facts on our intelligence would have informed them were wrong.
  Specifically, in September of 2002, before the vote to go to war, 
Vice President Cheney said the United States had ``irrefutable 
evidence'' of Iraq's nuclear program, based on Iraq's possession of 
thousands of tubes made of high-strength aluminum. In September 2002--
the same month--Condoleezza Rice said: ``We do know that he [Saddam 
Hussein] is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon.'' She went on to say 
that it was based on the aluminum tubes that were ``only suited for a 
nuclear weapons program.'' She said, ``We don't want the smoking gun to 
be a mushroom cloud.''

[[Page 20523]]

  Can you think of a more provocative statement from the National 
Security Adviser to the President about the threat of Iraq to the 
United States, that we might face a mushroom cloud; that we, in fact, 
would be the victims of a nuclear attack because Saddam Hussein had 
these weapons? Those were the words of Dr. Rice. Those were words that 
we know now were not backed up with facts and evidence.
  In October 2002, President Bush said in Cincinnati:

       Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes 
     and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, used to 
     enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

  In fact, by the time the President made that statement, this 
administration was clearly divided from within as to whether that 
statement was true. I know because I sit on the Intelligence Committee. 
I know because I sat through days of hearings, where representatives of 
the Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency clearly 
disagreed about whether those tubes were proof positive of Saddam 
Hussein's nuclear weaponry program.
  Let's concede the obvious. There was a time when Saddam Hussein was 
building nuclear weapons back in the early 1990s. We were right to be 
vigilant and to find out whether he had renewed that program and it was 
a threat to the region and the United States. The only thing we could 
find was some evidence that Iraq had purchased these aluminum tubes 
from Hong Kong. And then we were fortunate to be able to intercept a 
shipment of these tubes in Jordan and to take a close look at them.
  There was a fellow in the Central Intelligence Agency, working for 
that agency, an analyst, who was building the case that these tubes 
were proof positive that Saddam Hussein was back in the business of 
nuclear weapons.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee that I serve on took a look at his 
analysis. Their conclusion was troubling because they concluded that 
his facts were wrong, his conclusions were wrong; that he was involved 
in group-think, in their words, and a holy war within this 
administration to prove that these tubes were related to nuclear 
weapons.
  They wanted to prove--the CIA did--through this analyst that these 
tubes were part of a secret high-risk venture to build a nuclear bomb. 
But they kept running into a problem: Within the same Bush 
administration, the Department of Energy disputed their conclusions. I 
heard those arguments, most of America did not. One of the reasons I 
voted against the use of force resolution was, in my mind, it clearly 
was not established that Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons which he 
would use against the United States.
  In June 2001, we seized a shipment of these aluminum tubes. We sent 
our very best expert to investigate whether they could be used for 
nuclear weapons, and those who looked at them came back and said, 
first, in size and materials--this is August of 2001--the tubes were 
very different from those Iraq had used in centrifuge prototypes 
before. In fact, the team could find no centrifuge machines deployed in 
a functioning environment that used such narrow tubes. They believed 
that the conclusion was unlikely that these tubes were going to be 
used.
  In the months after September 11, 2001, the Bush administration 
devised a strategy to fight al-Qaida. Vice President Cheney became 
deeply involved in reviewing the intelligence evidence. He became a 
self-appointed examiner of the worst case scenarios involving Iraq. He 
had the background. He had been Chief of Staff of President Ford and 
Secretary of Defense for first President Bush. He knew all the 
intelligence agencies and what they did.
  So he was not simply passing when it came to this whole question. He 
read of an allegation that Iraq was importing yellow cake uranium 
concentrate from Niger in Africa. He went on to conclude in a statement 
made on CNN that based on what he had read, Vice President Cheney said 
Saddam Hussein is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time. But, 
in fact, there was a debate raging within this administration as to 
whether that was true.
  Over and over the reports from the CIA were disputed by other 
agencies. The tubes just did not have the necessary thickness to be 
part of a nuclear weapons program. So we find ourselves in a situation 
where statements were being made by the Vice President and by others 
which could not be verified based on the facts within the same 
administration.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee issued a 511-page report on this 
effort, and they concluded that the CIA analyst involved was so 
determined to prove his theory on this aluminum tube that he twisted 
test results, ignored factual discrepancies, and ignored dissenting 
views.
  We know how this ended. It ended with the American people and many 
Members of Congress convinced that these aluminum tubes were being used 
for nuclear weapons. For some Members of the Senate, there was no 
choice; they had to use this evidence to build a case to go to war in 
Iraq. Statements were made by Vice President Cheney on August 26, 2002, 
at the VFW convention in Nashville. Despite the dispute going on within 
his own administration, the Vice President said:

       The case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of our country, 
     requires candid appraisal of the facts.

  Mr. Cheney went on to say:

       We now know--

  And this is August of 2002--

       We now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire 
     nuclear weapons.

  On the thinnest evidence, on the disputed aluminum tubes, Vice 
President Cheney made the strongest possible case he could make that 
the nuclear weapons program in Iraq was underway. He conjured these 
images of an Iraq of nuclear weapons and the threat they posed to the 
world while members of his own administration disputed his conclusions.
  Again, President Bush, Mr. Tenet, and others made these cases over 
and over again about the aluminum tubes. Mr. Cheney went on ``Meet the 
Press'' on September 8, 2002, and confirmed when asked that the tubes 
were the most alarming evidence behind the administration's view that 
Iraq had resumed its nuclear weapons programs. He said the tubes had 
``raised our level of concern.''
  The same day, Dr. Rice went on CNN and said that the aluminum tubes 
``are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs.'' She made that 
statement at a time when the President's own Department of Energy had 
reached an opposite conclusion. She said these tubes ``are only really 
suited for nuclear weapons programs'' when, in fact, that was not the 
case.
  What we have learned here in the course of this investigation, what 
we have learned from all of the investigations that followed after our 
invasion of Iraq, what we have learned now that the 9/11 Commission, 
the bipartisan Commission, has had a chance to look closely at the 
evidence is that in this case and in so many others, we were misled. 
The American people were given wrong information and bad information 
about the situation in Iraq. It was not just flawed intelligence; it 
was not just a failure of the intelligence agencies; it was a failure 
of the leaders in the Bush administration to honestly portray the 
facts, to tell the American people that there was suspicion of a 
nuclear weapons program but an honest dispute as to whether it existed. 
Why didn't they portray it that way? Because we would never have gone 
to war if they had told us that fact, if they had given us the evidence 
straight, if they had told us about disputes within this administration 
which were unresolved.
  There was a debate last Thursday night between the two leading 
candidates, the President and Senator Kerry, about foreign policy and 
about Iraq. Time and again, President Bush said that his was a 
difficult job, and I do not dispute that for a moment. He talked about 
all the hard work that was necessary to protect America, and I do not 
doubt there is hard work. But I will tell you this: part of that hard 
work has to include taking an honest look at the evidence given to you 
as the Commander in Chief, being willing to say that if there is a 
dispute about evidence so basic as these aluminum tubes and the nuclear 
weapon program

[[Page 20524]]

of Iraq, that no President should step forward and mislead the American 
people.
  That dispute was ongoing within the Bush administration, and yet 
clear statements were made by the President, the Vice President, and 
leading members of the Cabinet that a nuclear weapons program existed 
when, in fact, it did not.
  I hope my colleagues and others will review this evidence, understand 
the challenges we face, and I hope they will also come to the same 
conclusion that I have, and that is that whatever we face in terms of 
threats in the future, whoever that President might be, I am certain he 
will be committed to the security of America, but he also must be 
committed to the values of America--the values of honesty, openness, 
and candor, even when the facts do not support original conclusions.
  In some cases, Senator Kerry has been criticized because he changed 
his position. In this case, the Bush administration took a position on 
nuclear weapons in Iraq that was wrong, that history and the evidence 
has proven was wrong. They refused to acknowledge the facts and 
evidence that came out to dispute it. They stuck with their story even 
when it was wrong, and now today we have serious questions as to the 
reasoning and the case made before our invasion of Iraq.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor in morning business. I would like to 
ask the Presiding Officer--I do not see either the chairman of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee or the ranking member in the Chamber. I 
have a pending amendment to the bill. I am not going to even suggest to 
offer it since the chairman is not on the Senate floor, but I will at 
some later time.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois is very 
eloquent in the position he takes, and he argues pretty aggressively in 
this political season one point of view on the question of nuclear 
weaponry and how the Senate was briefed.
  He said one thing that is true. I was not a member of the 
Intelligence Committee, but as a Senator, we received repeated 
briefings on the weapons of mass destruction issue, and in the 
briefings we received, all Members of the Senate, and that includes the 
Democratic nominee for the Presidency, a Member of this body, Senator 
Kerry, the issue of what those tubes were for was discussed and both 
sides of it were presented. It was left to the Senators, I guess, to 
decide how they would call the question.
  I felt as if the weight of the evidence indicated to me that Saddam 
Hussein was doing what he had done before, that this was just one of 
the weapons of mass destruction he was desirous of having, he was 
desirous of possessing and that he wanted to use to threaten his 
neighbors, his own people, and to improve his threat standing in the 
neighborhood in which his country existed. In other words, he was 
clearly desirous of that, else why would he not agree to a full 
inspection to prove what he did with the remains of his nuclear program 
that we know he had previously? Else why would he not show what he had 
done with the chemical weapons we know he used against his own people? 
And we all heard those briefings.
  I know the Presiding Officer was there in those briefings. We heard 
them, and we knew the issues involved. We debated it on the floor of 
this Senate for months and months and we discussed all those issues and 
we had to make a decision about whether or not to allow Saddam Hussein 
to remain in violation of 16 U.N. resolutions.
  We said we could not continue in this way. They fired at airplanes on 
a regular basis as they enforced the U.N. no-fly zone over Iraq, and we 
voted on it.
  After having all of those issues discussed, after having received the 
intelligence with both sides of this question discussed before the 
Senators, Senator Kerry, as referred to by the Senator from Illinois--
he referred to him in his campaign--voted to allow the President to 
make one final effort with Saddam Hussein and authorized him to 
commence hostilities if that did not succeed.
  Those last discussions did not succeed and we made one more effort. 
They did not succeed and we went to war as every Member of this body 
knew when we cast that vote. This body was not misled and Senator 
Durbin was not misled because he heard the same briefings as he has 
told us, and neither was Senator Kerry when he cast his vote in favor 
of allowing this war to proceed.
  I think it is critical for leadership in America that if an American 
makes a commitment and a decision on an issue as important as that to 
keep the commitment and not flip-flop on it next week, not change their 
mind next week and go back and try to find some excuse to blame the 
President who is leading troops in the field and make complaints on the 
floor of this Senate and in press conferences, statements which make it 
more difficult for us to be successful.
  We know what the challenge is, and we as a nation have made a 
commitment. This Senate, by a three-fourths plus vote, voted to allow 
this war to begin. We knew it was going to happen if Saddam Hussein did 
not back down and admit what he was doing and allow inspectors to come 
in and demonstrate clearly that he did not have these weapons of mass 
destruction. We received intensive briefings on that subject. We cast 
our votes and God gave us the ability to make a clear decision. We 
ought to stand by that decision, and we are going to stand by it.
  There are some who want to cut and run, bob and weave, flip and flop, 
but the American people will not and this Senate is not. We are going 
to stand firm and we are going to be successful in Iraq because it is 
the right thing to do.
  Those people have suffered greatly but progress has been made and 
will continue to be made. We are going to train the military, get them 
up to speed, and get them equipped. As we have seen in Samara when that 
happens and they work with the American military, progress, success can 
and will occur. This is a longrun solution.
  We have had so much success in Afghanistan where it is so wonderful 
to see over 10 million people registered to vote there, and 40 percent 
of them are women. To say that we cannot make progress in this area of 
the world is a mistake.
  Yes, it is tough. Yes, it is difficult. Yes, a significant but small 
number want to disrupt everything that has gone on and to make sure 
that democracy cannot take hold and a good and decent government will 
not be established to allow the Iraqi people to use their capabilities 
and work ethic to allow them to be successful, which is important for 
us. I just would make that response.
  I see Senator Collins is in the Chamber. I was going to make a 
statement on a separate issue, but if the Senator needs the floor for 
matters important to the bill, I would be glad to yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alabama. I do 
have two brief matters to deal with and then I would be glad to figure 
out where our order is.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, be 
added as a cosponsor to the underlying bill, S. 2845.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendments be set aside so I may call up two amendments on behalf of 
the majority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


          Amendments Nos. 3895, As Modified, and 3896, En Bloc

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I call up amendments Nos. 3895 and 3896, 
and further I send a modification to No. 3895 to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is modified. Both amendments will now be pending.
  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 3985

       On page 94, strike line 5 and insert the following:

[[Page 20525]]



     SEC. 144. NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER.

       (a) National Counterproliferation Center.--(1) Not later 
     than one year after enactment of this Act there shall be 
     established within the National Intelligence Authority a 
     National Counterproliferation Center.
       (2) The purpose of the Center is to develop, direct, and 
     coordinate the efforts and activities of the United States 
     Government to deter, prevent, halt, and rollback the pursuit, 
     acquisition, development, and trafficking of weapons of mass 
     destruction, related materials and technologies, and their 
     delivery systems to terrorists, terrorist organizations, 
     other non-state actors of concern, and state actors of 
     concern.
       (b) Director of National Counterproliferation Center.--(1) 
     There is a Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center, who shall be the head of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center, and who shall be appointed by 
     the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
     Senate.
       (2) Any individual nominated for appointment as the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center shall 
     have significant expertise in matters relating to the 
     national security of the United States and matters relating 
     to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their 
     delivery systems, and related materials and technologies that 
     threaten the national security of the United States, its 
     interests, and allies.
       (3) The individual serving as the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center may not, while so serving, serve 
     in any capacity in any other element of the intelligence 
     community, except to the extent that the individual serving 
     as Director of the National Counterproliferation Center is 
     doing so in an acting capacity.
       (c) Supervision.--(1) The Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center shall report to the National 
     Intelligence Director on the budget, personnel, activities, 
     and programs of the National Counterproliferation Center.
       (2) The Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center shall report to the National Intelligence Director on 
     the activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center under subsection (g).
       (3) The Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center shall report to the President and the National 
     Intelligence Director on the planning and progress of 
     counterproliferation programs, operations, and activities.
       (d) Primary Missions.--The primary missions of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center shall be as follows:
       (1) To develop and unify strategy for the 
     counterproliferation efforts (including law enforcement, 
     economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military efforts) of 
     the United States Government.
       (2) To make recommendations to the National Intelligence 
     Director with regard to the collection and analysis 
     requirements and priorities of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center.
       (3) To integrate counterproliferation intelligence 
     activities of the United States Government, both inside and 
     outside the United States, and with other governments.
       (4) To develop multilateral and United States Government 
     counterproliferation plans, which plans shall--
       (A) involve more than one department, agency, or element of 
     the executive branch (unless otherwise directed by the 
     President) of the United States Government; and
       (B) include the mission, objectives to be achieved, courses 
     of action, parameters for such courses of action, 
     coordination of agency operational activities, 
     recommendations for operational plans, and assignment of 
     national, departmental, or agency responsibilities.
       (5) To ensure that the collection, analysis, and 
     utilization of counterproliferation intelligence, and the 
     conduct of counterpro-
     liferation operations, by the United States Government are 
     informed by the analysis of all-source intelligence.
       (e) Duties and Responsibilities of Director of National 
     Counterproliferation Center.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, at the direction of the President, the 
     National Security Council, and the National Intelligence 
     Director, the Director of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center shall--
       (1) serve as the principal adviser to the President and the 
     National Intelligence Director on intelligence and operations 
     relating to counterproliferation;
       (2) provide unified strategic direction for the 
     counterproliferation efforts of the United States Government 
     and for the effective integration and deconfliction of 
     counterproliferation intelligence collection, analysis, and 
     operations across agency boundaries, both inside and outside 
     the United States, and with foreign governments;
       (3) advise the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the extent to which the counterproliferation 
     program recommendations and budget proposals of the 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government conform to the policies and priorities established 
     by the President and the National Security Council;
       (4) in accordance with subsection (f), concur in, or advise 
     the President on, the selections of personnel to head the 
     nonmilitary operating entities of the United States 
     Government with principal missions relating to 
     counterproliferation;
       (5) serve as the principal representative of the United 
     States Government to multilateral and bilateral 
     organizations, forums, events, and activities related to 
     counterproliferation;
       (6) advise the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the science and technology research and 
     development requirements and priorities of the 
     counterproliferation programs and activities of the United 
     States Government; and
       (7) perform such other duties as the National Intelligence 
     Director may prescribe or are prescribed by law;
       (f) Role of Director of National Counterproliferation 
     Center in Certain Appointments.--(1) In the event of a 
     vacancy in the most senior position of such nonmilitary 
     operating entities of the United States Government having 
     principal missions relating to counterproliferation as the 
     President may designate, the head of the department or agency 
     having jurisdiction over the position shall obtain the 
     concurrence of the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center before appointing an individual 
     to fill the vacancy or recommending to the President an 
     individual for nomination to fill the vacancy. If the 
     Director does not concur in the recommendation, the head of 
     the department or agency concerned may fill the vacancy or 
     make the recommendation to the President (as the case may be) 
     without the concurrence of the Director, but shall notify the 
     President that the Director does not concur in the 
     appointment or recommendation (as the case may be).
       (2) The President shall notify Congress of the designation 
     of an operating entity of the United States Government under 
     paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the date of such 
     designation.
       (g) Directorate of Intelligence.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and 
     maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a 
     Directorate of Intelligence.
       (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility 
     within the United States Government for the collection and 
     analysis of information regarding proliferators (including 
     individuals, entities, organizations, companies, and states) 
     and their networks, from all sources of intelligence, whether 
     collected inside or outside the United States, or by foreign 
     governments.
       (3) The Directorate shall--
       (A) be the principal repository within the United States 
     Government for all-source information on suspected 
     proliferators, their networks, their activities, and their 
     capabilities;
       (B) propose intelligence collection and analysis 
     requirements and priorities for action by elements of the 
     intelligence community inside and outside the United States, 
     and by friendly foreign governments;
       (C) have primary responsibility within the United States 
     Government for net assessments and warnings about weapons of 
     mass destruction proliferation threats, which assessments and 
     warnings shall be based on a comparison of the intentions and 
     capabilities of proliferators with assessed national 
     vulnerabilities and countermeasures;
       (D) conduct through a separate, independent office 
     independent analyses (commonly referred to as ``red 
     teaming'') of intelligence collected and analyzed with 
     respect to proliferation; and
       (E) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
       (h) Directorate of Planning.--(1) The Director of the 
     National Counterproliferation Center shall establish and 
     maintain within the National Counterproliferation Center a 
     Directorate of Planning.
       (2) The Directorate shall have primary responsibility for 
     developing counterproliferation plans, as described in 
     subsection (d)(3).
       (3) The Directorate shall--
       (A) provide guidance, and develop strategy and interagency 
     plans, to counter proliferation activities based on policy 
     objectives and priorities established by the National 
     Security Council;
       (B) develop plans under subparagraph (A) utilizing input 
     from personnel in other departments, agencies, and elements 
     of the United States Government who have expertise in the 
     priorities, functions, assets, programs, capabilities, and 
     operations of such departments, agencies, and elements with 
     respect to counterproliferation;
       (C) assign responsibilities for counterproliferation 
     operations to the departments and agencies of the United 
     States Government (including the Department of Defense, the 
     Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland 
     Security, and other departments and agencies of the United 
     States Government), consistent with the authorities of such 
     departments and agencies;
       (D) monitor the implementation of operations assigned under 
     subparagraph (C) and update interagency plans for such 
     operations as necessary;

[[Page 20526]]

       (E) report to the President and the National Intelligence 
     Director on the performance of the departments, agencies, and 
     elements of the United States with the plans developed under 
     subparagraph (A); and
       (F) perform such other duties and functions as the Director 
     of the National Counterproliferation Center may prescribe.
       (4) The Directorate may not direct the execution of 
     operations assigned under paragraph (3).
       (i) Staff.--(1) The National Intelligence Director may 
     appoint deputy directors of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center to oversee such portions of the operations of the 
     Center as the National Intelligence Director considers 
     appropriate.
       (2) To assist the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center in fulfilling the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under this section, the National 
     Intelligence Director shall employ in the National 
     Counterproliferation Center a professional staff having an 
     expertise in matters relating to such duties and 
     responsibilities.
       (3) In providing for a professional staff for the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under paragraph (2), the National 
     Intelligence Director may establish as positions in the 
     excepted service such positions in the Center as the National 
     Intelligence Director considers appropriate.
       (4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the analytical staff of the National Counterproliferation 
     Center is comprised primarily of experts from elements in the 
     intelligence community and from such other personnel in the 
     United States Government as the National Intelligence 
     Director considers appropriate.
       (5)(A) In order to meet the requirements in paragraph (4), 
     the National Intelligence Director shall, from time to time--
       (i) specify the transfers, assignments, and details of 
     personnel funded within the National Intelligence Program to 
     the National Counterproliferation Center from any other non-
     Department of Defense element of the intelligence community 
     that the National Intelligence Director considers 
     appropriate; and
       (ii) in the case of personnel from a department, agency, or 
     element of the United States Government and not funded within 
     the National Intelligence Program, request the transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of such personnel from the department, 
     agency, or other element concerned.
       (B)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
     shall promptly effect any transfer, assignment, or detail of 
     personnel specified by the National Intelligence Director 
     under subparagraph (A)(i).
       (ii) The head of a department, agency, or element of the 
     United States Government receiving a request for transfer, 
     assignment, or detail of personnel under subparagraph (A)(ii) 
     shall, to the extent practicable, approve the request.
       (6) Personnel employed in or assigned or detailed to the 
     National Counterproliferation Center under this subsection 
     shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center on all 
     matters for which the Center has been assigned responsibility 
     and for all matters related to the accomplishment of the 
     missions of the Center.
       (7) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or 
     detailed to the National Counterproliferation Center under 
     this subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of 
     such personnel at the Center.
       (8) The supervisors of the staff of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center may, with the approval of the 
     National Intelligence Director, reward the staff of the 
     Center for meritorious performance by the provision of such 
     performance awards as the National Intelligence Director 
     shall prescribe.
       (9) The National Intelligence Director may delegate to the 
     Director of the National Counterproliferation Center any 
     responsibility, power, or authority of the National 
     Intelligence Director under paragraphs (1) through (8).
       (10) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure that 
     the staff of the National Counterproliferation Center has 
     access to all databases and information maintained by the 
     elements of the intelligence community that are relevant to 
     the duties of the Center.
       (j) Support and Cooperation of Other Agencies.--(1) The 
     elements of the intelligence community and the other 
     departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 
     Government shall support, assist, and cooperate with the 
     National Counterproliferation Center in carrying out its 
     missions under this section.
       (2) The support, assistance, and cooperation of a 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government under this subsection shall include, but not be 
     limited to--
       (A) the implementation of interagency plans for operations, 
     whether foreign or domestic, that are developed by the 
     National Counterproliferation Center in a manner consistent 
     with the laws and regulations of the United States and 
     consistent with the limitation in subsection (h)(4);
       (B) cooperative work with the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center to ensure that ongoing operations 
     of such department, agency, or element do not conflict with 
     operations planned by the Center;
       (C) reports, upon request, to the Director of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center on the performance of such 
     department, agency, or element in implementing 
     responsibilities assigned to such department, agency, or 
     element through joint operations plans; and
       (D) the provision to the analysts of the National 
     Counterproliferation Center electronic access in real time to 
     information and intelligence collected by such department, 
     agency, or element that is relevant to the missions of the 
     Center.
       (3) In the event of a disagreement between the National 
     Intelligence Director and the head of a department, agency, 
     or element of the United States Government on a plan 
     developed or responsibility assigned by the National 
     Counterproliferation Center under this subsection, the 
     National Intelligence Director may either accede to the head 
     of the department, agency, or element concerned or notify the 
     President of the necessity of resolving the disagreement.
       (k) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``counterproliferation'' means--
       (A) activities, programs and measures for interdicting 
     (including deterring, preventing, halting, and rolling back) 
     the transfer or transport (whether by air, land or sea) of 
     weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and 
     related materials and technologies to and from states and 
     non-state actors (especially terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations) of proliferation concern;
       (B) enhanced law enforcement activities and cooperation to 
     deter, prevent, halt, and rollback proliferation-related 
     networks, activities, organizations, and individuals, and 
     bring those involved to justice; and
       (C) activities, programs, and measures for identifying, 
     collecting, and analyzing information and intelligence 
     related to the transfer or transport of weapons, systems, 
     materials, and technologies as described in subparagraph (A).
       (2) The term ``states and non-state actors of proliferation 
     concern'' refers to countries or entities (including 
     individuals, entities, organizations, companies, and 
     networks) that should be subject to counterproliferation 
     activities because of their actions or intent to engage in 
     proliferation through--
       (A) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or 
     nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or
       (B) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) 
     of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or 
     related materials.


                           amendment no. 3896

 (Purpose: To include certain additional Members of Congress among the 
 congressional intelligence committees and for certain other purposes)

       On page 8, strike lines 3 and 4 and insert the following:
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (D) the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate.
       On page 172, beginning on line 24, strike ``the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives,'' 
     and insert ``the committees and Members of Congress specified 
     in subsection (c),''.
       On page 173, beginning on line 17, strike ``the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives,'' 
     and insert ``the committees and Members of Congress specified 
     in subsection (c),''.
       On page 174, beginning on line 7, strike 
     ``Representatives'' and all that follows through line 13 and 
     insert ``Representatives, the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the Majority Leader and the Minority 
     Leader of the House of Representatives, and the Majority 
     Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate. Upon making a 
     report covered by this paragraph--
       ``(A) the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as 
     the case may be, of such a committee shall notify the other 
     of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, or Ranking Member, as the 
     case may be, of such committee of such request;
       ``(B) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader of the House of Representatives or the 
     Minority Leader of the House of Representatives shall notify 
     the other or others, as the case may be, of such request; and
       ``(C) the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate 
     shall notify the other of such request.
       On page 174, between lines 22 and 23, insert the following:
       (c) Committees and Members of Congress.--The committees and 
     Members of Congress specified in this subsection are--
       (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;

[[Page 20527]]

       (3) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (4) the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate.
       On page 176, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following:
       (iii) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (iv) the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate;
       On page 176, line 4, strike ``(ii)'' and insert ``(v)''.
       On page 176, line 7, strike ``(iii)'' and insert ``(vi)''.
       On page 200, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

     SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   ACT OF 1947.

       (a) In General.--Paragraph (7) of section 3 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(7) The term `congressional intelligence committees' 
     means--
       ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
       ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       ``(D) the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate.''.
       (b) Funding of Intelligence Activities.--Paragraph (2) of 
     section 504(e) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 414(e)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(2) the term `appropriate congressional committees' 
     means--
       ``(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       ``(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives;
       ``(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       ``(D) the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the 
     Senate;''.
       On page 200, line 5, strike ``307.'' and insert ``308.''.
       On page 200, line 12, strike ``308.'' and insert ``309.''.
       On page 200, line 19, strike ``309.'' and insert ``310.''.
       On page 201, line 11, strike ``310.'' and insert ``311.''.
       On page 203, line 9, strike ``311.'' and insert ``312.''.
       On page 204, line 1, strike ``312.'' and insert ``313.''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendments be set 
aside so I can offer an amendment for Senator Durbin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3923

  Mr. REID. I call up amendment No. 3923.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

                           amendment no. 3923

    (Purpose: To ensure the balance of privacy and civil liberties)

       On page 154, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the 
     following:
       (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes 
     to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need 
     for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy 
     and civil liberties; and
       On page 155, line 6 strike beginning with ``has'' through 
     line 9 and insert the following: ``has established--
       ``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.
       On page 166, strike lines 4 through 6 and insert the 
     following: ``element has established--
       ``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.
  Mr. REID. I ask that it now be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 3871

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of an 
amendment previously offered, No. 3871, and to share some thoughts 
about what I believe to be a critical issue facing us in terms of 
security for this country.
  One thing this legislation we are discussing today could do better is 
it could more effectively help deal with weaknesses that exist in our 
system today. We are moving blocks around at headquarters and creating 
responsibilities. Some of that may be good and some of that may not, 
but what I have not seen enough of is focus on what really is a problem 
and a weakness in our system and proposals that will actually fix that 
and make it stronger.
  We know, for example, that lack of human intelligence over decades 
since I guess the Church Committee has left us far too few intelligence 
officers around the world. We know that we have far too few translators 
who can translate foreign languages that may involve people who have 
connections to terrorism. Those are things we know are problems, and I 
am afraid we do not do enough about it.
  This is a matter that I think is critically important that is a 
problem generally recognized by people today in this country who give 
it much thought. It is simply this: That if a police officer in any 
town in America were to stop an individual he or she believes to be 
here illegally, I would suggest that most Americans do not know what 
will happen at that point. As a former Federal prosecutor and Attorney 
General of Alabama, I travel the State and frequently meet with local 
law officers, sheriffs and police officers, and I ask them what they do 
when they discover someone who has been in this country illegally.
  The answer is, they let them go. They used to call the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and they would tell them that if there were 
not at least 15 people in this group illegally they would not bother to 
come and even pick up this individual. As a result of that and a few 
court rulings that, in my view, are not persuasive, are not binding, 
the mentality has developed among State and local law enforcement that 
they do not have any role in enforcing our immigration laws, and they 
do not do it.
  I raise this simply because it used the same language I have used 
before. This is an article from, I believe, a Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, paper. It involves the Kittery, ME, police chief. The first 
line of the article says, ``This country is facing a tremendous 
security issue when it comes to illegal aliens.''
  The chief of police sent that strong message after his department 
detained a Colombian citizen and a Bulgarian citizen. Both were found 
to be in the country after their visas had expired--illegally:

       . . . but the police were told by Immigration and 
     Naturalization Service agents, to release them.
       ``They just let them go,'' the Chief said.

  That is what happens in America today. That is reality. Anyone who 
suggests that our police are able to participate effectively in 
apprehending people who are here illegally does not know what is 
happening in the real world. We have 650,000 State and local police 
officers in America--sheriff deputies, police officers, State troopers, 
and the like. But there are only 2,000 Interior enforcement officers 
for the Department of Immigration--ICE, they now call it; only 2,000 in 
the whole country.
  So, to tell our local people we don't want your help in this is 
unwise. It is a serious flaw in our system and I propose that we fix 
it.
  I understand the way we are proceeding here that this amendment is 
probably not germane. Therefore, if it is not germane, with cloture 
probably we will not get a vote on it. But it is something I wanted to 
share with the Members of this Senate.
  We have Senator Cornyn, Senator Ensign, Senator Chambliss--who chairs 
the Immigration Subcommittee in Judiciary--and Senator Miller from 
Georgia. They have signed onto this amendment. Senator Inhofe, I see 
just came in, is a signer and supporter of this amendment. It is common 
sense. It

[[Page 20528]]

is plain common sense. What we are doing now is wrong. I am very 
concerned about it.
  In addition to the fact that they are told not to participate in the 
apprehension or detention or holding of someone who is here illegally, 
even more bizarre is the fact that we now have 400,000 alien absconders 
in this country. That is 400,000 people who were determined to be in 
this country illegally, by one forum or another, by administrative 
ruling or court determination, and have been issued final orders of 
deportation, but are still at large. What do you think would normally 
happen if that occurred, if someone is found here illegally and 
determined so by an administrative or court proceeding? You would think 
they would be asked to leave. They would be deported.
  What happens is they are released on bail pending a final order of 
deportation and 80 percent of those never come back. They don't show up 
for their deportation hearing. They abscond.
  Mr. President, 86,000 of those are criminal felons; of that 400,000 
who absconded, 86,000 are criminal felons who came to this country with 
permission to live here and work here according to the rules and 
regulations. They have been convicted of a felony and they have been 
ordered deported, but they abscond and they are out there--criminals, 
many of whom are threats. Fifteen thousand of these 86,000 have been 
determined to be of ``national security interest,'' and 3,000 come from 
state sponsors of terrorism.
  We know that three of the 9/11 hijackers had contact with State and 
local police during routine traffic stops prior to 9/11. Hijacker 
Mohammed Atta, believed to have piloted American Airlines flight 77 
into the World Trade Center's north tower, was stopped twice by police 
in Florida. Hijacker Ziad S. Jarrah was stopped for speeding by 
Maryland State police 2 days before 9/11. Hani Hanjour, who was on the 
flight that crashed into the Pentagon, was stopped for speeding by 
police in Arlington, VA.
  Right now, if a State or local officer stops one of these 400,000 
absconders, they have no real way of knowing the person has been 
ordered removed from the country by an immigration court. Do you 
understand that? The key thing here is that people need to understand 
how the system works. Let's say a Mohammad Atta had been arrested for 
reckless driving or DUI, that he was in violation of his immigration 
laws and was ordered deported, and that he absconded back into the 
country and he is stopped in Maryland or Alabama or Maine by a local 
police officer. What would happen? If he had committed larceny and had 
a warrant out for his arrest from Maine, I will tell you what would 
happen if he is stopped in Alabama. The police officer will run the 
National Crime Information Computer check. It will come out that there 
is a warrant out for his or her arrest for larceny in Maine, and he 
will be held and turned over to the Maine authorities to be prosecuted.
  What happens if a person is one of the 400,000 alien absconders? That 
information is not being put in the NCIC database, so it is not 
available to the police officers who make a check. They can't determine 
whether this is a danger to America.
  This is what our amendment would do. It would simply clarify the 
authority of State and local police, that they have a voluntary role in 
their local role that requires information, and it requires information 
such as revoked visas and final orders of deportation be listed in the 
NCIC so the State and local officers can have access to it in the 
course of their routine duties. It does not say people have to go out 
and start looking for illegal aliens, but if they apprehend somebody, 
they run the NCIC check and see whether there is a final order of 
deportation in the system.
  Action by state and local police is totally voluntary. There has been 
some concern that similar legislation would require the local police to 
participate in enforcing immigration laws, which I personally think 
most should--or at least they ought to. But this amendment would not 
require any action by state and local officers. It also has no link to 
any funding they are currently receiving.
  The amendment goes a step further to clarify the voluntary nature of 
this amendment it includes language saying that nothing would require 
the State and local officers to report the immigration status of 
witnesses of crimes or victims of crimes. Some say if you do that, 
people will not come forward and report a crime; if they are a victim, 
they will not come forward and report if they are a witness. This 
amendment does not require any of that.
  Let me briefly conclude. I could say much more about this. But the 9/
11 Commission dealt with this issue. They recognize the ``growing 
role''--that is a quote in the 9/11 Commission report--of our State and 
local law enforcement agencies in the area of immigration law 
enforcement, and for effective cooperation of all levels of immigration 
law enforcement--Federal, State, and local.
  They also noted this challenge. On page 383 of the 9/11 report:

       The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism 
     is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming 
     risk from entering or remaining in the United States 
     undetected.

  We ought to listen to that. It is a threat to our country, that the 
people who are here illegally remain here without being apprehended. 
They say there is a growing role for State and local law enforcement in 
this area. That is why we have offered this language. That is why, even 
before 9/11, I recognized the problem would be crucial for this 
country.
  I am very frustrated but we need to step up to the plate and make 
sure every local and State law enforcement officer knows what their 
authority is; that the Federal ICE people will come and retrieve people 
who are here illegally; that people who have absconded after a valid 
order of deportation and a warrant for their arrest has been issued. 
That ought to be in the NCIC for an immigration offense just as much as 
a petty larceny offense or a DUI offense. That is not the way it is 
today.
  We have to confront this issue. In one fell sweep we could add 
600,000-plus law officers--the eyes and ears of America on the streets 
of every city and town in America. We could add them to the effort to 
make this country secure. We could add them as eyes and ears with the 
ability to identify and arrest people who have warrants out for them, 
who may be 1 of 3,000 from countries that harbor terrorism.
  I thank the Chair. I believe we need to continue to work on this. I 
intend to do so. We ought to have a vote on this, if possible. If not, 
we will just keep coming back at it.


    Amendments No. 3850, No. 3851, No. 3855, No. 3856, and No. 3872

  I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and 
on behalf of Senator Grassley, I would like to call up en bloc five 
amendments that are filed at the desk. I call up amendments No. 3850, 
No. 3851, No. 3855, No. 3856, and No. 3872, and I ask unanimous consent 
that the amendments be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Objection is made.
  I ask the Senator from Alabama if he could indicate what the 
amendments are.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank Senator Lieberman. This was a request from 
Senator Grassley, and I called these amendments up and then asked that 
they be set aside.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.
  I remove my objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.


                           Amendment No. 3566

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have filed amendment No. 3866, which 
would prohibit racial profiling with the relevant section as follows:

       The term ``racial profiling'' means the practice of law 
     enforcement agents relying to any degree on race, ethnicity, 
     religion or national origin in selecting which individuals to 
     subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities or 
     in deciding upon the

[[Page 20529]]

     scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the 
     initial investigatory procedure except where there is 
     trustworthy information relevant to the locality and 
     timeframe that links persons of a particular race, ethnicity, 
     religion or national origin to an identified criminal 
     incident or scheme.

  The amendment further defines routine or spontaneous investigative 
activities to include interviews, traffic stops, pedestrian stops, 
frisks, and other types of body searches, consensual or nonconsensual 
searches of the person and possessions, including vehicles, 
pedestrians, entrants into the United States that are more extensive 
than those customarily carried out, immigration-related workplace 
investigations, or other types of enforcement encounters as compiled by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Bureau of Statistics.
  As evident from these definitions, a number of these items would 
relate to the kinds of activities of national intelligence, the 
immigration-related workplace investigations, inspections and 
interviews of interest to United States.
  This amendment tracks very closely the provisions of the Department 
of Justice guidance regarding use of race by Federal law enforcement 
agencies promulgated in June of 2003 which says in relevant part, ``in 
making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as 
ordinary traffic stops, Federal law enforcement officers may not use 
race or ethnicity to any degree except that officers may rely on race 
or ethnicity in a specific subject description.''
  I understand the managers are not prepared to have another vote this 
evening.
  But for the Record I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment 
be set aside and the amendment No. 3866 be taken up for consideration.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I understand 
the legal prowess of the Senator from Pennsylvania when there is a 
legal issue. I know the good intentions he has in regard to this most 
important subject matter and to what the amendment relates. But on 
behalf of the authorizers, I think this matter should be discussed at 
the Judiciary Committee level in some detail, and it has not. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought to offer this amendment for 
most of the afternoon. I offered two amendments last week. I know how 
difficult it is to manage a bill.
  I, again, compliment the distinguished chairman, Senator Collins, and 
the distinguished ranking member, Senator Lieberman, for their work.
  As soon as the bill was called to the floor last week, I came to the 
floor and offered two amendments to cooperate with the managers. I was 
awaiting the time to offer this amendment.
  The problem which is posed procedurally is that cloture will be filed 
tomorrow. If cloture is invoked, this amendment will not satisfy the 
germaneness requirements which is the reason I have offered it this 
evening. But in light of the objection to set aside the pending 
amendment so debate and a vote can occur on this amendment, I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania. 
He is a very valued and constructive member of our committee in 
considering this legislation. He was dealing in this amendment with a 
problem that ought to be dealt with, but, unfortunately, because of the 
moment we have reached on this bill where effectively unanimous consent 
is necessary to take up a matter for a vote and objection has been 
heard on both sides, that will not be possible.
  I thank him. I thank him for getting the process going last week and, 
as he said, coming over early and submitting two amendments which 
helped to clarify the matters this bill contains. There will be another 
day for this amendment, I am sure.
  Once again, I thank him for his real leadership in pursuit of reform 
of our national intelligence assets.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I join the Senator from Connecticut and 
the Senator from Nevada in their compliments of the Senator of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I do very much appreciate that he was so 
willing to come forward early last week and offer the first amendments. 
I regret that objection on both sides of the aisle prevent us from 
accommodating him this evening.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their gracious 
comments and pick up on what Senator Lieberman said. This amendment 
will return. There will be a day for its due consideration and I think 
enactment by this body.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Talent). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be recognized to 
speak as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                          Grant Dollars at EPA

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I rise today to shed some light on a 
subject that is very important to me in my oversight duties as the 
chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee. Earlier this 
year, the Environment and Public Works Committee held an oversight 
hearing where the committee heard testimony from the General Accounting 
Office and the EPA inspector general regarding a 10-year history of 
numerous problems with the management of grant dollars at the 
Environmental Protection Agency.
  Some of the problems included EPA not requiring grant recipients to 
demonstrate real environmental benefits for grants, EPA not requiring 
competition in its grants awards, and a general lack of oversight of 
EPA grant officers and recipients. The EPA inspector general released 
an audit only 2 days before the hearing, finding that a particular 
nonprofit guaranty had violated the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and with 
nearly $5 million of EPA grant funding.
  Members may recall, because I talked about it at that time, that it 
was the Consumer Federation of America, which is a 501(c)(4), that had 
been a recipient of discretionary grants from the EPA. That is a 
501(c)(4) as in lobbying organization. They support candidates. It is 
strictly against the law.
  Over the last few months, my staff has done considerable research 
into the EPA grant and confirmed many of the problems and also found 
the EPA has a long history of awarding grant dollars without 
competition to some well-known nonprofit environmental groups that 
regularly engage in political activity. My staff has compiled some of 
these findings in this 30-page report to the chairman.
  In examining how the environmental groups receive and spend their 
Federal dollars, it became apparent they receive funding from numerous 
sources, including large foundations. Within these organizations, 
political and grassroots efforts quickly became difficult to 
differentiate the sources of their funding and how they spend them. 
Therefore, I instructed my staff to examine the funding and expenditure 
records of the organizations. That has resulted in a second report 
which is the focus of my remarks today.
  My staff has compiled this information into a 15-page report for the 
chairman to provide some preliminary examples describing five of the 
most widely politically active environmental groups, the description of 
their activity, the foundations that provide the financial support for 
these groups, and the interconnected web among all those organizations.
  Interestingly, these environmental groups are all tax-exempt, IRS-
registered 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, meaning contributions to 
these groups are tax deductible. These groups profess to be the 
greatest stewards of the environment and solicit contributions from a 
variety of sources by that

[[Page 20530]]

claim. But they demonstrate more interest in giving apocalyptic 
environmental scenarios to raise money for raw political purposes 
rather than working together to improve the environment for America.
  We have money from foundations, individuals, and government grants 
going into environmental groups, and then they turn around and put 
these out to the 501(c)(3), 527 organizations and 501(c)(4), these are 
political organizations. All these nonprofit groups are also closely 
associated and fund their affiliated 501(c)(4) lobbying organizations 
and the 527 political organizations.
  This report could not be more timely as the Washington Post, as 
recently as September 27 of this year, published an article 
demonstrating that IRS 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 527 organizations are 
all engaged in political activity this election cycle with expenditures 
designed to circumvent the prohibitions in the bipartisan campaign 
Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as McCain-Feingold.
  This article quoted a Federal Election Commission official stating:

       In the wake of the ban on party-raised soft money, evidence 
     is mounting that money is slithering through on other routes 
     as organizations maintain various accounts, tripping over 
     each other, shifting money between 501(c)(3)'s, (c)(4)'s, and 
     527's. . . . It's big money.

  Why is this important? Because the environment is important to all 
Americans. Despite what we hear from the groups in their attack 
advertisements against President Bush and the Republican candidates 
across the Nation, our air is cleaner, water more drinkable, and our 
forests are becoming healthier.
  Keep in mind this is over a period of time when we have almost 
doubled the amount of miles that are driven, and our population is 
dramatically increasing. Yet things are cleaner than they were before.
  For instance, over the last 30 years we have cut air pollution in 
half. Why, then, are some extremists spending millions upon millions to 
hijack the conservation movement? It seems to me that it is more 
important to the leadership of these groups to turn their once laudable 
movement into a political machine by sending out their bipartisan snake 
oil, salesmen, and misleading the American public regarding their 
purely politically partisan agenda under the guise of environmental 
protection.
  Our Nation's father of conservation, Teddy Roosevelt, said:

       To waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and 
     exhaust the land instead of using it so as to increase its 
     usefulness, will result in undermining in the days of our 
     children the very prosperity which we ought by right to hand 
     down to them amplified and developed.

  These words ring true today, but unfortunately it is clear that the 
environmentalist movement is deaf to them. What we find now is the 
fleecing of the American public's pocketbooks by the environmental 
movement for their political use. What we find now is exhausting 
litigation, instigation of false claims, misleading science, and scare 
tactics to fool Americans into believing disastrous environmental 
scenarios that are untrue.
  Pay close attention to the webs of this incestuous activity of these 
environmentalists groups and their financial benefactors. Environmental 
organizations have become experts at duplicitous activity, skirting 
laws up to the edge of illegality, and burying their political 
activities under the guise of nonprofit environmental improvement.
  Chart No. 2 demonstrates the interconnection environmental family 
affair with nonprofits and their benefactors. As we can see, six 
organizations at the bottom of the chart are all either 527 groups or 
501(c)(4)s. These are political organizations. Money that comes up 
here--for example, the Heinz Foundation, goes to the various 
organizations and ultimately gets to the Environmental Accounting Fund, 
the Save the Environment Organization, Action Fund, Sierra Club Votes, 
Defenders of Wildlife, Environment 2004. These are all either 
501(c)(4)s or 527 organizations.
  The LCV calls itself the political voice of the national 
environmental movement, and much of its grants from even its 501(c)(3) 
organizations go to fund voter mobilization and education drives. In 
each election cycle, LCV endorses congressional candidates and since 
1996 has published a ``dirty dozen'' list. They brag about the dirty 
dozen list that has been very effective, but the LCV mostly singles out 
only Republican candidates.
  What we are talking about is the money that is channeled from 
501(c)(3) organizations is going to defeat Republican candidates.
  Mr. President, let me provide some examples. So far this year, the 
LCV has released a ``Dirty Dozen'' list of eight congressional 
candidates--seven Republicans and one Democrat. For the first time 
ever, it includes the President and Vice President. I cannot forget 
that LCV has, of course, endorsed the junior Senator from Massachusetts 
for President, the earliest endorsement of a Presidential contender in 
its 34-year history.
  The LCV's 527 organization last reported to have raised over $3.3 
million in the 2004 election cycle. This is chart No. 3: $3.3 million. 
It has also joined with Environment2004, another 527 political 
organization directed by former Clinton administration EPA staffers 
purchasing air time to run ads against the President.
  Interestingly, not all candidates appreciate LCV's help.
  I recently read where the senior Senator from South Dakota requested 
the LCV not air advertisements in the South Dakota Senate contest this 
year and even characterized outside organization advertisements as 
``often too negative, too personal, and lack any real substance.''
  However, LCV has a long history of political involvement. This is 
chart No. 4. In 1996, LCV spent a total of $1.5 million in ads trying 
to defeat its ``Dirty Dozen'' list of targets of 11 Republicans and 1 
Democrat.
  In 1998, LCV spent $2.3 million targeting its ``Dirty Dozen'' list of 
12 Republican candidates and 1 Democratic candidate.
  In 2000, the LCV spent a total of $4 million, again targeting 11 
Republicans and 1 Democrat on its ``Dirty Dozen'' list. And I cannot 
forget, in 2000 the LCV also endorsed Al Gore for President.
  In 2002, the LCV once again targeted 11 Republican congressional 
candidates and 1 Democrat.
  I see a partisan pattern that is well developed here. LCV spent 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in congressional contests against 
Republican candidates. However, the strongest effort seems to have been 
focused on Senator Allard. The LCV claims to have budgeted a total of 
$700,000 for that race alone and hired a campaign staff of 12 to 
coordinate phone banks and precinct walks in addition to running 
television and radio advertisements. Altogether, LCV is reported to 
have spent $1.5 million in independent expenditures during the 2002 
election cycle. Of that total amount, LCV spent $1.313 million 
benefiting Democratic candidates while only spending $136,000 for 
Republican candidates.
  Another example is the Sierra Club. The Sierra Club describes itself 
as ``America's oldest, largest and most influential grassroots 
environmental organization.'' Sierra Club is also an IRS-registered, 
tax-exempt, nonprofit 501(c)(3) foundation. Here we go again. The 
Sierra Club Foundation is closely affiliated with its Sierra Club 
501(c)(4) and section 527 political organizations. In fact, the 
Washington Post detailed the interconnected organizations of the Sierra 
Club in an article it featured last Monday. This is what the Post 
printed:

       Perhaps no one better illustrates the host of interlocking 
     roles than Carl Pope, one of the most influential operatives 
     on the Democratic side in the 2004 election. As executive 
     director of the Sierra Club, a major 501(c)(4) environmental 
     lobby, Pope also controls the Sierra Club Voter Education 
     Fund, a 527. The Voter Education Fund 527 has raised $3.4 
     million this election cycle, with $2.4 million of that amount 
     coming from the Sierra Club. A third group, the Sierra Club 
     PAC, has since 1980 given $3.9 million to Democratic 
     candidates and $173,602 to GOP candidates.

  The Sierra Club is consistently critical of the Bush environmental 
record

[[Page 20531]]

and sometimes others as well. The Sierra Club even accused me of trying 
to raise the levels of mercury pollution. The Sierra Club's 527 
political organization reports to have raised over $6.8 million for the 
2004 election cycle alone, with a goal of over $8 million by the end of 
the month.
  Like the LCV, the Sierra Club has a history of involvement in 
politics. In the year 2000 Presidential contest, the Sierra Club spent 
several hundred thousand dollars in advertisements attacking President 
Bush. And in the 2002 election cycle, the Sierra Club endorsed 184 
Democratic incumbents and challengers and endorsed 10 Republican 
candidates--184 Democrats and 10 Republicans. Not surprisingly, the 
Sierra Club is heavily involved in the 2004 political cycle. The Sierra 
Club began spending early in the 2004 Presidential contest and has made 
a series of endorsements this year. Of course, the Sierra Club has 
endorsed the junior Senator from Massachusetts for President, and it 
has endorsed 16 Democratic Senate incumbents and challengers and no 
Republican candidates--16 Democrats, no Republicans. In races for the 
House of Representatives, the Sierra Club has endorsed 114 Democratic 
incumbents and challengers and has endorsed 7 Republican candidates.
  Let me use one more example briefly--the Natural Resources Defense 
Council. The NRDC is also an IRS-registered, tax-exempt, nonprofit 
501(c)(3) receiving $55 million in tax-deductible contributions--these 
are tax-deductible contributions; no money going into the Treasury--in 
just the last year running bogus ads like this one on this chart 
claiming President Bush is rolling back a mercury regulation that never 
existed. This is an outrageous lie. I do not remember how much this ad 
cost, but if you look, this was a full-page ad run in the New York 
Times. Down here it says:

       Yes, I want to join the Natural Resources Defense Council 
     and help thwart President Bush's plan to weaken controls on 
     toxic mercury.

  There aren't any controls on toxic mercury. This is an outrageous 
lie. How can you lower something that does not exist? The truth is, 
President Bush's Clear Skies legislative proposal, which I support, is 
the biggest emissions reduction plan ever proposed by any American 
President. Over 14 years, it would reduce emissions from powerplants of 
nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury emissions from powerplants 
by 70 percent. Let's be sure and understand that the NRDC deliberately 
lied in this ad because you cannot roll back standards that do not 
exist.
  The NRDC is affiliated with the NRDC Action Fund, a 501(c)(4) 
organization--here we go again--and the Environmental Accountability 
Fund, its section 527 political organization. The NRDC describes itself 
as ``the nation's most effective environmental action organization,'' 
and has a long history of political activity.
  The NRDC has joined this year with LCV and the Sierra Club to air 
television and radio ads and hire campaign staffs to work against 
President Bush in several States, including New Mexico, Florida, 
Arizona, and Nevada. Overall, the Environmental Accountability Fund, 
NRDC's 527 organization, last reported to have raised nearly $1 million 
in the 2004 election cycle.
  Well, that is three of the culprits. The report outlines two others 
in depth--Greenpeace and Environmental Defense--and shows similar 
patterns of partisan fundraising and spending, such as this Greenpeace 
ad that equates President Bush's conservation policies to the Texas 
chainsaw massacre--a disgusting comparison, especially considering that 
historic healthy forest legislation was proposed and passed by this 
administration. It is sad that many of these groups would rather watch 
our forests burn and our watersheds become destroyed rather than employ 
21st century forest management technology to improve forest health.
  But misleading and scaring the American people during a Presidential 
election year, I guess, is more important to them than true forest 
health.
  501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, political action committees, and 527 
political organizations--it is all tangled up in a web. Back to that 
chart we used, chart No. 2, you can see how convoluted it is.
  But the money all ends up down here being used for political 
purposes, millions upon millions of dollars going for partisan 
political activity while these groups attempt to maintain a nonpartisan 
cloak and justification that they are helping our environment. But 
these funds do not just come from scared mothers and others furiously 
writing checks because these groups have lied to them and told them 
that eating fish will kill their children. Our research has found that 
much of the funding these groups receive comes from independent 
foundations and trusts which also claim to be nonpartisan.
  Let's take a look now at some of these nonpartisan institutions and 
how their money finds its way to this intricately growing web. The 
Heinz foundations are a few of the largest contributors to these 
nonprofit environmental organizations. And, of course, Mrs. Teresa 
Heinz Kerry is either a chairperson of the board of trustees or a 
member of the board of trustees of each one of these foundations.
  In fact, Mrs. Heinz Kerry is the head of the $1.2 billion Heinz 
Foundation Endowment.
  Since 1998, these foundations have contributed nearly $3 million to 
the Sierra Club, LCV, the NRDC, and Environmental Defense. Each 
foundation is also a large contributor to the Tides Center and the 
Tides Foundation, contributing over $6 million since 1998. The Tides 
organization has in turn also contributed over $1.4 million to the 
Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and the NRDC over the same period of time.
  Another major supporter is the Turner Foundation, founded in 1990 by 
Ted Turner, who is chairman of the foundation board of trustees. The 
Turner Foundation sponsors the work of its special projects which 
include the Partnership Project, comprised of 20 national environmental 
groups. Since 1998, the Turner Foundation has contributed over $6.4 
million to the Partnership Project. Individually, the Turner Foundation 
has contributed more than $20 million to the LCV since 1998; over $2.6 
million to the NRDC; over $1 million to the Sierra Club; and nearly $2 
million to Environmental Defense, Earth Justice, and Greenpeace.
  Finally, another large supporter is the Pew Charitable Trust. You can 
follow the lines of the money there. It claims it is an independent 
nonprofit serving to inform the public on key issues. Two of the Pew's 
environmental priorities include global warming and wilderness 
protection. Pew has contributed $17.4 million to Clear the Air Campaign 
since 1999, with which it publishes materials such as this claiming 
that the Bush plan means more pollution. Again, another impossible lie 
because you can't roll back mercury standards that don't exist.
  Perhaps wilderness protection is where the Pew shows its true colors. 
It has joined with the Heritage Force Campaign, the Natural Resource 
Defense Council, Environmental Defense, and the Sierra Club in a 
campaign characterizing the President's conservation policies as 
``Crazy George's National Forest Give-a-Way.'' Once again, it is silly 
scare ads like this. For them, it is only about politics, not about 
true forest management.
  We should be more scared of this tangled web of political financing 
and the fact that there is no way to tell where taxpayer funded grants 
and private dollars cross. These are the grants we started out talking 
about. It is also convoluted where advocacy funding and political 
funding intermingle and even if environmental groups really spend any 
money actually improving the environment.
  Since 1998, Pew Foundation has contributed several million dollars to 
various environmental organizations. These contributions have included 
nearly $18 million to Earth Justice; over $3 million to NRDC; over $3.7 
million to Environmental Defense. Pew has also contributed $32.6 
million to the Tides Center and Foundation over the same period. The 
Tides organization has contributed over $1.4 million to the Sierra 
Club, Greenpeace, NRDC, among others, since 1998.

[[Page 20532]]

  This does not even represent all of the political involvement of 
environmental extremists. These groups have established an 
unquestionable record of partisanship and demonstrated a slithering 
flow of money among themselves and from their financial benefactors.
  Today's environmental groups are simply Democratic political machines 
raising millions of dollars in contributions and spending millions in 
expenditures each year for the purpose of raising more money to pursue 
their agenda. Especially in this election year, the American voters 
should see these groups and their many affiliated organizations as they 
are--the newest insidious conspiracy of political action committees and 
perhaps the newest multimillion dollar manipulation of Federal election 
laws.
  I ask unanimous consent that the reports be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Political Activity of Environmental Groups and Their Supporting 
                              Foundations


                       questionably non-partisan

       Following the League of Conservation Voters' endorsement of 
     Senator John Kerry for President, The Hill, a Capitol Hill 
     publication, published an article featuring the financial 
     connection between the League of Conservation Voters and 
     Heinz family foundations. The article further featured the 
     connections between the League of Conservation Voters and 
     other well-known environmental groups such as the Natural 
     Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense and their 
     financial links to Heinz family foundations as well. The Hill 
     article cited specific contributions such as a $56,000 
     contribution in 2003 to the Natural Resources Defense Council 
     from a Heinz family foundation and three $200,000 
     contributions from two Heinz family foundations from 2001 to 
     2003 to Environmental Defense. The article revealed that Ms. 
     Teresa Heinz Kerry is the chairperson or board member on each 
     Heinz family foundation, and since 2000, the Heinz 
     foundations have given nearly $1 million to the League of 
     Conservation Voters, members of its board, and the groups 
     those board members represent.
       Groups such as the League of Conservation Voters, the 
     Natural Resources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense 
     represent themselves as organizations concerned about the 
     protection of the environment. They are all tax exempt 
     Internal Revenue Service (IRS) registered 501(c)(3) 
     organizations often associated with 501(c)(4), 527 political 
     organizations, or other affiliated organizations. However, as 
     recently as September 27, 2004, the Washington Post published 
     an article demonstrating that IRS designated 501(c)(3), 
     501(c)(4), and 527 organizations are all engaged in political 
     activity this election year with expenditures potentially 
     designed to circumvent the prohibitions in the Bipartisan 
     Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as McCain-
     Feingold. The article quoted a former Federal Election 
     Commission official stating.
       ``In the wake of the ban on party-raised soft money, 
     evidence is mounting that money is slithering through on 
     other routes as organizations maintain various accounts, 
     tripping over each other, shifting money between 501(c)(3)'s, 
     (c)(4)'s, and 527's. . . . It's big money, and the pendulum 
     has swung too far in their direction.''
       This report for the Chairman provides preliminary examples 
     describing five of the most widely politically active 
     environmental groups with a description of their activity and 
     the foundations that provide the financial support for those 
     groups.


                      environmental organizations

                     League of conservation voters

       Beginning with the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 
     provides an appropriate beginning because the LCV board of 
     directors is comprised of various representatives from a 
     number of other environmental groups. Among those sitting on 
     either the LCV board of directors, LCV political advisory 
     committee, or the LCV political committee are leaders in the 
     following organizations:
       --Natural Resources Defense Council
       --Environmental Defense
       --Sierra Club
       --Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund
       --The Wilderness Society
       --Trust for Public Lands
       --Defenders of Wildlife
       --U.S. Public Interest Research Group
       --National Wildlife Federation
       --Environmental Working Group
       The LCV is an IRS registered 501(c)(4) organization 
     affiliated with the LCV Education Fund, a 501(c)(3) 
     organization. The LCV is also affiliated with a LCV political 
     action committee, a section 527 organization, and another 
     501(c)(4) organization, the LCV Accountability Project. The 
     LCV describes its affiliates as the ``LCV family of 
     organizations'' and describes its work as ``the political 
     voice of the national environmental movement and the only 
     organization devoted full-time to shaping a pro-environment 
     Congress and White House.'' Since 1996, a symbol of the 
     political activity of the LCV has been the Dirty Dozen list 
     it publishes each election year. The LCV represents that it 
     has defeated 28 of 49 candidates targeted by its Dirty Dozen 
     campaigns since 1996. Citing two examples from the 2000 
     election year, the LCV contends on its Web site,
       ``How much impact can LCV campaigns make on national 
     policy? In 2000, two of the most dangerous anti-
     environmentalists in the U.S. Senate--Spencer Abraham of 
     Michigan and Slade Gorton of Washington--were defeated by 
     less than 1% following major LCV campaigns. In a Congress 
     closely divided on the environment, these LCV victories can 
     make all the difference.''
       Senators Abraham of Michigan and Slade Gorton of Washington 
     were both Republicans running for reelection in 2000. In 
     fact, in 1996, the LCV spent a total of $1.5 million dollars 
     sending 254,000 direct mail pieces and airing 9,000 
     television and radio advertisements attempting to defeat its 
     Dirty Dozen list of eleven Republican congressional 
     candidates and one Democrat congressional candidate.
       In 1998, the LCV Dirty Dozen list targeted twelve 
     Republican congressional candidates and one Democrat 
     congressional candidate for defeat--spending a total of $2.3 
     million. The LCV spent in many cases over $200,000 per 
     congressional race--airing television and radio 
     advertisements and sending direct mail pieces. In the Nevada 
     Senate race, LCV aired a total of 661 individual television 
     airings against the Republican candidate. LCV spent up to 
     $420,000 in the Wisconsin Senate race against the Republican 
     candidate.
       In 2000, the LCV spent a total of $4 million--again 
     targeting eleven Republican congressional candidates and one 
     Democrat congressional candidate on its Dirty Dozen list. The 
     LCV spent up to $444,000 in the Washington Senate race, 
     $520,000 in the Virginia Senate race, and $705,000 in the 
     Michigan Senate race, all in an effort to defeat Republican 
     candidates. However, the LCV also reported spending $52,000 
     to attempt to defeat Congressman Traficant of Ohio for re-
     election, the only Democrat on the LCV Dirty Dozen for 2000. 
     Additionally, in May of 2000, the LCV endorsed Al Gore for 
     President.
       In 2002, the LCV again targeted eleven Republican 
     congressional candidates and one Democrat congressional 
     candidate with television and radio advertisements including 
     a television advertisement in the South Dakota Senate race 
     implying that the Republican candidate's environmental 
     positions were bought by campaign contributions. The LCV sent 
     thousands of direct mail pieces including 100,000 pieces 
     mailed in the Georgia Senate race and 75,000 pieces sent in 
     the New Hampshire Senate race--both against Republican 
     candidates. The LCV also joined other organizations and spent 
     a total of $570,000 against the New Hampshire Republican 
     Senate candidate. However, the strongest effort seems to have 
     been focused on the Colorado Senate contest. The LCV budgeted 
     a total of $700,000 for this race against incumbent 
     Republican Senator Wayne Allard. The LCV hired a campaign 
     staff of twelve against Senator Allard to coordinate phone 
     banks and precinct walks in addition to running television 
     and radio advertisements that LCV claims reached sixty-seven 
     percent of the state. altogether, the LCV is reported to have 
     spent $1,449,951 in independent expenditures during the 2002 
     election cycle. Of that total amount, LCV spent $1,313,041 
     benefitting Democrat candidates while only spending $136,910 
     for Republican candidates.
       Although the LCV has yet to release its completed Dirty 
     Dozen list for the 2004 campaign year at the time of this 
     report, it has released a Dirty Dozen list of eight 
     Congressional candidates, seven Republicans and one Democrat. 
     For the first time it has included the President and Vice 
     President on its Dirty Dozen list. The LCV has endorsed 
     forty-two candidates in Congressional elections in addition 
     to endorsing Senator John Kerry for President. In fact, the 
     LCV's endorsement of Senator Kerry is the earliest 
     endorsement of a Presidential contender in the thirty-four 
     year history of the LCV. Of the forty-two candidates endorsed 
     by the LCV at the time of this report, thirty-one are 
     Democrat candidates, and ten Republicans are candidates.
       As in previous election cycles, the LCV is active this year 
     airing political advertisements--already spending $100,000 to 
     elect a Democrat candidate in a Kentucky congressional 
     special election this year. The LCV is also reported to have 
     already spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on Senator 
     John Kerry's Presidential campaign including joining with 
     Environment2004, a 527 political organization, purchasing air 
     time in Florida and Washington, D.C. At the time of this 
     report, Environment2004 last reported to have raised over 
     $600,000 in the 2004 election cycle. The LCV's 527 
     organization last reported to have raised over $3.3 million 
     in the 2004 election cycle.
       However not all candidates appreciate LCV's help. The 
     senior senator from South Dakota is reported to have 
     specifically written LCV characterizing outside organization 
     advertisements, like those aired by LCV, as ``often too 
     negative, too personal, and lack any real substance.'' He 
     further requested that the LCV not air advertisements in the 
     South Dakota Senate contest this year.

[[Page 20533]]



                   Natural Resources Defense Council

       The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is an IRS 
     registered 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization affiliated with 
     the NRDC Action Fund, a 501(c)(4) organization. The NRDC is 
     also affiliated with the Environmental Accountability Fund, a 
     section 527 political organization. The NRDC's mission 
     statement is to ``safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants 
     and animals and the natural systems on which all life 
     depends;'' additionally, the NRDC describes itself as ``the 
     nation's most effective environmental action organization.
       Since the beginning of the Bush Administration, the NRDC 
     has compiled a ``Bush Record'' on its Web site characterizing 
     the Bush Administration as, ``in catering to industries that 
     put America's health and natural heritage at risk, threatens 
     to do more damage to our environmental protections than any 
     other in U.S. history.
       The NRDC has a long history of political activity. As early 
     as 1982, NRDC spent a record $2.5 million with other 
     environmental organizations on congressional and 
     gubernatorial races to ``oust Reagan supporters. The NRDC is 
     also involved in this year's Presidential race joining with 
     LCV and the Sierra Club to work against President Bush in the 
     state of New Mexico which has been characterized as a 
     ``battleground state'' this year. The Albuquerque Journal 
     reports that NRDC has already aired television and radio 
     advertisements against the Bush Administration's 
     environmental record joining the LCV and Sierra Club working 
     to hire their own campaign staffs against the Bush candidacy. 
     The NRDC's Environmental Accountability Fund, a 527 political 
     organization, is sponsoring political advertisements against 
     President Bush throughout New Mexico and other ``battle 
     ground states'' including Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. 
     Overall, at the time of this report, this 527 organization 
     has raised nearly $1 million in the 2004 election cycle.
       The NRDC 501(c)(3) organization, however, is also 
     nationally politically involved joining earlier this year 
     with Moveon.org, another section 527 political organization, 
     purchasing advertisements in the New York Times accusing the 
     Bush Administration of weakening regulations on drinking 
     water and air quality while soliciting contributions for the 
     NRDC 501(c)(3) affiliate.

                              Sierra Club

       The Sierra Club describes itself as ``America's oldest, 
     largest and most influential grassroots environmental 
     organization.'' With a reported membership of 700,000, the 
     Sierra Club is represented by a 501(c)(4) organization, a 
     section 527 political organization, and the 501(c)(3) Sierra 
     Club Foundation. In a September 27, 2004 article on the 
     interconnectedness of IRS designated 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 
     and 527 organizations this election year, the Washington Post 
     featured the Sierra Club as the prime example of this web 
     writing the following:
       ``Perhaps no one better illustrates the host of 
     interlocking roles than Carl Pope, one of the most 
     influential operatives on the Democratic side in the 2004 
     election. As executive direct of the Sierra Club, a major 
     501c(4) environmental lobby, Pope also controls the Sierra 
     Club Voter Education Fund, a 527. The Voter Education Fund 
     527 has raised $3.4 million this election cycle, with $2.4 
     million of that amount coming from the Sierra Club. A third 
     group, the Sierra Club PAC, has since 1980 given $3.9 million 
     to Democratic candidates and $173,602 to GOP candidates.
       ``These activities just touch the surface of Pope's 
     political involvement. In 2002-03, Pope helped found two 
     major 527 groups: America Votes, which was raised $1.9 
     million to coordinate the election activities of 32 liberal 
     groups, and America Coming Together (ACT), which has a goal 
     of raising more than $100 million to mobilize voters to cast 
     ballots against Bush. Finally, Pope is treasurer of a new 
     501c(3) foundation, America's Families United, which 
     reportedly has $15 million to distribute to voter 
     mobilization groups.
       ```I am in this as deeply as I am,' Pope said, `because I 
     think this country is in real peril.'''
       The Sierra Club is consistently critical of the Bush 
     Administration and it compiles a ``Sierra Club RAW 
     newsletter'' featuring ``The Uncooked Facts of the Bush 
     Assault on the Environment'' with regular criticisms of the 
     Bush Administration evironmental record and sometimes 
     expanding its criticisms to other officials as well. For 
     instance in its June 23, 2004 edition, the Sierra Club 
     accused Senator Inhofe of attempting to raise ``levels of 
     mercury pollution'' claiming the following: ``But wait--
     there's more. The Bush administration's weak air proposals 
     were not weak enough, it seems, for Senator James Inhofe, the 
     chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee. 
     Inhofe tried to raise the `acceptable' levels of mercury 
     pollution. . . .''
       Like NRDC's ``Bush Record,'' the Sierra Club has its own 
     ``W Watch'' where it features articles critical of the Bush 
     Administration on environmental issues to judicial 
     nominations. Sierra Club affiliated organizations such as 
     Earthjustice, which began as the Sierra Club Legal Defense 
     Fund, is also highly critical of the Bush Administration and 
     is regularly engaged in legal actions against the federal 
     government. In fact, in its most recent IRS filings, 
     Earthjustice describes eighty-six legal actions on a variety 
     of environmental related issues. Earthjustice also publishes 
     its own political information. It issued its ``Paybacks'' 
     report shortly before the 2002 elections that made such 
     explicit claims as, ``the Bush Administration is weakening 
     environmental laws in particular to help those industries 
     that paid to put it in office.''
       Like other environmental groups, the Sierra Club has a 
     history of involvement in political campaigns. In the 2000 
     Presidential contest, the Sierra Club spent several hundred 
     thousand dollars in advertisements attacking Candidate George 
     W. Bush's campaign throughout the country including what is 
     reported as the largest expenditure of a third party on 
     Spanish language advertisements. In the 2002 election cycle, 
     the Sierra Club is reported to have spent $265,772 in 
     independent expenditures all for Democratic candidates and 
     making no independent expenditures for Republican candidates. 
     Additionally, in the 2002 Senate races, the Sierra Club 
     endorsed nineteen Democrat incumbents and challengers and 
     endorsed no Republican candidates. In the 2002 races for the 
     U.S. House of Representatives, the Sierra Club endorsed one 
     hundred sixty-five Democrat incumbents and challengers and 
     endorsed ten Republican candidates.
       Like previous election years, the Sierra Club is heavily 
     involved in the 2004 political cycle. The Sierra Club began 
     spending early in the 2004 Presidential contest and is 
     reported to have spent at least $350,000 as early as late 
     2003 in advertisements against President Bush throughout the 
     country including in New Hampshire, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
     Pennsylvania, Florida, Nevada, and Nebraska. The Sierra Club 
     has made a series of endorsements in this year's political 
     contests, and like LCV, the Sierra Club has endorsed Senator 
     John Kerry for President. In Senate races, the Sierra Club 
     has endorsed sixteen Democrat Senate incumbents and 
     challengers and no Republican candidates. In races for the 
     U.S. House of Representatives, the Sierra Club has endorsed 
     one hundred fourteen Democrat incumbents and challengers and 
     has endorsed seven Republican candidates. At the time of this 
     report, the Sierra Club's 527 political organization claims 
     to have raised over $6.8 million for the 2004 election cycle 
     alone.

                               Greenpeace

       Greenpeace USA describes itself as ``the leading 
     independent campaigning organization that uses non-violent 
     direct action and creative communication to expose global 
     environmental problems and to promote solutions that are 
     essential to a green and peaceful future.'' It claims 250,000 
     members in the United States and 2.5 million members around 
     the world. Greenpeace USA is represented by Greenpeace, Inc., 
     a section 501(c)(4) organization and the Greenpeace Fund 
     Inc., a section 501(c)(3) organization.
       Greenpeace USA and its affiliate organizations through 
     Greenpeace International have received attention for many 
     years more through demonstrations than through political 
     endorsements. Press reports that have described some of 
     Greenpeace USA's demonstrations have included activists 
     rapelling down skyscrapers, occupying abandoned oil rigs, 
     intervening in whale hunts with inflatable rafts, and 
     illegally boarding ships while at sea, among other 
     demonstrations that often result in arrests and criminal 
     convictions for Greenpeace activists. In fact, on Earth Day 
     2001, Greenpeace USA founder John Passacantado was arrested 
     with the founder of the Rainforest Action Network for locking 
     themselves to a gate during a protest blockading the entrance 
     to the Environmental Protection Agency.
       Although, Greenpeace may be better known for its 
     demonstrations, its political views may be clear as it has 
     characterized President Bush as the ``toxic Texan,'' and hung 
     a banner from a water tower near the President's ranch in 
     Texas that read the same. Greenpeace has devoted much of its 
     Web site toward criticism of the Bush Administration equating 
     the Administration's environmental and conservation policies 
     to the ``Texas chainsaw massacre.''

                         Environmental Defense

       Environmental Defense describes itself as ``fighting to 
     protect human health, restore the oceans and ecosystems, and 
     curb global warming.'' Environmental Defense is represented 
     by two organizations: Environmental Defense, Inc., a 
     501(c)(3) organization and the Environmental Defense Action 
     Fund, Inc., a 501(c)(4) organization.
       Environmental Defense represents its work in a number of 
     issue campaigns for instance, increased air regulations, 
     increased regulation of ocean industries, strengthening 
     Endangered Species Act and adding additional listings, and 
     reversing global warming. Environmental Defense is involved 
     with various other environmental organizations such as the 
     Sierra Club on many other ``campaigns'' as well. All 
     ``campaigns'' are featured on its Web site or its 
     Action!Network Web site.
       Environmental Defense is regularly associated with other 
     politically involved environmental organizations as well such 
     as NRDC, Greenpeace, and LCV, among others, and its board of 
     directors not only includes the wife of the Democratic 
     Presidential nominee but also includes former Clinton 
     Administration

[[Page 20534]]

     officials involved in their own environmental organizations 
     regularly critical of the Bush Administration.


                              foundations

       The following are three of the foundations that regularly 
     contribute to the five environmental organizations referenced 
     in this report, among others.

                         Pew Charitable Trusts

       The Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew) are comprised of seven 
     separate trusts and reports it is an ``independent non-
     profit'' serving to ``inform the public on key issues and 
     trends, as a highly credible source of independent, non-
     partisan research and polling information and that its 
     environmental priorities include global warming, protecting 
     ocean life, and wilderness protection.'' In two of those 
     priorities in particular, global warming and wilderness 
     protection, Pew has joined and supported other organizations 
     and campaigns.
       In 1998, Pew created the Pew Center on Global Climate 
     Change. The Pew Center reports, ``the growing scientific 
     consensus is that this warming is largely the result of 
     emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from 
     human activities including industrial processes, fossil fuel 
     combustion, and changes in land use, such as deforestation.'' 
     Pew also sponsors the work of the Clear the air Campaign with 
     a $3.4 million grant in 1999, $4.3 million grant in 2000, 
     nearly $5 million grant in 2001, and $4.7 million grant in 
     2003 with which it published its Dirty Air, Dirty Power 
     report in June 2004 claiming, on the first page of the 
     publication, that coal burning power plants ``make people 
     sick and shorten the lives of thousands each year'' and 
     further claiming that ``President Bush has allowed polluters 
     to re-write clean air rules.''
       Concerning wilderness protection, Pew endorses the Heritage 
     Forests Campaign also highly critical of the Bush 
     Administration conservation policies, and, joining with the 
     Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense, the 
     Sierra Club, characterize the President's conservation 
     policies as ``Crazy George's National Forest Give-a-way, 
     Every Tree Must Go.''
       Since 1998, Pew has contributed several million dollars to 
     various environmental organizations. These contributions have 
     included nearly $18 million to Earthjustice, over $3 million 
     to NRDC, and over $3.7 million to Environmental Defense. Pew 
     has also contributed $32.6 million to the Tides Center and 
     foundation over the same period. The Tides organization has 
     contributed over $1.4 million to the Sierra Club and 
     affiliates, Greenpeace and affiliates, the NRDC, and the 
     Environmental Working Group since 1998.

                           Turner Foundation

       The Turner Foundation describes itself as ``a private, 
     independent family foundation committed to preventing damage 
     to the natural systems--water, air, and land--on which all 
     life depends.'' It was founded in 1990 by Ted Turner who is 
     Chairman of the Foundation Board of Trustees. The Turner 
     Foundation makes grants ``in the areas of the environment and 
     population.'' The Foundation is especially involved in the 
     issues of global warming and overpopulation, and supports the 
     work of its ``special projects'' which include the 
     Partnership Project which is comprised of twenty national 
     environmental groups. The Turner Foundation's other special 
     projects include the League of Conservation Voters Education 
     Fund, the NARAL Foundation, and Planned Parenthood Federation 
     of America.
       Since 1998, the Turner Foundation has contributed over $6.4 
     million to the Partnership Project that is comprised of the 
     League of Conservation Voters, Sierra Club, Earthjustice, 
     Environmental Defense, Natural Resources Defense council, and 
     Greenpeace among others. Individually, the Turner Foundation 
     has contributed more than $20 million to the LCV since 1998, 
     over $2.6 million to the NRDC, over $1 million to the Sierra 
     Club, nearly $2 million to the National Wildlife Federation, 
     and nearly $2 million to Environmental Defense, Earthjustice, 
     Greenpeace, and the Environmental Working Group.

                           Heinz foundations

       The Heinz foundations are comprised of several different 
     foundations, some established for specific purposes. Of the 
     Heinz family affiliated foundations, the largest contributors 
     to environmental organizations are the Howard Heinz 
     Endowment, Vira I. Heinz Endowment, and Heinz Family 
     Foundation.
       Ms. Teresa Heinz Kerry is either chairperson of the board 
     of trustees or member of the board of trustees on each 
     foundation. Ms. Heinz Kerry is the head of the $1.2 billion 
     Heinz Foundation endowment. Since 1998, these foundations 
     have contributed nearly $3 million to Environmental Defense, 
     the Sierra Club, the LCV, and the NRDC. Each foundation is 
     also a large contributor to the Tides Center and Tides 
     Foundation and affiliates contributing over $6 million since 
     1998. The Tides organization has in turn also contributed 
     over $1.4 million to the Sierra Club and affiliates, 
     Greenpeace and affiliates, the NRDC, and the Environment 
     Working Group over that same period.


                               conclusion

       This report does not represent the totality of 
     environmental groups engaged in political activity in this 
     election year or prior election years. It does not even 
     represent all the actions taken by the environmental groups 
     that are highlighted in this report each election year. 
     However, this report provides examples of some of the actions 
     taken by these groups and clearly questions any claims these 
     groups make concerning being ``non-partisan.'' These group 
     shave clearly established a record of partisanship and 
     clearly demonstrated each election cycle that they simply 
     have an agenda to work together against Republican candidates 
     and work to elect Democrat candidates. Additionally, these 
     groups are, in large part, annually financed by foundations 
     consistently supporting those groups' partisan efforts and in 
     some cases directly involved in partisan criticisms of the 
     Bush Administration. Moreover, these groups' activities 
     demonstrate the concern expressed in the Washington Post 
     article regarding political money this election year--money 
     ``slithering through on other routes as organizations 
     maintain various accounts, tripping over each other, shifting 
     money between 501(c)(3)'s, (c)(4)'s, and 527's.''
       Today's environmental groups are simply political machines 
     reporting millions in contributions and expenditures each 
     year for the purpose of raising more money to pursue their 
     agenda. Especially in this election year, the American voter 
     should see these groups and their many affiliate 
     organizations as they are--the newest insidious conspiracy of 
     political action committees and perhaps the newest multi-
     million dollar manipulation of federal election laws.
  Mr. INHOFE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me commend you for your leadership in 
presiding this evening. I realize it has been a very long evening and 
the Senator has been in the Chair for a long time.


    Amendments Nos. 3722, as modified, 3757, as modified, 3762, as 
modified, 3778, as modified, 3814, 3818, as modified, 3825, 3832, 3833, 
 as modified, 3836, 3841, 3859, as modified, 3860, 3867, as modified, 
                 3901, 3910, as modified, 3923 en bloc

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have a series of amendments that have 
been cleared on both sides of the aisle. I ask unanimous consent that 
the list of amendments that I send to the desk be agreed to with the 
modifications agreed to where indicated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments were agreed to, as follows:


                    amendment no. 3722, as modified

  (Purpose: To facilitate the utilization of United States commercial 
 remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and geospatial 
                       information requirements)

       At the end of subtitle A of title II, add the following:

     SEC. __. USE OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING SPACE 
                   CAPABILITIES FOR IMAGERY AND GEOSPATIAL 
                   INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     take actions to ensure, to the extent practicable, the 
     utilization of United States commercial remote sensing space 
     capabilities to fulfill the imagery and geospatial 
     information requirements of the intelligence community.
       (b) Procedures for Utilization.--The National Intelligence 
     Director may prescribe procedures for the purpose of meeting 
     the requirement in subsection (a).
       (c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``imagery'' 
     and ``geospatial information'' have the meanings given such 
     terms in section 467 of title 10, United States Code.


                    amendment no. 3757, as modified

 (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to report to 
    the Congress on the technological capabilities and equipment to 
         Transportation Security Administration field offices)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.  . TSA FIELD OFFICE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
                   TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORT.

       Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit a report to the 
     Congress, which may be transmitted in classified and redacted 
     formats, setting forth--
       (1) a descriptive list of each administrative and airport 
     site of the Transportation Security Administration, including 
     its location, staffing, and facilities;

[[Page 20535]]

       (2) an analysis of the information technology and 
     telecommunications capabilities, equipment, and support 
     available at each such site, including--
       (A) whether the site has access to broadband 
     telecommunications;
       (B) whether the site has the ability to access 
     Transportation Security Administration databases directly;
       (C) the means available to the site for communicating and 
     sharing information and other data on a real time basis with 
     the Transportation Security Administration's national, 
     regional, and State offices as well as with other 
     Transportation Security Administration sites;
       (D) the means available to the site for communicating with 
     other Federal, State, and local government sites with 
     transportation security related responsibilities; and
       (E) whether and to what extent computers in the site are 
     linked through a local area network or otherwise, and whether 
     the information technology resources available to the site 
     are adequate to enable it to carry out its functions and 
     purposes; and
       (3) an assessment of current and future needs of the 
     Transportation Security Administration to provide adequate 
     information technology and telecommunications facilities, 
     equipment, and support to its sites, and an estimate of the 
     costs of meeting those needs.


                    amendment no. 3762, as modified

 (Purpose: To improve information sharing by the national intelligence 
                                centers)

       On page 97, line 10, insert before the period the 
     following: ``, including through the establishment of 
     mechanisms for the sharing of information and analysis among 
     and between national intelligence centers having adjacent or 
     significantly interrelated geographic regions or functional 
     areas of intelligence responsibility''.


                    amendment no. 3778, as modified

 (Purpose: To improve the management of the personnel of the National 
                        Intelligence Authority)

       On page 113, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:
       (b) Termination of Employees.--(1) Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, the National Intelligence Director 
     may, in the discretion of the Director, terminate the 
     employment of any officer or employee of the National 
     Intelligence Authority whenever the Director considers the 
     termination of employment of such officer or employee 
     necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.
       (2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee 
     under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer 
     or employee to seek or accept employment in any other 
     department, agency, or element of the United States 
     Government if declared eligible for such employment by the 
     Office of Personnel Management.
       On page 113, line 18, strike ``(b) Rights and Protections'' 
     and insert ``(c) Other Rights and Protections''.
       On page 113, after line 24, add the following:
       (d) Regulations.--The National Intelligence Director shall 
     prescribe regulations on the application of the authorities, 
     rights, and protections in and made applicable by subsections 
     (a), (b), and (c), to the personnel of the National 
     Intelligence Authority.


                           amendment no. 3814

 (Purpose: To provide the sense of Congress that United States foreign 
   assistance should be provided to South Asia, Southeast Asia, West 
Africa, the Horn of Africa, North and North Central Africa, the Arabian 
peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe, and South America to prevent the 
                establishment of terrorist sanctuaries)

       On page __, between lines __ and __, insert the following:
       (2) regions of specific concern where United States foreign 
     assistance should be targeted to assist governments in 
     efforts to prevent the use of such regions as terrorist 
     sanctuaries are South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Africa, the 
     Horn of Africa, North and North Central Africa, the Arabian 
     peninsula, Central and Eastern Europe, and South America;


                    AMENDMENT NO. 3818, AS MODIFIED

       At the appropriate place, insert:

     SEC. __. NATIONWIDE INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK.

       (a) In General.--Within one year of enactment, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 
     Federal Communications Commission and the National 
     Telecommunications and Information Administration, shall 
     complete a study assessing potential technical and 
     operational standards and protocols for a nationwide 
     interoperable communications network (referred to in this 
     section as the ``Network'') that may be used by Federal, 
     State, and local governmental and non-governmental public 
     safety, homeland security, and other first responder 
     personnel. The assessment shall be consistent with the 
     SAFECOM national strategy as developed by the public safety 
     community in cooperation with SAFECOM and the DHS 
     Interoperability Office. The Secretary shall report the 
     results of the study to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation, the Senate Committee on 
     Governmental Affairs, the House of Representatives Committee 
     on Energy and Commerce, and the House of Representatives 
     Select Committee on Homeland Security.
       (b) Consultation and Use of Commercial Technologies.--In 
     assessing standards and protocols pursuant to paragraph (a), 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security shall--
       (1) seek input from representatives of the user communities 
     regarding the operation and administration of the Network; 
     and
       (2) consider use of commercial wireless technologies to the 
     greatest extent practicable.


                           amendment no. 3825

   (Purpose: To permit reviews of criminal records of applicants for 
                  private security officer employment)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 
                   ACT OF 2004.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
     ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 
     2004''.
       (b) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) employment of private security officers in the United 
     States is growing rapidly;
       (2) private security officers function as an adjunct to, 
     but not a replacement for, public law enforcement by, among 
     other things, helping to protect critical infrastructure, 
     including hospitals, manufacturing facilities, defense and 
     aerospace contractors, nuclear power plants, chemical 
     companies, oil and gas refineries, airports, communication 
     facilities and operations, and others;
       (3) the 9-11 Commission Report says that ``Private sector 
     preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business 
     in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous 
     potential cost in lives, money, and national security'' and 
     endorsed adoption of the American National Standards 
     Institute's standard for private preparedness;
       (4) part of improving private sector preparedness is 
     mitigating the risks of terrorist attack on critical 
     infrastructure by ensuring that private security officers who 
     protect those facilities are properly screened to determine 
     their suitability;
       (5) the American public deserves the employment of 
     qualified, well-trained private security personnel as an 
     adjunct to sworn law enforcement officers; and
       (6) private security officers and applicants for private 
     security officer positions should be thoroughly screened and 
     trained.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes both a 
     current employee and an applicant for employment as a private 
     security officer.
       (2) Authorized employer.--The term ``authorized employer'' 
     means any person that--
       (A) employs private security officers; and
       (B) is authorized by regulations promulgated by the 
     Attorney General to request a criminal history record 
     information search of an employee through a State 
     identification bureau pursuant to this section.
       (3) Private security officer.-- The term ``private security 
     officer''--
       (A) means an individual other than an employee of a 
     Federal, State, or local government, whose primary duty is to 
     perform security services, full- or part-time, for 
     consideration, whether armed or unarmed and in uniform or 
     plain clothes (except for services excluded from coverage 
     under this section if the Attorney General determines by 
     regulation that such exclusion would serve the public 
     interest); but
       (B) does not include--
       (i) employees whose duties are primarily internal audit or 
     credit functions;
       (ii) employees of electronic security system companies 
     acting as technicians or monitors; or
       (iii) employees whose duties primarily involve the secure 
     movement of prisoners.
       (4) Security services.--The term ``security services'' 
     means acts to protect people or property as defined by 
     regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
       (5) State identification bureau.--The term ``State 
     identification bureau'' means the State entity designated by 
     the Attorney General for the submission and receipt of 
     criminal history record information.
       (d) Criminal History Record Information Search.--
       (1) In general.--
       (A) Submission of fingerprints.--An authorized employer may 
     submit to the State identification bureau of a participating 
     State, fingerprints or other means of positive 
     identification, as determined by the Attorney General, of an 
     employee of such employer for purposes of a criminal history 
     record information search pursuant to this section.
       (B) Employee rights.--
       (i) Permission.--An authorized employer shall obtain 
     written consent from an employee to submit to the State 
     identification bureau of a participating State the request to 
     search the criminal history record information of the 
     employee under this section.
       (ii) Access.--An authorized employer shall provide to the 
     employee confidential access to any information relating to 
     the employee received by the authorized employer pursuant to 
     this section.

[[Page 20536]]

       (C) Providing information to the state identification 
     bureau.--Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history 
     record information search from an authorized employer 
     pursuant to this section, submitted through the State 
     identification bureau of a participating State, the Attorney 
     General shall--
       (i) search the appropriate records of the Criminal Justice 
     Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation; and
       (ii) promptly provide any resulting identification and 
     criminal history record information to the submitting State 
     identification bureau requesting the information.
       (D) Use of information.--
       (i) In general.--Upon receipt of the criminal history 
     record information from the Attorney General by the State 
     identification bureau, the information shall be used only as 
     provided in clause (ii).
       (ii) Terms.--In the case of--

       (I) a participating State that has no State standards for 
     qualification to be a private security officer, the State 
     shall notify an authorized employer as to the fact of whether 
     an employee has been--

       (aa) convicted of a felony, an offense involving dishonesty 
     or a false statement if the conviction occurred during the 
     previous 10 years, or an offense involving the use or 
     attempted use of physical force against the person of another 
     if the conviction occurred during the previous 10 years; or
       (bb) charged with a criminal felony for which there has 
     been no resolution during the preceding 365 days; or

       (II) a participating State that has State standards for 
     qualification to be a private security officer, the State 
     shall use the information received pursuant to this section 
     in applying the State standards and shall only notify the 
     employer of the results of the application of the State 
     standards.

       (E) Frequency of requests.--An authorized employer may 
     request a criminal history record information search for an 
     employee only once every 12 months of continuous employment 
     by that employee unless the authorized employer has good 
     cause to submit additional requests.
       (2) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue such 
     final or interim final regulations as may be necessary to 
     carry out this section, including--
       (A) measures relating to the security, confidentiality, 
     accuracy, use, submission, dissemination, destruction of 
     information and audits, and recordkeeping;
       (B) standards for qualification as an authorized employer; 
     and
       (C) the imposition of reasonable fees necessary for 
     conducting the background checks.
       (3) Criminal penalties for use of information.--Whoever 
     knowingly and intentionally uses any information obtained 
     pursuant to this section other than for the purpose of 
     determining the suitability of an individual for employment 
     as a private security officer shall be fined under title 18, 
     United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, 
     or both.
       (4) User fees.--
       (A) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may--
       (i) collect fees to process background checks provided for 
     by this section; and
       (ii) establish such fees at a level to include an 
     additional amount to defray expenses for the automation of 
     fingerprint identification and criminal justice information 
     services and associated costs.
       (B) Limitations.--Any fee collected under this subsection--
       (i) shall, consistent with Public Law 101-515 and Public 
     Law 104-99, be credited to the appropriation to be used for 
     salaries and other expenses incurred through providing the 
     services described in such Public Laws and in subparagraph 
     (A);
       (ii) shall be available for expenditure only to pay the 
     costs of such activities and services; and
       (iii) shall remain available until expended.
       (C) State costs.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed as restricting the right of a State to assess a 
     reasonable fee on an authorized employer for the costs to the 
     State of administering this section.
       (5) State opt out.--A State may decline to participate in 
     the background check system authorized by this section by 
     enacting a law or issuing an order by the Governor (if 
     consistent with State law) providing that the State is 
     declining to participate pursuant to this paragraph.


                           amendment no. 3832

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.    . COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY.

       (a) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     ``equipment interoperability'' means the devices that support 
     the ability of public safety service and support providers to 
     talk with each other via voice and data on demand, in real 
     time, when needed, and when authorized.
       (b) National Guidelines for Equipment Interoperability.--
     Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation 
     with the Federal Communications Commission and the National 
     Telecommunications and Information Administration, and other 
     appropriate representatives of Federal, State, and local 
     government and first responders, shall adopt, by regulation, 
     national goals and guideline for equipment interoperability 
     and related issues that--
       (1) set short-term, mid-term, and long-term means and 
     minimum equipment performance guidelines for Federal 
     agencies, States, and local governments;
       (2) recognize--
       (A) the value, life cycle, and technical capabilities of 
     existing communications infrastructure;
       (B) the need for cross-border interoperability between 
     States and nations;
       (C) the unique needs of small, rural communities; and
       (D) the interoperability needs for daily operations and 
     catastrophic events.
       (c) National Equipment Interoperability Implementation 
     Plan.--
       (1) Development.--Not later than 180 days of the completion 
     of the development of goals and guidelines under subsection 
     (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop an 
     implementation plan that--
       (A) outlines the responsibilities of the Department of 
     Homeland Security; and
       (B) focuses on providing technical and financial assistance 
     to States and local governments for interoperability planning 
     and implementation.
       (2) Execution.--The Secretary shall execute the plan 
     developed under this subsection as soon as practicable.
       (3) Reports.--
       (A) Initial report.--Upon the completion of the plan under 
     subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit a report that 
     describes such plan to--
       (i) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
       (ii) the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the 
     Senate;
       (iii) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate;
       (iv) the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
     of Representatives; and
       (v) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (B) Annual report.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     submission of the report under subparagraph (A), and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the 
     committees referred to in subparagraph (A) that describes the 
     progress made in implementing the plan developed under this 
     subsection.
       (d) International Interoperability.--Not later than 1 year 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     establish a mechanism for coordinating cross-border 
     interoperability issues between--
       (1) the United States and Canada; and
       (2) the United States and Mexico.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 
     2009--
       (1) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection 
     (b);
       (2) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection 
     (c); and
       (3) such sums as may be necessary to carry out subsection 
     (d).


                    amendment no. 3833, as modified

(Purpose: To require a report on the implementation of recommendations 
   of the Defense Science Board on preventing and defending against 
                      clandestine nuclear attack)

       On page 153, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 207. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
                   DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD ON PREVENTING AND 
                   DEFENDING AGAINST CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the June 2004 report of 
     the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and 
     Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack--
       (1) found that it would be easy for adversaries to 
     introduce and detonate a nuclear explosive clandestinely in 
     the United States;
       (2) found that clandestine nuclear attack and defense 
     against such attack should be treated as an emerging aspect 
     of strategic warfare and that those matters warrant national 
     and Department of Defense attention; and
       (3) called for a serious national commitment to a 
     multidepartment program to create a multi-element, layered, 
     global, civil/military complex of systems and capabilities 
     that can greatly reduce the likelihood of a successful 
     clandestine attack, achieving levels of protection effective 
     enough to warrant the effort.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Energy, submit to the 
     Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives a report on the actions proposed to be taken 
     to address the recommendations of the Defense Science Board 
     Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine 
     Nuclear Attack.


                           amendment no. 3836

  (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to award 
       grants to improve first responder communications systems)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

[[Page 20537]]



     SEC. __. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM GRANTS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may 
     award grants, on a competitive basis, to States, local 
     governments, local law enforcement agencies, and local fire 
     departments to--
       (1) improve communication systems to allow for real time, 
     interoperable communication between State and local first 
     responders; or
       (2) purchase communication systems that allow for real 
     time, interoperable communication between State and local 
     first responders.
       (b) Application.--Any State, local government, local law 
     enforcement agency, or local fire department desiring a grant 
     under this section shall submit an application to the 
     Secretary at such time, in such manner, and containing such 
     information as the Secretary may reasonably require.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums necessary for each of the fiscal 
     years 2005 through 2009 to carry out the provisions of this 
     section.


                    amendment no. 3859, as modified

       On page 94, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:
       (3) There may be established under this subsection one or 
     more national intelligence centers having intelligence 
     responsibility for the following:
       (A) The nuclear terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       (B) The chemical terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       (C) The biological terrorism threats confronting the United 
     States.
       On page 94, line 15, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.


                           amendment no. 3860

(Purpose: To improve the working relationship between the intelligence 
   community and the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
                                Center)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE OF NISAC CAPABILITIES.

       The National Intelligence Director shall establish a formal 
     relationship, including information sharing, between the 
     intelligence community and the National Infrastructure 
     Simulation and Analysis Center. Through this relationship, 
     the intelligence community shall take full advantage of the 
     capabilities of the National Infrastructure Simulation and 
     Analysis Center, particularly vulnerability and consequence 
     analysis, for real time response to reported threats and long 
     term planning for projected threats.


                    amendment no. 3867, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. TERRORISM FINANCING.

       (a) Report on Terrorist Financing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report 
     evaluating the current state of United States efforts to 
     curtail the international financing of terrorism.
       (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     evaluate and make recommendations on--
       (A) the effectiveness and efficiency of current United 
     States governmental efforts and methods to detect, track, 
     disrupt, and stop terrorist financing;
       (B) the relationship between terrorist financing and money 
     laundering, including how the laundering of proceeds related 
     to illegal narcotics or foreign political corruption may 
     contribute to terrorism or terrorist financing;
       (C) the nature, effectiveness, and efficiency of current 
     efforts to coordinate intelligence and agency operations 
     within the United States Government to detect, track, 
     disrupt, and stop terrorist financing, including identifying 
     who, if anyone, has primary responsibility for developing 
     priorities, assigning tasks to agencies, and monitoring the 
     implementation of policy and operations;
       (D) the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to protect 
     the critical infrastructure of the United States financial 
     system, and ways to improve the effectiveness of financial 
     institutions;
       (E) ways to improve multilateral and international 
     governmental cooperation on terrorist financing, including 
     the adequacy of agency coordination within the United States 
     related to participating in international cooperative efforts 
     and implementing international treaties and compacts; and
       (F) ways to improve the setting of priorities and 
     coordination of United States efforts to detect, track, 
     disrupt, and stop terrorist financing, including 
     recommendations for changes in executive branch organization 
     or procedures, legislative reforms, additional resources, or 
     use of appropriated funds.
       (b) Postemployment Restriction for Certain Bank and Thrift 
     Examiners.--Section 10 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
     (12 U.S.C. 1820) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(k) One-year Restrictions on Federal Examiners of 
     Financial Institutions.--
       ``(1) In general.--In addition to other applicable 
     restrictions set forth in title 18, United States Code, the 
     penalties set forth in paragraph (6) of this subsection shall 
     apply to any person who--
       ``(A) was an officer or employee (including any special 
     Government employee) of a Federal banking agency or a Federal 
     reserve bank;
       ``(B) served 2 or more months during the final 12 months of 
     his or her employment with such agency or entity as the 
     senior examiner (or a functionally equivalent position) of a 
     depository institution or depository institution holding 
     company with continuing, broad responsibility for the 
     examination (or inspection) of that depository institution or 
     depository institution holding company on behalf of the 
     relevant agency or Federal reserve bank; and
       ``(C) within 1 year after the termination date of his or 
     her service or employment with such agency or entity, 
     knowingly accepts compensation as an employee, officer, 
     director, or consultant from--
       ``(i) such depository institution, any depository 
     institution holding company that controls such depository 
     institution, or any other company that controls such 
     depository institution; or
       ``(ii) such depository institution holding company or any 
     depository institution that is controlled by such depository 
     institution holding company.
       ``(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `depository institution' includes an 
     uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank, if such branch 
     or agency is located in any State; and
       ``(B) the term `depository institution holding company' 
     includes any foreign bank or company described in section 
     8(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978.
       ``(3) Rules of construction.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, a foreign bank shall be deemed to control any 
     branch or agency of the foreign bank, and a person shall be 
     deemed to act as a consultant for a depository institution, 
     depository institution holding company, or other company, 
     only if such person directly works on matters for, or on 
     behalf of, such depository institution, depository 
     institution holding company, or other company.
       ``(4) Regulations.--
       ``(A) In general.--Each Federal banking agency shall 
     prescribe rules or regulations to administer and carry out 
     this subsection, including rules, regulations, or guidelines 
     to define the scope of persons referred to in paragraph 
     (1)(B).
       ``(B) Consultation required.--The Federal banking agencies 
     shall consult with each other for the purpose of assuring 
     that the rules and regulations issued by the agencies under 
     subparagraph (A) are, to the extent possible, consistent and 
     comparable and practicable, taking into account any 
     differences in the supervisory programs utilized by the 
     agencies for the supervision of depository institutions and 
     depository institution holding companies.
       ``(5) Waiver.--
       ``(A) Agency authority.--A Federal banking agency may grant 
     a waiver, on a case by case basis, of the restriction imposed 
     by this subsection to any officer or employee (including any 
     special Government employee) of that agency, and the Board of 
     Governors of the Federal Reserve System may grant a waiver of 
     the restriction imposed by this subsection to any officer or 
     employee of a Federal reserve bank, if the head of such 
     agency certifies in writing that granting the waiver would 
     not affect the integrity of the supervisory program of the 
     relevant Federal banking agency.
       ``(B) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the head 
     of an agency is--
       ``(i) the Comptroller of the Currency, in the case of the 
     Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;
       ``(ii) the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System, in the case of the Board of Governors 
     of the Federal Reserve System;
       ``(iii) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, in the 
     case of the Corporation; and
       ``(iv) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in 
     the case of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
       ``(6) Penalties.--
       ``(A) In general.--In addition to any other administrative, 
     civil, or criminal remedy or penalty that may otherwise 
     apply, whenever a Federal banking agency determines that a 
     person subject to paragraph (1) has become associated, in the 
     manner described in paragraph (1)(C), with a depository 
     institution, depository institution holding company, or other 
     company for which such agency serves as the appropriate 
     Federal banking agency, the agency shall impose upon such 
     person one or more of the following penalties:
       ``(i) Industry-wide prohibition order.--The Federal banking 
     agency shall serve a written notice or order in accordance 
     with and subject to the provisions of section 8(e)(4) for 
     written notices or orders under paragraphs (1) or (2) of 
     section 8(e), upon such person of the intention of the 
     agency--

       ``(I) to remove such person from office or to prohibit such 
     person from further participation in the conduct of the 
     affairs of the depository institution, depository institution 
     holding company, or other company for a period of up to 5 
     years; and

[[Page 20538]]

       ``(II) to prohibit any further participation by such 
     person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any 
     insured depository institution for a period of up to 5 years.

       ``(ii) Civil monetary fine.--The Federal banking agency 
     may, in an administrative proceeding or civil action in an 
     appropriate United States district court, impose on such 
     person a civil monetary penalty of not more than $250,000. In 
     lieu of an action by the Federal banking agency under this 
     clause, the Attorney General of the United States may bring a 
     civil action under this clause in the appropriate United 
     States district court. Any administrative proceeding under 
     this clause shall be conducted in accordance with section 
     8(i).
       ``(B) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an 
     order issued under subparagraph (A)(i) shall be subject to 
     paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 8(e) in the same manner and 
     to the same extent as a person subject to an order issued 
     under such section.
       ``(C) Definitions.--Solely for purposes of this paragraph, 
     the `appropriate Federal banking agency' for a company that 
     is not a depository institution or depository institution 
     holding company shall be the Federal banking agency on whose 
     behalf the person described in paragraph (1) performed the 
     functions described in paragraph (1)(B).''.
       (c) Postemployment Restriction for Certain Credit Union 
     Examiners.--Section 206 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 
     U.S.C. 1786) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(w) One-year Restrictions on Federal Examiners of Insured 
     Credit Unions.--
       ``(1) In general.--In addition to other applicable 
     restrictions set forth in title 18, United States Code, the 
     penalties set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection shall 
     apply to any person who--
       ``(A) was an officer or employee (including any special 
     Government employee) of the Administration;
       ``(B) served 2 or more months during the final 12 months of 
     his or her employment with the Administration as the senior 
     examiner (or a functionally equivalent position) of an 
     insured credit union with continuing, broad responsibility 
     for the examination (or inspection) of that insured credit 
     union on behalf of the Administration; and
       ``(C) within 1 year after the termination date of his or 
     her service or employment with the Administration, knowingly 
     accepts compensation as an employee, officer, director, or 
     consultant from such insured credit union.
       ``(2) Rule of construction.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, a person shall be deemed to act as a consultant 
     for an insured credit union only if such person directly 
     works on matters for, or on behalf of, such insured credit 
     union.
       ``(3) Regulations.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Board shall prescribe rules or 
     regulations to administer and carry out this subsection, 
     including rules, regulations, or guidelines to define the 
     scope of persons referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
       ``(B) Consultation.--In prescribing rules or regulations 
     under this paragraph, the Board shall, to the extent it deems 
     necessary, consult with the Federal banking agencies (as 
     defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) on 
     regulations issued by such agencies in carrying out section 
     10(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
       ``(4) Waiver.--
       ``(A) Agency authority.--The Board may grant a waiver, on a 
     case by case basis, of the restriction imposed by this 
     subsection to any officer or employee (including any special 
     Government employee) of the Administration if the Chairman 
     certifies in writing that granting the waiver would not 
     affect the integrity of the supervisory program of the 
     Administration.
       ``(5) Penalties.--
       ``(A) In general.--In addition to any other administrative, 
     civil, or criminal remedy or penalty that may otherwise 
     apply, whenever the Board determines that a person subject to 
     paragraph (1) has become associated, in the manner described 
     in paragraph (1)(C), with an insured credit union, the Board 
     shall impose upon such person one or more of the following 
     penalties:
       ``(i) Industry-wide prohibition order.--The Board shall 
     serve a written notice or order in accordance with and 
     subject to the provisions of subsection (g)(4) for written 
     notices or orders under paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection 
     (g), upon such person of the intention of the Board--

       ``(I) to remove such person from office or to prohibit such 
     person from further participation in the conduct of the 
     affairs of the insured credit union for a period of up to 5 
     years; and
       ``(II) to prohibit any further participation by such 
     person, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any 
     insured credit union for a period of up to 5 years.

       ``(ii) Civil monetary fine.--The Board may, in an 
     administrative proceeding or civil action in an appropriate 
     United States district court, impose on such person a civil 
     monetary penalty of not more than $250,000. In lieu of an 
     action by the Board under this clause, the Attorney General 
     of the United States may bring a civil action under this 
     clause in the appropriate United States district court. Any 
     administrative proceeding under this clause shall be 
     conducted in accordance with subsection (k).
       ``(B) Scope of prohibition order.--Any person subject to an 
     order issued under this subparagraph (A)(i) shall be subject 
     to paragraphs (5) and (7) of subsection (g) in the same 
     manner and to the same extent as a person subject to an order 
     issued under subsection (g).''.
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 341, 
     subsection (a) shall become effective on the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and the amendments made by subsections 
     (b) and (c) shall become effective at the end of the 12-month 
     period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, 
     whether or not final regulations are issued in accordance 
     with the amendments made by this section as of that date of 
     enactment.
       (e) Repeal of Duplicative Provision.--Section __16(c) of 
     this Act, entitled ``Report on Terrorist Financing'' is 
     repealed, and shall have no force or effect, effective on the 
     date of enactment of this Act.


                           amendment no. 3901

   (Purpose: To require certain overdue reports relating to maritime 
  security to be transmitted to the Congress within 90 days, and for 
                            other purposes)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF CERTAIN PLANS, REPORTS, 
                   AND ASSESSMENTS.

       (a) Strategic Plan Reports.--Within 90 days after the date 
     of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall transmit to the Congress--
       (1) a report on the status of the National Maritime 
     Transportation Security Plan required by section 70103(a) of 
     title 46, United States Code, which may be submitted in 
     classified and redacted format;
       (2) a comprehensive program management plan that identifies 
     specific tasks to be completed and deadlines for completion 
     for the transportation security card program under section 
     70105 of title 46, United States Code that incorporates best 
     practices for communicating, coordinating, and collaborating 
     with the relevant stakeholders to resolve relevant issues, 
     such as background checks;
       (3) a report on the status of negotiations under section 
     103 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 
     U.S.C. 70111 note);
       (4) the report required by section 107(b) of the Maritime 
     Transportation Security Act of 2002 (33 U.S.C. 1226 note); 
     and
       (5) a report on the status of the development of the system 
     and program mandated by section 111 of the Maritime 
     Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 70116 note).
       (b) Other Reports.--Within 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act--
       (1) the Secretary of Homeland Security shall transmit to 
     the Congress--
       (A) a report on the establishment of the National Maritime 
     Security Advisory Committee appointed under section 70112 of 
     title 46, United States Code; and
       (B) a report on the status of the program established under 
     section 70116 of title 46, United States Code, to evaluate 
     and certify security systems of international intermodal 
     transportation;
       (2) the Secretary of Transportation shall transmit to the 
     Congress the annual report required by section 905 of the 
     International Maritime and Port Security Act (46 U.S.C. App. 
     1802) that includes information that should have been 
     included in the last preceding annual report that was due 
     under that section; and
       (3) the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall 
     transmit to Congress the report required by section 110(b) of 
     the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 
     70101 note).
       (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, this section takes effect on the date of enactment 
     of this Act.


                    amendment no. 3910, as modified

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO THREATS.

       (a) Report.--Within 180 days after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 
     with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the 
     Federal Aviation Administration, shall submit a report to the 
     Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the 
     Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Select 
     Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives that contains the following:
       (1) A description of the current procedures in place to 
     address the threat of an inbound all-cargo aircraft from 
     outside the United States that intelligence sources indicate 
     could carry explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological or 
     nuclear devices.
       (2) An analysis of the potential for establishing secure 
     facilities along established international aviation routes 
     for the purposes of diverting and securing aircraft described 
     in paragraph (1).
       (b) Report Format.--The Secretary may submit all, or part, 
     of the report required by

[[Page 20539]]

     this section in classified and redacted form if the Secretary 
     determines that it is appropriate or necessary.


                           amendment no. 3923

    (Purpose: To ensure the balance of privacy and civil liberties)

       On page 154, strike lines 1 through 3 and insert the 
     following:
       (1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes 
     to protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need 
     for such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy 
     and civil liberties; and
       On page 155, line 6 strike beginning with ``has'' through 
     line 9 and insert the following: ``has established--
       ``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.
       On page 166, strike lines 4 through 6 and insert the 
     following: ``element has established--
       ``(i) that the need for the power is balanced with the need 
     to protect privacy and civil liberties;''.


                    Amendment No. 3867, as modified

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the managers of the intelligence 
reform bill, S. 2845, for accepting an amendment offered by myself and 
Senator Coleman on the issue of terrorist financing. This amendment, 
amendment No. 3867, was developed in coordination with Senators Collins 
and Lieberman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senators Shelby 
and Sarbanes of the Banking Committee. I thank each of my colleagues 
for their guidance and assistance which has enabled us to fashion a 
good amendment with bipartisan support and offer it to the bill today.
  This amendment is the result of an extensive investigation by the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, initiated at my request, into 
money laundering allegations involving Riggs Bank, a nationally 
chartered bank located right here in the Nation's Capital. Our 
investigation found a bank which routinely allowed highly questionable 
transactions with few questions asked. Some of these transactions 
involved millions of dollars in cash or suspicious wire transfers; 
others have raised serious concerns about possible terrorist financing.
  We live in a post-9/11 world. After the attack on America, we 
strengthened our antimoney laundering laws, in part, because Osama bin 
Laden boasted that his modern new recruits knew the ``cracks'' in 
``Western financial systems'' like they knew the ``lines in their 
hands.'' That chilling statement helped fuel a new effort to strengthen 
our defenses against terrorists, corrupt dictators, and others who 
would use our financial systems against us. Part of that effort was 
Congress' enactment of the PATRIOT Act which, in title III, 
strengthened U.S. laws to stop money laundering, foreign corruption, 
and terrorist financing.
  Even before the PATRIOT Act, we had laws and regulations to stop 
money laundering. In fact, since 1987, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, OCC, has required nationally chartered banks to establish 
anti-money laundering programs to ensure the banking system is not 
misused by criminals. The PATRIOT Act was intended to build on that 
existing foundation to further strengthen our defenses against money 
launderers.
  Our investigation found that Riggs Bank ignored its antimoney 
laundering obligations before the PATRIOT Act, and continued to ignore 
them afterward. We found that the bank didn't get serious in part 
because, in the past, when bank regulators pointed out problems with 
Riggs' antimoney laundering controls, if the bank promised to do 
better, the regulators let it go. The regulators tolerated the bank's 
weak antimoney laundering program, continued to accept excuses when 
deficiencies were not corrected, and continued to hold off on tough 
enforcement measures.
  We were particularly surprised to learn that the OCC examiner-in-
charge who oversaw Riggs Bank for 4 years, from 1998 to 2002, appeared 
to function at times as more of an advocate for the bank than an arms-
length regulator. The investigation found, for example, that in 2001, 
the examiner-in-charge advised more senior OCC personnel against taking 
a formal enforcement action against Riggs for its lax antimoney 
laundering program, because the bank had promised to do better. In 
2002, after subordinate examiners had uncovered troubling transactions 
and bank accounts involving Augusto Pinochet, the former President of 
Chile, and actions by Riggs to hide those accounts from the OCC for 2 
years, the examiner-in-charge ordered the examination materials not to 
be included in the OCC's electronic database, even though such 
materials are normally placed in that database. The examination 
materials were instead saved in paper form, making it much more 
difficult for subsequent examiners to learn about the Pinochet 
examination. About a month after giving this order, that same Examiner-
in-Charge was offered a job at Riggs. He later retired from the OCC and 
3 days after retiring, took a senior position with Riggs.
  These actions--advising against a formal enforcement action, 
suppressing the Pinochet examination materials, and accepting a job 
offer at the bank he regulated, among others--raise serious conflict of 
interest concerns. Federal bank examiners are our first line of defense 
against money laundering and terrorist financing at U.S. banks, and we 
can't allow their independence to be undermined by the lure of a job at 
the banks they oversee.
  The 9/11 Commission report notes the important role that stopping 
terrorist financing plays in our counterterror-
ism efforts. It explicitly recommends that U.S. antiterrorist financing 
programs remain ``front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.'' 
Subcommittee hearings and a report released by my staff in July of this 
year support that recommendation and offer a detailed legislative 
record demonstrating the need for new measures to further strengthen 
federal oversight of the antimoney laundering programs at our financial 
institutions.
  The Levin-Coleman amendment would strengthen U.S. anti-terrorist 
financing efforts in two ways. First, it would require the President, 
through the Treasury Secretary, to take a hard look at the current 
state of U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing and issue a report 
in 6 months with recommendations for reforms. One of the most important 
issues to be addressed is improving our process for setting priorities 
and coordinating U.S. agency efforts to detect, track, disrupt, and 
stop terrorist financing. It is far from clear today, when it comes to 
combating terrorist financing, what U.S. agency official, if any, has 
primary responsibility for developing priorities, assigning tasks to 
agencies, and monitoring the implementation of policy and operations.
  Secondly, the amendment would impose a 1-year cooling off period 
before a senior Federal examiner may take a job with a financial 
institution that he or she was responsible for overseeing. This cooling 
off period is similar to one already in place for Federal procurement 
officials under 41 U.S. 423(d). Members of Congress, Congressional 
staff, and many other Federal employees already operate under cooling 
off periods, which have been in place for years and have had a 
beneficial effect. Our amendment would apply a new cooling off period 
to senior federal bank examiners like the OCC examiner who oversaw 
Riggs.
  John D. Hawke, Jr., U.S. Comptroller of the Currency and head of the 
OCC, which served as the primary regulator of Riggs, has expressed 
strong support for legislation imposing a 1-year cooling off period for 
senior Federal examiners, stating in a memorandum to OCC staff that 
``when an OCC examiner, with no break in continuity, takes employment 
with a bank he or she has been supervising, there are inevitably 
questions that will be asked and suspicions raised.'' He apparently 
wanted to impose a cooling off period on OCC examiners 4 years ago but 
was advised that he lacked the statutory authority to do so. The report 
released by my subcommittee staff in July also recommends enacting a 1-
year cooling off period for bank examiners. Similar legislation, 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-
Ill., and Rep. Sue Kelly, R-NY, was recently approved by the House 
Financial Services Committee for inclusion in the House intelligence 
reform bill.

[[Page 20540]]

  The Levin-Coleman amendment would close the revolving door and 
eliminate potential and actual conflicts of interest for our federal 
examiners. It would also provide a fresh look at our country's 
antiterrorist financing efforts. I thank my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle for supporting this amendment.
  A brief section-by-section explanation of the amendment follows.
  Subsection (a) directs the Treasury Department to prepare a report 
within 6 months evaluating the current state of U.S. efforts to curtail 
the international financing of terrorism. The report is required to 
address the effectiveness and efficiency of current Federal programs to 
detect, track, disrupt, and stop terrorist financing; the relationship 
between terrorist financing and money laundering; the nature, 
effectiveness and efficiency of current efforts to coordinate 
intelligence and agency operations related to terrorist financing, 
including identifying which agency official, if any, has primary 
responsibility to develop priorities, assign tasks to agencies and 
monitor the implementation of policy and operations related to 
terrorism; the effectiveness and efficiency of efforts to protect the 
critical infrastructure of the U.S. financial system; ways to improve 
the effectiveness of financial institutions; ways to improve 
multilateral and international governmental cooperation on terrorist 
financing; and recommendations for reforms.
  Subsection (b) imposes a 1-year cooling off period on senior 
examiners at the OCC, Federal Reserve Banks, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union 
Administration before a senior examiner can take a job at a financial 
institution that he or she oversaw. The subsection does so by 
establishing a new subsection (k) in the statutes applicable to these 
agencies.
  The new subsection (k) contains language that was drawn from two sets 
of postemployment provisions now in the federal code, the provisions in 
section 207 of title 18 applicable to a variety of senior federal 
employees and the provisions in section 423(d) of title 41 applicable 
to senior Federal procurement officials. For example, the new 
subsection (k) draws on the ``knowing'' standard used in the section 
207 provisions, and the ``compensation'' language that appears in 
section 423(d).
  The new subsection (k) is intended to apply only to senior examiners 
who have a meaningful relationship with a financial institution, such 
as an examiner-in-charge or a senior examiner with dedicated 
responsibility to oversee a particular institution. It is not intended 
to apply to less senior examiners who may examine or inspect dozens of 
financial institutions in a single year without developing a sustained 
relationship with any one institution. It is also not intended to apply 
to persons holding supervisory positions that do not involve routine 
interactions with an institution for purposes of examining or 
inspecting the institution's books or operations. The provision may 
apply to more than one senior examiner at the same financial 
institution, and is not limited to examiners with an office at the site 
of the financial institution or to examiners who spend 100 percent of 
their time on a single institution.
  Each Federal banking agency is directed to issue rules, regulations, 
and guidance to delineate the personnel to which this postemployment 
restriction applies. Each agency head also has authority, on a case-by-
case basis, to waive the postemployment restriction for a particular 
individual if the waiver would not hurt the integrity of the agency's 
supervisory program. It is intended that the agency head issue these 
waivers personally, without delegating the waiver authority to another 
official, to ensure careful usage.
  The new subsection (k) authorizes two types of penalties for senior 
examiners who violate the 1-year cooling off period. These two 
penalties are in addition to any other administrative, civil, or 
criminal remedy or penalty that may be available to the United States 
or any other person for the same conduct. The first penalty is an 
industry-wide employment ban which requires the relevant agency to 
remove the affected individual from the financial institution and 
prohibit them from employment at any insured financial institution for 
up to 5 years. The second penalty authorizes the agency to impose a 
civil monetary fine on the individual of up to $250,000. This fine 
would have to be imposed either in a Federal court proceeding or in an 
administrative proceeding that accords with the agency's administrative 
rules for imposing civil monetary penalties. The provision also 
authorizes the Attorney General to impose a civil monetary penalty if 
an agency does not, but prohibits both from doing so.
  The requirement for a 1-year cooling off period is intended to become 
effective one year after the date of the enactment of this act, whether 
or not any agency issues implementing regulations to carry out the 
act's requirements.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, first of all, I thank Chairman Collins 
and ranking Member Senator Lieberman, for their diligence and hard work 
on the National Intelligence Reform bill. I would like to say a few 
words on the Levin-Coleman amendment on terrorist financing. Without 
question, financial institutions are vital to our economy. 
Unfortunately, banks can also be used as conduits for terrorist 
financing and money laundering.
  In July, 2004, as chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, I held a hearing on suspicious financial activity in 
accounts handled by Riggs Bank. The subcommittee uncovered clear 
evidence of poor bank compliance and lax oversight regarding Federal 
laws, designed to protect the integrity of the international financial 
system.
  Chairman Collins is currently looking at certain Saudi Arabian 
accounts that may have benefited two of the September 11, 2001 
hijackers. I commend her diligence in expanding our investigation and 
look forward to the results of her investigation.
  Equally disturbing, PSI's investigation demonstrated that Federal 
banking regulators took far too long to implement proper controls and 
procedures to identify, monitor, and combat money laundering, 
suspicious activity, and terrorist financing. In particular, I was 
troubled by the actions of a former senior bank examiner of Riggs Bank 
who began to work for Riggs Bank immediately after retiring from the 
Office of Comptroller of the Currency. Prior to leaving Riggs Bank, 
this examiner apparently limited findings of accounts owned by Augusto 
Pinochet contrary to established policies. Upon taking employment at 
Riggs Bank, this former examiner attended numerous meetings with bank 
regulators such that the potential for undue influence was less than to 
be desired.
  Certain provisions of this legislation will close the revolving door 
between senior examiners and the financial institutions they examine, 
by requiring a cooling off period of 1 year before taking employment at 
the financial institutions they previously regulated.
  In a post-9/11 world, we need to ensure that financial institutions 
and Federal banking regulators uphold Federal banking statutes, 
including the Bank Secrecy Act and the Patriot Act. This legislation 
will maintain the separation between Federal banking regulators and 
financial institutions. Given our concern for terrorist financing, and 
our heavy reliance on the integrity of the financial system, reducing 
the potential of harm is necessary because the stakes are too high if 
problems go uncorrected. I hope my colleagues will all join me in 
support of this amendment.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, on the morning of September 14, 2001, I 
toured the Pentagon with officials from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, FEMA. I was so impressed, that on the morning of 
September 11, in the hours following an unspeakable tragedy, first 
responders and rescue workers from different departments were able to 
work as one great team to extinguish the fires, to help the injured, 
and to save lives. This first impression only tells half of the real 
story. In actuality, the bravery and selflessness of the firefighters, 
emergency medical technicians, and

[[Page 20541]]

police officers were hindered by a lack of interoperability between 
their communications systems. I spoke with workers at the Pentagon who 
experienced this limitation firsthand. It's inconceivable to me that 
members of fire departments and emergency agencies from Fairfax and 
Arlington Counties, the District of Columbia, and Montgomery County 
were held back because of equipment incompatibility.
  The lack of adequate communications equipment was not only an 
unnecessary impediment to response operations in and among units on 
duty across the Potomac at the Pentagon, but has also been an obstacle 
to other emergencies. In March 2002, I chaired an Environment and 
Public Works Committee hearing to address the budget needs of FEMA. At 
the hearing, then-Director Joe Allbaugh testified that:

       This problem of limited interoperability is especially 
     frustrating in the area of communications. While at Ground 
     Zero for several days, I personally witnessed first 
     responders passing notes, handwritten notes, back and forth 
     to one another as the most reliable, effective means of 
     communication. On September 11 and in other emergency 
     situations, seamless communication interoperability would 
     have saved lives.

  Today, more than 3 years after the attacks of September 11, the 
Senate is still debating the issues of interoperability and sufficient 
communications capabilities.
  Interoperability is not only an issue during times of extreme 
national distress, whether brought on by a terrorist attack or a 
natural disaster. On August 19, 1997, residents and police officers 
from northern Vermont and New Hampshire were faced with tragedy when 
Carl Draga began a shooting spree, killing four and wounding three 
others, before being killed in an standoff with police. Throughout that 
sad day, officers from the Vermont and New Hampshire State Police and a 
New Hampshire Fish and Game warden chased Draga across the Connecticut 
River from New Hampshire to Vermont and back again to New Hampshire. 
Compounding the difficulty of pursuing a fugitive across State lines, 
was the lack of interoperability between the departments. 
Communications were hampered by the technical limitations of the radios 
and other equipment.
  Last week, the Senate unanimously adopted amendments that will 
provide for a higher priority for public safety in terms of Spectrum 
allocation. My amendment will further address the needs of first 
responders. My amendment will establish National Interoperability 
Standards and a National Interoperability Implementation Plan to put 
those standards into place. Specifically, the Department of Homeland 
Security, DHS, will, no later than 1 year after the enactment of this 
bill, adopt interoperability goals and standards to fully assess and 
evaluate the technical needs of first responders for more routine 
operations and for catastrophic events like those we suffered on 
September 11, 2001. After those goals and standards are developed, the 
DHS will create an implementation plan, and will report to the Congress 
on its plan and its progress. This will ensure that as the Federal 
Government, States, and localities spend money on interoperability, we 
will all be working in the same direction, toward one set of goals, 
with measurable results.
  My amendment also requires that the DHS establish a means of 
coordinating international interoperability. For States like Vermont, 
which share an international borer, it is imperative that first 
responders in both nations communicate with each other.
  We must be prepared for the future, and we must give our first 
responders the tools they need to perform their duties. My amendment 
will give the DHS the direction and authority to make our country 
safer.

                          ____________________