[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 13]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 18011-18013]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  DOCUMENTING THE ATROCITIES IN DARFUR

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. FRANK R. WOLF

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 9, 2004

  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, the State Department also released today a 
report titled, ``Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.'' The report 
documents over 1,100 interviews with refugees in Chad.
  The report says that in over \3/4\ of the attacks, the Government of 
Sudan was directly involved and that the attacks were systematic and 
widespread.
  I submit for the Record a copy of this report.
  The evidence of the atrocities which have been committed is now 
clear. It is now time for the international community to act. There is 
now the chance to stop genocide in its tracks. We must keep pressure on 
Khartoum. The people living in the camps have little time left. Many 
are already gone.
  The international community must come together to save lives. We must 
not fail the people of Darfur.
  Again, I commend the administration for documenting the horrific 
evidence of genocide. The U.S. has spoken the truth. The international 
community must now do the same. There is little time to waste.

                    Documenting Atrocities in Darfur

 [State Publication 11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research September 
                                 2004]


                                Summary

       The conflict between the Government of Sudan (GOS), and two 
     rebel groups that began in 2003 has precipitated the worst 
     humanitarian and human rights crisis in the world today. The 
     primary cleavage is ethnic: Arabs (GOS and militia forces) 
     vs. non-Arab villagers belonging primarily to the Zaghawa, 
     Massalit, and Fur ethnic groups. Both groups are 
     predominantly Muslim.
       A U.S. Government project to conduct systematic interviews 
     of Sudanese refugees in Chad reveals a consistent and 
     widespread pattern of atrocities committed against non-Arab 
     villagers in the Darfur region of western Sudan. This 
     assessment is based on semi-structured interviews with 1,136 
     randomly selected refugees in 19 locations in eastern Chad. 
     Most respondents said government forces militia fighters, or 
     a combination of both had completely destroyed their 
     villages. Sixty-one percent of the respondents witnessed the 
     killing of a family member, 16 percent said they had been 
     raped or had heard about a rape from a victim. About one-
     third of the refugees heard racial epithets while under 
     attack. Four-fifths said their livestock was stolen; nearly 
     half asserted their personal property was looted. This 
     assessment highlights incidents and atrocities that have led 
     to the displacement of large portions of Darfur's non-Arabs.
       An Atrocities Documentation Team, assembled at the 
     initiative of the US Department of State's Bureau of 
     Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), conducted interviews 
     in Chad in July and August. The team was primarily composed 
     of independent experts recruited by the Coalition for 
     International Justice (CIJ), and also included experts from 
     the American Bar Association (ABA), DRL, and the State 
     Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) as 
     well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 
     INR was responsible for compiling the survey data and 
     producing the final report. USAID met the costs of the CIJ 
     and ABA.


                          Humanitarian Crisis

       As of August 2004, based on available information, more 
     than 405 villages in Darfur had been completely destroyed, 
     with an additional 123 substantially damaged, since February 
     2003. Approximately 200,000 persons had sought refuge in 
     eastern Chad as of August, according to the UN High 
     Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the UN Office for the 
     Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports another 1.2 
     million internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in western 
     Sudan. The total population of Darfur is 6 million. The lack 
     of security in the region continues to threaten displaced 
     persons. Insecurity and heavy rains continue to disrupt 
     humanitarian assistance. The UN World Food Program provided 
     food to nearly 940,000 people in Darfur in July. Nonetheless, 
     since the beginning of the Darfur food program, a total of 82 
     out of 154 concentrations of IDPs have received food, leaving 
     72 locations unassisted. Relief and health experts warn that 
     malnutrition and mortality are likely to increase as forcibly 
     displaced and isolated villagers suffer from hunger and 
     infectious diseases that will spread quickly among densely 
     populated and malnourished populations. The health situation 
     for the 200,000 refugees in Chad is ominous. The U.S. Centers 
     for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that one in three 
     children in the refugee settlements in Chad is suffering from 
     acute malnutrition and that crude mortality rates are already 
     well above emergency threshold levels (one per 10,000 per 
     day).


                          Human Rights Crisis

       The non-Arab population of Darfur continues to suffer from 
     crimes against humanity. A review of 1,136 interviews shows a 
     consistent pattern of atrocities, suggesting close 
     coordination between GOS forces and Arab militia elements, 
     commonly known as the Jingaweit (Janjaweed). (``Jingaweit'' 
     is an Arabic term meaning ``horse and gun.'')
       Despite the current cease-fire and UN Security Council 
     Resolution 1556, Jingaweit violence against civilians has 
     continued (cease-fire violations by both the Jingaweit and 
     the rebels have continued as well). Media reports on August 
     10, 16, and 19 chronicled GOS-Jingaweit attacks in Western 
     Darfur. In addition to their work on the survey, the 
     interviewers had the opportunity to speak with newly arrived 
     refugees who provided accounts that tended to confirm press 
     reports of continuing GOS participation in recent attacks. 
     Refugees who fled the violence on August 6 and 8 spoke with 
     the team, providing accounts consistent with media reports: 
     joint GOS military and Jingaweit attacks; strafing by 
     helicopter gunships followed by ground attacks by the GOS 
     military in vehicles and Jingaweit on horseback; males being 
     shot or knifed; and women being abducted or raped. 
     Respondents reported these attacks destroyed five villages. 
     Multiple respondents also reported attacks on the IDP camp of 
     Arja.
       The UN estimates the violence has affected 2.2 million of 
     Darfur's 6 million residents. The GOS claims it has been 
     unable to prevent Jingaweit atrocities and that the 
     international community has exaggerated the extent and nature 
     of the crisis. The GOS has improved international relief 
     access to IDPs in Darfur since July, but problems, including 
     lack of security and seasonal rains, have hampered relief 
     programs. Survey results indicate that most Sudanese refugees 
     state that Jingaweit militias and GOS military forces 
     collaborate in carrying out systematic attacks against non-
     Arab villages in Darfur.


                        Ethnographic Background

       Darfur covers about one-fifth of Sudan's vast territory and 
     is home to one-seventh of its population. It includes a 
     mixture of Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups, both of which are 
     predominantly Muslim (see map, p. 6). The Fur ethnic group 
     (Darfur means ``homeland of the Fur'') is the largest non-
     Arab ethnic group in the region. Northern Darfur State is 
     home to the nomadic non-Arab Zaghawa but also includes a 
     significant number of Arabs, such as the Meidab. Sedentary 
     non-Arabs from the Fur, Massalit, Daju, and other ethnic 
     groups live in Western Darfur State. The arid climate and the 
     competition

[[Page 18012]]

     for scarce resources over the years have contributed to 
     recurring conflict between nomadic Arab herders and non-Arab 
     farmers, particularly over land and grazing rights. Various 
     ethnic groups have fought over access to water, grazing 
     rights, and prized agricultural land as desertification has 
     driven herders farther south.


                    Political and Military Conflict

       Ethnic violence affected the Darfur region in the 1980s. In 
     1986, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi armed the ethnic-Arab 
     tribes to fight John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation 
     Army (SPLA). After helping the GOS beat back an SPLA attack 
     in Darfur in 1991, one of these Arab tribes sought to resolve 
     ancient disputes over land and water rights by attacking the 
     Zaghawa, Fur, and Massalit peoples. Arab groups launched a 
     campaign in Southern Darfur State that resulted in the 
     destruction of some 600 non-Arab villages and the deaths of 
     about 3,000 people. The GOS itself encouraged the formation 
     of an ``Arab Alliance'' in Darfur to keep non-Arab ethnic 
     groups in check. Weapons flowed into Darfur and the conflict 
     spread. After President Bashir seized power in 1989, the new 
     government disarmed non-Arab ethnic groups but allowed 
     politically loyal Arab allies to keep their weapons.
       In February 2003, rebels calling themselves the Darfur 
     Liberation Front (DLF) attacked GOS military installations 
     and the provincial capital of A Fashir. The DLF complained of 
     economic marginalization and demanded a power sharing 
     arrangement with the GOS. In March 2003, the DLF changed its 
     name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLMIA), 
     intensified its military operations, unveiled a political 
     program for a ``united democratic Sudan,'' and bolstered its 
     strength to some 4,000 rebels. The Justice and Equality 
     Movement, with fewer than 1,000 rebels, was established in 
     2002 but has since joined the SLM/A in several campaigns 
     against GOS forces.
       The GOS has provided support to Arab militiamen attacking 
     non-Arab civilians, according to press and NGO reports. 
     Refugee accounts corroborated by US and other independent 
     reporting suggest that Khartoum has continued to provide 
     direct support for advancing Jingaweit. Aerial bombardment 
     and attacks on civilians reportedly have occurred widely 
     throughout the region; respondents named more than 100 
     locations that experienced such bombardment (see map, p. 8). 
     The extent to which insurgent base camps were co-located with 
     villages and civilians is unknown. The number of casualties 
     caused by aerial bombardment cannot be determined, but large 
     numbers of Darfurians have been forced to flee their 
     villages. According to press and NGO reports, the GOS has 
     given Jingaweit recruits salaries, communication equipment, 
     arms, and identity cards.


                     Current International Response

       On July 30, 2004, the UN Security Council adopted 
     Resolution 1556, which demanded that the GOS fulfill 
     commitments it made to disarm the Jingaweit militias and 
     apprehend and bring to justice Jingaweit leaders and their 
     associates; it also called on the GOS to allow humanitarian 
     access to Darfur, among other things. The UN placed an 
     embargo on the sale or supply of materiel and training to 
     non-governmental entities and individuals in Darfur. The 
     resolution endorsed the African Union deployment of monitors 
     and a protection force to Darfur. It requested the Secretary-
     General to report on GOS progress in 30 days and held out the 
     possibility of further actions, including sanctions, against 
     the GOS in the event of non-compliance.
       The Security Council has expressed its deep concern over 
     reports of large-scale violations of human rights and 
     international humanitarian law in Darfur. The main protection 
     concerns identified by the UN and corroborated by the 
     Atrocities Documentation Team include threats to life and 
     freedom of movement, forced relocation, forced return, sexual 
     violence, and restricted access to humanitarian assistance, 
     social services, sources of livelihood, and basic services. 
     Food security has been precarious and will probably worsen as 
     the rainy season continues. Many displaced households no 
     longer can feed themselves because of the loss of livestock 
     and the razing of food stores.
       Relief agencies' access to areas outside the state capitals 
     of Al Junaynah, Al Fashir, and Nyala was limited until late 
     May. Visits by UN Secretary-General Annan and Secretary of 
     State Powell in June 2004 brought heightened attention to the 
     growing humanitarian crisis. As a result, the GOS lifted 
     travel restrictions and announced measures to facilitate 
     humanitarian access. Nonetheless, serious problems remain, 
     specifically capacity, logistics, and security for relief 
     efforts. USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team and other 
     agencies have deployed additional staff to increase emergency 
     response capacity.


                   Refugee Interviews--Survey Results

       The Atrocities Documentation Team conducted a random-sample 
     survey of Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad in July and 
     August 2004. The team interviewed 1,136 refugees, many of 
     whom had endured harsh journeys across the desolate Chad-
     Sudan border.
       A plurality of the respondents were ethnic Zaghawa (46 
     percent), with smaller numbers belonging to the Fur (8 
     percent) and Massalit (30 percent) ethnic groups. Slightly 
     more than half the respondents (56 percent) were women. (See 
     map, p. 6, showing ethnicity of respondent refugees.)
       Analysis of the refugee interviews points to a pattern of 
     abuse against members of Darfur's non-Arab communities, 
     including murder, rape, beatings, ethnic humiliation, and 
     destruction of property and basic necessities. Many of the 
     reports detailing attacks on villages refer to government and 
     militia forces, preceded by aerial bombardment, acting 
     together to commit atrocities. Respondents said government 
     and militia forces wore khaki or brown military uniforms. 
     Roughly one-half of the respondents noted GOS forces had 
     joined Jingaweit irregulars in attacking their villages. 
     Approximately one-quarter of the respondents said GOS forces 
     had acted alone; another 14 percent said the Jingaweit had 
     acted alone. Two-thirds of the respondents reported aerial 
     bombings against their villages; four-fifths said they had 
     witnessed the complete destruction of their villages. Sixty-
     one percent reported witnessing the killing of a family 
     member. About one-third of the respondents reported hearing 
     racial epithets while under attack; one-quarter witnessed 
     beatings. Large numbers reported the looting of personal 
     property (47 percent) and the theft of livestock (80 
     percent).
       Most reports followed a similar pattern:
       (1) GOS aircraft or helicopters bomb villages.
       (2) GOS soldiers arrive in trucks, followed closely by 
     Jingaweit militia riding horses or camels.
       (3) GOS soldiers and militia surround and then enter 
     villages, under cover of gunfire.
       (4) Fleeing villagers are targets in aerial bombing.
       (5) The Jingaweit and GOS soldiers loot the village after 
     most citizens have fled, often using trucks to remove 
     belongings.
       (6) Villages often experience multiple attacks over a 
     prolonged period before they are destroyed by burning or 
     bombing.
       When describing attacks, refugees often referred to GOS 
     soldiers and Jingaweit militias as a unified group; as one 
     refugee stated, ``The soldiers and Jingaweit, always they are 
     together.'' The primary victims have been non-Arab residents 
     of Darfur. Numerous credible reports corroborate the use of 
     racial and ethnic epithets by both the Jingaweit and GOS 
     military personnel; ``Kill the slaves; Kill the slaves!'' and 
     ``We have orders to kill all the blacks'' are common. One 
     refugee reported a militia member stating, ``We kill all 
     blacks and even kill our cattle when they have black 
     calves.'' Numerous refugee accounts point to mass abductions, 
     including persons driven away in GOS vehicles, but 
     respondents usually do not know the abductoes' fate. A few 
     respondents indicated personal knowledge of mass executions 
     and gravesites.
       A subset of 400 respondents were asked about rebel activity 
     in or near their villages. Nearly nine in 10 said there was 
     no rebel activity before the attack. Nine percent noted 
     rebels were in the vicinity; 2 percent said the rebels were 
     present in their villages. The overwhelming majority (91 
     percent) said their village was not defended at all against 
     the attack. One percent asserted their village had been 
     successfully defended and another 8 percent cited an 
     unsuccessful defense.
       Respondents reported ethnic tensions in the region had 
     risen over the past few years. For example, markets in which 
     non-Arabs and Arabs had previously interacted have become 
     segregated, and almost all villages are now said to be 
     ethnically homogenous. According to many of the interviewees, 
     GOS soldiers and Jingaweit attacked villages because of their 
     non-Arab populations; men of fighting age have been abducted, 
     executed, or both; and women and girls have been abducted and 
     raped.


                 Refugee Interviews--Survey Methodology

       This report is based on results from personal interviews 
     conducted by three teams between July 12 and August 18, 2004. 
     DRL, USAID, and the Coalition for International Justice 
     jointly designed the questionnaire in conjunction with other 
     NGOs. INR provided technical assistance on questionnaire 
     design and survey methodology. The teams used a semi-
     structured interviewing approach that permitted the refugees 
     to give the broadest possible accounts of the events they had 
     experienced. The interviews were conducted in 19 locations in 
     eastern Chad, including UNHCR camps and informal settlements.
       Refugees were selected using a systematic, random sampling 
     approach designed to meet the conditions in Chad. 
     Interviewers randomly selected a sector within a refugee camp 
     and then, from a fixed point within the sector, chose every 
     10th dwelling unit for interviewing. All adults were listed 
     within the dwelling unit, and one adult was randomly 
     selected. This methodology ensures the results are as 
     representative as possible in light of refugee conditions. 
     Interviews took place in private, with only the refugee, a 
     translator, and the interviewer present.
       Several characteristics of the survey must be underscored. 
     First, accounts of atrocities may be dated, depending on when 
     the individual refugee fled his or her village. Second, the 
     data may actually undercount the extent of atrocities because 
     mass attacks often

[[Page 18013]]

     leave few survivors. Third, most respondents come from 
     villages within 50 miles of the border in Western Darfur and 
     Northern Darfur States. Fourth, it is very likely that rapes 
     are underreported because of the social stigma attached to 
     acknowledging such violations of female members of one's 
     family.
       The results are broadly representative of Darfurian 
     refugees in Chad but may not be representative of internally 
     displaced persons still in Darfur because they were not 
     included in the sample. A margin of error for this sample 
     cannot be calculated because of the lack of accurate 
     demographic information about the refugee camps and 
     settlements. The methodology was designed to achieve as 
     broadly representative a sample as was feasible under the 
     prevailing conditions. Dates of events reported by refugees 
     frequently utilized the Islamic calendar; these dates were 
     then converted to dates on the Gregorian calendar. (See map, 
     p. 6, showing interview locations.)
       The field data for the 1,136 interviews were compiled using 
     a standardized data entry process that involved the 
     collection and coding of detailed information from each 
     refugee respondent's set of answers. The researchers then 
     used a statistical program to aggregate the data and analyze 
     the results.

                          ____________________