[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19470-19474]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak to the monumental 
issue before us, the most profound, sweeping reform of our entire 
intelligence community in nearly 60 years, 3 years after the worst 
attack ever on American soil. As a member of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
critical issues I believe must be addressed this year.
  First, I thank the majority leader for his timely action and 
steadfast leadership ensuring that we have this legislation before us 
and we will complete action before we adjourn.
  I also want to recognize my colleague, the chair of the Governmental 
Affairs Committee, the Senator from Maine, Ms. Collins, for her 
exceptional and tireless work over the past 2 months to produce this 
comprehensive legislation to reform our intelligence community, to 
rightly reflect the sense of urgency that this legislation deserves and 
certainly one we should consider. I applaud her for undertaking this 
historic effort and for guiding this legislation through her committee 
on a bipartisan basis.
  As well, I want to express my appreciation to the ranking member, 
Senator Lieberman, for his efforts in bringing us to this day. It truly 
was an enormous undertaking that was assigned to the Governmental 
Affairs Committee, and I want to thank them for all they have done to 
begin this debate this week on the intelligence reform bill.
  As we begin these deliberations, I cannot help but be reminded that 
while the intelligence community reform has unquestionably taken on a 
new urgency, it is simply not a new issue. Since the first Hoover 
Commission in 1949, studies have been conducted, commissions have been 
established, and reports have been issued on how best to structure our 
intelligence community. Yet in spite of the over 50 years of debate on 
this issue, it was the morning of September 11 and all that followed 
that has resulted in us being where we are today on the Senate floor 
debating reform legislation and poised to accomplish what has alluded 
so many for so long.
  To say that September 11 is a seminal moment for our Nation certainly 
would be an understatement. Indeed, that day will forever be etched in 
our minds and our national consciousness, just as it always will 
forever change the way we view the world. It was that day, more than 
any before, that catapulted us into a new era in which our Nation faced 
very different, more pervasive and inimical threats. It was a day that 
revealed in the starkest terms the truism that intelligence is now and 
must always be our best and first line of defense against a committed 
enemy who knows no borders, wears no uniform, and pledges allegiance 
only to causes and not states. It was a day that has proven that the 
intelligence community's old structure and old ways of doing business 
are insufficient for confronting the challenges of the 21st century.
  But if September 11 provided the catalyst for reform, the failures in 
the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs 
provided even greater impetus for a major overhaul of the U.S. 
intelligence community, and that time for change is now upon us.
  For over a year, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has 
focused intently on reviewing the prewar intelligence of Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction program, the regime's ties to terrorism, Saddam 
Hussein's human rights abuses, and his regime's impact on regional 
stability. After the indepth analysis of 30,000 pages of intelligence 
assessment, source reporting, interviewing more than 200 individuals, 
the committee produced a report in early July that indisputably begs 
for intelligence community restructuring.
  The report revealed a stunning lack of accountability and sound 
hands-on management practices throughout the community's chain of 
command. This lack of leadership and poor management allowed 
assumptions to go unchallenged, contributed to mischaracterizations of 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, and led to significant 
lapses in the intelligence community's responsibility to convey the 
uncertainties behind their assessments. In short, there was a lack of 
analytic rigor performed on one of the most critical and defining 
issues spanning more than a decade.
  During our review, we learned that much of what analysts knew about 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program predated the gulf war, 
leaving them with little direct knowledge of the current state of those 
programs. The ``group think'' mentality that dominated analysis is just 
one of the intelligence failures this report illuminates.
  Intelligence community managers, collectors, and analysts believed 
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, a notion that dates back to 
Iraq's pre-

[[Page 19471]]

1991 efforts to retain, build, and hide those programs, and in several 
circumstances the intelligence community made intelligence information 
fit into preconceived notions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs. From our review, we know the intelligence community relied on 
sources that supported its predetermined ideas, and we also know that 
there was no alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' performed on such 
a critical issue. We also now know that most of the key judgments in 
the national intelligence estimate were overstated or were not 
supported by the underlying intelligence.
  For example, the intelligence community insists that Iraq had 
chemical weapons. Yet this was based on a single stream of reporting. 
The intelligence community based its assessment that Iraq's biological 
warfare program was larger and more advanced than before the gulf war 
largely on a single source to whom the intelligence community never had 
direct access and with whom there were credibility problems. The 
intelligence community judged that Iraq was developing a UAV probably 
intended to deliver biological weapons. Yet there was significant 
evidence clearly indicating that nonbiological weapons delivery 
missions were more likely.
  The committee's report also notes the lack of human intelligence on 
the Iraqi target and reveals, as the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001, also documented, that our intelligence community is 
averse to undertaking higher risk human intelligence operations, 
compelling our analysts to rely on inadequate, outdated, or unreliable 
intelligence.
  The points raised form an inescapable indictment of the status quo. 
The facts speak for themselves, and they are a significant reason we 
are here today to debate issues of intelligence community reform. The 
men and women, the dedicated professionals of the intelligence 
community, who toil every day to protect our national security, must 
have a decisive, innovative, and centralized leadership and management 
structure as well as the requisite resources to perform this vital and 
often daunting task. While I acknowledge the need to be cautious and 
deliberate, in this era of unprecedented challenges, we must ensure our 
intelligence community is poised to confront these challenges, and we 
must act now. The status quo is clearly not an option.
  On that note, I do happen to believe that we must create a national 
intelligence director and certainly that it would be a significant leap 
forward, and that is why I commend the committee for embracing this 
type of reform.
  I also commend Senator Feinstein for her leadership on this issue, 
and I am pleased to have joined with her several months ago, before the 
release of the September 11 Commission Report, in championing this idea 
of establishing a critical position, to be filled by a single person, 
independent from the day-to-day responsibilities of running a single 
intelligence agency and whose sole responsibility is to lead and manage 
the intelligence community. I believe our perspectives on the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and the work we did for more than a year and a 
half on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program gave impetus to this 
notion and this idea that we clearly had to embark on major 
restructuring of the intelligence community.
  I happen to believe that creating this central position is a 
significant component in the larger imperative of overall intelligence 
community reform because it simply just does not make sense today to 
have one person who is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
also responsible for the entire intelligence community of the other 14 
agencies. Rather, we need a national intelligence director whose 
dedicated leadership will ensure that consistent priorities are set and 
implemented, and that all the gears of our intelligence gathering, 
analysis, and reporting are synchronized and not ad hoc.
  In fact, Dr. David Kay, who is the former director of the Iraq Survey 
Group, said such management changes in the intelligence community could 
have resulted in a very different national intelligence estimate than 
we received on Iraq weapons of mass destruction program. He noted that 
failures of analytic tradecraft, culture, management, and mismanagement 
of the information flow could have been alleviated with proper 
management and leadership.
  Indeed, I asked Dr. Kay when he came before the committee in August:

       We know what went wrong. Could it have been a very 
     different product?
       Could we have had a very different product in the NIE, if 
     we had changes, organizationally, that we are speaking of?

  That is a question posed of Dr. Kay. He responded:

       It could have been a very different product, in my 
     judgment.

  That is a very telling and significant statement. He said the 
national intelligence estimate, the estimate upon which we predicated 
war, upon which we made our decisions, based on the assessments that 
were included in that national intelligence estimate, could have been a 
very different product if we had an entirely different type of 
organization within the intelligence community.
  I happen to believe that creating a national intelligence director 
would also facilitate a better atmosphere of objectivity, an element 
that has been sorely lacking in the intelligence community. Separating 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from one specific 
organization would better allow the other 14 intelligence community 
agencies to be heard in the debates about the validity and veracity of 
intelligence information and analyses that have a direct effect on our 
national security.
  A director of national intelligence would level the playing field 
when it comes to the competition of ideas and intelligence analysis. 
Currently, as the head of both the CIA, as well as the intelligence 
community, the DCI is the principal intelligence adviser to the 
President. This provides the CIA with unique access to policymakers. 
Although the goal of this structure was to coordinate the disparate 
elements of the intelligence community in order to provide the most 
accurate and objective analysis, this report reveals that in practice 
this arrangement actually undermines the provision of objective 
analysis.
  Indeed, this committee's report on Iraq concluded:

       The CIA continues to excessively compartment sensitive 
     human intelligence reporting and fails to share important 
     information about [human intelligence] reporting and sources 
     with Intelligence Community analysts who have a need to know.

  Further the report concluded that:

       The CIA, in several significant instances, abused its 
     unique position in the [intelligence community], particularly 
     in terms of information sharing, to the detriment of the 
     [intelligence community's] prewar analysis concerning Iraq's 
     [weapons of mass destruction] programs.

  One agency should not be able to control the presentation of 
information to policymakers, nor should an agency be able to exclude 
analyses from the other agencies. As the committee's report on the 
prewar intelligence on Iraq reveals, the Director of Central 
Intelligence was not aware of dissenting opinions within the 
intelligence community on the potential use for the aluminum tubes, 
despite the fact that the intelligence community had been debating the 
issue for well more than a year.
  Since the Director was not aware of all the views of the intelligence 
agencies, he could only pass on the CIA's view to the President. This 
has to change. Policymakers must be aware of all views of all 
intelligence agencies on such crucial matters.
  Some might say consolidating the leadership of the entire 
intelligence community under a national intelligence director might 
actually stifle healthy competition, that central planning will deprive 
decisionmakers of a full range of intelligence. I echo what Chairman 
Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have said:

       Competitive analysis is very important . . . no one can 
     claim that the current structure fosters competitive 
     analysis. Look at

[[Page 19472]]

     the Senate report on group-think with regard to Iraq. The 
     current system encourages, we believe, group-think. . . .

  In my view, to accomplish the task we have just discussed, the 
national intelligence director should be equipped with the authority 
commensurate with the responsibilities with which he is vested. We can 
no longer afford to have the Intelligence Committee unable to direct 
those resources.
  As the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission indicated--he said in response 
to another question I posed when he testified before the Intelligence 
Committee with regard to George Tenet raising the red flag about the 
threat from al-Qaida:

       . . . a problem we have of communication between agencies . 
     . . one of the best illustrations that hit me when I first 
     heard about it is in 1998, when [the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency] George Tenet got it. What we are 
     suggesting, I guess, is if you had that coordination and that 
     declaration of war had been made under the system we 
     recommend, the military, the diplomatic side, the 
     intelligence side, they all would have gotten it.

  If you can imagine when the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency had been talking about a major threat to the United States back 
in 1998, raising a red flag, going around Washington talking to 
whomever in order to get attention, to draw attention to this 
tremendous threat that al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden posed, that they 
were declaring war on the United States, and he could not get anyone's 
attention, never, ever again should we be in a position where the 
Director of Central Intelligence, now the director of the national 
intelligence community, should not be able to get the attention of the 
executive branch or of the Congress or of policymakers across the board 
within the intelligence community because he doesn't have the power to 
redirect resources or to redirect the attention or to make sure there 
is a collective focus on such a major threat.
  There are a number of authorities that this legislation before us 
will provide the national director of intelligence. I think it is 
absolutely vital and critical that the national intelligence director 
have strong authority to redirect resources with respect to budget and 
personnel. There is no question that we must have a director of 
national intelligence who is vested with the kind of power and 
authority to command a centralized organization. This is not just about 
moving boxes around. It is vesting the authority within this individual 
to command the direction of the resources and the decisionmaking that 
is absolutely vital to establish the kind of strategic thinking across 
the intelligence community that heretofore has not been present.
  Some have argued that providing the national intelligence director 
with these authorities equates to the loss of intelligence support to 
our warfighters. I do not dispute the fact that any successful 
intelligence reform must respect the military's necessity to maintain a 
robust organic tactical intelligence capability and to have rapid 
access to national intelligence assets and information.
  I would argue that providing the national intelligence director with 
the authorities commensurate to his responsibilities, by providing him 
the ability to better coordinate and manage the entirety of our 
Nation's intelligence operations, could improve national support to our 
military operations, both strategically as well as tactically.
  One of the national intelligence director's greatest responsibilities 
will be to secure national intelligence support to our warfighters and 
ensure that strategic information of tactical importance is 
expeditiously delivered to our soldiers, seamen, airmen and marines. 
There is no question but that the men and women of our Armed Forces 
deserve and must continue to receive the best, most timely actionable 
intelligence. So I believe that creating this position will also 
improve the accountability within the intelligence community, an issue 
that also has been a focus of mine for the past 20 years.
  I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in 
accountability during my 12 years as a member of the House Foreign 
Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and as chair of the 
International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  During the 99th Congress back in 1986, I worked to bring to the State 
Department an accountability review board as part of the Omnibus 
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986. I think about those 
times because accountability becomes a critical component as we ensure 
that our agencies are responsive to the threats that are posed to 
America, to Americans, to American interests here as well as abroad.
  As a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look back to that 
time. That is why I think it so critical to ensure that in every phase 
of the new challenges that we are facing we also incorporate the kind 
of accountability that compels our policymakers, our officials, and 
agencies responsive to those threats. As a member of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, I continue to see that there is a stunning lack 
of accountability within the community.
  The committee's review of the pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction is replete with information-sharing failures, 
analytic failures, and collection failures. It is imperative that these 
failures, many of which were identified in the Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, are not repeated. As former United Nations 
weapons inspector Dr. David Kay told the Intelligence Committee at one 
of our reform hearings, `` . . . intelligence reform without 
accountability will not achieve the objective we all share to avoid 
repeating the clearly avoidable tragedy of 9/11 and the equally 
avoidable failures in analysis that marked the Iraq WMD program.''
  That is why back in 1986 we created an accountability review board in 
the State Department because of embassy security, because of the threat 
posed by terrorists back in the 1980s. We had the Inman Report in 1983, 
and we responded to that. We redesigned embassy security, both 
physical, perimeter security, intelligence security, and we didn't want 
any more lapses and failures in that regard. That is why we set up the 
accountability review board--so we can ensure that these measures put 
in place are implemented and strongly enforced.
  I think the same is true here. We have to ensure there will be 
accountability. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in 
1993, there was a failure of information sharing among the agencies. 
Again, it was another lapse in failure among agencies. Even after 9/11 
we are now examining failures again of information sharing--replete 
with failure.
  It seems to me that we have to redesign the system to ensure that we 
have the kind of accountability we should demand rightfully of those 
who are in positions of authority to implement these responsibilities 
and obligations. That is why I think it is critical that we incorporate 
these types of reforms which will be essential.
  I concluded after my examination of what went wrong with our pre-war 
assessment concerning Iraq's WMD program and the reality posed to the 
military phase of Iraq that one way to prevent these lapses in the 
future is to inject more accountability into the intelligence 
community. That is why I introduced legislation in June to create the 
office of inspector general for intelligence.
  The intelligence community lacks a single, overarching intelligence 
communitywide investigative entity that bridges the gap between and 
among all the various agencies in order to identify problem areas to 
ensure critical deficiencies are addressed before they become crises or 
tragedies, and to develop and ensure the implementation of the most 
efficient and effective methods of intelligence gathering and 
interpretation.
  What is required, in my view, is an inspector general for the entire 
intelligence community. The agencies now have their own individual 
inspector generals. But I happen to believe that this newly created 
office would assist

[[Page 19473]]

in instituting better management accountability and would help the 
national intelligence director resolve problems within the intelligence 
community.
  I am very pleased that the legislation we are debating today 
includes--again I thank the leadership of the chair of the committee, 
Senator Collins, for including a provision to create an office of 
inspector general for the entire community. That inspector general has 
the ability to initiate and conduct independent investigations, 
including investigating current issues within the intelligence 
community, not just conduct ``lessons learned'' studies, not just a 
retrospective, but prospective to identify the problems that may be 
there, may be present in the intelligence community, and to have that 
strategic view of what is going wrong and make sure we can also prevent 
and preempt the problems before they take place.
  This new office will seek to identify problem areas and identify the 
most efficient and effective business practices required to ensure that 
critical deficiencies can be addressed before it is too late, before we 
have another intelligence failure, and before lives are lost.
  In short, an inspector general who can look across the entire 
community will help improve management and coordination, and 
cooperation and information sharing among the intelligence agencies--
again, another dynamic that will help to ensure and enforce the kind of 
information sharing that clearly has been lacking up to this point.
  The inspector general also will help break down the barriers that 
have perpetuated the parochial, stovepipe approaches to intelligence 
community management and operations.
  Again, I commend the work of the authors of this underlying bill, 
Senator Collins for her dedication, and Senator Lieberman for working 
together to include this recommendation of creating the inspector 
general in the office of the national intelligence director.
  The authors of this bill have crafted extensive language creating and 
defining this vital agent of accountability. I look forward to further 
working with them to complete the creation of an independent IG, and to 
ensure that proper accountability to the director of the national 
intelligence, to the President and to Congress, and ultimately to the 
American people is carried forward.
  In addition, I hope I can work with the committee on several other 
issues and amendments to enhance this legislation.
  For example, as I have been reviewing this legislation, and as we 
look at the pre-war intelligence, it was apparent that the intelligence 
community relied on forces that supported this predetermined idea and 
found there was no alternative analysis or ``red teaming'' performed on 
critical issues, allowing assessments to go unchallenged year after 
year, and certainly for more than a decade with respect to Iraq.
  While this bill includes provisions for an analysis review unit, I 
also think we must consider the ability for the community to look at 
alternatives in that area as well. It is very important to have that 
type of dynamic within the intelligence community, to think out of the 
box, to think creatively and innovatively and not just be confined to 
the assumptions that have been carried over, to preconceived notions 
that were so inherent in all of the pre-war assessments with respect to 
Iraq's WMD program.
  This bill also mandates that the national intelligence council 
produce national intelligence estimates. I believe this process must be 
made a little more automatic and transparent and a little ad hoc. I 
believe that the national intelligence council should report to us what 
they can do to streamline that process.
  I also believe we should have the National Counterterrorism Center 
report to us in a year about what they are doing and whether they are 
meeting the mark. This bill already requires a report from the national 
director of intelligence. But I think it would also be important to 
hear from the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center the 
lessons learned in the establishment of capability before we move to 
set up other centers. The creation of a national intelligence director 
and improving the community's accountability through the creation of an 
inspector general are but two of the many issues in the ongoing debate 
on intelligence community reform. Indeed, it has been an extremely 
challenging year for the intelligence community and those who work in 
it, one in which we saw every aspect of the intelligence process come 
to the fore at one time or another.
  From the tactical collection and analysis of on-the-ground 
intelligence by our battlefield commanders in Iraq that led to the 
capture of Saddam Hussein, to the global search for the information 
that led to the exposure of Aq Khan's nuclear proliferation network, to 
the decision to commit troops to the field in Iraq, it became obvious 
to every American that timely and quality intelligence is imperative if 
we are to be successful in defeating the forces that have pledged 
themselves to the destruction of America.
  I think all of these events highlight how abundantly crucial it is to 
ensure that we have the leadership with the requisite authority to 
ensure that the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 
information is as synchronized, accurate, and as comprehensive as it 
possibly can be, and that it represents the very best judgment of the 
intelligence community when it is provided to the national policymakers 
who rely on that information to make the most profound of decisions.
  Of course, intelligence reform must include reforming oversight of 
not only the intelligence community. Ideally, this should have occurred 
in tandem. Congress must not abrogate its responsibility to seriously 
tackle the oversight issue. As 9/11 Commissioner Lehman said, it is 
like one hand clapping, if you only do the executive branch this year. 
Hopefully we will be able to pursue those initiatives shortly as well.
  In the final analysis, it is apparent to me that the intelligence 
structure put in place over 50 years ago was one that focused primarily 
on developing intelligence to counter a military threat that is no 
longer sufficient for confronting the asymmetrical threats we are now 
confronting in the 21st century--a century in which our enemies no 
longer make distinctions between our battlefields and our backyards.
  So, therefore, we must develop a lighter and more agile intelligence 
capability that can keep pace with the kind of enemy we are now 
fighting--one that is elusive, one that does not need a large land-
based military capability to bring the fight to us.
  This legislation will bring America the agility we require, the 
ability to reform our intelligence apparatus into an adaptable 
organization prepared to anticipate and prepare for future threats.
  I look forward to working with my colleague again, the Senator from 
Maine, who I congratulate again for bringing this most timely, this 
most forthright, comprehensive, very sound framework for intelligence 
reform and working with them on the issues I might propose with my 
refinements and enhancements to the underlying bill.
  I hope in due course of this week or the following week, however long 
it takes before we adjourn, to complete this process, to pass this 
legislation, not only in the Senate but the overall Congress, so the 
President can sign this legislation because clearly it must be done 
forthwith. This is something the American people and the future of this 
Nation deserve.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I congratulate the senior Senator from 
Maine for her comments and her work on this issue. As a member of the 
Intelligence Committee she has understood very early the need for 
significant intelligence reform. The provisions included in the 
Collins-Lieberman bill that created an inspector general for the new 
national intelligence authority are the direct result of the 
legislation sponsored by the senior Senator from Maine.

[[Page 19474]]

  I thank the Senator for her expertise and her leadership. This is an 
area, as she indicated, on which she has been working for many years. 
We very much value her contributions to the debate.
  I know of no other requests to speak tonight.

                          ____________________