[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 19054-19064]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                        EMOTIONAL TRIP TO RUSSIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McCotter). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for the remainder of the time until midnight.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise not to refute or 
answer the comments that we just heard for the last several hours, but 
I will make

[[Page 19055]]

a couple of comments. First of all, rather than listen to Members of 
Congress and this body talk about the conditions in Iraq, tomorrow the 
American people will have a chance to listen to the Prime Minister of 
Iraq himself whose life has been threatened 4 times, attempted 
assassinations on him. I think the American people should listen to 
that gentleman, Prime Minister Alawi, to have us get an understanding 
of how well his country is responding to our effort.
  In terms of the need for the use of our Reservists, as the vice 
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I would just remind our 
colleagues that it was during the 1990s that our troops were deployed 
38 times. None of those deployments were paid for and, as a result, we 
had to cut the size of our military. The Army, for instance, in almost 
half, cutting our armored divisions down to 20; the Navy was cut from 
585 ships to 314. As a result of those significant cutbacks during the 
1990s, it was necessary to go to a policy that included the use of our 
Guard and Reserve forces. This was clearly understood in the 1990s 
because we had no choice. As our military budget was cut back, we had 
to rely more and more on the Guard and Reserves, that is why the Guard 
and Reserves are being used today in Iraq. I would add, Mr. Speaker, 
commitments were made that our troops would be out of Bosnia before 
Christmas of 1996. Our troops are still in Bosnia in the fall of 2004.
  So again, the rhetoric on this floor is typical rhetoric that we hear 
before an election, and I would just urge our colleagues and the 
American people to tune in tomorrow at 10 a.m., the Prime Minister of 
Iraq Alawi will present the case of the Iraqi people to this body in 
terms of how grateful they are and what level of success we are 
achieving.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to discuss a recent trip that a 
delegation of Members of Congress took in delivering a resolution that 
passed on the Floor of this body one week ago. It was my 38th trip to 
this country, Mr. Speaker, the country of Russia, which I have worked 
hard to try to assist our government, both Democrat and Republican 
administrations, in turning from an arch enemy of ours during the Cold 
War to a partner. This 38th trip was by far and away the most sad, Mr. 
Speaker, and the most emotional.
  Three of us traveled to Moscow and, in spite of significant concern 
expressed by both our government and the Russian government, we were 
able to travel from Moscow after visiting the North Ossetian office in 
downtown Moscow to express the condolences of the people of America and 
this Congress in particular. We traveled down to Beslan in North 
Ossetia. We traveled along with the President of Kalmykia, and the 
purpose of the trip was simple, but it was profound.
  We carried with us the resolution that was passed unanimously by this 
body expressing the solidarity of the American people and the U.S. 
Congress, Democrats and Republicans, with the people of Russia in their 
darkest hour. It was appropriate that we do this, Mr. Speaker, because 
it was, in fact, President Putin that was the first President to call 
the President of the United States after 9-11 to express the 
condolences of the Russian people in our darkest hour. And I can recall 
very vividly the embassy in Moscow, the American embassy after the 9-11 
attack, where literally hundreds and thousands of bouquets of flowers 
and notes, expressions of sympathy, were laid outside of our embassy by 
the people of Russia.
  So those of us in the Congress who supported the passage of the 
resolution on the Floor of this body one week ago and signed by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) thought it was imperative 
that we travel to Beslan and stand in that school and convey to the 
people of Russia our conviction that we were with them in the fight 
against terrorism.
  I want to briefly outline the trip, Mr. Speaker, and then comment on 
the implications of both the terrorist attack in Beslan and the 
terrorist attacks on 2 Russian airplanes and in downtown Moscow that 
have been occurring on a fairly frequent and regular basis.
  In arriving in Beslan in North Ossetia in the presidential plane of 
the President of Kalmykia, we were greeted by the Speaker of the State 
Parliament, or Duma, of North Ossetia. North Ossetia is an autonomous 
republic within Russia. They have their own President, their own 
parliament called the Duma, but they are, in fact, a part of the 
Russian Federation.

                              {time}  2310

  Therefore, the President was someone in that country we hoped and we 
did meet with. But the person who greeted us on our arrival at the 
airport in Beslan is in fact the Speaker of the Parliament of that 
country, equivalent to the Speaker of the House in our country. His job 
was to escort us through his country and explain to us in his own terms 
what happened at Beslan.
  The Speaker of the Parliament when he arrived was certainly someone 
who we could relate to because he had a similar job to us in terms of 
his function and his job. His name is Taymuraz Mansurov. And it is 
interesting because he told us when we arrived that he had four 
children himself, two children in college and two children who in fact 
were attending the actual school that was attacked by the terrorists on 
the first day of classes just several short weeks ago. In fact, both of 
his children are today in hospitals in Moscow recovering from 
significant wounds. His 12-year-old daughter was shot in the face with 
a weapon as she was attempting to leave the school and she is being 
treated at a Moscow special medical center for that wound.
  He told us that the state of trauma of his country and his city, the 
city of Beslan was just something that was impossible for people 
outside of North Ossetia to understand and appreciate. As we got off of 
the bus at the first stop on our way into Beslan, right next to a 
cemetery, we were struck by literally hundreds of graves that had 
recently been dug with mounds of dirt on top of each of them where the 
children of this school and their parents and their grandparents had 
been buried within the previous several days.
  On each of those grave sites, and again there were probably 360 of 
those graves because that is how many people were killed, were flowers 
and items that were left by friends and other well wishers around the 
world.
  I told our two colleagues who went with me on the trip, the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Souder) and the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks), 
that we would walk down the center aisle of these mounds of graves and 
that at some point in time we would stop, we would turn and face one 
grave and I would ask the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) to say a 
prayer, followed by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder), and then I 
would close.
  The Russian media was filming every step that we took, and I felt it 
appropriate to convey at the grave site of these people the prayers of 
the American people. The irony was, among these hundreds of graves 
sites, these hundreds of mounds covered with flowers and other 
materials left behind, we stopped at one about two-thirds of the ways 
down the center aisle. We turned to our left and the three of us stood 
around this one particular grave.
  The large floral bouquet on that grave was red, white, and blue. Now, 
the colors of the Russia flag are red, white, and blue as are the 
colors of our flag. But as we looked down and bowed our head and as the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) began the prayers on behalf of this 
delegation, on behalf of the American people, standing firm with the 
people of Beslan and Russia, I could not help but cast my eyes to the 
ribbon that was attached to this floral bouquet. And having studied 
Russia in both high school and college and understanding the language, 
I saw the Cyrillic letters which said USA.
  As I looked after the prayer was over at the rest of the ribbon, I 
could see who that floral bouquet had come from and where it had been 
sent from. That floral bouquet on the grave site out of hundreds that 
were there that we just happened to stop at was sent by the students, 
the teachers, and the community of Columbine High School in Colorado. 
What an amazing start to our

[[Page 19056]]

visit to Beslan, the three members of Congress would stop in the midst 
of this brand-new graveyard where all of these bodies of children and 
adults were buried, and the one grave that we had prayed over would 
contain the floral recognition of people from one of our own tragedies.
  After we completed our prayers at the grave site, we went back to our 
bus with the Speaker of the Duma, and he drove us into the town of 
Beslan, a small community in the southern part of Russia in the 
Caucasus that has just been rife with terrorism. Dagestan on one side, 
Chechnya not far away. And in fact, the fear of the Russians is that 
the 32 terrorists who caused this incident were in fact, and they have 
stated so publicly, a part of the Chechen uprising and the Chechen 
terrorist operation.
  As we got to the town, we stood in front of this massive brick 
building that in the center had been reduced to rubble. Literally 
thousands of floral bouquets, it was there that the Speaker of the Duma 
gave us a summary of what actually had occurred.
  He told us on the first day of school all of the children in this 
school assembled in lines by grades with their parents and their 
grandparents. The first day of school in Russia, Mr. Speaker, is a 
proud day. It is a family day. It is a community day. Everyone comes 
together to begin the new school year. In fact, it is considered a 
holiday throughout Russia. And on this day the students at this 
particular school all lined up neatly, ranging in age from the very 
young, some 2, 3 and 4, some who were too young to go to school, were 
there with their parents and they ranged up to the teenage years.
  Along with these students were the parents and grandparents who had 
come out to see their children off on the first day of classes. As they 
stood in the courtyard in front of the school, without any indication 
whatsoever, the terrorists surrounded the students and the faculty 
members and brought out their automatic weapons. And in a very 
deliberate and very nasty tone, ordered these 1,000 individuals inside 
the school building. As they threatened them with their automatic 
weapons and with their rifles and their pistols and threatened to harm 
them, the students were in a state of panic but in fact went through 
the only entrance into the building which led into a gymnasium area.
  The Speaker of the Duma told us that when some of the younger 
students were not moving fast enough, they picked up the students and 
threw them through the windows without any regard for the well-being of 
these youngsters. Once assembled inside this school complex, they had 
them stand along the walls, and they began a process of intimidation 
that lasted for 3 days. They denied the students water. They denied the 
students and the adults food. And in fact, Mr. Speaker, the terrorists 
in the early hours of the siege took the youngest parents, the youngest 
fathers that were there with their youngsters on the first day of 
school and one by one they assassinated them right in front of the 
students. They then took their bodies and threw them out the back 
windows of the school so that over the course of the first day or so, 
all of those fathers who had gone to school with their children were 
wiped out by these inhumane terrorists.
  As they got control of the hostages and they had reduced the level of 
men that were in the crowd that could provide perhaps resistance 
against them, the terrorists began to then focus on the mothers, the 
grandmothers, some of them very fragile, some of them very elderly, and 
the youngest children who were obviously in a state of shock and a 
state of fear.
  And in fact, Mr. Speaker, the Speaker of the Duma told us that they 
on a cellular phone had his children in the school call him on the 
cellular phone and the terrorists had his children plead with him to 
come and get them and to accede to the demands of the terrorists.
  What tremendous personal turmoil that the Speaker went through with 
his two youngest children in the school as the terrorists contained 
them and yet required them to talk on the cell phone to their father, 
using them as pawns in this unbelievable siege.
  Obviously, the leaders of the republic and the law enforcement 
officials who were around the school would not and could not accede to 
the demands of the terrorists.

                              {time}  2320

  The demands were too large in scope, and they were too unreasonable 
in nature. So it was basically a waiting game. Day one passed, day two 
passed and then day three came.
  Now, perhaps there is a lot of second guessing that has been going on 
about the effort surrounding the school and acts that should have been 
taken, but I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, our delegation was talking to a 
father who had his two children in that building when it occurred and 
who arrived on the scene within a matter of hours after the siege 
occurred.
  So this was not some sanitized message being given to us by Russian 
authorities. This was an elected official, the Speaker of the North 
Ossetia parliament, but it was also the father of two young children in 
that school. In fact, the Speaker himself had attended that school as a 
child, and his two older children also attended that school.
  It was on the third day, Mr. Speaker, when a sense of frustration 
came upon everyone, those that were trapped inside the building and 
those around the building, the parents outside who were urging the 
police officers, the military to do anything possible to end the siege, 
to get their children out. Fathers that were outside were screaming 
that something had to be done.
  Then an explosion occurred. The explosion was inside this school, and 
while it has not been fully determined as to the origin of the 
explosion, the initial thought by those outside, including the Speaker 
of the Duma, was that the explosion occurred because there was a 
movement of ammunition inside. When the explosion occurred, it set off 
a flurry of activity. Gunshots started to ring out, and family members 
on the outside of the school started to rush in. They were rushing in 
because they saw it as an opportunity to save their child, as over 
1,000 children and adults were still in this complex.
  The terrorists then responded by firing automatic weapons and gunning 
down the adults that were trying to get in. That explosion led to 
additional fires, and in matter of a short period of time, the entire 
gymnasium and center area of the school was an inferno.
  Children on the inside started running out. Young children, 6-, 7-, 
8-, 10-years-old, and the terrorists who were standing at windows, who 
had come outside, started firing at will at the backs of these young 
children, hitting some in the back of their head, others in their back 
and their legs. Children started to fall all over the schoolyard area.
  At the end of the siege, Mr. Speaker, 31 of the 32 terrorists were 
killed. One terrorist was captured and is currently in the control of 
the authorities. I am not sure whether it is in Beslan or in Moscow.
  This terrible incident had come to an end. The carnage was unreal. 
Immediately attempts were made to take those that were most severely 
burned to the local hospital, which we visited and was a typical 
hospital servicing a small town, not capable of responding to hundreds 
of injuries, hundreds of rifle shots, of wounds, of burns, that were 
far beyond the capability of this small-town hospital. In fact, the 
chief medical person at the hospital, whom we met when we visited the 
hospital after stopping at this school, told us that they treated some 
8- or 900 individuals who had serious injuries, and as soon as 
possible, within hours, they began flying them out to hospitals in 
neighboring cities and the most severely injured to hospitals as far 
away as Moscow where they are still located.
  Mr. Speaker, as we listened to the story and saw the visual 
realization of what this school was and imagined what it was before 
this incident to a community that shared the pride of the education of 
its young, we just were overcome with emotion. In my case, being a 
teacher by profession, I could

[[Page 19057]]

not imagine the feeling on opening day of school to have terrorists 
surround the building and to herd the students inside. I thought to 
myself, the Russians have been criticized for how they handled this, 
but I wonder if we would have been able to handle a situation at one of 
our schools, where on the opening day, a group of terrorists with 
automatic weapons or with rifles or pistols surrounded the schoolyard 
and forced those youngsters and family members inside of the building.
  I think the Russian people and those in North Ossetia did the best 
job they could in an impossible situation. When the Speaker of the Duma 
finished explaining to us the details of what had occurred, we walked 
solemnly over to the entrance of the school.
  We had prepared a special wreath, Mr. Speaker, a wreath that was red, 
white and blue, with a ribbon saying, ``In Deepest Sympathy, from the 
Congress of the United States.'' We were carrying with us, Mr. Speaker, 
an American flag that we had flown over the Capitol the day before we 
left to present to the people of Beslan as a symbol of our friendship, 
as a symbol of solidarity between the American people and the Russian 
people in the fight against terrorism.
  The three of us solemnly walked behind this floral bouquet as it was 
carried toward the center of the school by two local residents to be 
placed in the center of the building. We followed the floral bouquet 
in. They carefully placed it right next to a pile of literally hundreds 
of flowers. Mr. Speaker, in a sight that I can only describe as 
unbelievable, there were hundreds and thousands of bottles of water. 
Beslan's a poor community. Many of the family members could not afford 
to buy flowers, and yet all of them knew that those children and those 
parents and grandparents had been denied water for 3 days and food. So 
the people of Beslan brought bottles of water and set those bottles of 
water with open tops throughout the school complex and down the center 
corridor, interspersed with hundreds of flowers and bouquets. There 
were also Teddy bears and stuffed animals and the favorite toys of 
students who would never again be able to use them.
  Following the setting down of the flowers, and again, the thoughts 
and prayers of the members of Congress, I opened up the American flag 
and asked my colleagues to join with me in presenting that flag as a 
symbol of the friendship of the U.S. Congress and the people of America 
to the people of Beslan, the people of North Ossetia and the people of 
Russia.
  I have been to a lot of disasters, Mr. Speaker, during my 18 years in 
Congress and my career because, as many of my colleagues know, I have 
worked the issues involving disasters. In fact, before coming to this 
body I used to be a volunteer fire chief.
  I have been to earthquakes, Hurricanes Andrew and Floyd, the 
wildfires in California and Oregon in the West, the Midwestern floods, 
the Murrah Building bombing with Chief Marrs, the World Trade Center in 
1993 and the World Trade Center in 2001. They were all incidents of 
significant emotion, loss of life, terrible tragedy, terrible human 
suffering. But I can tell you in standing in this school, looking up at 
the basketball backboard that had been severely burned, looking at the 
scorched walls, seeing the evidence of where young people used to play 
and seeing hundreds and thousands of bottles of water placed all around 
this complex and still smelling this terrible smell of fire and of 
death, it was very difficult for us to provide remarks. In fact, all 
three of us had difficulty in getting through our statements.
  As we spoke to the people of Beslan who had assembled there with us, 
in front of the TV cameras from throughout Russia who were recording 
our visit, but very simply, we told the story of the feelings of the 
American people, their anger at what had happened at this school, their 
frustration in dealing with terrorists, who have no regard for human 
life and especially the lives of innocent women, grandmothers and young 
children.
  We told the Russians one very simple thing, Mr. Speaker, that on this 
day we were not Russians nor Americans. We were human beings who were 
standing together to tell the terrorists, the cowards that they are, 
that we would not stand for these kinds of actions, whether they would 
be in downtown Baghdad, whether they would be in the streets of Moscow, 
the streets of New York or Oklahoma City or the streets of a small town 
like Beslan. We told the Russian people that we were there expressing 
the sense of the United States Congress, that we shared their grief and 
we stand with them in solidarity.

                              {time}  2330

  I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, that there was a feeling in that school 
among the family members that were there of deep appreciation that the 
American Congress had taken the time to go to Beslan. We were the first 
and, to my knowledge, the only Americans that were allowed into Beslan 
to visit the school. Our ambassador would visit the North Ossetia 
office the day after we arrived in Beslan to express the condolences of 
the American people on behalf of our State Department. In fact, Mr. 
Speaker, we wondered why it had taken 2 weeks for our ambassador in 
Moscow to make that trip to the North Ossetia embassy.
  As we left the school and reflected upon what we had seen, we boarded 
the bus and asked to be taken to the local hospital. And there in the 
hospital we heard the briefings from both the chief psychiatrist who 
was brought in from Moscow and the chief medical leader of this 
hospital in Beslan about how they attempted to deal with these 
overwhelming casualties.
  Then we talked about the kind of treatment that the patients were 
currently receiving, both in that hospital, the hospitals around Russia 
who had taken other patients and about the offerings of support from 
all over the world. But I want to convey this to you, Mr. Speaker, and 
to our colleagues, every place we went on that trip we heard from the 
people of Beslan that the people of America responded in an 
unbelievable way.
  In fact, it was the speaker of the parliament and the mayor of the 
city who told us that, within hours, there was a planeload of supplies 
coming into his community from the people of America. It included 
health care needs. It included equipment. It included special beds and 
pharmaceuticals, from a Nation that had also suffered a very 
significant incident, responding to the needs of the people of Russia.
  As we went through the hospitals, we talked with some of the 
patients. We talked to the nurses. We thanked the doctors. And then we 
stopped in a room with youngsters who were suffering from post-
traumatic stress. I told the young girl who was in the sixth grade that 
my first year after college I taught sixth grade, and we talked about 
some common issues I knew she would have with sixth graders from 
America. I asked her if she had access to e-mail, and she said she 
could through the school or the local library. I asked her to e-mail my 
office so I could link her up with students of a similar age back in 
America.
  Again, the medical personnel in that hospital were working under 
unbelievable circumstances, and they were doing a fantastic job.
  We left the medical center, and my colleagues that wanted to make a 
simple contribution to the medical center, not on behalf of the 
American people but on behalf of ourselves. Each dug into our pockets 
and came out with an amount of money that we each could afford to give 
as a donation to that hospital on the spot. And I can tell you, the 
doctor was extremely gratified that we had taken the time to do that.
  Since coming back to Washington, I have learned that I have a group 
in my own State, headquartered in Bucks County, that I will provide the 
name of for the Record, Mr. Speaker, who has already raised almost 
$800,000 for the people and the families of Beslan. Typical of America 
and the American people, responding to a tragedy thousands of miles 
away because of people in need.
  As we drove from the hospital to the airport and drove through the 
streets of this small town, you just could not help but have a heavy 
heart in seeing

[[Page 19058]]

homes where families had been torn apart. We learned of a mother who 
had taken her four kids to school that day. The mother was killed and 
so were all four children, all buried at one grave site at that 
cemetery we had visited.
  As we arrived at the airport, we learned the president of North 
Ossetia would meet us there, an older gentleman. In fact, his name is 
Alexander Dzasokhov, and he warmly greeted us. We had a press event 
with the media, and we presented to him, Mr. Speaker, the framed 
resolution that our colleagues in this body passed unanimously 5 days 
earlier. That document, in a frame, was signed by the Speaker of the 
House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), on behalf of all of 
us, Democrats and Republicans, who voted unanimously to express our 
solidarity in the suffering of the Russian people and those families 
impacted at Beslan.
  We had discussions with the President about ways in which we could 
assist. We told him our burn foundations in America had offered 
assistance with burn treatment. We told him many of our people wanted 
to help with the monument being built at the grave site and the school.
  And I might add, Mr. Speaker, what the speaker of their parliament 
told us was that, when that monument is completed on the 40th day of 
mourning, which is the official mourning period in Russia, and that 
monument is dedicated to the memory of the victims, that American flag 
that we handed them that flew over this Capitol building, will be 
raised with the Russian flag and the North Ossetia flag, because of 
their thanks and their gratitude for the friendship that we showed 
them, again, in their darkest hour.
  We also discussed with the president other steps that we could take 
together as two nations fighting terrorism. We talked about the need to 
go after the terrorists, as President Bush and President Putin have 
been doing over the past several months and years. And then we followed 
up a dialogue we had had in Moscow with Duma Deputy Kokoshin. Chairman 
Kokoshin, who is a friend of mine, chairs one of the key committees in 
the Duma. The vice chairman of that committee is Deputy Lebedev, and we 
discussed with our North Ossetia leaders and the president our desire 
to host a conference in Moscow in the first quarter of 2005, a joint 
conference of Americans and Russians on the issue of homeland security 
and anti-terrorism.
  It was somewhat ironic, Mr. Speaker, that the Monday before I left 
for Russia, I was in New York giving the opening speech to a homeland 
security conference attended by 3,000 people at the Javitz Center. That 
conference on homeland security also had Asa Hutchinson in attendance 
and scores of other people from the leadership of our own Homeland 
Security, on what we are doing to defend America from the threats of 
terrorism and the protection of our homeland.
  Mr. Speaker, 260 corporations were exhibiting at that conference, 
which was put together by one of the largest conference organizers in 
America, EJ Krause. I talked to the EJ Krause folks before I left for 
Moscow, and they have agreed to organize the conference that we 
together will put on in Russia so that we can show a joint strategy, 
joint use of technology and a joint commitment to fight terrorism 
together.
  Mr. Speaker, we left the president, went back to Moscow, continued 
our meetings and discussions, and I can tell you that every one of our 
colleagues in this chamber needs to know that the people of Russia were 
extremely pleased by the actions this Congress took. It was important 
for us to show solidarity with the Russian people because there has 
been some turmoil between our countries over the past several years.
  And, Mr. Speaker, that leads to the second reason of my special order 
tonight and another reason why I felt it was important to make the 
statement that this Congress made in our resolution that passed last 
week.
  There have been some who have been advocating that America should 
move away from Putin and Russia, that because President Putin, partly 
in response to terrorism, partly for other reasons, has clamped down on 
the media, has in fact recently passed new provisions that will limit 
the role of the people of Russia to elect their own governors of their 
regions, that will reduce the number of political parties from the 
current number to approximately two or three, similar to what we have 
in America; there are even those colleagues in this body, in both 
parties, good friends of mine who I hold in high respect, who have 
written to our colleagues that we should deny Russia access to the 
World Trade Organization, that we should punish Russia because of these 
anti-democracy actions.
  Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that those actions would be the worst 
steps that we could take right now. Now is not the time for America to 
push Russia away from us. Sure, we are all troubled by some of the 
actions that President Putin has taken. I am concerned by the clamping 
down of the free media. I am concerned by some of the methods of 
intimidation. But now is not the time for us to be pushing Putin away, 
which would encourage more of the authoritarian efforts that we have 
seen rising up in Russia over the past several weeks and months.
  Now is not the time for us to move Russia in another direction. Now 
is the time for us to bring Russia back, to give Russia perhaps what we 
have not given them over the past 12 years since they threw off 
communism.
  Mr. Speaker, in looking at our relationship with Russia, I was very 
critical of the previous administration because I felt we did not have 
a consistent policy with Russia. We were talking a good game, saying 
all the right things, but there was not a follow-through in terms of 
implementation.
  We had the radical nationalists in Russia back in the 1990s saying 
that America does not want to be our friend; you watch, they will move 
NATO up to our borders, and they are going to threaten us; you watch, 
they will abrogate the ABM Treaty; they want to dominate us.

                              {time}  2340

  Watch, they do not want us to be involved. They are going to steal 
our money and our assets. They want to use us. That was what the 
radical nationalists in Moscow said back in the early 1990s. That was 
what Uranovsky and that is what Zyuganov said. But many in Russia were 
pro-West, and they said, no, we are going to continue to move closer to 
America because America is the model that we want to work with.
  But I think back, Mr. Speaker, over the past 12 years. We did move 
NATO up to Russia's borders, and I supported that. But we handled that 
miserably. We did not take the time to have the Russians understand 
that the movement of NATO to its borders was not to threaten or 
intimidate Russia, but rather to build a new sense of security and that 
one day, one day, Russia itself might be able to join NATO. And with 
the ABM Treaty, I was the one, Mr. Speaker, who offered the missile 
defense bill in 1998 that passed with a veto-proof margin, not because 
I wanted to dominate Russia, but when I took Don Rumsfeld and James 
Woolsey and Bill Schneider to Moscow the weekend before the vote on my 
bill, we told the Russians our concern is with North Korea, our concern 
is with Iran, our concern is with China, who were all developing long-
range missiles that we have no defense against.
  But, Mr. Speaker, from the Russian perspective in 1995 and 1996, we 
had one joint missile defense program with Russia called RAMOS. The 
Clinton administration tried to cancel it. Senator Levin and myself and 
a group of other Members in both parties and both bodies fought the 
administration, and we won. We kept that joint cooperative program 
together. But the Russians saw the handwriting on the wall: America 
does not want us to be partners in defending our people. They really 
want to dominate us. And they were convinced, and perhaps some still 
are, that that was our purpose in moving away from the ABM Treaty.
  And then we bombed Serbia, perhaps Russia's best friend and ally, the 
Serbian people. We all wanted Milosevic

[[Page 19059]]

out. But instead of using Russians to help us get Milosevic out of 
power, we went to NATO instead of the U.N., and we used NATO as an 
offensive force, invaded Serbia, and killed innocent Serbs. It was not 
until several months after we realized we could not get Milosevic out 
by bombing Serbia, by bombing innocent people, that Russia had to play 
a role. And it was, in fact, Russia through the special envoy of 
President Yeltsin and Victor Chernomyrdin that we were able to reach an 
agreement to end the war on the terms of the West, again with Russia's 
involvement at the 11th hour.
  The Russians saw through all of this, and they said America does not 
want to be our friend. And then we had President Clinton on a number of 
occasions say that we should lift Russia out of the restrictions of 
Jackson-Vanik. President Bush has made at least ten statements over the 
past 4 years that Russia should not be subjected to Jackson-Vanik 
consideration any longer. Mr. Speaker, Jackson-Vanik restrictions were 
placed on the Soviet Union because back in the 1980s, the Soviet Union 
was persecuting Jews. The National Council of Soviet Jewry led that 
effort. I supported that effort because back in the Soviet era I used 
to meet with the Soviet Jews in Moscow who were being persecuted and 
harassed by the KGB and by Russia's leaders.
  But in 2004, in 2000, in 1998, the persecution of Soviet Jews was 
largely ended. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I went to all the Jewish groups 
last August, and I asked will they send me a letter expressing their 
interest in elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, and all the major 
Jewish groups in America did, Mr. Speaker. They sent me letters, JINSA, 
the National Council of Soviet Jewry, AIPAC, all saying, We no longer 
think that Russia should be held captive by Jackson-Vanik.
  I went to the administration, and some of those people under 
President Bush who did not quite get his message said it is a trade 
issue, it is about poultry or steel. So I went to our colleagues who 
are Chairs of our trade committees, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Pombo), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner), and the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), and the three of them sent a letter to me 
saying that they too supported elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik. 
So, Mr. Speaker, here we had the support of leaders in this body on 
issues involving Soviet Jewry, on trade issues saying they support 
elevating Russia out. We have the President of our country demanding we 
do it. And we still have not done it.
  So the Russians look at us and say our words are good, but there is 
no action. There is no follow on. And it was those same Russians during 
the 1990s who saw oligarchs who were put into place by Yeltsin but with 
the help of American consultants and American academics who ripped 
their country off, who stole billions of dollars from the IMF and World 
Bank that were supposed to help build a Russian infrastructure.
  I remember very vividly back in the late 1990s, 1997, and 1998, 
telling the Clinton administration we have evidence that there are 
American companies ripping off the Russians. They did not want to hear 
it, did not want to talk about it. It was in the late 1990s, 2000, that 
we finally heard the Justice Department indict Bank of New York 
officials for allegedly scamming $5 billion out of Russia that should 
have gone for infrastructure but instead ended up in Swiss bank 
accounts and U.S. real estate investments.
  And then we saw the technology proliferation out of Russia, 
individual retired generals and admirals selling technology to Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea. We blamed the Russians for that, the 
Russian Government, when, in fact, Mr. Speaker, and I remember doing 
speech after speech on this, we had documented 20 times we had evidence 
of retired Russian generals and admirals selling technology illegally, 
violating arms control agreements. Of those 20 times, our Nation 
imposed required sanctions four times. Yet we blamed the Russians for 
something that we ourselves should have taken action to control.
  So if we look to the period from 1992 to 2004, we have to ask the 
question, What have we done to assist Russia in becoming our true 
partner? I would say, Mr. Speaker, not much. So now we criticize 
Russia. We criticize President Putin. We want to push him away further. 
President Putin and President Bush have a great personal relationship. 
They have met on three or four occasions. They get along very well, and 
they want to work together. But, Mr. Speaker, below the two Presidents 
there is a vacuum. The President says we want to do Jackson-Vanik 
elevation. He said it 10 times. The people under the President say not 
now, now is not the right time. They should be fired. The President 
sets the foreign policy of our country, but some of those serving him 
do not get the message. And Russia bears the consequences of our lack 
of action.
  The President calls for joint cooperation on missile defense. He has 
said it five times and so has President Putin. But this year our 
Department of Defense and Missile Defense Agency again canceled the 
RAMOS program. We have no cooperation with Russia on missile defense 
right now.
  We talk about Russian cooperation with weapons of mass destruction. 
But we have corruption on the Russian side, corruption on the American 
side. We are not being given access to those sensitive sites. And again 
we wonder why the Russians do not trust us.
  Mr. Speaker, we need Russia. We need Russia to be a partner of ours. 
We need Russia to be a partner of ours for several reasons. If we look 
at the world's situation right now, we are certainly unhappy with some 
of the direction of President Putin, but we have no leverage with him 
to get him to understand that he is taking the wrong steps as a 
democratic nation. We look at the Middle East. We heard our colleagues 
for 2 hours talk about Iraq. Mr. Speaker, the problem in Iraq is not 
being caused by the people in Iraq. The people in Iraq did welcome us. 
They did give us flowers, and they are happy that we are there. Ask our 
troops. Tomorrow we will hear Prime Minister Allawi tell us the real 
story of the gratefulness of the Iraqi nation. The problem in Iraq is 
not with the Iraqi people.
  Mr. Speaker, the problem with Iraq is the problem of the neighbor 
Iran. Iran has been involved in undermining our efforts to stabilize 
Iraq for the last 18 months. I remember going to CIA Director George 
Tenet 18 months ago when a former Member of this body, a former 
Democrat Member, came to me and said, I have a source that wants to 
work with us, a source that will tell us where bin Laden is and will 
give us information about Iran's involvement in Iraq.
  I went down to meet with Tenet, and for the past 18 months, Mr. 
Speaker, on a regular basis, I have interacted with this informant 
based overseas in Europe. We have gotten continuous information that I 
have passed along to the CIA, all of which has been verified, that Iran 
has been behind the destabilization of Iraq on a continual basis. I 
told the CIA over a year ago, Mr. Speaker, that the Ayatollah Khamenei, 
the religious fanatic in Iran, not Hatami, the governmental leader, but 
the Ayatollah Khamenei was providing $70 million of funding to Sadr.

                              {time}  2350

  The CIA at that time, Mr. Speaker, no one knew who al-Sader was. I 
told the CIA that Iran was crashing on a nuclear program. I told the 
CIA that my informant had even found evidence of two groups of Iranians 
going up through China into North Korea in an attempt to acquire their 
nuclear weapons materials. And I told the CIA that Ayatollah Khamenei 
had ordered his country to prepare for an attack on one of our nuclear 
powers plants, and the letters were beginning with SEA, Seabrook.
  Mr. Speaker, that was in June of last year. In August of last year, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested two al Qaeda-linked 
individuals who were flying a plane scoping out a nuclear power plant 
up in the Northeast near Seabrook.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran has been our problem, and it does not take a rocket 
scientist to figure that out. On one side of

[[Page 19060]]

Iran you have Afghanistan, a country that now has 10 million people 
registered to vote in their first elections, a constitution in place, a 
country moving toward a democracy.
  On the other side of Iran you have Iraq, stabilizing, moving toward a 
constitution, moving toward free elections. So on both sides of Iran 
you have democracy breaking out.
  And right down the road, Mr. Speaker, you have Libya, where Moammar 
Gadhafi has voluntarily given up all of his weapons of mass destruction 
without us firing a single shot. I know Gadhafi's purpose, because I 
led both delegations to Libya earlier this year in January and March. 
Sitting across the tent from him in the desert in Tripoli, looking out 
at his house that we had bombed in 1986, he said, ``Congressman Weldon, 
I don't want my people to suffer the fate of the Iraqi people and I 
don't want to be Saddam Hussein.''
  Mr. Speaker, the Iranians understand what is happening. The Ayatollah 
Khamenei understands he is not popular in Iran. When they had elections 
earlier this year, only 9 percent of the people eligible to vote voted. 
They despise radical fundamentalism, but they cannot do anything about 
it.
  So Iran understands their days are numbered, and that is why they are 
crashing on a nuclear program. That is why they are attempting to 
undermine Iraq, because Iran does not want Iraq to succeed.
  Our colleagues on the other side said we should have anticipated 
that. Mr. Speaker, there is no way the President could have anticipated 
that. We are dealing with it now.
  But how do we deal with Iran, Mr. Speaker? We do not have any 
leverage with Iran. We do not even have discussions with Iran. One 
country does, Mr. Speaker, and that country is Russia.
  Russia has worked with Iran over the past 10, 15 years. They have a 
regular entry into Moscow. They interact with the Members of the Duma 
and the Federation Council, and President Putin has a relationship with 
Iranian leaders that we need. But the problem is, Mr. Speaker, we do 
not have the leverage with President Putin.
  Yes, President Bush and President Putin have a good personal 
relationship, but there is a vacuum under that in both countries. Now 
we tried. Back in 2001, Mr. Speaker, we gave this document to Bush and 
Putin, 48 pages, 108 recommendations, signed by one-third of the 
Congress. Dick Lugar, Carl Levin, Joe Biden, myself, liberal Democrats, 
conservative Republicans, one-third of the Congress saying we are ready 
for a new relationship.
  Unfortunately, the people under President Bush have not been 
listening. They were not listening when President Bush said remove 
Jackson-Vanik. They were not listening when President Bush said do 
joint programs in missile defense. Now we are paying the price for 
that.
  Mr. Speaker, that is why I proposed to the President and that is why 
I am announcing tonight a new initiative, renewed commitments, 
strengthened relationships. This four-part strategy will give us a 
series of initiatives that will give President Putin and the Russian 
people a clear signal that finally we want to be their close friend and 
partners it is a simple strategy. It builds on successes of the past 
and deals with issues that we have talked about.
  The four strategies are fairly simple, Mr. Speaker. It calls for us 
to terminate Jackson-Vanik limitations on Russia, as our President has 
called for. We can pass that resolution in this body and the other body 
under a suspension.
  It calls for a new threat reduction initiative using a new process to 
get entry into President Putin that we have been working on for 2 years 
that will allow us to reduce the theft and corruption of American tax 
dollars and will give us access into sites we have never had access to 
before.
  Last August I took two members of the other side with me to the 
closed city of Krasnoyarsk 26, without any help from our State 
Department, no help from our Defense Department, no help from our 
Energy Department and no help from the CIA. We went in the mountain 
where the Soviet Union built their three largest plutonium producing 
reactors.
  We met in Moscow, and our Russian counterparts said if you follow 
this new process, you get access to any site in Russia you want.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, I have proposals signed by the Russians for six 
new biological weapons sites that they want to open up for American 
joint cooperation. I handed those six initiatives in both Russian and 
English to John Bolton the day I left for Moscow last week. The 
Russians do want to work with us in a new way, a new way of trust and 
confidence in solving problems with weapons of mass destruction.
  The third element of this plan, Mr. Speaker, calls for substantive 
work on joint missile defense cooperation. President Bush has called 
for this repeatedly, publicly. So the question is, why have we not done 
it? The answer is, the Defense Department told me they could not get a 
meeting with General Baluyevsky, who 6 months ago was the number two 
general in the Russian military.
  I told General Kadisch at Missile Defense Agency, you cannot get a 
meeting with him? Send someone over with me and I will get you the 
meeting.
  So, Mr. Speaker, two months ago I took a delegation to Moscow. From 
the Missile Defense Agency I took General Obering, who is now the three 
star general in charge of that agency. He took three other associates 
with him.
  We arrived in Moscow and they took us to Starya Plochad, which is 
equivalent to our East Wing of the White House. We sat at a table 
across from Putin's representative to the Duma and the Federation 
Council, the chairman of the committee overseeing the Ministry of the 
Interior, Alexi Alexandrov, and in walks General Baluyevsky. General 
Baluyevsky, in a business suit, talked with General Obering and began a 
dialogue that we could not get for a year on missile defense 
cooperation.
  Two weeks after we left Moscow, President Putin relieved the chairman 
of their Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kvashnin, and replaced him with 
General Baluyevsky.
  The fourth item in this initiative, Mr. Speaker, calls for the 
announcement of the U.S.-Russian free energy trade agreement. Not free 
trade agreement, but free energy trade agreement. We have significant 
energy needs. Russia has significant energy reserves. They are trying 
to get their energy to the marketplace, we want to use that energy and 
need it.
  What I am calling for, Mr. Speaker, is an equivalent relationship 
similar to Gore-Chernomyrdrin in the previous administration between 
the two presidents of our countries, so that Putin and Bush appoint a 
joint effort of having our energy leaders, private sector and 
government, work together with Russia's energy leaders, so that we can 
help bring their energy out and use it in our marketplace. It is 
already happening. We simply want to expedite that process, both in 
terms of fossil fuel and in terms of nuclear power.
  Along with this four-part position paper, Mr. Speaker, we need to 
work together with Russia on anti-terrorism.
  I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, if we follow these actions, if the 
President takes the bold leadership that is outlined in this document, 
then we will have the leverage for President Bush to go to President 
Putin and say, ``Vladimir, you are going too far in your actions in 
providing autocratic rule over your country. Allow democracy to 
survive, to grow and prosper. Vladimir, I need your help in allowing us 
to deal with Iran. Help us deal with the problem of the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant, because if we do not deal with that power plant, Israel 
will eventually try to take it out because they see it as a nuclear 
threat to their security.
  Mr. Speaker, now is the time for us to join with Russia, to be 
Russia's best friend, to be Russia's partner; to hold Russia 
accountable, to talk about human rights. But to do it in a way that 
Russia understands is in our mutual interest, not a condescending 
approach where we look down on Russia, as we have done in the past, and 
tell

[[Page 19061]]

Russia to do what we have outlined for them.
  Mr. Speaker, I am convinced nothing is more critical. The timing is 
right, and we must act quickly.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record these documents.

      U.S.-Russia Partnership--Renewed Commitments, Strengthened 
                       Relationships, August 2004


                              introduction

       Long before Perestroika, Gorbachev and the fall of the 
     Soviet Union, I developed a deep interest in U.S.-Russian 
     relations. The Soviet Union, an enemy of the United States, 
     demonstrated its strength and intent to protect its country 
     by producing massive stockpiles of nuclear and biological 
     weapons. The aggression between our two countries led me to 
     major in Russian Studies, believing that one day, our 
     relationship would change and the United States and the 
     Soviet Union would normalize relations. As a county 
     commissioner, I hosted my first group of young communists in 
     Pennsylvania in 1985. This relationship, forged 19 years ago, 
     has maintained its strength and expanded even further to 
     include a larger circle of Russian citizens. I take great 
     pride in my efforts to reach out and establish a solid base 
     of understanding and cooperation to achieve stability for the 
     people of Russia and the surrounding former Soviet republics.
       For the past 10 years, I have co-chaired the Duma-Congress 
     Study Group, the official inter-parliamentary relationship 
     between the United States and Russia. This exchange plays a 
     vital role in strengthening our relationship with Russia. The 
     overriding purpose of this relationship is to demonstrate to 
     the Duma and its leaders how an effective inter-parliamentary 
     relationship can lead to positive changes in both our 
     countries. Today, Members of Congress work with their 
     counterparts in the Duma on common interests such as the 
     environment, health care, social and economic issues. By 
     building and strengthening a working relationship, we are 
     then able to confront more difficult issues such as missile 
     defense, non-proliferation, Iran and other multilateral 
     relationships.
       Three years ago, I unveiled a comprehensive plan to 
     cooperate with Russia on eleven different issues ranging from 
     defense and security to agriculture and healthcare. This 
     proposal, A New Time, A New Beginning, was widely supported 
     in the U.S. and Russia. However, recently, I have watched 
     Russia lose confidence in the United States and move further 
     away from the West. The start of Russian distrust in the 
     United States began shortly after the fall of Soviet 
     communism. Russians believed that with the break up of the 
     Soviet Union, prosperity would soon follow. Instead, in 2001, 
     $4.08 billion of U.S. foreign direct investment flowed into 
     Russia while in 2001, Communist China received $10.53 billion 
     in U.S. foreign direct investment. This was the first of many 
     negative messages the U.S. sent to Russia.
       Additionally, Russians are still bitter of our handling of 
     the war in Kosovo. Russia believed we could have, and should 
     have, ended that war much earlier. In fact, instead of 
     ignoring Russia's relationship with Yugoslavia, we should 
     have encouraged Russia to play a more aggressive role in 
     peacefully removing Milosevic from power. It was not until 
     one year after we began the bombing that we finally requested 
     Russia's assistance.
       Furthermore, when news of the biggest money laundering 
     scandal broke in late 1999, the Clinton Administration 
     ignored the theft of billions of U.S. dollars destined for 
     Russian citizens. The Russians watched as the oligarchs, 
     including some with close connections to President Boris 
     Yeltsin, lined their pocketbooks. The United States 
     downplayed the Bank of New York scandal and continued to 
     protect the Clinton-Yeltsin relationship.
       The September 2000 Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia 
     concluded that both Russian government agencies and private 
     entities were directly involved in at least 26 transfers of 
     proliferation to such states as Iran and Iraq. Instead of 
     sanctioning Russia, the Clinton Administration continued to 
     rely on personal assurances from its small cadre of contacts 
     in the Russian government.
       The Clinton Administration's willful blindness to Russian 
     proliferation produced immense damage to our relationship 
     with Russia. Our policy under President Clinton was based on 
     a personal relationship between Presidents Clinton and 
     Yeltsin, and Vice-President Gore and Prime Minister 
     Chernomyrdin. As long as these Russians were in power, 
     nothing else mattered. While Russians lost faith in Yeltsin, 
     the U.S. continued to support this failed leader.
       During the Clinton Administration, tens of thousands of 
     young Russians were outside the American embassy in Moscow 
     throwing paint, firing weapons at our embassy and burning the 
     American flag. In fact, the State Department had issued 
     travel advisories to Americans traveling to Moscow because 
     the hatred for America had grown so great in such a short 
     period of time that the Russian people were adamantly opposed 
     to any Americans in their country.
       To repair our relationship, I have developed a new approach 
     to improve our relationship with Russia that builds upon the 
     recommendations in A New Time, A New Beginning. The four 
     initiatives in this proposal are not new to U.S.-Russian 
     relations. Rather, they are programs that could easily regain 
     Russian support and trust in the United States if implemented 
     in the short term. The U.S. needs Russian support not for our 
     own security concerns, but for international stability. In 
     that regard, I firmly believe that the key to stabilizing the 
     situation in Iraq lies in improving our relations with 
     Russia. It is no secret that Iran continues to fuel the bulk 
     of terrorist activity in Iraq. However, given our cold 
     relationship with Iran resulting from their continued pursuit 
     of weapons of mass destruction, support of global terrorism 
     and atrocious human rights record, there is little room for 
     diplomatic negotiations. In contrast, Russia's deep and 
     lucrative investments with the Islamic Republic may provide 
     the necessary leverage to effect change in that country's 
     activities in Iraq. Specifically, as a major supplier of arms 
     and nuclear technology to Iran, Russia can exert significant 
     economic pressure. In addition to its trading activity, 
     Russia has made strategic policy agreements with Iran to keep 
     them out of the Caucuses and has coordinated its policy in 
     Central Asia with specific regard to Caspian oil reserves.
       It is also in Russia's best interest to continue to engage 
     Iran and improve its own bilateral relations with the Islamic 
     Republic. Iran's military capabilities continue to threaten 
     Russian as well as its possible support of radical separatism 
     in Russia's turbulent ``southern rim''.
       As such, improving our relationship with Russia would 
     provide needed leverage to induce Russia to use its influence 
     with Iran to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. I firmly 
     believe that we have reached a crucial juncture in our 
     relationship with Russia and the independent states of the 
     former Soviet Union. By taking action in four key areas, we 
     can dramatically improve our relationship with our former 
     Cold War enemy for years to come. These four key areas are as 
     follows:
       Terminate Jackson-Vanik restrictions against Russia. 
     Although not a high profile issue in the U.S., Jackson-Vanik 
     continues to be a political hot-button for the Russian 
     government and its citizens. Removing the restriction would 
     send a tremendously positive message that the U.S. is serious 
     about improving relations between our two nations.
       Renew our commitment to Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     programs. An opportunity exists for the administration to 
     undertake a new cooperative program with Russian officials to 
     secure biological weapons facilities that at present are 
     poorly protected. The interagency Russian International 
     Exchange Group (IEG) is comprised of senior military, 
     intelligence and political officials. Operating with the 
     support of Russian President Putin, the IEG has been 
     established to remove bureaucratic obstacles to the 
     implementation of U.S. funded nonproliferation programs. The 
     IEG concept has been briefed to senior staff of the Office of 
     the Vice President. The IEG has offered to work with the 
     appropriate U.S. agencies--most likely DOD/DTRA--on a pilot 
     project whose goal would be to secure five biological weapons 
     sites.
       As many as 89 additional sites could be worked through the 
     IEG. DTRA is in the process of being briefed on this 
     initiative. White House support for the concept would be 
     instrumental in capitalizing on a new opportunity for the 
     administration to demonstrate it is working with Russia in 
     limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
       Improve Russian energy infrastructure. Russia and the 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union possess vast 
     oil and natural gas reserves. Despite their incredible 
     natural resources, Russia continues to struggle to get these 
     resources to the world market. Lacking the necessary capital, 
     much of Russia's natural resources remain untapped. By 
     assisting Russia in reforming and clarifying their tax code 
     could result in Russia's ability to extract, transport and 
     market its energy resources. Russian natural resources could 
     lower skyrocketing fuel costs and dramatically improve our 
     economy. Utilizing Russian natural resources would 
     significantly improve our national security by lessening our 
     dependence on Middle East oil. In exchange Russia would 
     receive the much needed upgrade in its energy producing 
     capabilities and gain the world's largest energy consuming 
     market as a key customer. Continued cooperation with Russia 
     on energy policy is also needed to improve the environment 
     for foreign investment. Assisting Russia improve its energy 
     infrastructure is the necessary first step towards attracting 
     the private investment that will sustain Russia's energy 
     industry for the future.
       Improve and enhance our cooperation on missile defense. 
     Emerging threats of missile attacks from rogue nations may 
     confront both the U.S. and Russia over the next decade. A 
     major objective of the Missile Defense Act was to establish 
     cooperative projects between the two nations. With a new 
     director at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and changes at 
     senior levels in the Russian military establishment, the U.S. 
     should pursue this cooperation immediately.
       With the accomplishment of these four proposals, the United 
     States will win a major

[[Page 19062]]

     victory in Russia, and in return, Russia will be more willing 
     to cooperate on issues significantly important to the United 
     States. It is time the bilateral relationship go beyond the 
     diplomatic posturing and produce real results.


                      termination of jackson-vanik

       Thirty years ago, the Jackson-Vanik amendment was included 
     in the Trade Act of 1974 to protect religious freedom in the 
     former Soviet Union. The United States Congress made a 
     courageous decision to pass the Jackson-Vanik amendment and 
     link it to the Soviet Union's trade status and its record on 
     Jewish emigration. Jackson-Vanik set guidelines for a string 
     of changes in the Soviet Union and allowed for Jews to escape 
     oppression and begin new lives. It was the right policy for 
     the right time.
       Since 1994, Russia has been in full compliance of Jackson-
     Vanik and Russian Jews are free to emigrate from the former 
     Soviet Union. Major Jewish organizations--the Jewish 
     Institute for National Security Affairs, the American Israel 
     Public Affairs Committee and the National Conference on 
     Soviet Jewry--that long opposed terminating Jackson-Vanik, 
     are in agreement and on record that the United States should 
     terminate this obsolete provision.
       Although President Putin requested, and President Bush 
     promised Russia's elevation from Jackson-Vanik two years ago, 
     there are some in Congress and in the administration that 
     want to change the original intent of the amendment to meet 
     unrelated trade disputes. Two years ago, due to Russian 
     safety concerns, President Putin blocked U.S. poultry imports 
     causing a major disruption in the U.S. poultry industry. 
     While I empathize with our farmers, using an emigration 
     provision to negotiate a trade dispute undermines U.S. 
     foreign policy. Trade disputes are natural components of an 
     evolving trade relationship, and under current trade laws, 
     there are effective remedies to address them. In resolving 
     the poultry disagreement, I worked with the key Members of 
     Congress concerned with agriculture issues. As a result of my 
     efforts, Representatives Pombo, Boehner and Goodlatte signed 
     a letter to Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House 
     Ways and Means Committee, which has trade jurisdiction, 
     indicating their disagreement that the lifting of Jackson-
     Vanik restriction to poultry trade was inappropriate.
       Additionally, using the amendment to leverage Russia's 
     accession to the WTO, as some have suggested, would weaken 
     U.S. credibility. WTO rules already require that every member 
     of the working party agree before a country is granted 
     membership. Therefore, Russia cannot accede without consent 
     from the United States. This guarantees that U.S. negotiators 
     have adequate authority to monitor and guide Russia's 
     accession.
       An overwhelming majority of U.S. companies active in the 
     Russian marketplace also agree that terminating Jackson-Vanik 
     is appropriate, especially since Russia is currently 
     recognized as a market economy under U.S. trade law.
       In addition to fulfilling the Jackson-Vanik requirements, 
     President Putin was the first foreign leader to contact 
     President Bush after Sept 11, 2001, to offer condolences, 
     intelligence assistance and other support, including agreeing 
     to the positioning of U.S. forces in Central Asia, which was 
     a key to our military success in Afghanistan. In October 
     2001, Russia appeased the United States by closing their 
     Lourdes Listening Facility in Cuba. More recently, instead of 
     protesting NATO expansion, which brought the organization up 
     to Russia's borders, Russia negotiated with NATO to establish 
     a formal method of cooperation. Although Russia has shown the 
     U.S. its willingness to cooperate and accommodate our many 
     requests, the United States, has not sent one positive 
     message to Russia.
       Jackson-Vanik is not a high profile issue in the United 
     States, but it continues to be a sensitive issue for the 
     Russian government and its citizens. While the changing 
     nature of our strategic relationship with Russia has been 
     full of promise, it has been challenged by a growing number 
     of domestic constituencies within Russia. Russian media 
     reports consistently remind Russian citizens of this 
     unfulfilled promise. This opposition can easily be resolved 
     by granting Russia what it rightfully deserves--elevating 
     Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This would send a 
     positive message that the U.S. is serious about improving 
     relations between our two nations.


 new threat reduction initiative: u.s.-russia cooperation on securing 
                 biological weapons and research sites

       Since 1992, the United States and Russia have engaged in a 
     series of cooperative threat reduction programs, commonly 
     referred to as Nunn-Lugar programs. Primarily, this 
     cooperation has focused resources on reducing the threat 
     posed by the theft or diversion of nuclear weapons and 
     materials. Some successes have been achieved, but the current 
     programmatic approach to this daunting challenge has in some 
     cases been bogged down in a maze of bureaucratic missteps and 
     a flagging sense of urgency. In other cases, programmatic 
     implementation has been slowed by bilateral disputes over 
     taxes and liability.
       This new initiative addresses a topic of heretofore--
     limited bilateral cooperation--programmatic work to enhance 
     the security at Russian biological sites that hold dangerous 
     pathogens of interest to rogue states or terrorist groups--
     and also proposes a new cooperative model for implementing 
     this work. Central to the success of this initiative is the 
     cooperation of Russian authorities that control access to 
     these facilities. Reflecting internal concerns about the pace 
     and scope of existing cooperative threat reduction programs 
     with the United States, the Russians established an 
     interagency group, supported by President Putin, senior 
     military, security and political officials, whose goal is to 
     find solutions to the bureaucratic obstacles that have 
     plagued existing programmatic efforts. Known as the 
     International Exchange Group (IEG) within Russia, as a sign 
     of its bona fides and influence within the Russian 
     government, IEG has presented to U.S. officials a list of 89 
     biological facilities as candidates for security enhancement 
     work.
       Recognizing the challenge and expense of working at such a 
     large number of sites, the IEG has proposed a pilot project 
     that would encompass work at six biological sites, including 
     Biopreparat, the military's leading producer of biological 
     pathogens. The IEG has contracted official agreements with 
     all six facilities. These sites would have to be assessed 
     carefully by U.S. experts to determine the appropriate amount 
     of funding and most effective set of security enhancements 
     required for implementing the project, but an overall initial 
     estimate of $10 million to complete work at the six sites is 
     required. Funding for this project could be made available 
     through funds existing within the Department of Defense's 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
       In addition to the national security benefit of securing 
     hazardous biological pathogens, the pilot project would have 
     two innovative programmatic elements. The first is that the 
     Russian side would commit its own ``upfront'' funding to 
     begin the projects. The IEG would expect U.S. funding to be 
     made available to ultimately fund the six site pilot 
     projects, but they are prepared to cooperate in the 
     establishment of a joint U.S.-Russian management team that 
     would oversee the project. The management team would place 
     U.S. funds in an escrow account, releasing those funds to the 
     Russians only when mutually agreed upon project milestones 
     had been achieved and verified. The second innovative element 
     of this initiative is that unlike much of the security 
     enhancement work currently funded that relies heavily on U.S. 
     contractor involvement--triggering legal disputes over 
     liability--the pilot project would be carried out by Russian 
     contractors, working in Russia at Russian sites. In so doing, 
     the Russians would accept all the legal liability for 
     performed work and there also would be no Russian claim that 
     funding should be subject to Russian taxation.
       A number of independent states of the former Soviet Union 
     have been helpful to the United States in the war on 
     terrorism. Such states are new and struggling democracies and 
     would benefit considerably from assistance to create 
     sustainable jobs for their underemployed or unemployed 
     scientists, engineers and technicians who were formerly 
     engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass 
     destruction for the Russian Federation or other such state. 
     The United States should establish and promote programs that 
     prevent the proliferation from scientists, engineers and 
     technicians of the former Soviet Union to countries with 
     potential for proliferation, development and production of 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       The Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, as included in the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (H.R. 
     4200), should immediately be enacted to award scientists 
     employed at the Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation 
     and scientists employed at Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory, international exchange fellowships in the nuclear 
     nonproliferation sciences. This program, between the leading 
     U.S. and Russian nuclear facilities, would promote peaceful 
     uses of nuclear technology and provide opportunities for 
     advancement in the field of nuclear nonproliferation to 
     scientists who, as demonstrated by their academic or 
     professional achievements, show particular promise of making 
     significant contributions in that field.
       Removing potential nuclear weapons materials from 
     vulnerable sites around the world would reduce the chance 
     that such materials would fall into the hands of groups 
     hostile to the national security of the United States. A Task 
     Force on Nuclear Material Removal should be established by 
     the President appointing the Department of Energy to ensure 
     that potential nuclear weapons materials are entirely removed 
     from the most vulnerable sites as soon as practicable.
       Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
     Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all part 
     of the Silk Road region, would benefit from the Silk Road 
     Initiative to develop sustainable employment opportunities 
     between the United States and the Silk Road nations for 
     scientists, engineers and technicians formerly engaged in 
     activities to develop and produce weapons of mass 
     destruction. This

[[Page 19063]]

     program will incorporate the best practices under the former 
     Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program and 
     facilitate commercial partnerships between private entities 
     in the United States and scientists, engineers and 
     technicians in the Silk Road nations.
       During the Cold War, the Soviet Union presented the U.S. 
     with a clear and identifiable threat to our national 
     security. For decades, the Soviet Union developed massive 
     stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. With 
     the fall of the Soviet Union, these stockpiles are largely 
     unaccounted for and in dangerously insecure locations and 
     facilities.
       In the post-September 11th world, in which our nation faces 
     new threats from underground terrorist organizations, it is 
     more important than ever to work with Russia to eliminate and 
     secure their weapons of mass destruction so that they do not 
     fall into the wrong hands. By implementing and engaging 
     Russia in these programs would secure our national security.


               U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION ON MISSILE DEFENSE

       Recognizing the emerging threat of missile attack from 
     rogue nations that may confront both the U.S. and Russia over 
     the next decade, a major objective of the Missile Defense Act 
     was the establishment of cooperative projects between the two 
     former rivals. With a new director at the U.S. Missile 
     Defense Agency and changes at senior levels in the Russian 
     military establishment, the time may be right to advance this 
     cooperation.
       Central to the development of bilateral cooperation in 
     missile defense would be commencement of an ongoing dialogue 
     between senior U.S. and Russian officials and their experts. 
     In July 2004, such a meeting occurred in Berlin. Sustaining 
     this fledgling momentum will be essential and, if supported 
     by the administration, the Congress and its counterparts in 
     the Russian Duma, that outcome can be achieved. Such 
     cooperation is in the national security interest of the 
     United States. Russian assistance in such areas as sharing 
     data from target acquisition radars, currently unavailable to 
     the Missile Defense Agency, would address one of the 
     information gaps in the system's current configuration.
       Comprehensive data exchanges could be the first area of 
     possible bilateral missile defense cooperation. Under the 
     auspices of the IEG, a series of senior working group 
     meetings could be established with U.S. counterparts. The 
     working group would be empowered to establish agenda topics 
     reflecting the interests and priorities of each side. In 
     addition, and as part of that mechanism, the sides might 
     agree on a process where they would report to their 
     respective political leadership, as well as representatives 
     of the U.S. Congress and Duma, on the progress being achieved 
     by the working group.
       Currently, a government-to-government agreement must be in 
     place to serve as a framework for any industry cooperation on 
     missile defense. Regular meetings and discussions between 
     officials of the two governments are ongoing and contributing 
     to this framework agreement. These discussions should also 
     review U.S. and Russian export control and liability policies 
     in order to normalize the trade relationship.
       Additional areas of potential missile defense cooperation 
     that may be beneficial to the two nations include targets, 
     radars and sensors.
       Targets--Both the United States and the Russian Federation 
     have space-based Early Warning Systems (EWS) and long 
     histories of development therein. A major new thrust is the 
     need for the future Ballistic Missile Defense System to 
     detect missile launches much earlier than provided by current 
     EWS capabilities. This is important to support the boost 
     phase intercept element of BMDS where alert and launch of 
     interceptors within tens of seconds of the threat missile 
     ignition are extremely valuable to the operational concept.
       Currently, an initiative exists that is on-going within the 
     Missile Defense Agency dealing with targets and 
     countermeasures. Through this initiative, targets are 
     provided for missile defense interceptor tests. Competition 
     exists between U.S. contractors to provide targets and these 
     awards, if appropriate could be competed to include non-U.S. 
     entities, including Russian firms to provide realistic 
     targets to the Missile Defense Agency.
       The Russian Federation has been requested by the Missile 
     Defense Agency to provide ballistic missile targets and 
     launch services for radar evaluation. In the long term, this 
     could evolve into an expanded test program to include target 
     intercepts. Both nations will cooperate to access threat 
     representative targets and provide more operationally 
     realistic testing opportunities.
       Radars--Early Warning Radars offer a propitious opportunity 
     for cooperation. A cooperative effort with Russia to co-
     develop early warning radars, located along the Russian 
     southern border looking toward Middle East and Southwest Asia 
     threats, is critical to both nations. UHF technology is 
     globally widespread and, therefore, in a category of 
     technology considered exportable. Early warning data alerting 
     our two governments of a Middle East threat would go to a 
     Russian site, a U.S. site or it could go to a third site that 
     would then pass the early warning data to both countries.
       Sensors--A great deal of attention is being paid by 
     Homeland Security and the Defense Agencies to detect the 
     presence of Special Nuclear Material or nuclear weapons at 
     points of entry or those assembled clandestinely here at 
     home. However, once a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb has been 
     detonated or a successful disastrous attack on a nuclear 
     reactor has been made, the important problem remains of 
     defining the contaminated areas for evacuation and subsequent 
     decontamination. The better and more quickly the delineation 
     of the dangerous areas can be accomplished, the sooner the 
     civilian population can be rescued and their fears alleviated 
     and the more quickly the decontamination effort can proceed 
     with protection for the clean up crews.
       Present technology depends in large part on the use of 
     detectors that are sensitive to the gamma rays emitted by the 
     decay of radionuclides. However, these detectors require that 
     they be used within the irradiated region that could produce 
     possible radiation effects on the operator. This mean of free 
     path of the gamma rays, however, is not sufficiently long 
     enough to permit the use of a gamma sensor from remote 
     platforms such as a helicopter or UAV that could provide a 
     rapid assessment of the situation and mapping of the affected 
     areas.
       Little known measurements, made a number of years ago, 
     showed that the radioactive decay products (alpha, beta and 
     gamma rays) cause the atmosphere to fluoresce principally in 
     the ultraviolet (UV) and to a lesser extent in other regions 
     of the spectrum. Using this phenomenon it is possible to 
     measure and localize the UV emission from these radiations 
     remotely on the ground or from aircraft or a UAV.
       The Russians have demonstrated expertise in ultraviolet 
     sensors under the RAMOS program. In addition, there are 
     ongoing activities with the Russian nuclear community for 
     Threat Reduction. The United States and Russia should broaden 
     and fuse these capabilities to this new program for remote 
     sensing and mapping of radiological contaminants.
       Measurements and modeling of the visible/infrared 
     signatures (spectral, temporal, and spatial) of Russian 
     missile plumes is a near term project that could be placed 
     under the RAMOS program. Of particular interest are data 
     taken on plumes of the Russian rocket motors and technologies 
     that have been previously exported or copied by third word 
     countries of concern. In addition to measuring the boost 
     phase of Russian and U.S. missile launches, there is also 
     interest in observing static tests.
       The key to forging a U.S.-Russian missile defense alliance 
     is now, before U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate further. 
     Even the most modest proposals and programs already underway 
     should be viewed as reforming a still adversarial 
     relationship between Washington and Moscow. Current 
     discussions between the Department of Defense, the Missile 
     Defense Agency and Russian officials should continue to 
     provide a strategy to evaluate the feasibility of increasing 
     technical cooperation with Russian military industry on 
     missile defense technologies such as the Russian S-400 and S-
     500. These cooperative opportunities would benefit Russia 
     through a long-term relationship and direct involvement in 
     the U.S. BMDS as well as significant Russian industry 
     involvement and monetary benefits.


                                 ENERGY

       Russia, with its vast oil and gas resources, a growing and 
     diverse number of private sector companies and a renewed 
     commitment to investment by international energy companies, 
     offers a unique opportunity to provide energy stability to an 
     often volatile and insecure world energy market. Working with 
     Russia, the U.S. can play a critical role in supporting 
     energy development among the resource rich countries of the 
     former Soviet Union. In a time of historically high crude oil 
     and natural gas prices, the United States and Russia must 
     establish a more effective energy partnership. Both the 
     United States and Russia have emphasized the importance of 
     energy in the bilateral relationship, and have sought ways to 
     encourage trade and investment, but the results of their 
     actions have not been sufficient. Russia's vast energy 
     resources have not flooded the United States market.
       Russia's energy sector is at full capacity, unable to 
     export greater amounts of oil and gas. Increasing Russia's 
     oil and gas exports will require sequenced long-term 
     investment in exploration, production and transportation to 
     increase total system capacity.
       Large-scale direct investment by United States companies, 
     with its major inputs of technology and management, in the 
     Russian energy sector is vital in order for Russia to 
     substantially increase its energy output for the benefit of 
     both the United States and Russia. American energy company 
     investment in the Russian energy sector will improve Russia's 
     economic development and political stability, while at the 
     same time supply the United States with additional oil and 
     gas, thereby enhancing energy security by decreasing 
     dependence on the Middle East.

[[Page 19064]]

       While Russia's foreign direct investment has increased, it 
     remains far below its potential. Russia's government 
     policies, regulations and practices still make American 
     investors wary of its uncertain business environment. United 
     States companies require greater security and protections of 
     their interests in order to invest further in their human, 
     technical and financial capital in Russian energy markets. 
     Numerous American companies have struggled with Russian 
     entities over asset ownership and appropriate taxation.
       If Russia seeks to encourage foreign investment, it must 
     create a transparent business environment. The United States 
     and Russian government must take action, simultaneously, so 
     that United States companies will overcome this uncertainty 
     and invest in Russia's energy market.
       A. Asset Ownership and Taxation.--Despite financial 
     incentives, such as the United States Export-Import Bank loan 
     guarantees to American exporters of oil and gas equipment to 
     Russia and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
     insurance and financing to American investors in the Russian 
     energy sector, the United States government must provide 
     further incentives to encourage greater investment in Russia 
     such as relaxing the foreign tax code. Over the decades, 
     there have been few major changes in the structure of the 
     United States international tax system. Reducing the relative 
     tax burden on foreign investment would increase the extent to 
     which American companies invest abroad. Policy options 
     include liberalizing the foreign tax credit's limitation and 
     Subpart F's restrictions on deferral for Russian energy 
     investment, exempting all income from Russian energy 
     production, or at least providing a substantial reduction in 
     the tax rate on repatriated earnings, and implementing tax 
     sparring for Russian, and especially the former countries of 
     the Soviet Union, energy investment.
       For Russia to recognize its potential, both Russian and 
     non-Russian investors must have confidence that, when 
     disputes arise, a judicial system exists that will fairly and 
     impartially enforce the rules applicable to their operations 
     and honor their agreements. In addition, a banking system 
     capable of providing the funds to finance this growth must 
     exist. By creating a joint United States-Russian Energy Bank 
     similar to the World Bank, European Development Bank or 
     International Monetary Fund but limited to the United States, 
     Russia and former countries of the Soviet Union, could create 
     a positive investment environment and produce long term 
     development of the energy sector in Russia. At least, during 
     the appropriation process, Congress must encourage that funds 
     appropriated to these development banks be used in energy 
     projects in Russian and the former countries of the Soviet 
     Union.
       Russia also needs to clarify and fix either the tax scheme 
     under which new exploration and production would be covered, 
     or revisit a Production Sharing Agreement. United States 
     energy companies need to be able to quantify their potential 
     outcome prior to investing in explorations, or even seismic 
     analysis to determine their interest in exploring a given 
     area.
       B. Improve Russia Production Capabilities.--Russia's 
     ability to transport and export oil and gas is significantly 
     below its production capabilities. In 2004, Russian oil 
     exports will expand almost 12% over the 250 mm tons exported 
     in 2003. However, in the following two years, exports will 
     increase only 3% annually because the existing pipeline 
     system is unable to pump greater quantities of oil. The 
     Russian government must define the rights of investors in 
     private pipelines so that outside investment can construct 
     additional major pipelines to increase output. Currently, 
     energy transportation out of Russia is controlled by the 
     Russian government which may restrict capacity. Russia should 
     open transportation capability to non-Russian entities so 
     that U.S. companies investing in Russia may determine 
     allocating capacity.
       Russia should also remove the government's current 
     requirement that a fixed percentage of new production must be 
     sold into the Russian domestic market at a significantly 
     lower price than the true market price. This would provide an 
     incentive for new production, since currently an estimated 
     65% of all production is sold at such a discount. The Russian 
     government could become economically indifferent when an 
     appropriate tax scheme is defined at the outset of the 
     agreement.
       Additionally, if Russian companies aspire to become global 
     leaders in the energy production market, the U.S. can assist 
     Russian oil companies to develop their resources, shift their 
     products to the United States market and help advance and 
     solidify Russia's integration into the international energy 
     economy. U.S. companies can offer the technical capability, 
     the access to capital and the international expertise to 
     Russia. Furthermore, the United States can provide Russian 
     companies adequate storage at refineries and ports. Old U.S. 
     military bases, which are no loner used by DoD, could provide 
     the storage and security for energy imported from Russia.
       C. Commercial Energy Dialogue.--The foundation formed by 
     President Bush and Putin's 2002 United States-Russia 
     Commercial Energy Dialogue must continue to be built upon, 
     but at a faster pace. The U.S. Department of Energy and the 
     Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy should continue to convene 
     annually with U.S. and Russian agency officials, legislators, 
     industry and academic institutions and identify areas of 
     further cooperative efforts and potential areas for new 
     collaborations.
       When the President and other high level United States 
     officials meet with their Russian counterparts, they must 
     emphasize the great need for Russia to improve its domestic 
     investment climate as a prerequisite for higher levels of 
     United States investment in the energy sector.
       While this dialogue is committed to pursuing new energy 
     opportunities by fostering closer relations between 
     educational and professional institutions and resolving 
     current trade and administrative disputes, the commission 
     should also review immigration policies practiced by the U.S. 
     and Russian agencies granting visas for energy sector 
     officials and employees. If this dialogue is to be 
     successful, the participants of both nations should receive 
     visas in a timely manner.
       Additionally, as co-chairman of the Duma-Congress Study 
     Group, I propose creating a task force between the two 
     legislative branches in order to expedite legislative reforms 
     recommended by the commercial energy dialogue. The task force 
     should hold annual exchanges between members and staff of the 
     energy committees.
       Russia has a renewed commitment to investment by American 
     energy companies. Recent actions by President Putin signal 
     the importance placed on energy trade and investment with the 
     United States. He has called for increased pipeline 
     infrastructure development to facilitate the export of oil to 
     Europe and the United States stating ``. . . I would like 
     relations between Russian and United States businesses to 
     develop more actively, especially in the strategically 
     important area of energy. . . .''
       It is clear, both the United States and Russia want and 
     need to increase Russia's exportation of energy. This is a 
     rare and distinct opportunity where American and Russian 
     collaboration on enemy research might be beneficial in 
     fostering a cooperative, market-based approach to energy 
     security, reducing dependency on the tumultuous Middle East. 
     This can be the new model of future energy partnerships. The 
     United States and Russia can play a critical role in 
     supporting energy development among the energy rich countries 
     of the former Soviet Union, further improving global energy 
     diversity and energy security.

                          ____________________