[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 150 (2004), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17980-17981]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          WAR ON PROLIFERATION

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the column ``An 
All-Out War on Proliferation'' by Undersecretary of State John Bolton, 
which appeared in Tuesday's Financial Times of London, be printed in 
the Record. This piece clearly articulates the Bush administration's 
aggressive approach to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The success of U.S.-led nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation efforts over the last 4 years shows strong U.S. 
leadership on a global scale. It is also an illustration of just what 
we are able to accomplish through U.S.-led multilateral, concrete 
action, rather than through inefficient bureaucracies and toothless 
treaties.
  I congratulate Undersecretary Bolton for his outstanding piece, and I 
strongly recommend it to my colleagues.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Financial Times, Sept. 7, 2004]

                    An All-Out War on Proliferation

                            (By John Bolton)

       Some supporters of ``multi-lateralism'' prefer to talk 
     about its glories in the abstract rather than take action in 
     the here and now. The Bush administration's non-proliferation 
     policies fall into the latter category. Rather than rely on 
     cumbersome treaty-based bureaucracies, this administration 
     has launched initiatives that involve co-operative action 
     with other sovereign states to deny rogue nations and 
     terrorists access to the materials and knowhow needed to 
     develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Our policies show 
     that robust use of the sovereign authorities we and our 
     allies possess can produce real results.
       The Bush administration is reinventing the non-
     proliferation regime it inherited, crafting policies to fill 
     gaping holes, reinforcing earlier patchwork fixes, assembling 
     allies, creating precedents and changing perceived realities 
     and stilted legal thinking. The frontlines in our non-
     proliferation strategy must extend beyond the well-known 
     rogue states to the trade routes and entities engaged in 
     supplying proliferant countries. This can properly be 
     described not as ``non-proliferation'', but as ``counter-
     proliferation''. To accomplish this, we are making more 
     robust use of existing authorities, including sanctions, 
     interdiction and credible export controls. Most importantly, 
     we have taken significant steps to improve co-ordination 
     between sovereign states to act against proliferators.
       As we learned from the unravelling of the clandestine 
     nuclear weapons network run by A.Q. Khan and from the Libyan 
     WMD programme, proliferators employ increasingly 
     sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or 
     missile-related materials. They rely heavily on front 
     companies and illicit brokers in their quest for arms, 
     equipment, sensitive technology and dual-use goods.
       In his September 2003 speech to the United Nations General 
     Assembly, George W. Bush proposed that the Security Council 
     pass a resolution calling on member states to criminalise WMD 
     proliferation, enact export controls and secure sensitive 
     materials within their borders. The resulting Security 
     Council Resolution 1540, unanimously adopted, achieved the 
     president's goals. Rather than requiring years negotiating 
     treaties and creating elaborate institutions, Resolution 1540 
     rests on the notion that sovereign states are responsible for 
     writing and implementing laws closing the loopholes exploited 
     by black market WMD networks.
       Among the most prominent of this administration's counter-
     proliferation innovations is the Proliferation Security 
     Initiative (PSI). We say that PSI is ``an activity, not an 
     organization,'' in this case an activity designed to halt 
     trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related 
     materials. In developing

[[Page 17981]]

     PSI, our main goal has been a simple one: to enable practical 
     cooperation among states to help navigate this increasingly 
     challenging arena. The initiative focuses on enhancing 
     states' operational capabilities in the intelligence, 
     military and law enforcement arenas. More than 60 countries 
     gathered in Poland just over a month ago to mark PSI's one-
     year anniversary--and some notable successes. The 
     interception, in cooperation with the UK, Germany and Italy, 
     of the BBC China, a vessel loaded with nuclear-related 
     components, helped convince Libya that the days of 
     undisturbed accumulation of WMD were over, and helped unravel 
     A.Q. Khan's network.
       Another important administration initiative is the Global 
     Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
     Mass Destruction, launched by the Group of Eight at its June 
     2002 summit. Here again, this effort relies on the 
     commitments of sovereign states acting separately and in 
     concert to secure sensitive materials. Like PSI, the Global 
     Partnership is an activity, not an organisation. The G8 
     Leaders and 13 additional partners have pledged to raise up 
     to Dollars 20bn (Pounds 11.3bn) over 10 years for projects to 
     prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the 
     wrong hands.
       The US already has non-proliferation projects under way not 
     only in Russia but in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
     Georgia and other former Soviet states, as do other Global 
     Partnership countries. We recently began assistance in Iraq 
     and Libya and are encouraging our partners to undertake their 
     own projects in such states. At Sea Island this year, the G8 
     agreed to use the Global Partnership to coordinate activities 
     in these areas.
       This administration is working to make up for decades of 
     stillborn plans, wishful thinking and irresponsible 
     passivity. We're already late, but we are no longer 
     bystanders wringing our hands and hoping that somehow we will 
     find shelter from gathering threats. We are no longer lost in 
     endless international negotiations whose point seems to be 
     negotiation rather than decision, and no longer waiting 
     beneath the empty protection of a reluctant international 
     body while seeking grudging permission to take measures to 
     protect ourselves.
       Mr. Bush has begun laying the foundation for a 
     comprehensive, root-and-branch approach to the mortal danger 
     of the proliferation of instruments intended for our 
     destruction. We are determined to use every resource at our 
     disposal--using diplomacy regularly, economic pressure when 
     it makes a difference, active law enforcement when 
     appropriate and military force when we must.
       We are just at the beginning, but it is an extraordinary 
     beginning. Not only are we meeting this ultimate of threats 
     on the field, we are advancing on it, battling not only 
     aggressively, but successfully. And so we must, for the 
     outcome of this battle may hold nothing less than the chance 
     to survive.

     

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